ML20058N782

STP 1994-98 Business Plan

ML20058N782
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	10/14/1993
From:	HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20058N780	List: ML20058N782 ST-HL-AE-4603, Forwards STP 1994-98 Business Plan & Matrix Correlating NRC Det 930610 Rept Findings & Observations W/Actions & Tasks in Business Plan & Operational Readiness Plan
References
PROC-931014, NUDOCS 9310200305
Download: ML20058N782 (100)

Text

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998

(- BUSINESS PLAN

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VISION: STP -- A WORLD-CLASS POWER PRODUCER jsA22888RZib8sjge );

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I TABLE OF CONTENTS l

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l. Introduction

11. Vision, Mission, Objectives, Performance Goals, Focus Areas, and initiatives 111. Performance Measures IV. Initiative Summaries V. Key Projects VI. Baseline Activities Vil. Generation and Outage Plans i Vill. Long Range Projections IX. Budget Summary E

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INTRODUCTION i

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN I SECTION I - Introduction I The South Texas Project (STP) Business Plan is the primary management tool for achieving and sustaining long-term improvement in station performance. It presents the business mission, objectives, and performance goals that must be accomplished to attain I STP's vision of becoming a world-class power producer. The Business Plan describes the significant tasks and hardware upgrades being undertaken at STP during 1994 I through 1998. It also includes a 1993 near-term component that incorporates work remaining from the 1993 Master Operating Plan. The Business Plan supersedes the Master Operating Plan.

The Business Plan has been developed with the participation of over 250 personnel from several organizational levels to ensure the Plan addresses the needs of station I organizations and is broadly supported by those charged with implementing it. Six key areas of focus were identified for improvement:

• Leadership and Management

• Communication and Teamwork

• Resources

• Human Performance ,

• Selt Assessment and Corrective Action

• Material Condition and Plant Reliability Within each of the focus areas, teams consisting of key managers and representatives of affected organizations developed specific initiatives for improving performance and the l associated detailed action plans for accomplishing each initiative. In general, these focus area initiatives and associated action plans address management processes or other matters that affect activities on a station-wide basis.

8 In addition to focus area initiatives, other initiatives have been developed at the departmental level to address more specific issues primarily within the purview of those departments. These other initiatives and key hardware projects are also included in the Business Plan.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN J

l SECTION I - Introduction Through the STP annual budget process, resources have been allocated to each of the improvement initiatives and hardware projects described in the Plan. As part of the budget process, Business Plan items were balanced and prioritized along with other ongoing STP activities. This process ensures that both Business Plan items are adequately supported and resources necessary for ongoing activities remain sufficient.

The business planning process contains mechanisms for evaluating progress in implementing particular items, as well as assessing the effectiveness of actions taken.

Top-level performance measures have been established to gauge success in achieving l overall Plan objectives, complemented by a comprehensive set of second-level performance measures to provide earlier indication of performance improvement or deviations from desired results. In addition, management will conduct periodic progress

l assessment meetings to review performance measures, consider reports of progress in

> particular areas, and evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken in achieving desired results. Field observations and other assessments, including independent assessments, will also be conducted in selected areas.

The Business Plan is a "living document" that will b . ;evised and modified to achieve ,

the Plan's overall objectives. Periodic progress review meetings will be used to identify and approve necessary revisions to actions, resource allocations, or schedules encompassed by the Plan. The Plan will be revised as necessary to reflect these changes.

1 The following sections describe these matters in more detail and also include the station's generation and outage plans, long range cost projections, and staffing plans.

} Detailed action plans associated with focus area initiatives described in the Business Plan are in a supplemental volume entitled the Business Plan: Companion Book.

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SECTION 11 VISION, MISSION, OBJECTIVES, PERFORMANCE GOALS, FOCUS AREAS, AND IN TIAT VES l s 1

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN E

SECTION 11 -

Vision, Mission, Objectives, Performance Goals, Focus Areas, and initiatives This section identifies the vision, mission, objectives and performance goals, and supporting focus areas and associated initiatives.

The vision describes STP's overall goal. It qualitatively states Aere the organization will be in the future, rather than planning how it will get there. The mission statement describes STP's business purpose and addresses questions such as: What business is STP in? What is the basic nature of the STP organization? Why is STP in business?

Objectives are broad-based, desired results within specified areas. Objectives target results required to achieve STP's vision and mission. Performance coals for objectives are STP's top-level performance measures. Performance measures and goals quantify the success of accomplishments toward desired results by providing interim feedback i

regarding performance effectiveness. The organization will be successful in attaining the STP vision only if all four objectives are achieved. )

In addition to the top-level performance goals for the Business Plan objectives, there are second- and third-level performance measures with associated goals. Second-level performance measures, discussed in section 111, provide additional information on i effectiveness of performance in the four objective areas. These performance measures include -selected INPO, NRC, and industry performance measures. Th'rd-level performance measures, associated with initiatives, are tracked to measure impro /ement.

These measures are identified in Section IV, initiative Summaries.

Focus areas are major areas targeted to sustain long-term improvement. The STP organization selected six focus areas based on STP's current capabilities identified by assessments. Each focus area is " owned" by a senior manager responsible and accountable for results achieved. Initiatives. discussed in section IV, are primarily non-hardware improvements in processes, programs, or performance undertaken in each focus area, designed to improve baseline activity performance. Sponsors, assigned to each initt:'.m facilitated the development of actn plans and performance measures and are responsible lor implementing the plan a7d achieving desired results.Section IV summarizes actions and desired results for each focus area initiative. Following the summaries is a list of other initiatives developed and controlled at the department level.

For convenience of reference, each focus area has been assigned a letter designation and each initiative an alpha-numeric designation. These designations are identified in Section IV, initiative Summaries.

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Vision, Mission, Objectives, Performance Goals, (gl' Focus Areas, and initiatives l

Projects, discussed in section V, are hardware or physical improvements, such as plant modifications or building upgrades. Project managers own the design, procurement, l

I and implementation of projects.

lI Ownership of focus areas, initiatives, and projects increases responsibility, accountability, and individua! participation in decision-making. t I

j The following figure depicts the development of the Business Plan.

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1 I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

.l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN  ;

I VISION: South Texas Project - a world-class power producer.

MISSION: To produce electricity in a safe, reliable, economical, and environmentally sound manner l

from nuclear energy.

OBJECTIVES:

Nuclear Safety Protect public and employee health and safety.

Reliability Operate STP to maximize plant and equipment reliability over the I long term.

I Cost Operate STP to maximize production at the lowest practical cost.

I Performance Continuously improve individual and organizational performance.

PERFORMANCE GOALS:

l Achieving the following goals will represent excellent performance -

the kind that will make STP a world-class power producer.

OBJECTIVES PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE GOALS MEASURES 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 SALP Rating 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.25 NUCLEAR SAFETY (Numerical Average) ,

RELIABILITY Capability Factor

• 53.6 49.7 74.6 76.2 77.1 COST Mills per Net KWH

• 24.31 28.79 20.68 20.19 19.66 Organizational / 3.50 3.75 4.0 4.0 4.0 PERFORMANCE Human Performance -

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Three-year rolling averages.

• • Measured by method used in Organizational Intedace Assessment (April 1993) by Behavioral Consu! tant Services.

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN I

I FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT The manner in which STP management communicates station expectations and I desired results, develops leadership and managerial skills, and supports quality improvement and long-term planning.

I INITIATIVES:

l Standardize the process for establishing and communicating goals, standards, responsibilities, expectations, and measurements of success at all levels.

Evaluate and clarify appropriate technical and supervisory / people skill requirements for managerial and supervisory positions. Assess and augment existing management and supervisory personnel, technical and supervisory skills.

l Ensure changes are clearly communicated and that the pace of change is steady and deliberate with predictable outcomes so that organizations can l assimilate the change effectively.

Foster an understanding and appreciation of the appropriate balance between l short-term costs and investment for long-term performance.

l Recommend measures to minimize unnecessary differences between organizations and organizational levels in order to improve employee morale, productivity, and effectiveness in attainment of station goals and objectives.

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I Alpha-numeric designations for the focus area and initiatives above can be found on the initiative Summary pages in Section IV: Initiative Summaries I _

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FOCUS AREA: COMMUNICATION AND TEAMWORK The manner in which STP promotes frank vertical and horizontal communication, g and heightens teamwork, individual involvement, and personnel development. g INITIATIVES: ,

Foster a culture and develop processes that promote station standards for communication, teamwork, recognition, and personnel development.

Increase individual involvement.

Maximize communication tools.

Implement a continuous improvement process.

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I Alpha-numeric designations for the focus area and initiatives above can be found on the initiative Summary pages in Section IV: Initiative Summaries.

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. SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN FOCUS AREA: RESOURCES The manner in which STP allocates assets for efficient and effective resource control, including enhancement of Jystem Engineering performance and

[ operations staffing.  ;

INITIATIVES:

Review and enhance the long-range and near-term planning, budgeting, and scheduling processes to ensure they are implemented in an integrated fashion.

Clarify the responsibilities and station expectations of the system engineer.

Improve managerial and supervisory practices and priorities to facilitate System Engineering organization performance.

Evaluate and revise the plant priority system and establish emergent work criteria for current schedule impact. Determine departmental scheduling needs  !

and establish support plan.

Reassess short-term and long-term operations staffing. l

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Alpha-numeric designations for the focus area and initiatives above can be found on the initiative

[. Summary pages in Section IV: Initiative Summaries.

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I i FOCUS AREA: HUMAN PERFORMANCE l, The manner in which STP improves work processes, teamwork, and training.  ;

INITIATIVES:

Develop and implement a standard methodology for analyzing, improving, and maintaining effective work processes.

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Standardize the criteria for administration, control, technical content, and skill level requirements for procedures.

Evaluate and revise (as necessary) existing Management Information Systems considering hardware deployment, software selection, database content, and performance monitoring reports.

Evaluate and enhance criteria and measures to identify and provide training to achieve effective human performance, including user training needs, training g prioritization, long-range planning, and implementation resources. 3 Strengthen and standardize criteria and measures used to identify and remove g inhibitors to achieving effective human performance. 3 identify and implement changes to Technical Specifications / Technical g Specification bases and/or design needed to reflect design basis, eliminate 3 conflicts and unnecessary requirements, and clarify meaning.

i Improve the external commitment management process to more effectively '

define, control, and communicate commitments.

l, Identify and implement the necessary resources and organizational structure to consolidate and more effectively maintain the station licensing and design basis.

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Alpha-numeric designations for the focus area and initiatives above can be found on the initiative Summary pages in Section IV: initiative Summaries.

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l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN I

FOCUS AREA: SELF-ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION The manner in which STP conducts business through improved comprehensive, I long-term resolution of identified performance issues and response to industry events.

INITIATIVES:

Enhance the Corrective Action Process to ensure adequate and effective l problem identification; trending; root cause analysis; and corrective action identification, selection, implementation, and monitoring for timeliness and effectiveness.

Reinforce the education of station personnel on the importance and requirements for identifying and effectively correcting problems.

l Foster a culture that promotes continual self-assessment and problem correction l by the line organizations.

Prevent events through an aggressive approach towards industry event ,

l corrective action programs.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT I

1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g FOCUS AREA: MATERIAL CONDITION AND PLANT RELIABILITY The manner in which STP maintains plant reliability through improved resolution 3 of equipment problems and housekeeping. 5 INITIATIVES:

Reduce backlog of material condition deficiencies to a level that enables event free, reliable station operation and facilitates continuing control of material I condition. 5 Maintain standard industry housekeeping and equipment / structure preservation practices.

Enhance the current equipment failure / repetitive maintenance root cause analysis program.

Improve the effectiveness of predictive / preventive maintenance programs ar - g system performance trending to maximize system and component availability / reliability.

Enhance maintenance program elements that facilitate quality work performance.

Improve the work package planning process.

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Establish and implement a plan to reduce the backlog of engineering documents and unincorporated amendments into design and vendor drawings and manuals. l, I

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Alpha-numeric designations for the focus area and initiatives above can be found on the Initiative Summary pages in Section IV: Initiative Summaries.

