IR 05000272/1986028
| ML20213E919 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1986 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-28, 50-311-86-28, NUDOCS 8611130368 | |
| Download: ML20213E919 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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j 050311-860911
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i 50-272/86-28
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Report Nos.
50-311/86-28 50-272 Docket Nos.
50-311
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OPR-70 l
License Nos.
DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza
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Newark, New Jersey 07101
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Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey l
Inspection Conducted:
October 1, 1986 - October 27, 1986 i
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Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector ('
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K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector I
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s Reviewed by:
b, E i 5 %
l R.JfSuma s, Project Engineer ae l
ReactfrProectsSectionNo.2B,DRP Approved by:
!@w,
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L. J/ Norrholm, ' Chi'sf, Reactor Projects
/date Section No. 28, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on October 1, 1986 - October 27, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-28 and 50-311/86-28)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, and licensee event l
followup. The inspection involved 94 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspectors.
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Results: No violations were identified during this report period.
8611130368 861106 DR ADGCK 05000272 PDR
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activity.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification
2.1 Documents Reviewed
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Selected Operators' Logs
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Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log
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Jumper Log
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Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
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Selected Radiat on Work Permits (RWP)
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Selected Chemistry Logs
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Selected Tagouts
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Health Physics Watch Log 2.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, auxiliary building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
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During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant management. The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical
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Specifications, and Administrative Procedures.
2.2.1 On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
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Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;
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Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control ro0m;
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Proper control room shift manning and access control;
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Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures;
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Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,
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Verification of surveillance testing for timely completion.
2.2.2 On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
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Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the
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correct positions;
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Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage,
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lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and,
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Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible,
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for proper operability.
2.2.3 On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
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Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety related system;
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Observed a shift turnover;
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Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and l
gaseous effluents;
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Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;
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Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented;
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Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,
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Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineup.
2.3 Inspector Comments / Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units' operations to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations.
The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not
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constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel. The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
2.3.1 Unit 1 a. Unit 1 operated at full power throughout this inspection period.
2.3.2 Unit 2
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a. At 11:53 p.m. on October 2, 1986, the licensee completed a controlled shutdown and removed Unit 2 from service for a 54 day refueling outage.
l b. Plant Cooldown from Outside the Control Room
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Following the normal shutdown and degassing operation, on October 4, 1986, the licensee demonstrated a partial plant cooldown from outside the control room. The control room normal complement of personnel were in place, however their responsibilities were to only act if the plant cooldown could not be controlled from the alternate shutdown panels.
The licensee manned the alternate shutdown panels, set up a communications
i link, and began the plant cooldown utilizing procedure AOP-EVAC-1 " Abnormal Operating Procedures-Control Room Evacuation." The plant was cooled down to approximately
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400 F (from 547 F) and a reactor coolant pump was stopped from outside the control room.
The resident inspectors observed the cooldown at all the manned stations and noted the following:
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The communications were effective and only minor problems were identified.
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The alternate shutdown equipment necessary to man the stations and perform the required functions was in place.
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The operators were knowledgeable in their assigned I
duties.
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The procedure was definitive and controlled the shutdown and will only require minor revisions.
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The licensee demonstrated that the operators could
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cooldown the unit in a controlled manner from outside the control room.
c.
During the remainder of the period the resident inspectors attended selected outage meetings, toured the facility, and witnessed the following outage activities:
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Defueling activity which included the review of procedures and personnel qualifications.
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Fuel inspection using an ultrasonic process to determine fuel pin leakage and visual observation for grid strap damage.
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Selected work activities which included Design Changes:
DCP-1806-Component Cooling Heat Exchanger tube replacement, 2EC-1077-Addition of hangers to the Auxiliary Feedwater Piping on the 84' elevation,
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2EC-2064-Addition of a pulsation damper on the positive displacement charging pump.
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The following observations are the results of the inspectors' tours and meeting attendance, with regard to the outage:
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Outage meetings were conducted on time and in a professional manner.
Problem areas were discussed and future activities were planned.
The necessary representatives from the ongoing outage activities were present.
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The licensee utilized approved procedures to perform
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the observed defueling operations.
The operators and supervisors questioned by the inspectors were i
cognizant of their duties and the procedures being performed.
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The licensee experienced leakage at the flux thimble area'during the flood up after head removal, and had to drain down and fill up several times before the leaks were repaired.
During this process, the water clarity became very turbid which resulted in a
delay in fuel movement. Also, after the water began
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to clear up, as a result of the operation of filtration rigs, ion exchange resin was observed throughout the refueling area.
During the analysis and correction of the resin problem, the licensee l
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performed the following:
(1) Volumetric examination of all resin beds in Unit 2 with none showing a loss of resins, indicating the resin came from the RWST. The resins have a very low
~ radioactive concentration and may have been in the RWST for a long period of time. The water movements resulting from refueling cavity filling and draining operations may have swept it from the bottom of the tank.
(2) Cleanup of the RWST and flushing of all lines to and from the RWST.
(3) Flushing and cleanup of the piping in the reactor coolant system and reactor vessel.
(4) The fuel in the spent fuel pit that will be returning to the core is presently being inspected
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with a cleaning program proposed if resins are present.
The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's progress.
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The ultrasonic fuel inspections which are designed
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to identify leaking fuel assemblies were conducted in the fuel building using approved procedures. The inspections identified four assemblies with leaking fuel pins.
These assemblies have been set aside for further analysis.
Four additional assemblies from previous cores were found compatible for re-insertion l
into the new core without core re-design. The licensee plans to perform additional ultrasonic testing on all the fuel left in the spent fuel pit.
Visual inspections were performed on all quadrants of i
the fuel for any visual damage.
l Design changes are being conducted utilizing approved
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procedures. After discussions with workers and supervisors in the field, the inspector determined that properly calibrated equipment, proper welding l
materials, and qualified personnel are performing the j
work associated with observed design changes.
e.
At the end of this report period the licensee is two days behind schedule with resin cleanup, service water
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header inspections and repairs, reactor coolant pump seal work, valve repacking, MOVATS testing and other l
activities in progress.
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3.
Maintenance Observations
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The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities with regard to No. 21 Diesel Generator to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standards.,
The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA program.
Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure Description 86-07-03-164-3 M15A Perform the 18 month refueling inspection and maintenance on the diesel and aftercooler and jacket water pump required by Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.
86-07-23-45-4 MPSA Perform inspection and MPS-18 maintenance required every four refuelings and inspection and maintenance of turbo-charger.
86-04-15-001-3 MllE Investigate and repair 86-09-20-037-0 NDWP-9 noise identified in the turbocharger area during operation.
Repair I
included a gasket change l
and weld repair to exhaust line.
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86-08-29-047-2 M11E Disassemble, inspect and
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reassemble prelube oil
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pump.
No violations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Observations On July 11, 1986, the licensee identified a 2% flow error in the conservative direction (indicated flow 98% when actual flow is 100%)
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relative to reactor coolant loop flow channels on Unit 2.
The cause of the error was discussed in Inspection Report 50-311/86-19.
The inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions through discussions with I&C and reactor engineering personnel and review of the following documents:
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Safety Evaluation TD-86-2-R200-00001 dated July 18, 1986
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Work Order Nos.
86-07-17-249-2 RCS Flow Channel Sensor 86-07-17-250-6 Calibrations 86-07-17-251-4
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86-07-17-252-2
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86-07-17-253-1
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86-07-17-254-9
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86-07-17-258-1
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86-07-17-259-0
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86-07-17-260-3
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86-07-24-287-3 DP Readings Across Nos.
21-24 RCS Flow Transmitters
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Reactor Coolant Flow Sensor Calibration Procedures
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Instrument Calibration Data Sheets
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Equipment History Cards
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I&C Flow Transmitter Calculation Book containing computer generated differential pressure and compensated voltage calibration data Specifically, the inspector verified that the following corrective actions denoted in the above referenced Safety Evaluation have been completed:
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Use of " Test Data" option eliminated from computer program.
Values for reactor coolant flow transmitters recalculated and
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revised in the appropriate calibration procedures.
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Option added to computer program to change the percent compensation in calculation of the static pressure compensation.
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All reactor coolant flow transmitters recalibrated with correctly compensated values during Unit 2 refueling outage.
No violations were identified.
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Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
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The review included the following:
inclusion of information required j
by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
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Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - September, 1986
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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - September, 1986 In addition, the inspector reviewed Special Report 86-7.
This report was written in response to Technical Specification 3.4.10.3.C which states,
in the event that either the pressurizer overpressure protection system
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(POPS) or the reactor coolant system (RCS) vents are used to mitigate an i
RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within thirty (30) days.
The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the
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effect of the POPS or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
On September 24, 1986, while Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) with RCS fill and vent operations in progress, No. 22 reactor coolant pump (RCP) was started.
The resultant pressure transient actuated both POPS channels (power operated relief valves 2PRI and 2f R2 opened). The highest indicated pressure was approximately 360 psig. Both POPS valves closed within a few seconds following actuation and the RCS pressure returned to
approximately 325 psig.
The required setpoint of the valves, by Technical Specifications, is no greater than 375 psig.
The momentary pressure spike
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when starting the RCP caused the lifting of the relief valves. The setting of the valves with regard to instrument and channel tolerances are such that only a minor increase in pressure can lift the valves. The licensee's procedures are adequate and avoid the possible lifting of safeties and the J
action to be taken in the event the valves fail to reseat. The licensee
is also exploring ways to prevent recurrence.
The inspector considers the item closed.
No violations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specifications.
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6.1 Unit 2 86-009 Reactor Trip from 74% and the Loss of No. 22 Station Power i
Transformer. This event was discussed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/86-24 and 50-311/86-24 and Report
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50-311/86-29. The inspector has no further questions at this time, but will review the licensee's supplemental report when available.
No violations were identified.
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7.
Exit Interview
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At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings
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were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. An exit interview was held with licensee
management at the end of the reporting period. No written material was provided to the licensee. The licensee did not identify any 10 CFR 2.790
l material in this report.
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