ML20059H819

Proposed Tech Specs Re SLCRS & Abfs

ML20059H819
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	11/04/1993
From:	NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20059H815	List: B14669, Forwards Proposed Rev to TS Re SLCRS & Abfs,In Response to NRC Request During 931103 Meeting to Consolidate Submittals Made on 931027,29 & 1103 & to Provide Addl Info Requested in Subj Meeting ML20059H819
References
NUDOCS 9311100229
Download: ML20059H819 (56)

Text

'.

.~. i Docket No. 50-423 B14669 1

i

-t Attachment 1 Millstone Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Retyped Pages h

November 1993 9311100229 931104 PDR P  !

P ADOCK 05900423 F PDR lL

n,

', 'I Proposed Changes to the Millstone Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications Technical Specification Section Paaes and Amendment Number Index page i 1, Amendment 84 '

Index page viii viii, Amendment 59 Index page ix ix, Amendment 63 Definition 1.12 1-3 Amendment 84 3.6.1.2 3/4 6-2, Amendment 59 -

Table 3.6-1 3/4 6-4, Amendment 59_ 1 3.6.6.1 3/4 6-38, 39, 40, Amendment 53 3.6.5.2 3/4 6-41, January 1986 3.6.6.3 3/4 6-42, January 1986 ,

4.7.7.g 3/4 7-17, January 1986 3.7.9- 3/4 7-20, 21 Amendment 2 Bases 3/4.6.6 B 3/4 6-4,5,6,7,8, January 1986 '

Bases 3/4.7,9 B 3/4 7-5, 7-Sa January 1986 i

v d -

INDEX -l .

.i

. DEFINITIONS-1 a

i SECTION~ MQ1  ;

L

- 1.0 DEFINITIONS- ,f 1.1 -ACTION . ... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. 'l-1 1.2 ACTUATION LOGIC TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. . . . . . . 1-1  ;

1.3 ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 1 4

1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 ';

1.5 CRANNEL; CALIBRATION ............-.......... .

1-11 j 1.6 CHANNEL CHECK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1  !

- 1.7 CONTAINMENT. INTEGRITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 j  !

. l.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE ....................... 1-2 1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS ........................ I'- 2 '!

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ' j 1.11 E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1.12 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ................. 1-3 b 1.13 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME . . . . . . . . . . . .- 1-3  !

-1.14 DELETED 1.15 FREQUENCY NOTATION ........................ 1-3 ';

1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . 1-3  :

1.17 MASTER RELAY TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . .- 1-3 A

- 1.18 MEMBER (S) 0F THE PUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-4

-r l

1.19 OPERABLE .0PERABILITY ...................... 1-4'  ;

1.20 OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 y

1.21 PHYSICS TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .-.1-4 1 1.22 PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 1-4 j 1.23 PURGE - PURGING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 i 1.24 -QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .- 1-51  !

1.25 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT-SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-5 ,

t 1.26 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT MONITORING AND OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONAL MANUAL (REM 0DCM) ................. 1-5 ~l 1.27 RATED THERMAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 j 1.28 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 =i l

1.29 REPORTABLE EVENT ......................... 1 1 t

1.30 SHUTDOWN MARGIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 j

.l.31 SITE BOUNDARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5;  !

l MILLSTONE -' UNIT 3 i Amendment No. pf, '

i

- ons

. . j u

INDEX  :

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- 1 zi SECTION' g

. FIGURE 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT 1131 REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC .

ACTIVITY. LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER-WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC' ACTIVITY

• 1*Ci/ gram-DOSE EQUIVALENT.I131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4 TABLE 4.4-4 REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS

. PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-31 j 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS j Reactor Coolant System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 4-33 l FIGURE 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS -

APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4 j FIGURE 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C00LDOWN LIMITATIONS -  :

APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-35 j TABLE 4.4-5 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM - . ,

WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-36  !

Pressuri zer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-37 Overpressure Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'3/4 4-38. .

)

FIGURE 3.4-4a NOMINAL MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PORV SETPOINT FOR'THE COLD.  !

3/4 4-40  ;

OVERPRESSURE SYSTEM'(FOUR LOOP OPERATION) . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 3.4-4b NOMINAL MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PORY SETPOINT FOR THE COLD .  :

OVERPRESSURE SYSTEM'(THREE LOOP OPERATION) . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-414 .l 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-42. j 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 3/4 4-43  ;

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 5-l' ,l 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,,, GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350 . . .'3/4 5-3 -l 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T.,, LESS THAN 350 . . . . . . . . . . 3/4l5-7' 'll 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 5-9'-

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS. i 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT j Containment Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4.6-1 j Containment Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 6-21 .]

TABLE 3.6-1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS . 3/4 6 Containment Air Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4.6-5 Containment Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 viii Amendment No. JJ,1 otes i y y 7 ., , . . . <

INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION EAGE Air Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-9 Containment Structural Integrity . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-10 Containment Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-11 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Quench Spray System . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-12 Recirculation Spray System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-13 Spray Additive System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-14 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-15 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-35 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-36 3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM Steam Jet Air Ejector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-37 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System . . 3/4 6-38 Secondary Containment Boundary .......... . 3/4 6-41 Secondary Containment Boundary Structural Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-42 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH IN0PERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-2 TABLE 3.7-2 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES THREE LOOP OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-2 t

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 ix Amendment No. JJ, JJ M43

1 I

DEFINITIONS SLCONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ,

1.12 The SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY is comprised of the containment -

enclosure building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building

[ partially], engineering safety features building [ partially], hydrogen recombiner building [ partially], and auxiliary building). The SECONDARY CONTAINMENT B0UNDARY shall exist when-

a. Each door in each access opening is closed except when the access ,

opening is being used for normal trasit entry and exit,

b. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g.,

welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE. ,

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME 1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF Actuation Setpoint t at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its ,

safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

1.14 Deleted FRE0VENCY NOTAT1QN 1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.1 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted  !

to a sump or collecting tank, or  !

b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE, or

c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the Secondary Coolant System.  !

i MASTER RELAY TEST 1.17 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall  :

include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 1-3 Amendment No. # ,

0189 i

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to: i

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L.,

0.3% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P ,

53.27 psia (38.57 psig);

b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P,;

and

c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L, for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY bypass leakage paths when pressurized to P,.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L,, or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L , or the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L., restore the overall incted leakage rate to less than 0.75 L , the combined leakage rate for all oenetrat6.u 4ubject  ;

to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L., and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.042 L, prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following i test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 (Mass Point Method): ,

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 10 month intervals during shutdown at a ,

pressure not less than P , 53.27 psia (38.57 psig) during each i 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice i inspection;

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L , the test schedule  !

for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the  !

Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L , j 4 Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two j consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;  !

4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. JJ 0081

2.

TABLE 3.6-1

~

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS  ;

r PENETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION -l 14 N, to Safety Injection Tanks Ground Release i

r 15 Primary Water to Pressurizer Ground Release .;

Relief Tanks

-l 35' Vacuum Pump Suction Plant Vent j 36 Vacuum Pump Suction P1 ant Vent' .

37 Air Ejector Suction Plant Vent .l l

38 Chilled Water Supply Plant Vent j 45 Chilled Water Return Plant Vent

'f 52 Service Air Turbine-Building. Roof-Exhaust- ]

54 Instrument Air Turbine Building Roof Exhaust '!

56 Fire Protection Ground Release  :

59 Fuel Pool Purification Ground Release f

^

60 Fuel Pool Pr,rification Ground Release l  :

70 Demineralized Water Ground Release -

i 72 Chilled Water Supply Plant Vent 85 Containment Purge Ground Release .j

~

86 Containment Purge Plant' Vent- l 116 Chilled Water Return Plant Vent i 124- Nitrogen to Containment Plant Vent i q

]

.I R

'I MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 57,_

0186 '

f a

.. ,)

'f;

'~

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 Two independent Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Systems shall be OPERABLE with each system comprised of:

a. one OPERABLE filter and fan, and

b. one OPERASLE Auxiliary Building Filter System as defined in Specification 3.7.9.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

KTJgi:

T With one Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.1 Each Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days aa a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, fl .. . .. rough the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating.

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance i on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-cating with the system by:

1) Verifying that the system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than

, 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Posi-tions C.5.a. C.5.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,* and the system flow rate is 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm; MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-38 Amendment No. 7, JJ 0168

1

~

. 1

,- u j CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

I

2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal,- that a laboratory.  !

analysis of a representative. carbon sample obtained in accord- l ance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, <

Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing criteria - :i of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi- 4 sion 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less 1 than 0.175%;_and j

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm during-  ;

system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. ,

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying,  :

within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre- l sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory l Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* i meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less- than 0.175%: l

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA i filters-and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.25 inches .

Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of i 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm, }

2) Verifying that the system starts on al Safety injection test  !

signal, 1 e

3) Verifying that each system produces a negative pressure 'of l greater than or equal to 0.4 inch Water Gauge in the Auxiliary  :

Building at 24'6" elevation within 120 seconds after a start  !

signal, and  :

4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. ,

r i

-i i

I

• ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in  :

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.  :

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-39 Amendment No. 1, N I esse 1

'e CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm; and

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for an acceptable test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-40 Amendment No. 7. J/

0158

l-

~.

CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS l SECONDARY CONTAINNENT BOUNDARY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION L

3.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES I, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT 300NDARY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within'the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-41 0182

t CONTAINMENT SYSTENS SECONDARY CONTAINNENT BOUNDARY STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LINITING CONDITION'FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.6.3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES I, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. .

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT 4.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.I.2) by a visual inspection of the exposed accessibic interior and exterior surfaces of the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY and verifying no apparent -l changes in appearance of the concrete surfaces or other abnormal degradation. Any abnormal degradation of the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY detected during the above - t required inspections shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant ,

to Specification 6.9.2 within 15 days.

r NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-42 0182

,. .g i' ',

'4 s PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA fil'ter bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration  ;

and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less:than 0.05% in-  ;

accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP.. test aerosol while operating.

i the system at a flow rate of 1120 cfm i20%; and

g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place _ ,

penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less l than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for an acceptable _ test  !

gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 1120.cfm i20%.

b a

.i 1

i I

l

)

~

• NSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory

~

Guide I.52, Revision 2, March 1978. l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 7-17 0100 s

'l

-o PLANT SYSTEMS

!. 3/4.7.9 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.9 Two independent Auxiliary Building Filter Systems shall be OPERABLE with each system comprised of:

a. one OPERABLE filter and fan, and

b. one OPERATIONAL Charging Pump / Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pump Ventilation System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Auxiliary Building Filter System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. In addition, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.6.6.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.9 Each Auxiliary Building Filter System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying a system flow rate of 30,000 cfm 10% and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;  !

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, t or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any i ventilation zone communicating with the system by:  !

1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.5.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* and the system flow  ;

rate is 30,000 cfm 10%; l

2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory ,

analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in -!

accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory  ;

Guide 1.52, . Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 7-20 Amendment No. 7 0161

~

~

{

• .. q PLANT SYSTEMS j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS testing _ criteria .of Regulatory Position C.6.a -of' d

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,- March 1978,* for a  !

methyl iodide penetration of less than,0.175%;' and -

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 30,000- cfm- 10% during .

system operation when tested in accordance .with ANSI i N510-1980. 1 I

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of. charcoal adsorber operation, by ~ -!

verifying, within 31 days after . removal, . that a laboratory. j analysis of a representative carbon sample _ obtained in '

accordance' with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide .j 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing j criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, ,

Revision 2, March 1978*, for a methyl iodide _ penetration of ' j less than 0.175%; j

q

d. At least once per 18 months by:  :

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA i filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.8 j inches Water Gauge while- operating the system at a flow' i rate of 30,000 cfm 10%, ;j i

.2) Verifying that the system starts on a Safety Injection  ;

test signal, and -

~

3) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 180 18 kW when - . ,

tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

e. After each complete or partial . replacement-. of a-_'HEPA filter .

bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the  !

in-place penetration and bypass leakage: testing -acceptance -l criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with. ANSI N510-1980 i for a D0P test aerosol while operating the system: at a 1 flow rate of 30,000 cfm 10%; and  !

i

f. After each complete or partial ' replacement .'of ~ a charcoal j adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies- -l the in-place penetration and. bypass leakage._ testing acceptance' l criteria of less than 0.05% 'in accordance with. ANSI N510-1980' ei for an acceptable test gas while operating the. system at a flow-- a rate of 30,000 cfm 10%. l l

-l

• ANSI N510-180 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in.

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978. i i

-MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 7-21 Amendment No. 7- 1 om _

a

~ - .= . . ~ . , , . , . . . , . . . _ . , ,, , ,,

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM Backcround The OPERABILITY of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) ensures that radioactive materials that leak from the primary contain-ment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered out and adsorbed prior to any release to the environment. The design of the SLCRS is to achieve a negative pressure within the secondary containment boundary within 120 seconds of a DBA.

In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas within the secondary containment boundary under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location (i.e., 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building) is 0.4 inches water gauge.

The secondary containment boundary is comprised of the containment enclosure building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building (partially),

engineered safety features building (partially), hydrogen recombiner building i (partially) and auxiliary building). To accomplish this, the SLCRS works in conjunction with the Auxiliary Building Filter (ABF) system (see Sec-tion 3/4.7.9). The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration units are located in i the auxiliary building. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

Applicable Safety Ana1Yses The SLCRS design basis is established by the consequences of.the limiting DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis assumes that only one train of the SLCRS and one train of the auxiliary building filter system is functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction of the airborr.e radioactive material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the containment is determined for a LOCA.

The SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS starts on a SIS signal. The modeled SLCRS actuation in the safety analysis (the Millstone 3 FSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.6) is based upon a worst-case response. time i following an SI initiated at the limiting setpoint. One train of the SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system is capable of drawing a negative pressure (0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation) within 120 seconds after a LOCA. This time includes diesel generator startup and sequencing time, system startup time, and time for the system to attain the required negative pressure after starting.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-4 0157

)

CONTA?NMENT SYSTEMS BASES

}/.i d,5 1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK CDLLE(JJQH.A@ELMSIESJfd (Continued) .

LCD In the event of a DBA, one SLCRS is required to provide the minimum postulated iodine removal assumed in the safety analysis. Two trains of the SLCRS must be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train will operate, assuming that the other train is disabled by a single-active failure. The SLCRS works in conjunction with the ABF system. Inoperability of one train of  :

the ABF system also results in inoperability of the corresponding train of the SLCRS. Therefore, whenever LCO 3.7.9 is entered due to the ABF train A (B)  ;

being inoperable, LC0 3.6.6.1 must be entered due to the SLCRS train A (B) being inoperable.

Applicability In MODES I, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could lead to a fission product release i to containment that leaks to the secondary containment boundary. The large break LOCA, on which this system's design is based, is a full-power event.

Less severe LOCAs and leakage still require the system to be OPERABLE through-out these MODES. The probability and severity of a LOCA decrease as core power and reactor coolant system pressure decrease. With the reactor shut down, the probability of release of radioactivity resulting from such an accident is low.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Under these conditions, the SLCRS is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS With one SLCRS train inoperable, the inoperable train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The operable train is capable of providing 100 percent of the iodine removal needs for a DBA. The 7-day Completion Time ,

is based on consideration of such factors as the reliability of the OPERABLE redundant SLCRS train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The Completion Time is adequate to make most repairs. If the SLCRS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To acFieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and ,

MODE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are '

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without  ;

challenging plant systems.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-5 0157 i

f N CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l BASES ,

t-  :

3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued) l Surveillance Reauirements I

Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10 N continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of

• moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan, motors and con-trol s.- This test is performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS once per 31-days.. i

b. c. e. and f i

These surveillances verify that the required SLCRS filter testing is j performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. ANSI l N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory.  !

Guide 1.52, Revision 2. The surveillances include testing HEPA filter i performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical  :

properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific  !

operations).

d 1

-The automatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train responds properly. i The 18-month frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under  !

the conditions that apply during a plant outage and'the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed with the reactor'at '

power. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a _ SIS test signal.  !

It also includes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation l systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition. ,

i

• The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates. j

• Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates. i

• Charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump area cooling subsystem aligns and discharges to the auxiliary building filters and a filter fan starts.

• Hydrogen recombiner ventilation system aligns to the.postaccident configuration. y

• The engineered safety- features building ventilation system aligns to the l postaccident configuration. .!

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-6  ;

ots7

i

'. I 1.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES i 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued)

With the SLCRS in postaccident configuration, the required negative pressure in the secondary containment boundary is achieved in 110 seconds from the time of simulated emergency diesel generator breaker closure. Time delays of dampers and logic delays must be accounted for in this surveillance. The time to achieve the required negative pressure is 120 seconds, with a loss-of-offsite power coincident with a SIS. The surveillance verifies that one train of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system will produce a negative pressure of 0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation relative to the outside atmosphere in the secondary containment boundary. For the purpose of this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made at the 24'6" ,

elevation in the auxiliary building. This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the '

large cross-section of the air passages which interconnect the various buildings within the boundary. In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the secondary containment boundary under most meteorological ,

conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location is 0.4 inches water gauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the down wind side of a building). For example, a very low outside temperature combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the upper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 2% of the time.

The probability of wind speed within the necessary moderate band, combined with the probability of extreme low temperature, combined with the small portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low probability of airborne radioactive material migrating to the upper levels ensure that the -

overall effect on the design basis dose calculations is insignificant.

3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to.those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System, and Auxiliary Building Filter System will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-7 0157 I

-i

?..

CONTAllglENT SYSTEMS BASES

~

3/4.6.6.3' SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 5 This limitation ensures that the strisetural integrity of the SECONDARY 'l CONTAINNENT BOUNDARY will be maintained comparable to the original' design

' standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to.

provide a secondary boundary surrounding the primary containment that:can be  !

maintained at a' negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual  ;

inspection.is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.  ;

,k l

I l

.i

)

i i

I l

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 0157 8 3/4 6-8

= , .

I i

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.9 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM (Continued) .

component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump ventilation system must be operational to ensure operability of the auxiliary building filter system and the supplementary leak collection and release system. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The opera-tion of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a proce-dural guide for surveillance testing. ,

3/4.7.10 SNVBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

For the purpose of declaring the affected system OPERABLE with the inoperable snubber (s), an engineering evaluation may be performed, in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. Snubbers of the same manufacturer but having different internal mechanisms are classified as different types. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at.the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of_10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber '

shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the '

expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g.,

temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-5 0159 i

'. r PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS (Continued) safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval 1

I l

k MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Sa 0159

m Docket-No. 50-423  :

I 10.65b1 Attachments 2 and 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Additional Information Related to the Amendment-Request dated October 27, 1993, Previously Supplied in a Submittal Dated October 29, 1993 November 1993 i

i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission '

B14669/Attat.hment 2/Page 1 November 4, 1993 Attachment 2 Responses to Recuest for Additional Information

1. NNEC0 has confirmed that our calculation starts with 50% of the core inventory of iodine in the containment air, and instead of assuming an .

instantaneous plate-out of 50% of that iodine, we assumed zero plate-out  !

at t-0 and assumed a plate-out removal factor of A - 0.176/hr for elemental iodine (see pages 13,14,14a of Enclosure 1 to this letter). ,

2. The mannsr in which we took credit for the spray is shown in the attached f pages from calculation #88-019-96RA (see pages 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 21 of Enclosure 1 to this letter).

3. The following paragraph is quoted from Attachment I to the NNECO letter dated December 6, 1990. ,

Pace 5 of Attachment 1. item 4 '

"4. Comoutation of Fission Product Removal Rate SRP 6.5.2 states in part that acceptable methods for computing fission product removal rates by the spray system are given in Subsection III.4.C of SRP 6.5.2, ' Fission Product Cleanup Models'.'

For Millstone Unit No. 3, calculation of the elemental iodine.

removal coefficient is based on the model presented in the ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979, 'PWR and BWR Containment Spray System Design Criteria,'

rather than that presented in Subsection 111.4.C of SRP 6.5.2. The model specified in the ANS standard considers the ef.fect of pH on the iodine removal coefficient. The model specified in the SRP does not consider this effect with the exception that.an upper limit is placed on the value for boric acid spray. For the spray droplet diameters and pH values applicable to Millstone Unit No. 3, the ANS  ;

standard is more conservative than the SRP."  ;

i l

l 1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 3/Page 1 November 4, 1993 Attachment 3 Comparison between the Hillstone Unit No. 3 FSAR Table 15.6-9 and NNECO's Submittal dated February 26. 1990 TABLE 15.6-9 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE LOCA February 26, 1990 '

ANALYSIS Submittal Expected Design Power level (MWt) 3,636(l) 3,636 Not specifically included.

Operating time (days) 650 650 Not specifically included.

Fraction of fuel defects 0.005 0.01 Not specifically included.

Core inventory Table 15.0-7 Table 15.0-7 Not specifically included.

Iodine composition Elemental (%) 95.5 95.5 95.5 (Page 14) '

Particulate (%) 4.0 4.0 2.5 (Page 14)

Organic (%) 0.5 0.5 2.0 (Page 14)

Fraction of core invntory released into reactor coolant Iodine 0.02 0.5 Not specifically included.

Noble gas 0.02 1.0 Not specifically included.

Fraction of reactor Not specifically included.

coolant inventory However, for iodine we '

available for release used 1.0 in our i from containment calculations. Therefore, Iodine 0.5 0.5 FSAR Table does not Noble gas 1.0 1.0 represent our assumptions  !

correctly.

Core inventory, available Not specifically included. t for release from However, for iodine we -

containment used 50 % in our Iodine (%) 1.0 25 calculations. Therefore, Noble gas (%) 2.0 100 FSAR Table 15.6-9 does not represent our assumptions correctly.

Containment free volume 2.3 x 10' 2.3 x 10' Not specifically included. l (fts)

~.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 3/Page 2 November 4, 1993 TABLE 15.6-9 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE LOCA February 26, 1990 ANALYSIS Submittal Containment leak rate (percent per day)  :

0-24 hr 0.65 0.65 Page 12 of the submittal.24-720 hr 0.325 0.325 Page 12 of the submittal. ;

Bypass leakage (fraction 0.04277 0.04277 Page 15 of the submittal.

of containment leakage)

Elemental iodine plate-out Page 16 of the submittal ,

rate 0.176/hr 0.176/hr says it is calculated in the model.

Containment spray assumptions:

~

• Volume of sprayed region - 1.20' x 10 8 ft 8

• Volume of unsprayed region - 1.114 x 10' ft *

• Iodine decontamination factor (DF) assumed Not included in our during quench spray operation - 200 submittal. However, our calculations allowed -

200, actual DF based on TACT 3 calculations using is.

• Iodine DF during recirculation spray Not included in our operation - 12 submittal. However,.our calculations assume as follows: Maximum allowed-12 reached in 1.5 hrs using is.

• Quench spray operation initiation time - 0

• Recirculation spray initiation time - 750 sec.