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5 SECTION 111 I

lg PERFO lMANCE MEASURES I ,

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

,l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN.  ;

SECTION 111 - Performance Measures Several steps are being taken to assure effectiveness in implementing Business Plan actions and achieving performance goals is carefully monitored and, where necessary, actions in the Plan are modified to accomplish desired improvements. As noted in section i I 11, top-level performance measures and associated goals have been selected to measure success in achieving overali station objectives: Nuclear Safety, Reliability, Cost, and

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Performance. STP's success is directly tied to achieving all four objectives, in addition to these measures, a group of second-level performance measures has ,

been selected to provide earlier indication of performance improvement or deviations from a desired results. STP selected the measures listed in the following table based on their E use by others in the industry, INPO, NRC, and management's evaluation of their usefulness for STP. Collectively, these measures provide a comprehensive basis for measuring performance.

The second-level measures are included in the STP Station Report, which is -

.l periodically distributed to selected station personnel. The Station Report defines each measure and shows each measure's targeted performance goal. Realistic annual goals have been developed based on industry top quartile performance, INPO goals, STP t I

historical performance, and desired performance. These measures may be amended from time to time as more data is obtained or to focus on different areas of station operation. The performance data included in the Station Report will be examined during periodic management meetings to review Business Plan progress.

As noted in sections IV and V, specific performance measures or schedules have also I been established for each initiative and project described in this Plan. These measures and schedules will be used by management and those assigned responsibility for particular Plan items to measure progress in completing tasks and the effectiveness of actions in achieving desired results.

Beyond the monitoring of performance measures, the following mechanisms will also be used to evaluate progress:

• Periodic station management meetings will be held at which responsible personnel report progress in accomplishing Business Plan activities. During these meetings, i I progress in implementing specific action steps will be reviewed along with performance data and other measures of effectiveness. Deviations from schedules or expected performance will be explained and adjustments will be made to action ,

I plans to reinforce performance improvement. Revisions to Business Plan initiatives or projects will be reviewed and approved during these meetings.

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i I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

~l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l SECTION 111 - Performance Measures t

• Based on performance data, management evaluation, or the importance of the ,

issue, particular initiatives and projects will be selected for special review to determine whether actions are having their intended effect and to make further ,

I recommendations, in some instances, independent assessors will be utilized. i

• Particular items will be selected for management field observation to determine I whether field work and operational activities are being accomplished in accordance with management expectations, j

t These activities will be scheduled to coincide with the appropriate stage of implementation i i

of the various initiatives and projects.

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN PERFORMANCE MEASURES I Unplanned Automatic Unptanned Safety System Fuel Reliability Emergency Diesel Generator I Scrams Actuations Performance NUCLEAR SAFETY Auxiliary High Head Safety Feedwater injection System I System Performance Net Performance Annual Unplanned Forced Capability Loss Outage Rate I RELIABILITY Generation Thermal Capability Factor Chemistry Factor Temporary Control Room Index Modifications instruments I Performance Inoperable Out-of Service I

Automatic Functions Annual Station Station O&M Station Capital Production Cost Performance Performance I

COST Mills / Net KWH HL&P Employee HL&P Collective Staff.ng Retention Overtime Radiation I Skin NPDES Violations Solid Low Level Radwaste Exposure Liquid Radwaste Contaminations I PERFORMANCE Gaseous industrial Safety Volume Total Outstanding Effluents Total Outstanding Radwaste I Effluents Station Performance Age of Commitments Service Commitments Overdue Preventive I Problem Report Station Problem Requests Maintenance Effectiveness Reports Deferraf Rate Stocked Contractor Plant Ratio Preventive Modifications I to Corrective Material Status Maintenance Availability Nonconforming Vendor On-the-Job Se!f Assessment Trahing Effectiveness I Condition Status Equipment Technical Information Program Status Certif; cations I m um thw trem 111 - 3 i

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SECTION IV I

INITIATIVE SUMMARIES g

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN i

SECTION IV - Initiative Summaries 1 I The purpose of initiatives is to improve station performance and plant reliability.

initiatives are activities that focus primarily on non-hardware work, such as process, program, or human performance improvements. The Business Plan encompasses two categories of initiatives: 1) focus area initiatives -- key station-wide initiatives developed ,

io sustain overall performance improvement by improving management processes in the i six Business Plan focus areas; and 2) "other" initiatives -- developed and controlled at the department level are designed to address specific areas of improvement.

This section provides summaries of each focus area initiative introduced in section 11 l and lists other initiatives by sponsoring department. The focus area initiative summaries identify desired results; summarize actions to achieve those results; set forth the performance measures, identifier designations, and program element numbers for budget l purposes; and identify start and end dates associated with each focus area initiative. The list of other initiatives includes the respective performance measure.

Every initiative is " owned" by a sponsor, who is responsible and accountable for the initiative's effectiveness, progress, and success. Quantifiable measures have been developed for initiatives to gauge progress and the effectiveness of meeting or exceeding desired results. Several initiatives include a task of " benchmarking," which is studying the best performers and adapting their practices to STP. In some cases, multiple action plans support an initiative.

Focus area initiatives usually require interaction by multiple departments, whereas the other initiatives are primarily developed and controlled at the department level. Budgets I for all initiatives were developed by either the Action Planning Teams or sponsoring department and reviewed by the Department and Site Management Teams. Initiatives were prioritized and action plan schedules adjusted as resources and work scope were I matched based on priority of need. Not all initiatives are funded for 1994.

Action plan summaries and plans detailing scheduled steps to achieve each initiative I are presented in a supplemental volume entitled the Business Plan: Companion Book.

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INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Leadership and Management OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Generation INITIATIVE: Standardize the process for establishing and communicating goals, standards, responsibilities, expectations, and measurements of success at all levels.

I DESIRED RESULT!s-Personnel will understand goals, expectations, and standards at all levels; the program will have effective feedback processes.

• Buy in" will occur at all levels.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Develop a guideline or policy defining the process to estab!ish and communicate goals, etc. Have Department Management Team review and approve the process. Train personnel. Implement the lI i process and then evaluate its effectiveness.

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I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Establish baseline understanding of the current goals, etc. and conduct an evaluation six months I after implementation for effectiveness by rerunning the survey on a random sample of personnel.

I FOCUS AREA: A SCHEDULE:  ;

INITIATIVE: A1 ACTION PLAN: A1.1 START: 08/02/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96032 COMPLETE: 09/01/95 I

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7 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g-INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Leadership and Management OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Generation

' INITIATIVE: Evaluate and clarify appropriate technical and supervisory / people skill requ;rements for managerial and supervisory positions. Assess and augment existing management and supervisory personnel, technical and supervisory skills.

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E DESIRED RESULTS:

I Current and future managers / supervisors exceed the established skill standards.

I' ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

t Define the standard for manager / supervisor skills and abilities. Evaluate managers / supervisors to this standard. Implement a manager / supervisor improvement program by providing the tools necessary to develop the estactished standards. Evaluate the management development program on an ongoing basis.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Feedback by individuals, supervisors, peers, subordinates, and customers.

2. Feedback by assessment results (i.e., manager assessment of proficiency (corporate course)).

I A SCHEDULE:

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INITIATIVE: A2 ACTION PLAN: A2.1 START: 01/01/94 PROG ELEM NO: H96033 COMPLETE: 12/31/98 I

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INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

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FOCUS AREA: Leadership and Management OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Generation i

INITIATIVE: Ensure changes are clearly communicated and that the pace of change is steady and deliberate with predictable outcomes so that organizations can assimitate the

{ change effectively.

F u DESIRED RESULTS:

Changes communicated, pace of change is steady, and predictable outcomes achieved.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Use teams to monitor business plan implementation. Study change process; educate and communicate change; use pilot programs to develop lasting guidelines for change implementation.

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1. Key performance measures of business plan achieved.

2. Key change initiatives achieve predictable outcome.

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FOCUS AREA: A SCHEDULE:

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' INITIATIVE: A3 A3.1 START: 01/01/94 ACTION FLAN:

H3CO34 COMPLETE: 12/31/96 PROG ELEM NO:

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5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Leadership and Management OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Generation INITIATIVE: Foster an understanding and appreciation of the appropriate balance between l' short-term costs and investment for long-term performance. E DESIRED RESULTS:

Problems will be anticipated, solved correctly, and not repeated. Company resources will be g coordinated station-wide and used efficiently and in accordance with company objectives. g increased long-range productivity through quick and accurate problem resolution and prevention, more application of new technologies and methods, and mu.e efficient use of resources.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Promote the appropriate balance in attitudes and decision-making processes through company objectives, policies, planning activities, and training. Demonstrate a commitment to long-term improvement by investing in programs that have long-term benefits.

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Improved scores in OrganizationalInterface Assessment areas: Measurement, Goal i

Setting.

2. Repeat maintenance / repairs tracking, Temporary Modification tracking.

l Business Plan tracking - budget and goal achievement.

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4. Capital budget variances, track 3- to 5-year rolling average of costKWd, net present value of long-range projects, repeat maintenance / repair tracking, vendor performance tracking, 3- to 5-year rolling average capability factor.

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FOCUS AREA: A SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: A4 A4.1, A4.2 START: 02/02/94 i

ACTION PLANS:

H96035,H96036 COMPLETE: 2/29/97 PROG ELEM NO's:

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[ SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT O

1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN

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INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

I FOCUS AREA: Leadership and Management Vice President, Nuclear Generation

( OWNER:

INITIATIVE: P.ecommend measures to minimize unnecessary difforences between organizations and organizational levels in order to improve employee morale, C productivity, and effectiveness in attainment of station goals and objectives.

I h DESIRED RESULTS:

i Establishment of consistency in facilities, work areas, policies and practices. Increased personnel efficieacy and productivity. Increased morale. Make STP a better place to work.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

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Assess differences in application of corporate and station policies and practices, inequities between organizations and organizational levels, and differences in work areas and facilities.

Develop recommendations for changes and implement.

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Completion of identified tasks within established milestones.

2. Results of an annual evaluation for effectiveness.

Measurement of employee morale by use of an annual survey, using the 1993 l 3.

[ Organizational Interface Assessment survey as a baseline.

4. Additional measures may be developed as solutions are identified.

FOCUS AREA: A SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: A5 ACTION PLANS: AS.1, A5.2, AS.3, A5.4 START: 07/12/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96037. HNiO38, H96039, COMPLETE: 12/31/98 f H96040 i

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: vommunication and Teamwork OWNER: Vice President, Plant Support INITIATIVE: Foster a culture and develop processes that promote station standards for communication, teamwork, recognition, and personnel development.

DES! RED RESULTS:

Frank communication, teamwork, and personnel development will be the standard in doing g business at STP. Personnel will be given recognition for exemplifying expected cultural standards. g I

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

This action plan emphasizes using teams to communicate cultural standards, promote and monitor cultural change, and determine developmental and training needs to improve STP culture. The plan addresses developmental assessment tools, personnel appraisal processes, supervisory skills training, continuing education, and development of a recognition plan.

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PERFORMAh:E MEASURES:

Improving trend on average score on selected Organizational Interface Assessment questions. .

Baseline average on 1993 assessment of selectud cuestions = 3.15.

l FOCUS AREA: B SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: B1 ACTION PLAN: B1.1 START: 08/01/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96041 COMPLETE: 07/30/97 Ii i

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN I INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Communication and Teamwork OWNER: Vice President, Plant Support INITIATIVE: Increase individual involvement.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Increased and improved personnel and customer involvement, particularly in goal development, decision-making, and changes that impact pertinent work.*

• Specific areas identified by Organizational interface Assessment.

LI ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

This plan enhances the managerial and supervisory development program to promote personnel and customer involvement. Task 3 of the plan requires evaluating and promoting existing

! opportunities. In addition, this plan sponsors the direct question and answer sessions (Compliments and Concerns) that began August 6,1993.

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l l PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Improved results in the Organizational Interface Assessment in the areas of Feedback, Teamwork and Communication (specifically, goal development and participation in decision making).

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I- FOCUS AREA: B SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: B2 ACTION PLAN: B2.1 START: 08/02/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96042 COMPLETE: 07/28/95 I

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se SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Communication and Teamwork OWNER: Vice President, Plant Support INITIATIVE: Maximize communication tools.

DES! RED RESULTS:

Improved effectiveness of internal STP written and verbal communication and feedback.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Evaluate effectiveness of existing communication, needs for additional training, and develop and implement plans to improve and use the most effective communication vehicles. Improve credibility of or eliminate existing communication vehicles based on STP personnel input.

