ML20216D059

Proposed Tech Specs Updating Heatup & Cooldown Rate Curves, Incorporating Use of Pressure & Temp Limits Rept & Changing Pressurizer PORVs Operability Temp

ML20216D059
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	03/06/1998
From:	SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20013F498	List: ML20216D008 ML20216D022 ML20216D049 ML20216D059 ML20216D091 ML20216D097 ML20216D110 ML20216D117
References
NUDOCS 9803160267
Download: ML20216D059 (32)

Text

I EXHIBIT B PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION License Amendment Request dated March 6,1998 Appendix A, Technical Specification Pages Marked Up Pages (shaded material to be added, strike through material to be removed)

TS-xiii TS.1-4 TS.3.1-2 TS.3.1 -4 TS.3.1-5 TS.3.1 -6 FIGURE TS.3.1-1 FIGURE TS.3.1-2 TS.3.3-1 TS.3.3-3 TABLE TS.4.1-1c (Page 4 of 4)

TS.6.7-4 B.3.1-3 B.3.1-5 B.3.1 -6 8.3.3-2 4

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TS-xiii RE" 129 5/12/9' APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIST OF FIGURES TS FIGURE TITLE 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits

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3.1-3 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Limit l

Versus Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER with the Primary Coolant Specific Activity >1.0 uCi/ gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 3.8-1 Spent Fuel Pool Unrestricted Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel 3.8-2 Spent Fuel Pool Unrestricted Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel 3.10-1 Required Shutdown Margin Vs Reactor Boron Concentration 4.4-1 Shield Building Design In-Leakage Rate j

5.6-1 Spent Fuel Pool Burned / Fresh Checkerboard Cell Layout 5.6-2 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Interface Requirements 5.6-3 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, No GAD 5.6-4 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, No GAD 5.6-5 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 4 CAD 5.6-6 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 4 GAD 5.6-7 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 8 GAD 5.6-8 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 8 GAD 5.6-9 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - OFA Fuel, 12 GAD 5.6-10 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 12 GAD 5.6-11 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 16 or More GAD 5.6-12 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 16 or More CAD B.2.1 1 Origin of Safety Limit Curves at 2235 psig with delta-T Trips and Locus of Reactor Conditions at which SG Safety Valves Open l

l

TS.1-4 REV 122 1/2':/96 OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function (s).

Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).

When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided:

(1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system (s),

subsystem (s), train (s), component (s) and device (s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this paragraph.

The OPERABILITY of a system or component shall be considered to be estab-lished when:

(1) it satisfies the Limiting Conditions for Operation in Specification 3.0, (2) it has been tested periodically in accordance with Specification 4.0 and has met its performance requirements, and (3) its condition is consistent with the two paragraphs above.

OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE An OPERATIONAL MODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table TS.I.l.

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental characteristics of the core and related instrumentation. PHYSICS TESTS are conducted such that the core power is sufficiently reduced to allow for the perturbation due to the rest and therefore avoid exceeding power distribution limits in Specification 3.10.B.

Low power PHYSICS TESTS are run at reactor powers less than 2% of rated power.

PRES SURE"AND* TEMPERATURE ~LLMITS ? REPORT MPTLR T The'"PTLR{i'aiths[doenmen tithsQyoiride s)@e ac to@e s se1Xprss;s upsN.ddgssps;ruturs limits nincinding fheatupf and6; cool.down) rates nforithefedrrent4reac torsyess el fluence s peit odMThe s e0 pfes surefand[tsmpe rature diiiidsikhal_libslee deEsihed {fo #

'eachifluence! peri 6d?iniascoidanceNithiSpesifisatioh{6$1$h EPlkrih{opsratiod yithin fthpsehperAtihgi11miss[iAjddfeissedjinitheithdisidsi1@esifisatiotish "

i

TS.3.1-2 REV 91 10/27/ES 3.1.A.l.c.

Reactor 'oolant System Average Temperature Below 350*F (and Reactor Coolant Level Above the Reactor Vessel Flanze)

(1)

Whenever the reactor coolant system average temperature is below 350*F, except during REFUELING, at least two methods for removing decay heat shall be OPERABLE with one in operation * (except as specified in 3.1.A.1.c.(2) below).

Acceptable methods for removing decay heat are at least one reactor coolant pump and its associated steam generator; or a residual heat removal loop including a pump and its associated heat exchanger.

(2)

With only one OPERABLE method of removing decay heat, initiate prompt action to restore two OPERABLE methods of removing decay heat.

If the remaining operable method is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

(3)

With no OPERABLE methods of removing decay heat, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the reactor coolant system and initiate prompt action to restore one OPERABLE method of removing decay heat.

(4)

A reactor coolant pump may be started at RCS temperature less than the 310*F"Di/sEPFdisinsiPisEaEtianisfsidis?Essble TsiiipsrsdiifeYspsdif~isdilAfthDT1R7"6^di)~ff~^siih e^$~^6f *BiE^ ~

f 11EGliiidadiffsne~iTssEI~ ~

There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer, or The (steam generator minus RCS) temperature difference for the steam generator in that loop is less than 50*F.

d.

Reactor Coolant Level Below or at the Reactor Vessel Flanze (1)

Both residual heat removal loops, each consisting of a pump and its associated heat exchanger, shall be OPERABLE with one in operation * (except as specified in 3.1.A.1.d.(2) below).

(2)

With one or both residual heat removal loop (s) inoperable prompt action shall be taken to restore the inoperable residual heat removal loop (s) to an OPERABLE status. During reduced inventory conditions, a safety injection pump may be run as required to maintain adequate core cooling and RCS inventory in the event of a loss of Residual Heat Removal System cooling.

• All pumps may be shutdown for up to one hour provided the reactor is suberitical, no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration and core outlet temperature is main-tained at least 10'F below saturation temperature.

• • ?: lid until 20EFPY

TS.3.1-4 REV 106 5/22/93 3.1.A.2.c Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (1)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature greater than or equal to 310*"*350*F (a)

Reactor coolant system average temperature shall not exceed and theiE~lF, unless two power operated relief valves (PORVs) 310*F'350 associated block valves are OPERABLE (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c(1)(b) below).

(b)

During STARTUP OPERATION or POWER OPERATION, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit.

If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified or the required action cannot be completed, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 210*F'350jf', within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

• ~~

1. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s) with power maintained to the block valve (s).

2. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close and remove power from the associated block valve. Restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close and remove power from the associated block valves and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 310*F'350 f, within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

4. With one block valve inoperable, within one hour either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV in manual control. Restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

5. With both block valves inoperable, within one hour either restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place the FORVs in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour.

(2)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature greater than or equal to 300*Fthe;:teniperatursjspecifiejdlin!TthsiPTLR?fofPdisablingboth safe ty% inj ec tionipumps t and below 310

• FtthisOver? Pressure Protection system Enable'Temoeraturs"soecified41tPthe5 PTLRW i

With Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than or equal to 2001Fthey tempe ra ture"spe cifi e d { ins thsf?TLE fo@dikablingib o tl3 safetyfinjection;pumpnyand less than 310*F*the20vertPressure Pro tec tion i Sys tem : EnablFLTempsfatfurW4pisifie dlinithe? PTLR i^'bo th pressurizei power ~ operated reliefNalves'(PORVs) shall be'0PERABLE (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c.(2).(a) and 3.1.A.2.c.(2).(b) below) with the Over Pressure Protection System enabled, the associated block valve open, and the associated backup air supply charged.

l

' Valid ur.til 20 EFPY i

TS.3.1-5

""1 105 5/21/93 3.1.A 2.c.(2).(a)

Ona PORV may ba inoparable for 7 days.

If these conditions cannot be met, depressurize and vent the reactor coolant system through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(b)

With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(3) Reactor Coolant S m average temperature below GOG?tFthd%famp fstMe yngglgrgdVin N E TfofM W1MMWinfst9WisisEEleaW eY ' ']

With Reactor Coolant System temperature less than GOO 1Fths%tsipsfdtki s "bifisdiing.M^Mfths!PTLRifoHdiW&blihyb6tlDWafety?fisJsutibnifpumpf%sE" ggggg WE s

" add ~thE"Fis6t3F^c8disnf" system is not vented through a 3 square inch or larger vent; both Pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) shall be OPERABLE (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c.(3).(a) and 3.1.A.2.c.(3).(b) below) with the Over Pressure Protection System enabled, the associated block valve open, and the associated backup air supply charged.

(a)

One PORV may be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

If these conditions cannot be met, depressurize and vent the reactor coolant system through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(b)

With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

3.1.A.3 Reactor Coolant Vent System a.

A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200*F unless Reactor Coolant Vent System paths from both the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space are OPERABLE

_i and closed (except as specified in 3.1.A.3.b and 3.1.A.3.c below).

i b.

During STARTUP OPERATION and POWER OPERATION, any one of the i

following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored.

If any one of these conditions is not restored to an OPERABLE status within 30 days, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN i

within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:

(1) Both of the parallel vent valves in the reactor vessel head vent path inoperable, or (2) Both of the parallel vent valves in the pressurizer vent path inoperable, or (3) The vent valve to the pressurizer relief tank discharge line inoperable, or i

l (4) The vent valve to the containment atmospheric discharge l_

line inoperable.

c.

With no Reactor Coolant Vent System path OPERABLE, restore at least one vent path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

L

TS.3.1-6 ErJ 91 10/27/S9 i

i 3.1.B.

Pressure / Temperature Limits 1

1.

Reactor Coolant System The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Systems (except the a.

l pressurizer) temperaturef and-pressureithuatupjststesjg^shd l

cdoldsvnfratsi shall be maiht'aissdisithir. lie Ed'iF" :E?dene:

01 F thE"11M E lin:: ch:!.="E"?!rEFEE^?r.^2.1 1 nd TS. 2.1 2 w&t.h+ thsE11mitsW ~difind!!1h3"hhPfsseur(Easd! Temp ~sriidri i

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b.

If these conditions cannot be satisfied, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the l

Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued l

operation or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the reactor coolant system average temperature and pressure to less than 200*F and 500 psig, l

respectively, within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l 2.

Pressurizer a.

The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

1.

A maximum heatup of 100*F in any 1-hour period.

2.

A maximum cooldown of 200*F in any 1-hour period.

l b.

The pressurizer spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 320*F.

c.

If these conditions cannot be satisfied, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within i

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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TS.3.3-1 REV 108 9/2/92 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Applicability Applies to the operating status of the engineered safety features.

Obiective To define those limiting conditions that are necessary for operation of engineered safety features:

(1) to remove decay heat from ttue core in an emergency or normal shutdown situations, and (2) to remove heat from containment in normal operating and emergency situations.

Specifications A.

Safety Iniection and Residual Heat Removal Systems 1.

A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200*F unless the following conditions are satisfied (except as specified in 3.3.A.2 below):

a.

The refueling water tank contains not less than 200,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least 2500 ppm.

b.

Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE when reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 1000 psig.

OPERABILITY requires:

(1) The isolation valve is open (2) Volume is 1270 20 cubic feet of borated water (3) A minimum boron concentration of 1900 ppm (4) A nitrogen cover pressure of 740 i 30 psig c.

Two safety injection pumps are OPERABLE except that pump control switches in the control room shall meet the require-ments of Sections 3.3. A.3rknd 3.3. A.4)E in ler and 3.1.^. 1.d.(2) rhencver the res:ter :::13nt cyste "tE=p:rstur ther 310*F*

d.

Two residual heat removal pumps are OPERABLE.

e.

Two residual heat exchangers are OPERABLE.

+Vclid until 20 EFPY l

l i

1 l

TS.3.3-3 R" 127 2/20/9' 3.3.A.2.g.

The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated l

valves specified in 3.3.A.l.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the valve position is verified once each shift.

3.

At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temp?Ensbis;Timpiraturs erature is less than i

310*F' thsiOvir??rsssufs Pr6tsdti'6 item sysdif f.. edj in. gg.'TLR~sE{c ip ti* thiE* R I

litheiP bb

~ 5I jumps ~dsy"'be~Fdn" f6r up g.

g Eonducting the integrated SI test ** when either of the following conditions is met:

l (a)

There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SI pump and the RCS is shut, or (b)

The reactor vessel head is removed.

4.

Both safety injection pump control switches *** in the Control Room shall be in pulloutKwhenever RCS temperature is less than 200*F the;3 tlempe rsturs7spe61fied sihithW7PTIA7 foe [Eaf~bi~run'~ss ~hysdi fie d

~^

disablingjji6thIsifstfy 1 ectionip'umpsV(eWesp"t 6 iris'~6e~ bete ~pGmpi i 3:37El3 ahd ^3.1. A.1.d. (2)).

5; ' ' 56thItsaEts?!E661WnEfiyiEsiiTEE60muistbiffshs11?bsTisdistid*

"~ wheneveriRCSEtemperahursfisislessithan(nthstPTLRF'~"~' ~~' ' ' ~ ~ " ""

thetover!PrissurejPritsEtibs l

S:yst._em;E..n.ab.lsu#_ Temp ~eratureisp.ec. ifind_iii

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+W11d =til 20 EFP fThis[spshiffEstionTd6sais6'tisppiffkhsnsVeRthsYfssEEBET6661ssEZiyifsni l

accumulatorsfarej;depressurizedjorfthejreactotlyesseliheadiisiremoved?

• • 0ther SI system tests and operations may also be conducted under these conditions.

• • • This specification does not apply whenever the reactor vessel head is removed.

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TS.6.7-4 RE" 122 1/2':/95 WCAP-10054-P-A, " Westinghouse Small Break ECCS Evaluation hodel Using the NOTRUMP Code", August, 1985 WCAP-10924-P-A, " Westinghouse Large-Break 1DCA Best-Estimate Methodology", December, 1988 WCAP-10924-P-A, Volume 1, Addendum 4, " Westinghouse Large Break LOCA Best Estimate Methodology", August, 1990 XN-NF-77-57 (A), XN-NF-77-57, Supplement 1 (A), " Exxon Nuclear Power Distribution Control for Pressurized Water Reactors Phase II", May,

{

1981 i

WCAP-13677, "10 CFR 50.46 Evaluation Model Report: H-COBRA / TRAC 2-Loop Upper Plenum Injection Model Update to Support ZIRLOm Cladding Options", April 1993 (approved by NRC SE dated November 26, 1993).

NSPNAD-93003-A, " Transient Power Distribution Methodology",(latest approved version) c.

The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable liW ts (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

d.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be supplied upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the 4

Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.

FM A? UPi Fs s6re'shdTTss6st'stufsT Lisits'Rss6fBTPTLRY FM RCS Tpfis sufaiahditsspe fiEEisElidif(Qand) hydros tatic(ties tisg@slWall iff6 H isV6 M E661ddsn 516u

-temperatureioperationMeriticalit j as heatupfandfcooldowntrates;shal ibefestablishediandidscumentedsin the! PTLRLfor; theS followin ' iTechnicaltS' ecificati6nflsectionsW ~ ~

i 3!11AMc'(4)h3114Ki24c(2 M3?nKl2fc( )p~3rEBiliab~i3;3?A;3]

i 313iA(4g3)3kA152 andM ablef411M C f '

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ "

b7?Theisnilyticklime th6dsydse d7to^7ds tiraiEWTtlisf RCS ?pfsssufsrshd

tempe rature i limits v and; Cold L overpres surei Miti gation? System ?se tp~sints shall

:lbeithose?previously;lreviewedi:andiap rovedibyEthe)NRCC

~"

specificallyfthosefdescribed[initheffpilo,ing@6cgentf ~~'

WCAP?l4040;NPlAiiRevision?2N* Method 616gyIUssditstDeVsloF[ Cold Overpressure: Mitigating]SystemiSetpointstandiRCS1HeatuplandCCooldo.wn Limit ? curves"[(Including;anyiexemptionigranted(by[NRCitoj AMSEhCode' CasedE514)

EMTh6EPTLREshs117bs4rovide d 36~ th~s3 NRC? uposi1H suad667fo Eis scEYe sc hor

~"""vessellfluenceiperiodLandFfor anylrevisio nerssupplementathereto C Changes;to:thelcurvesdserpointsgoriparameterssin!thelPTLRjresulting from new2or?additionalTanalysistofibeltlinetmateriappfopertiesjwill l

b ej submitted; tolthelNRC (prioritojissuancefoffanjupdatediPTLRy B.

REPORTABLE EVENTS The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

a.

The Commission shall be notified by a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and b.

Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the Operations Committee and the results of this review shall be submitted to the Safety Audit Committee and the Vice President Nuclear Ceneration.

B.3.1-3 REV 123 5/21/95 3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Bases continued A.

Operational Components (continued) b.

Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This is a function that is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.

c.

Manual control of the block valve to:

(1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item a above), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item

b. above).

i i

d.

Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of at least 3 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when the RCS temperature is less than 310*F+thE00sWPfessufs?Pr6tictidnVSy^stsii?Enabis TempsfatutsJapsdifisdiin[ths M P.'

~ "~~'~~ "~^^

^ ' ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~

The PORV control switches are three position switches, Open-Auto-Close. A PORV is placed in manual control by placing its control switch in the Closed position.

The -inimum proccurientier to peratur: (310*F+) is determined frc: Figur-e TS.3.1 1 nd in the te=peratur: equivalent to the RCS :sfety relief velve cetpcint preocure.

The RCS safety valves and normal setpoints on the pressurizer PORV's do not provide overpressure protection for certain low temperature operational transients.

Inadvertent pressurization of the RCS at temperatures below 310*F+theTOvef(PressursTProtsetihn?SystemTEhabls Tempsrstdriispecified71EthesPTIR'Ebsid EbhultE^1n"thi~ASMETA p?rgilf E? ~~~ "' ~

~

7g yypg7g3 -T 2 beldg~sxceeded." ThGE^^th'E"'1Ei? E'~Epsf3ture everproccure protentier cycter, ^i:F is decigned te prevent preccurizing the RCS ebeve the preocur: limit: cpecified in Figure: TS.3.1 1 :nd TS.3.

2, i nnbled t 310*F+.

^ber: 310*F+ the RCS cafety valver u uld limit the pretour inerence and veuld prevent the limite of Figure: TS.3.1 1 nd TS.3.1 2 frer being

d:d.

The setpoint for the low temperature overpressure protection system is derived by analysis which models the performance of the low temperature overpressure protection system assuming various mass input and heat input transients. The low temperature overpressure protection system setpoint is updated whenever the RCS heatup and cooldown curves (Figure: TS.3.1-1 and TS.3.1-2)hpopifisM in;the?PTLR are revised.

The 3 square inch RCS vent opening is based on the 2.956 square inch cross sectional flow area of a pressurizer PORV. Because the RCS vent opening specification is based on the flow capacity of a PORV, a PORV maintained in the open position may be utilized to meet the RCS vent requirements.

I

• V: lid until 20 EFPY

B.3,.1-5 om 2nr l-3.1 REACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM

-~

e m, ms Bases continued B.

Pressure /Temoerature Limits Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50, and the ASME Code require that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with sufficient margin to insure that, j

when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident l

conditions, the boundary behaves in a nonbrittle manner, the probability of l

rapidly propagating fracture is minimized and the design reflects the l

uncertainties in determining the effects of irradiation on material l-properties.

Fi; re: TS.2.1 1 - ' " f liiitschiftijajperatiiE3311iiitt! curves

-- '-- ' g i '" fer ::: 1) in

rr' rid erre re letirnr.

TheQifi W$stadi$igttinM~34 Tare; based on the pr6isifEfes*6f'ths~iiiBsi"lisiiftin5 l

i' Enateris1"'in either UHit's reactor vessel (Unit i reactor vessel bassisi~sW imemmardthesiiri%9i4 M

341$'EFP*l'"~The~W'rve'ggiefhiscienfomeniGigweld--W4) and are effe6tiVE ti6

, ressu.re and temp,erifuri' sensing [ih~dtrumentss hiAjptI(hsVs"hos b l

cG

ible :rrer:

i if~S:

reatia

-~

~

MuttmaatAnstregigia,2 The curves define a region where brittle fracture will not occur and are determined from the material characteristics, irradiation effects, pressure stresses and stresses due to thermal gradients across the vessel wall.

t l

Heatuo Curves l

During heatup, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce thermal stresses which vary from compressive at the inner wall to tensile at the outer wall. At the inner wall of the vessel, the thermal induced compressive stresses tend to alleviate the tensile stresses induced by the internal pre.ssure78Whi0idittiegidelyti6TeakaEtisiliT6Hid16hi@ tempers 4Gsigliiiii%hijbefQ Hesii9ierRaliiimidhulaatdes lirlfttisisti85MinetaMteep5pitisrefiniths bestgijconditiest$attietij]!perat: Ors %A441$jgi5po}L.ing tsadsjiptsduce finly gtonkigeancelgeachyttsj MLJg;t_mperature curve based ong)4.Tlierefore, angian141g pressure-e eenparises@@fSttili steadi sEste conditions (i.e.

n

~sedMhu iiiisifWsijssifsifuMidj :o thermal stresses hEESTif{finissihisilitup}snWenditises

pr::::::

1:r :

311~^EiE!!E#~: !"~EIfEF"'fiEEE EMlf"sEFE'^W5h S: inn:: ::11 :f S: :::::1 1: tr::::' :: S: ;;r:rnin; l e:: t!:.

l The heatup analysis also covers the determination of pressure-temperature l

limitations for the case in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the l

controlling location. The thermal gradients established during heatup l

produce tensile stresses at the outer wall of the vessel. These stresses are additive to the pressure induced tensile stresses which are already present.

The thermal induced stresses at the outer wall,iiiif,tiiiiiijiiii.s,tureare dependent on of the ve sel both the rate of heatup and de tire 212 ;5661s f

h

?dsiGifig the heatup ramp; therefore, a lower bound curys"simillf~Eo~thiti~disEfibed for the heatup of the inner wall cannot be defined.

F:: S: ::::: in rhich S: :::::

11 :f S: ::::1 5:::::: S: :tr::: ::::::1112-1 ::tientinifsf6Ed, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an ir$dividual bliiii's~~~The heatup limit curve is a composite curve prepared by determining the most conservative case in a point by point comparison, with either the inside steadyTatshtiMb.srvs?g isfinn,sids(fthiti%EstniigiiMutiii({earvsgor stis?joutside

,g,ftb

= q g g g g g pariy hbutup rats"Up to 60100*F g

g,,-

B.3.1-6 RE" 105 5/21/93 3.1 FEACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

Bases (continued)

Cooldetm'Cnrvsiif I

DuriMfh661dossWthsithunisis1TpidishtuEIuHhsMsihbHyusssEtis11?psdudu acA thee outertwalMTheithermaliihdncedRtensils@istressessatnhstinnertwallthermaR indiedditive$tRtSipreissreisinducedstessilefstkessasssh'ichfuefaires ~~

presanggj @ p fgpejg g @ sogyQ li M oM tM n1Ql y jj g jpM 3 p @ g ya M The cooldown limit curves were prepared utilizing the same type of analysis l

used to calculate the heatup curve except that the controlling location is always the inside wall.

Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.

Criticality Limits l

Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that for a given pressure, the reactor I

must not be made critical unless the temperature of the reactor vessel is 40*F above the minimum permissible temperature specified on the heatup curve and above the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice hydrostatic pressure test.

For Prairie Island the curves were prepared, requiring that criticality must occur above the maximum permissible temperature for the l

inservice hydrostatic pressure test.

The critie=11ty li=it ep::ified ir Fi ure TE.3.1 1 previde: ir.ereceed g

j

:n:: that the pr:p: rel:ti:n: hip 5:te::n ::::::r :::1:nt pr:::ur: :nd ten; reture vill be reintrin:d during ry: ten h: tup :nd pre:curi : tier

'henever the ::::ter v::::1 it in the nil ductility tenper ture : rg:.

M : tup t: thi t:np:::tur: rill b; ::::nplich:d by :p: : ting the :::::::

1:nt purp: :nd $ th: pre::uri::: h::ter.

The pr::: ri::: h::::: :nd 2 :: icted p:r:r ::g?::

h:v: 5::r 21:2d for centinuru ep::: tier et full henter p:r:r.

ASME Code Section XI Inservice Test Limits The pressure temperature limits for the ASME Code Section XI Inservice Test Limits (hydrostatic pressure test) are less restrictive than the heatup and cooldown curves to allow for the periodic inservice hydrostatic test.

These limits are allowed to be less restrictive because the hydrostatic test is based on a 1.5 safety factor versus the 2.0 safety factor built into the heatup and cooldown curves and because the test is run at a constant temperature so the thermal stresses in the vessel are minimal.

I pream Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations The limitations on steam generator pressure and temperature ensure that the l

pressure induced stress in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits and thus prevent brittle fracture of the steam generator shell.

Pressurizer Limits t

Although the pressurizer operates at temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern about brittle fracture, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with ASME Code requirements.

R:fer:ne:

1.

"S?.R S:: tier

^.2

l l

1 B.3.3-2 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

~ 1 9 "F S /0 A /O *F D t*t t Bases continued i

(1) Assuring with hi h reliability that the safety system will function j

properly if requ red to do so.

(2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat. % of RATED POWER l

1 min.

4.5 30 min.

2.0 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.62 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.96 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.62 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant acci-dent during POWER OPERATION.

Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-l of-coolent accident, and also allows more free access to some of the l

engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

l Specification 3.3.A.3 allows use of an SI pump to perform operations required at low RCS temperatures; e.g.,

raising accumulator levels in order to meet the level requirement of Specification 3.3.A.l.b(2) or l

ASME Section XI tests of the SI system check valves.

Specification 3.3.A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low tempera-tures for conduct of the integrated SI test and other SI system tests and operations providing the pumps run for less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. In this case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% and a positive means of isolation is provided between the SI pumps and the RCS to l

prevent fluid injection into the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor operated valve with the power removed. This combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that overpressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

Maintaining both safety injection pump Control Room control switches in pullout, as specified in 3.3.A.4, eill encure th:t the RCS pr:::ure/

t: ;:::tur: licit:ti:n: :p::ifi:d ir Figur:: TS.2.1 1 ::: TS.2.1 2 uill

b: : :::d:d, :t 1:e Ecs t: ;:::tur::,

th: ::: ult :f :::: input u-+-

nu. w.e r~

s...s..-

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s.

.s--..-- -... y 555iAEiME5sIE5cui515E556iiE{5pidilisd}i$5fliA15MIriiifhE6vids assurance?thatsthe Jplant@perat.ingsconditionsnrill% bounded lby&thW asstanptions fapplied(toitbeide te rminatiod(o fsthe t0PPSise tpo intil inithej mas s] inj ec tion 6 trans tent t analysisg4These ?se tpoint sivilltac tuates the PORVs! uporEanTRC81 pres surelinc r ease pto;smainta in(RC$ s pre:s nurejwi thiniths acceptable ! operating 1regionien the9 pres sure/temperatur@(brittle" frac turagl;imigcurve s}iniLthe iPTLRpThs"p~roYis ioHs"6 f %14the s e~

specifications are noti applicable when the reactor vessel head is removed since~in that condition RCS overpressurization can not occur.

EXHIBIT C PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION License Amendment Request dated March 6,1998 Appendix A, Technical Specification Pages Revised Pages TS-xiii TS.1-4 TS.3.1-2 TS.3.1-4 TS.3.1-5 TS.3.1 -6 TS.3.3-1 TS.3.3-3 TABLE TS.4.1-1c (Page 4 of 4)

TS.6.7-4 B.3.1-3 B.3.1-5 B.3.1-6 B.3.3-2

3 i

TS-xiii APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIST OF FIGURES TS FIGURE TITLE 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits 3.1-3 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Limit Versus Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER with the Primary Coolant Specific Activity >1.0 uCi/ gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 3.8-1 Spent Fuel Pool Unrestricted Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel 3.8-2 Spent Fuel Pool Unrestricted Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel 3.10-1 Required Shutdown Margin Vs Reactor Boron Concentration 4.4-1 Shield Building Design In-Leakage Rate 5.6-1 Spent Fuel Pool Burned / Fresh Checkerboard Cell Layout 5.6-2 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Interface Requirements 5.6-3 Spent Fuel Iool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, No GAD 5.6-4 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, No GAD 5.6-5 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 4 GAD 5.6-6 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 4 GAD 5.6-7 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 8 GAD 5.6-8 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 8 CAD 5.6-9 Spent Fuel Fool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 12 GAD 5.6-10 Spent Fuel Fool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 12 GAD 5.6-11 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - 0FA Fuel, 16 or More GAD 5.6-12 Spent Fuel Pool Checkerboard Region Burnup and Decay Time Requirements - STD Fuel, 16 or More GAD B.2.1-1 Origin of Safety Limit curves at 2235 psig with delta-T Trips and Locus of Reactor Conditions at which SG Safety Valves Open l

L

TS.1-4

(

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is' capable of performing its specified function (s).

Implicit in'this definition shall be the assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power l

sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to L

perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).

When a system, subsystem, train, component'or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely i

because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE

'for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided:

(1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system (s),

subsystem (s), train (s), component (s) and device (s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this paragraph, t

The OPERABILITY of a system or component shall be considered to be estab-lished when:

(1) it satisfies the Limiting Conditions for Operation in Specification 3.0, (2) it has been tested periodically in accordance with Specification 4.0 and has met its performance requirements, and (3) its condition is consistent with the two paragraphs above.

l OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE l

An OPERATIONAL MODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table TS.1.1.

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS ~ TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental characteristics of the core and related instrumentation.

PHYSICS TESTS are conducted such that the core power is sufficiently reduced to allow for the

. perturbation due to the test and therefore avoid exceeding power distribution limits in Specification 3.10.B.

i Low power PHYSICS TESTS are run at reactor powers less than 2% of rated power.

PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)

The PTLR is the document that provides reactor vessel pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown rates, for the current reactor vessel fluence period. These pressure and temperature limits shall be determined for each fluence period in accordance with Specification 6.7.A.7.

Plant operation within these operating _ limits is addressed in the individual specifications.

i j

TS.3.1-2 3.1.A.l.c.

Reactor Coolant System Average Temperature Below 350'F (and Reactor Coolant level Above the Reactor Vessel Flance)

(1) Whenever the reactor coolant system average temperature is below 350*F, except during REFUELING, at least two methods for removing decay heat shall be OPERADLE with one in operation * (except as specified in 3.1.A.1.c.(2) below).

Acceptable methods for removing decay heat are at least one reactor coolant peap and its associated steam generator; or a residual heat removal loop including a pump and its associated heat exchanger.

(2) With only one OPERABLE method of removing decay heat, initiate prompt action to restore two OPERABLE methods of removing decay heat.

If the remaining operable method is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

(3) With no OPERABLE methods of removing decay heat, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of y

the reactor coolant system and initiate prompt action to restore one OPERABLE method of removing decay heat.

(4) A reactor coolant pump may be started at RCS temperature less than the Over *rescure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in vv FTLR, only if either of the following conditions b so There is a ses a or gas bubble in the pressurizer, or The (steam generator minus RCS) temperature difference for the steam generator in that loop is less than 50*F.

d.

Reactor Coolant Level Below or at the Reactor Vessel Flance (1) Both residual heat removal loops, each consisting of a pump and its associated heat exchanger, shall be OPERABLE with one in operation * (except as specified in 3.1.A.1.d.(2) below).

(2) With one or both residual heat removal loop (s) inoperable, prompt action shall be taken to restore the inoperable residual heat removal loop (s) to an OPERABLE status.

During reduced inventory conditions, a safety injection pump may be run as required to maintain adequate core cooling and RCS inventory in the event of a loss of Residual Heat Removal System cooling.

• All pumps may be shutdown for up to one hour provided the reactor is suberitical, no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration and core outlet temperature is main-tained at least 10*F below saturation temperature.

__ q TS.3.1-4 3.1.A.2.c Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (1) Reactor Coolant System average temperature greater than or equal to 350*F l

(a)

Reactor coolant system average temperature shall not exceed 350*F, unless two power operated relief valves (PORVs) and l

their associated block valves are OPERABi2 (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c(1)(b) below).

(b)

During STARTUP OPERATION or POWER OPERATION, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit.

If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified or the required action cannot be completed, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 350*F, within the following 6 l

hours.

1. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s) with power maintained to the block valve (s).

2. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close and remove power from the associated block valve. Restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within one hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close and remove power from the associated block valves and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 350*F, within the following l

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

4. With one block valve inoperable, within one hour either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV in manual control. Restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />..

5. With both block valves inoperable, within one hour either restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place the PORVs in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour.

(2)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature greater than or equal to the temperature specified in the PTLR for disabling both safety injection pumps and below the Over Pressure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in the PTlR With Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than or equal to the temperature specified in the PTLR for disabling both safety injection pumps and less than the Over Pressure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in the PTLR; both pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) shall be OPERABLE (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c.(2).(a) and 3.1.A.2.c.(2).(b) below) with the Over Pressure Protection System enabled, the associated block valve open, and the associated backup air supply charged.

TS.3.1-5 3.1.A.2.c.(2).(a) Ons PORV may ba inoparable for 7 days.

If thssa conditions cannot be met, depressurize and vent the reactor coolant system through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(b) With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature below the temperature specified in the PTLR for disabling both safety iniection pumps With Reactor Coolant System temperature less than the temperature specified in the PTLR for disabling both safety injection pumps, when the head is on the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant system is not vented through a 3 square inch or larger vent; both Pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) shall be OPERABLE (except as specified in 3.1.A.2.c.(3).(a) and 3.1.A.2.c.(3).(b) below) with the Over Pressure Protection System enabled, the associated block valve open, and the associated backup air supply charged.

(a) One PORV may be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

If these conditions cannot be met, depressurize and vent the reactor coolant 1

system through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(b) With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

3.1.A.3 Reactor Coolant Vent System a.

A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200*F unless Reactor Coolant Vent System paths from both the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space are OPERABLE i

and closed (except as specified in 3.1.A.3.b and 3.1.A.3.c below).

)

b.

During STARTUP OPERATION and POWER OPERATION, any one of the l

following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored.

If any one of these conditions is not restored to an OPERABLE status within 30 days, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:

(1) Both of the parallel vent valves in the reactor vessel head vent path inoperable, or (2) Both of the parallel vent valves in the pressurizer vent path inoperable, or (3) The vent valve to the pressurizer relief tank discharge line inoperable, or (4) The vent valve to the containment atmospheric discharge line inoperable.

c.

With no Reactor Coolant Vent System path OPERABLE, restore at least one vent path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l l

TS.3.1-6 3.1.B.

Pressure / Temperature Limits 1.

Reactor Coolant System The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Systems (except the a.

pressurizer) temperature, pressure, heatup rates, and cooldown rates shall be maintained within the limits specified in the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR).

b..lf these conditions cannot be satisfied, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limits within-30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the reactor coolant system average temperature and pressure to less than 200*F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

2.

Pressurizer a.

The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

1.

A maximum heatup of 100*F in any 1-hour period.

I 2.

A maximum cooldown of 200'F in any 1-hour period.

b.

The pressurizer spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 320*F.

c.

If these conditions cannot be satisfied, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the l

out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the l

pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable I

for continued operation or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

TS.3.3-1 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Applicability Applies to the operating status of the engineered safety features.

Obiective To define those limiting conditions that are necessary for operation of i

engineered safety features:

(1) to remove decay heat from the core in an emergency or normal shutdown situations, and (2) to remove heat from containment in normal operating and emergency situations.

Specifications I

A.

Safety Iniection and Residual Heat Removal Systems 1.

A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall

]

reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200*F unless the following conditior.3 are satisfied (except as specified in q

4 3.3.A.2 below):

a.

The refueling warer tank contains not less than 200,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least 2500 ppm.

b.

Each reactor coolant t tem accumulator shall be OPERABLE when reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 1000 psig.

OPERABILITY requires:

(1) The isolation valve is open (2) Volume is 1270 120 cubic feet of borated water (3) A minimum boron concentration of 1900 ppm (4) A nitrogen cover pressure of 740 30 psig c.

Two safety injection pumps are OPERABLE except that pump control switches in the control room shall meet the require-ments of Sections 3.3.A.3 and 3.3.A.4.

d.

Two residual heat removal pumps are OPERABLE.

e.

Two residual heat exchangers are OPERABLE.

I

I TS.3.3-3 3.3.A.2.g.

The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated valves specified in 3.3.A.l.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the valve position is verified once each shift.

3.

At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control l

room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than l

the Over Pressure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in the PTLR except that both SI pumps may be run for up to one hour while conducting the integrated SI test ** when either of the I

following conditions is met:

l (a)

There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SI pump and the RCS is shut, or (b)

The reactor vessel head is removed.

4.

Both safety injection pump control switches *** in the Control Room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than the temperature specified in the PTLR for disabling both safety injection pumps (except one or both pumps may be run as specified in 3.3.A.3 and 3.1.A.l.d.(2)).

i 5.

Both reactor coolant system accumulators shall be isolated

• whenever RCS temperature is less than the Over Pressure Protection I

System Enable Temperature specified in the PTLR.

J

• This specification does not apply whenever the reactor coolant system accumulators are depressurized or the reactor vessel head is removed.

• • 0ther SI system tests and operations may also be conducted under these conditions.

• • • This specification does not apply whenever the reactor vessel head is removed.

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TS.6.7-4 WCAP-10054-P A, " Westinghouse Small Break ECCS Evaluation Model Using the NOTRUMP Code", August, 1985 WCAP-10924-P-A, " Westinghouse Large-Break LOCA Best-Estimate Methodology", December, 1988 WCAP-10924-P-A, Volume 1, Addendum 4, " Westinghouse Large Break LOCA Best Estimate Methodology", August, 1990 XN-NF-77-57 (A), XN-NF-77-57, Supplement 1 (A), " Exxon Nuclear Power Distribution Control for Pressurized Water Reactors Phase II", May, 1981 WCAP-13677, "10 CFR 50.46 Evaluation Model Report: W-COBRA / TRAC 2-Loop Upper Plenum Injection Model Update to Support ZIRLOm Cladding Options", April 1993 (approved by NRC SE dated November 26, 1993).

NSPNAD-93003-A, " Transient Power Distribution Methodology",(latest approved version) c.

The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met, d.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be supplied upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.

6.7.A.7 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) a.

RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown, low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic testing as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following Technical Specification sections; 3.1.A.l.c(4), 3.1.A.2.c(2), 3.1.A.2.c(3), 3.1.B.l.a.

3.3.A.3, 3.3.A.4, 3.3.A.5, and Table 4.1-lC.

b.

The analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure and temperature limits and Cold Overpressure Mitigation System setpoints shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, I

specifically those described in the following document:

WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2, " Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves" (Including any exemption granted by NRC to AMSE Code Case N-514) c.

The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or supplement thereto.

Changes to the curves, setpoints, or parameters in the PTLR resulting from new or additional analysis of beltline material properties will be submitted to the NRC prior to issuance of an updated PTLR.

B.

REPORTABLE EVENTS The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

a.

The Commission shall be notified by a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 *o 10 CFR Part 50, and b.

Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the Operations Committee and the results of this review shall be submitted to the Safety Audit Committee and the Vice President Nuclear Generation.

i B.3.1-3 3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTFE Bases continued A.

Operational Components (continued) b.

Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

This is a function that is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.

c.

Manual control of the block valve to:

(1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item a above), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item i

b. above).

d.

Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of at least 3 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when the RCS temperature is less than the Over Pressure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in the PTLR.

The PORV control switches are three position switches, Open-Auto-Close. A PORV is placed in manual control by placing its control switch in the Closed position.

The RCS safety valves and normal setpoints on the pressurizer PORV's do not provide overpressure protection for certain low temperature operational transients.

Inadvertent pressurization of the RCS at temperatures below the Over Pressure Protection System Enable Temperature specified in the PTLR could result in the ASME Appendix G brittle fracture pressure / temperature limits specified in the PTLR being exceeded.

The setpoint for the low temperature overpressure protection system is derived by analysis which models the performance of the low temperature overpressure protection system assuming various mass input and heat input transients.

The low temperature overpressure protection system setpoint is updated whenever the RCS heatup and cooldown curves specified in the PTLR are revised.

The 3 square inch RCS vent opening is based on the 2.956 square inch cross sectional flow area of a pressurizer PORV.

Because the RCS vent opening i

L specification is based on the flow capacity of a PORV, a PORV maintained in the open position may be utilized to meet the RCS vent requirements.

l

[

B.3.1-5 3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Ra,ses continued B.

Pressure /Temnerature Limits Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50, and the ASME Code require that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with sufficient margin to insure that, i

when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions, the boundary behaves in a nonbrittle manner, the probability of rapidly propagating fracture is minimized and the design reflects the uncertainties in determining the effects of irradiation on material properties. The pressure / temperature limit curves specified in the PTLR are based on the properties of the most limiting material in either unit's reactor vessel (Unit 1 reactor vessel nozzle to intermediate shell forging circumferential weld) and are effective to 35 EFPY, The curves in the PTLR have not been adjusted for pressure and temperature sensing instruments' uncertainties. The curves incorporated into plant operating procedures will incorporate instrument uncertainties.

1 The curves define a region where brittle fracture will not occur and are determined from the material characteristics, irradiation effects, pressure stresses and stresses due to thermal gradients across the vessel wall.

Heatuo Curves During heatup, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce 1

thermal stresses which vary from compressive at the inner wall to tensile at the outer wall. At the inner wall of the vessel, the thermal induced i

compressive stresses tend to alleviate the tensile stresses induced by the internal pressure, which tends to make the coolant temperature limit higher.

However, the coolant temperature is higher than the metal temperature in the heatup condition, which tends to reduce the coolant temperature limit. These two phenomena tend to cancel each other. Therefore, an inside-radius pressure-temperature curve based on a comparison of the steady state i

conditions (i.e., no thermal stresses) and the finite heatup rate conditions must be performed.

The heatup analysis also covers the determination of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the controlling location. The thermal gradients established during heatup produce tensile stresses at the outer wall of the vessel. These stresses are additive to the pressure induced tensile stresses which are already present.

The thermal induced stresses at the outer wall of the vessel are dependent on both the rate of heatup and coolant temperature during the heatup ramp; therefore, a lower bound curve similar to that described for the heatup of the inner wall cannot be defined. Therefore, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis. The heatup limit curve is a composite curve prepared by determining the most conservative case in a point by point comparison, with either the inside steady state curve, the inside finite heatup rate curve, or the outside finite heatup rate curve, for any heatup rate up to 100*F per hour.

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i B.3.1-6 i

3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Bases (continued)

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Cooldown Curves i

During cooldown, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce

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thermal stresses which vary from tensile at the inner wall to compressive at the outer wall. The thermal induced tensile stresses at the' inner wall I

are additive to the pressure induced tensile stresses which are already present.

Therefore, the controlling location is always the inside wall.

The cooldown limit curves were prepared utilizing the same type of analysis used to calculate the heatup curve except that the controlling location is always the inside wall.

Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.

Criticality Limits Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that for a given pressure, the reactor must not be made critical unless the temperature of the reactor vessel is 40*F above the minimum permissible temperature specified on the heatup curve and above the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice hydrostatic pressure test.

For Prairie Island the curves were prepared, requiring that criticalit must occur above the maximum permissible temperature for the inservice ydrostatic pressure test.

ASME Code Section XI Inservice Test Limits The pressure temperature limits for the ASME Code Section XI Inservice Test Limits (hydrostatic pressure test) are less restrictive than the heatup and cooldown curves to allow for the periodic inservice hydrostatic test.

These limits are allowed to be less restrictive because the hydrostatic test is based on a 1.5 safety factor versus the 2.0 safety factor built into the heatup and cooldown curves and because the test is run at a constant temperature so the thermal stresses in the vessel are minimal.

Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations The limitations on steam generator pressure and temperature ensure that the pressure induced stress in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits and thus prevent brittle fracture of the steam generator shell.

Pressurizer Limits Although the pressurizer operates at temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern about brittle fracture, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with ASME Code requirements.

B.3.3-2 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Bases continued 1

(1) Assuring with high reliability that the safety system will function I

properly if required to do so.

(2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat. % of RATED POWER 1 min.

4.5 30 min.

2.0 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.62 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.96 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.62 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant acci-dent during POWER OPERATION. Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

Specification 3.3.A.3 allows use of an SI pump to perform operations required at low RCS temperatures; e.g.,

raising accumulator levels in order to meet the level requirement of Specification 3.3.A.l.b(2) or ASME Section XI tests of the SI system check valves.

Specification 3.3.A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low tempera-l tures for conduct of the integrated SI test and other SI system tests and operations providing the pumps run for less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. In this case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% and a positive means of isolation is provided between the SI pumps and the RCS to prevent fluid injection into the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor operated valve with the power removed. This combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that overpressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

Maintaining both safety injection pump Control Room control switches in pullout, as specified in 3.3.A.4, and isolating the accumulators, as specified in 3.3.A.5, will provide assurance that the plant operating conditions will be bounded by the assumptions applied to the determination of the OPPS setpoints in the mass injection transient analysis.

These setpoints will actuate the PORVs upon an RCS pressure increase to maintain RCS pressure within the acceptable operating region of the pressure / temperature (brittle fracture) limit curves in the PTLR.

The provisions of these specifications are not applicable when the reactor vessel head is removed since in that condition RCS overpressurization can not occur.

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