• Mixing rate between sprayed and unsprayed region - 2 turnovers /hr

• Iodine removal rates in spray region:

1 elm - 28.1/hr 1 part - 2.16/hr Duration of release from 720 720 Page 13 of the submittal.

containment (br)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 3/Page 3 November 4, 1993 TABLE 15.6-9 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE LOCA February 26, 1990 ANALYSIS Submittal Post-LOCA Equipment Leakage Leakage initiation and (2) 220 see to Not specifically included cessation times 720 hr in the submittal. ,

Maximum operational leak (2) 5,000(4) Not specifically included rate (cc/hr) in the submittal.

Fraction of core iodine (2) 0.50 Not specifically included inventory in sump water in the submittal.

Sump water temperature (2) 256-<212 Not specifically included

(*F) in the submittal.

Iodine released to (2) 10(3) Not specifically included building atmosphere from in the submittal.

recirculation leakage (%)

Filter efficiency Figure 4 of the submittal.

Elemental iodine (%) 95 95 Methyl iodine (%) 95 95 HEPA (%) 95 95 NOTES:

1. Includes instrument error of 2 percent

2. Not applicable.

3. Despite temperature variation, at no time is there a Not applicable.

greater than 10 percent of the water in the sump flashing steam.

4. To be conservative, the calculation assumed the ,

maximum post-LOCA equipment leakage was a factor of two times the max operational leakage to give a total leakage of 10,000 cc/hr.

L ENCLOSURE 1 t

EAB AND LPZ DOSES 1 FROM A UNIT 3 LOCA l t

F QA CATEGORY 1 88-019-96RA 21 Pages '

i F

Method of Review:  ;

Full Review Performed by Reviewer Preparer: l[19ffj JC Wheeler Reviewer: . . I ~~ Na cf73 D. W. Miller  !

Approved by: O.!BA [ f.3 o t p  !

r- R. A. Crandall j i

$$r tMlvi 77 -ci9-wk4 6 DI

_1.L ohyde To cd kk Lh Ldy n/14y.1 dcs,s f.s t% FA6.gacI LP2 L, ., L)f,4 Lou 4 NI(sbx 2.

1)Cma,IL%1w#s wl~/sh~ is n,c,ssry L., x>

.1 pysd & L.c,I spe.L,1,'.a i4,,, g, ,,e,A th kl/6m 2 awfud sf Npjs,.+ ,.nh/.4 9 7pe. lum T4 bdt &4 na:7 d 'xppia w odiwi,,d,ik ns%;Jefa1ed,w a sk%y%c o,% /kr .7l,s e iw://as H i~

auby ad.as1.(ed d M A1Lkk77

$$ Thd.0L[0R) co.pke ed uxs usal %Mb

% Ek1 Ad LTL dosss. % .u, 3.shas, y,.4

,y,nt .w % calmlntua: (su Fy.n I) i)c4w5at lyess /ukip n) od-,,,sr 4hJ L,p 60EsF/usp l 1A s cLuG. aJ:+ aII s.& & c,~s.,x

F -

n . .  ;

hJY l

}l[f .:

72r - of f-%RA l

~7 DI  !

1 5f/t43 5 . McliJN,ss e h h s { t a g s lao N t m o s . g y [t a w f 4 f- .

Idc~t 4,llwJ e  %. %'s A ftn bF is ased(ed.r). ]

,.n,~, - n . .

t $5 koO d sad  % WC S[44 5 .5 4 ret 6Y

~U o[LM n.w .n.,

bud, Acacoldts .ds a oos ,%t,bFn n(e84). Fo< f11 imr~n .

2 f

caddio ,4 umiud.a JP W. la all% us,J whsa bo w -l 9b as .a opa 6 a.TL & Jj std ,'. Wilk.us,J 6 db. ,s % hF 1 3

BF - (Ehs,.5kl Al.A ,u dd,%d)(Ne,d J .I-131)@6o l Lits,,.M Lyn .a a,&.um 4)(hs oc .r-m F6 f 1 T-t 3 i a cs .<.l Ls o m .Y 6 , /o y d e// / k (? ,o r cl. 7 s ) .

e4 %S % RACMCn to-J Sf44 e t c 4:1 in in s -4 e 2fd 5tc0 3  % 5 i

q u>[$ k4spr.

• OS f.u YlL [ m\ O T-h-v2 % 4-t 4 ae :sok v.cuc eJ .To c_T IEF =-p.k au a Erot/cJ l ,

l i

doo W09E8 ,dok

• 199 7, cf /e /+k5 Tb [o// As[Ysc l Els m ,J M % d 4 @ t = o  : Of M me.53 j 9udr M LG t 'Et =o : /o,61 'd T o M A s.sbl Icd.4 @ t = pro 2,c M32iI+0och '

J

~

flV lll9fff 75-DI4- 96 FA T .2i  :

htesd 8 I-G ( @ 7 so ss c. ' //.26 2 D F = (Y./or E 4 0-*:ullo.e s 'h + h.y 37 E+ E ho)(/I.R6 %)

DPG2rosic = 2. 69

%dm tk 1& b o , r e % . spy ,u w.,,.,.1) s I,,. 4 i kW lcu. ,# km b ,ad pu.n b re:w%os ep7 n.%d a .

Nu+ .2 6 Ma ,,3, t ak ta i % bece 12 encLJ

& . , -t u 4 ,s .. A C g o y <., a .f, h . h - 4 , c.,/cJefd to 6 4 /,s3 3 /,,.a, .TA crg empb a,~ Bro 9/ca, b 19,

@ , h>%#T M9 2, c 4 lenlh1. % &u.a' y As ldb:

%A %iJ ala @ e wo s e : i. v n s + E c - e. n Swd k .T-l31 G T = ?To stc U M k To%l b .,sh I i d .'m O /,93 4c f,99o96 C4,Q f.v.sst c% T-6I & i.m la,.: G.oy 1 BF- 6asse4 eds.ai) +(7 99 en &)LisovQ bF-1197 h A s , h I.rn L s, % t M A ss A A .sec.y ,o '

s,~,fsknAd,&t % L r~J. k ~,1% M 4 +,.sg A k.,p.7s o %~.h A twoLa4,4 J.(d.s).

ffiH ihM

??-on ct-96 Rn Dj 9

Ca,J.t L .~ ,,J.4 ce%% is sss.nd i& % .sy n b k > 4e,y % y 414, eak 8 >d4.w m,e Js&&3).

% p~ck qup %, Ntek w% 6Y.sua.I,(,Ps)

& & n , , ,,,d. A > t & .2 ,,s.,- . % :9 quyy L gaaa,cedem,4 .,ar,b naa, k%e % quyJ egalas ns.d A unspsp l .egak d,i). k w m.,,J -/s 6 d A ad d a %.nes a aA u-5p y ,1 m y g a k d a d h .

a m N ( a n .r e b ea.kma = c ey= s= . A Tak i s ~ ,ua.a % quy us+fb..as S. 64,-, A L ss 6bp f

4s 1%bp i.s aft,1 s. %+ LLp da m Q,9cs ,,sfA,Mac. J sn,c~dv7 6 6 8,8 L A a , e L m p, h sfI, A n. w . w - t i.s-s,aa, a. a % p, s n, .~. .

A o y c o b . v .I Y d Ngcc g g c g , c j , , g ,9 g g , y , g l

TArrx s-r A %@un 4t,a,19,nr9,w m) c4(aW1 % %lis ~ %k E-1% a l:A1w

t" a s - . a. ~..

L:

AN t. - . l' -

lll4l[f;

[ Spy A ssa,g6 a -oie-e u IP, Al' To k(t 1 Spu 3 Ass s b hw,~, % -

t bf duAb gt0

-n .

S og'hteibw cx0 y f .I S00.- E

'4\

b kkdMot 'Oh d4 0 4 ddN O'b '

. E%

i%4 gu3 ;A.c.aa : tm.,nM (ue v~ds)

L ea hpy Scde : 2ro 3 4 (4 d 4)n ,~..