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To be determined after evaluating Organizational interface Assessment for use as baseline in g

! measuring effectiveness of the initiative. g l 1 l

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FOCUS AREA: B SCHEDULE:

i INITIATIVE: B3 [

ACTION PLAN: B3.1 START: 01/01/95 ,

PROG ELEM NO: H96043 COMPLETE: 10/29/96 i

l 5

mo w .om- IV - 9 ,

L

L SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN r

L INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

L . _ _

FOCUS AREA: Communication and Te . awork H

OWNER: Vice President, Plant Support t

INITIATIVE: Implement a continuous improvement process.

L DESIRED RESULTS:

F L Continuous improvement becomes a way of life at STP.

I f

L ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Charter a team to identify process for continuous improvement implementation; commission a pilot program; identity training needs and performance measures for continuous improvement.

I L

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

I L

Station average on OrganizationalInterface Assessment improvements.

I L

FOCUS AREA: B SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: B4 B4.1 START: 09/01/94 ACTION PLAN:

PROG ELEM NO: H96044 COMPLETE: 01/30/95

$cm m w a>i>+m v

IV - 10

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Resources OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Licensing INITIATIVE: Review and enhance the long-range and near-term planning, budgeting and <

scheduling processes to ensure they are implemented in an integrated fashion.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Completion of this initiative will result in a comprehensive guideline that describes key elements of the planning, budgeting, and scheduling process and provides the basis for development of an integrated system. This initiative will result in interim implementation of key items by 1994 (positive j time reporting, etc.) and full implementation of the integrated planning, budgeting and scheduling I system by 1996.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

The Action Planning Team will develop a process guideline that primarily considers integration of I

the planning, budgeting and scheduling processes. Consideration will also be given to " key" items for implementation during the 1994 planning cycle. A " System Evaluation Team" will be selected to define system objectives, review industry practices and resources, develop a conceptual design for Department Management Team review, and finalize and implement an integrated data management system.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Performance measures will be identified dunng the design stages of the process. Effectiveness reviews and initiative milestone presentations to management are essential to the success of this long-term initiative.

I FOCUS AREA: C SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: C1 ACTION PLANS: C1.1, C1.2 START: 07/02/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96045, H96046 COMPLETE: 09/30/96 i

i l l

-__ ,v .11 3_

l SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN Ir INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Resources l

OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Licensing i INITIATIVE: Clarify the responsibilities and station expectations of the system engineer.

s I{

DESIRED RESULTS:

Improved unit performance and reliabihty resulting from System Engineering proactive problem resoiution.

I I ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Assess and redefine system engineer expectations and responsibilities. Communicate System I- Engineering responsibilities to the site. Assess and recommend changes to System Engineering resources (personnel and other).

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

I 1. Semi-annual assessment of Station Problem Repoi1 repeat equipment problems and System Performance Monitoring identified equipment problems for system engineering resolution.

Semi-annual assessment of customer support satisfaction.

I 2.

3. Monthly asseument of system engineer overtime usage, time usage, accomplishment of required periodic tasks, morale, and quahfications.

I '

FOCUS AREA: C SCHEDULE:

I '

INITIATIVE:

ACTION PLAN:

C2 C2.1 START: 06/15/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96027 COMPLETE: 12/31/94 I

I 10'1493 (Thartwl 104pm IV-12 i

r-

]

I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l J I

i INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Resources l OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Licensing INITIATIVE: Improve managerial and supervisory practices and priorities to enhance System {

Engineering organizational performance.

i DESIRED RESULTS: g E

improved unit performance and reliability resulting from System Engineering proactive problem resolution.

I' ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

i Assess time utilization in management / supervisory tasks and assess system engineer work routines. Identify and assess alternatives to evaluate and manage system engineer perfnrmance.

Recommend actions to Plant Engineering Department manager (s) for implementation.

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES: -

1. Monthly assessment of System Engineer (overtime usage, time usage, accomplishment of required periodic tasks, morale, qualifications).

2. Semi-annual assessment of Station Problem Report repeat equipment problems and g System Performance Monitoring identified equipment problems for System Engineering g resolution. l

3. Semi annual assessment of customer satisfaction.

f k

FOCUS AREA: C SCHEDULE: 3 INITIATIVE: C3 l ACTION PLAN: C3.1 START: 07/15/93 l

PROG ELEM NO: H96028 COMPLETE: 09/24/93 l

wuw twwwn xem IV - 13 9 5

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Resources OWNER:

General Manager, Nuclear Licensing

" H TIATIVE: Evaluate and revise the plant priority system and establish emergent work criteria for current schedule impact. Determine departmental scheduling needs and

[ establish support plan.

l DESIRED RESULTS:

)

Efficient utilization of plant resources by providing a basis for determining the relative importance of work scopes that depend on defined resources for completion and by providing required level of scheduling resources.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Establish an interdepartmental team to assess industry sources and STP needs and determine an effective prioritization method for STP, existing STP procedures may be revised, or new procedures prepared. Before implementation, user training will be provided to facilitate correct and consistent application in addition, scheduling needs will be surveyed to determine if current i resources are adequate.

1

(

i I

r L j PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

\

Periodic assessment of priority categories, such as items per category, non-prioritized intrusions of t emergent work, priority changes and effectiveness for users.

i FOCUS AREA: C SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: C4 C4.1 START: 03/16/93 ACTION PLAN:

PROG ELEM NO: H96047 ,

COMPLETE: 04/30/95 wwunuse tosum IV-14

I.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT I 1

1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g 1

INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

i FOCUS AREA: Resources OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Licensing INITIATIVE: Reassess short term and long-term operations staffing.

l DESIRED RESULTS:

Short Term: Reduced operator overtime and administrative burden on the control rooms.

Increased operator sensitivity to safety-related and power-producing systems. g Enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of operating crews. E Long Term: Resources to satisfy long-term operations and strategic staffing level requirements.

, Development of entry level operations personnel into potential management candidates. Infusion of operations-based knowledge into strategic site organizations / positions.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Establish short-term plan to enhance crew staffing, reduce overtime, and reduce field and administrative workloads. Establish long-term plan to develop and implement an operator pipeline l E

and staff rotation process that satisfies staffing requirements and provides experienced licensed operators for infusion into strategic site organizations and positions.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

I

1. Operator overtime ratios.

2. Effectiveness review results on Operations Work Control Group, increased operations staffing levels, and redistribution of operator responsibilities. g

3. Evaluation results on work scope for on-shift operators compared to staffing levels. g

4. Comparisons to 1992:

A. Number of candidates in process.

B. Number of licenses / certifications held outside Operations.

C. Number of licensed / certified personnel in strategic station positions.

D. Number of degreed shift supervisors available for advancement into station management positions.

FOCUS AREA: C SCHEDULE: "

INITIATIVE: C5 ACTION PLANS: C5.1 C5.2 START: 05/01/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96048. H96049 COMPLETE: 12/31/94 I

I maa m-e orm IV - 15 5

[ SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN F INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

L FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Develop and implement a standard methodology for analyzing, improving, and maintaining effective work processes.

p DESIRED RESULTS:

L More eff ective STP work processes resulting in more efficient use of resources.

b k

[ ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Analyze and revise the Work Process Program to maximize effectiveness, efficiencies, end i products, and customer satisfaction. This program is a pilot for the analysis of additional STP work processes, which will be analyzed using lessons learned from actions previously taken.

L PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Performance measures will be based on the process selected for analysis.

u i, r

FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

l INITIATIVE: D1 ACTION PLAN: D1.1 START: 06/01/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96051 COMPLETE: 03/24/94 L

uion w ,x- iv _1s

5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Standardize the criteria for administration, control, technical content, and skill level l W

requirements for procedures.

DESIRED RESULTS:

An efficient, consistent procedure process to provide information required to perform tasks.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Standardize STP criteria for procedures. Make necessary cht.nges to implement standards.

Incorporate standards into goveming procedures. Train apprcpriate personnel. Continuously monitor feedback mechanisms.

1 PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Verification that identified issues are addressed: field changes, revision time, training feedback forms, interviews with end users, procedure feedback forms, and human performance errors.

I FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: D2 ACTION PLAN: D2.1 START: 03/01/94 PROG ELEM NO: H96015 COMPLETE: 06/01/95 I

I'

___ ,V . , z g.

SOUTH TEXAS PRrJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Evaluate and revise (as necessary) existing Management information Systems considering hardware deployment, software selection, database content, and  !

l performance monitoring reports.

DESIRED RESULTS: q Improved Information System (IS) business processes. Improved communications between IS and users. Improved IS responsiveness. User friendly, non-redundant databases. Improved software and data integriti . ,

l ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Establish Management Information System User Group. Expedite implementation of integrated centralized databases for Local Area Network and mainframe. Develop automation and connectivity communications plan. Provide end user training. Develop a Software Quality Assurance program. Develop a data validation and control program.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

7; A. User surveys l B. Mainframe access C. Reduction in overlapping databases D. Service Request planning time E. Station Problem Reports resulting from software problems

{

(

FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: D3 ACTION PLANS: D3.1, D3.2, D3.3, D3.4, D3.5, START: 08/01/93 D3.6, D3.7. D3.8, D3.9 COMPLETE: 12/31/98 PROG ELEM NO's: H96088, H95834, H96053, H96054, H96055, H96056, H96057, H96058, H96059 mmnwernaom IV - 18

5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Evaluate and enhance criteria and measures to identify and provide training to l W

achieve effective human performance, including user training needs, training prioritization, long-range planning, and implementation resources.

DESIRED RESULTS:

I A training plan that identifies planned training activities and expeced attendance. Training-related activities will become a priority of STP's routine. Better coordination of plant and training activities that demand the time of supervisors and instructors.

I ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Develop and implement a long-range training vision and plan. Implement a top-down philosophy of I

the importance of training-related activities. Improve coordination between plant and training departments by reviewing current interfaces and modifying them as necessary to improve communication.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Use of work direction to accomplish a task. g

2. Equipment rework caused by personnel knowledge and skill weaknesses. g i

3. Root cause determinations that indicate personnel knowledge and skill weaknesses 1

contribute to a problem or event.

Hours of emergent training conducted compared to hours of scheduled training conducted.

4.

5. Attendance at scheduled training.

I FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

)

INITIATIVE: D4 ACTION PLANS: D4.1, D4.2, D4.3 START: 11/01/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96060, H96061 H96062 COMPLETE: 12/31/98 I

I mmrt% mm IV - 19 =,

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance j OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Strengthen and standardize criteria and measures used to identify and remove inhibitors to achieving effective human performance.

DESIRED RESULTS:

An environment that promotes individual respect and teamwork. Adequate resources for effective performance. Empowered employees that accurately plan and predict workloads.

1 ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

1 Survey job scopes, responsibilities, employee expectations, and limitations. Develop station philosophy to promote individual respect Provide teambuilding training. Review and revise resource requirements policy. Identify inhibitors to human performance and determine solutions.

Identify barriers to effective planning and determine solutions. Benchmark approaches for promoting empowerment and develop implementation plan.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

A. Employee surveys.

B. Employee turnover.

C. Overtime ratio.

L FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: D5 ACTION PLANS: D5.1, D5.2, D5.3, DS.4, D5.5 START: 10/18/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96063, H96064, H96065, COMPLETE: 07/31/95 H96066. H96067 un4 nth- e own IV - 20

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Identify and implement changes to STP Technical Specifications / Technical l a

Specification Bases and/or STP design needed to reflect design basis, eliminate conflicts and unnecessary requirements, and clarify meaning.

DESIRED RESULTS:

I Consistent and improved Technical Specifications and their bases that are easy to interpret and take advantage of the STP three-train design.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Short-term enhancement to be accomplished by evaluation based on significance and ability to '

make the channo promptly. Long-term enhancement to be accomplished by evaluation based on ,

cost / benefit analysis. Technical Specification changes, and design changes as necessary, will bo developed, approved, and implemented.

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Nurnber of open Technical Specification interpretations.

2. Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) entry rate.

