IR 05000213/1985006

Insp Rept 50-213/85-06 on 850327-0401.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Open Items, Status Review of Emergency Program Changes & Annual Emergency Exercise Observation

ML20128B120
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	05/14/1985
From:	Harpster T, Rich Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128B089	List: IR 05000213/1985006 ML20128B083
References
50-213-85-06, 50-213-85-6, NUDOCS 8505240411
Download: ML20128B120 (9)

Text

r

.. .

,

I i

f U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. - 50-213/85-06 Docket No. 50-213 License _N DPR-61- Priority -

Category C Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 270-Hartford, Connecticut 06101-Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant

' Inspection-At: Haddam Neck, Connecticut

.

Inspection Conducted: March 27 - April 1,1985 Inspectors: /~ uz C H. Smith, Regional ' Team Leader

-

/ p(te P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector M. I. Good, Battelle, PNL J. D. Jamison, Battelle, PNL W. N. Herrington,-Battelle, PNL J. B. Davis, Battelle, PNL Approved by: evf4aer-- s~

.T.pHarper,Chiefg, Emergency Date Preparedness Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on March 27 - April 1, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-213/85-06)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced' emergency preparedness inspection to review open items identified on previous inspections, review the status of changes to the Emergency Program, and to observe the Licensee's annual-emergency _ exercise performed on March 30, 1985.' The inspection involved 166 inspector hours by a team of six URC Region I and NRC contractor personne Results: No violations were identified. The Licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise scenario were adequate to provide protective measures _for the health and safety of the public.

,

.

. -

w, ,

,

, . %

l- { , ' ^ 7

,c . -r 5 (

'

,

'

R

,

,

c

-

DETAILS 1 120l Persons Contacted

' '

?The following. licensee representatives attended th'e exit meeting on:

Apri1 1,; 1985:

,

~ 3 G[H. L Bouchard,1 Station : Services . Superintendent

' ~

-R;;S.lBromberg, Manager,. Nuclear Information 1W. G. Counsil, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering

'

_

.

-

and Operations Group

+. ~R; H.' Graves,: Station Superintendent

.

R.- T.' Harris, Director, Nuclear Engineering

.G. L.-Johnson, Director, Generation-Engineering and Design-P. A'. L Luckey, _ Training Instructor

% T.~.McCance, Emergency Planning Coordinato ,

'

• -

E.fJ..Molloy, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

.

-

'

. -J.:F. Opeka,'Vice President,' Nuclear Operations M.'cD. Quinn,. Supervisor, Chemistry

.

-

R. C..Rodgers, Manager, Radiological Assessment Branch

.

_ _

C;;F. Sears, Vice President, Nuclear. and Environmental Engineerin The-team observed and' contacted several' licensee personnel prior to and

during:the exercis '

' 2.0'- Licensee Actionon Previous Inspection Findings J

~

-2.1_'(Closed)(50-213/81-14-15): Establish a Technical Support Center which'

-

i provides, on 'an interim basis until'a permanent.TSC-can be established which meets appitcable regulatory criteria, adequate working space.for =

the assigned personnel, and.whichialleviates potential crowding 2in the~

Control-Roo The licensee-submitted letters dated April 15,-1983, and November 13, 1984,' requesting an exception to the TSC location requirements described in' Supplement I to NUREG-0737. By -letter dated March 6,1985, the- NRC ~

-granted an exception to the licensee and established specific requirements -

_

'

to.beLimplemented for= locating the TSC within the EOF. The. inspectors

.

confirmed that the licensee had revi_ sed the Emergency' Preparedness Imp-lementing Procedures effective March 26, 1985, to include the requirements for. locating the TSC within the EOF. The Emergency Plan' revisions have

.

-

been reviewed and are..in the process of being submitted to the NRC. The

<

-. inspectors also determined that the TSC within the E0F contained the required equipmen :2.2..(Closed).(50-213/84-06-01): Provide an operable dose calculational methodology for use in the control room as' described in NUREG-0654, 1 i Annex 1 to Appendix 2, and NUREG-0737, Item III. '

L l

,

l

.

.

t 7 ~

v- , 4 *y- -,w w-v. w- -v-evy**ve' w+*W-e ar vrr r -w tv----w- sr-ww--- -v--wevt'= -mv +w h-a e-v-.u w w--'m-~n m u - m w v v--*vN w. w w w-* -e -w e-w * w rt-- ,e -

w -

--

,

, 1

.

,

.. i 3 l

-

.

The/ inspectors reviewed the licensee's response dated August 8, 1984, the

-

Emergency Plan, EPIP's, and held discussions with' licensee personne .

Based on.a. review of the above, having a designated individual. on-call to perform dose calculations after arriving at the E0F or the -E0C appears

-

- -

--acceptable. ~The licensee will further clarify Section 6.2.2, " Station and

.

LCorporate Dose Assessment",'of the Emergency Plan.during.the next revisio .

