IR 05000272/1987001
| ML20211F582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1987 |
| From: | Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211F565 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-01, 50-272-87-1, 50-311-87-01, 50-311-87-1, NUDOCS 8702250138 | |
| Download: ML20211F582 (12) | |
Text
d U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMfSSION
REGION I
050311-861121 050311-861223 50-272/87-01 050311-861228 Report Nos.
50-311/87-01 50-272 Docket Nos.
50-311 DPR-70 License Nos.
DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: January 1, 1987 - January 26, 1987 Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Rev ent Inspector R'a tor Engineer F.
. Paulit e
Approved by:
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L. J. @rnholm, Chief, Reactor Projects
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Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on January 1, 1987 - January 26, 1987 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/87-01 and 50-311/87-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup
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on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance,
surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, and
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electrical followup inspection. The inspection involved 106 inspector hours
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by the NRC inspectors.
Results: One item of concern was identified during this inspection with regard to the misalignment of the RHR System during Mode 1 operations.
Refer to Special Inspection 50-311/87-03 for details.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activity.
2.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Bulletin 82-8U-02; Reference Inspection Report 86-25 (both units).
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (311/82-33-01); This item was opened to review corrective action initiated by the licensee as a result of P-250 computer failures due to parity error. The inspector reviewed documentation that installed a new power supply breaker and repairs to the air conditioning units. The P-250 computer presently is operating satisfactorily. At the present time an SPDS system is being installed to replace the P-250.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/83-12-03); Recurrent failures of GB4 valves. This item is also documented in item 84-13-03. The inspector considers this item closed and 84-13-03 remains open.
(Closed) Violation (272/83-33-01); This item was opened when the
licensee failed to submit an LER with regard to being in a degraded mode of operation with one charging / safety injection pump inoperable.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter dated December 28, 1983!and confirmed that the corrective action has been taken by the licertsee. This item is closed.
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(CloOd) Violation (311/84-32-03); This item was opened when the licedsee failed to implement written procedures for turbine valve j
surviillance.
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response j
daten November 11, 1984 and the licensee's corrective actions stated in the letter. This item is closed.
(Cl sed) Unresolved Items (272/84-38-02 ard 311/84-37-02); These iteris were opened to review the implementation of a centralized rec.ords management and control system which would provide easy access to uniform qualification / training records that are complete and up to date. The inspector reviewed procedures that have been established fe Records Management and concludes that these procedures are in ac'cordance with Regul pory Guide 1.88 and ANSI N 45.2.9-1974,
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" Requirements for Coljection, Storage and Maintenance of Quality Assurance F.ecords forrNuclear Power Plants". These items are closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/84-42-02); This item was opened due to the failure of the Limitorque operator on valve ICC131. The licensee has instituted a program of surveillance on all Limitorque operators utilizing the Motor Operated Valve Assessment and Testing System (M0 VATS) which insures proper torque and run-out settings.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/84-42-03); This item was opened to follow the permanent replacement of temporary piping on the fan cooler units inside containment.
The piping was replaced with permanent piping, therefore this item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/84-42-04) Violation (272/85-01-01);
These items were opened because of the licensee's procedural practices for the identification of unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant system. The licensee has properly answered these concerns and has instituted revised procedures that address the unidentified and identified reactor coolant leakage in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.45 " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems".
These items are closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (272/84-46-02 and 311/84-46-02); These items were opened because certain audits of the facilities' fire protection program were not available at the time of inspection.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's audit plan and subsequent audits noting that the original concern (implementing procedures audited at least once per 24 months) has been incorporated into the QA audits.
These items are closed.
(Closed) Violation (272/84-46-03 and 311/84-46-03); These items were opened because of identified inadequate fire barriers including fire doors.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated May 2, 1985 and the licensee's corrective actions. These items are closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (272/85-03-05 and 311/85-03-02); These items were opened because a failure of a test control switch for low suction pressure on the Auxiliary Feedwater System could result in the loss of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The licensee has installed a separate low pressure suction trip for each of the auxiliary feedwater pumps with additional circuitry to allow for actuation only during periods when " tornado warnings" are in effect.
The inspector reviewed design changes for both units and considers these items closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed:
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Selected Operators' logs,
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Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log,
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Jumper Log,
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Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous),
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP),
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Selected Chemistry Logs,
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Selected Tagouts, and Health Physics Watch Log.
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3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access was possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant management.
The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedures.
3.2.1 On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;
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Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control
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room;
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Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators
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that are in alarm;
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Proper use of procedures;
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Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,
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Verification of surveillance testing for timely completion.
3.2.3 On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
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Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions;
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Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the
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correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems
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were de-energized as identified by Technical
Specifications;
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Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and,
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Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operability.
3.2.3 On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
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Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety related system;
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Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and
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gaseous effluents;
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Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;
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Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,
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Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineup.
3.3 Inspector Comments / Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units' operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel. The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3.3.1 Unit 1 The unit operated throughout this report period.
One event as described below was investigated by the resident inspectors.
At about 11:30 a.m. on January 8, 1987, a one inch line in the feedwater system ruptured on the weld of a flanged fitting in the Unit 1 Turbine Building.
This failure also caused a similar joint on the common leg further upstream to fail.
The failed line connects to a moisture
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separator reheater (MSR) drain tank discharge. The failed line had been leaking for about two weeks and repairs were in progress at the time of the failure.
The maintenance personnel had vacated the area just prior to the failure because they noticed a distinct
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change in the leak rate. By 11:00 p.m. the licensee had reduced power, isolated the MSRs, and isolated the failed section of the pipe. The licensee made repairs and is operating temporarily without the feedwater injection into the drain tank discharge.
The MSRs were restored to service and power increased to 100%. No injuries occurred during the event and no equipment was adversely affected by the steam leak.
The leak and pipe break have been attributed to erosion downstream of an orfice in carbon steel pipe. The licensee plans to replace this piping with a chrome molly type when the unit is shutdown.
3.3.2 Unit 2 One event was investigated by the resident inspectors
as described below.
At 4:20 p.m. on January 17, 1987, the licensee identified a ground in the main generator field and began a shutdown to investigate. At 6:16 p.m. the generator was off the line, however during the shutdown, at 9% reactor power, a high flux rod stop alarm came in on N-36 (intermediate range). As the licensee began troubleshooting the cause of the N-36 alarm, a reactor trip occurred from 2% power.
The trip occurred when the instrument technician pulled the control power fuses. The cause of the trip has been attributed to a faulty procedure.
The resident inspector had discussions with the supervisor of the I&C department with regard to the event. The results showed that the procedure was not thorough enough to identify the complexity of what would happen in the intermediate range circuitry if a control power fuse is removed when the unit is operating below the
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P-10 signal.
The inspector verified that corrections to the procedure were made to prevent recurrence.
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t At 7:30 a.m. on January 19, 1987, the reactor was again critical and the main generator ground was identified. The ground was caused by moisture due to the heaters in the control cabinet being off.
The ground was corrected and the heaters re-energized.
At 12:34 p.m. on January 19, the unit was returned to service and is presently at 100% power.
3.3.3 Units I and 2 The licensee installed a new source of electrical power to three circulating water pumps on each unit. The pumps are powered in the following manner.
Unit I receives power from the Hope Creek 13KV ring bus between breakers 342G and 32G, and powers circulators 11A, 12B and 13A. Unit 2 receives power from the Hope Creek 13KV ring bus between breakers 41G and 341G and powers circulators 23A, 228 and 21A.
i This modification was made to reduce the load on the station power transformers to within the NRC accepted electrical study of 1981, and still operate the units at 100% power. The installation, although properly installed and protected by the necessary safety devices, is considered temporary until the electrical distribution system has been thoroughly analyzed by a consultant and the licensee.
Several features and limitations on the temporary system are:
Features
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System design minimizes changes in the control room to
enable operators to start and stop the pumps with the same controls.
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The breaker protection is the same.
Limitations l
The operator in the control room does not have
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indication of running current for the motor, however differential pressure across the water box may be used to monitor circulator flow.
Tagging will be different for maintenance.
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The inspector also reviewed the licensee's safety analysis H-1-MCXX-ESE-0631, Justification for Feeding Six Salem Station Circulating Water Pumps from Hope Creek 13 KV Ring Bus, dated January 16, 1987.
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The operators have been instructed and procedures are in place to operate and perform maintenance on the new installation. The inspector has reviewed and verified that the new procedures are in place and that the operators clearly understand the differences in the operation of the circulators.
For more details on the installation of the electrical changes see Section 8 of this report.
No violations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures, recognized codes and standards, and in compliance with NRC regulations.
The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA program.
Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure Description 86-07-21-245-1 M14A-2 Inspection and repacking MP 7.8 (with Chesterton packing)
of valve 24 AF-021 86-01-03-013-1 M14A-2 Inspection and repacking MP 7.8 (with Chesterton packing)
of control valve 21SS26 86-04-11-093-3 M14H Rebuild valve 2PS3 with M9II P-2 new internals and repack MP 7.8 No violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observations i'
The inspector observed portions of test performance and reviewed the l
data from core physics testing associated with Unit 2 startup following l
the third refueling outage including:
Reactor Engineering Manual Part 2 - Calorimetric Calculation
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Reactor Engineering Manual Part 6 - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio
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Reactor Engineering Manual Part 7 - Excore Detector - Flux
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Difference Calculations i
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Reactor Engineering Manual Part 12 - Flux Mapping Procedures L
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Reactor Engineering Manual Part 13 - Incore ' Flux Mapping System
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Operation Reactor Engineering Manual Part 14 - Statepoint Data Collection
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The inspector also observed performance of a flux map on Unit 1.
No violations were identified.
6.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - December, 1986
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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - December, 1986
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In addition, the inspector reviewed Special Report 86-6.
I This report describes fire barriers that have been degraded for more than seven days due to the installation of a design change which required floor hatches and wall penetrations to be opened to accommodate the welding cables and air hoses necessary to facilitate repairs for the fan cooler units. The inspector verified that compensatory measures were taken by the licensee.
No violations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-i dance with Technical Specifications.
Unit 2 86-012 Type B&C Leak Rate Out-of-Specification Due to Valve 2PR25 i
Excessive Leakage. During B&C testing, valve 2PR25 in the
"as found" condition exhibited a leak greater than the range of the leak rate test equipment, 100,000 SCCM.
This valve was never previously tested and has recently been identified as a valve necessary to be tested in the inservice testing program.
Upon inspection of the valve the licensee found small amounts of boron crystals on the valve seat.
The valve was cleaned with " scotch brite" and no other damage
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was identified. After reassembly and testing the leak rate had been reduced to 750 SCCM, within specification. The licensee has added this valve to the inservice testing program for B&C testing and the valve will be tested each refueling. A Technical Specification change has been issued to add the valve to the list appearing in Table 3.6-1 of Technical Specifications. The inspector had no further questions on this item.86-013 Turbine / Reactor trip P-7 interlock due to turbine overspeed while controlling speed using governor valve position limit.
This event was described in Combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-32 and 50-311/86-36. After review of the LER the inspector had no further questions.
i 86-014 Reactor trip from 77% power on steam flow / feed flow mismatch and #23 Steam Generator low level due to valve 23BF19 control problems.
This event was discussed in Combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-32 and 50-311/86-36. After review of the LER, the inspector had no further questions.
No violations were identified.
8.
Electrical Followup Inspection 8.1 Discussion As the result of the Salem Unit 2 false degraded grid voltage (Blackout) event (LER 86-07-00) on August 26, 1986, the licensee has proposed a split Group Bus electrical configuration which would i
permit 100% power operation of both units without the loading problems
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associated with the above event.
This configuration was presented to
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the Region I staff at a meeting on November 18, 1986. The licensee submitted a letter on November 26, 1986 to NRC Region I concerning short and long term corrective action following the August 26, 1986 event. A meeting was held by the licensee with the Region I staff on December 5, 1986 to address the previous concerns and new concerns after reviewing the information contained in the November 26, 1986 letter. A followup inspection was conducted by a Region I based inspector on December 10-13, 1986 to witness the Salem validation test for the PTI computer model and to resolve concerns from the previous meetings. A second inspection was conducted on January 23, 1987.
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The licensee has proposed an alternate electrical arrangement which:
Would allow 100% load on each unit.
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Would have group bus loads the same as 1982.
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Would not require Power Technology Inc., (PTI) computer model
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verification at this time.
Permits electrical modification while the units were operating.
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The electrical modification was to supply power from the Hope Creek 13KV Island Substation through two 13KV/4KV transformers per unit to three circulating water pumps per unit.
8.2 Findings The licensee presented to the inspector analyses supporting the following conclusions:
The available short circuit during a faulted condition does not
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exceed the circuit breaker ratings.
The group bus incoming supply breaker protective relays, reactor
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coolant pump motor breaker protective relay and cable short term rating are coordinated.
The licensee presented the inspector with a draft copy of the engineering evaluation documenting the verification and validation of the Power Technologies PSS/E software package and the model of the Salem electrical system for predicting voltages during static and transient load conditions.
The licensee explained the following abnormalities associated with this validation:
The No. 22 Station Power Transformer (General Electric) which
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replaced the failed Westinghouse transformer did not have the same turns ratio.
l The recorded tap changer position for No. 21 Station Power
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Transformer does not agree with other confirmed data.
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The No. 11 Condensate Pump was recorded as a Unit I load
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although it was being supplied power from the Unit 2 group bus.
The licensee has indicated that further studies of the degraded l
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grid voltage relays used for both bus transfer and load shedding i
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will be made to assure proper coordination with the long term system configuration.
The inspector walked down the new electrical modification with the licensee from the Hope Creek 13KV Island Substation to the transformers and reclosures located at the Salem Unit 1 and 2 Station Power Switchyard. At the time, the three Unit 2 cir-culators were connected and two Unit I circulators were connected.
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. The licensee did not identify any 2.790 material.
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