3. Rate of surveillance performance.

l FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: DG ACTION PLANS: D6.1, D6.2 START: 07/23/93 PROG ELEM NO: H95980 COMPLETE: 12/31/98

. I-I' wu u g,,,,,w %,,, iy . 21

II i SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT II 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN lI INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance ,

. OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering INITIATIVE: Improve the external commitment management process to more effectively define, control, and communicate commitments.

!I I DESIRED RESULTS:

l l An accepted commitment control and communication process that properly justifies, assigns, pnoritizes, and periodically revalidates commitments to external organizations. An overall reduction in the number and scope of commitments to externat organizations.

,I L

ig IN ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

)

Evaluate existing industry commitment management systems and STP needs to develop and implement a process for commitment control. The development and implementation will include

)

establishing criteria for commitment acceptance, prioritization, tracking, communication, and periodic revalidation. A review of existing commitments to extemal organizations that identifies l

those that should be revised or eliminated based on minimal benefit.

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

I 1.

2.

3.

Number of missed commitments.

Frequency of commitment changes.

Frequency of assignment changes.

4. Number of commitments to external organizations.

I i

I FOCUS AREA: D l SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: D7 I ACTION PLANS:

PROG ELEM NO:

D7,1, D7.2 H95977 START: 07/04/94 COMPLETE: 12/31/98 I

I manwruvo or#m IV - 22

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Human Performance OWNER: Vice President, Nuclear Engineering ,

INITIATIVE: Identify and implement the necessary resources and organizational structure to consolidate and more effectively maintain the station licensing and design basis. I*

DESIRED RESULTS:

Heightened understanding of licensing / design basis and more consistent reportabikty/ operability g

determinations.

g I

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

I Develop a more responsive Licensing organization, establish station-wide understanding of g

licensing basis, and provide easy access to design basis references. E i I i PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

I

1. Reduction in interpretations.

2. Well defined process for operability calls.

Reductions in unnecessary reports.

3.

I:

FOCUS AREA: D SCHEDULE: ,

l INITIATIVE: D8 D8.1 START: 01/01/95 -

ACTION PLAN:

PROG ELEM NO: H96091 COMPLETE: 07/30/95 Il .

I!

__ , 43 g

r

.I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN 3 I INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Self-Assessment and Corrective Action OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Assurance INITIATIVE: Enhance the Corrective Action Process to ensure adequate and effective problem identification; trending; root cause analysis; and corrective action identification, selection, implementation, and monitoring of corrective actions for timeliness and effectiveness.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Timely, adequate and effective problem identification, root cause analysis, corrective action identification and implementation, p.ocess oversight, and trend analysis.

I LI ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Enhance processes that ensure effective and adequate problem identification, root cause analysis, corrective action identification and implementation, process oversight, and trend analysis. Actions will be based on user and industry input regarding resources, organizational structure, and training I requirements.

I I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Station Problem Report Effectiveness Station Problem Report Age ,

Additional measures to be determined as solutions are developed.

I FOCUS AREA: E SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: E1 ACTION PLANS: E1.1, E1.2, E1.3, E1.4 START: 07/01/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96068 H96069, H96070, COMPLETE: 04/30/94 l 1

H96071 I l I __ , . . .

1 3

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Self-Assessment and Corrective Action OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Assurance INITIATIVE: Reinforce the education of station personnel on the importance and requirements for identifying and effectively correcting problems.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Station personnel routinely identify and solve problems and participate in self-assessments without g fear of retribution, retaliation, or reprisals. g I

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Determine training requirements. Develop training course (s). Identify attendees. Determine methods to take advantage of existing training opportunities. Schedule training. Implement training. Evaluate training effectiveness.

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Work group compliance with established performance standards including customer service g (initially it is expected there will be an increase in the number of problems identified by the g line organization). ,

2. Nuclear Assurance periodically validate the departmental self-assessment processes during Corrective Action audits.

FOCUS AREA: E SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: E2 '

ACTION PLAN: E2.1 START: 08/02/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96072 COMPLETE: 12/30/93 E

1 I

___ , 2e  !

[. SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Self-Assessment and Corrective Action OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Assurance INITIATIVE: Foster a culture that promotes continual self-assessment and problem correction by the line organizations.

DESIRED RESULTS:

A continuous improvement process that results in meeting or exceeding expectations established by line management.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Develop an ' Objective" relative to quality in the Business Plan. Develop generic guidelines for work groups to establish self-assessment and corrective action processes. Determine site-wide and department-level training requirements. Develop a set of performance standards for each work group. Departmentalimplementation of the self-assessment process.

i PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Work group overtime.

2. Departmental backlogs.

3. Work group compliance with established performance standards including customer service (initially it is expected there will be an increase in the number of problems identified by the

. line organization).

L 4. Nuclear Assurance periodically validate the departmental self-assessment processes during corrective action audits.

I' i

FOCUS AREA: E SCHEDULE: j INITIATIVE: E3 ACTION PLAN: E3.1 START: 07/01/93 H96073 COMPLETE: 12130/93 PROG ELEM NO:

i l

i i

wusm ma,nwe IV - 26 l l

J

5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN l INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

II FOCUS AREA: Self-Assessment and Corrective Action OWNER: General Manager, Nuclear Assurance Prevent events through an aggressive approach towards industry event corrective $

INITIATIVE: '

action programs.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Minimized potential for events occurring that have industry precursors.

ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

I Define expectations of Operation Experience Review (OER) program. Evaluate and revise OER process. Obtain Department Management Team approval and implement program. Review OER Program effectiveness. Define expectations of Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (VETIP). Evaluate and revise VETIP program. Obtain approva' from Department Management Team, implement VETIP program changes. Rev:ew VETIP p ogram for effectiveness.

I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

r To be determined in accordance with action plans.

I I

FOCUS AREA: E SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: E4 ACTION PLANS: E4.1, E4.2 START: 08/01/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96092, H96093 COMPLETE: 07/15/94 I

I.

wsw'% u>c- IV-27

~ ---- _- _ -

I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN 1 5< -

INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

l FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliability OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager INITIATIVE: Reduce backlog of material condition deficiencies to a level that enables event I

free, reliable station operation and facilitates continuing control of material condition.

E i l

l DESIRED RESULTS:

, Reduced level of Service Request backlog and improved backlog maintenance.

r' ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Reduce open non-outage Service Requests on Unit 1 and common equipment to < 1,000 Service l Requests by end of 1993. In 1994, reduce the Unit 1 and common non-outage Service Requests to < 856 and reduce the Unit 2 Service Requests < 550. In 1995, continue to work the backlog of

[ non-outage Service Requests to <700 Service Requests. Develop an Service Request handling process whereby all Service Requests are reviewed within one week for restraints and simple to fix i

Service Requests are fixed within one month. Implement a Work Package Control Center to

{ reduce administrative burden and improve work package retrievability.

L  :

p PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

L.

1. Backlog statistics measured against expected goals.

2. Monitor open Service Requests by craft by unit compared to milestones.

3. Assessment of schedule performance.

{

~

FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: F1 F1.1 START: 07/01/93 ACTION PLAN:

H96016 COMPLETE: 12/31/95 PROG ELEM NO:

mm ow=*e me IV - 28

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - . __ __ __-._ __ ___--____________________-._____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J

5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

I:'

FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliability OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager f INITIATIVE: Maintain standard industry housekeeping and equipment / structure preservation practices. j DESIRED RESULTS:

Best industry practices in housekeeping by 3rd Quarter 1994 ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Il Implement a multi-year program to ensure plant housekeeping and equipment / structure preservation practices support the STP business plan goals for nuclear safety, cost, and reliability.

The action plan will consist of improved housekeeping practices, initiation of enhanced plant inspection program, and the implementation of a coatings preservation program.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Performance measures will include:

+ Housekeeping self-assessments I

FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

I*'

INITIATIVE: F2 '

ACTION PLAN: F2.1 START: 08/15/93 PROG ELEM NO: H16074 COMPLETE: 12/31/98 I

muwuem we IV - 29

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN i l

i INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliability f OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager )

INITIATIVE: Enhance the current equipment failure / repetitive maintenance root cause analysis program.

E 1 DESIRED RESULTS: {

l

{

I An effective equipment failure analysis program to identify, ana!yze, track, and resolve signif; cant equipment issues in a timely manner.

I l

l ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

l L

Enhance the current equipment failure root cause analys:s program. Provide additional training on r equipment failure root cause analysis for Maintenance, Engineering, Operations, and Quality l ,

Control personnel.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Number of repetitive failures.

F 2. Number of maintenance preventable functional failures.

L c

i FOCUS AREA: F U ScHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: F3 ACTION PLAN: F3.1 START: 09/15/93 PROG ELEM NO: H96075 COMPLETE: 12/31/94 H

ion a nthun*v)i mom IV - 30

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . ____J

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN g INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

Il FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliability OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager INITIATIVE: Improve the effectiveness of predictive / preventive maintenance programs and system performance trending to maximize system and component availability / reliability.

I DESIRED RESULTS:

A comprehensive Predictive Maintenance Program with a documented basis which reduces intrusive maintenance tasks and inservice failures and facilitates System Performance Monitoring for increased system / component reliability. A Preventive Maintenance (PM) program based on ,

improving equipment reliability and maintenance of system function, with the basis for each PM task documented; shift from time-directed maintenance tasks to condition-monitored maintenance tasks; PM program process in which duplication has been eliminated and is more efficient.

I' ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Implement changes to the Predictive Maintenance program. Improve system and component reliability; optimize the PM program to increase equipment relability. Assess the existing reliability-centered maintenance efforts. needs, and resources to develop a reliability-based predictive / preventive maintenance program with documented basis; review all existing Preventive Maintenance to ensure that they are applicable and effective; evaluate PM program process, including software to identify elements that require enhancement. ,

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Increased condition directed to time directed task ratio.

2. Predictive Maintenance effectiveness ratio.

3. System / equipment reliability.

4. Predictive Maintenance to time-directed maintenance tasks ratio.

5. Preventive Maintenance to Corrective Maintenance ratio.

FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: F4 I F4.1, F4.2 START: 03/15/93 ACTION PLANS:

PROG ELEM NO's: H96076, H96077 COMPLETE: 12/31/97 I

I

__ ,.s,  !'

r-I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l

1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN I INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliabihty OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager INITIATIVE: Enhance maintenance program elements that f acilitate quality work performance.

DESIRED RESULTS:

Effective processes that facilitate work and reduce feedback response time and job delays.

I improved communication and acceptance of adopted standards / measures and expectations.

Improved performance and increased self-identification of problems. Improved problem identification and timely resolution of Quality Control issues to provide a quality product in a timely manner.

I I j ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Improve support elements faci!!!ating increased quality of work practices and productivity. Develop '

and communicate clear standards / measures / expectations to Maintenance personnel. Develop accurate performance measures and a program that promotes the self-identification of problems.

Improve interface between Quality Control and Maintenance.

l PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Work activities held up by lack of tools, scaffolding, worker qualification and other internal support elements.

' 2. Component rework.

3. Quality Control Survei!!ance Performance.

I FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: FS ACTION PLANS: F5.1, F5.2, FS.3 START: 08/01/93 PROG ELEM NO's: H96079, H96080, H96081 COMPLETE: 12/31/95 l

I I

I _ . _ _ , . s2

5 E

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN l INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

FOCUS AREA: Material Condition and Plant Reliability ,

OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager INITIATIVE: Improve the work package planning process.

DESIRED RESULTS:

An increase in work package quality will decrease revision rates, thereby improving craft satisfaction and efficiency.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Charter a representative team to identify problems associated with work package planning and provide solutions for continuous improvement. Improve craft planning interface. Develop planning j standards. Improve Post Maintenance Testing Program. Increase planner technical training.

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Work package unit rate.

2. User Surveys (perception by customer organizations that the process and product has g improved).

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3. Work package revision rate.

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FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: F6 ACTION PLAN: F6.1 START: 06/01/93 H96082 COMPLETE: 12/31/94 PROG ELEM NO:

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3 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT'

-l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS _ PLAN INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

Material Condition and Plant Reliability FOCUS AREA: f OWNER: Unit 1 Plant Manager & Unit 2 Plant Manager  !

INITIATIVE: Establish and implement a plan to reduce the backlog of engineering documents  !

and unincorporated amendments into design and vendor drawings and manuals.

DESIRED RESULTS: f, I Design Engineering Department and Plant Engineering Department backlogs will be accurately identified, monitored, and controlled at a level of minimum impact on station operation.

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ACTION PLAN

SUMMARY

Develop and implement a plan to reduce the backlog of engineering documents.

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s I PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

Target values for all types of engineering documents identified in the backlog reduction plan.

I i1 I FOCUS AREA: F SCHEDULE:

INITIATIVE: F7 ACTION PLAN: F7.1 START: 07/01/93 i PROG ELEM NO: H96033 COMPLETE: 12/31/97

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN OTHER INITIATIVES As indicated in the Introduction to this section, in addition to focus area initiatives, other I initiatives, listed below, have been developed at the departmental level to address issues that are expected to enhance overall plant performance. Work scopes have been developed for these initiatives, which will be scheduled based on their contribution to I performance improvement.

Program Element Description Performance Measure I 1. Initiatives Sponsored by Generation H96024 Surveillance Procedure Upgrade Program - Station Problem Reports Re-write of approximately 1100 procedures H97027 Plant Labeling Upgrade Station Problem Reports ,

H96013 Cortractor support ar.d training necessary for Station Problem Reports implementation of IBM-based Pianning and',

Scheduling Software H95955 Electrical Maintenance service request and Service Requests preventive maintenance support H95969 Oversight and coordinations for high Sewice Requests I priority / emergent instrument and control service request work H95981 Mechanical Maintenance contractors to Service Requests augment baseline HL&P craft I H95946 River Makeup Pumping Fecility spillway and blowdown structure maintenance / repair Equipment procurement / service request Service Requests Service Requests H95970 reduction support HL&P Overtime H95976 Maintenance Planning staff assistance I H95999 Maintenance Support staff assistance and supplies for procedure reviews / revisions HL&P Overtime Station Problem Reports H95881 Emergency Operating Procedure validation program H96023 Operation Support contractor assistance in HL&P Overtime support of crew increases for Units 1 and 2 I

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E SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN l>

OTHER INITIATIVES Program Description ll W

Element Performance _ Measure H95972 Security Dept. equipment purchases and Station Problem Reports contractor support H95974 Technical Services equipment, supplies, Collective Radiation Exposure specialized training, etc.

H96095 Outage duration optimization Capability Factor W

11. Initiatives Sponsored by Engineering H95888 Maintenance Rule implementation in Safety System Performance g accordance with 10CFR50.65 g H96029 Plant Engineering Department system expert Capability Factor program training Safety System Performance H96019 Update STP Decommissioning Study Station Capital Performance H96002 Design Engineering Department - special Capability Factor a training g H96003 Design Engineering Department - on site Capability Factor Westinghouse management / administration g services g H96004 Design Engineering Department - Station Problem Reports Mechanical / Nuclear design basis document g open item reduction, special projects (e.g., g chiller / refrigeration program upgrade, solenoid operated valve plan of action, g Appendix R analysis etc.)

Service Requests B.

H96005 Design Engineering Department -

codes / standards, software / materials Capability Factor g reconciliations and performance g demonstration initiative H96006 Design Engineering Department - bac'Klog SerViCO Requests g reduction of Vendor Equipment Technical Capability Factor g Information Program open amendments, consolidation of PC database information to g local area network system, update vendor g manuals I

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' SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN

[

OTHER INITIATIVES r

b Program Element Description Performance Measure L H9600/ Design Engineering Department - Service Requests Electrical /l&C Special Projects (e.g., Fuse Capability Factor g List update, Appendix R information database software, setpoint methocology document preparation, unitize electrical drawings, lighting' distribution panet load list conversion

[ to computer format, configuration Control L Program for Printed Circuit Boards, instrument setpoint process document,

- Sandia Labs, toxic gas monitor cale update, etc.

H95936 Plant Engineering Department - inspection, Service Requests

( testing / trending equipment and on site Capability Factor

( contractor assistance for service request production and design basis document I H97046 Motor operated valve program support for Safety System Performance L Phase 1 of Generic Letter 89-10, input to tracking / trending prograrn, issuance of test

~ procedure and testing at Kalsi facility L Steam Generator initiatives H97107 Utility Replacement Group Capability Factor i

L H97108 Safety improvement - N16 monitors Capability Factor H97109 Safety improvement - component Capability Factor modification H97110 Analysisfiechnical Specification changes Capability Factor F H97112 Inspection, testing and repair Capability Factor H97114 Steam generator inspections and Capability Factor maintenance secondary side H97116 Steam generator outage cost control Capability Factor optimized outage plan H97117 Steam generator tube leak outage recovery Capability Factor H97118 Steam generator procurement program Capability Factor H97102 Steam generator tube leak outage prevention Capability Factor c

L mem'=$ivn we IV - 37

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN g OTHER INITIATIVES Program Description Performance Measure l

Element 5 '

I!!. Initiatives Sponsored by Plant Services H95998 Nuclear information System equipment O&M Performance additions H95975 Records Management System records O&M Performance conversion to optical storage H96020 Maintenance Training support - temporary O&M Performance graphics and word processing technicians H96022 Nuclear Information System improvement O&M Performance program - equipment lease / buy out, training hardware, contractor maintenance support for special networks / communications etc.

H96094 Conversion of documents on PRIME system O&M Perforrnance to Wordperfect IV. Initiatives Sponsored by Quality Assurance I

H95988 ASME Section XI Appendix Vil and Vill Capability Factor '

flawed specimen preparation, procedure qualification, equipment and personnel g development g H96012 Quality Assurance special reviews, Capability Factor inspections, audits etc.

H95989 Uitrasonic thickness gauging equipment Capability Factor upgrade to support erosion / corrosion program H95990 Heat exchanger eddy current equipment to Capability Factor support expanded scope of secondary heat exchanger program I

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n-I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT g 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN  ;

l OTHER INITIATIVES I Program t Element Description Performance Measure ,

i V. Initiatives Sponsored by Licensing H95979 Licensing staff assistance for maintenance of Station Problem Reports I commitment tracking program, Operational Experience Reviews, industrial Safety Engineering Group and Nuclear Safety Review Board administration VI. Initiatives Sponsored by Nuclear Fuels I H96018 Nuclear Fuel special projects - shielding and Fuel Reliability physics code purchase, Westinghouse User interface, Boraflex testing, etc. ,

Vil. Initiatives Sponsored by Plant Support H96010 Nuclear Training staff assistance to upgrade Capability Factor [

and present training for technical and O&M Performance I H95760 operatic ~ accredited training programs Storm ' age preparation Capability Factor I H95995 Contractor assistance for Emergency Response graded exercise Station Problem Reports H96009 Nuclear Training materials, staff assistance Capability Factor I and support for technical and supervisory training and upgrading of audioMsual classroom equipment O&M Performance H95992 Emergency Response off site facility Station Problem Reports upgrades - radiological equipment cabinets. .l signs, dosimetry, county emergency operations center modifications H95994 Emergency Response enhancement - Station Problem Reports purchase tone alert radios, pagers and I emergency response contractor services, recording / projection equipment, contractor staff augmentation services  !

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)

E SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN OTHER INITIATIVES Program Element Description Performance Measure Vill, initiatives Sponsored by industry Relations H96026 Research and development - shutdown risk Capability Factor assessment, EPRI Gothic computer program, O&M Performance special motor operated valve tests, Makay's pump data acquisition, etc.

IX. Initiatives Sponsored by Nuclear Purchasing and Material Management I

H95984 Equipment and supplies - transfer of capital Stocked Material Availability spares from inventory, purchase of new capital spares H96097 Long-Term Spare Parts Program Service Requests Capability Factor I

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! SECTION V .

4

, KEY PROJECTS  :

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN j l SECTION V - Key Projects This section provides a list of projects over $40,000, which are key hardware or physical improvements that are expected to upgrade quality, safety, or reliability of STP. Two

,g categories of projects exist: engineered modifications and additions, and facility i l5 modifications and additions. Both types of projects are assigned a program element number for budget tracking.

l Engineered modification projects are identified from many sources, such as customer ,

input, similar stations, vendors, and industry groups. When a project is approved, priorities and implementation schedules are established to focus resources on activities g that produce desired results over the next five years.  ;

I Facility modification projects are included in the STP Facility Master Plan maintained by Facilities Management. Facilities Management and various line organizations identify these projects. The projects are prioritized for implementation based on considerations such as industrial safety, environmental benefits, and reliability.

Both types of projects are managed through the project management concept. Large, l complex projects requiring effort by many departments will be managed through a separate project management organization. Matrixed project managers from sponsoring ,

departments coordinate a project's design, procurement, and installation phases. l lI The following projects are listed by business need category. Additional project information can be found in a supplemental volume entitled Business Plan: Companion l Book.

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

-I- 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN KEY PROJECTS I Mod. Prog.

Description Desian Procure Install

& Elem. Unit e I 1. Business Need Category: Regulatory 87068 M90000 1 Redesign monorail for safe removal of 1994 1995 1995 charping pump 1B I 87076 M90000 1 Reroute vent tubing from instrument CV-FIS-0201B Permanent access to Reactor Makeup Water 1994 1994 1994 1995 1994 1995 88129 M88129 1 Tank room air handling unit and tornado

-I damper 88130 M88130 2 Permanent access to Reactor Makeup Water 1994 1995 1995 I Tank room air handling unit and tornado damper M83115 Replace relay room halon system 1994 1994 -1RE05 I

89115 1 89116 M89116 2 Replace relay room halon system 1994 1995 2RE04 8922G M89226 1 Add radiation monitor to condensate return to 1994 1994-5 1RE05 auxiliary steam system 89227 M89227 2 Add radiation monitor to condensate return to 1994 1994-5 2RE04 auxiliary steam system I 90043 M90043 1 Provide safe access (ladders & platforms) to equipment 1994 1994 1994 90044 M90044 2 Provide safe access (ladders & platforms) to 1994 1994 1994 equipment 90068 M900S8 Provide bypass for fuel pool cooling motor 1994 1995 1RE05 I

1 operated valves CC-MOV 0032 and 0447 90069 M90069 2 Provide bypass for fuel pool cooling motor 1994 1995 2RE04 operated valves CC-MOV 0032 and 0447 91-J-0009 M90000 1 Remove negative flux rate trip hardware from 1994 1994 1REOS nuclear instrumentation system 91037 M91037 1 Provide permanent support ring for reactor 1994 1995 1RE05 pressure vessel head temporary shielding I

C = Complete j I vmue m 23snm V-2 l

E SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT E 1994 -1998 BUS! NESS PLAN 8 KEY PROJECTS I

Mod. Prog.

& Elem. Unit Description Deslan Procure Install 91058 M90000 1 Replace smoke / thermal detectors in isolation 1994 1994 1994 valve cubicle 91059 M90000 2 Replace smoke / thermal detectors in isolation 1994 1994 1994 valve cubicle 92021 M92021 1 Platform outside Reactor Containment 1994 1995 1RE05 Building hatch for reactor coolant pump motor 92040 M92040 1 Mechanical Auxiliary Building heating, 1994 1994 1RE05 ventilation and air conditioning HEPA filters 92041 M92041 2 Mechanical Auxiliary Building heating, 1994 1995 2RE04 ventilation and air conditioning HEPA filters 93001 M90000 1 Revise standby diesel generator trip circuitry 1994 1994 1RE05 93004 M93004 2 Relocate laundry room ladders 1994 1994 1994 93010 M93010 1 Permanent nitrogen bottle racks and piping in 1994 1995 1995 Isolation Valve Cubicle 93011 M93011 2 Permanent nitrogen bottle racks and piping in 1994 1995 1995 g isolation Valve Cubicle 3 93029 M93029 2 Change condensate valve to fait close 1994 1994 1994 93033 M93033 2 Temperature alarm switches for Isolation 1994 1995 2RE04 Valve Cubicle 93034 M93034 1 Provide _ safer means of entering the Essential C 1994 1994 Cooling Water Building 93035 M93035 2 Provide safer means of entering the Essential C 1994 1994 Cooling Water Building  !

93045 M93045 1 Test zones for intrusion detection system 1994 1995 1995 93046 M93046 2 Upgrade closed circuit TV security system 1994 1994 1994 93050 M93050 2 Chiller bypass valves C C 1994 t 93053 M90000 1 Reptr.,ce Target Rock solenoid operated 1994 1995 1995 g valves used as above-seat drain valves g C = Complete w asc m unzawm V.3 I

I l SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN I KEY PROJECTS Mod. Prog.

Elem. Unit Description Desian Procure Install h

93054 M90000 2 Replace Target Rock solenoid operated 1994 1995 1995 valves used as above-seat drain valves 93055 M90000 1 Replace Target Rock solenoid operated 1994 1995 1995 valves on steam generator bulk sampling containment valves 93056 M90000 2 Replace Target Rock solenoid operated 1994 1995 1995 valves on steam generator bulk sampling containment valves NA H95435 NA Simulator upgrade 1994-5 C 1995 NA H96025 NA Concrete security barriers 1994 1994 1994

2. Business Need Category: Rehabilitation I 88055 M88055 0 Design and install reliable level indicators on 1994 1994 1994 acid / caustic tanks 89014 M89014 1 Upgrade 13.8KV electrical distribution system C C 1994 89117 M89117 0 Rehabihtate reverse osmosis units C C 1994 89188 M89188 0 Seal electrical manholes to keep out C 1994 1994 groundwater 89218 M89218 1 Replace Exide battery chargers 1994 1995 1RE06

= 90005 M90005 1 Upgrade turbine supervisory system 1994 1995 1RE06 90007 M90007 0 Modify, expand, and rehabilitate potable water 1994 1994-5 1994-5 lE lg system I 90047 M90047 1 Upgrade refueling machine 1994 1994 1RE05 90048 M90048 2 Upgrade refueling machine 1994 1995 2REO4 90086 M90086 0 Replace Circulating Water intake Structure 1994 1995 1995

(

sodium hypochlorite supply line I

C = Complete wuntm en2vom V-4 I

I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN I KEY PROJECTS Mod. Prog.

Elem. Unit Description Deslan Procure Install h

91003 M91003 1 Replace steam generator secondary manway 1994 1994 1RE05 and hand hole studs 91004 H95854 2 Replace steam generator secondary manway 1994 1995 2RE04 and hand hole studs 91021 M91021 1 PROTEUS plant computer replacement 1994 1995-6 1RE07 91022 M91022 2 PROTEUS plant commter replacement 1994 1995-6 2RE06 91023 M91023 1 Fire detection syste eotacement 1994 1995 1RE06 91024 M91024 2 Fire detection si -  ?.iacement 1994 1994-5 2RE04 91025 M91025 1 Feedwater pump speed control system C 1994 1RE05 upgrade 91031 M90000 1 Column conoseal joint assembly 1994 1995 1RE06 91032 M90000 2 Column conoseal joint assembly 1994 1995 2RE05 91063 M91063 1 Condenser air removal pump automatic oil C C 1994 mist lubrication system unit 91064 M910G4 2 Condenser air removal pump automatic oil C 1994 1994 mist lubrication system unit 92015 M92015 1 Essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer 1994 1994 1RE05 l replacement 5 92016 M92016 2 Essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer 1994 1995 2RE04 replacement 92037 M90000 1 Replace trim in auxiliary feedwater flow control C 1994 1RE05 valve to reduce vibration 93014 M93014 2 Replace obsolete condensate polishing sump 1994 1994 1994 pumos 93018 M93018 1 Raplace load center, U1001W 1994 1994-5 1995 93019 M93019 2 Reptace load center, U2 001W 1994 1995 1995 93020 M90000 1 Replace load center, U1001U 1994 1994-5 1995 C = Complete mm(%*n := V-5 I_

I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT iI 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN KEY PROJECTS Mod. Prog.

& Elem. Unit Description Design Procure Install 93021 M90000 2 Replace load center, U2 001U 1994 1995 1995 93022 M90000 1 Retrofit switchgear cube to accept more 1994 1995 1995 reliable breaker f 93023 M90000 2 Retrofit switchgear cube to accept more 1994 1995 1995 reliable breaker 93024 M90000 0 Retrofit switchgear cube to accept more 1994 1995 1995 t reliable breaker 93051 M93051 1 Replace Technical Support Center chiller 1994 1994-5 1994-5 package I 93052 93058 M93052 M90000 2

1 Replace Technical Support Center chiller package Move feedwater isolation valve limit switches 1994 1994 1995 1994-5 1995 1REOS outside the valve yoke l

93059 M90000 2 Move feedwater isolation valve limit switches 1994 1995 2RE04 t

outside the valve yoke NA H96030 NA Refurbish auxiliary boiler 1994 1994 1994 l

3. Business Need Category: Enhancement i_ 87030 M87030 1 Additional battery charger for 125VDC Class 1994 1995 1RE05 1E service

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89-L-0135 M90000 1 Add run hour meter to track running hours of 1994 1994 1994

- residual heat removal pumps 89127 M89127 1 Load bank for balance of plant, Technical 1994 1994 1REOS

Support Center, Emergency Operations r- Facility and lighting diesel 89128 M89128 2 Load bank for balance of plant and Technical 1994 1995 2REO4 Support Center diesel 90023 M90023 1 Reduce hot leg temp, minimize steam throttle 1994 1995 1RE05 m losses, upgrade fuel L

C = Complete H unu n% y,m V-6 l

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN KEY PROJECTS I

s Mod. Prog. -

Description Deslan Procure Install

& Elem. Unit 90024 M90024 2 Reduce hot leg temp, minimize steam throttle 1994 1995 2RE04 I

losses, upgrade fuel .

1 90037 M90037 1 Technical Support Center diesel enclosure 1994 1994 1994 90038 M90038 2 Technical Support Center diesel enclosure 1994 1994 1994 90083 M90083 1 Install communications loop antenna system in 1994 1994 1995 Essential Cooling Water, Diesel Generator, Isolation Valve Cubicle, Reactor Cr ntainment Buildings 90087 M90087 1 Sludge lancing platforms C C 1994 90088 M90088 2 Studge lancing platforms C C 1994 90089 M90089 1 Replace low pressure turbine rotors 1994 1994 1RE05 90090 M90090 2 Replace low pressure turbine rotors 1994 1995 2RE04 M91033 0 Unit cross tie for liquid waste discharge to 1994 1995 1995 91033 either unit open loop cooling system 91041 H91041 1 Modify Reactor Containment Building to allow 1994 1994 1RE05 reactor coolant pump motor removal 91049 M90000 0 Provide a means to retain the yard rainwater 1994 1994 1994 Modify level switches on high total dissolved 1994 1994 1994 =

91062 M91062 0 solids and low total dissolved solids transmitters 92007 M92007 2 Fuel Handling Building / Mechanical Auxiliary 1994 1994 2RE04 Building heating ventilation air conditioning condensate to essential cooling water reservoir 92008 M92008 1 Fuel Handling Building / Mechanical Auxiliary 1994 1994 1RE05 Building heating ventilation air conditioning condensate to essential cooling water reservoir 92009 M92009 1 N16 rnonitors - steam generator tube leakage C C 1994 C = Complete mm mma > 2 v xnm V-7

E SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

• 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN I KEY PROJECTS Mod. Prog.

N 9. Elem. Unit Description Design Procure install 92010 M92010 2 N16 monitors - steam generator tube leakage C C 1994 i

92012 M92012 1 Secondary side chemical addition 1994 1994 1REOS 92013 M92013 2 Secondary side chemical addition 1994 1995 2REO4 93036 M93036 Modify radwaste truck bay 1994 1995 1995 I

1 93038 M90000 2 Revise method of adding chemicals to 1994 1994 1994 standby Diesel Generator cooling water ,

system 93041 M93041 1 Upgrade Qualified Display Processing System 1994 1995 1995  ;

93064 M93064 0 Route condensate reject directly to low total 1994 1994 1994 I NA H95983 NA dissolved solids sump STP Visitor Center - video display 1994 1994 1994 I 4. Business Need Category: Change in Criteria 93043 M93043 1 Provide fiber-optic interconnect for local area C 1994 1994 network to Maintenance Operations Facility, ,

Bldg 50 & Unit 1 93044 M93044 2 Provide fiber-optic interconnect for local area C 1994 1994 ,

network to Maintenance Operations Facility, Building 50 & Unit 2 NA H95950 NA Roof over deaerator structure - Turbine 1994 1994 1994 Generator Building NA H95950 NA Ditch mower and tractor 1904 1994 1994 NA H95950 NA Service trucks (2) 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 I NA H95950 NA cu .-iture for Unit 1 & 2 Maintenance Operations Facility, Nuclear Training Annex, Nuclear Training Facility, Central Processing Facility

.I C = Complete m m t w w t opm V-8 i l

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN KEY PROJECTS Mod. Prog.

& Elem. Unit Description Deslan Procure Install NA H95950 NA Upgrade Central Processing Facility and 1994 1994 1994 practical areas in Central Processing Facility, Nuclear Training Annex, Nuclear Training Facility, Building 50 NA H95950 NA Furniture for Unit 1 & 2, Maintenance 1994 1994 1994 Operations Facility, Nuclear Training Facility, Nuclear Training Annex, Central Processing Facility, Nuclear Support Center, Buildings 45 and 50 I-I C = Cornplete san 4*;a owowy> 2 3com y.9 I

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I iI SECTION VI L

Ll BASELINE ACTIVITIES I

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN SECTION VI- Baseline Activities Resources were assigned to both Business Plan activities and ongoing STP baseline workloads during the STP annual budget process. STP uses a concept known as program-based budgeting in which station activities are divided into discrete baseline

" program elements." These program elements make up programs generally corresponding to the station's organizational units.

During the budget process, each baseline program element is reviewed and -

appropriate resources assigned to support each element's activities. As part of this effort, schedules and estimated types and quantities of work are examined to determine the level of resources required. Assigning resources to each program element explicitly accounts for anticipated routine work scopes.

Each initiative and project described in sections IV and V has also been assigned a program element number and dedicated resources based on the type of work, amount of work, and schedule (some improvement activities encompass and take credit for particular tasks being funded through baseline program elements). During the budget process, allocation of resources to program elements for Business Plan activities was considered along with allocations for program elements associated with routine baseline work.

This process assures both the Business Plan baseline activities and improvement actions are specifically and adequately funded and improvement efforts do not detract from the performance of routine work.

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lI SECTION Vil l

I GENERATION AND OUTAGE PLANS il lE I

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN SECTION Vil- Generation and Outage Plans I This section contains the Generation Plan, which provides the forecast net generation, capacity factor and capability factor for each unit by month for 1994 and annually l l

thereafter. The Outage Plan, which defines the schedule for planned refueling and maintenance outages, is also included.

l Refueling outage duration is a significant component of both capacity and capability factors. Accordingly, an initiative has been developed to optimize outage length. This initiative is identified in the section IV list of "other initiatives" sponsored by Nuclear l Generation.

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT g 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN-l GENERATION PLAN UNIT 1 UNIT 2 Net Capability Net Net Capability Net Generation Factor (%) Capacity Generation Factor (%) Capacity (MWH) Factor (%) (MWH) Factor (%)

JAN 1994 20,046 22 22 0.0 0.0 FEB 561,295 67.3 66.8 0.0 0.0 MAR 768,578 92.0 82.6 200,462 21.7 21.5 APR 822,105 92.0 91.3 601,387 67.3 66.8 MAY 849,508 92.0 91.3 849,508 92.0 91.3

(

JUN 822,105 92.0 91.3 822,105 92.0 91.3 JUL 849,508 92.0 91.3 849,508 92.0 91.3 AUG 849,508 92.0 91.3 849,508 92.0 91.3 SEP 822,105 92.0 91.3 822,105 92.0 91.3 OCT 849,508 92.0 91.3 849,508 92.0 91.3 NOV 8P2,105 92.0 91.3 822.105 92.0 91.3 DEC 849,508 92.0 91.3 849.508 92.0 91.3

TOTAL 1994 8,885,879 81.7 81.1 7,515,704 69.1 68.6 TOTAL 1995 7,406,090 68.1 67.6 7,506,523 69.3 68.5 i TOTAL 1996 7,783,192 72.2 71.0 9.904,604 91.1 90.4 TOTAL 1997 9,862,487 90.7 90.0 7,616,001 70.6 69.5 TOTAL 1998 7,753,069 71.9 70.8 7,841,316 72.7 71.6 Assumptions

!E 1. Unit net generating capacity is 1241.1 MWe (Historical Annual Average)

J 2. Operating capacity factors:

a. 67.3% in first 40 days after refueling outages

b. 92.0% all other times during operation between refueling outages

,I 3. Outage start dates and durations per Outage Plan

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sus aus W seus una sua e uma sus uma sus aus sus sum use sus nun una gun 1 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN 1994 - 1998 REFUELING OUTAGE PLAN 1993 1994 1995 199G 1997 1996 J F MA M J J A S O N O J FM AW J J A S O NO J F M A M J J A S ON D J F M AM J J A S ON D J F MA M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N O UNIT 1 m.

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I SECTION Vill I

LONG RANGE PROJECTIONS I

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT g 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN SECTION Vill - Long Range Projections l

_l l This section contains the Long Range Cost Projection and Staffing Plan, which provides a five-year projection of resources and staffing. Included in this section are the following:

- Long Range Operations & Maintenance Projection Summary, which identifies 1 projections by department.

I - Long Range Capital Projection, which identifies total capital improvement projections t

by elements of the capital account:

Modifications / Additions I Facilities Equipment and Assets Capital Spares Program

- Long Range Resource Staffing Plan I Total Staffing Total Staffing by functional area I

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 3 1994 -1998 BUSINESS PLAN  !

l tono ninos gnosecrious i

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I I g LONG RANGE l COST AND STAFFING  :

I INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT I STP  :

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[ SECTION IX I

BUDGET

SUMMARY

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I I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN SECTION IX - Budget Summary Section IX provides the Budget Summary which is a matrix of 1994 budget dollars by major department by major cost category.

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I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT i

.g. 1994 - 1998 BUSINESS PLAN  ;

BUDGET

SUMMARY

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! 1994 BUDGET

SUMMARY

I INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT i i

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O CROSS REFERENCE OF ,

NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM '

) REPORT ON STP O TO STP BUSINESS PLAN AND HL&P OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN l

O L:

7. I INTRODUCTION The Business Plan and the Operational Readiness Plan (ORP) provide STP's response  !

to the root causes and specific findings and observations contained in the NRC's Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) Report of June 10,1993. The following matrix shows '

which Business Plan and ORP elements address the various DET Report findings and observations. References to the Business Plan are by Focus Area Initiative Action Plan i number designations (example: C5.1) and to the ORP by section and paragraph designations (example: V.B.1.a) and by the Action Summary designations (example: l i

ORP 51). As illustrated by the matrix all of the DET findings have been or are being addressed. Following the matrix are indexes for the Business Plan Focus Area Action ,

Plans and for the ORP section headings.  !

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DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN-Operations 2.1.1 Marginal Staffing for Scope of Responsibility 6 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.a

a. The shift supervisor spent the majority of his time performing a number of administrative duties, including reviewing work packages for work start authority D 1.1 D 5.1 V.B.1.b and again at closecut for post-maintenance test adequacy. D 5.2 05.4 V.B.2.b 0 5.5 F 6.1 ORP 51,52 -

b. The team confkmed through interviews that there was a heavy administrative 6 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.b D 1.1 D 4.2 ORP 51,52 burden placed on the shift supervisors during power operation. This sitt,ation was exacerbated during refueling outages. D 4.3 D 5.1 D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4 D 5.5 ,

6 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable i

c. Additionally, the team obsented that the shift supervisor was routine!y involved in providing the maintenance craft personnel with general information, such as plant D 1.1 04.2 status and schedules, that could have been obtained elsewhere. D 4.3 D 5.1 D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4 - D 5.5 }

d. The surveillance test program was also a significant resource burden on the u C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.a a control room staff in general and the SROs in particular. Each unit has three- D 1.1 D 4.2 V.B.1.b D 4.3 D 5.1 ORP 51,52 trains of safety equipment, thus adding a third more surveillance than the '

conventional two train design. D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4 . D 5.5 D 6.1 D 6.2 f

e. Operations, in lieu of the instrumentation and control department, conducted the 6 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable solid state protection system (SSPS) logic surveillance that essentially consumed D 4.2 D 4.3 the entire control room staff. Shift supervisors stated that during these tests, it D 5.1 D 5.2 was sometimes necessary for them to become directly involved in collecting test D 5.3 D 5.4 data. D 5.5 D 6.1 '

D 6.2 In addition, with the implementation of the reactor trip reduction program, SROs 6 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.b l f.

were expected to assume a more active oversight role curing certain critical D 4.3 D 5.1 ORP 51,52 surveillance. This program was a good initiative, but was implemented without D 5.2 D 5.3 ,

regard to the accompanying resource burden. D 5.4 r

• ' g. The work control program, inclJding post-maintenance testing (PA1T) and 6 D 1.1 D 2.1 V.B.1.b equipment clearance orders, had evolved to become cumbersome and labor D 5.1 D 5.2 V.C.7 ,

intensive. D 5.3 D 5.4 V.B.2.b  ;

F 6.1 ORPB7 ,

h. The limited operational experience throughout the site organization placed an 6 A 2.1 C 5.1 V.A.3 excessive reliance on the shift supervisor to screen work packages for safety C 5.2 D 4.2 V.B.1.b l impact and selection of appropriate PMT. D 4.3 D 5.1 ORP 49 -

D 5.2 D 5.3  !

D 5.4 F 6.1

i. The three train design requirements and the history of material condition 7 D 5.1 - D 5.2 111.B.1 -j problems frequently prompted the control room staff to cause the plant to enter D 5.4 D 6.1 lil.C.3  !

limiting conditions for operation (LCO). . On the basis of a request by the team. D 6.2 til.B the licensee performed a survey and concluded the plant entered LCOs at a rate ORP 13,14, l greater than four times that of similar facilities. 22,23 ,

J. The licensee further strained staffing levels for the non-licensed reactor plant 7 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.a  :

operators (RPOs) by implementing 12-hour shifts without margin above the D 5.2 D 5.3 ORP 51,52 ,

administrative staffing Itmit of 4 each shift. Thus, any delay in an RPO reporting D 5.4 j to work resulted in holding one of the onshift RPGs over past the normal 12-hour shift and therefore, on occasion, exceeding the technical specification (TS) ,

overtime guidelines.

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k. The RPOs were significantly affected by degraded equipment and balance of 7 D 5.2 D 5.4 Ill.B plant workarounds. D 5.5 - F 1.1 lit.C ,

F 3.1 ORP 13,14, l 19- 21, .;

24 - 25 L RPO logkeeping rounds were being conducted on an expedited basis to 7 A 1.1 C 5.1 Not Applicable i accommodated management's expectation to keep work moving. Numerous C 5.2 D 5.1 examples of frayed insulation and oil leaks were left unchallenged by the RPOs. D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4 D 5.5

m. The shortage of RPOs resulted from the decisions management made . . to 7 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B 1.a  !

reduce the operator training pipeline size and frequency, as well as to staff an D 4.1 D42 ORP 51,52 operations support activity with reactor operators (RO) and RPGs in lieu of D 4.3 D 5.2 outside contractors. D 5.4 D 5.5 j

n. Additionally, management recently decided to relax the standards for staffing a 7 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.a i crew to allow the use of apprentice RPOs as long as there were qualified at their D 4.1 D 4.2 ORP 51,52  ;

specific watchstations. These management decisions could continue to impact D 4.3 D 5.2 plant performance because of the need to utilize seasoned RPOs to fill the D53 D 5.5 i

upcoming reactor operator license class, thus further reducing the skill level of the remaining RPOs in the field.

f

o. The additional workload associated with the dual unit outages had forced the 7 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable licensee to defer operator training and reduce the shift rotation from five to four D 4.1 D 4.2 ,

crews. Personnel from the extra crew that would normally be in training were D 4.3 D 5.2  ;

dispersed into remaining crews to support the outages. Training personnel D 5.4  !

i stated the proposed schedule to resume training would reduce the scope of -

requalification training to include only the minimum required subjects.  !

p. In addition, the licensee had suspended on-the-job RPO training since February 7 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable 18,1993, to correct performance issues relating to the role of the evaluators. An D 4.1 D 4.2 .

attempt to retrain evaluators, both in an initial one day class and subsequent D 4.3 D 5.2  !

series of classes, f ailed in part because operations could not divert individuals D 5.4 D 5.5 l away from their plant duties to attend.

8 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.1.a  ;

q. The team reviewed the staffing requirements to mitigate a resource-intensive D 5.2 D 5.4 ORP 51,52 l accident (reactor shutdown outside the control room) and concluded that the existing staffing would be significantly strained to handle such a scenario.

2.1.2 Poor Support to Operations Operations

a. Absence of permanently-installed flow measuring devices required the use of 8 A 4.1. A 4.2 Ill.D.8  !

temporary test instrumentation to support routine pump flow surveillance in D 5.2 F 3.1 ORP 37 - 39 i i

safety-related systems such as the essential chilled water, auxiliary feedwater, RHR, and spent fuel cooling systems. Extended surveillance setup times had . j l

been necessary to obtain accurate and meaningful surveillance results. j

b. Numerous Target Rock solenoid valves (SOVs) exhibited problems due in part to B A 4.1 A 4.2 til.D.6 l insta!!ation in high temperature applications. Some of the problems resulted in F 3.1 ORP 35 c .

l the SOVs being out of their required position or without proper remote indication. I Operators obtained local readings and measurements to compensate for these l,

inadequacies and performed contingency actions to operate these valves properly. Systems where these SOVs were installed included the primary. j sample system the steam generator bulk water sample system, the chemical j volume and control system, and the reactor vessel head vent system.

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c. Numerous automatic controls, such as temperature control valves (TCVs), had 8 A 4.1 A 4.2 III.D.5 1 been inoperable for a significant period of time. Examples included the TCVs in D 5.2 F 3.1 ORP 34 ,

BOP lube oil coolers, the seat oil coolers, and the hydrogen coolers on the {

turbine generator. These TCVs were oversized and had to be manually throttled, l j

along with the associated bypass valves, in order to control cooling for the various systoms. _

i

d. The Information Resources Organization supplied the operations staff with 9 D 3.3 D 3.5 V.B.1.b (4) '

programs, such as a TS Actior; Statement Program, which it could not use D 3.6 D 3.7 ORP 55 because they did not perform the required tasks and were difficult to use. As a D 3.8 D 3.9 result, operations developed an intemal network of computer information systems ,

l and software programs that aided in performing such functions as work control, equipment clearances, and reactor coolant system leak rate calculations {also (

operability tracking]. . . These systems were initially developod without ,

s appropriate quality assurance controls and procedural guidance. The team reviewed the licensee's actions to date and found these computer systems still >

lacked quality controls regarding software development and utilization.

e. The licensee had not aggressively pursued TS revisions to resolve the numerous 9 D 6.1 D 6.2 Not Applicable -l i

inconsistencies within the TS at STP. The licensee has written approximately 150 technical specification interpretations (TSls) and clarifications (TSCs) to help clarify some of these TS inconsistencies.

Confusing and Conflicting Management Expectations Operations >

2.1.3

a. Management has sent confusing and conflicting guidance to the control room 9 A 1.1 B 3.1 V.C.9  :

staff through numerous memoranda without soliciting input from the first line 10 D 2.1 D 5.4 l supervisors. Some of this guidance consisted of the implementation of D 5.5 D 6.1 ,

operations policies and standards and other informal guidance. Many of these D 6.2 D 8.1 ,

informal memoranda were revisions or changes that sometimes contradicted earlier memoranda. . The licensee attempted to consolidate their written j t

guidance to the control rooms into a

• Plant Policies and Procedures Manual".

This effort appeared to have been hampered by the inability of the licensee to 7 determine the extent and subject matter of the memoranda that had been issued. 'l

b. Program and policy implementation was ineffective, in part, because of a lack of 10 A 1.1 B 3.1 Not Applicable 7 operations perspective and middle management involvement. . The reactor trip D 2.1 D 5.1 {

prevention program was implemented without being explained sufficiently to be D 5.2 D 5.3  ;

uniformly understood and accepted. Managemerit's desire to reduce trips by D 5.4 D 5.5  ;

r deferring more work to the outage, while at the same time not providing i

additional resources or extending the outage duration, appeared as a conflicting message to the control room staffs.