Skf uzci Mit p_s'O _fyco yc/s . / a .

b)ff44,ongss0qug,e.,,ei f,,ah! ef;a -

~s: w & ia a-u (,M h bF & is enehd : ),sn k.as 6N 3 M1(a hau, ucyuf J a,ya p L.46J s% :

LRR7EdAfkr

9) Sp7 cu aey 512 (44 vj lo) Aga a 4 : Al6/hlt(g@4) 4 h .a.l: Jg,iAuG4J)

IAMe6 + = o.os)k (re y) 13hdc he,,u.1 : h,3,, , + )gws (d 3) = ,T,Aw/4g t

B

. 741 .2 h Jtt f/n/g7 B3pss Le  %@,~5 97-ciq-y(a 1 B R/ 1 74b,t M .i 8cs tukt o.o sel AsJo "

.s 5 D [u, ss Bct :q.odf)s cod.%,sT *L ,s,/4 7 (assaed b) j d).3$ 2 Tab 4.J ida /bs usn absil (ce s ,J 6) ]

3 f L k b e 69 *( A D 95,52 th ,,Ael,R.5% p .t k ,lr1 ,  ;

.?.a%c.ya:c.  ::

'/)Co.O.aandOakm:;l 3D E4 h' fjk 7)

/) 6Msh Ocg 2dts e(gM5) b-T bues: 3.y? F-Y w ,c g-24 %ss: / 755-y 4 ,e JN-Mb ha 'R.3a E-4 ~3 sc- .

t

& ){lQ Eh% :lsk 5) 5 416-Y.nl,3  ;

I) //Q LP2.:(zd5) : o-7 hods: l.99G-[.sso[,J A,f/ F-r .src 7

% - A Y &as <*

RM-98 kwe.s : l3 9 b-720 ko.dt3: E.6LE-6 9,63E-b .stex)/,3 l

c. 4 i o d ' s*O

't gag 24 4 Mi

• if b k<O8 M,f I -

h

/*

• N Sf] Me[ 4 w') % 7.c: bAr 0%

C A J-* u h h 3 Lic,3% Wn do. ydk<,)i, .+ *>Qt, SV!

e.1) tyg ItR +ord iidj w) by p.,, LAr Edo, : o.o'GT1 (-r4Lin-9,RJi)

\ id = = % b. .JW &

uy.% l 4

, . . . .. . ~. -

.. 4

$V 69)gg i I

((~C/9-96fk  :

. A I- .;

./V 74Nt 3 i p (t j ew wg 1 LP.rhbt FC.tTacxIt ,6,e m th '

/

tu' i f

TACT III -

FEC. 83 VERSION

• ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRAT 3CH CAPD ItiPUT l CASE HD. I I

TIME ItCEPEtCEtif ItiPUT-ffP-3 LOCA ANALYSIS 10.0278%/ DAY UNFILTERED 150% REDUCTION AT 24 HDURS. 00000100 .l 2 8 2 21 1 16 89 3.636E *03 0.9 5.000E-01 1.000E+00 1.000E*00 9.550E-01 2.000E-02 2.500E-02

?

TIME DEPENDEtti INPUT VALUES PE AD IN FOR X ARR AY j ISET IDATA INLM 1 2 0 0.9 2.083E-01 2 2 8 5.200E-01 4.800E-01 1.114E*06 3 2 9 1.206E+06 5 2 0 2.828E+01 0.0 7 2 0 2.160E+00 0.0 ,

10 3 1 S.0 0.0' 3.712E+04

-t le 3 2 0.0 3.712E+04 0.0 11 3 1 2.780E-02 0.0 0.0 -l 3 2 2.780E-02 0.0 0.0 l 11 6 0 5.420E-04 2.910E-05 3.470E-04 0.0 0.0 2.780E-02  ;

17 i

1 2 0 2.083E-01 1.000E+00 3 1 2 0 1.000E+00 1.533E+00 J

1 2 0 1.533E+00 2.000E*00 5 2 8 0.0 0.0 .j 1 2 8 2.000E*00 6.000E*00 2.930E-05 3.470E-04 0.0 0.0 - 2.780E-02 17 6 8 8.0 i

3 2 9 8.000E*00 2.400E+01 0 1.990E-05 1.750E-04 8.0 0.0 2.780E-02 17 6 4.0 3 2 8 2.400E*01 9.600E+0!

0.0 11 3 1 1.390E-02 0.0 I 11 3 2 1.390E-02 0.0 e.0 9 8.660E-D6 2.320E-04 0.0 0.8 1.390E-02 ,

17 6 0.8 .

f' 1 2 9 9.600E*01 7.200E+02 0 S.9 2.630E-06 2.320E-04 8.9 0.0 1.390E-02 l 17 6 i

i l

i

L

~a '

l I -

' 20em 8 o - N!RTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY '

~.

' sue M T SY DATE i i

CHED.eV DATE I CALC.NO. R E V. ')

i E

$HEET NO. OF _ -I Tdb3 '

i 4QCnsdL7st,B;gsLAoy ]

I e -

l TACY III

• FES. SS WERSION e ACCIDEwi ANALYSIS DRANCN CARD INPUT CASE No. 1 TENE IseEF.NDENT INPUT r

.I SIP-3 LOCA ANALYSIS TOTAL OYPA55 TC 2.5 MIN 850% 1,100% as stateele g 2 4 2 22 le 14 93 3.636E*e3 8.e 5.Seef-81 1.6eoE*00 1.setE*Se 9.550E-81 2.ooef-82 2.500E-82 i i

TIME BEPEsmENT INPUT 15ET 1 DATA laaet VALUE5 NEAD IN FOR R ARsAY g

's 1 2 0 0.0 4.167E-82 1 l

2 2 8 5.2eef-el 4.seet-el 3 2 e 1.286E*e6 1.114E*06 l 5 2 8 2.82SE

• e1 e.8 3 7 t 8 2.16eE**e o.e  :

le 3 1 e.e e.8 3.712E

• M '

le 3 2 s.e 3. 712E

• M e.e 11 3 1 3.setE-01 0.0 0.9 11 3 2 3.eeeE-el 8.8 e.e ,

17 o e 5.420E-M 2.91eE-85 3.47eE-M 0.8 s.e 2.76eE-02 1 2 e 4.167E- 82 1.eeeE*09  ;

11 3 1 1.20sE-e2 ee e.e -6 il 3 2 1.283E-e2 . e.8 8.o i

t 1 2 e 1. e.* * .. 1.Esuces-  ;

1 2 e 1.55 Meet 2.000E*00 5 2 e e.e e.e ,

?

1 2 e 2.000E*0s e.steE*se 17 6 e 0.o- 2.910E-05 3.47eE-M e.0 e.e 2.780E-82 .}

l 1 2 e 8.000E*De 2.400E*e1 r 17 6 e e.e 1.99eE-e5 1.75eE-M e.e s.e 2.7 set-o2 i 1 2 e 2.400E*01 9.60eE*01 .

t 11 3 1 6.416E - 93 e.e e.8 11 3 2 6.416E-e3 e.e 0.e '

~17 6 e 4.660E-06 2.32eE-M e.e e.e 1.390E-82 2.4etE*82 1 2 e 9.600E*e1 7.2eeE*42 <

17 6 e o.e . 2.6 Set-06 2.520E- M e.8 0.5 ' 1.59eE-02 i

-]

I

q ftJ 1l19lgfl 77-o+ 96aa 1 21 DI i I

EM ae G.L i) S a c%%% n Rn.04 v500 3Yo,0b.~.n,i~ ^

ba S4-d 7 h1% Pr N.2 G_ cod , Em Nils.e,cet. e,197f f) Tact _nt Absgh*'TewpctC,4 S h,S.,.,/dieoA713 ' '

M,,s J E40absh %4 S .u~ysy o P ., G .c h ei 6 6 ~.,, A ,

Sts %saI h vs.wn., Soc,sm et L,.,4,9, so ~~ Ats.4 7, ..wT,a(#Edy i% % 1 11 se& <y l i

2)Redeef Ol4em.,f hb , /t.4Lf 6-dioc>,[e l s ,

4)S+ta c,\cMw nan.09 a4) 3v10,ful<% A Rdubk .