2.3 .(Closed) (50-213/84-06-02): . Familiarize the members of the corporate M ' meteorological response team with the PUFF code to enhance their ability

'

,

.to contribute to model inputs and interpretatio ~ ~

g The inspectors confirmed that the. corporate meteorological personnel completed the required training related to the PUFF code on l October-10, 1985.

U k' * - 2.4 (0 pen);(50-213/84-06-03): Perform a systematic computational comparison between licensee dose models and those used by the State, and document

'

-the result ~

'As-described in the licensee's response dated January 14, 1985, this item-is scheduled for completion by December 31, 198 <

(2.5 (Closed) (50-213/84-06-04): Prepare documentation which contains the basis- and justification for the PUFF code and its input data, including a

~

E -

discussion of the models limitations and capabilities as described in NUREG-0654, Appendix :The. inspectors confirmed that the above documentation is available in Training Modules and Emergen'cy Procedures located at the corporate offic .6 :-(Closed) (50-212/84-06-05): Modify the training lesson plan for,

" Manager of Radiological Dose Assessment", to-include instruction on v where data inputs used in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure, 1.5-7

'? are generated and who might be contacted to obtain them. The-instruction should clearly define and explain each input and the criteria for its

, selection, as well as offer guidance on who could be contacted for help if necessar ,

The' inspectors examined the revised lesson plan for, " Manager of Radio-

. logical Dose Assessment," and determined that the needed criteria described above was included. The inspectors also confirmed that the personnel assigned to the duties of Manager of Radiological Dose

-

LAssessment received training on January 30, 1985, with the revised lesson pla .7 (Closed) (50-213/84-06-06): Update the Emergency Plan, Section 6. regarding the Containment Hatch Monitor and the Interim High Range Radiation Monitor p

n

'

.: \

. i

i The inspectors confirmed that the necessary changes were included in Revision 13 of the Emergency Plan which became effective on-September ~20, 198 .8 (Closed) (CAL No. 84-10): Significant deficiencies were identified during-the annual emergency exercise performed on May 12, 1984, and inspection Report No. 50-213/84-10 was issued by letter dated May 25, 1984. A man-agement meeting was held on June 1,-1984, by the NRC at the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company corporate office located in Berlin, Connect-

'icut. The NRC issued CAL No. 84-10, dated June 5, 1984, following this-meeting which contained corrective actions to be completed. The licensee-described their corrective actions in a letter to the NRC dated August 23, 1984. The-inspectors confirmed that the corrective actions described by the licensee were completed on October 12, 198 .0 Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program The inspectors verified that changes to emergency facilities, equipment and instrumentation since the previous inspection had been incorporated into the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures-(EPIP's). The inspectors also reviewed Revisions 13 and 14 to the Emergency Plan and all revisions to EPIP's from September 21, 1984 to March 26, 198 .0 Emergency Exercise The Haddam Neck partial participation exercise was conducted on March'30, 1985, from 8:00 a.m. until 2:00 . Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had tele-phone discussions with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, revisions were made to the scenario and the supporting data sheet The NRC observers were provided a scenario briefing by the licensee on March 29, 198 The changes in the scenario and the emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario were discusse The exercise scenario included the following events:

• Inoperable loop inlet isolation valve;

Fire in the cable spreading area;

• Loss of power to a control air compressor;

,

. . .

..

.

- Reactor trip;

• Steam generator tube' failure;

• -Failure of a safety relief valve to reset;

• Unmonitored release of radioactivity; and

-Implementation of the Recovery Organizatio LThe above events caused the activation of the licensee's emergency facilities and also permitted the state and local government agencies to exercise their Emergency Plan .2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made de-tailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response. facilities. The following activities were observed:

Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;

Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

Notification of. licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;

• Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions;

• - Provisions for in plant radiation protection;

Performance of offsite, onsite, and in plant radiological surveys;

+- Maintenance of site security and access control;

• Performance of technical support;

• Performance of repair and corrective actions;

• Communications /information flow, and record keeping; and

. Management of Recovery Operations.

,

14 . 3 Exercise Observations

.The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities;

! and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with

y L di

6 m

.i g their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also F noted the following actions of the licensee emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions, f * Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assignments and the emergency procedures in general, and demonstrated that they were competent in performing their assigned functio '

• The Production Maintenance Management System report was promptly prepared to investigate the problem with the reactor coolant inlet isolation valv The Control Room narrative log was well maintained.

'

_

• The Shift Supervisor was timely in considering a load reduction and/or plant trip due to the fire potentially affecting plant system * The fire brigade response was indicative of an active training progra * A TSC representative was dispatched to the Control Room to act as liaiso * Briefings in the EOF by the Emergency Director were timely and thoroug * The State Representative in the EOF was informed of conditions and significant events on a constant basi * Off-site monitoring teams made detailed equipment checks prior to departure and routinely checked their pocket dosimeters in the fiel * The information flow, documentation of ongoing events, and status boards were noted to be current and accurate in the Corporate EO * The E0C Director held frequent meetings for disseminating event information and plant statu * Dose projections at the E0C were computed at 15 minute intervals using current radiological and meteorological data. Printouts were appropriately distributed and the plume was continuously projected and doses integrated even after the release was terminate The following areas were identified which require licensee attention:

- - _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . .

<, . ,

_

'

-

v , -

.

>

.,

~ (0 pen)'50-213/85-06-01: Dur'ing the exercise the NRC Contractor-

'

'

"

~

_ observers assigned In Plant and to the Control Room were not escorted by a member of the Plant. Security force and were not' authorized ac -

cess,; prior to the exercise,.to two vital areas involved in the

.

-

scenario TheseL11mitations on the observers movements impeded

' observation.of some' activitie =

-* ' (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-02: -The Control Room requested delivery of three. portable radios prior to an Unusual' Event being declared which

~

,

was considered to be prestagin s e' (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-03: :The required notifications to the NRC were  ;

simulated and the timeliness of the notifications could not be  !

confirmed..- The EPIP's l'.5-1, 1.5-2, and 1.5-33 should be reviewed '

regarding the NRC notification ~ requirement m

'a '(0 pen),50-213/85-06-04: .There were many radio communications made without the notice that a drill or exercise was in progress.-

• (0 pen)50-213/85-06-05: .The plant public address system was not used effectively 'for notification of events, classification, and plant status'information'. (Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)

'

e (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-06: It took almost one and one half hours to obtain requested adm_inistrative help in the site TS * (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-07:- It took over one half hour to get the repair team out of. the OSC for gagging the. relief valve to terminate -

the' releas * (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-08: There was some confusion in information coming out of the CR regarding the plant trip since the TSC thought the plant was. tripped and was later informed of a controlled shutdown in progres >

'

+- (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-09: The site TSC activities regarding corrective-actions were incomplete, in that special procedures were not. drafted, reviewed, and approved by a multi-disciplined body as the Plant Operations Review Committe * (0 pen)-50-2.3/85-06-10: Certain health physics practices in plant contributed to a degraded performance:

~

• '. Af r sample filter paper and cartridge handled with bare hand * Portable survey meter not battery checked and stack gas sampling

. area approached with radiation survey instrument turned of * An emergency dosimeter was issued to CR personnel without being

,

checked after it was dropped on a hard tile floo ,

_

-

(

e

,. -

--

p

• - An air sample was started without noting the time the sampler-was turned on.

,4

• (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-11: The Fire Brigade Team left spare air .

bottles and CO 2 fire extinguishers standing upright and unrestrained in a_ passagewa * (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-12: There was no equipment in the offsite monitoring kit to zero dosimeters in the fiel (Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)

• (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-13: A source check of the R02A instrument, was not performed by the offsite monitoring team prior to departure from the EO . (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-14: The offsite monitoring team was delayed from leaving the site twice during the exercise because of a requirement to have the vehicle surveyed for radioactivity by site personne * -(Open) 50-213/85-06-15: While an air sample was being taken offsite the vehicle motor was started and remained in operation for radio communication. The sample flow rate increased about 25 percent and +

was not accounted for in total volum . (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-16: During collection of an air sample, the team congregated at the back of the van doorway, which could restrict the collection of a representative sample. In addition the sampler was set back a short distance inside the van which could also impair col-lecting a-representative sample. (Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)

• (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-17: Security personnel were wearing respiratory equipment outside the EOF while other site personnel were not. It was also noted that Security personnel removed the respiratory equipment to use the telephon * (0 pen) 50-213/85-06-18: EPIP 1.5-10, Rev 8, "Off-Site Emergency Radiological Surveys", should be clarified regarding the check out of kits, use of designated or private vehicles, obtaining background counts, marking and counting of particulate f11ters, and personnel, equipment, and vehicle survey * (0 pen)50-213/85-06-19: Security personnel opened the Corporate E0C and established access controls about 30 minutes before activation was started. There appeared to be several licensee personnel pre-staged in the E0C are The licensee's actions in addressing these items will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

-

--

@

L ..

'

'w*

st :.

5.0 Licensee's' Critique The NRC team' leader and some team members attended the post-exercise critique on March 30, 1985,'during which Exercise Controllers-discussed their observations of the exercise. There were some deficient areas discussed which were.also observed by the NRC team, however, the total critique was weak in identifying and. discussing areas for improvement .'(50-213/85-06-20)

6.0 Exit Meeting

'The NRC team met with the licensee representative listed in Section ~

on April 1, 1985. The.NRC team leader summarized'the observations made during the exercise including the repeated items that were previously observed during the 1984 exercise, and the improvements to be made in the licensee's critiqu The licensee was informed that no violations were identified and although there were areas for improvement,-the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demon-strated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide for the health and safety of the publi _

License management acknowledged the findings and indicated that ap-propriate action would be taken regarding the identified improvement area At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector t