ML20076K986

Public Version of Revised Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures,Including Procedures A.2-001 Re Emergency organization,A.2-107 Re Activation of Operations Support Ctr & A.2-402 Re Contamination Control

ML20076K986
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	05/20/1983
From:	Fey F NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20076K972	List: ML20076K980 ML20076K986
References
AAA056, AAA56, PROC-830520-02, NUDOCS 8307180327
Download: ML20076K986 (82)

Text

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. Intenial Correspondence

. Da* May 20, 1983

' From G. D. Mathiasen Location Monticello T*

Special Distribution of Ihergency Procedures '***" n Various sue sect Revised Procedures for Energency Procedures Book Revisicas to the Emergency Procedures were reviewed in a recent Coerations Cemittee Meeting. Listed below are the procedures superseded and revised.

Other pages not revised my have been reprinted with the revised pages to facilitate updating the Book.

Sucerseded Pates Procedure A.2-001, Paoes 1 through 19, Pavision 5

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Revised Paces ..'

Procedure A.2-001, Pages 1 through 19, Pavisien 6 Prepared by: 66Mek-Reviewed by: idM Op. Com. Final Review: Mee" ting # /J203 Date f!/7!l3 Approved by: 4 7 7?// / 7 Date r 1 o- p 3 O

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.INTE.RN,AL

.. .. CORRESPONDENCE

. OaTc May 20, 1983 FaoM D. L. Orrock LOCATION MCnticellO To Special Distribution of Energency Procedures LOC A TIO N VariOUS suestCr Revised Procedures for Energency Precedures Book Revisiens to the Frergency Precedures were reviewed in a recent Operations Comittee Meeting. Listed below are the precedures sunerseded and revised.

Other pages not revised nay have been reprinted with the revised pages to facilitate updating the Bcok.

Surerseded Pages Precedure A.2-107, Paces 1 through 4, Revisica 5 Procedure A.2-402, Pages 1 through 8, Revision 1 Procedure A.2-603, Pages 1 throuch 11, Revision 1 (Deleted)

Revised Pages Procedure A.2-107, Pages 1 through 4, Revision 6 Procedure A.2-402, Pages 1 through 8, Revisicn 2 -

Prepared By /[Cf h p /- )

Reviewed By 63/7/4//ub Op. Cem. Final Review Mtg.# 1203 Date 5/19/83 Approved By 8 kIMa Date 6 20-8 3 S

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' Intsnal Corrcspondence

< h* May 20, 1983 p,,,n G. D. Mathiasen Locaten Monticello T*

Special Distribution of Emergency Procedures toe.non Various s

sweet Revised Procedures for Emergency Procedures Book Revisicas to the Emergency Procedures were reviewed in a recent Coeratiens Co rittee Meeting. Listed below are the procedures superseded and revised.

Other pages not revised may have been reprinted with the revised pages to facilitate updating the Book.

Sucerseded Pares Procsiure A.2-101, Pages 1 through 46, Pevision 4

(.

Revised Pages .

Procedure A.2-101, Pages 1 through 46, Revisicn 5 Prepared by: MMcd' hum -

Reviewed by: ll(V/hYd) A t]:.n/ W4, Op. Com. Final Review: Meeting i /.JoA Date 6!/f h 3 Approved by: i d 4No Date f -fo -f 3 e

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. 05/20/83 A.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES LIST OF CURRENT PAGES 4

PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TITLE ,

REVISION NUMBER

( 000 Series - Organization A.2-001 Emergency Organizaticn 6 100 Series Activation A.2-101 Classification of Emergencies 5 l A.2-102 Notification of an Unusual Event 4 A.2-103 Alert 4 A.2-104 Site Area Emergency 3 A.2-105 General Emergency 3 A.2-106 Activation of Technical Support Center 4 A.2-107 Activation of Operations Support Center 6 l

A.2-108 Access Control During Emergencies 0 200 Series Assessment A.2-201 On-Site Monitoring and Protective Action Criteria 3 A.2-202 Off-Site Monitoring During an Emergency 1 A.2-203 Deleted 3-1-82 A.2-204 Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations 2 A.2-205 Personnel Accountability 2 A.2-206 Deleted 3-1-82 A.2-207 Sampling Priorities During an Emergencj 0 A.2-208 Core Damage Assessment 0 A.2-209 Responsibilities of Radiological Emergency Coordinator 0 .

300 Series Protective Actions .

A.2-301 Emergency Evacuation 2 ~~

, A.2-302 Assembly Point Activation 3 A.2-303 Search and Rescue 3 A.2-304 Thyroid Prophylaxis 2 400 Series Radiolooical Surveillance and Control A.2-401 Emergency Exposure Control 2 A.2-402 Contamination Control 2 A.2-403 In-Plant Emergency Surveys 3 A.2-404 Airborne Iodine Sampling and Analysis 3 A.2-405 Release Rate Determination 2 A.2-406 Off-Site Oose Projection 7 A.2-407 Personnel and Vehicle Monitoring 2 A.2-408 Sample Coordination During an Emergency 1 A.2-409 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Use During An Emergency 0 A.2-410 Out-of-Plant Surveys 2 A.2-411 Establishment of Secondary Access Control 1 A.2-412 Deleted 1-6-83 A.2-413 Small Volume Liquid Sample Obtained at the Post Accident Sampling System 1 A.2-414 Large Volume Liquid Sample and/or Dissolved

, Gas Sample Obtained at Post Accident Sampling i System 1 A.2-415 Containment. Gas Sample Obtained at Post Accident Sampling System -2

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05/20/83 1 A.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES LIST OF CURRENT PAGES

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PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION NUMBER 400 Series Radiological Surveillance and Control (Cont'd.)

A.2-416 Containment Iodine ana Particulate Samples Obtained at Post Accident Sampling System 2 A.2-417 Draining the Trap, Sump and Collector of Post Accident Sampling System 1 A.2-418 Post Accident Sampling Station Demin Water Tank Fill Procedure 0 A.2-419 Liquid Radiochemical Analysis 0 A.2-420 Containment Atmosphere Radiochemical Analysis 0 A.2-421 Containment Atmosphere Iodine / Particulate Analysis 0 A.2-422 Stack Iodine / Particulate Sampling & Analysis 1 A.2-423 Reactor Building Vents Iodine / Particulate Sampling and Analysis 1 A.2-424 EOF Count Room Counting Procedure 0 A.2-425 Post-Accident Gas Sample Line Heat Trace 0 500 Series Communications and Documentation A.2-501 Communication During an Emergency 1 A.2-502 Recordkeeping During an Emergency 0 A.2-503 Deleted - 04/28/83 600 Series Re-Entry and Recovery A.2-601 Re-Entry 0 A.2-602 Deleted 11-19-81 A.2-603 Deleted 5/19/83 (

700 Series A.2-702 Response to an Emergency at Prairie Island 2 A.2-703 Response to Off-Site Situation Involving Radioactive Materials 0 -

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. Procedure A.2-001

, Revision 6 .

Page 1 of 19

... Op. Com. Rev. Reg'd. Yes- X No Q. A. Review Reg'd. Yes No X ALARA Review Reg'd. Yes No X EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION A.2-001 REVIEW AND APPROVAL

, Prepared by: Cd/b/I % ALARA Review: G. D. Mathiasen Date 11/17/81 Reviewed by: YUN Q.A. Review: R. L. Scheinost Date 11/17/81 Operations Committee Final Review: Meeting Number J203 Date 5//9/83 Approved by: h8[ Date SN#c/?d Op. Com. Results Review: Not Required Mtg. 10'86 Date 5$'27/82 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the on-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and to provide an orderly method of staffing the positions of which the ERO is comprised.

PRECAUTIONS No Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant personnel shall make any information releases to members of the news media or the general public during an emergency -

unless cleared through the Emergency Manager, if established, or Emergency Director. Direct all inquiries to the Communications Department at NSP Head-quarters or at the EOF.

DISCUSSION A. Although it is not practical to develop detailed procedures encompassing every conceivable emergency ~ situation, advance planning should create a high order of preparedness and ensure an orderly and timely decision-making body. = Advance planning of the Emergency Organization ensures that during an emergency the duties of the plant staff members, who are required to direct the emergency effort, are defined. (See Figure 1)

8. The Emergency Organization is herein described. The duties and responsi-bilities of the individual Emergency Organization members are defined.

C. The Tag Boards are used to make speedy personnel duty assignments dufing the initial stage of an emergency, to insure that qualified personnel fill the positions in the ERO, and insure that,the more important positions in the ERO are filled first.

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The Main Tag Board consists of a board with a layout of the Emergency Response Organization. Under each position on the board is a list of the individuals who are qualified to fill that position, and a tag with the necessary instruc-tion for filling that position. There is also a sign-in sheet that serves to indicate who has taken a specific tag from.the Tag Board.

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Page 2 of 19 The Maia Tag Board is located in the hall outside the Shift Supervisor's Office. The RP Tag Board is at access control. All personnel who are ] '

members of t'he ERO have the responsibility of checking the Tag Boards when it is announced that ERO personnel are to report to their duty stations.

The Tag Board system is designed to work as follows:

When an announcement is made to activate the ERO duty assignments, ERO personnel should pass by the appropriate Tag Boards (see below lists). If an individual's name is on one of the lists for a position in the ERO, and the tag for that position has not been removed, he should remove that tag, read the instructions on the tag, and sign the sign-in sheet indicating the position in the ERO that is being filled. If an individuals name appears on more than one list the individual must determine which of the positions should be filled first and remove the appropriate tag. (If you have a question as to the priority of filling positions contact the Emer-gency Plan Coordinator.)

If an individual arrives at the Tag Board and finds the tag is removed for a position they are qualified to fill, the person should check the sign-in sheet and determine if they are higher on.the order of succession than the person performing that job. If so they should relieve that individual.

Main Tag Board RP Tag Board

• Emergency Director RPS Personnel Radiological Emergency Coord.

Group Leaders STA's SEC's D. It is the Emergency Director's responsibility to ensure 24-hour coverage of key positions in the emergency organization. He must consider that the emergency may continue for some time and " pace" the utilization of personnel resources (e.g. , ensure rotation of personnel to allow time for eating and sleeping).