%,A4,oA Pie akzJ.h %,.d 4,6A.A 5 th 4' M s. .u , r c L ss s & s ,, Q A. o k $ , & t a i, b ? T .

h At;Il.sp.m 3 F5A K J e+,.t 7 Ak /.y, A.,-jti 6)NEc 8th.&\ &'f,dtAyal C,as<Yus~ tk fu 6L.d.a css 7h#

J +

$ )< ss-zizd Loha% es,ho Q, L t 197y' .

i)% to c.debhoA ime.12. 4 L(S)- 2a7-9. , R Hone 548 n.oel So D9 L?z % s % s, LY 3 U>G4,5yf 8,b+12,. l f) Ec osck'h4 o cdvshoe CSB 64, Deb.s4 ?<el di S As 4.h1 P,b hDJ 66%-# ?/4,6o 2,SJ/itrl f) NRc_ .5binel Smeb , t. 07g,oJi<

g&a., 8, bloriceAccc42:

Io.se-of-dehd I

%, ya.a DP & hc.,y.o F-,7 nad 177/

So% ,fiha, Lpm,b Msdv

% y fic k,fm_ . b, soI,3 l y ,

i

Docket No. 50-423 B14669 Attachment 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Radiological Dose Calculation Assumptions November 1993 i

f

~.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 4/Page 1 i November 4, 1993 Attachment 4 Radiological Dose Calculation Assumptions }

The following tables provide detailed assumptions utilized for performance of

• the radiological consequence calculations of the Millstone Unit No. 3 design- i basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The assumptions are related to the_  !'

analyses performed for this Technical Specification change request.

The assumptions differ from the current FSAR analysis assumptions in the '

following regard.  ;

1. Containment leak rate has been reduced from L. - 0.65 wt.%/ day to 0.3 wt.%/ day. j NOTE - This also results in a reduction in bypass leakage from 0.0278 wt.%/ day to 0.012831 wt.%/ day.

2. An assumption of 2 minutes of total unfiltered containment leakage due to increased drawdown time of SLCRS/ABFS.

3. A reevaluation of effective time for spray removal from 1.53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> to  :

1.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> based on the need to terminate sprays once a DF of 12 from T-0 is achieved.

In addition to these changed assumptions, the attached Tables also provide additional detail for the asrumptions which are not entirely clear in the '

1 current FSAR, as evident based on recent conversations with the NRC Staff.

Table 1 presents all the assumptions associated with the iodine removal from containment atmosphere by the containment spray systems. Table 2 presents all  ;

of the other assumptions associated with the radiological calculations. t i

t i

6 h

l

)

i

~.

U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 4/Page 2 November 4, 1993 TABLE 1 Spray System Parameters

• A for quench spray - 28.1/hr for elemental iodine based on:

Containment temperature of 109'F (conservative for equal or higher temperatures)

Spray pH of 8.1 (minimum during injection)

• A for quench spray - 2.16/hr for particulate iodine

• A for wall plateout = 0.176/hr for elemental iodine

• Iodine composition (based on SRP 6.5.2 - Rev. 1):

2.0% organic 2.5% particulate 95.5% elemental

• Sprayed volume - 52% of total containment free volume (corresponds to quench spray only)

• Mixing rate - 2 unsprayed volume per hour

• Maximum DF for elemental iodine - 12 (corresponds to minimum dissolved iodine equilibrium for recirculation spray with pH 2 7)

• Time line for spray system operation t=0: assumed time for quench spray initiation (real time e s 68 sec) t=600 sec: sump pH - 7 (increasing)-  ;

t=750 sec: minimum time to recirculation spray initiation (quench sprays continue) t=3600 sec: calculated time for elemental iodine DF to reach 12 (sprays considered off for elemental iodine removal) t=113 min.: minimum duration of quench spray operation _ ,

(See Attachment 5 for more detailed information) l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14669/ Attachment 4/Page 3 November 4, 1993 TABLE 2 Radiological Dose Assumptions (See Table I for Spray Assumptions)

1. Power Level - 3636.0 Hwt (includes 2% instrument uncertainty)

2. Containment Leak Rate L. - 0.3 wt.%/ day for 0 - 24 hrs 0.15 wt.%/ day for 24 hrs - 30 days ,

3. Initial Core Activity of Iodine Available for release from containment

- 50%

4. Initial Core Activity of Noble Gases Available for release from  ;

containment - 100%

5. Iodine Chemical form: 95.5% elemental Based on SRP 6.5.2, Rev. I 2.5% particulate 2.0% organic

6. Offsite Breathing rates: (0 - 8) hrs - 3.47E-4 m 8'sec (8 - 24) hrs = 1.75E-4 m'/sec ,

(24 - 720) hrs - 2.32E-4 m*/sec 8

7. Site Boundary X/Q (sec/m ): Auxiliary Bldo. Vent. Containment Surface 4.3E-4 5.42E-4

8. Low Population Zone X/Q's (sec/m*):

Time Auxiliary Bldg. Containment Period Vent Surface (0-8) hrs 2.91E-5 2.91E-5 (8-24) hrs 1.99E-5 1.99E-5 (24-96) hrs 8.66E-6 8.66E-6 (96-720) hrs 2.63E-6 2.63E-6 ,

9. Bypass Leakage fractions - 0.04277 x Containment Leak Rate therefore .01283 wt.%/ day 0-24 hrs and .006416 wt.%/ day 24 hrs-30 days

10. Containment Volume - 2.32E+6 ft*

11. Time for Enclosure Building To Achieve Design Negative Pressure -

2.0 minutes - There are 2 minutes of total unfiltered leakage assumed.

12. Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building Filter Efficiencies - 95%  !

(all forms of iodine)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

B14669/ Attachment 4/Page 4 November 4, 1993

. TABLE 2 ,

Radiological Dose Assumptions (cont.)

i

13. Release point to environment for filtered releases - assumed to be Auxiliary Building Vent since higher X/Q than SLCRS which discharges to '

elevated stack. ,

ESF Leak Assumptions i

r

1. 50% of core iodine inventory in the containment sump water

2. Sump volume at: 220 sec - I hr: 80,000 gallons  !

I hr - 2 hr: 700,000 gallons 72 hrs: 1,000,000 gallons t

3. ESF Leakage (Twice the Maximum Operational Leak Rate Limit) =

1.0E+4 cc/hr

4. Iodine Partition Factor = 0.1

5. ESF Leakage Begins at 220 sec.

6. Release Point to Environment - Auxiliary Building Vent -

l

-J I

i i

I l

I 4

J Docket No. 50-423' B14669 I

. l!

Attachment 5 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3.

Proposed Revision to Technical' Specifications RWST Drawdown vs. Time P

i P

November 1993

l:a )n

^

+

' * ?.' E

'RWST Drawdown va; T4==

l DBA LOCA The following-discussion' describes the response of the Quench Spray _ System (OSS) and Containment Recirculation System (RSS) j following a DBA Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA). Two cases- .;

will be. presented; the first assuming maximum safeguards flow- l is available, the second with minimum. safeguards available.  ;

It should be noted that the values used'in'this discussion.

are taken.from the text of the FSAR.

i Maximum Safecuards , Li This discussion will describe the operation of'theLQSS and j RSS systems following a DBA LOCA assuming both trains iof f safeguards equipment are available. In the-interest of- [

simplicity and clarity, this discussion will assume the-QSS t and ECCS pumps start simultaneously when the diesel generator >

output breaker closes. j i

At time t = 0, the'following pumps start and take a suction a from the RWST:  !

Nominal. i Flowrates 2 Charging Pumps at 410 gpm per pump 820 gpm 2 SIH pumps at 445 gpm per pump 890 gpm j 2 RHR pumps at 4850 gpm per pump 9,700 gpm. Ei 2 QSS pumps at 3000 gpm per pump- 6-000 gpm.

j 17,410 gpm- 'l total flow from the RWST~ j (Ref: FSAR Sec. 6.3.2. 8, page 6.3-16a)

The charging, safety injection, and FWR pumps draw from the l RWST and inject to the RCS while the Quench Spray pumps draw from the RWST and spray to the Containment atmosphere.

I At t = 11 minutes, the Containment Recirculation Pumps (RSS) .

are automatically started. These pumps. draw 3950 gpm each (15,800 gpm total) from the Containment sump and spray i~

directly to the Containment atmosphere. At no time do these pumps draw from the RWST. (Ref: FSAR page 6.2-48) [

At t = approximately 35 minutes, the RWST has been' drawn down to.the low-low' level setpoint (605,000 gallons have been

_ pumped out, leaving 561,000 gallons in the RWST),fand the. ~!

control room operators commence switchover_to cold leg- ll recirculation. During switchover to cold ~1eg recirculation, 86,800 gallons are pumped out of.the RWST in the 10 minutes-it is' assumed to take_to-accomplish the switchover. This-conservatively assumes one RHR pump fails to_ automatically-~

trip when the trip setpoint of 520,000 gallons is reached.

(Ref: FSAR Sec. 6.3.2.8, pages 6.3-16a to 6.3-16b). During l

I t

.I

a

'- i 1

'. R d

switchover, 1 RSS pump per train is aligned to provide i: suction to the charging and SI pump on its associated train, l while the other RSS pump on each train continues to spray to ,

L the _Conta; nment atmosphere at 3950 gpm (7900 gpm total) . ]

-i At t = approximately 45 minutes, switchover to' cold leg >

recirculation is complete. Approximately 474,200 gallons of-water remain in the RWST. The QSS pumps continue to draw from the RWST at 3000 gpm per pump (6000 gpm. total). Total l containment spray flow at this point is 13,900 gpm (6000 gpm from QSS plus 7900 gpm from RSS) .

At t = approximately 113 minutes, the RWST reaches the low-low-low level setpoint of 68,000 gallons, which trips the two operating QSS pumps off. One RSS pump per train continues to 1 spray to the Containment atmosphere for a total spray flow of 7900 gpm, until the pumps are turned off, ,

Minimum Safeauards '

This discussion will describe the operation of the QSS and -

RSS systems following a DBA LOCA assuming only one train of safeguards equipment is available. Again, in the interest of l simplicity and clarity, this discussion will assume the QSS and ECCS pumps start simultaneously when the diesel generator output breaker closes.

At time t = 0, the following pumps start and take'a suction ]

from the RWST:

Nominal Flowrates 1 Charging Pump at 410 gpm 410 gpm 1 SIH pump at 445 gpm 445 gpm 1 RER pump at 4850 gpm 4,850 gpm ,

1 QSS-pump at 3000 gpm 3.000 gpm 8,705 gpm total flow from the RWST The charging, safety injection, and RHR pumps draw from the l RWST and inject to the RCS while the Quench Spray pump draws from the RWST and sprays to the Containment atmosphere.

At t = 11 minutes, one train of Containment Recirculation Pumps (RSS) is automatically started. These pumps draw 3950 gpm each (7900 gpm total) from the Containment sump and spray directly to the Containment atmosphere. At no time.do these pumps draw from the RWST.

At t = approximately 70 minutes, the RWST has been drawn down 4 to the low-low level setpoint (605,000 gallons have-been  !

pumped out, leaving 561,000 gallons in the RWST), and the control room operators commence switchover to cold leg .;

recirculation. During switchover to cold leg recirculation, 2 ,

1 l- R l

s

.: j l

43,400 gallons are pumped _out of the RWST'in the 10 minutes [

it is assumed to take to accomplish the switchover.s This j conservatively assumes the RHR pump-fails to. automatically J trip when the trip setpoint of 520,000 gallons-is reached.  !

(For the purposes of this discussion, it-is assumed that it j still takes 10 minutes to align the one train of ECCS to cold j leg recirculation;-however, the loss from the RWST during  :

this time is only half due to the lossLof one train.) During l switchover, I RSS pump is aligned-to provide' suction to the  !

t charging and SI pump on its associated train, while the.other.

RSS pump continues to spray to the Containment atmosphere at:

3950 gpm.

i At t = approximately 80 minutes, switchover to cold leg .

recirculation is complete. Approximately 517,600 gallons of- i water remain in the RWST. The operating train of_QSS '!

continues to draw from the RWST at 3000 gpm. Total Containnment spray flow at this point is 6,950 gpm. _j 1

At t = approximately 230 minutes, the RWST reaches the low- y; low-low level setpoint of 68,000 gallons, which tripsfthe _-

operating QSS pump off. One RSS pump continues to spray _to- M the Containment atmosphere at a flow of :3950 -gpm until the ,

pump is turned off. .;

1 p

l

.j 6

b l

]

i

?

1 i

3 i 5

4 i

)

l 4 &

MAXIMUM SAFEGUARDS RWST Vol. = ' RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. =

1,166,000 gal. 974,490 gal. 561,000 gal. 474,200 gal. 68,000 gal.

(+17,760 gal. NaOll)

T=0 T=ll minutes T=35 minutes T=45 minutes T=113 minutes

(+1-1/2 min. to fill sys.)

DBA LOCA (CDA signal at 23.5 psia) 2 CHS Pps.@ 820 gpm Switchover to Coldleg Switchover Completc QSS Pps. Auto trip.

2 SIH Pps.@ 890 gpm Recirculation 2 RilR Pps. @ 9700 gpm 2 QSS Pps.@ 6000 gpm QSS continues to draw from RWST @ 6000 gpm 17,410 gpm 4 RSS Pps. @ 15,800 gpm 2 RSS Pps. to Containment Spray RSS continues to entmt.

2 RSS Pps. to Recirculation spray and recire.

To containment spray from To containment spray and recire.

containment sump -Int from from sump - aqi from RWST.

- RWST

L RWST LEVEL VERSUS TIME, LARGE BREAK LOCA, TWO TRAINS IN OPERATION - MAXIMUM SAFEGUARDS RWST TANK PUMPS IN OPERATION Volume OUTFLOW DRAWING FROM THE TLME Gallons DESCRIPTION RATE GPM RWST 1,207,000 MAXIMUM FILL 0GPM N/A LEVEL 1,171,000 LOW LEVEL 0GPM N/A MAKEUP ALARM T=0 1,166,000 TECHNICAL 17,410 2 Quench Spray Pumps @

SEC SPECIFICATION GPM 6000 GPM LIMIT 2 Charging Pumps @ 820 GPM 2 High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps @ 890 GPM 2 ResM ial Heat Removal Pun 9700 GPM T= 11 974,490 CONTAINMENT 17,410 SA' .wABOVE Minutes RECIRCULATION GPM in aution,4 Containment PUMPS START Recirculation Pumpsline up to (THEY DONOT the Containment Spray from the DRAWFROM Containment Sump.

RWST)

T= 35 561,000 INITIATION OF 86,800 2 Quench Spray Pumps Minutes SWITCH OVER Gallons over continue to draw from the TO COLD LEG the 10 RWST@ 6000 GPM and 1 RECIRCULATION minutes. Residual Heat Removal Pump fails to trip - draws at 4,850 GPM.

2 Containment Recirculation Pumps switch from spray to supply (2) High Pressure Safety Injection and(2)

Charging Pumps.

T= 45 474,200 SWITCH OVER 6000 GPM 2 Quench Spray Pumps @ .

Minutes TO COLD LEG 6000 GPM RECIRCULATION COMPLETE T=ll3 68,000 QUENCH SPRAY OGPM NONE - 2 Containment Minutes PUMPS AUTO Recirculation Pumps continue STOP to supply (2) High Pressure Safety Injection and (2)

Charging Pumps. 2 Containment Recirculation Pumps supply sprays.

y

.ep.-

MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS RWST Vol = RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. = RWST Vol. =

1,166,000 gal 1,070,245 gal. 561,000 gal. 517,600 gal. 68,000 gal.

(+17,760 gal. NaOli)

T=0 T=11 minutes T=70 minutes T=80 minutes T=230 minutes

(+l-1/2 min, to fill sys.)

DBA LOCA

' (CDA signal at 23.5 psia) 1 CilS Pps. @ 410 gpm Switchover to Cold Leg Switchover Completc QSS Pps. Auto trip 1 Sill Pps.@ 445 gpm Recirculation 1 RIIR Pps. @ 4850 gpm I QSS Pps.@ 3000 gpm QSS continues to draw from

. RWST @ 3000 gpm 8705 gpm 2 RSS Pps. @ 7,900 gpm 1 RSS Pps, to Containment Spray RSS continues to entmt.

1 RSS Pps, to Recirculation spray and recist. .

To containment spray from . To containment spray and recire.

containment sump - noi from - from sump-Dalfrom RWST RWST

_.___-___-___2._.. - . . - - _ - .- . - . . _. = . . . . .- -. . . - . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . = . . . . . - . _ , _ . . . ~

w

~.

RWST LEVEL VERSUS TIME, LARGE BREAK LOCA, ONE TRAIN IN OPERATION - MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS RWST TANK PUMPS IN OPERATION Volume OUTFIDW DRAWING FROM THE TIME - Gallons DESCRIPTION RATE GPM RWST 1,207,000 MAXIMUM FILL 0GPM N/A LEVEL 1,171,000 LOW LEVEL 0GPM N/A MAKEUP ALARM T=0 1,166,000 TECHNICAL 8,705 GPM 1 Quench Spray Pump @ 3000 SEC SPECIFICATION GPM LIMIT 1 Charging Pump @ 410 GPM 1 High Pressum Safety -

Injection Pump @ 445 GPM 1 Residual Heat Removal Pump

@ 4850 GPM T= 11 1,070,245 CONTAINMENT 8,705 GPM SAME AS ABOVE Minutes RECIRCULATION in addition,2 Containment PUMP START Recirculation Pumps line up to (THEY DO NOT the Containment Spray from the DRAW FROM Containment Sump.

RWST)

T= 70 561,000 INITIATION OF 43,400 1 Quench Spray Pump continue Minutes SWITCH OVER Gallons over to draw from the RWST@

TO COLD LEG the 10 3000 GPM and 1 ResidualHeat RECIRCULATION minutes. Removal Pump fails to trip -

draws at 4,850 GPM.

1 Containment Recirculation--

Pump switches from spray to supply (1) High Pressure-Safety Injection and (1)

Charging Pump.

T=60 517,600 SWITCH OVER 3000 GPM I Quench Spray Pump @ 3000 Minutes TO COLD LEG GPM RECIRCULATION COMPLITE T= 230 68,000 QUENCH SPRAY 0GPM NONE - 1 Containment Minutes PUMP AUTO Recirculation Pump continues STOP to supply (1) High Pressure Safety Injection and (1)

Charging Pumps.1 Containment Recirculation Pump supplies spmy.

P 4 :: ,

Docket No. 50-423 814669 Attachment 6 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Auxiliary Building Filtration Units -

Residence Time l'

November-1993 v

(

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l B14669/ Attachment 6/Page 1 November 4, 1993 Attachment 6 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTRATION UNITS - RESIDENCE TIME The Millstone Unit No. 3 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System exhaust  ;

filtration units are designed for a filtration airflow capacity of 30,000 CFM per unit. (Reference Nos. I and 2). .

At a 30,000 CFM airflow rate, a 0.43 second residence time would result for air flowing through the 4 inch deep activated carbon adsorber bed of the Auxiliary Building Filter Banks. (Reference No. 3.) Section C.3.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2 indicates an ESF adsorber system should be designed for an average atmosphere residence time of 0.25 seconds per two -

inches of adsorbent bed when an impregnated activated carbon medium is utilized. Millstone Unit No. 3 utilizes this type of adsorbent medium.

During seasons of temperate ambient conditions, the Millstone Unit No. 3 Charging and Component Cooling Pump Supply / Exhaust Ventilation System operates  ;

in a once through alignment (" Summer" mode). -This Ventilation System is '

manually reconfigured to a partial-recirculation alignment (" Winter" mode) during periods of- cold ambient conditions. Flow testing has identified maximum Auxiliary Building Filter Bank flowrates of 27,500 CFM for the

" Summer" mode alignment and 19,700 CFM for the " Winter" mode alignment. The associated adsorber bed residence time will increase to approximately 0.65 seconds (30,000/19,700 x 0.43) for the " Winter" alignment and approximately 0.47 seconds (30,000/27,500 x 0.43) for the " Summer" alignment. >

Increase of residence time will equate to an increase of filter efficiency.

REFERENCES:

1. MP3 FSAR Section 9.4.3

2. SWEC Specification No. 2170.430-065 entitled "Special Filter Assemblies"

3. MP3 FSAR Table 1.8-1 i

l

Fl .

I Docket No. 50-423 B14669 Attachment 7 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Simplified ABFS/SLCRS Drawings November 1993

m :--- - - -

"J . . .

'~

UNIT I ELEVATED RELEASE { ..' ,

i. :

AUXILIARY' BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM U

SUPPLEMENTARY-LEAK LECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM

=

, 6 OEATYDNid$c'c70M -

4 H2 RECOM.

~

-> Aur.eLoc, y /

I

ccemcc  :

4 CHARGING >-- @

s

" S 1 1 1 I

_L _L '

'"'oY 2h"Ta*T Z x 'W>' '"4Y i x

" # T so - T x 's'r? rggi x

--4 x

T rgi,2,8

'( "

\ nctosont E

g, m 'is #"

C i-e> 3 -P8 5 MSVO g g PLENUM

/

L- g, 7. -- --

s' . g, _.

UI > AUX BUILDING p -- --

D-[ lg_-rs.

FNGA

(-0) %

% FN68 g-p 3 A0044BI-P) h - ._ .

-a ,

ABFS AT w . A W f g M J Q g(((( [y 1001

.= _ . . - - . .. .- . . = . = . .- .= - ... - -. _ = =

ATMOS.

.a N

A002sai-of A002981-P)

FC FC FC A0044Ai-010

] ] rn4 Cont.Funct 4

f DD B l A A0020 *0 18hA '

F0

]

FLTIA 900 30,000 cF - - +

,%. m ai i-e ,46a, e

___' --F0 rue. 1

] ,,,,,,

] !hW'" e,1C ___________

'-o'-

7 ~7g- e r------------- , _

/ _ U PIC '

n. 1048 8 yonggg b b 18 8 27B Mil "s?

-\

- '=

M _O' rtria

--ro 8

r,"g

-/-

i-m aco20ei-e> lp

.,,,a

,y,, c .wss.i-Oia o .wssei-e, FC FC jh[ rus w.o.etoc.

5

,42$ g, [ [ rus Aux.stoc.

FC FC A0043a t-0) U U A00438(-P) j j FN7 AUX.BLOG.

FN13A F F 4A g48 l-0) 1 1 (N138

-Pi A0042A(-0 BO FC FC U A00428f-P)

T T 45

(-P I Iee S

(-0 )

C,ancruc rour ,. ccp AUXILIARY BUILDING FLOW PATH incas DURING ACCIDENT VENTILATION wi

_ - . _ _ . . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ . . __ _ __. . _ _ . _ _ . . ._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _