IR 05000272/1987003

Insp Repts 50-272/87-03 & 50-311/87-04 on 870127-0223. Violation Noted:Control & Testing of Containment Boundary Valves Incomplete

ML20245A293
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/11/1987
From:	Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207S405	List: IR 05000272/1987003 ML20207S404 ML20207S418
References
50-272-87-03, 50-272-87-3, 50-311-87-04, 50-311-87-4, NUDOCS 8703190433
Download: ML20245A293 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/87-03 Report No /87-04 50-272 Docket No ,c

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DPR-70 License No DPR-75 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company

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80 Park Plaza

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Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, Ne'w Jersey Inspection Conducted: January 27, 1987 - February 23, 1987 Inspei: tors: T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector

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K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector

R. J. Summers, Project Engineer Approved by: b b = -4 3/" [8 7

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L. J. Norrholm, Chief, Rdactor Projects date Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

Inspections on January 27, 1987 - February 23, 1987 (Combined Report

' Numbers 50-272/87-03 and 50-311/87-04)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including:

operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, Region I Temporary Instruction 87-02 inspection, and containment boundary valve surveillance testing. The inspection involved 130 inspector hours by the NRC inspector Results: One violation concerning control and testing of containment boundary valves was identified. As a result of this violation, it appears 'that the licensee's program for identifying containment boundary valves to be included

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in monthly operational surveiliance tests, failed to do so for a number of valves (Paragrap'y 2.3.2).

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit . Operational Safety Verification 2.1 Documents Reviewed

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Selected Operators' Logs

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Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log

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Jumper tog

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Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

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Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)

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Selected Chemistry Logs

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Selected Tagouts

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Health Physics Watch Log 2.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments-(when access is possible).

During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant management. The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure . On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:

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Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;

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Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room;

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Proper control room shift manning and access control;

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Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm;

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Proper use of procedures;

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Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,

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Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio l l

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2. On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:

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Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the. correct positions;

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Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the

- correct positions;

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Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications;

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Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrica-tion, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and,

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Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit .2.3- On a biweekly basis, the inspector:

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Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system;

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Observed a shift turnover;

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Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents;

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Verified that radiation protection and contrals were '

properly established;

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Ver'fied that the physical security plan was being implemented;

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Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,

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Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu .3 Inspector Comments / Findings:

The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did'not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel. The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:

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2. Units 1 and 2 operated at full power throughout the inspection perio . During a previous NRC inspection (50-272/86-32; 50-311/86-36) the inspector identified a potential concern about the administrative controls and testing of a certain containment boundary valve (2CS64) located in the contain-ment spray system. During this inspection, the licensee's containment integrity surveillance program for manual vent, drain and test connection isolation valves (that are part of the containment boundary) was reviewe Surveillance procedures (SP(0) 4.6.1.1A1 - I and II) are periodically performed (31 and 92 days respectively) to verify that containment integrity is maintained per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1(a). This Surveillance Requirement verifies that all containment penetrations are closed, as required, once per 31 days. Exceptions are that vent, drain and test connection valves which are: one inch nominal pipe diameter, located inside containment, and locked or otherwise sealed in a closed position, shall be verified closed once per 92 days. The inspector reviewed Salem Unit 2 "as-built" drawings for selected systems penetrating containment and the containment valve local leak rate test (LLRT) procedure for the same systems, to identify a small sample of vent, drain, and test connection valves which are considered within the containment boundary. The two previously referenced surveillance procedures were then reviewed to determine if they included the above identified valves, as appropriate. Twelve such valves were selected from inside containment and all were appropriately included in the 92 day position verification surveillance procedur Of twenty-three valves similarly selected from outside containment, five were not included in the 31 day position verification procedure, SP(0)4.6.1.1Al-I. These five valves are:

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2CS64 (containment spray system)

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2SJ293 (safety injection system)

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2SJ229 (safety injection system)

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2CV309 (chemical and volume control system)

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2CV365 (chemical and volume control system)

Failure to include these five valves in the surveillance procedure resulted in a failure to properly conduct Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement

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, 5 4.6.1.1(a). This Technical Specification, with certain stated exceptions, requires that containment integrity shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations not capable of being closed by an operable automatic isolation valve and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions. This is a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements (50-311/87-04-01).

The five identified valves were all located in the piping associated with the discharge from various relief valves in the Auxiliary Building, which subsequently form a common header that penetrates containment and discharges to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). This line has only a single check isolation valve inside containment by design. The basis for this design is that the system is considered to be a " closed" system outside containmen Therefore, all of the manual vent, drain, and test connection valves outside containment in the associated piping provide an isolation function to ensure that the system is closed. The design of these valves are that they are nominal 1 inch or less, single, manual valve It appears that the licensee's program for identifying such valves failed to identify at least these five valve During the inspection, the licensee immediately performed the surveillance on the valves and determined that they were closed. They also installed locking devices on the valves. In addition, although the five valves were not routinely verified closed, the normal, operational system lineup procedures required the valves to be closed. The system lineup is normally conducted prior to returning to service from a refueling outage. Since the valves were found in a closed position, containment integrity was, in fact, maintaine .3.2 As required by Region I Temporary Instruction (TI) 87-02

" Steam, Feed and Condensate System Surveys," the inspectors investigated the licensee's program for identifying secondary system pipe thinnin PSE&G has a program for inspecting main and bleed steam piping for Salem Units 1 and 2 on a 4 year frequency. The program consists of a field directive for ultrasonic testing (UT) of approximately 15 spools in the bleed steam system and a field directive for testing of main steam turning vein, cross-under, and cold reheat pipin . -

Ultrasonic, dye penetrant, magnetic particle and visual examinations are performed on various locations of the above mentioned main steam piping. The licensee inc1'uded the factors listed in Section D.2 of TI 87-02 in their determination of locations to inspect with the exception of fittings less than 10 pipe diameters apart. In addition, the licensee considered degree of turbulence as a factor (i.e. "T's" and elbows).

No degradation has been identified as a result of the licensee's inspections. However, a steam leak occurred on Unit 1 20" bleed steam piping to No. 15 feedwater heater that connects from 44" moisture separator reheater pipin (Details in Inspection Report 50-272/86-24; 50-311/86-24)

This piping location had not been included in the licensee's progra Following the Surry event, the licensee performed UT inspections of nineteen Unit 2 and two Unit I feedwater system locations. The results of these inspections were discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/86-32; 50-311/86-3 The licensee plans to consolidate and expand their inspec-tion program to include main and bleed steam, feedwater and other secondary high pressure pipin One violation was identifie . Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA progra Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure Description 86-12-19-085-1 M6D Excessive vibration on M116 generator inboard bearing 87-01-08-090-3 M34 Re-run cable 1ADC21-CT for IA125V DC bus and repair associated fire barrier

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86-09-17-177-9 1C-1.4.003 Perform valve position calibration on valve 21SWO42 l

009917084-1 1C-1.4.003 Repair and adjust control room dampers i

86-09-17-225-2 1C-1.4.003 Repair valve actuator

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for service water valve 2SW002 I

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86-11-25-024-9 A-29 Preventative maintenance; clean or replace flow controllers for lube oil coolers and jacket water heat exchangers for emer-gency diesel generator 2C j No violations were identifie l 4. Surveillance Observations '

During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance packages. The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accor-dance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulations. The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance test The following surveillance tests were reviewed:

Unit 1 Surveillance Work Order Number Procedure Description 87-02-02-072-6 IPD-16.2.007 Channel functional test for channel N41 (Source Range)

87-01-30-030-0 IIC-4.2.027 Channel functional test for 1R16 plant vent effluent monitor Unit 2 Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure Description 87-02-18-117-7 2PD-2.6.009 Channel functional test on 2TE431 Channel III, Tavg; OT delta-T; and, OP delta-T

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. 8 Units 1 and 2 During a plant tour the inspector noted that the Unit I waste gas analyzer had an outdated calibration sticker and the Unit 2 waste gas analyzer had no sticker. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Radiation Protection / Chemistry Manager and the inspector questioned whether the calibrations had been performed as required by the Salem Technical Specifications. Data was provided to the inspector indicating that the surveillances had been performed as follows:

Calibration Unit 1 January 15, 1987 Unit 2 January 13, 1987 Functional Unit 1 February 5,1987 Unit 2 January 13, 1987 During subsequent tours the inspector noted that the calibration stickers have been update No violations were identifie . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

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Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - January 1987

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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - January 1987 In addition, the inspector reviewed Special Report 86-11 which described the resin intrusion into the Unit 2 reactor cavity during third refueling outage. The inspectors followed the licensee's investigation and correc-tive actions as described in Inspection Reports 50-272/86-28; 50-311/86-28, 50-272/86-31; 50-311/86-34, and'50-272/86-32; 50-311/86-3 The licensee submitted this Special Report for informational purpose No violations were identifie . Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia _ - _ _ _ _-