ML20072A978
| ML20072A978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1994 |
| From: | UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072A971 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9408150332 | |
| Download: ML20072A978 (69) | |
Text
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ULNRC-3050 1
1 ATTACHMENT FOUR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISIONS l
1 9408150332 940004 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P PDR l --- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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, C TAINMENT SYSTEMS
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l SPR ADDITIVE SYSTEM LIMIT CONDITION FOR OPERATION
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l 3.6.2.2 T e Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with: I
- a. A s ray additive tank containing a volume of between 4 40 and 454 gallons of between 31% and 34% by weight NaOH s ution, j and
- b. Two spr additive eductors each capable of addi NaOH solution from the hemical additive tank to a Containme Spray System pump flow.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the Spray Additive Sys em inoperable, res+ re the system to OPERABLE iANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be(in at least HOT restore the Spray Additive Syt+em to OPERAB status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within t e followin 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS ,
- 4. 6. 2. 2 The Spray Additive Syste. sha 1 be demonst"ated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 ays by v rifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or utomatic) i the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherw e secured in sition, is in its correct position;
- b. At least once r 6 months by:
- 1) Verify g the contained solution volume in the tank, and
- 2) Veri ying the concentration of the 'a0H solution by chemical an ysis.
- c. At i st once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each au matic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position o a Containment Pressure-High-3 (CSAS) test s'gnal; and
- d. At least once per 5 years by verifying
- 1) Each eductor flow rate is greater than or equ i to 52 gpm using the RWST as the test source throttled to 17 ps1 at the eductor inlet, and
} 2) The lines between the spray additive tank and the ductors are
._ ~ not blocked by verifying flew.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 Amendment No. 44
' Corrected
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RECIRCULATION FLUID pH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be OPERABLE with each of the two storage baskets (one within the confines of each of the two containment recirculation sumps) containing a minimum of 19", but not to exceed 36.8" (uniform depth), of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP-C).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4 ACTION:
With the RFPC System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the RFPC System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that:
(a) One TSP-C storage basket is in place in the confines of each containment recirculation sump, and (b) Both baskets show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion, and (c) Each basket contains between 19" and 36.8" (uniform depth) of granular TSP-C. i l
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
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REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued) l The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST l also ensure a p" c hc of bctwcca 0.; cad 11.0 for the solution recirculated ,
within conta nment af ter a LOCA. This pH minimizes the evolution of iodine l and minimiz the effect of chloride and caus ic stress corrosion on mechanical i systems an components. I level 1 yim* mum ogurllArium ramj pll of 7 /
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'." BASE 5 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and blank flanged during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed and blank flanged during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive material will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that the 36-inch containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are blank flanged.
The use of the containment mini-purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 36-inch valves, the 18-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident.
Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging operation.
Operation will be limited to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> during a calendar year. The total time the Containment Purge (vent) System isolation values may be open during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating ~
experience. Only safety-related reasons; e.g., containment pressure control or
- the reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate personnel access for '
surveillance and maintenance activities, should be used to support additional time requests. Only safety-related reasons should be used to justify the opening of these isolation valves during MODES 1, 2, 3,_ and 4 in any calendar year regardless of the allowable hours.
p1 Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for G containment purge supply a'nd exhaust supply valves will provide early indica-
- tion of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L leakage limit ofSpecification3.6.1.2b.shallnotbeexceededwhentheleakaheratesdeter-mined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3 /_4. 6. 2.1- CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break The pressure reduction and resultant lower contain-ment leakage rate are consistent. with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.
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SPRAY A00!TIVE SYSTEM (Continued)
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te!utten r:circu!:ted -ith4-eents' ::nt f t:r : LOC?.
-th: :::! t!:n :f fed!n: :nd =f-frf::: th: Offect c' ch!c-fde 3rd car tic
-etre:: cerre !cr e rech nic:! cyster: 2nd crrpenente. The cent:ined 50!etten re!u c 'fr!t i c!ude: n :n 21!ce:nt: 'er ::!utien not r:25!0 bectu : 0' tan'
-44+ehr;;; ' ' n: 1:::tt: er eth:r phy !c:! cherecter! tice. he e d"-t^- 'h::: '! c' t e ;; f 50 g7., .;ith L'ST ;ter i; wiv lent t: 10 ;;; N 0" ::!;ti:n
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mm, 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.
The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment .-
atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable ..
out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time require-ments for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment -
atmosphere. ,
- '} 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES )h The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designert to close auto-matically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
,3,/,4. 6. 4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILJTY of the equipment and systems required for the detection i and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to m.iintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the Purge System) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (!) 2.irconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The Hydrogen Purga Subsystem discharges directly to the Emergency Exhaust System. Operation of the Emergency ,
t xhaust System with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day. period is suf ficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the i l
recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, l November 1978.
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BASES 3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID pH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM The operability of the RFPC System ensures that there exists adequate TSP-C in the containment such that a post-LOCA equilibrium sump pH of greater than or equal to 7.1 is maintained during the recirculation phase. The minimum depth of 19" inches ensures that 5000 lbm of TSP-C is available for dissolution to yield a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1. This pH level minimizes the evolution ofiodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The upper limit of 36.8" corresponds to the basket design capacity.
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RECIRCULATION FLUID nH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be OPERABLE with each of the two storage baskets (one within the confines of each of the two containment recirculation sumps) containing a minimum of 19", but not to exceed 36.8" (uniform depth), of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP-C).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4 ACTION:
With the RFPC System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the RFPC System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be demoristrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that:
(a) One TSP-C storage basket is in place in the confines of each containment recirculation sump, and (b) Both baskets show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion, and (c) Each basket contains between 19" and 36.8" (uniform depth) of granular TSP-C.
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CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 Amendment No. 44 Corrected l
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued)
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5 - 4 Amendment No. 42,68
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and blank flanged during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed and blank flanged during plant operation ensures that excessive j quantities of radioactive material will not be released via the Containment Purge System. l To provide assurance that the 36-inch containment purge valves cannot be inadvertently '
opened, the valves are blank flanged.
I l
The use of the containment mini-purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch purge supply and j exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 36-inch valves, the 18-inch valves are capable of l closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose i guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging operation. Operation will be limited to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> during a calendar year. The total time the Containment Purge (vent) System isolation valves may be open during MODES 1,2,3, and 4 m a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating experience. Only safety-related reasons; e.g., containment pressure control or the l reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate personnel access for surveillance and maintenance activities, should be used to support additional time requests. Only safety-related reasons should be used to justify the opening of these isolation valves during MODES 1,2,3, and 4 in any calendar year regardless of the allowable hours.
Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b. sha!I not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM i The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or l steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atrnosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment. l 3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID oH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM The operability of the RFPC System ensures that there exists adequate TSP-C in the !
containment such that a post-LOCA equilibrium sump pH of greater than or equal to 7.1 is CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6 - 3
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES . _ _
3/4.6.2.2 RECIRQ)LATION FLUID nH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM (Continued) maintained during the recirculation phase. The minimum depth of 19" ensures that 5000 lbm of TSP-C is available for dissolution to yield a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1. This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The upper limit of 36.8" corresponds to the basket design capacity.
l 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM j The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, 1 and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray System during post-LOCA conditions.
The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-l service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been
} appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for l the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned I other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containrnent atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part i
- 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves i designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the Purge System)is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The Hydrogen Purge Subsystem discharges directly to the Emergency Exhaust System.
Operation of the Emergency Exhaust System with the heaters operating for at least 10 l continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the l adsorbers and HEPA filters. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Centrol of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.
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conditions is described below. The post-accident parameters used in the equipment review are provided in summary form in Table 3.11(B)-2 and as used in the review, in Figures 3.11(B)-1 through 84. .1~n d};} ion y asedf
}/s},a a y ,.f e ecoun+ An
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/neomen+, w e oS ,e Ne i ,,c ,.g aefire "noller 3'/o Radi att ork - Jfrny addilive s f4e con}ainthan-/yr}em wif) a ,>arsive syk of Jos/ce-fr inrscirca Using he g dance of NUREG-0588, post-LOCK radiatioW environ-ments ere determined in all areas of the containment. The origit al fission product release data used in this analysis l were cbtained from Westinghouse. The isotopic inventory provic ed by Westinghouse was for an equilibrium cycle Callaway core. The data were calculated at the end of cycle life and, therefore, represent maximums suitable for post-accident evaluo tions. This source term is referred to as the licensing basis EQ source term, applicable to the initial core load.
Subsequent cycles have seen changes in fuel type (from STD/LOPAR to OFA to VANTAGE 5), power level (from 3425 MWt to 3579 rWt), and burnup (up to 60,000 mwd /MTU as discussed in Sectio 4.2.1) The doses reported in Table 3.11(B)-4 have been increased by 5% to account for these effects.t The following discussion refers to the initial calculations performed with the licensing basis EQ source term and a 50%
cesium release fraction.
The accident scenario assumed that a LOCA event occurred
_ causing core damage. The entire source of 100 percent noble gas inventory, 50 percent of the core halogen inventory, 50 percent of the cesium, and 1 percent of the other solids was released to the containment. This release was conservatively assumed to occur at time zero. For the liquid source, 50 per-cent of the halogens, 50 percent of the cesium, and 1 percent of the remaining fission product solids were assumed to go directly to the sump and were diluted by the volume of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the liquid volume of the reactor coolant system. For the airborne source, 100 percent of the noble gases and 50 percent of core halogens were assumed to be released to the free volume of the containment. The
'N simultaneous release of 50 percent of the halogens to the
) atmosphere and to the sump introduced additional conservatism.
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Credit was taken for mechanistic removal of the airborne iodine via containment spray and plateout. The spray removal lambdas for elemental and particulate iodine 9were taken from Ecction /decm/ca/aht/
-&-S. The plate-out removal lambda u n i.turun&d= using method P4/u8t' ology outlined in NUREG/CR-0009. he surface area available //JY4/ In for plateout was assumed to be eq ivalent to the heat sink area 77d/8 used in the containment pressure analysis given in Table 6.2.1-4. [.5'-2, In addition, two of the four hy ogen mixing fans were assumed to be operating, at 42,500 cfm ach, to provide mixing between g the sprayed (86 percent) and u sprayed (14 percent) regions of
) the containment. These remov.1 processes were assumed to persist until the elemental nd particulate iodine in the (i.snt') was e,IcuMed 1 1
Rev. OL-6 l 3.11(B)-5 6/92 j l
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CALLAWAY - SP
s sprayed region were reduced by factors of 200 and 10,000, respectively. SMTEg7' /
To determine the gamma dose rate inside the contain4nent, the multigroup, three-dimensional, point kernal code QAD-CG was used to take credit for all major internal structures. The containment was divided into regions, and the maximum dose rate within each region as a function of time was determined. These dose rates were assumed to apply to all equipment within that
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Rev. OL-6 l 3.11(B)-Sa l 6/92
INSERT 1 These decontamination factors (DFs) were taken from Reference 22. The spray removal rate for elemental iodine was calculated in Section 6.5A.2 to be 25.7 hrl. This spray removal rate plus the plateout removal rate (25.7 hrl
+ 1.58 hrl) were assumed to be effective in the sprayed region tmtil an elemental iodine decontamination factor (DF) of 200 was reached in the EQ dose calculations. Only the plateout removal rate was assumed to be effective in the unsprayed region until an elemental iodine DF of 2 was reached in the EQ dose calculations. The spray removal rate for particulate iodine was calculated to be 0.73 hrl ni Section 6.5A.1 and was assumed to be effective in the sprayed region until a particulate iodine DF of 10,000 was reached in the EQ dose calculations.
It is noted that the offsite and control room doses discussed in Section 15.6.5 were calculated using an elemental iodine spray removal rate of 10 hrl and a particulate iodine spray removal rate of 0.45 hrl, until a DF of 28.7 was reached for elemental species and a DF of 50 was reached for particulate species. No plateout removal lambda was used in the Section 15.6.5 dose calculations since credit was taken for the instantaneous plateout of half of the iodines released to the containment atmosphere (i.e. 25% of the core iodines).
With the replacement of the spray additive system with trisodium phosphate 1 I
baskets in the containment recirculation sumps, the minimum equilibrium sump fluid pH is reduced to 7.1. This reduced pH results in a reduced spray l partition coeflicient (H, from Equation 6.5A-15 on page 6.5A-7) of 1100 per )
Reference 23. Using Equation 6.5A-15, the resulting elemental iodine DF was calculated to be 28.7 for the analysis of offsite and control room doses discussed in Section 15.6.5. Per Reference 24, the particulate iodine spray )
removal rate, calculated using Equation 6.5A-1 on page 6.5A-2, can I conservatively be based on an assumed E/D of 10 per meter initially, changing to 1 per meter after a DF of 50. After the particulate iodine spray removal rate is reduced, there is no DF limit. However, for simplicity and conservatism, removal was assumed to stop after a DF of 50 was reached in the analysis of offsite and control room doses. With consideration given to l these reduced DF values for elemental and particulate iodines, airborne l gamma doses listed in Table 3.11(B)-4 have been estimated to increase by l 3% as a result of the use of the trisodium phosphate baskets. l l
CALLAWAY - SP l region. Each dose rate was numerically integrated to obtain
} the 180-day integrated dose for each region. The beta dose rate as a function of time was obtained assuming a semi-infinite cloud model. These dose rate values were also numerically integrated to obtain the 180-day beta doses for each region.
The gamma plate-out was modeled using a cylinder with a height and radius equal to that of the containment. The dose rate was obtained at the center of the cylinder without taking credit for air attenuation. Beta dose rate contributions due to l plate-out were obtained assuming a contact dose rate.
The resulting containment integrated dose curves are provided )
as Figures 3.11(B)-50 through 3.11(B)-84. '
l Per the commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.7 and 1.89 in l Appendix 3A, a 1% cesium source term is sufficient for i Callaway. However, the radiation levels reported in Table !
3.11(B)-4, obtained using a 50% cesium source term, were ;
utilized during the NUREG-0588 review. Due to the extreme i conserva ti sm in the equipment specifications, most components l were qualified to this radiation level. For the isolated ,
cases where the 50% cesium source term radiation proved too I severe (i.e. electrical specifications J-301, J-481, J-1030, J 2^2', ESE-3A and mechanical specifi ations ESE-21, ESE-48A),
the equipment was evaluated against c 1% cesium source term.
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Pressure, Temp _erature, and Humidity Callaway unique containment pressure-temperature profiles were utilized for the current equipment evaluation to NUREG-0588.
The temperature and pressure conditions were evaluated for both LOCA and MSLB accidents. The resulting containment temperature and pressure profiles are provided in Figures 3.11(B)-1 through 6.
The maximum containment temperatures are 308.6 F and 384.9 F for LOCA and MSLB conditions, respectively. The maximum containment pressure utilized for evaluating both accidents is 63 psia.
For the evaluation of equipment located inside containment, pressure-temperature enveloping profiles for Callaway have
_. T' been generated. These environments were generated for a spectrum of MSLBs and LOCAs. For LOCAs, full and partial double-ended breaks and split breaks in the pump suction line were evaluated. Full double-ended hot and cold leg breaks were also analyzed. For the main steam lines, a spectrum of break sizes (split and double-ended) at various power levels with minimum entrainment were evaluated. For these evaluations, loss of offsite power and a worst single failure were assumed. Pressure and temperature mitigation from the operation of safety-related containment sprays, air coolers, )
and heat transfer to structures was considered.
All methods applied in the determination of environments are in
}
, accordance with Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of NUREG-0588, Revision 1 for Category I plants. The evaluation of mass and energy Rev. OL-6 3.11(B)-6 6/92 o
' ' CALLAWAY - SP s a. The peak qualification temperature envelopes the peak
) uprating temperature with significant margin (384.9*F vs.
352 F).
- b. The total heat transferred into the equipment is greater I for the previous EQ profile (Fig. 3.ll(B)-3) than for the l uprating profile, particularly at 45 seconds. This is 1 possible since the EQ pressure at 45 seconds is higher than the uprating pressure (55 psia vs. 45 psia) and the condensing heat transfer coefficient is orders of magnitude greater than convective heat transfer coefficient.
- c. The equipments' thermal lag makes small deviations from an accident profile insignificant in comparison to the
} overall profile.
Therefore, there was no impact on equipment qualification as a result of the plant uprating to 3579 MWt.
Containment Spray The Callaway design utilizes two redundant trains to supply containment spray for temperature and pressure reduction -and fission product removal from the containment atmosphere.
Table 3.ll(B)-5 identifies the containment spray requirements.
The Standard Review Plan indicates that single failures should 3 be evaluated to determine the worst case chemicalcingle k reculting frcr concentrations.
p The worst case concentrationsg fcilure,
~' are pH = 4.0 and pH = 11.0, as discussed in Section 6.5.2.3.
will Le A caustic spray with an upper limit of pH = 11.0 +ekbsed in 4Gwr d22 reviews,tcucver, it ic recogniced that thic event will only cccur for ch c r t --p e ri od .- A boron concentration of 2050 ppm was used in the EQ reviews. The Cycle 4 change to an RWST boron concentration of 2350-2500 ppm has a negligible effect on peak pH, therefore the corrosive effects of the containment spray are not increased. As such, there is no adverse EQ impact arising from this change in RWST boron concentration.
- 3.ll(B).l.2.3 Accident Environments - Outside Containment Radiation Using the guidance of NUREG-0588 and NUREG-0737, post-LOCA dose rates and doses were determined in those areas of the auxiliary building where safety-related equipment qualification would be reviewed. The fission product release data used in this analysis were the same as discussed in Section 6.2.1. The analysis for the auxiliary building yielded a conservative upper bound estimate for the doses to all safety-related electrical equipment as required by NUREG-0588. See Section 3.11(B).l.2.2 regarding source term changes since the initial
- core load. The following discussion refers to the initial
) calculatio s performed with the licensing basis EQ source term and a 50% .esium release fraction.
XN FEM 2 Rev. OL-6 3.ll(B)-Ba 6/92
INSERT 2 With the replacement of the spray additive system with trisodium phosphate l baskets in the containment recirculation sumps, the doses in penetration rooms 1409-1412 and 1506-1509 in Table 3.11(B)-2 have been estimated to increase by 8% due to the harder spectrum of gamma energies associated with the iodines.
(
i I
1 1
1 l
)
i l
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L___.___.___.____m_ _ _ _ _ .._____ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _m_____.____ ___ .- - .
CALLAWAY - SP SLNRC 83-054, " Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch )
- 17. s Review," October 27, 1983.
- 18. WCAP-9230, Rev. O, " Report on the Consequences of a Postulated Main Feedline Rupture, Proprietary."
- 20. ULNRC-1471 "Callaway Plant Uprating Submittal", March 31, 1987.
- 21. ULNRC-1618 " Responses to Questions on Callaway Uprating",
September 18, 1987.
._s DsEW 3 )
)
w I
Rev. OL-3 3.11(B)-32 6/89
INSERT 3
- 22. NUREG-0588, Revision 1, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," Part II, Appendix D, page IID-4, July 1981.
- 23. E. C. Beahm, W. E. Shockley, C. F. Weber, S. J. Wisbey, and Y. M.
Wang, " Chemistry and Transport of Iodine in Containment,"
NUREG/CR-4697, October 1986.
- 24. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan Section 6.5.2, Revision 2,
" Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System," December 1988.
k
CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 3.11tB)-2 ISheet 31 DBA DBA DBA DBA Environmental Pressure Temp. RN % Dose ph
.} Area Max. I psig I III Hax. F IOUII Hax.IIII'I IRadI II0I DBA 1 ,1 Room No.
Auxiliary Building 1325' Auxiliary feedpump Atmospheric 104 70 7.26 x 10 tmotor) room 1326 I 'I Auxiliary feedpump Atmospheric 104 70 6.66 x 10 tmotor) toom 1327 Feedwater pump valve Atmospheric 104 70 8.79 x 10 2~
compartment No. 2 1328 Feedwater pump valve Atmospheric 104 70 8.79 x 10 compartment No. 3 1329 Vestibule 1.0 110 73 8.79 x 10 2 2
1330 Feedwater pump valve Atmospheric 104 70 8.79 x 10 compartment No. 4 I
1331 Auxiliary feedpump Atmospheric 142 100 8.85 x 10 Iturbine) room I 'I 106 71 4.48 x 10 1401 CCH pump room 1.0 1402 Corridor No. 1, 1.0 106 71 1.55 x 10 2 El. 2026' I
140dI'I CCW pump room 1.0 106 71 4.85 x 10 l
1408 Corridor 1.0 106 71 7.88 x 10 1409 Electrical pene- 1.0 106 71 + rte = x 10' tration room /. 2 *7 Electrical pene- 1.0 106 71 .4,4+ x 10 1410 tration room /,W Main feedwater room 6.7 324(18) 100 bef x 10' No. 1 /, /4 m ) 1411 1412 Main feedwater room No. 2 6.7 324'
' 100 bee x 10
/,/f 1413 Auxiliary shutdown 1.0 106 71 1.10 x 10 panel room I
1501 Control room a/c Atmospheric 104 71 7.14 x 10 equip. room 2
1502 CCW surge tank area 1.0 106 71 8.92 x 10 l (B)
I 1503 CCW surge tank area 1.0 106 71 9.58 x 10 IA) 1504 Ctat. purge exhaust 1.0 106 71 3.97 x 10 I
% and mech equip.
) room (B) 1506 Ctat. Furge supply Same as room 1504 conditions .= Lee x 10 5 air handling unit -/,73 room iA)
Personnel hatch 1.0 106 71 4,4+ x 10' 1507 area El. 2047'-6" /g
- Rev. OL-4 6/90
a CALI.AWAY - SP TABLE 3.11181-2 IShset 41 DBA DBA DBA DBA Environmental Pressure Temp. RH % Dose ph %
Room No. Area Max. I psig l III Hax. F I0IIII tiax . I O II ' I (Rad)II"I DB.
Auxiliary Building 1508 Main steam / main 6.7 324 I '3 100 w x 10' feedwater isolar,3 /, //,
tion valve room 1181 0 1509 Main steam / main 6.7 324 100 W x 10 feedwater isolap,, / //
tion valve room 1512 Control room a/c Atmospheric 104 71 3.13 x 10 2 equip, room 2
1513 Control b1dg a/c 1.0 106 71 3.13 x 10 equip. room Control Building )
3101 Pipo space tank area Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 El. 1974' 3105 Control building Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 cable chase 3106 Control building Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 cable chase 3222 Health physicists Atmospherie 120 95 <2.5 office, E1. 1984' 3224 Vestibule No. 2 Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 El. 1984' 3229 Control building Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 cable chase 3230 Control building Atmospheric 120 95 <2.5 ;
N cable chase l II7I 3301 ESF switchgear room Atmospheric 90 70 <2.5 l II73 Atmospheric 90 70 3302 ESF switchgear room <2.5 3404 IIII Switchboard room Atmospherie 90 70 <0.0005
( No . 4 )
1 IIII 90 70 <2.5 3405 Battery room Atmospheric l
3407 IIII Battery room Atmospheric 90 70 <2.5 l IIII Switchboard room 90 70 <0.0005 3408 Atmospheric (No. 1)
IIII Switchboard room At ospheric 90 70 <0.0005 3410 (No. 2)
' Battery room Atmospheric 90 70 <2.5 3411 3413
' Battery room Atmospheric 90 70 <2.5 3414'
' Switchboard room Atmospherie 90 70 <0.0005 (No. 31 l
Rev. OL-3 l 6/B9 l l
1 j
1 CALLAWAY - SP
~,
TABLE 3.11(B)-4 CONTAINMENT WORST CASE RADIATION LEVELS (MRADs)
UPPER ABOVE SUBMERGED SOURCE CTMT. SUMP IN SUMP Gamma f, Pa 3. /D Airborne Source e-9T + 0 4-r-Ot + 0 Negl.
- Liquid Source 1.52 +1 6.32 +1 1.26 + 2
\ Plateout Source 9.24 - 2 1.39 - 1 Negl.
Total -i h -& G + 1 -G,-G+ + 1 1.26 + 2
.a .4/ l. 4f Beta Airborne Source 1.46 + 2 1.46 + 2 0 Liquid Source 0 0 1.55 + 1 l Plateout Source 1.40 + 1 2.08 + 1 0 Total 1.60 + 2 1.67 +2 1.55 + 1 Total 1.84 +2 2.33 +2 1.42 + 2 1
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l i
. , CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 3.11(B)-5 CONTAINMEh7 SPRAY REQUIREMEh7S Sprayed Fluid Injection Phase Aqueous Solution, pH ' rr . . ) 40 NO *7.' 4 Boric Acid, ppm boron (max / min.) 2,500/2,350 Sprayed Fluid- Recirculation Phase
-'itr continucd ?? 0:: ;ddi;i;n)-
Aqueous Solution, pH t r..} M ~7. / ~ //.4 Boric Acid, ppm boron (max./ min.) 2,500/1,000- l
.Z #47
-Cprayed Fluid P.ccircul: tion Phace
'quecuc Colution, pH
-S.O ~_ C . 0 -
Ocric J.cid, ppr horcr '-: /~d- i 2 , E O C / ~_ , D O C- l Finalg Sump Fluid Aqueous Solution, pH 3.5-10 C '/. /- f. d Bd A id, ppm b r n (max./ min.) 2, s 00 /c, 0 7 o -2, e4 7 Egur///-rum I
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tawi o..lise j jergra es >T P CALLAWAY PLANT SPRAY W7,'l E S IW: J FIGURE 612-1 CONTANWENT SPRAY SYSTEu A (W-22ENOHO) 2) i k_
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CALLAWAY - SP Radiciodine in its various forms is the fission product of primary concern in the evaluation of a LOCA. It is absorbed by the containment spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance this iodine absorption capacity of the spray, the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH which promotes iodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms tending to plate out on containment structures or to be retained in the containment recirculation sumps.
The physical characteristics of the. CSS are discussed in Section 6.2.2.1. Discussed herein Ebsr the -cpray additive pertien of +ba rycter and the containment spray system's fission product removal capability following a LOCA.
6.5.2.1 Design Bases 6.5.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - The CSS is designed to provide an I N f 6A'7 ~ f i epray celutier hile the cpray additive portier of the cyctem I ic in operation in the p" rang: cf 0.2 to 11.C and a finci l jc{.tciament recirculation cump colution with pH cf at 1ccat v.s.
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The CSS is capable of reducing the iodine and particulate fission product inventories in the con-tainment atmosphere such that the offsite radiation exposures resulting from a design basis LOCA are within the plant siting '.
dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100.
Additional safety design bases are included in Section 6.2.2.1, in which the capability of the spray system to remove heat from the containment atmosphere is discussed.
6.5.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis The CSS has no power generation design basis.
6.5.2.2 System Design 6.5.2.2.1 General Description The containment cpray additivc pcrtion of the CSS providcc for
- eduction of 31 Si ucight percent codian hydroxidc into the l
- --spray inj ecti er celutkr Thic y c i d e a--spr-ay mi r t u r c id tF r
=pF cf from Gh3 to 11.0 during the injection phacc, when 1 g4 m 4 m m ., m ,- u 4 m, .. m,. a c .. _ _ m u 4 m., a ,+a--
jjk$?/ee$ reheab'N 5e efNN5lN$.rse5-0l !$NY Nve A**n C*y*k The spray additiveVcubryct:r of the CSS, shown schematically at in Figure 6.2.2-1, cencictr of one cprny addit!"^ + " , tre
-adu c t e r r , valver, end connecting piping. The cycter ucer tb^
- c ^ n t a i r m c at cprc; pumpc and cprc; headcrc, ac dcccribed i:,
Cecticn S.2.2.1, to dcliver and dictribute tF^ cprc; additi"c-Rev. OL-4 6.5-4 6/90
l 4
INSERT 4 !
equilibrium sump solution pH of greater than or equal to 7.1 following the !
complete dissolution of the trisodium phosphate stored in baskets within the j confines of the containment recirculation sumps. )
i i
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. . CALLAWAY - SP
-eelutier te the centada ent strecphere. Initially, water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is used for containment
) spraying followed by water from the containment recirculation sumps. Sediur hydroxide ir educted frcr the cprcy cdditi;c tan' int the watcr frcr the P"ST and containment rccirculation-
-cumpc and pumped te the cpr2y ring henderr 2nd nezzlcr candnimen}~.rfrey S/urd.r Those parts of the system in contact withV bernted atcr er the
-cedium hydrexide cprcy additi"e, er mixturer of the t'.? c ,- a r e stainless steel or an e Jarke-h- com4ruthY corrosio in lt.!! J/**l Mo"*
f./.redium,i */*s n1yfele (~TTf-c)quivalent [ stent -material es 7T/*-C .Y"Y b' TheVctc _cc ctcci cpr2r additive
-31 35 ucight percent cedium hydroxide cprey additive celutier t n '- contain sufficient I y, fr
.t
~N to bring the sump fluid to a minimum pH of G-5 upon mixing with
)
the borated ater from the refueling water sto age tank, 44we bcr:- injer_ der t:r ' , the accumulators, and r actor coolant.
This assur s continued iodine retention effecciveness of the sump wate dur ng the recirculation phase. 7/
egui llrium
. u. m.
. .. _ - - _ , , , ,,aa4+2,,_
m a,,
+. m_ . - -..,__,_4_
_ . . . .w _4.,4._ _2.._.___
Thc unito draw the 31 30 veight percent cedium hydrenide cpray l
_ s n c .._ __ ,.n: __ :_ _ : - ..._: ..u.. .._4.- u___+_a ...+__
nuuavavw wvAuwAv44 4 44 wv nw .u awas wwwv4v.. ug uwa..y uvau www nw wwa ,
diccharged by the centcinment cprcy pumpc, ac their motivc flev. l The spray header design, including the number of nozzles per header, nozzle spacing, and nozzle orientation, is provided in Section 6.2.2.1 and shown in Figures 6.2.2-2 and 6.2._2-4. Each spray header layout is oriented to provide more than 90-percent area coverage at the operating deck of the reactor building.
Total containment free volume, unsprayed containment free volume, speciijr unsprayed regions and volumes, and post-accident ventilation between sprayed and unsprayed volumes are provided in Table 6.5-2. Operability of dampers, ductwork, etc., for which credit is taken poet-accident is discussed in Section 6.2.2.2.
6.5.2.2.2 Component Description m
The mechanical ccmpencnte of the oprcy additive cubsystcm crc
} deccribed in thic cectier Other ccmpenente in the contcir-ment spray cyctcm arc dcccribcd in Ccction 5.'.2.1. Spray additive cubsystcm ccmponent-decigr parameterr cre giver ir a-
_u,_
.e . .r
. jaan g4 e-eJ,,,f Hr-e oin p al e e .
The containment spray additive tank, located at El. ,000 feet in the auxiliary building, is a stainless steel tank ri th c nitregen gcc bken';ct decigned to centcin 31 3'_ percent by wcight- l
__m y.u. _ , - .4.+y... _c a. . . +.,.,w 4 mm.._ m... u. .mm,.
. .,m. _ . . _. a _ .. _ 3 ._. a. _ _ . .-
~ __..
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In Tahic 5.5 3. 7. lecc1 ccmpic cer"ectie- 211eue pari ^ die 6
Rev. OL-4 6.5-5 6/90
CALLAWAY - SP c'^mical :nclyc!: cf thc contenta, and fill and drair connccticr-pro de for initial fill, concentration adjustments, and nainte nee. A manway is also provided for tank internal
.nspecti .
Tank level, pressure indication, and alarm a-
- rumentati are provided.
An interlock is ovided from the tank level tra itters to preclude closure o. the discharge valves befor sufficient HaOH has been added the spray solution t comply with the sump pH criterion. Hea tracing of the s ay additive tank-and associated piping con ning 31-34 eight percent NaOH is act required since the auxil ry bu l ing rooms (areas containing this tank and the a ated piping) are heated to maintain temperatures at no le an 60 F. The containment 3 pray additive tank is provj d wit verpressure protection tnd vacuum relief. Setpo ts of the r ief devices are arovided in Table 6.5-3 odium hydroxide added to the spray liquid a liquid jet 3ductor, a devi which uses kinetic energy of a ressurized Liquid to en ain another liquid, mix the two, and scharge the mixtur against a counter pressure. The pressuri d Liquid this case is the spray pump discharge which i sed to e ain the sodium hydroxide solution and discharge the ni ure into the suction of the spray pumps. The eductors a ecigned to accurc ; minimun p! cf 0.3 for th^ cpray minture. l ,
i Component descriptions of the nozzles are provided in Section l 6.2.2.1. Special tests performed on the spray nozzlesinclude }
capacity and droplet size distribution. Figures 6.5-i, 6.5-2, and 6.5-3 provide the test results for the spray nozzles (Ref. 1).
The spray nozzle was flow tested at a range of inlet pressures from 3 to 100 psig to determine that the actual flow at 40 psi differential across the nozzle was in accordance with the design value of 15.2 gpm, as depicted in Figure 6.5-1.
Droplet-size distribution measurements were performed at the design pressure differential of 40 psi and the design flowrate of 15. 2 gpm. At these conditions, the spray distribution was obtained by measuring the spray volume distribution in two perpendicular planes over a timed interval (Ref. 1).
For the droplet size distribution measurement, a television camera and light source were mounted on a flat beam. A pro-tective covering was constructed with a slot which allowed spray droplets to fall between the camera and light source.
Measurements of drop count in each micron increment were re-corded at 4-inch increments from the outer edge of the spray cone to the spray axis.
Rev. OL-4 6.5-6 6/90
CALLAWAY - SP At the design pressure, the droplet size distribution was re-corded by high speed photographic methods. The droplet images were measured, and droplets with a diameter in the micron in-crement being counted were registered. Figure 6.5-2 shows the relative frequency for each droplet size. The results of testing performed on the spray nozzle are provided in Table 6.5-2. The containment spray envelope reduction factor as a function of post-LOCA containment saturation temperature is provided in Figure 6.5-4. This envelope reduction factor was applied to the throw distance and elliptic coverage values presented in Table 6.5-2, 6.5.2.2.3 System Operation T
I Summary of the design basis LOCA and MSLB chronology for the CSS is presented in Table 6.2.2-3.
The spray system is actuated either manually from the control room or on coincidence of two-out-of-four CSAS containment pressure signals. Either of these actuation mechanisms starts the spray containment headers, e.d sprayop e n pumpsg c opens the discharge valves to the accccieted zith the cpray
-additiv tank. tF(an/
velvec recinuln}sd.
On actuation, app oximately 5 percent of each spray pump's discharge flow is. diverted through cacF cpray additive eductor s
I to draw codium hydrc:>idc frcm th; cpray additice t a r'- Th^
i
~:dir hydrenide celuticn mi::cc with the liquid entering tb^
cuctier line Of the pumpc te give a celutic: cuitable fc:
rcmoval of iodinc frer the contairment etmerpher^
When the refueling water storage tank has reached its specified low-low-2 levol limit, recirculation spray flow is manually ini-tiated. The operator can remotely initiate recirculation flow by'use of either or both of the spray pumps. Sections 6.2.2.1.5 and 6.5.2.5 address the instrumentation and information displays !
