IR 05000272/1986022
| ML20215M750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1986 |
| From: | Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215M743 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-22, 50-311-86-22, NUDOCS 8611030255 | |
| Download: ML20215M750 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos. 50-272/86-22 50-311/86-22 Docket Nos.
50-272 50-311 DPR-70 License No.
DPR-75 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:
Salem Generating Station Unit 1
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Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
September 15-17, 1986 Inspectors:
(~
/o/2YIf6 J. Hawxhurst, Team L(ader
'date G. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector C. G. Amato, NRC, Region I R. T. Hudley, Battelle Approved by:
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/d Mf6 W. Jf)f.airrp's) Chief da'tb Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 15-17, 1986 (Report No. 50-272/86-22)
Areas Inspected: Observation of the licensee's partial-scale Emergency Exercise conducted September 16, 1986.
Results: No violations were identified.
Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. All open items from the previous exercise were closed.
Five new items were identified as requiring licensee attention.
8611030255 061024 PDR HDOCK 05000272 G
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Details 1.0 Persons Contacted
- C. Adams, Senior Engineer, Emergency Preparedness
- C. Banner, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness
- J. Boettger, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations Support M. Bovino, Technical Supervisor W. Cianfrant, Senior Engineer
- J. Clancy, Principal Engineer, Radiation Protection Services D. Esken, Senior Shift Supervisor J. Gueller, Manager, Operations Salem D. Jagt, Assistant General Manager, Projects Engineering
- C. Johnson, General Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- J. Kotsch, Senior Engineer
- D. Mohler, Engineer, Radiation Protection
- J. Molner, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- D. McClosky, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- B. McKeever, Principal Staff, Cost Administration K. McNeil, Vice President, Nuclear J. Pierson, Senior Shift Supervisor
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V. Polizzi, Electrical I and C Engineer
- L. Reiter, Assistant General Manager, Licensing and Reliability
- L. Salmon, Nuclear Representative R. Stanley, Manager, Nuclear Systems Engineering
- J. Schaeffer, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness J. Trejo, Manager, Radiation Protection / Chemistry
- D. Vito, Senior Engineer, Licensing
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- W. Weckstein, Supervisor Nuclear Training L. Zitkevitz, Nuclear Technical Supervisor, Radiation Protection Salem Operations
- J. Zupko, General Manager, Salem Operations
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on September 17, 1986 2.0 Eaergency Exercise The Salem Unit 2 announced exercise was conducted on September 16, 1986, from 6:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions with licensee representatives and provided written comments on the scope and contents of the objectives and scenario.
In addition, the NRC observers attended a licensee brief-ing on September 15, 1986.
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The exercise scenario included the following events:
Recognition of initiating conditions Use of the Event Classification Guide to correlate initiating conditions with Emergency Action Levels, required notifications and implementation of appropriate response procedures
Emergency Notifications
Callout of Emergency Response Personnel
Activation of Emergency Response Facilities PASS Sampling / Analysis
Radiation Protection Measures l
Small Break Loss of, Coolant Accident I
Containment Breach
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Filtered, vented release (
Inplant, Onsite and Offsite Monitoring
Accountability and Evacuation
Search and Rescue Core Damage Estimates
Barrier Breach Analysis
Calculation of Projected Doses and Projected Dose Commitments
Formation of Protective Action Recommendations
Communication of Protection Action Recommendations
Recovery Planning 2.2 Exercise Observations The NRC observation team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan l
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and Emergency Procedures. The NRC team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and efficiently implemented:
Command and Control at all Emergency Response Facilities was effective in responding to the changing emergency conditions.
Plant and radiological data flow was timely; important parameters were emphasized.
- Transition briefings were detailed and function transfer was efficient
Protective Action Recommendations were timely, based on plant status, and updated rapidly in response to changed conditions
Emergency Response Organization personnel were well trained and demonstrated a high degree of proficiency Controllers were ale'rt, adept and helpful but objective while
providing information and maintaining the scenario time line.
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Offsite notifications were made within the prescribed time limits The Event Classification Guide was used correctly.
Initiating conditions were correlated with Emergency Action Levels, notifi-cation requirements and response procedures.
Observation of actions relating to open items from the previous exercise demonstrated adequately that there was no repetition. The following open items are closed.
(Closed) IFI (50-272/85-27-01) and (50-311/85-29-01). The Controller for the PASS team was not knowledgeable on PASS Panel operation.
The controller for the PASS sample team was knowledgeckle of PASS procedures and expected performance under accident condition.
(Closed) IFI (50-272/85-27-02) and (50-311/85-29-02). Press Release No. 3 drafted at the declaration of a General Emergency was poorly written in that PSE&G's recommendations for protective action were included.
The press releases developed in the EOF were timely, concise and informative.
No information on licensee offsite recommendations were included, which is consistant with the states agreements with the states (Delaware and New Jersey).
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The following areas were identified which could have degraded the licensee's response and need to be addressed for possible corrective action. Most of these findings were also identified by the licensee as part of their post exercise critique.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-01) and (50-311/86-22-01).
Information on the release duration was not communicated to the necessary technical people. Offsite it was stated to be less than twelve hours.
How-ever, a default time of four hours was used for dose assessment in accordance with Attachment 3 Revision 4 to Emergency Procedure IV-108.
The release was a vented, filtered release;. containment pressure was dropping rapidly.
No estimate was provided as to the time required under these conditions for containment pressure to reach ambient pressure and for the release to terminate.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-02) and (50-311/86-22-02). Almost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> were required to locate a missing Radiation Protection staff member.
Information as to this person's last known location was not communi-cated to.the Search and Rescue Team.
In addition, there was an
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unwarranted delay in dispatching this team.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-03) and (50-311/86-22-03). The Emergency Response Manager called seven manager's conferences in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) without designating an individual to take charge of E0P operations.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-04) and (50-311/86-22-04).
Fuel damage in-formation was not disseminated in a timely manner, nor was the basis for the value of the gap fraction release given.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-05) and (50-311/86-22-05). Dose projections were made using a single straight line Gassian model. A more refined method was needed especially after the release was terminated.
Overall assessment is difficult with the simple model since it is unable to track the plume and effectively determine dose offsite.
(0 pen) IFI (50-272/86-22-06) and (50-311/86-22-06). The Operations
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Support Center (OSC) did not provide feedback to the Control Room as
to the status of, and results obtained by teams dispatched from the OSC.
2.3 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on September 17, 1986 during which licensee lead controllers presented and discussed observations of the exercise. The critique covered all areas identified as requiring additional management attention.
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3.0 Exit Meeting Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the findings of the inspection as noted in this report.
The licensee was informed that no violations were identified, that the licensee demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures in a manner which could adequately provide pro-tective measures for the health and safety of the public. However, it was also stated that there are areas which required additional licensee atten-tion.
At no time during the inspection did the inspectors provide written infor-mation to the licensee.
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