PY-CEI-NRR-1756, Forwards Annual Rept of 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations for 1993
| ML20064G213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1994 |
| From: | Stratman R CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| PY-CEI-NRR-1756, NUDOCS 9403160073 | |
| Download: ML20064G213 (184) | |
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l CENTERDOR ENERGY PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Mail Address:
PO. BOX 97 Robert A. Stratman CEN "^ PERRY, OHIO 44081
[g y,T OHIO 081 VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR (216) 259-3737 March 11, 1994 PY-CEI/NRR-1756 L U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 Annual Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for 1993 Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), enclosed is the report of facility changes, tesis, and experiments for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Those changes, tests, and experiments reported are for the period September 19, 1992 through September 18, 1993, and in selected cases more recent evaluations.
This report summarizes a total of 176 safety evaluations, none of which resulted h the identification of an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaluations are numbered sequentially and those not included in this summary have M ther been voided, withdrawn or are still under consideration although not appi oved at this time. Attachment i lists the number of safety evaluations in hjc=. categories bassJ on the type of item being evaluated. Attachment 2 defines the acronyms and format description. Attachment 3 provides the summarier N the safety evaluations described above.
If you have questions or require additional information, please coitact Henry Hegrat - Regulatory Affairs at (216) 280-5606.
Very truly yours,
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Attachmtnt 1 PY-CEI/NRR-1756 L Summary of 1993 Perry Safety Evaluations 0y Category The safety evaluations are divided into the major categories listed below.
Category Percentage Number of Total
- 1. Design Changes (except setpoint changes) 55 31.3
- 2. Drawing Changes 15 8.5
- 3. USAR Changes 21 11.9
- 4. Procedure / Instruction Changes 32 18.2 (revisions, temporary changes)
, 5. Lifted Lead & Jumper, Electrical Devices 18 10.2 and Mechanical Foreign Item Changes
- 6. Nonconformance Report Evaluations 21 11.9
- 7. Temporary Test Instruction Evaluations 6 3.4
- 8. Miscellaneous 8 4.6 Total 176 100%
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k Attachment 2 PY-CEI/NRR-1756 L FORMAT DESCRIPTION Each 50.59 Safety Evaluation summary is presented in the following format:
SE No.: A sequentially assigned number from one (001) to end of the period, preceded by the year; e.g.86-025.
Source Document: There are several sources of evaluations which are abbreviated as shown.
DCN - Drawing Change Notice DCP - Design Change Package EP - Emergency Plan FCR - Field Clarification Request FPI - Pre-Fire Plan Instruction FTI - Fuel Technical Instruction ISS - Installation Standard Specification LL&JED - Lifted Lead and Jumper and Electrical Device MFI - Mechanical Foreign Item NR - Nonconformance Report where S or N in the serial number indicates safety or nonsafety PAP - Plant Administrative Procedure PEI - Plant Emergency Instruction PSP - Physical Security Plan PSTG - Perry Specific Technical Guidelines PTI - Periodic Test Instruction SCN - Specification Change Notice SCR - Setpoint Change Request S0I - System Operating Instruction SSCR - Safe Shutdown capability Report SVI - Surveillance Test Instruction TAF - Technical Assignment file TXI - Temporary Test Instruction USAR CR - Updated Safety Analysis Report Change Request Description of Change:
A short narrative describing the lotetion and type of plant change.
Summary I. Response to 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2)(1) - is the probability nf orem tence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report increased?
II. Response to 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(ii) - is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created?
III. Response to 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2)(iii) - is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
4 Attachment 3 PY-CEI/NRR-1756 L PERRY NUCLEAR POVER PLANT SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2) 1993 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - -
SE No.: 92-168 Source Document: PAP-1920, Rev. 4 Description of Change This change to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1920, " Periodic Fire Inspection", improves and clarifies the fire inspection process.
Summary
, I. No. This administrative change does not alter any equipment or plant operating practice. It is consistent with all NRC and NFPA guidelines for the inspection process. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This change is administrative and does not affect the operation of any equipment required for safe shutdown. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change does not affect any equipment or operating practice relied upon by Technical Specification. The Fire Protection Program is referenced under administrative controls sections 6.5.1.6 N, 6.5.2.8 E, and 6.8.1 H of the Technical Specifications. These changes were evaluated and found to be consistent with these Technical Specification sections and with the USAR. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-169 Source Document: NR 92-N-291, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions a leaking crack at a weld interface on the condensate (N21) header " Temporary Use-As-Is" until a repair can be made.
Summary I. No. The leaking veld has been inspected and found to pose no current plant operational problems. The crack vill be observed on a routine basis to ensure it does not propagate. The veld area was evaluated and structural integrity of the piping is not impacted. The piping vill still continue to deliver condensate at the required flow. The loss of feedvater flow transient (USAR 15.2.7) is not impacted.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this disposition.
II. No. The piping and associated equipment vill continue to perform its design function at the specified crack size. Leakage !s adequately contained within the floor drain system's capability. The leakage and steam plume vill not adversely affect any safaty related equipment. Therefore, this disposition vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The condensate system is non-safety and is not addressed within Technical Specifications. Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 92-170 Source Document: NR 92-N-285, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions the cracked and leaking Service Vater (P41) strainer blovdown line " Temporary Use-As-Is" until it can be repaired.
Summary I. No. The Service Vater system is non-safety related and is not required for safe shutdown. Isolation of the blowdown line in the case of a complete failure vill not adversely affect the overall operation of this system, nor vill it adversely impact any othet plant systems.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence no the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill oe increased by this disposition.
II. No. The potential flooding from a complete failure of this line vill be contained by the Plant Catch Basin Storm Drainage (P67) system. No other systems or equipment vill be adversely affected by this disposition. Therefore, this disposition vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Service Water system vill continue to function as required. No Technical Specification related equipment will be adversely affected by this disposition. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-171 Source Document: NR 92-S-287, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions ball valve 2P45F0040B "Use-As-Is" with its actuator removed. This is a Unit 1/ Unit 2 boundary valve which must remain closed in order to support Unit 1 operation.
Summary I. No. Overall system performance vill remain unaffected by this disposition. The ball valve vill continue to meet the design and construction standards for the Emergency Service Vater (P45) system.
The valve vill remain in a closed position with its actuator removed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Operation of the P45 system will remain as designed and the stress analysis shows that the system remains within allovable code limits.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P45 system is addressed by Technical Specification 3 7.1 and this disposition does not alter its basis. The P45 system vill continue to operate as designed. Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 92-172 Source Document: Security Plan, Rev. 17, TC-1 Description of Change This change to the Security Plan has been evaluated to ensure that the effectiveness of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan has not been reduced and to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, continue to be met. Site Protection must be contacted for further details since this.is considered
" SAFEGUARDS" information.
Summary I. No. The Security Plan describes the comprehensive Physical Security Program and has no effect on the occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.
II. No. The Security Plan does not direct the operation of plant systems or equipment and, therefore, can not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Security Plan can not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 92-174 Source Document: PSTG, Rev. 2, TC-2 Description of Change This change to the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTG) removes ambiguity concerning the use of the hydrogen control equipment.
Summary I. No. Operation of the hydrogen control equipment is not affected by this change nor is any equipment altered. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This is an editorial change. It removes ambiguity and prevents the equipment from being operated in an unsafe manner. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This editorial change does not alter the requirement or the bases for hydrogen control equipment in Technical Specifications 3.3.7.5, 3.6.7.1, 3.6.7.2 or 3.6.7.3. Therefore this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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Source Document: SCRs 1-92-1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186 and 1187 l Description of Change l
These setpoint changes alter the tolerance specified for the Emergency j Service Vater pump motor inverse time overcurrent relays to ensure that j the pickup setting does not fall below the degraded voltage value.
Summary I. No. These SCRs vill not alter the function, operation or operability of these relays. This tightening of the lower tolerance vill ensure that the relays protect the motors during a degraded voltage condition. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These setpoint changes simply tighten the tolerance associated with the setpoints for these relays. Therefore, these changes vill not l create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These setpoint changes do not affect the Technical Specification l cssociated with the ESV System. Therefore, they will not reduce the '
margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-178 Source Document: NR 92-S-301, Rev. 0 NR 92-S-302, Rev. 0 i Description of Change l
- i These nonconformance reports disposition ventilation system prefilters which were not processed as safety related, "Use-As-Is" Summary I. No. These prefilters do not perform a safety related function. They are used to prolong the High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter life during normal operation. No credit is taken for prefilters in i
the accident analyses. Failure of the prefilters vill not affect
- the overall efficiency of the Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) filter i trains as analyzed in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability
- of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Failure of these prefilters will have no adverse affect on any ESF 4
system or on any other component in the plant. Therefore, this
- change vill not create the possibility for an accident or i
malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The out of service times specified for the ESF ventilation systems vill not be exceeded by the failure of these prefilters. Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-179 Source Document: NR 92-S-307, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions ball valve 2P45F0160 " Repaired and Use-As-Is" with its actuator removed. This is a Unit 1/ Unit 2 boundary valve which must remain closed in order to support Unit 1 operation.
Summary I. No. O'orall system performance vill remain unaffected by this disposition. The ball valve vill continue to meet the design and construction standards for the Emergency Service Vater (P45) system.
The valve vill remain in a closed position with its actuator removed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the
- consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
l I II. No. Operation of the P45 system will remain as designed and the stress analysis shows that the system remains within allovable code limits.
l Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an i accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously l evaluated.
I III. No. The P45 system is addressed by Technical Specification 3.7.1 and this disposition does not alter its basis. The P45 system vill continue to operate as designed. Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any
- Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-182 Source Document: Emergency Plan, Rev. 10, TC-7 Description of Change i
! This change to the Emergency Plan completely revises the Classification 1 Flowchart and the Emergency Action Levels (EAL) listed in Table 4-1 to accommodate Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.101.
Summary l
l I. No. This change does not direct or affect the operation of any plant I equipment necessary for safe shutdown. Only the classification of l accidents is being altered, not the initiators. Therefore, neither l
the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l II. No. This change does not alter the design nor affect the operation of l the plant. Therefore, it vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This changes does not adversely affect any equipment or operation relied upon by Technical Specifications. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-183 Source Document: PAP-1914, Rev. 5 Description of Change 3
These changes to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1914, " Fire Protection System Operability", incorporate the necessary information from PAP-1923, " Actions on Inoperable Fire Protection Systems", to establish PAP-1914 as the single source document governing fire system j operability. This vill result in the cancellation of PAP-1923.
l Summary j' I. No. This administrative change does not alter any equipment or plant operating practices. It does not introduce any new fire hazards or 4 change the combustible loading of any plant area. Therefore,
, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a l previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
i II. No. This is an administrative change. No plant equipment or operating practices are changed. There, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
i 1 III. No. This administrative changes does not affect the alternate shutdown equipment or methods discussed in the USAR or the Technical j Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of
- safety as defined in the bases for any the Technical Specification.
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, Source Document: NR 92-N-300, Rev. 0 4
Description of Change j i l This nonconformance report dispositions a linear indication on a 3/8" l
section of Mixed-Bed Demineralizer (P22) piping "Use-As-Is" and " Repair". l
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j Summary j l I. No. This piping is non-safety. The indication is not believed to extend into the minimum vall thickness and it does not adversely affect the
- function or operating of the P22 system. Additionally, this system l
- is not relied upon in the safety analyses. Therefore, neither the 1 probability of occurrence nor the consequences of previously analyzed accident will be increased by this disposition.
I II. No. This disposition does not adversely affect any equipment important to safety. In the unlikely event that the piping does fail, the P22 system is expected to remain operational and the leakage is not i expected to adversely affect any other equipment relied upon for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this disposition vill not i create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
[ III. No. The P22 system is not addressed in the Technical Specification, nor l 1 are any licensing basis parameters affected by this condition. I 1
Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. i I
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SE No.: 92-185 Source Document: NR 92-N-299, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions several Target Rock solenoid valves in the Post Accident Sampling (P87) system which exceed nameplate pressure and temperature ratings " Interim Use-As-Is" and "Use-As-Is".
Summary I. No. These valves have been hydrostatically tested and have been found to exceed the existing design requirement for external leakage. In the event of valve failure, check valves are provided to restrict reverse flow. Additionally, failure of the P87 system vill not initiate any accident analyzed in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this disposition.
II. No. The P87 system is not relied upon for safe shutdown of the plant.
This disposition vill not lead to any failure which could adversely affect any equipment important to safety. Therefore, this disposition vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
- III. No. Technical Specification 6.8.4.c governs the administrative aspects of the P87 system. This disposition vill have no affect on these requirements. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-186 Source Document: DCP 88-119, Rev. 2 l l
Description of Change 1 This revision to the design change eliminates one of the nine Underdrain (P72) system pumps.
Summary I. No. The P72 system is oversized with respect to pumping capacity. It vill continue to perform its design function with one less pump.
Vith the failure of all nine of the original pumps, the P72 system
! vill still meet its design function assuming simultaneous. Unit 1 and Unit 2 circulating water line breaks. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Operation with one less pump vill continue to satisfy design requirements. In face, loss of all nine pumps vill not result in the groundwater level rising above the specified limit. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or j malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The plant underdrain system including both the pumped and the l gravity discharge subsystems is not addressed in Technical l Specifications. Inoperability of one pump will not affect the l system's ability to perform its design function. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 32-190 Source Document: DCP 92-026, Rev. O Description of Change This design change deletes the LOCA auto-start feature for the Emergency Service Water (ESV) screens (OP49-D001A/B) and screen vash pumps (0P49-C002A/B).
Summary I. No. This design change vill improve voltage availability to the OP49 equipment during LOCA responses with offsite power present. The total post-LOCA load vill be slightly decreased by this change. The net effect will be increased reliability of the OP49 equipment post-LOCA. Auto initiation, due to level variance and manual initiation post-LOOP via the control switch vill remain unchanged by this modification. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This design char.ge vill not result in the OP49 system becoming unavailable during normal operations or post-LOCA/ LOOP. Even if both screen wash subsystems were to become inoperable, there is a high probability that the traveling screens vill remain clean for a period of at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. There is more than sufficient time to manually rotate screens and clean them using an alternate water supply as necessary. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously.
III. No. The P49 system is not addressed in Technical Specifications.
Complete operability of the screen vash system is not required to ensure operability of the P45 system. Therefore,'this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-191 Source Documents DCP 92-074, Rev. O Description of Change This design change modifies the Feedvater Sample Probe (B21) by shortening it and by using a seal velded collar at the point of attachment.
Summary I. No. This modification vill decrease the probability of future failures of this probe by increasing its structural integrity. The modified probe meets design requirements for sampling. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The probability of probe failure is greatly reduced by this modification. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. System and plant operation vill remain unaffected by this modification. The probe vill be less likely to fail. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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I SE No.: 92-192 Source Document: DCP 89-039, Rev. O Description of Change This design change adds temperature control valves (TCV) to the Nuclear
( Closed Cooling (P43) lines supplying the lube oil coolers for the Service (P51) and Instrument Air (P52) compressors in order to provide automatic regulation of the cooling flow.
Summary l 1
I. No. Automatic flow regulation provided by the TCVs to maintain oil !
temperature in the desired operating range vill improve compressor l reliability since operator action vill no longer be required to throttle manual valves to accomplish the same function. This DCP vill eliminate the potential for a trip of an auto started unit due i to unregulated flow shortly after the compressor starts. Therefore, i neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a
, previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change. ;
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( II. No. There vill be no adverse operational impact on the P43 system l operation. This system vill remain at least as reliable as it was l vithout the TCVs. Therefore, this change vill not create the l possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change vill not alter the function or the overall operation of any of the systems involved. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 92-193 Source Document: TXI-0149, Rev. O Description of Change This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0149, " Determining Fuel Pool and Containment Pool Grace Time", is designed to determine the heatup rate of the Fuel Handling Building and Upper Containment Pools with the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC) System secured.
Summary I. No. No accident analyzed in Chapter 15 of the USAR taken credit for FPCC operation. All actions specified in this procedure fall within the scope of normal system operation and all FPCC instrumentation vill remain available during the performance of this test.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. All actions specified fall within the scope of normal system operation. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility 1 for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. There is sufficient time to restart FPCC if the TXI limit of 98"F is j reached in order to prevent exceeding the Technical Specification limit of 100'F. Staying below this limit ensures that this test l vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-001 Source Document: DCP 91- 277, Rev. O Description of Change DCP 91-277, Rev..I supersedes this change. See SE No.93-012. l l
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SE No.: 93-002 Source Document: DCP 91-054, Rev. O Description of Change This design change modifies the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control (E32) system to reduce boundary leakage and to facilitate Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT).
Summary I. No. These changes meet applicable design criteria. They provide a system configuration that is equivalent to the original design while l providing enhancements for minimizing main steam line penetration l
! leakage and for snubber optimization. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously l analyzed accident vill be increased by this change. )
i l II. No. These changes actually result in the elimination of some postulated i
! pipe breaks without adding any new ones. The net affect is the l l reduction of main steam line penetration leakage without compromising system function or integrity. Therefore, these changes vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunctions of a different type than any previously evaluated. ,
III. No. These modifications reduce main steam line penetration leakage without compromising the structural integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of satety as defined in the bases for any Technical l Specification. l l
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SE No.: 93-003 l Source Document: DCP 91-197, Rev. 0 l Description of Change This design change installs Fire Suppression (P54) aystem branch lines l and sprinklers in the Intermediate Building (IB) 571' level to '
accommodate increased combustible loading in thi area. ;
Summary I. No. This change vill not degrade or adversely affect the design of the existing P54 equipment. This installation vill meet appropriate criteria including the requirements contained in USAR Section 9A.5.
The floor drains in the area are sufficient to prevent flooding following actuation of tha sprinklers. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. There is no safe shutdown equipment located in the affected fire zone. The sprinkler system is designed to suppress and control the fire within this zone. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The addition of this sprinkler system enhances the overall capability to protect the plant from fire damage. The installation vill not adversely affect any Technical Specification required equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin cf ,,
safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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! Source Document: DCP 92-184, Rev. 0 l
Description of Change This design change vill activate spare wires, optical isolators, terminals and an annunciator vindow to install an alarm designated Suppression Pool Overflow. During refuel outages water from other pools l
is stored in the suppression pool causing a high level condition. The new annunciator vill alert the reactor operator prior to the suppression pool over flowing the veir vall and spilling water into the dryvell.
Summary l I. No. This is an alarm only. It vill be optically isolated from the l safety related circuitry. It will not control or affect any equipment in the plant. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l II. No. This alarm is optically isolated from safety related circuitry. It I
has been evaluated and used during past refueling outages under an approved Lifted Lead & Jumper (MFI/LLJED). It has no effect on any equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility l
for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
( III. No. This design change converts a temporary alarm into a permanent alarm. This alarm is not deceribed in Technical Specification and it does not affect any Technical Specification equipment.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-005 Source Document: DCN 4080, Rev. O Description of Change i
1 This drawing change corrects the mislabeling of two valves on l P&ID D-302-604, Reactor Recirculation System. I Summary I. No. The configuration in the field is correct and all other supporting documentation is correct. The mislabeling was limited to this drawing. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the I consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by 1 this change.
II. No. No equipment is altered by this change, nor are any operational changes being made. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This is an editorial change to a drawing. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-006 Source Document: MFI 1-92-091, Rev. O Description of Change This Hechanical Foreign Item vill allow installation of a 5 horsepower, 250 gpm, 300 lb. pump in the reactor vessel during a forced outage to minimize thermal stratification in the core with only the fuel pool closed cooling system available for heat removal.
Summary I. No. The pump will be properly supported and vired. The LOCA, Loss of AC Power and Seismic analyses are not affected by this installation.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The pump vill not be installed near moving equipment that is important to safety. The Alarm Response Instruction (ARI) provides guidance for lov vessel level in the event the vater level decreases below the required level. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This installation aids the G41 system in removing heat and minimizing stratification within the vessel. The temporary pump and hose have no adverse impact on any Technical Specification required equipment or operation. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the raargin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-007 l Source Document: DCP 92-043, Rev. O !
Description of Change l This design change vill allow the plant to Le placed in a condition that ,
vill more easily allow Containment Integrated Leak Rate Testing (CILhT) l to be performed. It consists of changing 1E51F0068 from a remote-manual to an automatic valve, taking credit for E51F0078 and E12F0102 as ,
containment isolation valves and including flange E51D0023 into the l containment isolation tables.
i Summary :
I. No. This change automates a remote manual function required when high dryvell pressure and low reactor pressure exist. Safety Evaluation 92-097 provide for locking close valve E12F0102. Taking credit for E51F0078 as an automatic isolation valve and E12F0102 as a locked closed manual isolation valve vill change the isolation arrangements of the four affected penetrations, but vill still allow each penetration to meets its originally specified design criteria.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Only the closure of valve E51F0068 is changed. The interlocks for this valve remain in effect. The E12F0102 valve is presently locked closed under DCN 3755. The function and operation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remains essentially unchanged.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The function and operation of RCIC rer.ain essentially unchanged.
Allowing E51F0068 to automatically close vill provide a greater margin of safety by removing protected human error. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-008 Source Document: DCP 91-155, Rev. O SCRs 0-91-1071 through 1074 Description of Change This design change deletes the low pressure trip and alarm for the vaste feed and vaste devatering pumps in the Solid Radvaste (G51) system.
Summary i I. No. These trips and alarms were designed for operation of the original G51 system. This system never operated and was converted for use with a vendor supplied liner system. The trips and alarms being l
modified hinder operation of the vendor system. Their elimination vill improve system operation and will actually reduce the probability of a radioactive spill by eliminating a major cause of system blockage. The failure of this portion of the radvaste system l is bounded by the accident analyses in USAR Chapter 15. Therefore, l neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes have no impact on equipment impacted to safety.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Eliminating these trips and alarms does not affect any equipment or operation described in the Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i l SE No.: 93-009 l Source Document: DCN 4045, Rev. O Description of Change I 4
l This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-110, Condensate Demineralizer i l System to accurately depict valves 1N24F0746A and B as relief valves l
rather than gate valves.
1 Summary I. No. This drawing change simply updates the drawing to reflect actual, approved field conditions. Therefore, neither the probability of l occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
l II. No. This is simply a drawing change. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different !
type than any previously evaluated. )
i III. No. This drawing change does not affect Technical Specification.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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Source Document: DCP 85-098, Rev. 9 Description of Change This design change adds a backwash flow control valve, flow element and temperature element to the backwash line of the Cation Regeneration Tank to improve system control.
Summary !
I I. No. This change vill improve control and result in less vaste being generated. The failure of the regeneration portion of the Condensate Demineralizer (N24) system vill not affect the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of any accident. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The regeneration position of the N24 system is non-safety related and has no affect on equipment important to safety. This change enhances the performance of the resin backvash process. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The regeneration portion of the N24 system is not addressed by Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for sny Technical l Specification.
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SE No.: 93-011 Source Document: DCP 92-213, Rev. O
! Description of Change This design change replaces Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system gate i valve 1E12F024B vith a globe valve to increase reliability of the valve fully seating.
Summary i
I. No. The replacement valve design has been determined to be acceptable 3 for this application. The piping loads and internal valve loads s
resulting from this valve replacement have been demonstrated not to result in exceeding ASME code allowable stresses. The replacement valve vill be installed and tested in accordance with the design and 7 quality assurance requirements of the original construction code
, such that replacement installation does not compromise the originally evaluated design. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
i II. No. The design change maintains the requirements of the original equipment design and construction codes. It utilizes equipment of proven reliability for this particular application. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
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l III. No. This change improves the reliability of the 1E12F024B valve closing properly. It does not adversely affect any equipment specified in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-012 Source Document: DCP 91-277, Revs. O and 1 Description of Change l
This design change modifies the Reactor Vater Cleanup (G33) system's regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchangers to provide positive i isolation of the drain lines and to facilitate maintenance.
l Summary l
I. No. These modifications will not change any functional or operating l pacemeters of the system. The vent and drain lines are used during mainteriance to drain the heat exchangers and related piping. These portions of_the G33 system are classified as ASME, non-safety related piping. The relief valve removal involves a redundant relief valve. Relief capacity remains adequate. The analyses for flooding, jet impingement, leak detection and fire suppression are not altered by other modifications. Therefore, neither the probabilitv of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The piping, valves and flanges will be installed or altered in accordance with accepted codes and standards. The modifications have no significant affect on dose rates on heat loads in the room.
The analyses for flooding, jet impingement, leak detection and fire suppression remain unaffected. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
i III. No. Technical Specification addressing reactor water chemistry and l activity are not affected by these modifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-013 Source Document: DCP 91-112, Rev. 0 1 i
Description of Change I 1
1 This design change adds vent valves to the non-safety portions of the l Diesel Generator Starting Air (R44) and the High Pressure Core Spray l Starting Air (E22) systems to allow reverse flow leak testing of several I valves. '
liummary I. No. These non-safety portions of the starting air systems vill continue to meet ANSI 331-1 and vill have no impact on diesel generator operation or availability. These non-safety piping runs are not ;
relied upon to provide diesel starting air under accident conditions. The safety related receiver tanks provide the necessary air volume under accident conditions. Check valves provide isolation of the receiver tanks from this non-safety piping. Current analysis assumes the loss of the non-safety piping.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This modification does not adversely affect the original system design or operation. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. S; stem design requirement and operation remain the same. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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, Source Document: NR 93-S-028, Rev. O j Description of Change A design change (DCP 87-204A) added a jumper to the operator for
, MOV 1B21F0019 to allow the Torque Switch (TS) to be removed for testing vithout affecting the TS balance. The design drawings were not updated 4
to reflect this change. This nonconformance report was written to identify this drawing discrepancy.
Summary
- I. No. The viring change was approved using Safety Evaluation 88-202 in conjunction with DCP 87-204A. This change simply updates the 4
drawing to reflect the approved as-built condition. Therefore,
- neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a i previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
j II. No. This is simply a drawing change to reflect as-built condition.
- Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously
- evaluated.
III. No. Technical Spr.citications are not affected by this change nor is any equipment or Operation. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-016 Source Document: RVI-G50(VCS), Rev. 1, TC-1 Description of Change l This procedure change to Radvaste Instruction (RVI)-G50 (VCS) " Chemical Vaste System", vill allow the use of carbon in the radvaste Vaste Demineralizer to reduce total organic carbon levels. l l
Summary I. No. No physical changes are required to implement this change. The
, carbon is placed on top of the resin. It is removed and processed 4 in the same manner as the resin. Therefore, neither the probability 3
of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The carbon vill improve the efficiency of the Vaste Demineralizer.
! It will not adversely affect any equipment. Radioactive loading of the carbon / resin mix vill remain within evaluated levels.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
I III. No. This change vill improve effluent quality and will not adversely affect system operation. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical i Specification.
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, Source Document: TXI-0150. Rev. 0 Description of Change
, This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0150, " Testing of 1E12-F0024A(B) and a 1E12-F0064A(B) without the Minimum Flow Time Delay Logic of Eight Seconds a Activated" provides for testing 1E12-F024A(B) and F064A(B) with the i minimum flow time delay logic deactivated.
4 Summary i
I. No. This is an instruction to allow for the collection of data at various flow rates between minimum flow and tull flow while j
operating the Suppression Pool Test Mode of RHR. All of the interlocks are still active with respect to system operations and pump protection. The minimum flow valve vill still respond under minimum flow conditions with a time delay of zero seconds rather i then eight seconds. The Operational capabilities of the equipment within the system to provide flow, pressure, cooldown rates, and reaction times under accident conditions are still active under this instruction. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The purpose of this instruction is to collect data for the evaluation of the RHR A(B) Suppression Pool Test Return Valves
[1E12-F0024A(B)]. The methods used to collect the data are consistent with the methods used for system operation in accordance with design requirements. The zero time delay vill prevent tie RHR pump from dead heading. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This is a data collection instruction. The time delay associated with an Agastat relay is being tested to satisfy calibration and
- logic system function requirements of Technical Specification System operation and pump protection are not adversely affected.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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Source Document: NR 92-S-012, Rev. 3 Description of Change This nonconformance report allows the " Temporary Use-As-Is" for a 1 inch nominal tube in the Control Complex Chiller Vater (P47) system. The installed 1 inch 0.D. copper tubing transports oil to various components on the P47 compressor motor.
Summary I. No. The installed tube was found to meet the minimum wall thickness in all locations. The discrepancy is that is doesn't exceed minimum vall thickness by factor of 1-66. Because it meets minimum vall thickness, and because it is not subject to erosion / corrosion degradating it will maintain pressure integrity through April 24, 1993, when it vill be replaced. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The tubing is stable under normal vibrational loads as well as seismic loads and it is not susceptible to erosion / corrosion in this application. Therefore, the tubing vill maintain pressure integrity and this disposition vill not create the possibility for an accident or nalfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P47 system as well as the system it supplies vill remain unaffected by this disposition. Therefore, this change vill r. st reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-019 Source Document: DCN 4091, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change to P&ID D-302-739, Liquid Radvaste Sumps, reflects the as-built plant. The drain line from the Control Rod Drive (Cll)
Scram Discharge Volume was relocated from the Equipment Drain Sump to the Suppression Pool during initial plant design and the plant was licensed with this changed design.
Summary I. No. This change is editorial. The drain line is installed properly in the correct location. Changing the P&ID to reflect this design vill not affect the operation of any equipment. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Removal of the information from this drawing vill not affect plant operation or control in any way. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change does not affect the operation of any equipment. It is strictly an editorial change to the USAR. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification, l
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SE No.: 93-021 Source Document: PAP-0501, Rev. 7; PAP-0502, Rev. 8; PAP-0507, Rev. 9 Description of Change Changes to Plant Administrative Procedures (PAP)-0501, 0502 and 0507 are being made to restructure the procedure hierarchy and to modify procedure processing methods. These administrative changes do not change the content, intent, interpretation or established commitments contained in the Operations Manual.
Summary I. No. These changes are administrative. They vill not modify the physical plant nor vill they lessen the PORC review requirements for changing procedures. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes do not affect the operation or control of any equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These changes are administrative and do not affect Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-023 Source Document: Emergency Plan, Rev. 11 Description of Change Several changes are being made to the format of the Emergency Plan to make it more consistent with other plant procedures.
Summary I. No. These changes do not alter the scope or contents of the Emergency Plan. They are administrative in nature and are intended to make the Plan easier to use and to revise. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes do not alter the operation on the configuration of the plant. Therefore, they vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated. j III. No. These changes do not affect any equipment or operation relied upon in the Technical Specification. Therefore, they vill not reduce the !
margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-024 Source Document: S0I-M14, Rev. 10, TC-3 Description of Change This change to System Operating Instruction (S0I)-M14 " Containment Vessel and Dryvell Purge System", eliminated the requirement to operate the Containment Vessel and Dryvell Purge (M14) system at full flow prior to personnel entry into the dryvell and during refueling activities.
Summary I. No. No changes are being made to the hardware. The accident analysis assumes full flow and isolation within 20 seconds of an accident I
initiation. A lover flow rate vould lessen the release following a fuel handling accident. The isolation vill still occur within i 20 seconds because of the Containment Vessel Cooling (M11) and l Dryvell Cooling (M13) operation. Therefore, neither the probability i
of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident l
l vill be increased by this change.
l II. No. Compensatory actions include operating the M11 and M13 systems when l M14 is not operated prior to personnel entry. This will ensure adequate air flow and cooling. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. No changes are being made to the M14 system isolation logic.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification, ex.
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SE No.: 93-025 Source Document: FCR 17384 Description of Change This Field Change instal)s a freeze seal on the reactor vessel bottom head drain piping to allow maintenance on Reactor Vater Cleanup (G33) valves.
Summary I. No. The freeze seal vill be applied in accordance with the criteria contained in approved plant procedures. It serves as a backup to installed isolation valves which are closed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously ;
analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Loss of the freeze seal vould result in no more leakage than j presently exists past several leaking isolation valves. Makeup is !
more than adequate to compensate for this leakage. Therefore, this I change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated. )
III. No. The water level in the reactor vill not be adversely affected by this temporary freeze seal, nor with any other equipment required by l Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the l margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-026 l Source Document: TXI-0153, Rev. 0 '
Description of Change This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0153, " Suppression Pool Bottom ,
Vacuuming", provides for vacuuming the suppression pool bottom using the l Pacific Nuclear Torus Cleanup System (TCS).
Summary I. No. The TCS is equivalent to the vacuum normally used for the tank. The difference vill be that the vaste vill be pumped through a High Integrity Container (HIC) rather than through cartridge filters.
The processing of vaste in an HIC has been previously evaluated and determined to be acceptable. The plant vill remain in a normal shutdown condition during this evolution. All of the water removed from the suppression pool vill be returned to the suppression pool.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The vacuuming activities will not adversely affect any equipment important to safety. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These activities vill not affect any equipment required by Technical l Specifications while the plant is shutdown. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-027 Source Document: DCP 92-043, Rev. 1 Description of Change This design change allows the Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of valves 1E51F0078 and 1E12F0102 in the reverse direction.
Summary I. No. The reverse testing of these valves is an acceptable method per ASME Section XI. Any leakage vill be properly categorized. The proposed activity does not change the system configuration nor does it alter the operational performance of any system. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. There are no configuration or operational changes to the plant. i Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
1 III. No. This method of testing is allowed by the ASME code. It does not adversely affect any other systems, structures or components relied upon in Technical Specifications, nor does it adversely affect the operation of any equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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Source Document: DOSEPROJ 3.1 Description of Change This change to DOSEPROJ revises the evacuation criteria based upon ,
off-site dose following a release. l 1
1 Summary I. No. DOSEPROJ is a software program used as a supplement for manual calculation of off-site doses and for determining protective actions in accordance with the Emergency Plan. This change to the program :
has been validated to ensure that it properly and accurately projects off-site dose. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This software does not affect any plant system, structure or component. The dose projections from this software have been verified to accurately predict off-site doses following a release.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The changes to this software do not adversely affect any system, structure or component identified in the Technical Specification.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-030 Source Document: DCP 92-213A, Rev. O Description of Change i This design change replaces Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system gate I
valve lE12F024A with a globe valve to increases reliability of the valve fully seating.
l l Summary I. No. The replacement valve design has been determined to be acceptable for this application. The piping loads and internal valve loads resulting from this valve replacement have been demonstrated not to t result in exceeding ASME code allovable stresses. The replacement l
valve vill be installed and tested in accordance with the design and quality assurance requirements of the original construction code such that replacement installation does not compromise the originally evaluated design. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This design change maintains the requirements of the original equipment design and construction codes. It utilizes equipment of proven reliability for this particular application. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change improves the reliability of the lE12F024A valve closing properly. It does not adversely affect any equipment specified in l the Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-031 Source Document: DCP 91-177 B/C, Rev. 0 EDCR 91-7177 Description of Change This design change allows the construction of a Low Level Radioactive Vaste Storage and Processing Facility (LLRVSPF). This facility is
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intended for the processing and interior storage (5 years) of lov level radioactive vaste.
il Summary I. No. The design, construction and use of the LLRUSPF are in compliance
- with the guidelines contained in Generic Letter (G.L.) 81-38.
Complete failure of the facility has been analyzed and vill not d
result in the generation of radiological conditions in excess of the Technical Specification limits. The Fire Protection aspects of the
, facility are in compliance with NFPA 13, NFPA 24, and the Fire Protection Program described in the USAR. No systems required for safe shutdown or for accident mitigation vill be affected by the
- construction, use or failure of this facility. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Facility failure has been analyzed and is in compliance with existing regulations / guidance. The effects of natural events have been analyzed and the facility is bounded by existing analyses.
. Safe shutdown and accident mitigation systems will not be impaired.
j Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an i accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
i III. No. The LLRVSPF is not required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. Failure of the structure or internal equipment vill not
- adversely impact the capability to process or store radioactive
! waste. Further, failure does not impact the accident analysis as described in USAR Chapter 15.7. Administrative controls and the physical design of the LLRUSPF satisfy the criteria described in
, Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce l t
' the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-032 Source Document: DCP 92-011, Rev. O Description of Change This design change resoves the calibration stations, associated tubing, air supply and service water supply from the local H22 panels located in the Auxiliary Building.
Summary I. No. The calibration stations are not required and are not utilized by plant or I&C personnel to perform instrument calibrations. The calibration stations are non-safety related and are isolated from the safety related instrumentation. This design change vill have no impact on plant operation. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The calibration stations are isolated during normal operation.
Their removal vill have no impact on the operation of the plant.
Appropriate lines will be capped using approved codes. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The calibration stations are non-safety related and have no interaction with the plant shutdown capability. The removal of these stations vill actually improve the ability of the instrument racks to withstand seismic loading. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-033 Source Document: DCP 88-005, Rev. O SCR's 1-90-1033 through 1048, 1056, 1087 l Description of Change 1
This design change extends the Reactor Vater Cleanup (RVCU) delta flov timer setpoint to 10 minutes and reconnects the containment room temperature switches. The increased timer setpoint vill allow system perturbations to settle without isolating the system. The temperature switches vill isolate the system if the flow rate increases substantially before the timer times out, indicating a line break.
Summary i
I. No. These changes to the Leak Detection system enhance the reliability of the RVCU System by limiting unnecessary system isolations. The
- RVCU delta flow timer setpoint has been increased from 45 seconds to 10 minutes to allow the delta flov signal to stabilize during system startup conditions. The increased time has been analyzed concerning its impact on off-site doses, with the results shoving that releases due to a possible leak for this time period, are well within PNPP's off-site dose limits.
- The containment RVCU room temperature monitoring switches are being j
placed back in service to monitor for increased temperatures from a line break. The temperature increase could occur if the leak rate
, becomes greater than the heat removal capability of the system
- during the timer interval (10 min.). The temperature switches vill isolate the RVCU system before any equipment damage occur.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the j consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
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- II. No. The changes to the leak detection system consist of an increase of an existing timer setpoint, and reconnection of existing room l temperature switches, similar to other evaluated switches. These
, systems have been previously evaluated in the USAR. Therefore, this 1
change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
t III. No. The increased delta flov timer setpoint has been evaluated for l impact on the off-site dose limits, with the results showing that i
the increase is well within the 10CFR100 limits. The technical
' specification table for isolation actuation instrument setpoints has been revised in Amendment No. 46 to our Operating License by the
' NRC. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-034 Source Document: S01-E12, Rev. 7, TC-11 Description of Change This change to System Operation Instruction (S0I)-E12, " Residual Heat Removal System", involves the operation of an RHR pump with its minimum flov valve incapable of opening. It replaces the requirement that the RHR pump breaker be racked out whenever the minimum flow valve is incapable of automatically opening with a requirement that either the RHR pump breaker be racked out or that additional monitoring be provided the RHR pump is operating to ensure that minimum flow requirements are met.
In either case, the associated RHR pumps must be declared inoperable and the appr.priate Technical Specification actions taken.
Summary I. No. The only accident analyzed in Chapter 15, of the USAR vhich evaluates RHR as a potential initiator is the inadvertent initiation of shutdown cooling analysis. Allowing the RHR pump breaker to be racked in with the minimum flov valve disabled does not increase the probability of this accident which is assumed to be caused by operator error.
This analysis also assumes that the RHR pump starts and operates at full design flow rate. During a startup of the RHR System to Shutdown Cooling, the minimum flow valves are closed and the shutdown cooling return valves are throttled to provide the equivalent flow prior to starting the RHR pump. This same condition vill exist with the RHR pump breaker racked in and the minimum flov ,
valves incapable of opening. Therefore, neither the probability of i occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. RHR pump failure has already been evaluated in the USAR. This change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The instruction requires declaring the associated RHR System inoperable and taking the required Technical Specification actions for an inoperable RHR Loop. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 93-035 Source Document: FTI-B05, Rev. 5 Software Change Request C91-93-3 Description of Change This change to Fuel Management and Analysis Instruction (FTI)-B05, " Core Heat Balance", allows the use of the Main Feed Pump suction flow minus Recirculation flow indication to be used for total feedvater flow in the core heat balance calculation.
Summary I. No. The core thermal power calculated by this method vill be used to-calibrate the APRMs. There is no active interface between the process computer and other plant systems. The process computer and its associated software are non-safety related. Miscalibration of the APRMs is not a precursor to any accident or malfunction described in the USAR. This change specifies that the suction minus recire flow indication may only be used when it indicates higher than the main feed flow venturis. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The use of thic indication vill affect the calibration of the APRM system only. The only possible negative consequence of this action vould be miscalibration of the APRMs. Given that the feed pump suction minus recirc flows are within the required accuracy, miscalibration will not occur solely as a result of implementation of this activity. Therefore, this change vill not create the i possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
j III. No. It has previously been determined that a feedvater flow measurement uncertainty of 1.7% vill have a negligible (although non-conservative) impact on the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio. The main feed pump suction minus recire flow uncertainty is less than 1.7%, and this indication is only allowed to be used when it is higher than the indicated main feedvater venturi flow.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-036 Source Document: DCP 93-010, Rev. O Description of Change This design change installs the I&C hardware necessary to support the addition of three Process Computer Point inputs associated with feedvater flow parameters.
Summary I. No. This design change terminates existing viring between cabinets to obtain desired feedvater flow computer point inputs. The ,roposed terminations vill have no impact on the feedvater control loops in performing their required function as described in USAR Section 7.7.1.4 nor vill they impact current USAR Chapter 15 analysis associated with feedvater flow. The proposed circuit addition vill also have no impact on current USAR analysis in Sections 7.7.1.3 and 7.7.1.8 associated with the Recirc Flow Control System and Process Computer System, respectively (with exception to the required USAR P&ID changes). Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The inputs are connected in a manner that will not affect the operation of the existing Recirculation Flow Control System nor the Feedvater Control System. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated III. No. Process Computer point viring has no impact on any Technical Specification basis or margin of Safety described therein. The installation also has no impact on the proper functions of the Feedvater Control System. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l l SE No.: 93-037 Source Document: 50I-B33, Rev. 4, TC-4 j Description of Change This change to System Operating Instruction (S0I)-B33, " Reactor
- Recirculation System", describes actions to take if the feedvater flov l venturis are providing an erroneous interlock preventing the upshift to faster speed recirculation pump operation. This revision vill allow use of the appropriate bypass switches when NPSH requirements have been verified.
Summary I. No. The bypass switches vill only be used to bypass the low pump vater flow cavitation interlock for the reactor recirculation pump upshift after the feedvater flow venturi signal has been proven to be falsely below the interlock setpoint and when NPSH requirements are met. The primary lov speed pump operation cavitation interlock (L3) is not affected by this change, nor is the primary fast speed pump operation cavitation downshift interlock (dome to loop less than 8 degrees F indicating inadequate subcooling from feedvater).
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The administratively controlled use of these bypass switches cannot create any type of malfunction of equipment important to safety that has been previously evaluated in the USAR. The manner in which the system is operated is unchanged. Cavitation prevention is maintained. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This is an administrative change. The regions and borders described
, for power vs. flow operation are unchanged. Therefore, this change l vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-038 Source Document: HFI/LLJED 1-93-011 Description of Change This Hechanical Foreign Item (MFI) provides for inserting a blind flange in place of an existing spectacle flange (1E12DO502A) to allow operation of IE120001A while replacing valve IE12F0024A.
Summary I. No. The installation of the blind plate flange vill pre .qt flow back to the suppression pool. In this condition, the suppo:ssion pool cooling and full flow test return mode become unavailable. In additicn, the shutdown cooling or Alter 7 ate Shutdown Cooling modes described in USAR 5.7.4.1.5 also becomes inoperable. However, since the plant vill be in Modes 4 and 5 during the 1E12F024A replacement there is no need for these modes of RHR to be available. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The blank flange being installed vill be designed in accordance with the applicable requirements of the ASME code. The blank vill remain in place until 1E12F0024A has been replaced and hydrostatically vented. Throughout the valve replacement, 1E12C002A vill be in service to provide alternate shutdown cooling. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. There are no changes to the Technical Specification or the Operating License because the system vill not be considered operable during the time this MFI is installed. The RHR A vill however be available for alternate decay heat removal. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-039 Source Document: MFI/LLJED 1-93-012 Description of Change This Lif ted Lead & Jumper will install a jumper to defeat the interlock between IE12F024A and F006A to allow the use of RHR A as a source of alternate decay heat removal during the replacement of valve 1E12F024A.
Summary I. No. The interlock to be jumpered prevents 1E12F024A and F006A from being opened simultaneously to prevent draining the reactor. During the period that this LLJED vill be in effect, the piping upstream of 1E12F024A vill be blanked off, thus preventing draining of the reactor via this valve. Therefore, during this period, the interlock is not needed, and neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of e previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The LL&J vill not affect any other function or interlock associated with IE12F006A. The LL&J vill be installed in a junction box and vill not affect any other system or component. The possibility of draining the reactor through 1E12F0024A/1E12F006A vill not be a problem with the blank installed. Therefore, this change vill not cree.te the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The LLJED will allow the use of the inoperable but available RHR A system as a source of alternate decay heat removal. This operating enhancement vill give added flexibility and reliability to the operable decay heat removal system, thereby increasing the margin of safety. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-040 Source Document: DCP 92-009, Rev. O NR 90-S-257, Rev. 1 NR'90-S-264, Rev. 1 Description of Change This design change replaces the springs in five Emergency Service Water (ESV) relief valves to change the backpressure characteristics.
Summary I. No. These modification are consistent with the requirement of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and do not alter _the existing Safety Evaluation as stated in USAR 9.2.1.3. The performance and ,
availability of the ESV system is not being degraded by these changes. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by i this change.
II. No. This change does not alter the functioning or operating characteristics of-the ESV System. The new relief valves vill still open at 150 psig during operation of the ESV System. A break in these lines is still bounded by the larger size pipe break. analysis for the Control Complex and the Diesel-Generator Buildings.- ESV l remains available as designed in accordance with the USAR and ASME code and reliability is increased. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l III. No. The use of the new relief valves does not alter any existing .
Technical Specifications nor adversely affect any other equipment.
This change does not alter the operation, functions or design of the ESV System in any way. ESV reliability is increased. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l l SE No.: 93-041 Source Document: TXI-0155, Rec. O Description of Change This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0155, "RHR Alternate Suppression Pool Cooling" provides an alternate flow path for RHR suppression pool cooling in which the RHR pump takes a suction through IE12F004A(B) and returns to the suppression via 1E12F011A(B). This instruction maintains the minimum flov valtes in the open position.
1 Summary J l
I. No. The only accident analyzed in the USAR vhich evaluates RHR as a l potential initiator is the inadvertent initiation of shutdown cooling. Operation in this mode effectively prevents this accident l from occurring. Vith 1E12F003A(B) and F048A(B) closed, there is no I vay to establish a return flow path to the RPV. Therefore, neither l the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously I analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Adequate minimum flow is assured by deenergizing the minimum flow valve in the open position. The flow path is identical to the path used when flushing RHR loops with suppression pool water in preparation for shutdown cooling. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different l
type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change requires declaring the associated RHR system inoperable and taking the required Technical Specification actions for an l inoperable RHR loop. It also requires declaring Containment Integrity Inoperable and taking the required outcome for a loss of Containment Integrity. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-042 Source Document: USAR CR 93-011
{ FTI-B0010, Rev. O, TC-1 l
Description of Change Superseded by SE 93-052.
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SE No.: 93-043 Source Document: PAP-1916, Rev. 4, TC-2 Description of Change This change to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1916, " Duties of the Fire Vatch" the Fire Protection Program allows impairment compensating actions to be assigned to the individual work groups to improve the utilization of manpower when minor fire door impairment are required along with other administrative changes.
Summary I. No. The administrative changes are consistent with NRC and NFPA guidelines. They do not alter any system or component. Therefore, l neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a
! previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Ine changes are administrative and do not adversely affect any system, structure or component. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These changes do not impact any activity described in Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-044 Source Document: DCN 3662, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change deletes reference of the MSIV isolation valves in the
" Valves Closed" portion of Table III shown on P&ID D-302-964, Leak Detection System, for temperature switches 1E31N351A-D. The isolation function of these leak detection (E31) system switches was deleted via DCP 88-298. Reference SE 89 110.
Summary I. No. This is an editorial change to a USAR drawing. The E31 Leak Detection System design basis and field configuration are not affected by this DCN. Neither the probability of occurrence nor the l consequences of a previously analyzed accident are increased by this l change.
( II. No. This DCN does not affect the hardware on the operation of the E31 l system. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction l of a different type than any previously evaluated in the USAR is not created.
III. No. This editorial DCN does not change any Technical Specification design as operability requirements, nor does it affect the licensing l bases. Therefore, this change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-045 j Source Document: DCP 87-5240, Rev. 0 Description of Change i
This design change removes the Feedvater Zine Injection (P85) system I i analyzer, associated equipment, and sections of the existing sample l lines. The existing RVCU (G33) and NCC (P43) piping which provide the !
sample and cooling water are being capped.
Summary 1 I. No. Although continuous reactor coolant zinc analysis is desirable, intermittent grab sampling and analysis is an acceptable alternative. The operation of the zine injection skid provides a
- relatively constant zine concentration within the feedvater and reactor coolant. Because of this, grab sampling and analysis is adequate to maintain the zine concentration within specified limits.
The P43 & G33 vent and drain valves which were previously used vill now be closed and the end of the piping capped. This work vill be performed in accordance with ASME and ANSI B31.1 requirements
- applicable to the original line spec requirements.
4 The P85 reactor coolant analyzer is not required for safe shutdown
. of the reactor. Removal of this equipment has no adverse radiological affects, and has no impact on off-site dose / releases.
, Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by l this change.
1 II. No. The removal of the P85 reactor coolant zine analyzer and capping of j the P43 and G33 piping vill be done in accordance with the original i
industry standards which are applicable to each system's piping.
The reactor coolant zine analyzer is non-safety, and the P85, G33 l
and P43 systems are not important to safety and are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type
- than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P85 reactor coolant analyzer is not addressed by Technical
, Specifications nor are the Technical Specification Reactor Vater Chemistry limits affected by removal of this equipment. In addition, the Technical Specification licensing bases parameters are not affected by the removal of the analyzer and capping of the P43 i and G33 piping. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-046 Source Document: HFI/LLJED 1-93-013 Description of Change This Hechanical Foreign Item vill allow the installation of 50 feet of 1/2" stainless steel tubing at the sample point in the feedvater system to support chemical traces testing. This line vill be connected and supported properly and pressure tested prior to use.
Summary I. No. The vent valve isolating the tubing from the non-safety feedvater system vill remain Normally Closed. Additionally, the feedvater line break outside of containment analysis bounds any potential break of this line. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. There is no equipment important to safety in the vicinity of the tubing run. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The connection of this 1/2" tubing to a vent line in the non-safety feedvater system vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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a SE No.: 93-047 Source Document: DCP 89-056, Rev. 2 Description of Change This design change improves maneuverability of the solid radvaste i disposal system crane, (S.R.D) under both loaded and non-loaded conditions. The crane limit switch trippers were originally set to move only 55 gallon drums. This change vill allow movement of line-s which are 180 cu. ft. and 72 in. diameter. The new design vill allow operators to control the view (cameras) with one hand and the crane travel with the other without mechanical interlock. It vill also permit a hoist fast speed in the process pit to minimize radiation exposure to operating personnel. The extent of this Safety Evaluation is to consider the operation of the S.R.D. crane not its rated capacity which has been previously evaluated.
Summary I. No. The solid radvaste disposal system crane function and performance remain essentially as originally designed. The only exception to the description in USAR Sec, ion 11.4 is that the override switch vill allow slow speed movement of the crane when the hoist is not fully up. This was previously accomplished by jogging the switch, and thus the load. Additionally, the operator now has full view of all crane movements via closed circuit TV to allow better control.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Crane control and operation are enhanced by these changes, not degraded. Circuit reliability remains unchanged while inspection, testing and maintenance of the system are improved. The function, operation and reliability of the system remain eventually unchanged.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The reliability of the system remains unchanged by these changes.
The proposed activities do not change the control or operation of the crane as previously evaluated nor does it change the way the liners are handled. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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- TXI-0157, Rev. O j Description of Change
. This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0157, "RHR Shutdown Cooling Using Throttled ESV Flow", analyzes operation of the Emergency Service Vater (P45) and Residual Heat Removal (E12) systems in a modified shutdown cooling mode in which the RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve, IE12-F048A(B),
is closed and the cooldown rate is controlled by throttling ESV flow through the RHR heat exchangers.
1 Summary i
l I. No. Operation in this mode vill result in lover Emergency Closed Cooling i (ECC) temperatures and increased flow to certain ECC supported systems. No changes to the RHR system flow rate vill be made. The only accident analyzed in Chapter 15 of the USAR with RHR as a ,
potential initiator is the inadvertent initiation of shutdown
. cooling. The initiator of this accident is dependent on operator j error, the probability of which is not affected by this change. The l ECC loads have been analyzed for the Operational Conditions during I i
which this change applies and compensatory actions have been incorporated into procedures to ensure system reliability.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the 1 j consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by )
l this change.
i II. No. The only equipment of concern affected by this change are the Control Complex Chilled Vater (P47) chillers. If the ECC cooling water supply is too cold, the chillers may trip. This change i requires the Control Room HVAC (H25/26) subsystem associated with the "at risk" P47 chiller to be declared inoperable, thus ensuring i that compensatory actions per Technical Specifications are taken in advance of any protected problem. No potential exists for either the P47 system or the M25/26 system to initiate a transient or an accident in Operational Conditions 4 or 5 during which this change 4
applies. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
, III. No. This instruction requires declaring the associated RHR and M25/26 subsystems inoperable and taking the required Technical i Specification actions for the inoperable equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-049 Source Document: DCP 93-020, Rev. O Description of Change This design change replaces restricting orifices (MPL 1E12D003A/B) with restricting orifices which have a provision for air testing the sealing surfaces of the flange / orifice to verify that the joint is leak-tight:
1 Summary I. No. This design change meets ASME III, subsection NC design requirements. The replacement restricting orifice vill be of the same size (6.21 inch I.D.) as the original orifice and vill have no detrimental affect upon the flow characteristics through this line.
The gasket material conforms with ISS-2000 line specification. As documented in the Design Interface Summary, this modification vill have no impact upon the piping analysis or the seismic supports associated with this piping and the design remains in compliance with GE system design specifications. The design of the testable orifice plate vill permit type B testing consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix J. Finally, the RHR system test l return line penetrations are not associated with any accident initiators described in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l II. No. The proposed design change meets all original design criteria. It i
has no negative impact upon containment integrity or RHR system function. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This design change ensures the maintenance of containment integrity oas. oost-LOCA conditions and maintains the RHR system design s tanaan s. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of s,ciet" as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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- SE No.: 93-050 Source Document: NR 93-N-059, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report provides the " Temporary Use-As-Is" and
. " Repair Use-As-Is" dispositions for a through vall pin hole leak on Auxiliary Steam and Drain (P61) system valve IP61F0583. Per USAR
- Section 9.5.10 the valve was designed in accordance with the standard set j forth in ASME/ ANSI B31.1. The pin hole leak violates the pressure
, boundary of the valve and consequently it is no longer in compliance with ANSI /ASME B31.1. Therefore, the valve is no longer in compliance with the USAR and this results in an implied change to the plant as described in the USAR. The purpose of this Safety Evaluation is to evaluate the i implied change to the plant as a result of this Temporary Use-As-Is and
, Repair with Use-As-Is dispositions.
Summary I. No. The pin hole leak has been inspected and found to be acceptable for 4
Temporary Use-As-Is. In the unlikely event that the valve fails, there vill be no increase in the probability of an accident
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previously analyzed in the USAR. The Aux. Boiler System and the
- components it supplies are non-safety related and are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. There are nu correlations between the performance of the Aux. Boiler system and any of the accidents previously evaluated in the USAR. Additionally, the Aux. '
Boiler and valve 1P61F0583 are located outside of the RRA in a j non-safety building that contains no safety related equipment.
l Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This equipment does not interact with any equipment important to safety or safety related. Therefore, this proposed activity will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j different type than any previously evaluated.
1 III. No. Although heavy reliance is placed on the P61 system to supply the j
Building Heating (P55) system with steam for freeze protection, neither the P61 nor the P55 systems are included in the bases of the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the proposed activity will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-051 Source Document: PAP-1917, Rev. 3, TC-2 Description of Change This change to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1917, " Fire Protection Training Program" modifies the definition of " Annual Basis" to allow flexibility in the training schedule. It allows up to a thirteen month training frequency, not to be used routinely, to alleviate problems created by the realignment of working shifts within the Site Protection Section. This change also corrects a discrepancy between course content and description and it modifies the training requirements for a work group serving as a firevatch when minor fire door impairments are required.
Summary l I. No. The changes made in this procedure are consistent with all existing licensing requirements. They do not alter any system or component nor do they change any plant activity which could affect system operation. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes have no effect on system function or operation.
Therefore, th3= change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specifications contain only the administrative aspects of the Fire Protection Program, including review and audit responsibilities, the need for administrative procedures and reporting requirements. Additionally, the training frequency change being made is consistent with Section 4.0.2 of the Technical Specification, The changes being made to PAP-1917 do not reduce the !
margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Tec>nical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-052 Source Document: USAR CR 93-011 FTI-B0010, Rev. O, TC-1 Description of Change This evaluation analyzes the update of USAR Appendix 15B, " Reload Safety Analysis," and the Plant Data Book Section F (PDB-F0001), " Core Operating Limits Report," and the Fuel and Core Analysis Instruction (FTI-B0010),
" Preparation for Final Feedvater Temperature Reduction." The update is necessary because of the change in the fuel loading configuration made during the Cycle 4 mid-cycle outage.
Summary I. No. The only change to the plant is in the introduction of a new fuel configuration and core design. No other plant system or component is altered. Since all the accidents involving fuel are initiated by other systems, no change to accident initiators is proposed.
The fundamental sequences of accidents and transients have also not been altered. Potentially limiting plant transients and accidents have been analyzed and evaluated using the same limits on consequences as have been used previously in the USAR, and as approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation for GESTAR II. The General Electric document 23A7147, Rev. 2, " Supplemental Reload Licensing Report for PNPP Unit 1 Reload 3 Cycle 4" documents the results of the GESTAR II analysis for the remainder of Cycle 4. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Plant operation which conforms to the analyzed envelope of the USAR Chapters 4, 5, and 15, and with the Core Operating Limits Report revision, vill allow conformance with the GESTAR II analysis. The GESTAR II analysis has been accepted by the NRC as comprehensive for ensuring that fuel designs vill perform within acceptable bounds.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The new fuel configuration does not alter the design or function of any plant system, outside of the fuel. The fuel design was produced using NRC-approved methods described in GESTAR II. The design satisfies the acceptance criteria which are consistent with the MCPR Safety Limit, and the bases of the other fuel-related Technical Specifications (MAPLHGR, LHGR, Shutdown Margin). Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-053 Source Document: Emergency Plan, Rev. 11, TC-1 Description of Change This change to the Emergency Plan involves assignment and availability of back-up communicator support during the initial phase of an event. l Summary I. No. This change does not reduce the NUREG-0654 requirement for on-shift notifications / communications support, nor does it alter the commitment as outlined in Table 5-1 of the Emergency Plan. Rather, '
this change merely clarifies the availability of back-up l communicator support during the initial phase of an event. Based on this review, the change has been evaluated as not decreasing the
, effectiveness of the Plan per 10CFR50.54(q) and continues to meet l the requirements of 10CFR50.54(b) and Appendix E. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
l l II. No. See Item I above.
III. No. This change is administrative and does not affect the operation of !
plant systems, components, or structures. Therefore, this change i vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for ary l Technical Specification. l l
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SE No.: 93-054 Source Document: NR 93-S-066, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report provides for the " Interim Use-As-Is" disposition regarding operability of the pilot air header position of the Control Rod Drive (Cll) system hydraulic control units (HCU) with mixed tube fittings.
Summary I. No. The nonconforming condition involves the mixing of tube fittings from different manufacturers. These mixed tube fittings are comparable in strength to the proper fittings and are present in the pilot air header which is a fail-safe position of the system. A gross tube failure is bounded by the loss of instrument air analysis l
and would result in a reactor scram. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
! II. No. Initial testing and plant operation to date has shown the integrit3 of the tube fitting connections to be maintained and acceptable for interim operation in their present configuration. Gross failure of any of the tube fitting joints is considered to be highly unlikely.
l The Parker and Svagelok fittings presently installed are relatively l similar in design strength and assembly configuration, thus giving
- reasonable assurance against this type of malfunction. Gross l failure in this case is bounded by the loss of instrument air accident analysis (Chapter 15) and would result in a reactor scram.
Therefore, this condition vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This condition is limited to the fail-safe portion of the HCUs. In the highly improbable event that grcss tube joint failure occurs, a reactor scram would result thus maintaining Technical Specification margins of safety. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the
! margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-055 Source Document: PTI-E12-P0003, Rev. 1 Description of Change This change to Periodic Test Instruction (PTI)-E12-P0003, "RHR Heat Exchangers B and D Performance Testing", involves the replacement of installed temperature indication with more accurate instrumentation to support data collection on the B and D Residual Heat Removal (RHR) (E12) heat exchangers.
4 Summary I. No. This activity collects data to enable an analysis to be performed on the capacity of the RHR B & D Heat Exchangers. The system is functional with all of the designed safety interlocks still active during the data collection process. The four temperature elements used in recording the inlet and outlet temperatures of the RHR and the ESV system are the only plant equipment affected by the implementation of this instruction. These temperature elements are replaced by more accurate temperature measuring devices known as RTD's, (Resistance Thermal Devices), and are placed within each of the existing pipe thermalvells. Temperature indication, during data collection, for these points are no longer _ transferred to the recorder on the 1H13-P601 panel in the control room. The instruction identifies that these temperature elements are not available for control room observation by the illumination of three control room annunciators as annotated in the instruction. However, the temperature indication is available through the test equipment I used within this instruction during the data collection period.
During the collection of the data necessary for the heat exchanger evaluation the individual temperatures may be obtained from the l responsible test personnel.
The operation of plant equipment, or maintenance activities will not be affected by the use of this instruction. The systems used for this instruction will be placed in operation by the use and/or performance of pre-approved instructions, primarily by the applicable System Operating Instruction (s) IS0I(s)]. The parameters established vill be maintained within the design basis criteria established in Section 5.4.7 of the USAR for the Shutdown Cooling I and Suppression Pool Cooling Modes of the RHR System, and I Section 9.2.1 of the USAR for the Emergency Service Water System.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The activity associated with the performance of this instruction is the collection of data for the evaluation of the RHR B 4 D Heat Exchangers. All of the methods implemented during this data collection are consistent with the operational methods use for system operations in accordance with design requirements within USAR Sections 5.4.7.1.1.1, 5.4.7.2.2.b, and 5.4.7.2.6.a. Therefore, this instruction vill not create the possibility fer an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously analyzed.
Summary (Cont.)
III. No. The RHR system is functional with all of the designed safety interlocks still active during the data collection process.
Therefore, this instruction vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-056 Source Document: PTI-E12-P0002, Rev. 1 Description of Change This change to Periodic Test Instruction (PTI)-E12-P0002, "RHR Heat Exchanger A and C Performance Testing", involves the replacement of installed temperature indication with more accurate instrumentation to support data collection on the A and C Residual Heat Removal (RHR) (E12) heat exchangers.
Summary I. No. This activity collects data to enable an analysis to be performed on the capacity of the RHR A & C Heat Exchangers. The system is functional with all of the designed safety interlocks still active during the data collection process. The four temperature elements used in recording the inlet and outlet temperatures of the RHR and the ESV system are the only plant equipment affected by the implementation of this instruction. These temperature elements are replaced by more accurate temperature measuring devices known as RTD's, (Resistance Thermal Devices), and are placed within each of the existing pipe thermalvells. Temperature indication, during datt collection, for these points are no longer transferred to the recorder on the 1H13-P601 panel in the control room. The instruction identifies that these temperature elements are not available for control room observation by the illumination of three control room annunciators as annotated in the instruction. However, the temperature indication is available through the test equipment ;
used within this instruction during the data collection period. l During the collection of the data necessary for the heat exchanger l evaluation the individual temperatures may be obtained from the ;
responsible test personnel. j The operation of plant equipment, or maintenance activities vill not be affected by the use of this instruction. The systems used for this instruction vill be placed in operation by the use and/or performance of pre-approved instructions, primarily by the applicable System Operating Instruction (s) [S0I(s)]. The parameters !
established vill be maintained within the design basis criteria I established in Section 5.4.7 of the USAR for the Shutdown Cooling and Suppression Pool Cooling Modes of the RHR System, and Section 9.2.1 of the USAR for the Emergency Service Vater System.
l' Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l t II. No. The activity associated with the performance of this instruction is the collection of data for the evaluation of the RHR A & C Heat Exchangers. All of the methods implemented during this data collection are consistent with the operational methods use for system operations in accordance with design requirements within USAR Sections 5.4.7.1.1.1, 5.4.7.2.2.b, and 5.4.7.2.6.a. Therefore, this instruction vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously analyzed.
Summary (Cont.)
III. No. The RHR system is functional with all of the designed safety interlocks still active during the data collection process.
Therefore, this instruction vill not reduce the margin of safety as ,
defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-057 j Source Document: USAR CR 93-009 Description of Change This change specifies the submergence requirements for spent control rod blades during both transit and storage. The USAR currently addresses only spent control rods in underwater storage.
j J Summary
, I. No. The proposed change vill allow for spent control rod blades to be lifted above the interpreted minimum " storage" submergence requirement of 6 feet - 7 inches during transit without having j provisions in place to administer minimum " storage' shielding 4
requirements. Once seated upon the hanger, the control rod blade vill be maintained with a minimum of 6 feet - 7 inches shielding of j vater as previously stated in the USAR. The change, which allows for the raising of the control rod blade, does not affect any
, accident postulations as previously evaluated nor vill it initiate
- any accident. As a result or this change, spent control rod blades vill be lifted as necessary to place them onto the hangers. The lifting of the spent control rod blade vill not create an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the USAR. A condition of a spent control rod drop under the additional height increase vould still be enveloped under the verst case load drop.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this USAR change.
II. No. This change defines the submergence requirements for spent control rods blades during transit and during storage. Activities associated vill not affect equipment important to safety.
Therefore, this activity vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously analyzed.
III. No. As a result of this proposed change, a reduction in water shielding 1 by a maximum of four inches vill occur to allov the control rod )
blade to be lifted onto the storage hanger. This reduction in I shielding vill result in a submergence of no less than 6 feet -
3 inches of water during transit activities. A comparison of this submergence with that of calculation REE-92-004 " Assess Impact of Lower Fuel Pool Vater Level," which estimates the maximum drop in l vater level, shows that the 6 foot - 3 inch submergence as required '
for the transit of a control rod blade onto a hanger vill be bounded by the results which show that decreasing the shielding of water above the control rod to 6 feet - 1 inch vill still be within the USAR Chapter 12 Figure 12.3-3 limits which are not to exceed the Zone III limit of 25 mR/hr. Furthermore, fuel handling accident
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Summary (Cont.)
consequence bound the consequences of potential drop of control rod blade from a 4" higher elevation. Based on the fact that the dose limit at the operating floor vill not be exceeded and that the proposed change any associated activities vill not affect equipment important to safety or result in an accident which already has been analyzed for the proposed activity of adding this change to the USAR and the direct result of lifting a spent control rod blade onto the hanger vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any technical specifications.
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1 SE No.: 93-058 Source Document: DCN 3704, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change corrects MPL numbers on P& ids D-352-621, Emergency Closed Cooling System (Unit 2), and D-302-243, Instrument Air (Unit 1).
Summary I. No. The revision of P& ids to correct MPL numbering vill not affect plant operation in any vay. Therefore, neither the probability of i occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. See Item I above.
III. No. This DCN does not change or affect any information contained in the Technical Specification, nor does it affect the operation of any system. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-059 Source Document: MFI/LLJED l-93-29 Description of Change This MFI/LLJED connects equivalent temperature sensors in Reactor Steam Domes A and B to the control logic for the Reactor Recirculation Pumps in order to restore the Thermal Shock and the B Degree Delta Temperature Interlocks to operation.
Summary I. No. The thermocouple and RTDs being used are identical to the ones originally providing these interlocks. Jumpers and connections are of like materials to those already present in the circuits.
Chapter 15 of the USAR and the Technical Specifications assume that the interlocks are administratively enforced. There is no Chapter 15 analysis or Technical Specification basis which relies on this interlock. Thus, automatic actuation is an added benefit.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The Reactor Recirculation Pump control logic is described in USAR Section 7.7.1.3 under " Control Systems not Required for Safety."
Vith the interlocks restored to operation the Reactor Recirculation System vill be protected from events already described in the USAR.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specifications assume that the Thermal Shock Interlocks are administrative 1y enforced during recirculation pump starts and they make no assumption regarding the 8 Degree Delta Temperature interlock. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-060 Source Document: DCP 89-216, Rev. 0 l Description of Change ;
This design change is considered to be Phase I of a 3 phase program to l upgrade the Perry Plant Computers. This first phase vill upgrade the Monicore VAX 11/780 Digital Equipment Computer (DEC) to a 3D Monicore (30MS) VAX 7000 DEC computer. The new system vill be installed and operated in parallel with the original equipment for a period of time to I ensure successful operation of the new equipment. I Summary j I. No. The new 3DMS has state-of-the-art hardware and enhanced software which does not alter the operation and reliability of the core performance requirements needed to support plant operation.
Therefore, the original design intent has not been compromised. The 3DMS vill operate in parallel with the Monicore and Process Computers until the new 3DMS is satisfactorily tested and accepted by Reactor Engineering. If for any reason the 3DMS cannot meet all design and operatfonal requirements, the existing Monicore and l Process computer as before, vill be used. The evaluated events I described in Section 15.0 are not impacted by the parallel operation !
of the new 3DMS. The 3DMS is non-safety related and has no active l interface with safety related systems. Therefore, neither the l probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Parallel operation of this computer vill not affect plant operation.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The values obtained in parallel by the 3DMS vill be compared with the valve from the original Monicore VAX 11/780 prior to use.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-061 Source Document: DCP 91-064, Rev. O Description of Change This design change replaces the Solon differential pressure switches associated with the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment (M15) System (AEGTS) fans with Fluid Components Inc. (FCI) thermal dispersion type flow switches.
Summary i
I. No. The flow switch is a fully qualified component capable of performing its intended function in a nuclear environment. There are no moving parts. Actual flow is detected and measured based on a thermal dispersion technique. Set point drift experienced by the existing differential pressure switches has been eliminated thus increasing the reliability of AEGTS.
Failure of the flow switch itself or loss of power vill automatically provide the fan transfer function to the standby system. This assures maintenance of the negative differential pressure in the annulus at all times. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The flov switch is a fully qualified component capable of performing its intended function in a nuclear environment. The purpose of the switch is to provide the fan transfer function to the standby system. Failure of the flow switch itself or loss of power vill automatically provide this transfer. There are N0 other interlocks associated with this switch. Therefore, this design change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This design change does not deviate from any design basis. Accident analyses as described in the USAR are not affected. Operational requirements are unchanged. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
i SE No.: 93-052 Source Document: CHIA-54, Rev. 1 Description of Change This change to Chemistry Analytical Instruction (CHIA)-54, " Radiological Effluent Data Reduction", allows planned liquid radvaste discharges to be j made during periods when the excess service water flow rate is less than ,
l the currently specified minimum dilution flow rate of 30,000 gpm. This l l
vill be accomplished by varying the tank discharge rate accordingly.
- Summary l
I. No. The proposed change does not involve accidental releases as described in the USAR safety analyses, out rather deals only with planned, cognizant releases. Variability in the dilution flow rate is a normal occurrence. This change has no affect on the operability or availability of equipment important to safety. It ,
! simply alters the method by which proper dilution flow is obtained.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not impact the operability or availability of equipment important to safety. Therefore, it will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The proposed change does not alter any liquid radvaste discharge limits specified in the Technical Specifications, or does it allow for the release of liquid radioactive vaste above specified limits.
Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 93-063 Source Document: HFI/LLJED l-93-031 Description of Change This Hechanical Foreign Item removes the internals of check valves OG50F663 and 0G50F664 to allow use of the Chemical Vaste Distillate Tanks (CVDT) for storing water. Vater from the radvaste filters will be sent to the CVDT for temporary storage. Froa the CVDT, it will be processed through the radvaste demineralizers to the sample tanks in accordance with approved procedures.
Summary
! I. No. Removal of the check valve internals does not change the design basis of the piping system. The CVDT is designed to contain l radioactive liquid. The piping configuration is consistent with the other lines that tie into the radvaste demineralizers. The CVDT line to the discharge station is controlled by a locked valve so there is no increase in the probability of an inadvertent discharge.
The locked valve is administrative 1y controlled to prevent discharges except as allowed by Technical Specifications.
The analyzed accident pertaining to this change is the rupture of a radvaste storage tank resulting in a liquid release. The CVDTs are ,
approximately 15,000 gallons smaller than a vaste collector or floor drain collector tanks. The radioactive contents of the CVDTs vill l be filtered vaste collector or floor drain collector tank water thus 1 l vill be lover in activity. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The modified system vill meet the original design basis and the configuration without a check valve is consistent with other l radvaste branches off the same pipe. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l III. No. Liquid radvaste vill continue to be treated and discharged in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications and therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-064 Source Document: HFI/LLJED 1-93-032 Description of Change This Mechanical Foreign Item supplies temporary keep fill capability to Emergency Service Water (P45) Loops A, B and C while the Service Vater (P41) system is isolated from ESV. The temporary source of water is from the Fire Protection (P54) system via a hose connection to the non-safety related piping iade of the Class 3 boundary check valves. l Sucmary I. No. The temporary keep fill system will operate essentially the same as the originally installed system. It vill tie into non-safety piping side of the Class 3 boundary check valves. In the event of a hose rupture, the Class 3 check valves are designed to prevent ESV backflow. The hose and connection are designed for P54 system pressure. This change has no impact on any of the fixed fire suppression systems in the plant. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident I be increased by this change.
II. No. The ESV keep fill system vill continue to operate normally to 1 prevent air pockets from forming that could cause water hammer. The 1 fixed fire suppression system operability vill remain within established margins of safety. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This MFI will not affect the overall operation of the ESV system on the Fire Suppression system. The capability of both vill remain I within design limits. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the
! margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical l Specification.
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SE No.: 93-065 Source Document: HFI/LLJED 1-93-033 l Description of Change l
This Mechanical Foreign Item provides a temporary source of backup air to the service and instrument air system during maintenance on the service water system. The temporary compressor vill only be used if the installed service and instrument air compressors canr.ot maintain adequate system pressure.
Summary l
I. No. The connection of the temporary compressor vill be through the normal Integrated Leak Rate Test connection and the air vill be fed into the service air system, through its receiver tank to the instrument air receiver tank and on through the filters and dryers l to the process piping. Air quality and pressure at this point vill be the same as that supplied by normally installed systems. All materials and connections vill be in accordance with plant approved specifications. The complete loss of instrument air accident bounds a rupture in this temporary connection. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l l II. No. The instrument air pressure and quality will be maintained within l normal limits. Loss of the temporary air source is bounded by the
- complete loss of instrument air accident analysis. Therefore, this l change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously analyzed.
III. No. The service and instrument air systems are not addressed in Technical Specifications. Instrument air pressure and quality will be maintained within normal limits. Therefore, this change vill not l reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any i Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-066 Source Document: HFI 1-93-034 Description of Change This Mechanical Foreign Item provides an alternate source of cooling from the Fire Suppression System (F54) to the Instrument Air Compressor during the period that maintenance is being performed on the Service Vater l
System. This MFI will provide an effective alternate cooling vater source in the event of a loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling (NCC).
Summary I. No. This MFI will permit the continued operation of the Instrument Air compressor in the event of a loss of NCC to the compressor. The loss of Instrument Air is evaluated in the USAR and this MFI falls within the bounds of that evaluation. The use of the Fire Suppression system for backup cooling is with'n the excess capacity of that system and vill not adversely inipact the operation of that system. Connections and materials vill be made in accordance with plant approved specification. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. All equipment and materials are rated for the pressures to which they vill be subjected. This installation will minimize the l possibility of a loss of Instrument Air. The Loss of Instrument Air, Fire and Flooding accidents are already analyzed in the USAR and they bound any situation which could result from a failure of this equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change enhances the operability of the Instrument Air System and it does not adversely affect the Fire Suppression System. It vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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I SE No.: 93-067 Source Document: MFI l-93-035 i
Description of Change 1 This Mechanical Foreign Item vill supply an alternate source of cooling water to the Condensate (N21) Hotvell pump motor lube oil coolers. Fire Suppression (P54) system water vill be routed through a portion of Turbine Building Closed Cooling (P44) (TBCC) system to the lube oil coolers to allow pump operation for Hotvell level / vater management purposes. P54 vill supply 8 to 25 gpm of cooling water flov to the Hotwell pumps.
Summary I. No. This hPI provides for temporary cooling water from P54 to the i Hotwell pump motor lube oil coolers in order to permit operation of
! the hotvell pumps for the purposes of hotwell level control and vaster management. This MFI will not be utilized to support power operations nor is it required to support equipment important to safety in the present plant condition. This MFI does not increase '
the potential for flooding in the areas associated, as no new water l source is involved and the equipment utilized is rated for the !
pressures concerned. The consequences of a fire are unchanged with
! this temporary modification as the MFI has no impact on any fixed suppression systems. Therefore, neither the probability of I
occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The HFI is to be installed on non-safety equipment, with the plant l in a shutdown condition. This equipment vill not be utilized to support the plant in power modes of operation nor vill it impact equipment important to safety in the current plant condition either ,
due to proximity or application. The capabilities of the P54 system '
remain unchanged. Therefore. this MFI does not create the
- possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The proposed usage of the P54 system is within the margin of safety for fire suppression capability. Neither the Condensate nor the TBCC systems are described in Technical Specification. Therefore, I this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. )
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SE No.: 93-068 Source Document: HFI 1-93-036 Description of Change This Mechanical Foreign Item adds a heat exchanger cooled by the Fire Suppression (PS4) system to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling (TBCC) system during the period that the Service Water (P41) system is not available.
Summary I. No. The heat exchanger has been tested in accordance with the ASME code.
The capabilities of the P54 system remain within acceptable limits.
All materials and component are properly rated. The additional vater source in the Turbine building is negligible in comparison with the flooding analysis assumptione The TBCC system is non-safety related and is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The TBCC system is non-safety related and does not supply any safety related equipment. The affect on the P54 system has been evaluated and found to be acceptable. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Turbine Building Closed Cooling system is not discussed in the Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.11.2.4 requires the offgas system (a TBCC load) to be in operation only when the air ejector evacuation system is in operation and this modification vill be removed prior to start-up. The P54 vater usage has been found to be well within the safety margins. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-069 Source Document: DCN 4163, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change revises drawings D-302-110, Condensate Demineralizer System, and SS-304-107-181, Condensate Demineralized System - Turbine Power Complex, to show orifice flanges, a ring spacer and the associated root valves in the Condensate Demineralizer (N24) system that have been abandoned in place following removal of an orifice plate and flow meter by an earlier DCP.
Summary I. No. The components remaining in place are installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1. No new failure mechanisms are introduce by leaving these items installed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The items abandoned in place do not affect the safe operation or shutdown of the plant. They meet plant design basis requirements and their failure would have no impact upon equipment required for safe shutdown. Therefore, this change vill not creata the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. System operability has not been adversely affected by these components remaining in place. This change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical l Specification. l I
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SE No.: 93-070 Source Document: USAR CR 93-027 j Description of Change This change updates the USAR to identify the Diesel Fuel Storage Tank
- Maintenance Structure Missile protection barriers.
Summary J
I. No. The missile shields already exist. The USAR is being updated to 4
reflect their location. No changes to systems, structures or components are being made, nor are any changes to system operation j being made. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased
- by this change.
- II. No. This change simply updates the USAR to reflect existing missile protection structures which meet the appropriate design criteria.
1 Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously 4 evaluated.
- III. No. There are no changes to systems, structures or components nor are there any changes to any operating parameters or procedures.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-071 Source Document: DCP 93-045, Rev. O Description of Change This design change adds a 2" drain line and valve to the low point in the 42" L1-4 Service Water (P41) return piping in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building to facilitate draining of the 42" header.
i Summary ,
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I. No. The operation of the Service Vater system vill not be altered as a result of this DCP. The drain line valve vill be closed and the I line capped during normal operation. The modification vill be made i in accordance with Perry Installation Standards and ASME/ ANSI B31.1.
1 Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by ;
this change. l I
II. No. The reliability of the P41 system vill not be adversely affected by this change. No additional flow paths are created and the line vill be capped during normal operation. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different j type than any previously evaluated.
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- III. No. The Service Vater system is not addressed by Technical Specifications nor does its operation affect the bases for any Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-072 Source Document: USAR CR 93-010 FCR 17234 Description of Change This change vill allow the storage of up to two High Integrity Containers (HIC) containing spent resin in the Radvaste Building. The USAR currently requires metal tanks for storing resin and the minimization of plastics in the plant.
Summary I. No. The fire hazard from storinggtvo polyethylene HICs containing spent resins in the Radvaste Building has been evaluated and found to be acceptable as has the radiological hazard. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area. The size and weight of the HICs do not exceed that of the steel tanks previously used. The storage area is surrounded by a concrete vall that vill contain any spills and floor drains provide drainage to the liquid radvaste drain system. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change vill not adversely impact the fire suppression capability in this area nor is any safe shutdown equipment located in this area. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-073 l Source Document: DCP 91-274, Rev. 0 '
s Description of Change This design change switches the control complex elevator power supply from the Division II diesel generator backed distribution panel 1R2580009 to the non-diesel backed panel R25S005.
Summary I. No. The control complex nlevator is non-safety and does not require diesel backing. Removing this load will reduce the Division II diesel generator loading by approximately 50 amperes which improves the loading capability of the diesel generator. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The control complex elevator has no safety related function and the diesel generator loading should be made more reliable by this change. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Diesel generator operability is not reduced.by this change and the elevator does not affect any Technical Specification related equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-074 Source Document: DCP 93-047, Rev. 0 Description of Change This design change adds a 2" drain line and valve to the low point in the
- 24" L1-4 Service Vater (P41) return piping in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building to facilitate draining of the 42" header. i
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- Summary I. No. The operation of the Service Water system vill not be altered as a ;
result of this DCP. The drain line valve vill be closed and the j line capped during normal operation. The modification vill be made '
in accordance with Perry Installation Standards and ASME/ ANSI B31.1.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The reliability of the P41 system vill not be adversely affected by this change. No additional flow paths are created and the line vill be capped during normal operation. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Service Vater system is not addressed by Technical Specifications nor does its operation affect the bases for any Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-075 Source Document: DCP 93-046, Rev. O Description of Change This design change removes the Mixed Bed Demineralizer (P22) system flush / purge capability for the Reactor Recirculation (B33) and the Reactor Vater Cleanup (G33) samples in the Post Accident Sampling (P87) system near the sample source to prevent further contamination of the P22 system. Flushing vill be performed downstream using other P22 flush lines within the system.
Summary I. No. The modification vill be made utilizing the same design and construction materials as the original design. Flushing downstream of the sample cooler using P22 vater and purging the sample lines using the sample itself satisfies the intent of NUREG-0737. Failure of the affected portions of the P87 and/or P22 systems can not cause the initiation of an accident analyzed in the USAR, nor are the affected portions of these system required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the l
consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by l this change.
l II. No. The P87 and P22 system modifications have no affect on equipment import to safety. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specification 6.8.4.c governs the administrative agents of the P87 system. This change does not affect the system's ability to provide the samples necessary to maintain conformance with these administrative requirements. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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I SE No.: 93-076 Source Document: DCP 90-012A, Rev. 3 i
j Description of Change i This design change replaced two manual Emergency Closed Cooling (P42)
} system valves P42F551 and P42F550 which control water to the Control
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Complex Chilled Vater (P47) system "C" chiller with motor operated
- valves. DCP 90-012A, Rev. 1 was written to install new circuits for the valve operators along with 1-hour rated fire wrap to protect the I circuits. The current revision (Rev. 3) deletes the fire vrap until an acceptable wrap becomes available.
Summary
] I. No. The new equipment and circuits were analyzed in all fire zones and
! areas where they would be installed to verify that the MOV valve Isolating the line from the chiller for the method utilized-for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in these areas vould be able to close and remain closed in order to provide the necessary cooling water for the system. These raceways have been analyzed for
! separation from the redundant train of safe shutdown components and j circuits and the protection of the redundant train in these areas
- meets the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III G or has a previously approved deviation of like application. j The new circuits terminate in the MOVs which are separated by only 6 ft. To protect these valves, fast response type sprinkler heads have been provided about 6 ft. above the valves. There is also an !
l area sprinkler system at ceiling level and area fire detection. The
. routing of the conduits extend the separation to 16 ft. at the level 1 l of the valves and to over 20 ft. near the ceiling. This increase in i j separation, along with the reinforcement of the fire suppression capabilities where the separation is less than 15 ft., provides for i an equivalent level of protection for these conduits as is provided j for the redundant MOVs. An hourly fire watch is present in the area
- due to the generic problems with the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rating for other i vrap in the area. This compensatory action meets the requirements l of the approved fire protection program for any fire rated barrier that is degraded or removed with detection on one side of the
, barrier. The fire watch, separation and protection limits the
] potential for a fire affecting the conduits of both divisions of valves until the cable protection is installed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
4 II. No. This revision does not impact the equipment or protection of the P42
, system described in the Safe Shutdown Capability Report in a manner i required for safe shutdown. It does not increase the fire hazard or degrade fire suppression so it will not alter the effect a fire would have on any equipment important to safety.
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Summary (Cont.)
The Emergency Closed Cooling System has been analyzed as operating with the P42F551 and P42F550 valves closed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. This revision vill not affect this analysis.
Operation of this system is addressed in existing operation instructions. The revision does not involve changes to operator actions or post fire repairs required to achieve shutdown due to damage to the systems incurred by the fire in the area of the cable i vrap installation. Therefore, this change vill not create the ]
possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than <
any previously evaluated.
III. No. This revision does not alter P42 system operation in any way, nor does it affect any other equipment relied upon in the Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-077 Source Document: SCN 00387-ISS-2155, Rev. O Description of Change This specification change allows the use of appropriate off-site material as Class B fill. The previous specification required the use of lower till material that had been excavated on-site during construction and stockpiled for use as Class B fill. The stockpiles of this material have been depleted.
Summary I. No. The off-site material vill be tested to ensure that the properties of the replacement soil are similar to those of the depleted on-site material. The placement requirements remain unchanged. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. There is no change to the performance requirements of the Class B fill. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The off-site material vill provide adequate backfill and vill not interfere with the ability of any structure, system or component to perform its intended function. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-078 Source Document: PAP-0525, Rev. 2 i
Description of Change This change to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-0525 " Solid Radvaste Administration", allows the Radvaste Unit to operate the vendor-supplied
" vet vaste" proccssing equipment in lieu of the vendor supplied technicians. Numerous format and editorial changes are being made that do not impact radvaste processing or shipping as described in the USAR or the Process Control Program (PCP).
Summary I. No. The processing vill continue to be performed in accordance with the Perry Process Control Program. The operators vill receive training equivalent to that received in the vendor training program. All operation vill be under the vendor's NRC Topical Report.
Maintenance of the equipment vill be in accordance with approved vendor procedures. Home office vendor support vill be available as needed. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
II. No. The only change being made is in the employment of the radvaste operators. Training vill be equivalent and the equipment vill l remain the same. Therefore, this change vill not create the i possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than l any previously evaluated.
III. No. All processing vill remain in accordance with Technical Specifications. This change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-079, 93-169 Source Document: DCN 4202, Rev. O Description of Change This design change removes the roughing filters from the Dryvell Cooling (M13) system during normal operation. The filters will be utilized only during outage periods.
Summary I. No. Removal of the filters during normal operating periods vill not adversely affect the operation of the M13 system. This is a recirculation system and very little dust loading occurs during normal operation. The filters will be reinstalled during outage periods when dirt and dust is introduced into the dryvell.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The purpose of this change is to eliminate a source of debris with the potential for clogging the Emergency Core Cooling System strainers in the suppression pool. M13 system performance vill remain within specification. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated. 1 III. No. The M13 system function, operation and design all remain within specification following this change. Dryvell area average temperature limits vill continue to be complied with. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-080 Source Document: NR 93-N-090, Revisions 0 through 5 Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions repairs to allow the " Temporary Use-As-Is" of the Service Water (P41) system until RFO-6. This NR repairs deficiencies on the 48", 42" and 30" diameter P41 supply side fiberglass piping.
Summary I. No. The P41 system in a non-safety related system and is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. These changes vill not alter system flow for Unit 1. The 30" supply to Unit 2 is being blanked off, thus isolating potential break locations from the active / pressurized Unit 1 piping. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The operation of the P41 system is unaltered by the disposition of this NR. The " blanking off" of the 30" P41 supply line does not alter the Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Analysis performed in USAR Section 3.6.1.2.2 Paragraph i. Furthermore, blocking off of the 30" supply line to the Unit Two TBCC heat exchanger vill provide added system reliability since the 30" fiberglass piping vill no longer be a part of the !
" active / pressurized" Unit One P41 system. The reliability of the Unit One P41 system vill be increased as a result of this NR. No additional system operational flow paths are created by this NR.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The normal operation of the Unit One P41 system as well as the plant I will be unaltered following implementation of this NR. The 1 operation of the P41 system is not addressed in the Technical l Specification nor does it affect the bases for any other Technical Specification. Therefore, this proposed activity vi'l not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-081 i Source Document: NR 93-N-103, Revs. O and 1 Description of Change l This nonconformance report dispositions " Temporary Use-As-Is"
! repairs to the fiberglass piping adjoining the Service Vater (P41) system.
Summary l I. No. The P41 system is a non-safety class system and is constructed in I
accordance with ANSI /ASME B31.1 for carbon steel and in accordance with accepted industry practice for fiberglass. These changes vill be made in accordance with these standards.
The current operation of.the service water system vill not be altered as a result of this NR. The " blanking off" of the 24" P41 return line does not alter the Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Analysis performed in USAR Section 3.6.1.2.2 Paragraph 1.
Furthermore, blanking off of the 24" return line from the Unit Two
, TBCC heat exchanger (performed at the 24" to 42" reducer) vill i provide added system reliability since the 24" fiberglass piping l vill no longer be a part of the " active / pressurized" Unit One P41 system. All Unit One system flow paths and required flow will remain unaltered by this NR oisposition. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
! II. No. The reliability of the Unit One P41 system vill be increased as a l result of this NR. No additional system operation flow paths are I created. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The normal operation of the Unit One P41 system as well as the plant will remain unaltered following implementation of this NR. The
, operation of the P41 system is not addressed in the Technical l Specifications nor does it affect the bases for any Technical l Specifications. Therefore, this activity vill not reduce the margin l of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-082 Source Document: USAR CR 93-032 Description of Change-This change clarifies USAR Sections 6.5, 7.3, 9.4, 15.7 and 15A to 4 consistently identify only the exhaust portion of the Fuel Handling Area
- Ve dilation (M40) system as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) system.
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I. No. This change does not alter or change any M40 technical information contained in the USAR. No changes are being made to the design,
- function or operation of the M40 system. The exhaust portion of M40 remains an ESF. The M40 ESF functions have not been affected, nor s
have the accident mitigation functions of M40 been impacted. The failure of M40 is not an initiator for any USAR analyzed accident or transient. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This is an editorial change. The M40 system design function and operation have not been altered. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change is an editorial clarification to the USAR. The M40 ESP functions have not been affected. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-083 Source Document: DCP 93-048, Rev. O Description of Change Superseded by SE 93-088.
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l SE No.: 93-084 Source Document: DCP 93-055, Rev. O l Description of Change i
l This design change removes the roughing filters from the Containment Vessel Cooling (M11) system, i
l Summary I. No. The M11 system is not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Removal of the filters vill not affect the M11 systems intended function. In order to ensure that the cooling coils continue to deliver the required cooling capabilities, the current Repetitive Tasks to inspect and clean the coils vill be increased in frequency. Containment average air temperature vill not exceed 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
P II. No. The M11 system function vill not be affected by this change. The :
-system vill continue to meet all operational and design parameters. l l Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an i
accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Operation of the M11 system vill continue to meet design and Technical Specification requirements. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-085 Source Document: NR 93-S-115, Rev. O Description of Change i
This nonconformance report dispositions "Use-As-Is" piping support with actual stresses exceeding ASME allovables but not exceeding yield strength to remain in place until the end of RFO-4.
Summary l I. No. The actual stresses have been evaluated to be lover than the yield l strength capacity of SA-36 structural steel. This portion of piping l is used only during system testing and not during normal operation.
l It has been declassified to non-safety. The piping and equipment have been analyzed for the applicable upset loads and it has been shown that failure vill not occur. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this disposition.
l l II. No. The piping has been analyzed and shown not to fail. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Failure of the pipe and support under load vill not occur nor vill they affect any other equipment. Therefore, this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for pry Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-086 j Source Document: TXI-0161, Rev. O Description of Change This Temporary Instruction (TXI)-0161, "RHR A/B Pump Suction Strainer Test", is intended to demonstrate adequate RHR pump flow with the new suction strainers partially plugged.
Summary I. No. The required number of ECCS systems vill be operable during the performance of this test without taking credit for LPCI A and B (RHR). The RER loop not being tested vill remain in service in the shutdown cooling mode and the RHR loop being tested vill be available for shutdown cooling service. Precautions are included in the TXI to trip the affected pump should the suction pressure decrease to 6 psig (i.e., indicative of strainer fouling / programs).
Additionally, the temporary test hood is secured in such a manner so as to ensure that if it were to dislodge from the strainer, it would not impact any other SSC's in the suppression pool. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change. .
l II. No. The RHR system vill be operated within the specified parameters of j the design basis. Also, the temporary. test hood vill be secured in l such a manner so as to ensure that if it were to dislodge from the strainer, it vould not impact any other SSC's in the suppression pool. Therefore, this TXI will not create the possibility for an l l accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously l evaluated.
III. No. This TXI can only be performed in Modes 4 and 5. The Technical Specification required number of ECCS systems vill be operable without taking credit for LPCI A or B. The RHR loop not being tested per this TXI will be in service for Shutdown Cooling. The TXI is written such that the loop being tested vill remain available for Shutdown Cooling throughout the test. Therefore, this instruction vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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- Source Document
- USAR CR 92-015 1 Description of Change i
This change updates the USAR to reflect changes made to drawing D-226-501, Electric Cable Tray Layout Emergency Service Vater Pumphouse -
1 586', 6". This drawing was revised to incorporate FVA 3556-33-749. The
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FVA moved several non-safety cable trays slightly to improve maintenance 3 access to the ESV sluice gates. The FVA vas performed under Safety Evaluation 92-027.
Summary i I. No. This is strictly an editorial change. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously j analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
4 II. No. This editorial change vill not create'the possibility for for an i
accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The editorial change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-088 Source Document: DCP 93-048, Rev. 3 Description of Change This design change replaces the existing suppression pool ECCS/RCIC strainers with a new strainer design to minimize strainer fouling problems.
Summary I. No. This new design vill continue to meet the original design, material and construction requirements. The RHR, LPCS, HPCS and RCIC systems vill continue to operate as designed without loss of NPSH.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not reduce the level of equipment redundancy nor any design margins previously in existence. It does not introduce any new equipment type. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l III. No. This new strainer design maintains the original equipment design and l construction standards. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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j SE No.: 93-089 Source Document: DCP 89-216, Rev. 1 !
l Description of Change This design change provides for the paralleling of eight computer inputs i from the Process Computer system to the new 3D-MONICORE Computer system.
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Summary I. No. The design change installs viring and hardware for computer points required to provide an alternate method for calculating and indicating feedvater flow on the 3D-HONICORE Computer. This alternate method has already been implemented on the Process Computer per DCP 9300010 and Safety Evaluation 930036. The proposed changes will have no impact on the feedvater control loops in performing their required function as described in the USAR Section 7.7.1.4 nor vill they impact the current USAR analysis in Sections 7.7.1.3 and 7.7.1.8 associated with Recirculation Flow Control System and Process Computer System, respectively.
Paralleling the Process Computer points to the 3D-MONICORE Computer System vill have no impact on the current analysis described in the USAR Chapters 7 and 15. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The addition of computer points to the 3D-MONICORE vill require paralleling existing Process Computer points currently in service.
The computer points are connected in a manner that vill not affect the operation of the existing Recirculation Flow Control System nor the Feedvater Control System. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different
'/pe than any previously evaluated.
III. No. 3D-MONICORE computer point viring has no impact on any Technical Specification basis or margin of safety as described therein. The installation also has no impact on the proper functions of the Feedvater Control System. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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( SE No.: 93-090 Source Document: SCN 00399-ISS-2155 Description of Change This specification change revises SP-2155, " Technical Requirements for Excavation and Installation of Backfill" to allow the use of flovable fill material, j Summary I. No. The use of the flovable fill vill be limited to those areas where regular fill is not easily applied, such as undermined areas.
Engineering approval vill be required for each application to ensure bearing capacity equal to or greater than the original material.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. There vill be no decrease in the level of backfill performance because the flovable fill material must be approved by Engineering and it must have properties meeting or exceeding the fill material it replaces. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The flovable fill material vill provide adequate backfill and vill not interfere with the ability of any system, structure or component to perform its intended function. Therefore, this enange vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-091 j Source Docuaent: DCP 93-032B, Rev. O Description of Change This design change removes several toilet trailers and buildings from site which have potable water (P71) and service (P66) connected. These services vill be capped off below grade. A new 3" vater line vill be
, tapped off the 10" P71 main. This vill require a short P71 system l outage.
I Summary I. No. These modifications vill improve the reliability of the P66 and P71 systems. The short outage vill not adversely affect any plant systems. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The change being proposed involve the removal of service to buildings and trailers being demolished, a new water line to the new Perry Administrative building and the sbandonment of the existing water line to the Start-Up Building. System reliability is enhanced while system function remains unchanged. These changes will not i
adversely affect any other plant required systems. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This new configuration vill not adversely affect any system or l operation important to safety. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any l Technical Specification.
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- Source Document
- DCP 93-032A, Rev. 0 Description of Change This design change installs a nev 8-inch fire main via a tee connection in the existing non-safety 8-inch main in order to provide fire protection capability to the new Perry Admiristrative Building.
, Summary I. No. This change vill not degrade the existing fire suppression system nor will the total fire service demand be increased. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This change affects only the fire protection system. It vill not increase the severity of any fire. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This design change has no impact on the administrative aspects of the Fire Protection Program nor does it affect the Remote Shutdown System. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-093 Source Document: Condition Reports92-251, 93-014 and 093-076 Description of Change This evaluation examines proposed actions to minimize the spread of contamination to the Auxiliary Boilers.
Summary I. No. The actions taken to minimize contamination vill not adversely affect any system important to safety. This safety evaluation does not allow continued operation of a contaminated boiler. The increased sampling frequency and system operating instruction (S0I) changes are in place to minimize boiler contamination and to aid in gathering data if a future contamir.ation occurs. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The Auxiliary Boiler is non-safety and does not support any safety related equipment. The changes to the S01 and increasing sampling l frequency do not alter the original design. Therefore, this change i vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Auxiliary Stem and Drain (P61) system is a ncn-safety related system. These changes vill not adversely affect any Technical Specification equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-094 Source Document: USAR CR 93-039 Description of Change This change updates USAR Section 13.1, 13.5 and 17.2 to reflect the new Perry Site organization.
Summary I. No. No function or activities have been eliminated. They have only been reassigned. The qualifications of the site management remain consistent with ANSI N18.1-1971, Regulatory Guide 1.8 and Technical Specification. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not alter the plant in any way nor does it adversely impact plant operation. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Plant operations vill not be adversely affected. There changes are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.8 and ANSI N18.1-1971.
Therefore, they vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-095 Source Document: DCP 91-176, Rev. 0 :
Description of Change This design change replaces the existing Service Air (P51) system supply to the Building Heating (P55) system expansion tank with a nitrogen ,
generator supplied by Instrument Air (P52). This change vill minimize I hydrazine depletion in the P55 system caused by exposure to oxygen.
Summary I. No. Replacing the pressurization medium in the expansion tank from compressed air to compressed nitrogen does not affect the operability of the P55 system. The expansion tank will centinue to maintain P55 pressure above the extraction steam pressure to prevent contamination of the hot water distribution system by the extraction steam. Hydrazine has been shown to be more easily controlled in the absence of oxygen.
Operational transients and design basis accidents accident (DBAs) located in various section of the USAR analyses are unaffected by the change in pressurization medium at the expansion tank.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These design changes to the P51, PS2 and P55 systems do not degrade the reliability of any safety related component. The Building Heating System is non-seismically designed and piping and components are located so that they have no adverse affects on any safety related structure, system or component if a system failure occurs during a SSE. Therefore, these changes will not create the '.
possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These changes do not adversely affect any equipment required by Technical Specificatio.is. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-096 Source Document: DCP 91-060A, Rev. O Description of Change This design change replaces an existing non-regulating distribution transformer with regulating transformer to minimize voltage dips on the Division II Class lE 120 VAC power distribution system.
Summary I. No. This change vill enhance the operability of the Division II 120 VAC power distribution system by limiting voltage dips during large load svings. It vill not adversely impact the accident analyses described in the US'- Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor th- Aooences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased y ange.
II. No. This transformer replacem vill not impact system function and it vill greatly enhance system capability, reliability and operability.
It vill not adversely affect any other equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Division II 120 VAC power system operability vill be greatly improved by this transformer replacement. This change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-097 Source Document: PSTG, Rev. 2, TC-3 Description of Change These changes to the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTG) are minor changes to eliminate redundaticy and to improve human factoring.
Summary I. No. These changes do not affect any actions taken in the PEIs. They are strictly intended to make the PEIs easier to use. The same actions continue to be taken at the same point in each scenario. Therefore, neither the probability cf occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes do not alter any actions specified in the PSTG.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The actions and sequences have not been changed. Therefore, this l change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-098 Source Document: FCR 017764 and 017561 Description of Change This field change permits the temporary installation of freeze seals in the 3/4" to 1-1/2" branch lines of the Two Bed Demineralizer (P21) system to allow for valve repairs.
1 Summary l
I. No. A failure of the freeze seal vould result in a maximum leakage of less than 100 gpm which is enveloped by the USAR assumptions for flooding in the Turbine Building. This flow rate would not adversely affect any other equipment in the area. The P21 system is a non-safety system and is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the !
consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this chy -n.
II. No. The performance of these freeze seals vill not produce any undesirable consequences for equipment important to safety. The rate of flooding is bound,ed by the flooding consideration in the USAR. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l III. No. The operation and design of the P21 system are not relied upon within the Technical Specification base. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-099 Source Document: USAR CR 93-037 Description of Change This change updates USAR Table 9A.3-2 regarding Emergency Lighting to reflect reviews performed in accordance with I.E. Notice 90-69. These changes are editorial. No equipment changes have been made.
Summary I. No. These changes are editorial. Several lighting elements were added to Table 9A.3-2 to reflect installed equipment and the numbering system was changed to reflect the plant Master Parts List (HPL) identification system. No equipment changes were made. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes are editorial and do not physically affect any equipment in the plant. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These editorial changes do not alter any equipment or operational considerations. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-100 Source Document: DCN 4199, Rev. O Description o,f Change This drawing change revises various Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID) to correct the construction coordinates.
Summary I. No. This change is strictly editorial. It does not alter any equipment or operating practices. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident '
vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The editorial change does not alter or adversely affect any equipment in the plant. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change is editorial and has no affect on Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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Source Document: MPI/LLJED l-93-041 Description of Change This MFI/LLJED relocates the Control Room HVAC (H25) H25-C002A motor to the M25-C001 fan to restore operability of the M25/26 A train in the Emergency Recirculation (ER) mode. The A train was rendered inoperable by the failure of the M25-C001A motor.
Summary I. No. This temporary modification vill allow operation of the M25/26 A train in the ER mode. It vill still permit annunciation of .oss of power for the remaining A and B train components. The M25/26 system vill still be available to support plant operation; however, the A train vill be able to support only the ER mode. Smoke clearing vill be accomplished with the B train or by using portable blowers.
Control room evacuation has been analyzed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This temporary modification restores all modes of operation to the M25/26 system. Therefore, it vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Technical Specification bases assume the availability of the M25/26 system in the ER mode. This change restores that mode and it doesn't diminish any other Technical Specification required conditions. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-102 Source Document: DCN 4186, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change revises P&ID 302-212, Service Water System, to reflect modifications made to the Service Vater (P41) system under Safety Evaluations93-080 and 93-081.
Summary I. No. This is strictly an editorial change. Equipment changes vere made under other Safety Evaluations. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This editorial change does not alter any equipment or affect the operation of the plant in any way. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. No physical plant changes are being made nor are any operating practices being altered. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 93-103 Source Document: PTI-P42-P0001, Rev. 1 Description of Change This change to Periodic Test Instruction (PTI)-P42-P0001, " Emergency Closed Cooling Heat Exchanger A Performance Testing", vill provide for the taking of data to evaluate the capability of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) (P42) A heat exchangers while in operation. This change involves the temporary replacement of installed temperature elements with more accurate instrumentation.
Summary I. No. The ECC system vill remain fully functional with all designed safety interlocks still operable during the data collection process.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The methods implemented during data collection are consistent with the methods used for normal system operation and the equipment is more accurate. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The performance of this instruction change vill not adversely affect any equipment or operation relied upon by Technical Specification.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-104 Source Document: PTI-P42-P0002, Rev. 1 Description of Change This change to Periodic Test Instruction, (PTI)-P42-P0002, " Emergency
- l~ Closed Cooling Heat Exchanger B Performance Testing", vill provide for ,
the taking of data to evaluate the capability of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) (P42) B heat exchangers while in operation. This change 4
involves the temporary replacement of installed temperature elements with more accurate instrumentation.
i Summary I. No. The ECC system vill remain fully functional with all designed safety interlocks still operable during the data collection process.
- Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by
- this change.
i II. No. The methods implemented during data collection are consistent with the methods used for normal system operation and the equipment is more accurate. Therefore, this change vill not create the 4
possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than
, any previously evaluated.
l III. No. The performance of this isstruction change vill not adversely affect
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any equipment or operation relied upon by Technical Specification.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 93-105 Source Document: HFI l-93-042 Description of Change This Mechanical Foreign Item installs a leak sealant device (line kill) on valve IN36F511 to eliminate a source of contamination from the i
Extraction Steam (N36) system to the Auxiliary Steam (P61) system.
I Summary I. No. Valve IN36F511 is a manual, normally closed valve thich provides 4 isolation of the cross connection between the Extraction Steam and 4
the Auxiliary Steam systems. This cross connection is not relied upon for any accident mitigation purposes. The device, sealant and methods of construction vill be in accordance with the appropriate guideline. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. :ia. The operation of the N36 and P61 systems with this MFI installed represents an equivalent condition to normal operation. The components meet applicable codes. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The N36 and P61 systems are not relied upon in Technica)
Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-106 Source Document: Emergency Plan, Rev. 11, TC-1 Description of Change This change to the Emergency Plan revises the Classification Flowchart and Emergency Actions Levels (EAL) to reflect the latest revision (Rev. 3) to Regulatory Guide 1.101.
Summary I. No. This change does not alter any equipment nor does it direct any operator actions related to plant operation. This change affects only the classification of accidents once they have occurred.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not alter any plant equipment or operating procedures. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. It does not later any plant equipment or operating procedure.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-107 Source Document: 10I-9, Rev. 4 Description of Change This change to Inegrated Operating Instruction (10I)-9, " Refueling",
allows reactor disassembly, manipulation of a limited number of irradiated fuel assemblies (less than 10) and reactor reassembly without installing the Refueling Operation Atmospheric Radiation Monitor (D17-K650) and the Unit 1 Portable Dryvell Radiation Monitor (1D21-N340).
This revises SE 92-107.
Summary I. No. The purpose of these monitors is for personnel protection for those individuals involved with maintenance and testing during refueling.
Equivalent compensatory measures have been taken to ensure personnel protection. The accident analyses are not affected by this change.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l II. No. There are no changes to plant refueling other than these personnel safety monitor changes. Equivalent compensatory actions have been j taken to ensure personnel safety. Therefore, this change vill not l create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different 1 type than any previously evaluated. !
i III. No. These monitors are not described in Technical Specifications nor do 1 they provide a safety margin for plant system and equipment.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-108 Source Document: NR 93-N-156, Rev. 1 MFI 1-93-049 Description of Change i
This Mechanical Foreign Item installs a leak sealant device on a 1" j
Condensate (N21) drain line to prevent leakage from a veld discontinuity or a coupling in the system. The nonconformance report.vas dispositioned Use-As-Is with this modification installed until a veld repair can be made.
Summary l
t I. No. System and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary installation and any flooding resulting from a sealant failure is l bounded by the Turbine Building flooding accident analysis.
Materials and methods of construction vill be in accordance with approved standards and instructions. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
i II. No. System and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary plugging of the drain line. Flooding resulting from a loss of this seal vill not affect any safety related equipment and is bounded by the accident analyses. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical l Specification.
III. No. The operation of the N21 system and of the plant is not adversely affected by this disposition. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
SE No.: 93-109 Source Document: DCP 91-017, Rev. O Description of Change This design change increases the power circuit fuse size for the Control Room HVAC (H25) fan motors from 100 amp to 150 amps to prevent unwanted fuse operations on motor starts.
Summary I. No. This change vili increase the reliability of the fans. The larger fuse size remains within limits specified in the National Electric Code and by the manufacturer, and vill not change the operation of the plant's power distribution system. Therefore, neither the 1 probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously I analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
i II. No. This change vill not adversely affect the operation of any i equipment. Coordination of protective devices remains properly sequenced and the reliability of the fan is greatly increased.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an i accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously l evaluated.
III. No. This design change vill not affect the operation of the plant's power distribution system. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-110 Source Document: NR 93-N-163 Description of Change This nonconformance report assesses the operation of the Auxiliary Boiler in a contaminated condition caused by the inleakage from the Main Steam system. The nonconformance report provides a "Use-As-Is" disposition for the Auxiliary Boiler in this condition pending repair of the leaking valves.
Sammary I. No. The contamination does not decrease the reliability of the Auxiliary Boiler. The additional off-site dose resulting from operating a contaminated boiler is insignificant and vill not increase the dose consequences analyzed in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The contamination vill not decrease system reliability or function.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Equipment performance remains unaltered and increased dose consequences are negligible. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-111 Source Document: DCN 4107, Rev. O Description of Change This design change upgrades the Alison temperature sensors from an earlier design to the present one because of the unavailability of parts for the earlier sensors.
Summary I. No. The upgraded part fulfills the function within the required temperature range and does not lessen the sensitivity of the instrument. Control room and local alarms still annunciate at a minimum temperature of 225 degrees F. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change involves the upgrade of an obsolete part. The new sensors contain a hermetically sealed connector which is an improvement over the original design and vill increase the reliability of the sensor. No other new equipment has been added.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specifications remain unaffected by this sensor change.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-112 Source Document: USAR CR 93-054 Description of Change This change describes a corporate reorganization involving on-site personnel. It includes the establishment of a Senior Vice President-Nuclear and the reorganization of department and sections.
Summary I. No. No functions or activities have been eliminated. The on-site personnel involved continue to meet the ANSI N18.1-1971 and Regulatory Guide 1.8 qualification requirements for their positions and the change complies with Technical Specifications. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not alter the plant in any way. No functions or activities have been eliminated. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. There are no changes being made to the plant. The personnel qualifications continue to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.8 and ANSI N18.1-1971 and the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of-safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-113 Source Document: NR 93-N-165, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report assesses the operation of the Auxiliary Boiler in a contaminated condition caused by the inleakage from the Main Steam system. The nonconformance report provides a " Rework" disposition for the leaking valves causing the contamination.
Summary I. No. The contamination does not decrease the reliability of the Auxiliary Boiler. The additional off-site dose resulting from operating a contaminated boiler is insignificant and vill not increase the dose consequences analyzed in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
! II. No. The contamination vill not decrease system reliability or function.
l Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an
! accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Equipment performance remains unaltered and increased dose consequences are negligible. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-114 Source Document: SVI-P53-T8305 SVI-P53-T8312 Description of Change i
This change to Surveillance Instructions, (SVI)-P53-T8305 and T8312, I
" Type B Local Leak Rate Test of Lover / Upper Containment Airlock (Penetration P305/312) Barrel Test" provides clarification for the number 1 of strong backs (test clamps) required to perform the lover )
(SVI-P53-T8305) and the upper (SVI-P53-T8312) airlock barrel test. '
Summary I. No. This change specifies that three test clamps be used at 11.31 psig versus four test clamps at 17.25 psig. This change affects only the test conditions, not plant operation. It has been approved as an acceptable alternative by the manufacturer for providing a valid test of the airlocks. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
This change does not affect plant design or operation. The barrel II. No.
test will be performed safely and without over-stressing airlock components. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change does not affect any Technical Specifications parameters.
It provides a valid test at the test pressure utilized for this testing. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-115 Source Document: SOI-G36, Rev. 6 TC-4 l j Description of Change i
l This change to System Operating Instruction (50I)-G36, "RVCU Filter 4 l
Demineralizer System (Unit 1)", eliminates the requirement to operate the )
l Containment Vessel and Dryvell Purge (M14) system when backvashing an !
l RVCV filter /demineralizer. f i
Summary l
l l l I. No. The USAR contains no analyses requiring the operation of the M14
! system following an accident. No changes are being made with respect to the automatic isolation features of the M14 system.
Administrative limits are in place to ensure that the containment to ;
annulus and the containment to dryvell d/Ps are maintained within i specification. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor l r the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased I
by this change.
l l II. No. Compensatory actions have been taken to ensure that the design objectives of the M14 system continue to be met. Therefore, this i change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Administrative limits are in place to ensure that the air being 1 added to the containment during the RVCU backvash will not increase l containment pressure beyond the administrative d/P limits. !
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as '
defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-116 l Source Document: HFI/LLJED 1-93-048 l
Description of Change This MFI/LLJED defeats the Steam Bypass (C85) pressure regulator error from the load demand error signal fault isolation logic. !
Summary I. No. The load demand error signal is only used for operation in the auto load following mode. This mode is not used at Perry. Elimination of this regulator trip vill have no affect on the operation of the i
plant. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Removal of this trip vill have no detrimental affect on the reliability of the Steam Bypass system. The fault detection logic l vhich monitors the pressure regulator outpat and the bypass valve l demand signals is not impacted by this change. Therefore, this l change vill not create the possibility for an accident or l malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Removal of this trip has no adverse impact on the ability of the Steam Bypass system to perform its intended function, nor of any other equipment to meet Technical Specification Requirements.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-117 Sourcs Document: USAR CR 92-028 i
Description of Change l
This change eliminates postulated breaks RHS1 and RH1LL in the recirculation piping based upon the results of of GE Design Report 23A4755, Rev. 1. No new breaks are added, l Summary I. No. This change involves the removal of postulated breaks in the racirculation ping based upon updated analysis. No equipment changes are being made. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. There is no change to equipment or to plant operation as a result of this postulated pipe break elimination. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The Technical Specifications do not address the postulation of rupture locations within any piping system nor do they address the i criteria associated with this issue. The configuration and the function of the piping remain unaltered. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-118 Source Document: DCN 4170, Rev. O Description of Change This change allows the use of threaded end connections rather than socket velds for the small valves in the Two-Bed Demineralizer (P21), Mixed-Bed Demineralizer (P22) and Liquid Radvaste Disposal (G50) systems. It also allows the replacement of Dresser valves with Ladish valves in these applications to eliminate the seat leakage problems associated with the hard disc Drisser valves.
Summary I. No. Both the Dresser and the Ladish valves with threaded end connections meet ANSI B31-1 requirements. This change vill not affect the function or operability of any system. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. The replacement valves meet the material and service requirements for the systems involved. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P21, P22 and G50 systems are not addressed by Technical Specification nor vill any Technical Specification related equipment be adversely affected by these valve specification change.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-119 l Source Document: PSTG, Rev. 2, TC-4 l Description of Change This change to the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTG) revises the ,
Heat Capacity Limit (HCL), Figure 4 in the PSTG, to indicate the UNSAFE )
region and deletes an unnecessary (redundant) step regarding lov l suppression pool level. j Summary i
I. No. This change is strictly editorial. It improves the labeling of the l HCL curve and removes a redundant step. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. This change is editorial and does not affect the technical content of the PSTG. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This editorial change vill not affect any actions or equipment required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin t - safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-120 Source Document: hR 92-S-170 Rev. O Description of Change This nonconformance report provides a "Use-As-Is" disposition for operation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) vaterleg pump in a degraded condition. Pump flow fill below the required 28.9 gpm at 33 psig discharge pressure. -
Summary I. No. Analysis shows that the watet. amp vill keep the minimum flov line full of water at a discharge pressure of 27 psig or above. The i pump has not degraded to this point yet. Therefore, neither the l probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously l analyzed accident vill be increased by this disposition.
II. No. No equipment changes have been made and f terleg pump is able to perform its intended function at the red iov rate of 28.1 gpm at 33 psig. Therefore, this disposition vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The vaterleg pump will maintain the minimum flov line full of water at present conditions. Continued performance of pump surveillances l as required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 vill identify any further decrease in pump flow such that tions can be taken prior to the pump not being able to perform i itended function.
l Therefore, disposition change vill not rtmace the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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. I SE No.: 93-121 Source Document: USAR CR 93-057 Description of Change This USAR change updates the radiological consequences information associated with a large break LOCA based upon a reanalysis of this event for Perry. The reanalysis utilizes revised information taken from a tracer gas study performed for the plant.
Summary I. No. The proposed change is an analytical re-evolution of an accident previously postulated to occur. No changes to the physical plant or to its operation are being made as a result of this reanalysis.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be inc. eased by this change.
II. No. This is strictly an analytical change to the input parameter used in determining radiological consequences for a postulated design basis LOCA. No physical changes to the plant are being made. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The margin of safety applicable to this change involves the post accident dose levels. The parameters being changed in the radiological reanalysis do not affect the LPZ vhole body dose or any of the EAB doses. Thus, the margin of safety remains the same for these doses. The LPZ thyroid dose is being increased (due to postulating a passive failure of an ECCS component), however, the new dose value remains below the 150 R value recognized by the NRC for the Perry Plant. It is also well below the 300 R acceptance limit of 10CFR100. Therefore, the margin of safety for this dose is considered not to be reduced. The Control Room doses for thyroid, whole body, and skin remain the same or decrease below those values previously calculated. As such, the margin of safety for these doses remain the same. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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r SE No.: 93-122 Source Document: NR 93-S-172, Rev. O Description of Change This nonconic.mance report dispositions 30A time delay fuses in the motor conttol centers for Main and Reheat Steam (Nil) system MOVs "Use-As-;s". USAR Section 8.3 requirements for these fuses is being changed from 300% to 200% for motor full load amps (FLA).
Summary I. No. The change in operating point of the motors FLA vill give the associated MOVs more protection under locked motor (LRA) conditions.
It vill not adversely impact any of the accident analyses contained in the USAR. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this disposition.
II. No. This change vill improve MOV LRA protection without adversely impacting MOV function and operability. No equipment changes are being made as a result of this disposition. Therefore, it vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4-8 are concerned with the operability of the Class lE power distribution system. These changes vill not l affect the function or the operability of this system. Thereforc, l this disposition vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-124 Source Document: USAR CR 93-059 Description of Change This USAR change involves the manual actuation of the HVAC Charcoal Filter Plenum Deluge System. They vill no longer be manually actuated from the Control Room, but rather from the local deluge valve location.
This change is being implemented to reduce the current risk of accidental water intrusion into the HVAC charcoal filters.
Summary I. No. This change does not adversely affect the operability or function of the fire suppression system. It reduces the chances of inadvertently vetting charcoal and rendering the HVAC for charcoal absorbers less effective. All fire protection and safe shutdown systems vill continue to operate as designed. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously I analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The potential for disabling charcoal absorbers reduced by this change. No other systems or equipment is effected. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change does not adversely affect any equipment or operating practices required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, it will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
1 SE No.: 93-125 Source Document: NR 93-N-178, Rev. O i Description of Change This nonconformance report dispositions " Repair" and "Use-As-Is" a leak sealant device installed on a 0.75 inch drain line coupling on the Feedvater (N27) system to prevent leakage from a veld discontinuity or a coupling in the system until a veld repair'can be made.
Summary I. No. Systems and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary installation and any flooding resulting from sealant failure is bounded by the Turbine Bui2 ding flooding accident analysis.
Materials and methods of construction vill be in accordance with approved standards and instructions. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. System and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary plugging of the drain line. Flooding resulting from a loss of this seal vill not affect any safety-related equipment and is bounded by the accident analysis. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The operation of the N27 system and of the plant is not adversely affected by this disposition. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-126 l Source Document: NR 93-N-180, Rev. 0 l Description of Change The nonconformance report dispositions " Repair" and "Use-As-Is" a leak ;
sealant device on a 1.5 inch elbow on the 1B MSR shell pocket drain to :
prevent leakage from a pin hole leak on the elbow, until a veld repair can be made.
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Summary I. No. System and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary 1 installation and any flooding resulting from sealant failure is bounded by the Turbine Building flooding accident analysis.
Materials and methods of construction vill be in accordance with approved standards and instructions. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. System and plant operation remain unaffected with this temporary plugging of the drain line. Flooding resulting from a loss of this seal vill not affect any safety-related equipment and is bounded by the accident analysis. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The operation of the MSRs and of the plant is not adversely affected by this disposition. Therefore, it vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-127 Source Document: S0I-E22A, Rev. 4, TC-7 Description of Change This change to System Operating Instruction (S01)-E22A, "High Pressure Core Spray System", incorporates alternate HPCS keepfill methods.
Summary I. No. The only accident / transient analyzed in Chapter 15 which is initiated by the HPCS System is Inadverent HPCS Startup (USAR Chapter 15.5.1). This transient assumes a manual startup of the HPCS System (i.e., operator error). The source of keepfill (the water leg pump or one of the alternate keepfill methods) vill not affect the probability of an operator error that could start the HPCS Pump. HPCS pump discharge pressure is high enough to close the HPCS Flush Line Check Valve (1E22-F003) against Two Bed Demineralizer (P21) pressure. For all analyzed USAR accidents / transients in which the HPCS Pump starts, the use of alternate keepfill vill not create an alternate injection path.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Alternate keepfill from the CST has already been demonstrated viable and P21 system pressure is within the normal bounds of HPCS system
- pressure. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility l for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any l previously evaluated.
III. No. Technical Specifications 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 require the HPCS System to be maintained filled with water to ensure the minimum possible
- injection time and to minimize the potential for vater hammer. Both l
of the analyzed methods are capable of achieving this. Furthermore, since HPCS Flush Line Check Valve (1E22-F003) has not been inservice tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, the HPCS System is declared inoperable whenever using the Two Bed l Distribution System to supply keepfill. When the HPCS System is I
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declared inoperable, actions vill be taken in accordance with T.S. 3.5.1 or 3.5.2 as required. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-128 Source Document: DCN 4254, Rev. O Description of Change This drawing change allows an alternate, equivalent bearing housing to be substituted for the obsolete bearing housing on the ECCS vaterleg pump. ;
Summary I. No. The substitute bearing housing meets the original design, material l and construction specifications. Pump performance vill not be
! adversely affected by this part substitution. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The substitute bearing housing meets the original design, material and construction specifications. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different l
type than any previously evaluated.
i III. No. This part substitution meets all of the material and construction l requirements of the original part. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-129 Source Document: ONI-Nil, Rev. 5 Description of Change This change to Off Normal Instruction (ONI)-Nil, " Pipe Break Outside Containment (Unit 1)", incorporates the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPG), Revision 4 Secondary Containment Control Guidelines.
I Summary I. No. ONI-Nil is entered after an accident or transient has occurred.
Once entered, attempts are made to mitigate the accident or transient. This change results in a plant shutdown, cooldown and depressurization at least as rapid as that assumed in the USAR, and in many cases, more rapid than that assumed in the USAR. This will result in a quicker leak isolation and vill reduce the radiological consequences of analyzed accidents. Therefore, neither the i
probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. ONI-Nil, with this change incorporated, attempts to mitigate the accident or transient by isolation of the leak source. All actions taken are within the range of analyzed actions in the USAR.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an I accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously l evaluated.
III. No. ONI-Nil actions may result in exceeding the Technical l
Specification 3.4.6.1 maximum cooldown limit of 100'F in any one hour period. Emergency depressurization is bounded by the USAR analysis and Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 requires an engineering evaluation prior to repressurization. The actions of ONI-Nil vill drive the plant to Cold Shutdown conditions which establishes the "or" part of the Action statement (or be in at least HOT SHUTD0VN vithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTD0VN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as l defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-130 Source Document: MFI/LLJED l-93-056 Description of Change This Mechanical Foreign Item installs a teuporary reset switch for RPS channel "D". The present switch is malfunctioning.
Summary I. No. This modification installs a parallel switch using similar equipment but in a different panel. It does not affect the operation or function of the switch and is installed so as not to interfere with any other equipment. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. fio. This modification utilizza like equipment (svitch and viring) and does not change the function or operation of the RPS "D" channel.
It does not interfere with the operation of any other equipment.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This modification does not adversely affect any equipment required by Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-131 Source Document: USAR CR 93-061 Description of Change This change updates the USAR to reflect the title change from Licensing and Compliance Section to Regulatory Affairs Section.
Summary I. No. This is strictly an editorial change. No functions or activities were eliminated. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change simply revises an organizations name. It does not alter the plant in any way. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. No changes have been made to the plant or to any functions or activities described in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
d i 1 SE No.: 93-132 Source Document: DCP 93-032D, Rev. O Description of Change This design change modifies the Storm Drain Sewer (P67) system to
- accommodate the construction changes associated with the site completion proj ec t .
Summary I. No. The changes being made do not alter the function or the capability I of the P67 system. They provide for additional paths for storm water to enter the system. The accidents analyzed in the USAR assume a complete blockage and failure of the P67 system. Yard flooding is controlled by grading the site to slope away from plant buildings. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the )
consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Building flooding is not controlled by the P67 system, nor is P67 connected to any other plant system. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a :
different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P67 system is not addressed by Technical Specifications nor are any plant systems affected by it. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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- DCP 89-050, Rev. O Description of Change
, This design change adds a charcoal filter to the Controlled Access Area HVAC (H21) system exhaust ducting to filter contaminants from the oil analysis lab fume hoods.
Summary I. No. The addition of this filter vill have no effect on overall system performance. The balancing damper in this branch is greater than 50% closed without the filter installed. It vill be adjusted as necessary to rebalance flow. This filter vill remove contaminants which have been prematurely poisoning the charcoal in the main exhaust unit. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. System function and reliability will not be adversely affected by this change, nor vill this change adversely affect any other system or equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This change vill not adversely affect any equipment required by Technical Specifications. All design parameters in the USAR will continue to be met. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
l SE No.: 93-134 l Source Document: HFIs 1-93-058 and 1-93-059 l Description of Change These Mechanical Foreign Items temporarily install gauges, vent valves and fittings in order to monitor the HPCS injection Valve 1E22F0004 and ;
the RCIC injection valve IE51F0013 for the potential for pressure i locking.
Summary I. No. The components vill remain isolated via locked closed valves except during brief periods to obtain pressure readings. They vill not be pressurized without being monitored. This temporary installation vill not impact the ability of the permanent safety-related components to perform this intended function. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change does not adversely affect any other equipment nor alter the operation of any permanent equipment. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Administrative controls have been established as required Technical Specification bases 3.6.4 to ensure satisfactory operation of this equipment and to maintain Containment Integrity. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-135 Source Document: DCP 93-075, Rev. O Description of Change This design change installs a continuous backfill modification to the reactor vessel level instrument reference legs off of condensing ,
chambers 1B21D004A, B, C and D to prevent noncondensable gases from !
building up in the reference legs.
Summary I. No. This safety evaluation addresses only the fabrication and installation of this equipment. A separate evaluation vill be performed prior to connecting and placing this equipment into operation. All materials and installation requirements vill be met.
Because this system is not connected and because it will be supported properly, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased.
II. No. The hardware installation has been analyzed for structural integrity and it meets the applicable codes and standards. No tie-ins vill be made, therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. This modification is not connected to any plant systems. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-136 I Source Document: DCN 3135, Rev. 0; SCN 281-DSP-E12; i SCN 276-DSP-E15 and SCN 277-DSP-E51 Description of Change Changes to drawings, specifications and the USAR are being made to reflect an earlier design change allowing Emergency Service Vater inlet I temperature to rise from 80'F to 85*F. Safety Evaluations88-387 and 90-045 addressed the increase in ESV temperature and the resulting increase in the maximum suppression pool temperature for the HSIV closure transient.
Summary I. No. The changes reflect corrections to the USAR text, tables, and figures; various drawings; and Piping Design Specifications DSP-E12, DSP-E15 and DSP-E51 based on approved design basis information. All of the changes are directly related to the change in the ESV system inlet water temperature from 80'F to 85'F. The increase in temperature from 80'F to 85'F was approved by Safety .
Evaluation 88-387. The operational data updated on D302-661 to l reflect the current suppression pool temperature was previously ;
addressed and approved by Safety Evaluation 90-0045. The requested {
changes do not change the physical plant in any way or change the operational basis of any system. Therefore, neither the probability !
of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes simply reflect a previously approved change to the ESV l inlet temperature. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Previous evaluations of the 85'F ESV Safety Evaluations88-387 and 90-045 show no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-137 Source Document: Emergency Plan, Rev. 11, TC-3 l Description of Change 1
This is an administrative change to the Emergency Plan which deletes redundant and extraneous information, adds clarifying information and updates the telephone system descriptions.
l Summary i
I. No. These are administrative changes to the existing Emergency l Preparedness Program which do not alter any equipment or plant operation. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The administrative changes do not alter any equipment or plant operation. Therefore, they vill not create the possibility for an i accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated. ,
III. No. There are administrative changes which do not affect any equipment or operation required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-138 Source Document: DCN 4259, Rev. O Description of Change This change revises the drawings of various ventilation systems to permit the removal of the supply plenum roughing filters during cold weather in order to prevent collected snow from causing lov flow conditions.
Summary I. No. Removal of the supply plenum roughing filters during cold weather vill not adversely affect the operation of these systems. Supply pressure vill vary slightly but vill remain within specification.
Dust and dirt loading during the vinter is negligible. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This change vill not adversely affect any other equipment or operating practices. Air supply will remain within specification.
Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an l accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. System operation vill remain within design limits. Therefore, this I change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases l for any Technical Specification. I i
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SE No.: 93-139 Source Document: DCP 93-079, Rev. O Description of Change This design change increases the number of locking devices to the Inclined Fuel Transfer (IFTS) system area floor plugs, the IFTS valve room shield doors and the dryvell airlock shield door in accordance with changes to 10CFR20.
'ammary I. No. These additional locking devices vill allow compliance with the new 10CFR20 regulations and will provide increased personnel protection.
These changes do not affect the function or operation of any plant systems required for safe shutdown. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The modifications will not affect any equipment or operating practices required for safe shutdown. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These modifications do not adversely affect any equipment or operation required to satisfy the bases for any Technical Specification. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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1 SE No.: 93-140 Source Document: PAP-0114, Rev. O Description of Change This change to Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-0114, " Radiation Protection Program", is a new procedure which incorporates the requirements of the revised 10CFR20 into the Perry radiation protection program.
Summary I. No. The revisions to 10CFR20 require only an administrative change to Perry's existing Radiation Protection Program. This program does not involve any activity which could impact the design, function, or i operation of any plant system or component. Accident analysis is not affected. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor i the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased l by this change.
II. No. This is strictly an administrative change to an existing program.
It does not alter any plant equipment or operation required for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this change vill not create the l possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The NRC is preparing a Generic Letter to provide additional guidance l to ensure Technical Specification compliance with the revised
! Part 20. In the meantime, a letter from NRR dated June 30, 1993 allows the current Technical Specifications to be utilized after January 1,1994 until such time that the Technical Specifications are changed. The limiting factors for the current effluent technical specifications are based on 10CFR50 Appendix I dose i limits. These values have not changed and are still applicable.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification, l
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SE No.: 93-141 Source Document: DCP 90-280A, Rev. O Description of Change l This design change installs an independent closed circuit television (CCTV) camera system on the auxiliary platform to provide better viewing capabilities during refueling.
Summary I. No. The structural adequacy of the auxiliary platform for all loading conditions has been verified with the increased loading by the CCTV positioner. A CCTV positioner is within the bounds of the single fuel bundle drop accident previously analyzed. Therefore, neither l the probability of occurrence nor consequences of a previously
! analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
l l II. No. Beyond the possibility of a dropped CCTV positioner which has l already been analyzed, there are not possibilities for equipment l interaction which could adversely affect any equipment important to
- safety. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The CCTV camera positioner system vill improve the platform operation during core verification and vessel internal inspection.
There is no change to the auxiliary platform. Therefore, all l operating requirements associated with the auxiliary platform and I i fuel handling equipment, i.e., load limits, as defined in the f
Technical Specifications load limits vill continue to be met.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-142 Source Document: SOI-F11/15, Rev. 5 Description of Change This administrative change to System Operating Instruction (S01)-F11/15,
" Fuel Handling, Refueling and Auxiliary Platforms", involves the clarification of the type jumper installed and identification of a USAR paragraph number change.
Summary I. No. The technical changes associated with using a jumper were approved under Safety Evaluation 90-193. The current changes are strictly l
administrative to reflect revised terminology in the tagging program and revised USAR paragraph numbering. No changes to plant equipment or operation are being made. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This is strictly an administrative change. No changes to equipment or operation of the plant are being made. Therefore, this change i vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l l III. No. This administrative change does not alter any plant equipment or operation. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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l SE No.: 93-143 Source Document: DCP 92-048, Rev. O I
l Description of Change This design change replaces obsolete Two-Bed (P21) and Mixed Bed I. Demineralizer (P22) system acid and caustic pumps with new pumps by the same manufacturer but with different baseplate dimensions and piping connections. This change also adds as-built information to the P&ID associated with these pumps.
Summary I. No. The new pumps are manufactured by the original equipment manufacturer (Pulsafeeder) with the same horsepover, materials of construction, and motor controls. They have capacities and design l ratings suitable for the service conditions. The never model pumps
- have different baseplate dimensions and inlet / outlet piping !
connections which necessitates this change. The baseplate and piping materials used with the new pumps are the same as those supplied with the original pumps stations. None of the changes above affects the design function or operation of the system.
Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. The P21/P22 systems are non-safety and do not supply water to systems important to safety. The changes in the pump and the P&ID are considered equivalent to the currently reviewed and approved design. The pumps and new piping meet the material and service requirements for the P21/P22 systems, and the changes do not adversely affect the function or operation of the system nor any l other system. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The P21/P22 systems are not addressed by Technical Specifications.
In addition, the Technical Specification licensing bases parameters are not affected by the pump and P&ID changes. The Technical Specification water quality limits are not changed or affected by this change. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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a SE No.: 93-144 Source Document: USAR CR 93-065 Description of Change This USAR change updates Section 9, 11, 12, and 15 to reflect NRC l revisions to 10CFR20. It also updates the USAR with respect to Zn-65 i
concentration (SE 92-173).
Summary I. No. These changes which reflect the revised 10CFR20 do not impact the design, function or operation of any plant system or component. The revised calculated 2n-65 concentration was evaluated as acceptable under Safety Evaluation 92-173. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. These changes are administrative. They do not change any activity
, which could impact the design, function, or operation of any plant system or component. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. The NRC is preparing a Generic Letter to provide additional guidance to ensure Technical Specification compliance with the revised Part 20. In the meantime, a letter from NRR dated June 30, 1993 allows the current Technical Specifications to be utilized after January 1, 1994 until such time that the Technical Specifications are changed. The limiting factors for the current effluent technical specifications are based on 10CFR50 Appendix I dose limits. These values have not changed and are still applicable.
Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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i SE No.: 93-145 Source Document: DCP 92-161, Rev. O l
i Description of Change l
This design change strengthens the design of-the valve stem coupling on the 2" Control rod drive scram discharge valves 1C11F0011 and F0181.
Summary I. No. This modification utilizes a higher strength steel for the coupling and for the fasteners and minimizes the removal of material required for assembly. The design of the coupling and fasteners remain ,
equivalent in fit and function. Therefore, neither the probability '
of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. This coupling design using higher strength materials was evaluated !
and found to be acceptable with respect to the existing lower ;
strength actuator and valve stem materials. Therefore, this change l vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. Valve function for stroking closed in the event of reactor scram is not affected by this design change because the stem coupling fit and i form are essentially equivalent. This function vill be verified in the DCP by performing SVI-C11-T2004 and SVI-C11-T2200 following coupling installation. On the basis of the above equivalency and testing, the valve function to provide isolation of the scram ;
discharge volume as described in Section 3/4.1.3 of the Plant Technical Specifications is fully maintained. All other design '
margins for the Control Rod Drive system and these valves are l maintained. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Spe.cification.
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SE No.: 93-146 Source Document: DCP 87-671, Rev. 5 Description of Change This design change installs communication jack stations in the Unit 1 Dryvell for the R51 PA system, the R52 Maintenance and Calibration Jack system and the RSS PBX telephone system to facilitate communication.
Summary I. No. The R51, R52, and R55 Communication systems are all nonsafety-related. The have no interaction with any other plant system. Their failure vill not adversely affect any other plant equipment. Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident vill be increased by this change.
II. No. Failure of any of other communication system vill not adversely affect any system or equipment important to safety. Therefore, this change vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
III. No. These added phone jacks vill not interfere with the proper operation of any Technical Specification related equipment. Therefore, this change vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-148 Source Document: HFI 1-93-061 TXI-0166, Rev. O Description of Change This temporary modification to the plant installs a system which purges the reference leg of the shutdown and upset range reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level instrumentation, using the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic system (C11) as a water source. The purge system is isolated from existing plant systems except for performance of TXI-0166, which will verify stable level indications during normal plant evolutions which include RPV level changes and control rod manipulations. This plant change and test is in response to Generic Letter 92-04 and NRC Bulletin 93-03, which addressed potential outgassing from BVR reference legs causing false level indications. A complete system description is evaluated in Safety Evaluation 93-166.
Summary I. No. This purge system installation affects RPV instrumentation which only provides indication, and vill not affect engineered safeguard actuations. Purging the reference leg of this instrumentation increases level indicator reliability, which augments consistent operator response under upset and shutdown conditions. Check valves prohibit draining of the instrument reference leg through purge system breaks, and C11 makeup flow is limited by a flow restricting orifice. Plant evolutions performed during TXI-0166 are already covered by plant procedures and are analyzed in the USAR. In addition, TXI-0166 contains administrative controls to ensure that tests are performed in operational conditions that do not impact Technical Specifications. The break of an instrument line as analyzed in USAR 15.6.2 bounds any consequence of purge system failure. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. Restricting orifice or check valve protection prohibits adverse effects on interfacing vater supply (C11) and reference leg systems.
The purge system installation is also analyzed to assure no seismic or fall-down impacts on previously installed safety related equipment. Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. The Technical Specification Bases and interfacing systems are not adversely affected by any of these changes. Therefore, margins of safety so defined are not reduced.
SE No.: 93-149 Source Document: EDCRs 93-7018, Rev. O and 93-7032, Rev. O Description of Change This safety evaluation is intended to examine all aspects of the Site Completion Project which have not been covered by specific safety evaluations.
l Summary i
I. No. Flooding is the only concern v'i_n has not been specifically eliminated through the other st.fety evaluation. Completion of this l project does not adversely af fect the drainage capability of the I site. Plant buildings vill remain protected from flooding.
l Therefore, neither the probability of occurrence nor the consequences of a previously analyzed accident will be increased by this change.
II. No. Plant structures remain protected from flooding. Therefore, these changes vill not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
l III. No. Flooding of buildings and plant structures vill not occur as a result of these changes. Therefore, they vill not reduce the margin of safety as defi Ad in the bases for any Technical Specification.
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SE No.: 93-151 Source Document: DCP 93-085, Rev. O Description of Change This design change modifies the actuator of the low pressure core spray (LPCS) minimum flow valve to increase torque / thrust capability.
Increased actuator torque was determined by revised valve operational loading calculation in accordance with Generic Letter 89-10. Vith this change, valve stroke time increases about 2 seconds.
Summary I. No. The probability of USAR event occurrence is not affected by this change. Valve reliability is increased with higher activator torque. Consequences of analyzed events are not adversely affected.
For purposes of maintaining adequate core cooling in the LPCS mode, USAR Section 6.3.3 defines minimum required injection flow under stated conditions (the " licensing bases"). Although the minimum flow line takes 2 seconds longer to isolate, thereby diverting an estimated 20 gallons of coolant injection, the amount by which actual LPCS flov exceeds the flow required to meet core cooling safety margin results in net core cooling flow, in the required time frame, which still exceeds the licensing basis. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. This change maintains original system configuration and functions, and creates no new system interactions. Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Valve reliability is increased to provide greater assurance of full LPCS injection flow to the reactor vessel. Core cooling safety margins are maintained by exceeding the licensing basis LPCS injection flow versus time with actual demonstrated system performance capability. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
SE No.: 93-152 Source Document: DCP 93-110B, Rev, O Description of Change This design change modifies the actuator of the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) valve to increase torque / thrust capablity. Increased actuator torque was determined by revised valve operational loading calculations in accordance with Generic Letter 89-10. Vith these changes, valve stroke time increased about 5 seconds.
Summary I. No. The probability of USAR event occurrence is not affected by this change. Valve reliability is increased with higher actuator torque.
Consequences of analyzed events are not adversely affected. For purposes of maintaining adequate core cooling in the LPCI mode, USAR Section 6.3.3 defines minimum required injection flow under stated conditions (the " licensing basis"). Although the time to injection valve full open is increased 5 seconds from 27 to 32 seconds, LPCI rated flow is achieved with the injection valve approximately 60%
open. Sufficient core cooling flow is delivered to meet safety margins defined in the licensing basis. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. This change maintains original system configuration and functions, and creates no new system interactions. Therefore, the possibility i of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any '
evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Valve reliability is increased to provide graater ass trance of timely LPCI injection to the reactor vessel. Core coo?ing safety margins are maintained by exceeding the licensing baser LPCI injection flov versus time with actual demonstrated system performance capability. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases.for any Technical Specifications vill not be reduced.
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i SE No.: 93-153 Source Document: DCP 93-0085A, Rev. O Description of Change This design change modifies the actuator and power supply circuit for the low pressure core spray (LPCS) injection valve to increase torque / thrust capability. Increased actuator torque was determined by revised valve operational loading calculations in accordance with Generic Letter 89-10.
With these changes, valve stroke time increased about 5 seconds.
l Summary I I. No. The probability of USAR event occurrence is not affected by this change. Valve reliability is increased with higher actuator torque.
Consequences of analyzed events are not adversely affected. For purposes of maintaining adequate core cooling in the LPCS mode, USAR Section 6.3.3 defines minimum required injection flow under stated conditions (the " licensing bases"). Although the time to injection valve full open is increased from 27 to 32 seconds, LPCS rated flow is achieved with the injection valve approximatley 40% open.
Sufficient core cooling flov is deliverad to meet safety margins '
defined in the licensing bases. In addition, power supply circuit modifications dulicated existing circuit routing to meet separation and fire protection criteria in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R and (Fire Protection) as further described in USAR Appendix 9A. l Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an I accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. This change maintains original system configuration and functions, and creates no new system interactions. Increased power cable size vill improve voltage at the valve motor and reduce I2R heat loads.
Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Valve reliability is increased to provide greater assurance of timely LPCS injection to the reactor vessel. Core cooling safety l
margins are maintained by exceeding the licensing bases LPCS l injection flov versus time with actual demonstrated system performance capability. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
SE No.: 93-154 Source Document: MFI 1-93-061 TXI-0166, Rev. O, TC-3 Description of Change This revision to the plant modification, to evaluate purging of reactor vessel level instrumentation reference leg, changes the method of limiting backfill flow rate. The restricting orifice between the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic system (C11) and the purge system is elininated.
Maximum flow is controlled by adjusting two C11 supply line needle valves located in a locked enclosure.
Summary I. No. The consequences of any purge system tubing breaks are bounded by USAR 15.6.2. The range of reactor vessel pressure transients analyzed in USAR Chapter 15 are accomodated by purge system design so that purge flow continues in an acceptable range to maintain reliable level indication. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment is not important to safety previoasly evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. A line break in the purge system (3/8 inch diameter) would result in insignificant flow relative to C11 makeup capacity; restricting orifices also protect the scram accumulators from excessive loss of inventory. The needle valves used to limit C11 flov are already part of the purge system. Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. More reliable reactor levels allow more predictable, consistent operator response. Safety functions provided by interfacing systems are not affected. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications vitll not be reduced.
SE No.: 93-155 Source Document: USAR CR 93-068 Description of Change These editorial drawing changes to USAR Figures 6.2-60 (Sheets 2 and 3),
Containment and Dryvell Isolation, reflect pre-existing plant design information not previously shown or shown incorrectly:
Added PCV F205 and safety clarification to the containment side of line no. 30(b).
Changed outboard isolation valve position switch designation on line nos. 28(b) and 38(a).
Added complete designation to inboard containment purge supply valve PCV F195 in line no. 30(a), and system designations to components in dryvell vacuum relief line no. 39(a).
Summary I. No. These editorial additions and changes in no way effect safety-related structures, systems, or components design or function. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. See item I above.
III. No. The Technical Specification Bases are not affected by any of these changes, therefore margins of safety so defined are not reduced.
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SE No.: 93-156 l Source Document: DCP 93-075, Rev. 1 I i
Description of Change l This design change installs the equipment to allow continuous purging of the reactor vessel level instrument reference legs. This safety !
evaluation addresses only the installation of purge control stations and j connections to the Nuclear Boiler system (B21) and Control Rod Drive l Hydraulic system (Cll), installation of an in-line orifice to isolate purge control station debris from the level reference leg line, and i termination of water supply line to removed equipment with a threaded cap (to avoid draining the Mixed-Bed Demineralizer system and back purging for a socket-veld cap). According to this safety evaluation, the new purge system vill remain isolated from B21 and C11 by Engineering Hold Order until analysis of potential system interactions and other i operability assessments are complete. This modification is being installed in response to Generic Letter 92-04 and NRC Bulletin 93-03, which addressed potential outgassing in BVR reference legs causing false level indications.
Summary I. No. Isolation of the new backfill system from plant systems previously analyzed in the USAR prevents system interactions until their effects are satisfactorily analyzed. The installation meets applicable seismic criteria regarding system interactions. The threaded pipe cap design meets applicable codes and standards to maintain system integrity. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
l II. No. With the new system isolated from B21 and with seismic-related interactions evaluated and found acceptable, no other interactions with safety-related structure, systems or components are possible.
Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Vich the new system isolated from B21 and Cll, the Technical Specification Bases are not affected by any of these changes.
Therefore, margins of safety so defined are not reduced.
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SE No.: 93-160 Source Document: DCP 93-075, Rev. 2 Description of Change ,
This design change installs the equipment to allow continuous purging of l the reactor vessel level instrument reference legs. This safety i evaluation addresses only the installation of a vent valve inside the purge control panels to facilitate system filling, suppression chambers inside the purge control panel to dampen control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic system perturbations, and several corrections to as-built drawings to relocate a tubing support and to eliminate pipe interference.
According to this safety evaluation, the new purge system vill remain isolated by Engineering Hold Order until analysis of potential systems interactions and other operability assessments are complete. This modification is installed in response to Generic Letter 92-04 and NRC Bulletin 93-03 which addressed potential outgassing from BVR level instrument reference legs causing false level indications.
Summary I. No. Isolation of the new backfill system from plant systems previously analyzed in the USAR vill prevent system interactions until their effects are satisfactorily analyzed. The installation meets applicable seismic criteria regarding system interactions.
Therefore, the porbability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. Vith the new system isolated and with seismic-related interactions evaluated and found acceptable, no other interactions with safety-related structure, systems or components are possible.
Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Vith the new system isolated, the Technical Specification Bases are not affected by any of these changes. Therefore, margins of safety so defined are not reduced.
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SE No.: 93-161 Source Document: DCP 93-075, Rev. 3 ;
I Description of Change This design change installs the equipment to allow continuous purging of the reactor vessel level instrument reference legs. This safety evaluation addresses only installation details and resolution of a tubing interface. According to this safety evaluation, the new purge system vill remain isolated by Engineering Hold Order until analysis of potential systems interactions and other operability assessments are complete. This modification is installed in response to Generic Letter 92-04 and NRC Bulletin 93-03 which addressed potential outgassing from BVR level instrument reference legs causing false level indications.
Summary I. No. Isolation of the new backfill system from plant systems previously analyzed in the USAR vill prevent system interactions until their effects are satisfactorily analyzed. The installation meets I applicable seismic criteria regarding system interactions.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
i II. No. Vith the new system isolated and with seismic-related interactions evaluated and found acceptable, no other interactions with
- safety-related structure, systems or components are possible.
l Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of I a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. With the new system isolated, the Technical Specification Bases are not affected by any of these changes. Therefore, margins of safety so defined are not reduced.
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SE No.: 93-166 l Source Document: DCP 93-075, Rev. 4 Description of Change This design change completes installation of a continuous backfill modification to the reactor vessel level instrument reference legs of condensing chambers IB21D004A, B, C and D to prevent noncondensable gases from building up in the reference legs. This safety evaluation addresses performance of initial testing, system operability, and potential system interactions in order to cancel an Engineering Hold Order on system operations. This modification is installed in response to Generic Letter 92-04 and NRC Bulletin 93-03, which addressed potential outgassing from BVR level instrument reference legs causing false level indications.
Summary I. No. This design change improves the reliability of reactor vessel level indications, thereby improving cperator response and the consistency of associated reactor water level automatic trips and other actuations. Instrument Reference Leg Purge Control System performance has been verified by performance testing under various plant evolutions which include reactor water level changes within normal operating range, and control rod drive (CRD) operations (CRD charging water is the source of water for the purge system).
Regarding system integrity, safety-related portions of the system, including control stations, meet seismic design criteria applicable to Seismic Category 1 equipment. Existing reference leg lines are isolated from non-safety portions of the new system by two check valves in series which vill be included in the Inservice Inspection Program to assure continuing integrity. Any tubing breaks (all inside containment) are bounded by USAR Section 15.6.2, " Instrument Line Pipe Break". The range of reactor vessel pressure transients analyzed in USAR Chapter 15 are accomodated by purge system design to that purge flow continues in an acceptable range to maintain reliable level indication. Separation of Purge Control Stations protects against loss of redundant level indications from a localized fire. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. The CRD Hydraulic system (C11) which provides water to the subject purge system is isolated by two check valves in series, which are included in the Inservice Inspection Program to assure continuing operability of reactor vessel level instrumentation in the event of ,
C11 depressurization. Conversely, a line break in the purge system l
(3/8 inch diameter) would result in insignificant flow relative to C11 makeup capacity; restricting orifices also protect the scram accumulators from excessive loss of inventory. Regarding operating interactions, in-line surge suppression chambers serve to stabilize l purge system / reference leg pressure from CRD operating cycles. In
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II. No. (Cont.)
addition, consequences of Purge Control Station failures which could pass debris into the reference leg and cause false level or pressure signals, are prevented by an in-line restricting orifice.
Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. More reliable reactor vessel level I & C functions make associated margins of safety for reactor core portection more predictable.
Safety functions provided by interfacing systems are not affected.
Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
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SE No.: 93-175 Source Document: USAR CR 93-081 Description of Change This evaluation analyzes changes to the USAR concerning additional containment bypass leakage penetrations. These penetrations are associated with the Reactor Core Tsolation Cooling (RCIC) system. These penetrations vill be included in Table 6.2-33 and in the Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) program.
Summary I. No. This change to the USAR does not affect any safety-related equipment, system configuration, or related function. By adding these penetrations to the LLRT program, greater demonstrated assurance of the containment leak integrity assumed in accident analyses vill be maintained under vorst case conditions. Total allovable containment bypass leakage vill be maintained at or below the licensed limit (5.04% of total containment leakage). Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. This change to the USAR does not affect any safety-related equipment, system configuration, or related function. Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Relevant margins of safety are verified with greater assurance of required containment leak integrity. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
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SE No.: 93-183 Source Document: USAR CR 93-078 Description of Change This evaluation analyzes changes-to the USAR concerning the as-built configuration for the transmission lines near the plant site. The name of the switchyard is also changed.
Summary I. No. The actual location of transmission lines was verified during the station blackout evaluatien in conjunction with tornado risk categorization, and is reflected in this USAR change. The safety function and reliability of offsite power supplies remain as described in the USAR. There is no increase in risk loss of offsite power (LOOP). Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. With station blackout risk assessments completed, and no change to design configuration or system operation, there is no impact on plant systems or performance as described in the USAR. Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated reviously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Power distribution system configuration and reliability remain unchanged by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
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SE No.: 93-187 Source Document: USAR CR 93-092 HPI-A0003, Rev. O PAP-1403, Rev. 4 Description of Change This evaluation analyzes a change to USAR Sections 12.3.4.1 and 12.3.4.4 concerning airborne and area radiation monitor (Dl?/D21) setpoint methodology. The purpose of the change is to eliminate excessive alarms, establish setpoints consistent with specific plant operating experience, and to alert plant personnel to off-normal radiation levels that have the potential to violate established margins of safety.
Summary I. No. Affected equipment improves plant and control room radiation protection. Elimination of unnecessary alarms vill improve personnel response to the more significant alarms that may occur in the future. There are no engineered safeguard actuations associated with this equipment. Several ventilation fan trips are provided to minimize the spread of airborne contamination within the plant, but have no impact offsite. The changes to setpoint methodology vill assure previously established margins of safety between plant administrative limits on personnel radiation exposure and 10 CFR 20 guidelines. Plant operations vill continue to satisfy applicable codes and standards cited in USAR 12.3.4. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. D17/D21 setpoints vill be maintained consistent with plant operating experience. As a result, control room personnel response to significant changes vill improve, which reduces the possibility of accidents going undetected. These setpoints are reviewed annually by the Radiation Protection Technical Unit to ensure that the margin of safety has been maintained and that there are no adverse trends.
This vill provide additional protection against degradation in equipment or operations which control radioactive material.
Therefore, the possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR does not exist.
III. No. Margins of safety with respect to 10 CFR 20 vill be maintained for protection of plant personnel. There is no impact on offsite releases from normal operations or accident conditions. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.
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SE No.: 94-003 l Source Document: USAR CR 93-080 '
Description of Change This change updates the diesel generator loadings as listed on USAR Table 8.3-1. j Summary I. No. The revision to the USAR table is meant to define the current diesel generator (D/G's) loading values for a loss of offsite power (LOOP) or LOOP /LOCA combination. The tabulated values for automatically connected equipment are within the D/G ratings. Administrative controls are in place to provide sufficient guidance to prevent-operators from overloading the D/G's. The D/G's and their associated power distribution equipment are used in an accident mitigation role and are not evaluated as initiators of any of the accidents described in Chapter 15 of the USAR. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
II. No. The divisional D/G functions vill remain unchanged. The same is true for the associated safety related power distribution system and '
Class 1E equipment. The emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) systems / functions remain as explained in USAR Section 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling Systems. This USAR update vill not increase the probability of a loss of a D/G. Therefore, no new or different types of accidents or malfunctions are created by this USAR revision.
III. No. The operability of each divisional D/G remains unchanged.
Sufficient onsite power is available to supply the safety-related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the unit as well as the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the unit.
Therefore, no margin of safety is reduced.
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1 SE No.: 94-014 Source Document: USAR CR 94-003 ,
Description of Change This USAR change updates License Commitment (LC) #14, Instrument Setpoint Methodology. The change accounts for all of the NRC and PNPP activities that occurred during 1993, specifically the NRC's approval of the methodology and Perry's submittal of a previously committed report. This change is administrative in nature and only updates USAR Appendix 1B LC #14. It makes no other changes to the USAR or to the plant.
Summary I. No. This change is administrative. It updates Appendix 1B LC #14 to close the commitment regarding the submittal of an Instrument Setpoint Methodology Report. This report was submitted to the NRC October 17, 1993. Listing a report submittal does not impact the design / function / operation of the plant. USAR accident and transient analysis cannot be affected. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment is not increased.
II. No. This change updates the USAR to include the submittal of a report.
The change does not evaluate nor incorporate the contents of the report. Hence, this change cannot impact the design / operation of the plant. Accident analysis is not affected. Therefore, the creation of a new accident or malfunction of equipment is not possible.
III. No. This change updates the USAR to include the submittal of a report.
The change does not evaluate nor incorpoate the contents of the report. Submittal of the aforementioned report satisfies a previously made NRC commitment. The plant design is not impacted and is still being operated in a conservative manner. Hence, no margin of safety is reduced.
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