-available to the operator, in order for manual switchover of l the CSS to take place. i i System flow rates and the duration of. operational modes are presented in Section 6.2.2.1 2.3.
Design operation of the CSS ,W the ce"tcinment cp ry cdditi"e
.c"ke"c'am is such that LCCA iodine removal requirements are fulfilled during the injection phase and the amount of NeeE7772.c grov/M a4kkxF is sufficient to ensure long-term iodine retention. =Op
.e:ctu" ef t-he--eent,wi nm e n t cpray cMi ti m cubcyctcm ac rcmot;
.tenuclly tcraincted fclicwing thc cauct;cn f 'hc prc cc ribc d wtity of "cOH chic 4: accurec c .ninim- Ic"g-terr c"mp pF cf
^"
'^2ct 9.5 ^utomatic icelation of the certainment cpray c-dditi"e cubeycter or ;rc uper receipt ^fe 1~'-Ice 1c"^1 cigncl frcr the npray additive t e "'- Icvel ir-trumertc. The D
Uontainment iodine removal credit assumed in the calculation of offsite doses following a LOCA is provided in gc'1.ptc; IE 0 95)le /5.S-$.
ICAU'687' I Rev. OL-O 6.5-7 6/86
I INSERT 5 l l
l Following a large break LOCA, the containment spray during the injection phase will be a boric acid solution having a pH of about 4.5. The desired pH level is greater than 7.0 to assure iodine retention in the sumps, to limit !
corrosion and the associated production of hydrogen, and to limit chloride induced stress-corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels. To adjust the sump solution pH into the desired range, a minimum of 5000 pounds of I trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (Na3 PO 4 12 H2O 1/4 NaOH)is stored in two baskets, one within the confines of each containment .
recirculation sump, which will be submerged after a LOCA. This amount of l trisodium phosphate is suflicient to assure that the equilibrium sump solution l pH will be greater than or equal to 7.1. l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
1 1
- CALLAWAY - SP l 6.5.2.3 EM etv Evaluation f The safety evaluations are mimbered to correspond to the safety design bases.
par-O c e are A SAFETY EVALUATION ONE - The system's capability to reduce the airborne fission product inventory is based on theVpH- of the spray solution for removal during injection and for retention during recirculation, and on the system's capab,lity to provide spray for essentially all regions of the conta nment, considering post-accident conditions, on Juy Je/u//m[ i
~ '"h e - d e r .4 'z-*.'. w'n m' ~ 'e . , - . a " .~ y ".
^# n . '- ,
. '".4b..-_---.-~-
-p'n'--
_c. c
- n. . v n , ,w..
- a. ,. w,, .wm w..% a-, g u,..j .v A
. n.. e s..g_-t7om4.n.,m.. .t, ._. m w
.-. -- +. ,,,, e nw y n ,
7---_
coupa+d '->ith the dependent----paramete-rc identi-f-i-ed "'
in Safet-y-
.- m u .mw. . ^ ' - ' .
a .aa.u a 4 e '.'.~'^ ^_ "_. e' , -- 4- 4. 4,. '.". .
~
c c .: , : ~. m.. _c ,se.m_- "m'm^
t-- a, , . . . . .~ 4__-, .: ,,
.4 m. 3 e_ w m. -.,,,m__.4_n_._,.
.y~-.~._. m
, - _es . e- . ym . mm _ .. _
-ph*se.,(The ' .m .cm. minimum sump pH of G-5 3 assures iodine retent on in the recirculated spray liquid. 7, /
WIW7" <.
d e
.,g -m;, . gui/ij,-rum q.. . m ,_,.4,-,,,,,
m .-wm3 .- -._.4.,..,m .a e. . g_ _ , _- a a 4 ._. 4 , , - . -;_...,
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m _--
.__,..m u_ ,, n n ,s . m 2 _ - u b ,.. .m' mmuamm m g , ,, ,,,
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m-u= um aus ~ c . ..~ a mus--..
yu v. - a u. o y a.7 ov.uv.vu .u r.~
ma h_ _cnA n.Q hg.g .4 ,m.. .. ., m. . ,, , m e.a. _k 1_ m. n_a , t r_- &_ n_ _- e n_ A_ 4 , , .
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A , , v_ _ , , ,
.-vm.
-. n. o v , vac .-..m v om - u 2 u . -- . _
c , 4 , ,, e n
,,2_,, ,,,,,,e,s.,.,s. J ,,
- t. L m~
2 _ .: _. 2 _
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t.__
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- .m , , ~ . .
~ ~- -- .-,_... - - k_ n c*
een s, g- ;
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- . a v
r.k.a v _- --~
vs v.
- n e p....viU.- g n_ c - - - 1e r D.t n (W O p. 4 n.. .-
. k. ~n c.,,m...p c ..+- .. .-
. b. . a_ ~n n A - - o2.- .-wh ^ . n.s. -1 m._m *.4 n n...ys h_.3 e n J. -
__8 m.u
.. .,~, _____
.. ... uuc
._ - . ~ .
eu.
_ ._t_ _ _ _
.mm 2._._..,.~ .2 .
_ u ,, _
-e_. e m ~ . _
.~ - _ neur-e-
.v- m u3 m
_ _. r_ _ . gr _ .- c_. m. . a n. . 4. ,.,. n. s .-
sr ., e e . _e y,. v. v -
4
.n. .. h. ~m gggp.g ,.
-,,_a. - 2_, .. m2,.._ _f
___ ~ _c g+ %g.,r._,T, , , _ a , , a , . m.~,2. ..
w... , - . . m 8. . u .- - m v. . ,
_ ._n n,m n. J,
- . . . *. k. ~e A_4. e.,. , p~ e_ r,..
,gL cg.
- b. . n.
. . t. .
e_, n t. . *_.-4 _
r_,gagg , . n e n i,
,aas. ,,A,,r,._. n_ v _-..A_
y_.. un_ y.m.. , , , , , , - , , ~
gggg1_.. .- : , ,
+ .~.a. m, 1, ._. \,
_ _ __ _._n.4,,-
mm . ; ..- _ _ _ _ _ - - - -
_m _ae_u,r _ . . ,m--2_ svm
,f, c s
.c.1ewrer_m_ _ .u.v.__ .u_
t
..m u cuy
__ _ ,..m
-- is t., W,.
-Tabl-c C 2 1, (b) runeut- f1owrase ,a ,-fer-Mm--oonta-i-nment-spray- i
_..u.-.
s j .J %
g~
~.~u,_w ru . ,s ,,
. s. r , Sw;
, - , - - n uwww .7Y
- ,,w ~,,,,
- s. w . . v -~
4.~..,,
._.m_ SMr"ww-'er%* _ C- ^-- - n n l
J g e. A n. c e, v 4_ % n A~
- - 4 e.
-. -~.4-e n s, +.
-~ . ..,
t' * ,
.q~A fa\
n, QLys,,. -
- m. ~. . ' C '.' , ,g}.y. _
sod-i-um-hv. er-owi-de-wou-1-4--have to be educ ted -dur-ing the 1
-recir-cu4,aeien phacc t c mcct thc long--t-er~. minir'um-sump-pE
~_ .- a w 4 n .,. n, c .,
. n - c. -e.e
~m.~ m .. . . ,
.g. e
+-
The system is designed to provide a s ray solution - - C S-during the recirculation phase.with avm.=imum pH of lecc thar 21 0
-baced- on ea longwerm-esmp-p:: cf-at .least-4.5 v: -
(due e,~.
to prior v.. , w., , a... ,.- ; - 3y- ,_. _. .; . ,, _: _su
. ~,
ve - ._ -. - a --
_ a a : _ 4_ n_ . n. m
, m m, ~ .m ,
y m pp ]
~ . -su%1m.
.. m-
- - < m ._ . m o ad-e? a, : g, n--ep ...y. _, A A . .. 2.m r1 v~. .em, n .e. . . gp~=m. w s
Tc preel-ude-e-lesurc c f ---t.hc ico1as-ien vc1vc ht-wec-n-ehe--syway-.---- !
addi-t.iye t a nk-and---t-he.-.sprcesit ve-edu c t ces-bef e-r c caf f icien t- l NaC" has--bccn added--tc mcc t -t-he e ump-p:: c r-4-t-er--ion , cn--in.t e r1 e cP is l p.*ej-a 2- n_
- - . .u.. u. m. __ . . ~_ _ __vy_ __ .m
,%_... . _ m_.
s .
_-prey. . m
.=
a_m 2
1 i
es--p r chih i t cl'ccurc of Na^" has-been-addcd-to the--sump Mic vc1vc c -Th besere-4-hc e t o t a1 -vea.ume prcccr-ibed--amar o f e adi r tha.m t - rf4['/.~F-C ( l I
hydrc>.ide-added to the cenhinment f ollous-ne n LOG results in +-
yM/.r 'ene--*_ xr minimum pH, c ' ~ 3 in the sumps, ahd-the ra"e of addition (
-F. i n tair.c the cp ray - ;oa.ue?on -pH in tP- CSE bet..-een
/eveI Rev. OL-7 1 6,5-8 5/94 '
INSERT 6 During injection, the effectiveness of the spray against elemental iodine vapor is chiefly determined by the rate at which fresh solution surface area is introduced into the containment atmosphere, as discussed in Reference 3. The first-order spray removal coefficient calculated oer Reference 3, as discussed in Section 6.5A.3, is 37 hr-1. Thus, the elemental iodine removal coeflicient of 10 hr-1 used in Section 15.6.5 is conservative.
1 l
l
CALLAWAY - SP
}fei *acdhn er *[**l
's
/arbr M Wn
-b .r.e, % j*s7. wAsnol .re W Mll ld f f b *!
9.3 c .d 1: O during the inject 2cn phas; and bctwccn 0.0 and 10.0 l
)
-during the redirculatierphace The worst case concentrationer-reculting frer a cingic failurc, crc p" - d.O and p" 11.0. Thc recultc frcr a cingic failure of one of the valueofp"-(e.O containment op- p nidi ti -- ' ,E isolation valvcs. If enc of
-thcsc two valvcc fails to opca,Iwater from the refueling water storage tank ip" - ".0)- is sprayed directly to the containment, t'c the affected train tithout " OH being added. ^
failure of one these valves to operate is an unlikely event. Prior to fuel lo a jumper is installed around the thermal overloa to ensure t power to open the valves is not interru + d.
"he valves are wered from safety-related power so ces that
_s have multiple sour s (including the diesel gene tors). If one of these two valveo should fail to open e to a loss of
'} .
power, it is probable tha 'e rest of t . affected train would also not have power to operate. The ore, no spray would be l introduced from that train. In t unlikely event that one of '
these valves did fail to oper and rest of the affected train did function, this c . ition would immediately identified in the control room on le ESF status panel. '
one of these v alves does not opo (and no resulting operator a " on is taken),
the resulting c dition will be one train providing s y at ,
pH = 4.0 w d.e the other train provides spray at pH 210. .
J Since t spray header is redundant the components being spra vil eceive spray from both headers. Theresultang-p"at th ' '
injection phase is the only time that this^ pH dditionall) - The
., e sper^nt cFould be appre::ima' cly 7. 0. .
i
.3 = 4.0/$ondition I
_jf could exist. The injection phase is short (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) relative to j the entire spray duration (approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). During the ;
grem7 recirculation phaseythe pH range is C.C 10.0. This spray is l directed through the s me spray he- ders and, therefore, should rinse all of the prev'ously spray components (for a period of approximately 23~ho rsegur ) . /ilca.um 7, / -- f,0, normal 0p:a3 p" duiang thc injcction phasc ;s 0.5 to 10.5.
"he u her value occurs early during the injection phase.
the leve the spray additive tank decreases, the he ' on the spray additive uctors decreases; accordingly, t p level decreases in the s . It is possible durin" u e beginning of the recirculation phase " still be addi . sodium hydroxide via the eductor (s). During thi. e ort . od ($1 minute), it is l possible to have an elevated pH 1.0. Assuming a single ,
failure in the spray syste -his pe . could last up to l 00 minutes. For the .. inder of the rec ulation phase (22 '
to 23.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />), t - spray pH = 8.0-10.0. Sin failure analysis l for the spra* aditive subsystem is given in Table 5-4. The sump pH s a function of time, is provided in Figure . <-5.
The ,cle 4 changes have an insignificant impact on Figure L.s- 5, ihm- it _; prciidca for infcrmaticn only -
.1NJ'ER7* 1 --k SAFETY EVALUATION TWO - The spray iodine removal analysis is based on the assumptions that:
.)
- a. Only one out of two spray pumps is operating
- b. The ECCS is operating at its maximum capacity Rev. OL-4 6.5-9 6/90
INSERT 7 The minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1 is based on the Technical Specification minimum of 5000 lbm of TSP-C in the baskets and the maximum sump solution boric acid concentration of 2500 ppm boron. With the Technical Specification maximum of 13,440 lbm of TSP-C in the baskets and the minimum sump solution boric acid concentration of 2007 ppm boron, the maximum equilibrium sump pH would be less than 9.0.
The previously evaluated upper bound for containment spray pH of 11.0 will continue to be cited, consistent with Section 3.11(B).l.2.2, for the purpose of performing EQ reviews.
Another issue that has been reviewed is the unlikely, but possible, event in which an initially concentrated solution of TSP-C occupies the stagnant volume of an inoperable sump. This situation would not last for long since, as the recirculated sump fluid is cooled in the RHR heat exchangers, sufficient buoyancy-driven circulation within containment will result to displace the stagnant solution and eventually yield a uniform, equilibrium solution.
i I
l I
CALLAWAY - SP The spray system is assumed to spray approximately 85 percent of the total containment net free volume. This volume consists ,
of those areas directly sprayed plus those volumes which have !
good communication with the directly sprayed volumes. The '
remaining 15 percent of the containment free volume has res- l tricted communication with the sprayed volumes and is assumed i to be unsprayed. A description of the unsprayed volumes is presented in Table 6.5-2.
The centeinment rpray 2dditi"e cubryrte- ir reed te m2inteir the aprcy celution at minire pH cf 9 3 du r 4 ng M2OH l
injcctier tc cncure efficient end rapid remer-1 cf tPc iodine frcr the centcirment atmccpbere.
The performance of the spray system was evaluated at the containment post-LOCA calculated saturation temperature cor-responding to the calculated peak pressures and containment design pressure provided in Table 6.2.1-2. The net spray flow rate of 3,131 gpm (see Table 6.5-2) per train was used in the calculations described in Appendix 6.5A.
Based on Regulatory Guide 1.4, three species of airborne iodine are postulated to exist in the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. These are elemental, particulpte, and organic species.
en/
It has been assumed in these eval (uations of spray removal ef-fectiveness that organic iodine Corms are not removed by the coa /w/nmendb
'^dir- hydic..idc spray. A limited credit for the removal of ;
airborne particulates centainingi' elemental iodine has been taken deco assuming that the spray removal rate is 10 hr-8 until a_ 4 ,/, ,f,/'
amination factor (DF) of 400 is attaine- M These assump-ti s underestimate the actua amounts of io <ne removed and g7, ,
us result in calculated ac dent doses hi er than could realistically be expected. p p,7 4 #//un/f/ e Ieceald^indM'M in SAG *W. rift ed con /n/ rwm }are ce/ ulah Sac k of 9 !> dl$'Ined lor Utilizing the dose in Table 6.5-2, andanalysis in Appendix inpuk paradeters 15A, indicated the dose analysis a ficu/s/Ar of above,n !a d, V4 +
Chapter 15.0 demonstrates that offsite radiation exposures -/4e rjarey resulting fr m a design basis LOCA are within the plant siting re ag e,/
dose guide nes of 10 CFR 100. re f, /.c Se c / & n / 5',4. S Appendix 6.5A provides the model used to calculate the iodine removal coefficients provided in Table 6.5-2.
6.5.2.4 Tests and Inspections
^11 2ctive componente in the spray 2dditive r'iryste 2re tcotcd both by performcnce tectc ir the " :f acturer' c chop end-by in placc tcoting cf ter inctcllation,-
Prcopcrational tcoting is dcccribcd in Chaptc; l'.O. During th: initial precperational tccto of the cycten, the perferrr"cc-of thc cductor in chcchcd by rurn =g the cer+1ir.cr+ cprcy Rev. OL-4 6.5-10 6/90
CALLAWAY - SP
~" mpo , tith the cpray additivc tank filled with water. Cali r$h"hioncurves, which correlate water flow with 30 weight-perce NaOH flow, are provided by the manufacturer, bas on ahop te .
In addition, during the initial preopera 'onal
- ests, cal ration curves are generated for water w, under
- he condition of periodic plant tests when the ray pump will be operating at utoff head (miniflow only).
Toutine periodic testi of the spray a itive system compo-1ents and all necessary 8 - port syst s at power is planned.
[ncluded is a periodic samp go he NaOH in the spray additive tank through the loca ampling connection.
y opening the valves in
) The spray eductors are te ed singl
- he spray pump miniflo ines to the R and the valve in the 3ductor suction line rom the RWST and ru ing the respective pump. The operat observes the eductor suc 'on ficw and luction pressu .
The spra additive tank isolation valves can be open pe-riodi ly for testing. The contents of the tank are p ci cally sampled to determine that the required solution 's aintained.
"dditional- CSS tests and inspections are discussed in Section 6.2.2.1.4, including spray nozzle tests and inspections.
6.5.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements strument& tion and as ociatcd analog and logic charncic emp ed for the initiation of spray additive system operat ire di ussed in Section 7.3.8.
The fol3swin describes the instrumentation which g employed for monitoring e spray additive subsystem dur normal plant operation and duri post-accident operatio All alarms are annunciated in the co rol room.
'" a. Spray Additive Tan ress A locally mounted i 1ca r on the spray additive tank provides means t monitor t tank pressure while adding nitro and during per die inspections. i 1
l
- b. Spray itive Flow low element is located in each discharg- ine from the spray additive tank to the eductors. Rea ut is local and on the main control board to provide indication during flow testing.
f l
Rev. OL-O 6.5-11 6/86
l l
CALLAWAY - SP
- c. Spray E.dditi'fe T2rk Le'Jel s
- 1. Redundant level instruments are provided to ala )
Iq imminent depletion of the spray additive ank and provide automatic closure of the ay additi tank discharge line valves.
- 2. Redundant lev instruments ar .c so provided to annunciate at the ime that fficient ad-ditive has been educted frobsth s ank to meet the pH criteria of the syste These level instruments l are interlocked w' the s y additive tank discharge line alves to prec e premature closure of ose valves. 3 T
i cl. Spray Ad .ive Eductor Suction Pressure j l
A cally mounted indicator on the eductor suctio )
ine provides eductor suction pressure during flow i testing.
-e, Containment spray instrumentation is e444* discussed in Section 6.2.2.1.5.
6.5.2.6 Materials Th; ;;ntain;;nt Spray additri; Sub;7;tcr I; CCr;tr2;tCd Pri5;ril'1
-cf ccrrecien-recictant auctenitic ctrinlecr rteel. The sprey additive tank, in which thc.!kW!! ic ctcred, ir acnctructed cf }-
Lu;t;niti; Stainic;; st;;1 COnctructiCr T2tCri21; fCr th?
-cprcy.additivc cubcycter ccc provided ir Ichl^ f 5-3 The chemical compositions of thc "cO!! ctcred in th; cprcy cdditi"c tcn';pfthe containment spray fluid entering the spray header during the injection phase of containment sprayg Pand the containment spray fluid in the system during the recirculation phase of containment spray (containment recirculation sump solution) are provided in Table 6.5-5.
None of the materials used is subject to decomposition by the ^
radiation or thermal environment. ?.11 cpe cifi ccticr c rcTtire )
Lhot th; ;;tcrial; b; unoff;;t;d Wh;n ;%p;;;d t; th; ;;uip Crt-dccign tcnpcrcturc cnd totcl integrcted rcdicticr dccc.
The corrosion of materials in the NSSS and the containment building, resulting from the spray solution used for iodine absorption, has been tested by the Reactor Division at ORNL (Ref. 2). The spray solutions provided in Table 6.5-5 result in negligible corrosion, based on these studies.
~77/' C Icdiur h dr;n i dc Yd oes not undergo radiolytic decomposition in the post-LOCA environment. Sodium has a low neutron absorption cross section and will not undergo significant activation.
Rev. OL-0 6.5-12 6/86
i I
CALLAWAY - SP With respect to the potential for fyrolytic- decomposition, -Naetf-778-C is stable to at least itc :lting point tcmpcraturc of C ^ ^ :' .- /D#6 It'may con /crt to codium oxide (NaO' u On remo'zal of the 7i
- a t e r , alove /3? W ma d ber J$ N 6 -[mn -/-fg Thm -C erMu Q
JVE/{ wh A hhe- E-lv' c-ly, r-e ru /+ In -/- ecaus-/ic fn 6.5.3 FISSION PRODUCT CONTROL SYST E lg d e.t'.
1 6.5.3.1 Primary Containment l
The containment consists of a prestressed post-tensioned, reinforced concrete structure with cylindrical walls, hemispherical dome, and base slab lined with a welded quarter-inch carbon steel liner plate, which forms a i continuous, leaktight membrane. Details of the containment i structural design are discussed in Section 3.8. Layout j drawings of the containment structure and the related items are i given in the general arrangement drawings of Section 1.2.
The containment walls, liner plate, penetrations, and isolation valves function to limit the release of radioactive materials, j subsequent to postulated accidents, such that the resulting j offsite doses are less than the guideline values of 10 CFR 100. l Containment parameters affecting fission product release accident analyses are given in Appendix 15A.
l Long-term containment pressure response to the design basis LOCA is shown in Figure 6.2.1-1. Relative to this time period, the CSS is operated to reduce iodine concentrations and containment atmospheric temperature and pressure commencing with system initiation, at approximately 60 seconds, as shown in Table 6.2.2-3 and ending when containment pressure has returned to normal. For the purpose of post-LOCA dose calculations discussed in Chapter 15.0, two dose models have been assumed, the 0-2 hour case and the 0-30 day case, as shown in Appendix 15A.
The containment minipurge system may be operated for personnel access to the containment when the reactor is at power, as discussed in Section 9.4.6.
Redundant, safety-related hydrogen recombiners are provided in the containment as the primary means of controlling postaccident hydrogen concentrations. A hydrogen purge system is provided for backup hydrogen control. See Section 6.2.5.3 (Saf ety Evaluation Eight) .
Containment combustible gas control systens are discussed in detail in Section 6.2.5.
Rev. OL-7 6.5-13 5/94
CALLAWAY - SP 6.5.3.2 Secondary Containment i
This section is not applicable to SNUPPS.
6.5.4 ICE CONDENSER AS A FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEM This section is not applicable to SNUPPS.
6.
5.5 REFERENCES
- 1. Spraying Systems Company Topical Report No. SSCO-15215-1C-304SS-6.3-NP, April 1977, " Containment Spray Nozzles for Nuclear Power Plants"
- 2. " Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray Systems, The Corrosion of Materials in Spray Solutions," ORNL-TM-2412 Part III, December 1969
.3, A/MfGS-0!40, f}andard Ae via"' ?l*n fa cfron d. C 2, fevision 2, "Cs n-/arnm en+ Ip~y ar a R<<rsn k duc+ Cleanup J y&ny" beeamAe, M n.
)
S Rev. OL-0 6.5-14 6/86
CALLAWAY - SP
. _s TABLE 6.5-1 ESF FILTRATION SYSTEMS INPUT PARAMETERS TO CHAPTER 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS Emergency exhaust 90 filter adsorber unit efficiencies (percent)
Emergency exhaust 9,000 system flowrate (SCFM)
] Control room filter s90-9dI
/ adsorber unit efficiency (percent)
Control room air conditioning system flowrate (SCFM) per train Filtered intake from 540 l control building Filtered recirculation 1,440 l
from control room
-d i
i Rev. OL-4 6/90
~
~. l CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 6.5-2 INPUT PARAMETERS AND RESULTS OF SPRAY IODINE REMOVAL ANALYSIS Core power rating 3,565 MWt Total' containment free volume 2.50 x 10' ft' Unsprayed containment free volume <l5.0 percent 1
Area coverage at the operating deck design ;
Calculated >90 percent
>93 percent Mixing rate between sprayed and unsprayed volumes 85,000 cfm Dose model One region Minimum vertical distance to operating deck from lowest spray header 118 feet - 2 in.
' Net spray flow rate per train, -
injection phase 3,131 gpm
-Occign "cO" ficw rctc pcr cductor- 10.0 gpr Number of spray pumps operating 1 Spray solution pH 9.2 tc 11.0 Elemental iodine absorption co- 4.0-20 .,,pc-w l w.)
2 ~/. / ree/, eu o /en /,,fe, efficient, 1s, used in4cccidcnt- A d y//, ggg calculations /_d cA ,Mr/-/e an/ carfr// 10 hr 2 *IO rMrh dore E;;pectcd is ca tatahed 25.7 hr **(2) g1A,-,-2 Particulate iodine absorption
- coefficient, Ap, used in /dcA o((#ife d d C' '# I '##^
sccidentjcalculations O.45 hr-2 "* C3) pare Calculated 1p O.73'hr-2 "*Cf)
. Spray drop size, design See Figure 6.5 ,
Rev. OL-4 .
6/90
CALLAWAY - Sp . .
~
TABLE 6.5-2 (Sheet 2)
} 11.5g Schmidt number (se e f e c-Non S.CA.2) '
Gas diffusivity-(./te [*e'Nd" 4. fA. 2 ) 0.064CA/#8C 5,000 Partitioncoefficient(see $** O n l*#b' Got ,o/Are mar.r -fran.r$e, cae SPreyqs red (see R (4/ min re~nin./ mas.r-naan dn,a ve/sciG (ree rec % c.ss,e //bb
)
forh'hhn co e fAcien.{ (Jee fe e f sn f.CA.3) l i
- Used D"a of 1:p to inn
" A5 C61culatcd frc ?.ppendi." 6.53 (0 f/nfil bf = 2 P.1. '
) (3) 2s of W.7 An was ca /coladed diseaired in SeeHon 2. in/tfec Non'hC.CA.D y). I.2.2. of 37/ *nd
~~
En do.re csIcesic~/*hhnt u /ded in fe e% l.rA.S Asd /b A, ~'wae uied in +Ae l c
wsi off.el-le and eon +n,/ rosm o/sie c Ieula}ionr g,seutrodinf'e ygs (T) /4+i/ 1 f= S0 fe c} ion J,rA./ and useol 7, 44e 59 of 0.73 Ar war c = lcu fa}ept in (1) } dose c * /c ula h>nr.
CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 6.5-3 SPRAY ADDITIVE SUBSYSTEM-DESIGN PARAMETERS Eductors Quantity 2 Eductor in et (motive)
Operat'ng fluid Borate water Operati g temperature Ambie t Eductor Sucti n Fluid NaOH conc tration, wt percent 31- 4 Specific g avity ~
.35 Viscosity ( esign), cp 0 Operating te erature mbient Material Stainless steel Spray Additive Tank Number 1 Total volume, usable gal ons 4,700 NaOH concentration, wt pe cent 31-34 Design temperature, F l 200 External design pressure, p ig 3 Internal design pressure, ps g 10 Operating temperature, F Ambient Operating pressure, psig ~1*
Material j Stainless steel '
High pressure relief valve t point, psig 5 Vacuum relief valves setp int, in. Ig 2 Spray Additive System Pipin-Material Stainless steel
- During normal conditi s, there is a 1 to 2 sig nitrogen ;
gas blanket. During ccident injection, the t k pressure '
will fall below atmo>pheric pressure; redundant vacuum breakers :
are provided in or r to assure that tank externe design pressure is not e eeded relative to the tank int nal vacuum.
l
])EL ETEb Rev. OL-6/90
CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 6.5-4 SPRAY ADDITIVE SUBSYSTEM - SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Comment and Componen Malfunction Consea ences y Fails to open Two rovided in Automatica pa allel. Operation operated sp y o one required.
additive tan outlet isolati n valve Fails to close Potential exists for losing one train. Operation of only one train required.
Spray additive Fails to ope Two provided.
tank vacuum Operation of one breaker required.
S l
l J
m
~
pstersb Rev. OL-O 6/86 i
I i
.,s44.c.:;g. -n W: *' -- A _ ,a -
,A-4 -.m- ,- usa _.a. 4 a,. . . , ~t ,. a. 4>r,,> > an,,.
CALLAWAY - SP Wsird/arn llory a+e A bede ca l}rlrwde (~T.*r*--c) s
[Mg4/4 /.2 4 0 * //#A/,4N) TABLE 6.5-5 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FLUID CHEMISTRY I. Containment Spray Additive y Cedi r hydroxide, '1'cight pcrecnt - 21 C '. (No //m rei,k/muen Temperature range, F 40 104 So- /no II. Sprayed Fluid - Injection Phase 7,g Aqueous solution, pH 4.0 11.0-Chloride, ppm, max 100 Fluoride, ppm, max 100 Boric acid, ppm boron, max / min 2,500/2,350
-Sedir hydrcxide, ppm-- -0 7,530 -
Temperature range, F 37-120 III. Sprayed Fluid - Recirculation Phase Aqueous solution, pH _
S.O 11.0- Z /-//,0 Boric acid, ppm boron, max /mir 2,500/1,000 2,oe7
-Ecdium hydrcxids, ppa, as; -10,000 Temperature range, F 120-255 Ega,-/, J,.;w IV. FinalV Recirculation Sump Fluid Aqueous solution, pH E.5 10.0 7. /- 7.4 Boric acid, ppm boron, max / min 2,500/1,070-2 j # 7 Medium hydrcxidc, ppm, rs:- ?,000 Temperature range, F 120-255 i
l l
Rev. OL-7 5/94 l
l 1
SUMP TEMP. = 200F 9.0 -
CONTAINMENT Ni NAL FLOW SPRAY RECIRC.
OF BO. EDUCTORS i 8. 6 - '
b 8.4 MINIMUM REO. m p
a.
- E U} 8.2 - bl
/ NOMINAL FLOW OF ONE EDUCTOR 7.8 -
REV. OL-7 OTAL 5/94 ECCS CALLMAY PLANT RHR 7.4 - FIGUR .5-5 REC CONTAINMENT SUMP PH \ NOMINAL EDUCTOR FLOW FOR ONE ED OR AND TWO EDUCTOR OPERATIO 7.0 , , , ,
3 6 9 12 15 i 30 45 60 TIME (MINUTES)
- At end of injection phase; long-term minimum is 8.5.
h __
- CALLAWAY - SP 6.5A.1 PARTICULATE IODINE MODEL The spray washout model for aerosol particles is represented in equation form as follows:
AP = (6.5A-1) 2dV Where:
AP = spray removal constant for particles h = drop fall height E = total collection efficiency for a single drop F = spray volumetric flow rate l d = mean drop diameter V = volume of sprayed region The capture of particles by falling drops results from Brownian diffusion, diffusiophoresis, interception, and impaction.
Early in the injection phase, particles are removed mainly by impaction. Following injection, when the larger particles have already been removed, the removal rate is controlled by diffusiophoresis, which is the collection of particulates by steam condensing on the spray drops. The single drop collection efficiency, E, is taken as 0.0015, the minimum value observed in experimental tests (Ref. 1). The minimum collection efficiency, 0.0015, was only attained after the major fraction of airborne 1 articles was removed. For early time periods, the removal races were much hicher than the minimum values ultimately reached. .fA/J6A'~/' I The spray removal constant (AP) for particulate iodine has been calculated to be 0.73/hr, based on equation 6.5A-1,on/ ufed Tn fe e.,L;gn y fj(g), j,,3, *:t , - ;n ge e _;gy n jg g g)
A limited and conservative credit for spray amoval of airborne particulates containing iodine has been taken assuming the spray removal constant is 0.45/hr-for thc 0 to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period following the postulated LOCA (s a Table 6 -2).
fdi/ a e condamine/fon & e-/s,- sC Particle spray removal constants considerably larger and of // red e adj longer duration than those conservatively chosen above have been reported from the Battelle Northwest Containment Systems Experiment (Ref. 2) and by the Oak Ridge National Laboratories Nuclear Safety Pilot Plant (Ref. 4).
[
6.SA.2 ELEMENTAL IODINE MODEL F9,e EQ bof6 CA L C WA774NT The spray system, by virtue of the large surface area provided between the droplets and the containment atmosphere, will afford an excellent means of absorbing elemental radioactive Rev. OL-7 G.5A-2 5/94
.- , l INSERT 8 l
Per Reference 11, it is conservative to assume that E/D is 10 per meter initially (i.e.,1% efficiency for spray drops of one millimeter in diameter), .
changing abruptly to one per meter after the aerosol mass has been depleted by a DF of 50 (i.e.,98% of the particulate mass is ten times more readily removed than the remaining 2%). Using the 831 micron mean drop diameter identified in Table 6.5-2 and the minimum collection efficiency of 0.0015 from Reference 1, E/D would be 1.8 per meter which is consistent with the value from Reference 11 after a DF of 50 is attained.
w-, , -.- ..-ge- - , , _ , , , - - , - . - , -
CALLAWAY - SP iodine released as a consequence of a LOCA. Sodium hydroxide will bc added to t-hc opray fluid to inereccc the colubility of
+3dinc in the spray to the point wherc-fhe rate of absorption is largely dependent on the concentration of radiciodine in the air surrounding the drops.
.--->~
TAUERT The basic model of the containment atmosphere and spray system
$P is given by Parsley (Ref. 4). The containment atmosphere is viewed as a " black box" having a sprayed volume, V, and containing iodine at some uniform concentration Cg. Liquid enters at a flow of F volumes per unit time, containing iodine at a concentration of CL1, and leaves at the same flow, at concentration CL2. A material balance for the containment vessel as a function of time is given by:
-VdCg = F(CL2 - CL1)dt (6.5A-2)
Where:
CL1 = the iodine concentration in the liquid entering the dispersed phase, gm/un 3 CL2 = the iodine concentration in the liquid leaving the dispersed phase, gm/cm 3 V = sprayed volume of containment, cm 3 Cg = the iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere, gm/cm 3 F = the spray volumetric flow rate, cm 3 /sec t = spray time, sec A drop absorption efficiency, E, which may be described as the fraction of saturation, is defined as:
E =
(CL2 - CL1) / (CL* - CL1) (6.5A-3)
In addition, the equilibrium distribution of iodine between the vapor and liquid phases is given by:
H = CL*/Cg ( 6 . 5A- 4 )
Where:
H = the iodine partition coefficient (gm/ liter of liquids) / (gm/ liter of gas)
CL* =
the equilibrium concentration in the liquid, gm/cm3 Rev. OL-7 6.5A-3 5/94 I
INSERT 9 l
The following discussion is based on the pH dependent correlation for the elemental iodine spray removal constant discussed in Reference 12 and used in the EQ dose calculations of Section 3.11(B).l.2.2 (see Equations 6.5A-9 and 6.5A-17). Section 6.5A.3 discusses the surface area dependent correlation for the elemental iodine spray removal constant discussed in Reference 11 and used in the offsite and control room dose calculations of Section 15.6.5. Both of these correlations are applicable for the injection phase only, i
1
CALLAWAY - SP l
Substitution of equation 6.5A-4 into equation 6.5A-3 yields E= (CL2 - CL1) / (hcg - CL1) (6.5A-5)
Solving equation 6.5A-5 for (CL2- CL1) and inserting the result into equation 6.5A-2 gives ^
- (V) dCg = EF (hcg - CL1) dt (6.5A-6)
During the injection phase, CL1 = 0, so that
- (V) dCg = (EFHCg)dt (6.5A-7)
Equation 6.5A-7 can be integrated to solve for Cg. The concentration of iodine in the containment atmosphere during injection as a function of time is given by:
Cg = C; exp [-EHFt / V] (6.SA-8)
Where:
Cgo = the initial iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere, gm/cm 3 Equation 6.5A-8 is applicable up to the time the spray solution is recirculated and is based on the following assumptions:
- a. Cg is uniform throughout the containment
- b. There are no iodine sources after the initial release
- c. The concentration of iodine in the spray solution entering the containment is zero From equation 6.5A-8, the spray removal constant, L5,is given by 4 As= EHF (6.5A-9)
A V The above equation for A is independent of the models on which the numerical evaluation of the drop absorption efficiency, E, and the iodine partition coefficient, H, may be based.
Absorption efficiency for elemental iodine may be calculated from the time-dependent diffusion equation for a rigid sphere, with the gas film mass transfer resistance as a boundary condition. This mass transfer model was suggested by L. F.
Rev. OL-7 6.5A-4 5/94
CALLAWAY - SP interface, is in equilibrium with the iodine concentration in the gas phase outside the drop. The expression in this reference model is:
I 6kt' ge E = 1 - exp -
(6.5A-14) s dH j The absorption efficiency is a function of the drop diameter, the gas phase mass transfer coefficient, diffusivity of iodine in the liquid drop, the partition coefficient, and the drop exposure time.
Eggleton's equation (Ref. 8) for the equilibrium elemental iodine de. contamination factors, DF, is given by:
DF = 1 + H (VL) / (VG) (6.5A-15)
Where:
H = equilibrium iodine partition coefficient 4,,-,% l concenMien DF = ratio of the -t e talviodine Vin the my liqui'2 and -
containment atmos here to th:2 in thex containment atmosphere = C3 Cy egut/il,-ium iodina concan}n-l Ton in-//e VG = net free containment volume minus VL VL = volume of liquid in the containment sumps plus overflow from the sumps, which may be used for calculation of the partition coeff4cient, H, for a g~d Mofa civen value of the DF. 1 --, b ation 6.5A-15 was cea /c u /o8sne V not used in the'prca:nt an;1ys;;,- instead, a numerical value of 5,000 for H, the minimum found from diecv//c/In Containment Systems Experiment (CSE) tests (Refs. 9 fec6'en K//(t),/.n.2jand 10) &or sodium hycroxa.ce spray, was used in the evaluation of ).. .'ZMTEAT' /0 Since the spray does not consist of a uniform droplet size, a spectrum of drop sizes and their corresponding volume percentage (for the specific nozzle design) were used to determine the individual spray removal constant for each droplet size. The total spray removal constant is equal to the sum of the individual spray removal constants, i.e.:
n n m 2 = [2 ; = [ [ 2; (6.5A-16) i=1 i=1i=1 I Since the drop exposure time, t e , is dependent on distance from l
the spray header to the operating deck, and each spray header consists of ring headers -( f ) located at various levels, 2; was calculated for each spray ring header (l ) , utilizing the appropriate drop distance for each header.
Rev. OL-7 6.5A-7 5/94
I 1
INSERT 10 i
While a value of 5000 for H was used to calculate the elemental iodine spray l removal constant of 25.7 hrl used in the EQ dose calculations, it is noted l that Section 6.5A.3 calculates an elemental iodine spray removal constant of l 37 hrl. In any event, for dose calculations the spray removal constant is not as important as the DF in detennining EQ doses.
l l
1 l
i 1
I
~
l l
I 1
I I
I
CALLAWAY - SP Therefore, Ei I H Fj#
2 -
(6.5A-17) 2 f -v V Where:
E,i = collection efficiency for a single drop of micron increment i for ring header /
Fi = spray flow rate for micron increment i for header I and, Fi -
(F;/ nozzle) -
(Nf ) (6.5A-18)
Where:
F;/noule = (15.2 n gpm) (N;)-(V;)
[ N V; i
=1 Ng = number of nozzles on ring header i N. = number frequency for micron increment i i
(Figure 6.5-2)
V; = volume of a drop in micron increment i As the spray solution enters the high-temperature containment atmosphere, steam will condense on the spray drops. The amount of condensation is easily calculated by a mass balance of the drop:
mh + mc hg= m' h f where:
m and m' = the mass of the drop before and after condensation, lbs m = the mass of condensate, lbs h = the initial enthalpy of the drop, Btu /lb h and h p = The saturation enthalpy of water vapor and g
liquid, Btu /lb Rev. OL-7 6.5A-8 5/94
CALLAWAY - SP The increase in each drop diameter in the distribution, therefore, is given by:
r dA3 / '
v 'h g - hl
~
sd> v h sg g Where:
vf = the specific volume of liquid at saturation, R 3 /lb v = the specific volume of the drop before condensation, 3
R /lb h = the latent heat of evaporation, Btu /lb h = the enthalpy of steam at saturation, Btu /lb d and d' = the drop diameter before and af ter condensation, cm Postma and Pasedag (Ref. 6) conclude that condensation will tend to increase the iodine washout rate due to the increased volume of the spray. Their effect has been conservatively ignored.
The drop exposure time calculated is based on the assumption that the drops were sprayed in such a manner that the initial downward velocity of the drops at the spray ring header elevation was zero. The drops fall under the effect of gravity from the spray ring header to the operating deck. -The minimum height is given in Table 6.5-2. As the drop size increases, the average exposure time decreases from about 20'to 5 seconds. l Incorporating the above parameters into equation 6.5A-16 with the sprayed containment volume, V, and assuming a single spray header flow rate, the value of the spray removal coefficient calculatedg is presented in Table 6.5-2.
( 2 714;')
eA The resulting elemental iodine spray removal constant is greater than 10/hr. -C. 4 v.us Vconservative removal constant of 10/hr is assumed and used in the design basis LOCA evaluations presented in Section 15.6.5.
_TswEAT // ->- l 6 . 5 A . REFERENCES
+
- 1. Hilliard, R. K., Coleman L. F., " Natural Transport Effects of Fission Product Behavior in the Containment System Experiment," BNWL-1457, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, December 1970.
Rev. OL-7 6.5A-9 5/94
INSERT 11 l
6.5A.3 ELEMENTAL IODINE MODEL FOR OFFSITE AND CONTROL ROOM DOSE CALCULATIONS As discussed in Reference 11, the effectiveness of the spray during the injection phase against elemental iodine vapor is chiefly determined by the rate at which fresh solution surface area is introduced into the containment atmosphere. The rate of solution created per unit gas volume in the containment atmosphere may be estimated as (6F/VD), where F is the spray volumetric flow rate, V is the volume of the sprayed region, and D is the mean diameter of the spray drops. The first-order spray removal constant for elemental iodine,1s, may be taken to be:
k As=fLglE VD where kgis the gas phase mass transfer coefficient and T is the drop fall time (or drop exposure time), which may be estimated by the ratio of the average fall height to the tenninal velocity of the average drop. The above expression represents a first-order approximation if a well-mixed droplet model is used for spray absorption efficiency. This expression is valid for As values equal to or greater than 10 per hour but less than 20 per hour. Using this expression and the values contained in Table 6.5-2 a value of 37 hr-li s calculated. A value of 10 per hour will continue to be used in the dose calculations of Section 15.6.5.
Spray removal of elemental iodine continues until the DF of Equation 6.5A-15 is reached. Although the VL tenn in Equation 6.5A-15 represents the volume of the sumps plus any overflow from the sumps, it is conservative to just use the volume of the sumps for VL since a lower DF will result. The value for the partition coeflicient, H, in Equation 6.5A-15 was taken from Figure 6 of Reference 13 using the 323 K plot at 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> (representative of the average conditions during a LOCA). The value of 1100 used is considered to be conservative since the sump fluid temperature at 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> would be greater than 323 K per Figure 6.2.1-17 and Figure 6 of Reference 13 shows that higher temperatures would be associated with higher partition coefIicients. The resulting DF is calculated to be 28.7.
1
CALLAWAY - SP
- 2. Hilliard, R. K., et al, " Removal of Iodine and Particu- .
lates from Containment Atmospheres by Sprays - Containment i Systems Experiment Interim Report," BNWL-1244, 1970.
- 3. Perkins, J. F., " Decay of U235 Fission Products," Physical Science Laboratory, RR-TR-63-11, U.S. Army Missile Command I Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, July 25, 1963.
- 4. Parsley, Jr., L. F., " Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray Systems - Part VII," ORNL TM 2412, Part 7, 1970.
- 5. Ranz, W.E., and Marshall, Jr., W.R., " Evaporation from Drops," Chemical Engineering Progress 48, 141-46, 173-80, '.'
1952.
- 6. Postma, A. K., and Pasedag, W. F., "A Review of Mathematical Models for Predicting Spray Removal of Fission Products in Reactor Containment Vessels," WASH-1329, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, June 1974.
- 7. Griffiths, V., "The Removal of Iodine from the Atmosphere by Sprays," Report No. AHSB(S)R45, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, London, 1963.
- 8. Eggleton, A. E. J., "A Theoretical Examination of Iodine-Water Partition Coefficient," AERE (R)-4887, 1967. T
- 9. Postma, A. K., Coleman, L. F., and Hilliard, R. K.,
" Iodine Removal from Containment Atmospheres by Boric Acid Spray," BNP-100, Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Washington, 1970.
- 10. Coleman, L. F., " Iodine Gas-Liquid Partition," Nuclear Safety Quarterly Report, February, March, April 1970, BNWL-1315-2, Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Washington,
- p. 2.12-2.19, 1970.
. z-A/.rd-M /2. .
Rev. OL-0 6.5A-10 6/86
INSERT 12
- 11. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan Section 6.5.2, Revision 2,
" Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System," December 1988.
- 12. ANSI /ANS-56.5-1979, "PWR and BWR Containment Spray System Design Criteria."
- 13. E. C Beahm, W. E. Shockley, C. F. Weber, S. J. Wisbey, and Y. M.
Wang, " Chemistry and Transport ofIodine in Containment,"
NUREG/CR-4697, October 1986.
l l
l l
l CALLAWAY - SP l
^ assumed to plateout onto the internal surfaces of the contain-ment or adhere to internal components. The remaining iodine and the noble gas activity are assumed to be immediately i available for leakage from the containment. 1 Once the gaseous fission product activity is released to the l containment atmosphere, it is subject to various mechanisms of j removal which operate simultaneously to reduce the amount of )
activity in the containment. The removal mechanisms include radioactive decay, containment sprays, and containment leakage. !
j For the noble gas fission products, the only removal processes considered in the containment are radioactive decay and con- l tainment leakage.
- a. Radioactive Decay - Credit for radioactive decay for I fission product concentrations located within the containment is assumed throughout the course of the accident. Once the activity is released to the l environment, no credit for radioactive decay or f
deposition is taken,
( re}en44n !
- b. Containment Sprays - The containment spray system is i designed to abuorb airborne iodine fission products within the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine r: c cadcapability of the containment sprays,Ye/te// urn The pdarg/w/esprayendiu-effectiveness hydronid - is added for thetorec the.al spray solution M.. / of, iodine #d bM #
n chemicd f dependent 4t rm ,rur> ong }{; iodingreder Nan rebnYIon 7.0, "IN^ N" 'Y' pwirrl*in;Uc.a /oEontainmen[, [eakage - The containment leaks at a rate l of 0.2 volume percent / day as incorporated.as a Technical l Specification requirement at peak calculated internal !
j containment pressure for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and at '
50 percent of this leak rate for the remaining duration of the accident. The containment leakage is assumed to be directly to the environment. g i
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONDITIONS - The major assumptions and param- i !
m eters 15.6 assumed nd di.rewein the/ Ir, anal sis are itemized in Tables 15A-1 and c}fon J.CA.3.
In the evaluation of a LOCA, all the fission product release assumptions of Regulatory Guide 1.4 have been followed. The f following specific assdmptions were used in the analysis.
Table 15.6-7 provides a comparison of the analysis to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.4.
- a. The reactor core equilibrium noble gas and iodine ,
inventories are based on long-term operation at a core power level of 3,636 MWt.
s }
Rev. OL-2 ?
15.6-27 6/88 i
. _ _ . ~ . _ - ._
, , i CALLAWAY - SP
- b. One hundred percent of the core equilibrium radio- ,,) i active noble gas in;entory is immediately available for leakage from the containment.
- c. Twenty-five percent of the core equilibrium radio-active iodine inventory is immediately available for leakage from the containment.7%e o}/er .351/s re / eared Ys -//e dembr/anissM-a}rharfhere inr/ns-fonepsly y/a}er 44,
- d. Of the iodine fission product inventory released to the containment, 91 percent is in the form of ele-mental iodine, 5 percent is in the form of particulate iodine, and 4 percent is in the form of organic iodine.
c '11.*1 ,
s
- e. Credit for iodine removal by the containment spray ,
system is taken, starting at time zero and continuing l until a decontamination f actor of -le&"for the ele-mental md p nti latm speciesg has been achieved, and'[0 for. He jaedicula}e rfecIer
- f. The following iodine remov constants for the con-tainment spray system are n med in the analysis:
Elemental iodine -
10.0 per hr Organic iodine -
0.0 per hr Particulate iodine -
0.45 per hr
- g. The following parameters were used in the two-region .
l spray model: i i
Fraction of containment sprayed - 0.85 Fraction of containment unsprayed - 0.15 Mixing rate (cfm) between sprayed and unsprayed regions - 85,000 Section 6.5 contains a detailed analysis of the sprayed and unsprayed volumes and includes an ex-planation of the mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions.
)
- h. The containment is assumed to leak at 0.2 volume I
percent / day during the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> immediately following the accident and 0.1 volume percent / day thereafter.
- i. The containment leakage is assumed to be direct unfiltered to t e environment.
cen-/vol bu(lll
- Cen$rsl rHrn
- j. The.EG.FVfil ers will be 49 percent efficient in the removal of all species of iodine.
V Rev. OL-4 15.6-28 6/90
_m_ _ _ - ... _ . _ _ . _
CALLAWAY - SP g MATHEMATICAL MODELS USED IN THE ANALYSIS - Mathematical models
/ used in the analysis are described in the following sections:
- a. The mathematical models used to analyze the activity released during the course of the accident are described in Section 15A.2.
- b. The atmospheric dispersion factors used in the analysis were calculated, based on the onsite meteorological measurements program described in Section 2.3 of the ,
Site Addendum, and are provided in Table 15A-2.
- c. The thyroid inhalation and total-body immersion doses to a receptor exposed at the exclusion area boundary
) and the outer boundary of the low population zone were analyzed, using the models described in Sections 15A.2.4 and 15A.2.5, respectively.
- d. Buildup of activity in the control room and the integrated doses to the control room personnel are analyzed, based on models described in Section 15A.3.
IDENTIFICATION OF LEAKAGE PATHWAYS AND RESULTANT LEAKAGE ACTIVITY - For evaluating the radiological consequences of a postulated LOCA, the resultant activity released to the con-tainment atmosphere is assumed to leak directly to the i environment.
" No credit is taken for ground deposition or radioactive decay during transit to the exclusion area boundary or LPZ outer boundary.
15.6.5.4.1.2 Radioactive Releases Due to Leakage from ECCS and Containment Spray Recirculation Lines ,
Subsequent to the injection phase of ESF system operation, the water in the containment recirculation sumps is recirculated by the residual heat removal, centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps, and the containment spray pumps. Due to the
- operation of the ECCS and the containment spray system, most of
)
the radioiodine released from the' core would be contained in the containment sump. It is conservatively assumed that a leakage rate of 2 gpm from the ECCS and containment spray recirculation lines exists for the duration of the LOCA. This leakage would occur inside the containment as well as inside the auxiliary building. For this analysis, all the leakage is assumed to occur inside the auxiliary building. Only trace quantities of radioiodine are expected to be airborne within the auxiliary building due to the temperature and pH level of the recirculated water. However, 10 percent of the radiciodine.in the leaked water '
is assumed to become airborne and exhausted from the unit vent to the environment through 'c2fety crade filters (90% efficient). No T credit is taken for ho up (i.e. decay) or mixing in the auxiliary
) building; however, mi. ng and holdup in the sumps are factored into the release and decay removal constants for this pathway.
Oe *ukIliy luill*j dmyeny exhad Rev. OL-6 15.6-29 6/92 ,
CALLAWAY - SP loadings are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, which limits the maximum loading to 2.5 mg of iodine per gram of l activated charcoal. The 100 percent efficiency assumption is conservative for the purpose of checking filter loading and is not to be confused with the 449 efficiency assumption used for radiological consequences s listed in Table 15.0 0 oud 15.A-1.
15.6.5.4.3.2 Doses to a Receptor at the Exclusion Area Boundary and Low Population Zone Outer Boundary The potential radiological consequences resulting from the occurrence of the postulated LOCA have been conservatively analyzed, using assumptions and models described in previous 3 sections. )
l The total-body dose due to immersion and the thyroid dose due to inhalation have been analyzed for the 0-2 hour dose at the exclusion area boundary and for the duration of the accident at the LPZ outer boundary. The results, with margin, are listed in Table 15.6-8. The resultant doses are within the guideline l values of 10 CFR 100.
15.6.5.4.3.3 Doses to Control Room Personnel Radiation doses to control room personnel following a pos-tulated LOCA are based on the ventilation, cavity dilution, and dose model discussed in Section 15A.3.
,)
Control room personnel are subject to a total-body dose due to immersion and a thyroid dose due to inhalation. These doses have been analyzed, and are provided in Table 15.6-8. The listed doses, with margin, are within the limits established by GDC-19.
15.6.6 A NUMBER OF BWR TRANSIENTS This section is not applicable to the Callaway Plant.
15.
6.7 REFERENCES
l
- 1. Burnett, T. W. T., et. al., "LOFTRAN Code Description", )
WCAP-7907-P-A (Proprietary), WCAP-7907-A (Non-Proprietary),
April 1984.
- 2. Chelemer, H., Boman, L '. H., Sharp, D. R., " Improved Thermal Design Procedures", WCAP-8587, July 1975.
- 3. SGTR Analysis letters SLNRC 86-01 (1-8-86), SLNRC 86-03 (2-11-86) SLNRC 86-05 (4-1-86), SLNRC 86-08 (9-4-86),
ULNBC-1442 (2-3-87), ULNRC-1518 (5-27-87), ULNRC-1849 (10-21-88), ULNRC-2145 (1-29-90), and the NRC SER dated j 8-6-90. I 1
- 4. " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident-Risk in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1400, NUREG-75/
014, October 1975.
Rev. OL-6 15.6-32 6/92
- CALLRWAY - SP TABLE 15.6-6 PARAMETERS USED IN EVALUATING THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS-OF-COOLANT-ACCIDENT I. Source Data
- a. Core power level, MWt 3,636
- b. Burnup, full power days 1,000
- c. Percent of core activity initially airborne in the containment
- 1. Noble gas 100 g
- 2. Iodine -i+ fd
- d. Percent of core activity /M 8/,%/8// I#f#l'!'
in containment sump ; 0.47 hoas
- 1. Noble gases 0
- 2. Iodine 50
- e. Core inventories Table 15A-3
- f. Iodine distribution, percent
- 1. Elemental 91
- 2. Organic 4
- 3. Particulate 5 II. Atmospheric Dispersion Factors See Table 15A-2 III. Activity Release Data
- a. Containment leak rate, volume percent / day
- 1. 0-24 hours 0.20
- 2. 1-30 days 0.10
- b. Percent of containment leakage that is unfiltered 100
- c. Credit for containment sprays
- 1. Spray iodine removal constants (per hour)
- a. Elemental 10.0
- b. Organic 0.0
- c. Particulate 0.45
- }/a/S i,,rknhneoc/y p lahr e<+ /**vig 25'A /~ediakl yavor/alle
/s,. /eakge km -He conhime d.
Rev. OL-2 6/88
. . CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 15.6-6 (Sheet 2)
- 2. Maximum iodine decontamination factors for the containment atmosphere
- a. Elemental 00 - 2R 7
- b. Organic 0
- c. Particulate 09- So
- 3. Sprayed volume, percent 85
- 4. Unsprayed volume, percent 15
- 5. Sprayed-unsprayed mixing rate, CFM 85,000
- 6. Containment volume, ft' 2.5E+6
- d. ECCS recirculation leakage
- 1. Leak rate (0.47 hour5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br />s-30 days), gpm 2.0
- 2. Sump volume, gal. 460,000
- e. RWST leakage
- 1. Leak rate (0.47 hours5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br /> -
30 days), gpm 3.0
- 2. RWST volume, gal. 400,000
}
PARAMETERS USED IN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS I. General
- 1. Core power level, Mwt 3636 (102% Power) i 2. Number of fuel assemblies in the core 193 Maximum radial peaking factor 1.65
( 3.
- 4. Percentage of failed fuel 1.0
- 5. Steam generator tube leak, lb/hr 500
)II. Sources
- 1. Core inventories, Ci Table 15A-3 l
- 2. Gap inventories, Ci Table 15A-3 l
1 3. Primary coolant specific activities, Table 11.1-5*
l pCi/gm l 4. Primary coolant activity, technical I specification limit for iodines - I-131 l dose equivalent, pCi/gm 1.0 ;
- 5. Secondary coolant activity technical l specification limit for iodines - I-131 dose equivalent, pCi/gm 0.1 III. Activity Release Parameters 3 2.5 x 10'
- 1. Free volume of containment, ft
- 2. Containment leak rate l I
- i. 0-24 hours, % per day 0.2
- 11. after 24 hrs, % per day 0.1 IV. Control Room Dose Analysis (for LOCA)
- 1. Control building
- i. Mixing volume, cf 150,000
- 11. Filtered intake, cfm Prior to operator action (0-30 minutes) 900 l After operator action )
(30 minutes - 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />) 450 l j iii. Unfiltered ~inleakage, cfm 300 l iv. Filter efficiency (all forms of iodine), % Je&-76~
- 2. Control room ;
- i. Volume, cf 100,000 j
)
- 11. Filtered flow from control build-ing, cfm 540 -
I
- Except for SGTR events for which Table 11.I-4 is used. I Rev. OL-4 f 6/90
m CALLAWAY - SP TABLE 15A-1 (Sheet 2) 111. Unfiltered flow from control building, cfm Prior to operator action (0-30 minutes) 540 ;
After operator action (30 minutes - 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />) 0 iv. Filtered recirculation, cfm 1440 l
- v. Filter efficiency (all forms of 1 iodine), % Geff l l
V. Miscellaneous ,') l l
- 1. Atmospheric dispersion factors, x/Q sec/m 3 Table 15A-2
- 2. Dose conversion factors
- 1. total body and beta skin, rem-meter3 /Ci-sec Table 15A-4
- 3. Breathing rates, meter s /sec
- i. control room at all times 3.47 x 10 ~'
ii. offsite ~
j 0-8 hrs 3.47 x 10
- 8-24 hrs 1.75 x 10 '
- )24-720 hrs 2.32 x 10 *
\
- 4. Control room occupancy fractions 0-24 hrs 1.0 24-96 hrs 0.6 96-720 hrs 0.4
)
Rev. OL-4 6/90