E. While the qualification criteria listed in this procedure will be used to determine who may be qualified to fill a given emergency organization position, it is not intended that a person who is not qualified may not be assigned to that position. The goal should be to have several people qualified to fill each position, but if there is no one available from the qualified list, the most qualified person available should be selected.

Requalification, when applicable, will be required on an annual ( 3 months) basis. This procedure will be reviewed quarterly, and revised if necessary.

I F. In the periods between revisions of this procedure, personnel who become qualified may be used to staff these positions.

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'm QUALIFICATION. ORDER OF SUCCESSION AND OUTIES

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I. Coordination and Direction Group A. Emergency Director

1. Qualifications

a. Five years experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant NOTE: This requirement does not apoly during initial phase i

of emergency when the Duty Site Superintendent is Emergency Director.

b. Experience as Plant Manager Designee NOTE: This requirement does not apply during initial phase of emergency when the Outy Shift Supervisor is Emer-gency Director. .

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c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas

- Corporate Emergency Plan

- Monticello Emergency Plan

- Emergency Implementing Procedures:

A.2 - 001

• k A.2 101 A.2 - 303 A.2 - 102 A.2 - 304 A.2 - 103 A.2 - 401 A. 2 - 104 A.2 - 502 .

A.2 - 105 A.2 - 601 -

A.2 - 204 A.2 - 205 '

A.2 - 301

- Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementing Procedures SCPIP - 1 SCPIP - 8

, SCPIP - 2 SCPIP - 12 SCPIP - 4

2. Qualified Personnel in Order of Succession a.

D'

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d. I

e.

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3. Duties

a. ' Coordinates the response of the plant emergency organization;

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b. Evaluates plant and radiological conditions;

c. Ensures assessment of offsite radioactivity releases;

d. Recommends offsite protective actions;

e. Determines emergency classification;

f. Calls in additional plant personnel;- *

g. Assumes control of Technical Support Center personnel and activities;

h. Makes decisions regarding habitability of emergency response centers and location of assembly areas;

i. Approves radiation exposures in excess of normal limits;

j. -Ensures all injured personnel receive medical assistance; and

k. Ensures 24-hour. coverage for key positions of plant emer-gency organization. .

8. Shift Technical Advisor

1. Qualifications Qualified per 4 AWI-4.7.1 ./

2. Qualified Personnel DicLEi ED -

! 3. Responsibility Provide technical operational advice to the Shift Supervisor.

C. Shift Emergency Communicator

1. -Qualifications .

j a. Six months experience at Monticello l .

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. b. Ability to communicate verba_lly.in clear, concise manner

c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Emergency Implementing Procedures:

\ A.2 - 101 A.2 - 105 A.2 - 102 A.2 - 205 A.2 - 103 .A.2 - 302 A.2 - 104 A.2.- 501

A.2 - 502 s - Emergency Plan (Knowledgeable to degree necessary to be able-to direct others in use of procedures) t

d. Other administrative qualifications as. determined by Plant Management.

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2. Qualified Personnel i . ,

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3. Duties

a. Assists Emergency Director in emergency classification;

b. Conducts initial and followup notification in accordance with procedures;

c. Coordinates all incoming and outgoing communications;

d. Ensures proper logging and recording of communications.

e. Assist Emergency Organization in use of procedures.

l II. Operations Group

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l A. Operations Group leader

1. Qualifications

- '. M a. Current SR0 License for Monticello -

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b. Demonstrated ability in supervisory skills. .

c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Monticello Emergency Plan

- Emergency Implementing Procedures: -

A.2 - 101 A.2 - 301 A.2 - 107 A.2 - 401 A.2 - 108 A.2 - 502 A.2 - 205 l

2. Qualified Personnel in Order of Succession ,

2

a. Antony, D. l

b. Senior Site Superintendent present, not on duty shift

c. Senior Shift Supervisor present, not on duty shift

d. Outy Site Superintendent

e. Duty Shift Supervisor

3. Duties

a. Coordinates response of Operations Group;

b. Evaluates plant and radiological conditions; .

, c.

d.

Ensures Emergency Director is informed of plant status; Directs operation of the plant in compliance with all

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_ normal plant procedures, directives, technical specifi-

, cations and emergency procedures;

e. Monitors plant parameters and conditions.

B. Fire Brigade

1. Qualifications 4

a. Currently qualified in accordance with 4 AWI-3.13.2, including SC8A training and qualification.

b. Currently qualified in accordance with Appendix R, 10CFR50:

i 1.) -The Team Leader and #2 & #3 Team Members shall have 4

sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and i

fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. -

2.) The Team Leader shall be competent to assess the poten :

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-room personnel. -This shall be evidenced by current SRO or RO or current enrollment in license training program.

c. Qualified physically in accordance with Tab 7 of the NSP Medical Policy and Procedure Manual (annual requirement).

2. Qualified Personnel .

a. Team Leader (Normally Site Superintendent or Shift Supervisor)

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b. Team Members #2 & #3

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III. Maintenance Group

' The Maintenance Group consists of the Plant Superintendent, Operations and ilaintenance; the Superintendent, Maintenance; the Maintenance Supervisors;

). all maintenance crew people; the plant electricians; plant helpers and the p Instrument & Control Group including supervisors and coordinators.

A. Maintenance Group Leader

1. Qualifications 1-(

a. -Five years experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

b. Demonstrated ability in supervisory skills l'

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Revision 6 '

Page 8 of 19 '

, c. . Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Emergency Plan

- Emergency Implementing Procedures:

A.2 - 001 A.2 - 205 A.2 - 106 A.2 - 303 A.2 - 107 A.2 - 401 A.2 - 108 A.2 - 502

2. Order of Succession a.

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B. OSC Coordinator m 1. Qualifications - (Same as Maintenance Group Leader) a

2. Order of Succession - (Same as Maintenance Group Leader)

C. Responsibilities

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• . 1. Maintenance Group primary responsibility for emergency repairs

. and corrective actions.

2. Maintenance Group Leader: -

a. Responsible for participating in discussions regarding emergency response and for formulating specific tasks in the categories of emergency repair and corrective action.

b. Responsible for implementing emergency repair and corrective action tasks by relaying task information to OSC Coordinator and requesting that a'. team be dispatched to accomplish task.

c. Responsible for notifying Monitoring Section Leader of impending l t tasks.

. 3. OSC Coordinator:

Responsible for coordinating and assigning personnel to tasks desig-i nated by TSC personnel.

• IV. Engineering Group The Engineering Group consists of the Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection, Superintendent, Technical Engineering and the Technical' ..

l Engineering Group, plus the Superintendent, Operations Engineering and the (_.

Operations Engineering Group.

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A. Engineering Group Leader

( 1. Qualifications

a. Five years experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

b. Demonstrated ability in supervisory skills

c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Emergency Plan

- Emergency Implementing Procedures:

A.2 - 106 A.2 - 502

2. Order of Succession

a. )

b.

c, DELt. ED d.

e.  !

8. Group Responsibilities a The group shall have the responsibilities for providing technical support for emergency repairs and corrective actions.

V. Health Physics Grouo The Health Physics Group consists of the Supt., Radiation Protection and all

(.. Members of the Radiation Protection Group.

The grouc is divided into two sections: The Offsite Dose Assessment and Chemistry Section and the Monitoring Section. The group leader is the .

Radiological Emergency Coordinator (See Figure 2). ..

A. Radiological Emergency Coordinator

1. Qualifications

a. Five years experience at Monticello Nuclear Plant; b.' Demonstrated ability in supervisory skills;

c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Health Physics

- Emergency Plan

- Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures:

A.2 - 101 A.2 - 208 A.2 - 404 A.2 - 106 A.2 - 209 A.2 - 405 A.2 - 107 A.2 - 301 A.2 - 406 A.2 - 108 A.2 - 302 A.2 - 407 A.2 .201 A.2 - 303 A.2 - 409 L A.2 - 202 A.2 - 304 A.2 - 410 A.2 - 204 A.2 - 401 A.2 - 411 A.2 - 205 A.2 - 402 A.2 - 502

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Page 10 of 19 -

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2. Order of Succession-

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b. DELETED  !

c. '

d. l

e.  !

3. Duties

a. Coordinate assessment of radiological aspects of accident, including offsite surveys prior to EOF activation. '

b. Formulate protective action recommendations

c. Ensure radiological surveillance and control measures are implemented. j

d. Advise Emergency Director on health physics matters

e. Man the HPN line as required.

B. Offsite Dose Assessment and Chemistry Section Leader .

1. Qualifications .

a. One year experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (

b. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Chemistry and radiochemistry, including Monticello .

Chemistry Manual -

- Emergency Plan Implementing Procdures:

A.2 - 207 A.2 - 413 A.2 - 419 A.2 - 208 A.2 - 414 A.2 - 420 A.2 - 405 A.2 - 415 A.2 - 421 ,

A.2 - 406 A.2 - 416 A.2 - 422 A.2 - 408 A.2 - 417 A.2 - 423 A.2 - 502 A.2 - 418 A.2 - 425

2. Order of Succession

a.  !

b'  !

c. DELETED :

d.

, e. I

3. Duties

a. Offsite dose projection

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c. Sampling and analysis of reactor coolant, containment atmos-phere and plant effluents

d. Sample coordination and recording C. Monitoring Section Leader

1. Qualifications

a. One year experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

b. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

- Monticello Radiation Safety Procedures

- Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures:

A. 2 - 108 A.2 - 403 A.2 - 201 A.2 - 404

, A.2 - 202 A.2 - 405 A.2 - 301 A.2 - 407 A.2 - 302 A.2 - 409 ,

A.2 - 303 A.2 - 410 -

' A.2 - 304 A.2 - 411

• s- A.2 - 401 A.2 - 502 A.2 - 402 A.2 - 601 4 2. Order of Succession a.

b

c. DELETED' d.

e.

3. Duties

a. Emergency exposure control

b. Contamination Control

c. Emergency surveys

d. Personnel and vehicle monitoring

e. Personnel and equipment decontamination -

VI. Support Group

. I The Support Group consists of all plant office personnel and all plant QA l personnel.

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' Proccdure A.2-001 Revision '6 '

Page 12 of 19 '

A. Support Group Leader

(

1. Qualifications

a. One year experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant;

b. Demonstrated ability in supervisory skills;

c. Knowledgeable or qualified in following areas:

A.2 - 501 A.2 - 503 A.2 - 502 A.2 - 106

2. Order of Succession

a. I b'

c. DE'ETED

d. -

e.

3. Duties e

a. Assign group personnel to provide' administrative support, document control and document retrieval;

b. Assure that TSC is staffed adequately. (

c. Coordinate and provida personnel for logistics functions

d. Act as TSC Coordinator and be responsible for cor.doct of .

Procedure A.2-106, Activation of the Technical Support --

Center.

B. Emergency Document Control Coordinator

1. Qualifications

a. Thorough understanding of Morticello document and record control system;

b. Knowledge of physical storage locations of plant documents and records; WP/kk ,

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2. Order of Succession .

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a.  ! *

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d. ' '

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3. Duties -

Y

a. Provide document retrieval support for.TSC.and-0SC;

_ b. Assist Support Group Leader with records control in TSC area.

VII. Security Group  ;

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The Security Group consists of all plant Security and Services personnel

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and the contract security force.

f A. Security Group Leader

1. Qualifications

a. Two years experience at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant f '

b. Knowledgeable or. qualified in following areas:

Il - Monticello Security Plan s

7 - Safeguards Contingency Plan & Implementing Procedures

- Emergancy Plan Implementing Procedures: .

i' A.2 - 205 i

A.2 - 301 '

A.2 - 302

2. Order of Succession i

i i

b DELETED' I. C. t i d.

3. Duties- '

i

a. Carry out plant security and access control functions

b. Maintain strict personnel accountability onsite.  %

i VIII. Emergency Team Personnel L If-required by procedure or for other purposes, an Emergency Team will be selected from available personnel.

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IX. Miscellaneous Positions A. Emergency Planning Coordinator -

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1. Qualifications

a. Health physics background or_ health physics expertise on j staff.

b. Five years experience at nuclear power plant.

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c. Two years experience at Monticello,

2. Designated Emergency Planning Coordinator

Mathiasen, G.

G. Eme.gency Preparedness Instructors

1. Qualifications

a. Knowledgeable in Plant and Corporate Plans and Implementing Procedures.

I b. Demonstrated ability in instructing methods. -

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.c. Thoroughly familiar with subject matter of instruction. (-)

[ 2. Qualified Personnel

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4 Personnel approved by Monticello Training Superintendent i C. Assembly Point Coordinator

1. _ Qualifications See Qualifications for Shift Emergency Communicator

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2. Qualified Personnel N

See Qualified Personnel for Shift Emergency Communicator

.3. Duties -

a. Assume control of operational Assembly Point

b. Ensure proper radiological surveys are conducted

c. Conduct accountability procedure as required

d. Maintain communications between Assembly Point and TSC D. TSC Coordinator (See Support Group Leader),

E. Radiation Protection Coordinator

1. Qualifications - Experience as Radiation Protection Coordinator during normal operation.

.; 2. Qualified Personnel

a. I

. b:

c DELETED 7 ! .

. d.

A. e.

3. Duties Responsible for conduct of Procedure A.2-108, Access Control -

During Emergencies.

F. Technical Communicator

1. Qualifications -

a. Experience at Monticello '

b. Systems. expertise

2. Qualified Personnel This position will be filled by designating the most qualified person from among available candidates. The Emergency Director-will be responsible for. assuring that this position is adequately staffed.

3. Duties

a. Continuously maintains an open telephone communications link-between the Control Room, TSC, and' EOF.

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Revision 6 .

Page 16 of 19 ,

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b'. Communicate technical information between response centers.

c. If located in TSC, post information on Status board.

] X. Response Center Staffing A. TSC Staffing

1. Emergency Director - In charge

2. Group Leaders.

a. Radiological. Emergency Coordinator

b. Engineering. Group Leader

. c. Operations Group Leader *

d. Maintenance Group Leader

e. Support Group Leader (TSC Coordinator)

f. Security Group Leader If primary designate is not available, this individual may be required to stay in Control Room.

3. Communicators

.. a. Lead TSC Communicator

b. Assistant TSC Communicator (offsite notification) (2)

c. Technical Communicator (3-way to EOF and CR) J

d. Assistant TSC Communicator (for Emergency Dir'ector)

4. Auxiliary Staff

a. Monitoring Section Leader .

A

b. Offsite Dose Assessment and Chemistry Section leader

c. Engineering Assistant

d. Security Assistant

e. Emergency Document Control Coordinator.

f. Recorder ,

g. Off-Site Survey Team Controller

h. Dose Projection. Communicator B. OSC Staffing i

1. OSC Coordinator - In Charge

2. Standby Personnel

a. All unassigned RPS.

.- b. Extra Operators (i.e., not assigned to Control Room) c.- .I&CS Supervisor, Coordinator and Specialists.

r

d. Maintenance Supervisors, Chief Electrician, Station Electricians, Machinists, Welders, Repairmen, and Riggers.

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Proceduce A.2-001

, Revision 6 .

Page 17 of 19 .

3. Communicator (To be designated by OSC Coordinator if needed)

C. Control Room Staffing

1. Site Superintendent - In Charge

2. Assistance

a. Shift Supervisor

b. Shift Operators

c. Additional operators assigned to Control Room

c. STA

3. Technical Communicator (CR to TSC)

4. Technical Support Center personnel as directed by Eme,gency Director REFERENCES

1. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan

2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Operations Manuals

3. NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio- I

_ logical Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

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Procedure A.2-001 Revision 6 Page 19 of 19 l

FIGURE 2 HEALTH PHYSICS GROUP ORGANIZATION i

Dmrgency Dmrgency Manager Director

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Rad. Prot. Radiological Support . _ _ _ _ _ Dmrgency Supervisor Coordinator C h isti'f tenitoring -

Section Isader Section Icader Projection ,

Ccmnunicater Off-Site Dase Assess-n Off-Site Fbnitor -

Access Centrol Chertistry Coordinator * #

hchnicians gl}er T & lcians Technicians Staffed during initial stage of emrgency.

After B3F activation, Off-Site Fbnitoring Team dissolves.

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. Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 .

, Page 1 of 46 l l -

Op. Com. Rev. Req'd. Yes X No Q.A. Review Reg'd, Yes No X ALARA Review Reg'd. Yes No X CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES A.2-101 l

Prepared by: ddM b ~

ALARA Review: Revision 0 Date 03/31/81 Reviewed by: %.4} d b Q.A. Review: Revision 0 Date 03/31/81  ;

OperationsComNitteeFinalReview: Meeting Number , /S.O 3 Date S//9/93 Approved by: kdM Date 5 20-23

, Op. Com. Results~ Review: Not Required Mtg. # 946 Date 03/20/81-l PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify conditions or groups of conditions that indicate an emergency exists and the actions to be taken by the Shift Supervisor or Control Room Operators to verify and classify the type of emergency condition.

CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of-the initiating events described in the appendices of this procedure is occurring or has occurred. -

PRECAUTIONS

! A. There are many indications of an emergency condition that may occur either

. individually, in group events or sequentially. The operator or Shift Super-visor must be careful not to rely on any one indication as being absolutely -  ?

indicative'of an emergency condition. Although the operator should believe indications and take action based on those indications, he snall attemot to verify indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators. Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions is necessary to ensure that

' the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, .

or as more definitive information is obtained.

B. None'of the actions specified in the EPIP's shall take precedence over the actions that are necessary to comply with Technical Specifications.

ORGANIZATION 1 'A . Overall Responsibility - Emergency Director B. In Charge Control' Room - Shift Supervisor i.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision.5 Page 2 of 46 C. Assistance

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Reactor Operator Shift Technical Advisor when assigned Shift Emergency Communicator DISCUSSION A. Definitions

1. Emeroency Condition - An occurrence, or combination of events and indica-tions that fall into one of the following classifications:

a. Notification of Unusual Event Unusual events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

b. ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of .-

the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near site boundary' .

d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

2. Emeroency Action Levels (EAL) - Numerical or qualitative values for the operational or radiological parameters, (radiological dose rates; water borne or surface deposited concentrations of radioactivity; specific instrument indications or changes in indications) that may be used as threshholds for initiating procedures or actions to assess and verify plant conditions and may require initiating specific emergency procedures as designated by a particular class of emergency.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 3 of 46 B. Reccanition Attached to this procedure is Attachment 2, Event Recognition Guidelines (1-30). These guidelines identify the four emergency classifications, the possible initiating event (s), emergency action levels for each classifica-tion, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency. The identified instruments and alarms are a representative listing of various instruments that may be used to verify an emergency condition. There are many process variables referred to in the guidelines.

The instruments, indications, or alarms listed for any particular event are not necessarily a complete list of all those that will show abnormal indi-cations or be useful in classifying the event. There is typically more than one instrument or instrument channel that monitors a specific parameter.

The redundant channels and coincident indicators should all be used to verify the emergency condition.

The emergency action levels specified in the guidelines do not necessitate initiation of any particular phase of the emergency plan but rather signify a need for assessment and classification of conditions. In many cases, the proper classification will be immediately apparent from in plant instrumen-tation. In others, further assessment is necessary to determine the appli-cable emergency classification.

The plant operating staff should consider the effect that combinations of initiating events have, that if taken individually would constitute a lower emergency classification but collectively may exceed the criteria for a higher classification.

In the Unusual Event classification, numerous EALs are related to limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) as specified in Technical Specifications. -

In these cases, the EAL is not considered exceeded and an emergency condition does not exist if the appropriate corrective action for exceeding the LC0 is taken. The EAL is exceeded and sa Unusual Event has occurred if the event results in a forced shutdown by the LCO.

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j. Pro'cedure A.2-101' i

Rev.sion.5 '

Page 4 of 46 '

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< RESPONSIBILITIES A. -Emercency Director (Shift' Suoervisor)

1. Prior to EOF activa'. ion, the Emergency Director shall declare the appropriate emergency condition as soon as the event has been indicated and verified.

, After EOF activation, the Emergency Director shall notify the Emergency Manager when change in classification is indicated and verified.

2. After the emergency condition has been declared, the Emergency Director

is responsible for implementing the actions as specified in the follow-ing procedures:

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a. Notification cf an unus'ual Event, ,

'-102

b. Alert, A.2-103

c. Site Area Emergency, A.2-104

, d. General Emergency, A.2-105 .

$ B. Control Room Ooerator

4. .

- I 1. The centrol room operator shall immediately notify the Shift Supervisor of any events that may be classified as emergency conditions.

2. The operator shall attempt to verify any indications. -

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3. The operator shall assist the Shift Supervisor in assessing the J indications and determining the classification of emergency.

_ $ 4. The operator shall take immediate actions as dictated by plant procedures and his general knowledge to control the event and place the plant in a safe...

condition.

C. Shift Technical Advisor The Shift Technical Advisor shall advise the Shift Supervisor in identifying the event.

1.

D. Shift Emergency Communicator The Shift Emergency Commuiicator shall assist the Shift Supervisor in event classification.

PROCEDURE STEP 1: Verify the initial ~ indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument _ channels or to related parameters, physical observations, and field reports, as appl.icable.

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Procedure A.2-101 l

' Revision 5 -

.' Page 5 of 46

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STEP 2: If the situation is clearly an emergency at this point and the SEC is

. likely asleep in the SEC Trailer, contact the SEC and instruct the SEC to make initial notifications to the State and Counties from the SEC Trailer. (Thise notifications shall be made within 15 minutes of emergency declaration.)

Summon the STA and the SEC, if not already notified.

STA-' Pager  !

House DELETED i SEC: Pager DELETED l House i STEP 3: Use Attachment 1 to identify any Guidelines applicable to the initiating condition.

STEP 4: Locate the applicable guideline sheets in Attachment 2.

STEP 5: Determine the appropriate emergency classification by comparing the verified plant parameters to the EALs for each emergency condition. If more tnan one guideline is applicable to the initiating condition, use the guideline which indicates the most severe classification.

Initiate Form 5790-101-1, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHECKLIST (Attachment 3).

STEP 6 If the EOF is not activated, declare the appropriate emergency and implement the corresponding response procedure. If the EOF is activated, contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. If a change is to be made, implement the corresponding proce-dure. (The Emergency Manager will declare the new classification.) .

a. Notification of Unusual Event, A.2-102

b. Alert, A.2-103

c. Site Area Emergency, A.2-104

d. General Emergency, A.2-105 STEP 7: Continue to assess the events and, if necessary, the emergency classifi-cation, as more definitive information becomes available or if plant conditions change significantly.

REFERENCES

1. NSP Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Plant Emergency Plan

2. NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Flan and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"

3. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation Part 50, Appendix E ATTACHMENTS 1

1. Attachment 1, List of Initating Condition Categories

. 2. Attachment 2, Guidelines for Classification of Emergency Conditions

3. Example of Emergency Classification Checklist WP/kk

Procedure A.2-101

• Revision 5 ,

Page 6 of 46 ,

/

Attachment 1 s

'T l , List of Initiatina Condition Cateaories '

Initiating Condition Guideline Radioactive effluents-high release rate or unmonitored --- 1 Increase in plant radiation levels ----------------------- 2

+

Release or loss of control of radioactive material within

plant ---------------------------------------------------- 2 Fuel handling accident ----------------------------------- 2 Reactor pressure high ------------------------------------ 3 Re acto r co o l a n t l eak ------------------------------------- 4 Main steam line break ------------------------------------ 5 Fuel cladding degradation -------------------------------- 6 High coolant or off gas activity ------------------------- 6' 1

FSAR transient (Control Rod Drop) ------------------------ 6

! Safety relief valve failure ------------------------------ 7 4

ECCS i n i t i a ti o n ------------------------------------------ 8 Los s o f p rima ry contai nment ------------------------------ 10

(~)

4 Loss of engineered safety or fire protection features ---- 11 -

Failure of RPS to initiate or complete scram ------------- 12 Loss of plant shutdown or shutdown cooling capability ---- 13 Loss of indicators or alarms (annunciators) -------------- 14 ~

Co ntro l room evacuati o n ---------------------------------- 15

Toxic or flammable gas ----------------------------------- 16 Security compromise -------------------------------------- 17 Lo s s o f A C p owe r - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - ,- - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - 18 Loss of DC power ----------------------------------------- 19 Tornado or sustained winds -------------------------------' 20 Flood or low water --------------------------------------- 21 Earthquake ----------------------------------------------- 22 Fire ----------------------------------------------------- 23 Explosion ------------------------------------------------ 24 Aircraft or missiles ---------- .-------------------------- '

25 Train accident ------------------------------------------- 26 1 -

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Procedure A.2-101

. Revision 5 -

Page 7 of 46 l

Attachment 1 (Cont'd.)

i

. List of Initiatino Condition Cateaories 1

l

) Initiating Condition Guideline Contaminated injury -------------------------------------- 26 Turbine failure ------------------------------------------ 26 General emergency ---------------------------------------- 28 Other plant conditions ----------------------------------- 29 Spent fuel, major damage to ------------------------------ 30

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, Procedure A.'2-101

' Revision.5 '

Pacje 8 of 46 ' '

ATTACHMENT 2 Guideline 1 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT-i UNUSUAL EVENT

Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded.

EAL's

1. Discharge Canal Monitor exceeds 20 cps.

'(High alarm annunciated on C04-A-22, DISCHARGE CANAL RADIATION, and recorded by C02-17.358)

I E

2. Unconitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10CFR20 App. B limits.

E

3. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 90,000 pCi/s'ec.

, (Hi-Hi-alarm annunciated on C259-A-1, STACK EFFLUENT HI-HI RfDIATION; i

recorded on C257 and C258 (RR 7858A and RR 78588), STACK NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE;.and alarmed by computer point D-061.) -s '

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,. 4. Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 4500 pCi/sec.

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! 5. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or

?- suspected to exceed Appendix I Tech. Spec. limits.

j. ALERT 3

Radiological efflents u greater than 10 times technical specification instan-

.taneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />,'would result in about 1 mR at the site boundary under average meteorological condi-tions).

EAL's

1. Discharge Canal Monitor. exceeds 200 cps.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 9 of 46  :

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 1 (Cont'd.) RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT

2. Unmonitored liquid release to river which is 10 times the limits in 10CFR20 Appendix B.

EE

3. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+5 pCi/sec.

EE

4. Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 45,000 pCi/sec.

EI

5. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or expected to exceed 10 times Appendix I Tech Spec limits.

SITE AREA

a. Effluent .nonitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mR/hr for hour or greater than 500 mR/hr Whole Body for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteoroloay,

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g. ,

' radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs; or

c. EPA Protective Action Guidelines are projected to be exceeded outside the Site Boundary.

EAL's

1. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+5 pCi/sec for 30 minutes 2f

2. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+6 pCi/sec for 2 minutes EE

3. Stack release rate of radioiodines exceeds 1.7E+4 pCi/sec for 30 minutes 2f

4. Stack release rate of radioiodines exceeds 1.7E+5 pCi/sec for 2 minutes 2f

5. RBV Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 2.1E+4 pCi/sec for 30 minutes WP/kk ,

Procedure A.'2-1,01' Revision.5 Pag'e 10 of 46 ' '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 1 (Cont'd.) RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLOENT E

6. RBV Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 2.1E+5 pCi/sec for 2 minutes.

E

7. RBV release rate of radiciodines exceeds 2100 pCi/sec for 30 minutes E

8. RBV release rate of radiciodines exceeds 2.1E+4'pci/sec for 2 minutes E

9. Whole body doses greater th'an 1 Rem or thyroid doses of greater than 5 Rem are projected beyond the site boundary.

E

10. Containment Radiation Monitor reading indicates above the .01% curve when.

plotted versus time after shutdown on the graph shown in Figure 1. -

E

11. Measured W.B. dose rates at site boundary or beyond exceed 50 mR/hr for 30 minutes or 500 mR/hr for 2 minutes E

12. Radioiodine concentrations measured at site boundary or beyond exceed 7.0E-8 pCi/cc for 30 minutes or 7.0E-7 pCi/cc for 2 minutes.

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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1 Procedure A.2-101 i

' ' Revision 5 ~

Page 11 of 46 FIGURE 1 Percent of Fuel Inventory Airborne in the Containment 10 ,

1004 Fuel Inventory = 1004 Noble Cases

+ 25% Iodine 2c 7 + 14 particulates

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Time After Shuldater. (Hrs) 4 Fuel Inventory Approxfr. ate Source and Damage Estimate Released 100. 1004 TID-14844, 10Cl fuel da= age, potential core melt.

50. 50% TID noble gases, TMI source.

10. 104 TID, 100% NRC gap activity, total clad failure, partial core uncovered.

3. 34 TID, 100% WASH-1400 gap activity, major clad failure.

1. ItTD, 10% NRC gap, Max. 10% clad failure.

.1 .14 TID, 14 NRC gap, 11 clad failure, local heating of 5-10 fuel asse blies.

.01 .01% TD, .It"NRC gap, clad failure of 3/4 fuel ele =ent (36 rods).

10-3 .01% NRC gap, clad failure of a few rods.

10-4 100% coolant release with spiking.

p 5x10-6 2004 coolant inventory release.

10-6 Upper range of normal airborne noble gas activity in containment.

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Procedure A.'2-101'

, Rev.ision 5 ,

Page 12 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) '

Guideline 2 IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable ALERT Severe degradation in control of radioactive materials.

EAL l 1. Increase by factor of 1000 in plant radiation levels as indicated by Area

Radiation Monitoring System:

l Panel Description Normal EAL C-11 A-1 Refuel Floor Low Range 2 Full scale C-11 A-2 Refuel Floor High Range 5 5000 C-11 .A-3 Refuel Floor S.W. Stairway 1 1000 C-11 A-4 New Fuel Storage 20 Full scale C-11 A-5 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tk Area 20 Full scale -

T-C-11 A-6 1001' Rx South 3 Full scale / '

C-11 A-7 985' Sample Hood 5 Full scale C-11 A-8 Rx Cleanup System Access 0.25- 250 C-11 A-9 962' Rx Tool Storage Area 0.8 800 ..'

C-11 A-10 East CR0 Module Area 7 Full scale C-11 A-11~ West CRD Module Area 3 Full scale l

C-11 A-12 TIP Drive Area 2 Full scale ,

C-11 A-13 TIP Cubicle 30 Full scale-C-11 A-14 HPCI Turbine Area 2 Full scale.

C-11 A-15 Rx. Bldg Drain Tk Area 25 Full scale

C-11 A-16 RCIC Pump Area .1 1000

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C-11 A-17 East C.S. and RHR Area 10 Full scale '

l ~C-11 A-18 West C.S. and RHR Area 5 Full. scale C-11 A-19 Hot Lab 0.25 250 l; C-11 A-20 Control Room Low Range 0.02 20 1

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. Procedure A.2-101

, Revision 5 Page 13 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 2 (Cont'd.) IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVEL Panel Description Normal EAL C-11 A-21 Control Room High Range 3 3000 C-11 B-1 Turbine Operating Floor 20 Full scale C-11 B-2 Turbine Front Standard 10 Full scale C-11 B-3 Cond Demin Operating Area 1 1000 C-11 B-4 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Rm 9 Full scale C-11 B-5 Feedwater Pump Area 1 1000 C-11 C-1 Radwaste Control Room 0.2 200 C-11 C-2 Sample Tank Area 2 Full scale C-11 C-3 Conveyor Operating Area 0.2 200 C-11 0-1 Hot Machine Shop 0.2 200 C-252 E-1 Recombiner Instrument Room 2 Full scale C-252 E-2 Recombiner Pump Room 2 Full scale C-252 F-1 Offgas Storage Foyer 0.1 100 C-11 F-2 Offgas Storage Foyer High Range (100 100 C-257 & C-258 Containment Radiation Monitor 50 R/hr NOTE: EAL's shown as FULLSCALE indicate that an increase by a factor of 1000 is beyond the range of the particular monitor. In these -

cases, a fullscale reading combined with the Shift Supervisor's concurrence, shall meet the criteria for the ALERT classification.

2E

2. Direct measurement of radiation levels corresponding to an increase by a factor of 1000.

SITE AREA Not applicable GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101' Revision.5 , , ,

Page 14 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 3 REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Reactor Pressure exceeds safety limit (1335 psig).

Instrument Description EAL C05-FPR 6/97 Reactor Wide Range Pressure Recorder 1200 C05-6.90 A/B Reactor Pressure Indicators 1200 Verify 1335 psig exceeded by checking pressure indicator PI 2-3-608 on C56.

ALERT Not Applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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' Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 15 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 4 REACTOR COOLANT LEAK UNUSUAL EVENT Primary system leak rate exceeds technical specification.

EAL's

1. Unidentified leakage calculated from C4-FQ2543 or by computer point 0-122, Floor Orain Sump Rate of Change, exceeds 5 gpm 03

2. Identified leakage calculated from C4-FQ 2544 or from computer point 0-120, Equipment Drain Sump Rate of Change, exceeds 20 gpm.

93

3. Unidentified leakage rate increases 2 gpm within any 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> period as determined from Test #0381, CONTAINMENT COOLANT LEAKAGE LOG.

ALERT Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm.

EAL ,

1. Total leakage calculated from C4-FQ2543 and FQ-2544 or from computer points 0-120, Equipment Orain Sump Rate of Change, 0-122, Floor Orain Sump Rate of --

Change, exceeds 50 gpm.

SITE AREA Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity.

EAL's

1. Reactor water level (C05-2.3.85 A/B) decreasing below 1 foot above active fuel (-114 inches)

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.'2-101'  !

' Revision.5

• Page 16 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) .

)

Guideline 5 MAIN STEAMLINE BREAK j

UNUSUAL EVENT

.Not Applicable 4

ALERT l Steamline break with MSIV malfunction causing leakage to secondary containment.

, EAL's .

~

1. Shift Supervisor's opinion that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam flow with evidence that steam line break-is outside of primary containment (e.g. visual observation, radiation or temperature),

a.nd 2a. Annunciator alarms on MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW A/B (C05-A-25/26) and RX WATER LEVEL HI/LO (C05-B-24),

• or . .

-)

2b. Annunciator alarm MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE A/B (C05-A17/18) or

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2c. Annunciator alarm MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE (C05-B-32).

SITE AREA Main steam line break with failure of MSIV's to isolate leak and ' causing leakage outside.of secondary containment.

EAL's

!- 1. Shift Supervisor's opinion that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam flow with evidence that steam line break is outside'of primary containment and i

t 2a. Annunciator alarms on MAIN STEAM L'INE HIGH FLOW A/B (C05-A-25/26) and RX i

WATER LEVEL-HI/LO (C05-B-24)-

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. Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 17 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 5 (Cont'd.) MdIN STEAMLINE BREAK 2b. Annunciator alarm on MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE (C-5-A-17/18) or 2c. Annunciator alarm on MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE (C05-B-32) and 3a. Annunciator alarm on TURBINE BUILDING HIGH RADIATION ALARM (C04-A-21) or 3b. High airborne radioactive material levels in Turbine Bldg. indicated by air monitors or direct measurement or 3c. Visual observation that blow-out pancis between steam chase and turbine building have been ruptured.

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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6----- Procedure A.~2-10,l' Revision.5 ~

Page 18 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 6 -} I

)

FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION UNUSUAL EVENT Fuel damage indication EAL's

1. Offgas Radiation Monitor exceeds 20,000 mR/hr or-

2. Offgas Radiation Monitor increases by 4000 mR/hr within 30 minutes at steady power or

3. Reacto? coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 5 pCi/ gram as determined by sample and analysis.

ALERT Severe loss of fuel cladding.

a. High offgas at air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/sec; corresponding to 16 isotopes cecayed 30 minutes) or

b. Very hIgh coolant activity sample (e.g. , 300 pCi/cc equivalent of I-131)

EAL's )

1. Offgas Radiation Monitor exceeds 200,000 mR/hr or

2. React 3r coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 300 pCi/gm as determined by sample and analysis. -

or

3. Main Steam Line monitor initiates trip due to high radiation.

NOTE: Resin intrusion may cause high radiation without fuel cladding damage.

SITE AREA Degraded Core with possible loss of coolable geometry EAL's

1. More than 1/3 of core uncovered as indicated by reactor water level below

-174 inches and

2. a. Reactor coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 3000 pCi/gm as determined by sample and analysis.

or

b. InabiTIty to insert control rods fully or

c. InabiTIty to position SRM's or IRM's within core.

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

WP/kk

Procedure A.2-101

' Revision 5 Page 19 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

( Guideline 7 SAFETY RELIEF VALVE FAILURE l

t UNUSUAL EVENT Failure of a safety relief valve to close following reduction of applicable pressure.

EAL's Auto Blowdown Relief Valve Leakage Alarm, C03-A-09 or SRV Open Alarm, C05-A-54 ALERT Not applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY

~~~

Not applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY ...

As specified in Guideline 28.

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M. %L Procedure A.'2-101'

' Revision.5 '

• Page 20 of 46' -

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

, }

' Guideline 8 ECCS INITIATION UNUSUAL EVENT 1

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated and discharge to vessel.

EAL's la. RHR flow to reactor as indicated by RHR FLOW A/B Indicator, 1

C03-10.13cA/B or

~

lb. Core spray flow to reactor as indicated by CORE SPRAY FLOW A/B Igdicator,C03-14.50A/B or Ic. HPCI flow to reactor as indicated by HPCI FLOW Indicator, C03-FIC 23-108 or ld. APRS actuation as indicated by annunciator AUTO. BLOWDOWN TIMERS ACTIVATE 4

i (3-A-25) and subsequent S/RV OPEN (5-A-54) annunciator and

2. Shift Supervisor's opinion that an emergency should be declared. ..

ALERT Not Applicable i

SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY See Guideline 28.

4 #

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Procedure A.2-101

, Rcvision.5 l Page 21 of 46  ;

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 10 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications.

EAL's Plant shutdown is required by any one of the following limiting conditions for operation:

a. TS 3.7.A - Primary Containment; or

b. TS 3.7.B - Standby Gas Treatment System; or

c. TS 3.7.C - Secondary Containment; or

d. TS 3.7.0 - Primary Containment Isolation Valves ALERT Not Applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedur4 A.2-101' Revision.5

i ,

Page 22 of 46 '

, ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. ) ~].'

/

.. Guideline 11 LOSS OF ESF OR

, FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM UNUSUAL EVENT J' 1. Loss of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) or fire protection system requiring shutdown by Technical Specifications. The following is a list of operable ESF and fire protection subsystems necessary to meet LCO:

l Core Spray System Low Pressure _ Coolant Injection Subsystem 5-Containment Cooling Capability (RHR Service Water System)

High Pressure Coolant ~ Injection System i

Automatic Pressure Relief Diesel Generator System ',

. )

Fire Protection System Standby. Liquid Control System i- ALERT I

Not Applicable i

SITE AREA EMERGENCY i- Not Applicable f

[ GENERAlzEMERGENCY As'specified in' Guideline 28.

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, . Revision 5 -

Page-23 of 46

, ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 12. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE

.i UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable r

, ALERT Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical.

EAL's Valid Scram Signal and Nauti'on count rate indicates reactor critical.

~

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

! Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram (continued power operation but no core damage immediately evident.)

EAL's Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods and 3 Failure of the standby liquid control system and Shift _ Supervisor's opinion that a transient is in progress j and i

No indication of core damage (if core damage indicated, call a general

-emergency)

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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- Procedure A.2-101' Ravision 5 *

} Pag'e 24 of 46 ' '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

}

Guideline 13 LOSS OF PLANT SHUTDOWN OR SHUTOOWN COOLING CAPABILITY UNUSUAL EVENT '

1 Not Applicable ALERT Complete loss of ability to achieve or maintain cold shutdown.

EAL's

1. Loss of both RHR SW Loops or loss 3Y both RHR Systems Shutdown cooling mode of operation or Loss 87 both RHR LPCI modes of operation and loss of both core spray systems.

AND/OR

2. Shift Supervisor's opinion that plant cannot reach or maintain cold shutdown.

SITE AREA

, 'i Complete loss of ability to achieve or maintain hot shutdown .

EAL's

1. Inability to SCRAM and inoperable Standby Liquid Control System ..;

and

2. Loss of all safety relief valve capability or ,

Inoperable RHR System

• or

?

Inoperable RHR heat sink and

3. Loss of main condenser cooling er

, No makeup capability from either HPCI or RCIC systems.

AND/0R

4. Shift Supervisor's opinion that plant cannot reach or maintain hot shutdown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY

~As specified in Guideline 28. ,

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Procedure A.2-101

, Revision 5 .

Page 25 of 46 9

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 14 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION NOTE: Indication of alarm or instrumentation failure may be difficult to determine. A failure of normally lighted indicators or the failure of certain alarms to annunciate during a surveillance procedure may provide an initial warning. A cause of annunciator failure, and thus an indication of failure, could be a loss of the uninterruptable MG set and no transfer to CKT Y10.

UNUSUAL EVENT Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in the Control Room to an extent requiring plant shutdown.

ALERT Loss of most or all annunciators (on panels C03, C04, COS, C08) sustained for

> 15 minutes with the plant not in cold shutdown.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Loss of most or all annunciators (on panels C03, C04, C05, C08) > 15 minutes and plant transient initiated or in progress.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

4 e

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. Procedure A.2-101

. Revision 5 '

Page 26 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)  ;

Guideline 15 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable ALERT Evacuation of the Control Room is required or anticipated and control of shutdown systems has been established at local stations. (If local control has not been established in 15 minutes, go to SITE AREA.)

EA!:

As determined by on-duty Shift Supervisor.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY Evacuation of Control Room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes. ,

EAL As determined by on-duty Shift Supervisor.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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. Procedure A.2-101

• Revision 5 .

Page 27 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 16 T0XIC/ FLAMMABLE GASES UNUSUAL EVENT Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release.

EAL Gaseous hazards being experienced or pro,iected onsite (out-of p1 nt) as indicated by visual observation, physical measurement or notification.

ALERT Entry into facility environs of uncontrolled toxic or flammable gases.

EAL's Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within the plant as indicated by measured concentrations equal to or greater than:

(a) 3 ppm chlorine; or

, (b) explosive levels (as detected by explosive meter).

SITE AREA Entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas or entry of uncontrolled --

toxic gases into vital areas where lack of access to the area constitutes a safety problem and plant is not in cold shutdown.

EAL's

1. Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within vital areas of the plant as indicated by measured concentration equal to or greater than:

a) 3 ppm chlorine; or b) explosive levels (as detected by explosive meter) and

2. Plant not in cold shutcown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101' Revision 5 Page 28 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) )

Guideline 17 SECURITY COMPROMISE UNUSUAL EVENT Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.

EAL Shift supervisor's opinion.

ALERT Ongoing security compromise.

EAL Security safeguards contingency event that results in adversaries commandeering an area of the plant, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas.

SITE AREA ,

Imminent loss of physical control of the plant.

~

EAL ~

Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the control room, auxiliary shutdown panels, and any other vital areas.

GENERAL Loss of physical control of the facility.

EAL l Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the control room or any other vital areas.

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. . Procedure A.2-101

' ' Revision 5 Page 29 of 46 -

4-ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline'18 LOSS OF AC POWER UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability.

EAL's

1. Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators:

3 :- C08-B-7 No. 1R Res Trans to No. 13 Bus Bkr Trip; and

.C08-C-08 No.- 1AR Res Trans to No. 15 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-11 No lAR Res Trans to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage indicated on Bus 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14, and 1AR Transformer' voltage meters on panel C8.

EI

- 2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be cperable by Technical Specifications. -

ALERT

, Loss of offsite power and loss ofall onsite AC power. (see Site Area Emergency 1

for exteaded loss) l' EAL's-

1. -Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators;

, C08-B-7 No. IR Res Trans to No.13 Eus Bk- Trip; and i .C08-C-08 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 15~ Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-11 No.1AR Res :Tras to No.16 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage indicated on Buss 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14 and 1AR Transformer voltage meters on panel-C8.

and

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be -

operable by Technical. Specifications.

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Procedure A.2-10.l'

, Rev.ision.5 , ,

Page 30 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

' )

Guideline 18 (Cont'd.) LOSS OF AC POWER SITE AREA Loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes.

EAL's t

1. Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators:

C08-B-7 No. 1R Res Trans to No. 13 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-08 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 15 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-ll No. lAR Res Tras to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage indicated on Buss 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14 and 1AR Transformer voltage meters on panel C8.

and

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications. -

and

3. 15 minute time lapse.

GENERAL EMERGENCV As specified in Guideline 28.

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. Procedure A.2-101 Ravision 5 ~

Page 31 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

-Guideline 19 LOSS OF DC POWER UNUSUAL EVENT

! Not applicable.

ALERT-Loss of all vital DC power. (See Site Area Emergency for extended loss.)

EAL's Loss of both 125V DC power sources and loss of 250V DC power source as indicated

by

4

1. Annunciators C08-A-20 250V Bus low Voltage; and

'C08-B-13 No. 12 125V DC Bus low Voltage; and

. C08-C-13 No. 11 125V DC Bus Low Voltage AND f

2. Shift Supervisors opinion that all vital DC power is lost or degraded voltages are measured at battery terminals. '

. SITE AREA

Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes.

EAL's -

Loss of both 125V DC power sources and loss of 250V DC power source as indicated by:

- 1. Annunciators C08-A-20 250V Bus low Voltage; and C08-B-13 No. 12 125V~DC Bus Low Voltage; and C08-C-13 No. 11 125V DC Bus Low Voltage AND

2. Shift Supervisors opinion that all vital DC power is lost or. degraded voltages are measured at battery. terminals.

AND

3. Lapse of.15 minutes.

GENERAL EMERGENCY j

'As specified in Guideline 28.  !

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Procedure A.2-1Dl' Revision 5 , ,

i

- Page 32 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 20 TORNADO OR SUSTAINED WINDS

' UNUSUAL EVENT Any tornado on-site.

'EAL's A tornado is observed to touch down within site boundary i

. or Sustained winds above 75 mph for greater than 10 minutes at the site.

ALERT Tornado striking facility.

EAL's A tornado strikes a vital plant structure E

l Sustained winids above 90 mph for greater than 10 minutes at the site.

1 SITE AREA Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess cf design levels.

t EAL's

Tornado causes damage to vital plant equipment or structures E- .

j Sustained winds above'100 mph for' greater than 10 minutes at-the site.

GENERAL EMERGENCY

[

As specified in Guideline 28.'

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Procedure A.2-101 1

, , Revision 5 Page 33 of 46

~

i ATTACHMENT 2 (Co'nt'd.)

Guideline 21 RIVER WATER HI/ LOW

[. UNUSUAL EVENT

~ 1. River water level in excess of 918 Feet

12. River flow below 240 CFS (about 902.4 FT river-level) l t

. ALERT

. 1. River water level between 921 and 930 FT.

2. River flow below 220 CFS (about 902.3 FT).

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. River water level exceeds 930 FT.

~

2. River water level below 899 FT.

3. Flood or low water caules damage to vital equipment.

1 GENERAL EMERGENCY' --

l As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 34 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) 'T

~

Guideline 22 ,

EARTHQUAKE UNUSUAL EVENT Any earthquake felt in plant or detected on station seismic instrumentation, and subsequently confirmed by one or more off-site sources.

EAL's

1. Alarm C06-C-8, EARTHQUAKE 2E

2. 55ift Supervisor's opinion ALERT Confirmed earthquake greater than OBE levels.

EAL Alarm C06-C-13, OPERATIONAL BASIS EARTHQUAKE SITE AREA ,

Confirmed earthquake greater than DBE levels and plant not in cold shutdown.

EAL's Alarm C06-C-18, DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE a_gd Plant not in cold shutdown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY l

As specified in Gudeline 28.

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f' . Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 35 of 46 -

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline'23 FIRE UNUSUAL EVENT Fire within plant lasting more than 10 minutes after initiation of fire fighting.

4

j. EAL a

Fire Brigade Leader's determination.

4 ALERT i Fire potentially affecting safety systems.

EAL's i

I Observation that fire could affect safety system; ajLd

/- Shift Supervisor's opinion.

i SITE AREA i

Fire compromising the. functions of safety systems. - -

EAL's

Observation of fire that affects safety systems or functions; i

and -

r-I Shift Supervisor's opinion.

GENEAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Pro'cedure A.2-101

. Revision 5 ,

Page 36 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) T Guideline 24 EXPLOSION UNUSUAL EVENT Near or On-site explosien.

EAL Visual observation or notification received; and Shift Supervisor's opinion.

ALERT Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation.

EAL ,

Shift Supervisor's opinion.

SITE AREA Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from explosion or missiles. -

~

EAL's Plant not in cold shutdown and Shift Supervisor's opinion GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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, Procedure A.2-101

', , Revision 5 _

Page 37 of 46 1

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 25 AIRCRAFT & MISSILES UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Aircraft crash onsite or suspicious aircraft activity over facility.

EAL Visual observation or notification is received.

ALERT Aircraft crash on the facility or missile impacts on facility.

EAL Visual observation SITE AREA

a. Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire.

b. Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion.

EAL As determined by Shift Supervisor with plant not in cold s5utdown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY ...

As specified in Guideline 28.

WP/kk

Pro'cedure ' A. 2-10.I'

' Revision.5 '

• Page 38 of 46-ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) ]. .

, Guideline 26 MISCELLANEOUS UNUSUAL EVENT

a. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital.

i

b. Train derailment on site.

2

c. Turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown.

EAL's

. 1. Visual observation E

2. Shift Supervisor's opinion ALERT Turbine failure causing casing penetration. -

EAL's

1. Visual observation and .

2. Shift Supervisor's opinion 1

[ SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY i

As specified in Guideline 28.

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. . Page 39 of 46 1

ATTACMENT 2 (Cont'd.) -

Guideline 28 ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERAL.EHERGENCY i

a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem /hr W.B. or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions.

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters

, (e.g.,-radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are measured in the environs.

EAL's l .' Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch. A or B) exceeds:

1.3E+8 pCi/sec in stability class A 1.9E+8 pCi/sec in stability class B 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class C 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class D 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class E 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class F RE

2. RSV Effluent Monitor exceeds: '

9.6E+7 pCi/see in stability class A 3.1E+7 pCi/sec in stability class B 1.5E+7 pCi/sec in stability class C l 7.1E+6 pCi/sec in stability class D 4.4E+6 pCi/sec in stability class E ~'

2.8E+6 pCi/sec in stability class F

3. Stack radiciodine release rate exceeds

2.3E+6 pCi/sec in stability class A 2.6E+6 pCi/sec in stability class B 3.4E+6 pCi/sec in stability class C

. 4.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class D l 4.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class E t I

5.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class F-I' WP/kk B

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 ,

Page 40 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY 4 RBV radiciodine release rate exceeds:

1.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class A 6.0E+5 pCi/sec in stability class B 3.0E+5 pCi/sec in stability class C 1.4E+5 pCi/sec in stability class D 8.6E+4 pCi/sec in stability class E 5.6E+4 pCi/sec in stability class F or

5. Release rate projection based on Containment Radiation Monitor exceeds any of the values in 1 or 2 above or

6. Dose rates of 1 rem /hr W.B. are measured at the site boundary or beyond or

7. Radiciodine concentrations measured at the site boundary or beyond exceed 7E-6 pCi/cc.

NOTE: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or prajected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> or EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels are predicted to be exceeded at larger '

distances.

c. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of ,

3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure and high potential for loss of containment).

EAL's

1. Cailure of fuel cladding as evidenced by gap activity in reactor coolant (> 300 pCi/ gram I-131 dose equivalent) or presence of gap activity in primary containment atmosphere.

and Failure of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by:

I high drywell pressure; or high drywell temperature; or

[ failure of MSIV's to isolate; or -

I safety relief valve stuck open; or gap activity in primary containment atmosphere and WP/kk

Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 Page 41-of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY Potential loss of containment as evidenced by:

containment temperature or pressure approaching design limits (281 F and 56 psig) and increasing; or loss of containment cooling; or Shift Supervisor's opinion that loss of containment is likely.

4 NOTE 1: Failure of MSIV's to isolate constitutes a loss of both primary coolant boundary and containment. When this is combined with cladding failure, all three barriers have been lost.

NOTE 2: In situations of:

a) Small or large LOCA with failure of ECCS to perform, or b) Loss of requisite decay heat removal systems (RHR and other heat sinks) following shutdown, loss of containment should be judged to be likely.

, 2. Failure of fuel cladding (per guidelina 6) -

I and 1

i Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment penetrations

, required for isolation not valved off or closed; or Shift Supervisors opinion that containment has failed - -

l and Potential loss of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by reactor pressure near design limits and increasing or lots of ECCS. ,

3. Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment peretratiers required for isolation not valved off or closed or Shift Supervisor's opinion and Failure of primarj coolant boundary as evidenced by high drywell-pressure or temperature-or failure of MSIV's to isolate or stuck open safety relief valve and i Potential for loss of cladding as evidenced by ECCS failure or reactor water level low and decreasing.

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Pro'cadure A.2-10,1

, Rev,ision.5 ,, ,

Page 42 of 46 -

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) 'N

)

GUIDELINE 28 (Cont'd.) 'ALLGUIDELINES'-GENER'ALEMERGE'N NOTE: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. If more than fuel gap activity released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.

i

d. Loss of physical control of the plant.

NOTE: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.

e. Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release  ;

of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation. See the example BWR sequences.

NOTE: a. For core melt sequences where significant releases from containment are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. Consider 5 4

mile downwind evacuation (45 to 90 sector) if large amounts of fission products (greater than gaa activity) are in the containment atmosphere. Recommeni sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circumstance (radius 10 miles).

b. For core melt sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to j' a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not imminent and large amounts of fission prcducts in addition to noble gases are in the containment -

atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (45 to 90 sector).

c. For core melt sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment  ;

atmosphere and containment failure is judged imminent, recommend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot be completed before transport of activity to that location.

d. As release information becomes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time available to evacuate and estimated evacuation. times given current conditions.

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. Procedure A.2-101

, , , Revision 5 .

Page 43 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY Examole BWR Sequences

1. Transient (e.g., loss of off-site power) plus failure of requisite core shutdown systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.

2. Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform, leading to core degradation or melt in minutes to hours. Loss of containment integrity maj be imminent.

3. Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.

4. Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.

5. Any major internal or external events (e.g. , fires, earthquakes,

• substantially beyond design basis) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.

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Procedure A.2-101 Rev.ision 5 , ,

Page 44 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. )

Guideline 29 OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities.

2. Plant conditions exist that require shutdown under technical specifi-cation requirements.

3. Plant conditions exist that involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g. cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits or pipe cracking found during operation).

ALERT Plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of TSC and place-ment of EOF and other key emergency personnel on standby.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY Othee olint condit:cns exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams or precautionary notification to nearsite public.

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. Procedure A.2-101'

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EATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 30 MAJOR DAMAGE'TO SPENT FUEL 2

UNUSUAL ~ EVENT Not applicable i . ALERT

, - Not applicable SITE AREAL Major damage to spent fuel in containment (e.g., large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level).

,. EAL's

1. a. Decrease in fuel pool level below 36'9" confirmed by LT-2787, Spent Fuel Pool Level Hi/Lo alarm or

b. Dropping of heavy object onto spent fuel confirmed by direct observation 4

and l

2, Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Ch A or B )50 mR/hr (Confirmed by annunciator 5-A-1 or 5-A-2)- -

3 _ GENERAL ,

f' As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 5 - .

Page 46 of 46 ATTACHMENT 3 Form 5790-101-1 Rev. 1, 10/20/81 Page 1 of 1 Example of EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHECKLIST (For Use With Procedure A.2-101)

1. Initiating Condition:

ED Initials Time Date

2. Attachment 1 directs use of Guideline Number (s): .

ED Initials Time Date

3. Attachment 2 classification:

Declared

ED Initials Time Date

4. Implemented Procedure A.2- .

ED Initials Time Date '

NOTE: If reclassification be;on.es necessary, start a r.ew Emeroency Classification Checklist.

NOTE: After this checklist is completed and is not required for immediate use, it shall be placed in the appropriate container provided for Emergency Records.

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Procedure A.2-107 Revision 6 ~

Page 1 of-4

.. Op. Com. Rev. Req'd. Yes X No Q. A. Review Req'd. Yes No X

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ALARA Review Req'd. Yes No X ACTIVATION OF THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

A.2-107 REVIEW AND APPROVAL Prepared by: 1[("f owc ALARA Review Revision 0 Date 3/28/81 Reviewed by: CAMtd - Q. A. Review Revision 0 Date 3/28/81 Operations Committee Final Review: Meeting Number 1203 Date S/19/83 Approved by: b$M '

Date 6- Ao43 Op. Com. Results Review: Not Reauired Mtg.# 1056' Date 1/22/82 PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENTS This procedure provides specific information and instructions for the organiza-tion,. activation, operation and de-activation of the Operational Support Center (OSC) in support of the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant and NSP. Emergency Plan.

CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES An emergency condition entresponding to an Alert or a higher emergency classi-fication has been declared at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant as provided in the MNGP Emergency Plan.

PRECAUTIONS The OSC facilities may be used for normal daily operations as well as for training and energency drills, provided that these activities do not interfere with the immediate activation of the OSC or the continuing OSC operations in the event of an accident. OSC facility use during normal operation shall be limited to activities that will not degrade the level of OSC preparedness to react to '

accident situations and will not reduce OSC reliability.

GRGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES A. Emergency Director - Overall In-Charge B. Operational Support Center Coordinator - Responsible for implementation of this procedure.

DISCUSSION A. OSC FUNCTION The OSC will be the onsite area separate from the Control Room where predesignated operations support personnel will assemble.

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Procedure ~A.2'107 '

~ Revision 6- ' ' ' '

Page 2 of 4 I i B. Location

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The OSC location will be the I&C Shop on the second level of the Administra-tion Building.

C. Communications

1. Two (2) plant telephone extensions D. If the repair or corrective action must be performed in an area of the plant affected by a radiological emergency, the operation must be performed as expeditiously as possible to minimize the dose to the emergency team.

E. Rescue of a victim should take precedence over repair or corrective action,

, unless such actions are necessary to affect rescue.

i F. Emergency Team Members should be selected from volunteers if the operation involves high exposure or risk.

G. Equipment available for repair and corrective action may be obtained or is located in various areas on the Plant site and off-site facilities.

I 1. Location and Eauipment 1

a. Hot Shop: Lathe, Orill Press, Welder and Hand Tools

b. Cold Shop: Lathes, Milling Machine, Power. Saws Welders and Hand Tools. -

c. Wa*ehouse 1, 2 and 3: Pumps and parts for repair of plant equipment.

a. Fire Brigade Room (Basement North of New Administration): Equipment .

and Clothing for Fire Control.

e. SherCo Flant (about 15 miles away): Complete inventory of equipment and tools used in power plants.

f. Fab Shops: Welders and various tools used by Construction. (These l items may not always be available, depending on current level of construction activity on site.)

PROCEDURE NOTE: The following is a list of procedural steps for which the OSC Coordinator is responsible. Each step which contains the word

" continually" means that the steps should be repeated regularly L as needed while the OSC is in_ operation.

STEP 1 Ensure that communicati.on links are continuously manned. Obtain the services of a Shift Emergency Communicator, if needed.

I NOTE: Extension 1224 is the published OSC number.

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STEP 2 Continuously maintain accoentability for OSC personnel. Ensure that a list of all persons reporting to the OSC is prepared. Update the list as additional personnel report, are dispatched, or relieved.

1 STEP 3 If a plant evacuation is directed, ensure that OSC personnel insert their.

ID cards in the TSC card reader. Provide a list of OSC personnel (names and badge numbers), not currently present in the OSC, to the Security Group Leader.

]. STEP 4 Continually hold. briefings to update OSC personnel'on plant status.

STEP 5 When a work request is received from the TSC:

a. Form up a team for the job. Try to anticipate the requisite skills, but do not over-staff.

b. Fill out a Job Description, Fc m 5790-107-4 (Attachment 1). Direct j someone (not a team member) to make two copies and deliver the original to the RP Coordinator at Access Control.

, c. Ensure that team members are instructed thoroughly and are prepared to accomplish the task. Discuss types of tools and equipment needed, where or how to cbtain tools and equipment, possible alternatives

, fer accomplishing tarks, etc. Also, ensure that the Team Leader has instructions on how and to whom to report problems or job completion.

NOTE: An Emergency Document Control Coordinator should be available

to assist in finding drawings, manuals, etc. If not, contact Support Group Leader in TSC for assistance in this matter. ..

4 d. khen prepared,' dispatch the team to Access Control for final. radio-

! logical preparations. Log the dispatch time on the Job Description j form and update the accountability list. ,

STEP 6 Initiate and continuously maintain the OSC Log in accordance with A.2-502.

STEP 7 Keep the Maintenance Group Leader informed on status and events in OSC.

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Procbdure A.2-107, Revision 6 , ,

Page 4 of 4 Form 5790-107-4 Revision 0, 02/15/83 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 Example of JOB DESCRIPTION JOB:

LOCATION:

ESTIMATED DURATION: Minutes TEAM:

TLD NO. OMJ Team Dispatched: From OSC From Access Control NOTE: After this form is completed and is not required for immediate use, it shall be placed in the appropriate container provided for Emergency l

Records.

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', Procedure A.2-402

. . -' Rsvision 2 Page 1 of-8 '

Op. Com. Rev. Reg'd. Yes X No Q.A. Review Req'd. Yes No X ALARA Review Reg'd. Yes X No CONTAMINATION CONTROL A.2-402 Prepared by: /(h tOwD ALARA Review: C6f/Ltldi.- Date 6//2/f 3 Reviewed by: (M /7ldd,% Q.A. Review: Revision 0 Date 3/29/81 Operations Committee Final Review: Meeting Num er 1203 Date 5/19/83

. Approved by: _ k ks-\

Date '$ 40- t 3 Op. Ccm. Results Review: Not Required Mtg. h 949 Date 3/26/81 i

PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide contamination control guidelines for certain emergency conditions. This procedure applies to those situations involving large spills or release of radioactive material, and/or contaminated personnel.

The procedure for onsite monitoring contains a reference to this procedure which ensures implementation when appropriate. The Radiological Emergency Coordinator has the authority to invoke the emergency contamination limits at his discretion. .

Normal limits will be, adhered to as much as possible.

CONDITIONS AND PRERE0VISITES A. An emergency condition has been declar.d at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant as provided by the MNGP Emergency Plan, ar.d .

8. A radioactive spill, release, or other event has caused significant levels of radioactive contamination, and/or C. There is reasca to suspect that personnel may have become contaminated (e.g.. portal monitor alarm while personnel are exiting controlled area).

PRECAUTIONS A. Personnel entering a contaminated area must be properly attired in protective clothing, respiratory equipment, etc. , in accordance with normal plant operat-ing procedures and any Radiation Work Permit (s) that may be in force.

B. Medical treatment /first aid to seriously injured individuals and personnel safety always take priority over contamination control measures. .

C. Definitive detection of inhalation or ingestion of ' radioactive material depends on positive findings of radionuclides in urine, feces or the body by "whole-body counting" or excreta analysis. It is extremely important to identify " potential-inhalation / ingestion" cases'so'that definitive evaluation may be initiated.

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I D. The Health Physics' Group is responsible for controlling all food and 'N, water. supplies at.the plant during an emergency. Whenever an evacuation due to radiological conditions take's place, all food and water supplies f

within the evacuated area will be considered contaminated and measures l

will be taken to prevent their use.

E. Before any water or food may be consumed, the Health Physics Group must i verify that the water / food itself and the eating surfaces are below emergency

contamination guidelines for personnel (Attachment 1). Random samples of l food / water shall be analyzed for low level contamination on a periodic basis.

ORGANIZATION Radiological Emergency Coordinator - in charge

! Monitoring Section Leader - direct supervision

{ Radiation Protection Specialists - conduct of this procedure i

DISCUSSION This procedure is divided into two parts:

i 1. Radioactive Spill or Release

2. Contaminated Personnel Each part may be implemented separately or both may be implemented in parallel, depending on the situation.

l' 1

PROCEDURE .__

NOTE: Document all surveys and measurements using appropr.iate data forns.

l RADI0 ACTIVE SPILL ~0R RELEASE: _.

NOTE 1: This portion of the procedure apolies only to a spill or

! release resulting in significantly elevated levels of f i contamination in plant or eltewhere on site.

j STEP 1: If possible to do so in a safe manner, take immediate steps to terminate the spill or release.

STEP 2

.Take steps to mitigate the consequence of the spill or release, j e.g., perform the following actions as appropriate:

a. Inform others in the area.

b. Secure ventilation.

c. . Inform the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (Emergency Director or Shift. Supervisor if REC not available).

d. Contain the contaminated area by barricading, closing doors,

-etc.

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PROCEDURE (Cont'd.)

e. If personnel were contaminated or are suspected to be, and must 4 be moved, consider having them don clean, protective clothing to

! contain the contamination.

i STEP 3: Monitor the area to determine the extent of the contamination spread.

Smear and radiation / airborne surveys should be in accordance with

' normal plant procedures. Report conditions through supervisory channels.

STEP 4: Properly barricade and post the area in accordance with normal plant procedures and the guidelines in Attachment 1. Inform Radiation Protection Coordinator and update plant area status maps at Access Control and the.

TSC.

CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL j -STEP 1 Monitor personnel suspected of being contaminated. Use an RM-14 with HP-210 probe or equivalent instrumentation and-detector.

STEP 2 If contamination is found:

_ a. Attempt to reduce skin contamination levels tc backgrcund by

• employing normal decontamination procedures. Applicable

___ limits are shown in Attachment 1. .

b. Contaminated clothing should be decontaminated, confiscated or i

modified to reduce contamination levels to the levels specified

for skin. -

c. I' circumstances make decontamination impracticable,1 clean '

protective clothing may be employed to minimize the spread of contamination.

) d. Record survey results for individuals found to be contaminated.

STEP 3: If inhalation of radioactive material is suspected, determine if the individual is a potential inhalation case as follows:

NOTE 1: Exposure to airborne contamination, whether the employee-was or was not using respiratory protective-equipment, places him in the group of " potential inhalation cases".

uqTE 2: A positive Geiger-Mueller or alpha ~ survey or a positive smear survey in the area of. the nose and mouth places L the employee in the category of " potential inhalation cases".

a. Smear sterile moistened cotton tipped applicator gently about the openings of the nose (not deep in the nose) and l- then count. Detectable radiation places the individual in L~ the category of a " potential inhalation case".

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b. All persons considered as " potential inhalation cases" will be given a body burden analysis. ')/ '

STEP 4: If ingestion of radioactive materials is suspected, determine if the individual is a potential ingestion case as follows:

NOTE: A positive Geiger-Mueller or alpha survey or a positive smear survey in the area of the mouth

. places an individual in the group of potential ingestion cases.

4 4

a. Smear a sterile cotton tipped applicator within the mouth and count. Also, have the individual gargle with one ounce of water for 30 seconds, collect water and count. A positive result from either sample places an individual in the group of potential ingestion cases,

b. All individuals considered to be in the " potential ingestion group" will have body burcen analysis initiated as in the potential inhalation group.

STEP 5: Report all' results to the Radiological Emergency Coordinator .and assure that individuals requiring followup analyses, decontamination, etc., are properly attended to.

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PEFEREhCES

[ 1. 14onticello Nuclear Gererating Plant Emergency Plan i

2. flonticello Nuclear Generating Plant Operations Manual

3. N!JREG-0654/FEH;-9EP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of -

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support 4

of Nucicar Power Plsnts"

ATTACHMENTS. '

^

1. Emergency Contamination Guidelines

2. Example of Personnel Contamination Record 1

3. Example of Nasal Smear Test Data

4. Example of Contamination Control' Summary - Contaminated Personnel l i

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Procedure A.2-402

- - - Revision 2 Page 5 of 8 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 CONTAMINATION LIMIT GUIDELINES Transferrabje Fixed (dom /100 cm ) (cpm W/HP-210)

Normal limits Personnel, Clothing, & < 100 p y < 100 Unrestricted Area < 10 a Clean Area < 100 p y < 1000

< 10 a Unposted Parts of < 500 y ( < 2.5 mr/hr)

Controlled Area < 50 a Emeraency Limits Personnel < 100 p y < 100

10 a Food & Eating Areas -: 100 p y < 100 (On-Site) < 10 o Clean Area < 5000 E y ( < 2.5 mr/hr)

< 50C a Equipment Released < 2200 p y < 100C To Unrestrictad < 220 a Area Personal Clothing < 1000 p y < 1000

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Procedure' A.2-402 ' *'

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Page 8 of 8 ATTACHMENT 4

Form 5790-402-2 Revision 1, 12/11/81 ] l Page'l of 1-Example of CONTAMINATION CONTROL

SUMMARY

CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL FRISK RESULTS INHALATION INGESTION P INDIVIDUAL .,8 ETA-GAMMA , ALPHA CASE (YES/NO) CASE (YES/NO) DISPOSITION t

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Radiation Protection Specialist Date Reviewed:

Radiological Emergency Coordinator Date NOTE: When this form is completed and not required for immediate use, j transmit to the Health Physics Group Leader for filing.

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