2.1.4 inconsistent Operator Performance Operations j

a. No SRO was in the Unit 2 control room for a short period of time because the 11 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable unit supervisor left the control room to participate in a surveillance activity. The D 4.1 D 4.2 licensee determined the root cause to have been a lack of se!f-veriftvation and D 4.3 D 5.4 deficiencies in management guidance regarding command and control. D 5.5 Contributing f actors included the relative inexperience of the SROs involved, shift i rotation, and competing tasks that called the unit supervisors out of the control room.

b. An inadvertent boron dilution event occurred while the operators attempted to 11 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable  !

borate the reactor coolant system. The licensee determined that the event was D 4.1 D 4.2 caused by a deficient understanding of the system operation during shutdown D 4.3 conditions. However, other contributing factors mentioned in the licensee's j assessment included and inadequate shift turnover, insufficient crew experience, ';

and the inabihty of personnel to property focus on a specified task.

?

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d c. During a periodic surveillance of the ECW system, the operator who was . 11 C 5.1 C 52 V.B.2.d i performing the local valve manipulation had to leave the area to locate a valve D 4.1 D 42  ;

lock key so he could throttle flow to heat exchanger. When he retumed, he D 4.3 D 52 throttled the valve to the wrong heat exchanger in a different train. The licensee determined that the event resulted in part frcm inadequate self verification. ' The ' i 3

licensee stated that a contributor to the event was the insufficient number of '

personnel available to perform the evolution. SROs who have performed this surveillance in the past stated to the team that generally, four RPOs are required -l r

to perform this surveillance, although the surveillance could have been performod efficiently with three RPOs. In this case, only two RPOs performed this I

surveHlance which made it difficult to focus on the required specific tasks. The three remaining RPOs on shift at the time were not available because they were 1 performing other duties. 5

d. Weaknesses in the PMT program, such as difficulties <n understanding the PMT 12 D 1.1 D 2.1 V.C.7

• reference manual, have resulted in confusion and differing interpretations by the D42 D 4.3 ORP 87 ,

various users. As a result, the PMT recommendations from the planners were F 6.1 ,

often very broad and vague. This contributed to the periormance of incorrec' ,

post-maintenance testing following painting activities on SDG 13. j

e. Poor procedures contributed to two occasions in which an RHR pump tripped on 12 D 2.1 D 42 Not Applicable  !

D 4.3 low flow. One of these trips occurred during a reactor cavity draindown.

f. An operating crew shifted from charging pump 1B, which was operable, to 12 D 1.1 D 42 Not Applicable ,

charging pump 1 A, which was inoperable, because they did not thoroughly D 4.3 D 5.5 ,

review a work package for closure. In this case, two maintenance groups were performing work activities associated with pump 1 A. One group had completed .;

its work and had sent its package to the control room, the other had not. There was no easy way to determine the status of work being performed. _

g. The team generally agreed with the licensee's assessment that there were two 12 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.2.d [

fundamentaliactors for the events in 1992 and early 1993: (1) personal D 1.1 D 2.1  !

accountability and responsibility needed to be emphasized, stressing self- E 2.1 E 3.1 verification and attention to detail and (2) organizational and programmatic  ;

support had to be strengthened to enhance the clarity of written guidance, oral briefings and instructions, equipment design and labeling, and repetitive task assignments. However, the team considered that work schedule, work practices l and staffing issues have also been significant contributors to past events. These {

were only recently being considered as contributory causes by the licensee.

2.1.5 Ineffective Problem Identification and Resolution Operations j

a. The procedure for performing the operations'self-assessment program appeared 12 D 4.3 E 2.1 Not Applicable >

to provide a good, detailed methodology. However, in implementing this E 3.1 procedure, the operations staff performed shallow assessments that were .[

relatively ineffective in identifying program weaknesses. l

b. Evaluations of operational events, both by operations and other organizations, 13 E 1.1 E12 ' V.C.1 . I were of limited depth and did not always consider the broader implications and E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 78 3 impact on the plant E 2.1 i

c. In followup to a Unit 1 inverter trip on March 29,1993, the corrective actions 13 E 1.1 E12 V.C.1 : f group (CAG) focused on several narrow elements of the event such as the RPO E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 78 - E energizing the cabinet without a procedure in hand. However, the CAG did not E 2.1 i address other generic aspects of the event, such as the adequacy of the :j recovery actions and the RHR system controls automatically swapping to the remote shutdown panel.

t, l

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DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN f

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d. Two performance problems reviewed by the team concerned the retum of 13 D 1.1 D 52 V.82.d essential chiller 21 A to service without proper paperwork being completed and D 5.5 E 1.1 V.C.1 failed to verify control rod position between digital rod position indication and E12 E 1.3 ORP 78 '

demand position. The operations staff determined that the root causes were E 1.4 inattention to detail and human performance problems, respectively.

Recommended corrective actions focused on counseling the individuals or issuing memoranda to the operators. However, the more fundamental aspects of these events, including weaknesses in the work control process and distractions in the control room, were not pursued. Discussions w:th applicable operations personnel indicated that they were aware that more fundamental issues existed; but did not have the time or charter to pursue further.

e. The two SPR coordinators on the operations staff were responsible for 13 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.C.1 performing 8 to 10 OER and 20 to 30 SPR reviews a month. These individuals D 52 05.3 ORP 78 spent large amounts of overtime to complete the sizable workload as the volume D 5.4 E 1.1 of SPRs continued to grow. E12 E 1.3 i E 1.4 E 4.1 i 13 A 1.1 A 4.1 Not Applicable .

f. Management support to correct program and component problems was not A42 C 4.1 :r always effective. This was evidenced by management deferral of correctlve action proposals to fix several longstanding problems. D 5.5 E 1.1 E 1.2 E 1.3 E 1.4

g. The operators continually faced challenges such as poor plant labeling. . Poor 13 See ORP V.C2 ORP 79,80 component labels contributed to numerous plant transients and other events. In ,

response to a 1991 NRC concem, the licensee stated that a labeling improvement program was being implemented. and committed to reconsider the direction and schedule for the program. . At the end of the evaluation (DE) the i licensee informed the team that it was again reviewing the prioritization of the plant labeling upgrade. i 13 See ORP V.C.3  ;

h. The operators continually faced challenges such as a weak locked valve ORPB1 l program.

i. The operators continually faced challenges such as difficulty in controlling plant 13 F 1.1 F 3.1 Not Applicable l F 4.1 )

cooldown after a reactor trip.

Adddionally, to reduce waterhammer in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. 13 A 4.1 A 42 Not Applicable j J. i the operators had to control AFW flow to the steam generators with a stop check D 5.5 F 3.1 j

valve. Management did not properly address this problem until after the thermal cycles on the steam generator from this method of flow control became an issue.

t Maintenance and Testing 2.2.1 Ineffective Corrective Maintenance

a. The licensee had established a program to determine the root cause of events 15 D 5.2 E 1.1 V.C.1 and major equipment failures but the identification and evaluation of maintenance E12 E 1.3 CRP 78 issues did not always occur. E 1.4 E 2.1 l F 3.1 .]

b. Though the procedures in many cases did not help alert workers to potential 15 D 2.1 D 42 V.B2.a problems, a well trained, qualified, attentive workforce could have successfully ' D 4.3 E 3.1 V.B.2.e q completed the tasks. ORP 60 i

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l NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP

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c. A feedwater isolation bypass valve (a containment isolation valve) was found 15 E 1.1 E 12 Not Applicable partially open for over a year. Maintenance had been performed on the valve to E 1.3 E 1.4 i correct a failere to get a closed indication light in the control room. Maintenance  ;

personnel stroked the valve several times and then adjusted the closed limit  !

switch to bring in the closed light without confirming the actual position of the valve. Five months later the licensee issued another SR to correct an apparent discrepancy between the control room indication and the local position indication. ,

However, the potential safety significance of this condition was not properly J 6

recognized and the SR wa worked s:.x months later. At that time maintenance personnel determined the va've was only going 75% closed.

d. Standby diesel generator (SDG) injector pump hold down studs failed on nine 15 E 1.1 E 12 V.C.1  ;

separate occasions. The root cause analysis was shallow and corrective actions E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 78 i were insufficient to preclude recurrence. The licensee did not perform a more E 2.1 E42 detailed analysis of tne stud failures until the team became involved. F 3.1

e. A SDG jacket water leek took four attempts to correct. The first two repair efforts 16 D42 D 4.3 _ V.B2.e ,

were unsuccessfu! because maintenance personnelinstalled the wrong size of E 2.1 E 3.1 ORP60 .

gasket. In a third repair attempt, the gaskets were made on site with material not F 5.1 F S.3 -

suited for that application.

f. Corrective maintenance performed on the high head safety injection (HHSI) 16 D 42 D 4.3 Not Applicable pump damaged the motor when too much oil was added. The oillevel sight D 5.5 F 5.2 glass was reinstalled upside down resulting in a higher level mark on the sight glass. The procedure specified 11 quarts as the espacity of the bearing .

reservoir. Due to the unrecognized reversed level sight glass, maintenance personnel added 20 quarts of oil to obtain the level mark on the sight glass. The result was oil intrusion into the motor windings.

g g. Repeatedly, the overspeed trip tappet of a turbine driven auxiliary feedwater 16 D 4.2 E 1.1 Not Applicable pump (TDAFWP) did not retum to its normal position after a manual or E12 E 1.3 I overspeed trip. The initial corrective action involved removing a sticky tar.like E 1.4 E 2.1 substance from the tappet and the upper turbine housing. Personnel did not F 3.1 determine the cause of the tar-like substance and took no action to preclude its recurrence. Approximately six months later the tappet stuck again in its tripped position when the turbine was manually tripped,

h. In 1989, the windings of a motor-operated valve, critical in establishing hot leg 16 D 4.2 E 1.1 V.C.1 ,

recirculation following a LOCA, electrically shorted rendering the valve E 1.2 E 1.3 ORP 78  ;

inoperable. The licensee performed an inadequate root cause analysis and did E 1.4 E 2.1  ;

not rectify the problem. In 1993, the windings shorted again rendering the valve F 3.1 i inoperable.

i. In August of 1992, the licensee discovered that seismic hold down screws in the 16 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable  :

Qualified Display Processing System (ODPS) card racks were missing but did D 4.2 E 1.1 not issue an SR to replace the missing screws for four months. The team noted E12 E 1.3 that the SR had not been implemented or evaluated for operability. At the E 2.1 F 1.1 request of the team the licensee evaluated the situation. Consequently, ODPS was declared inoperable affecting both units.

J. The steam generator primary side access covers on Unit had 1 known leak for 16 A 4.1 A 42 Not Applicable twe and a half years prior to being repaired. On four separate occasions C 5.1 C 52 .i ~

licensee personnel noted the leaks, however, corrective action was not E 1.1 E 1.2 implemented. These leaks existed through two refueling outages. While E 1.3 F 1.1 _;

Nmerous SRs were written for repairs, confusion concerning the status of the SRs resulted in the repair efforts not being performed.

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k. Failure to assess the safety impact of a steam leak and properly prioritize the 16 E 1.1 E 1.2 Not Applicable repair effort resulted in an inoperable steam generator power operated relief E 1.3 E 1.4 valve (PORV). The steam was impinging on the PORV actuator but was not F 3.1 i immediately repaired. Having observed previous failures of the FWlVs, caused by degraded hydraulic fluid, the licensee knew that subjecting hydraulic fluid tu high temperatures would cause it to degrade. Eventually, the oil degraded preventing the PORV from operating, and it was declared inoperable. After ,

repair efforts failed, the licensee entered and B day forced maintenance outage.

1. There was a large maintenance backlog of security system components such as 17 E 1.1 E 1.2 111.B 'l rusted camera base plates, water in manholes, broken doors, and degraded E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 13 - 21 {

intrusion detection systems. An average of 13 officers, eacn working 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> E 2.1 F 1.1 l shifts were being schedu!ed to compensate for long term maintenance issues. F 3.1

m. A numbir of components in the inservice test program were in the aiert and 17 C 5.1 C 5.2 III.D.7 failed condition. Seven had been in the alert condition since 198g without E 1.1 E 1.2 ' ORP 36, 85, effective corrective action taken. Eleven components had been in the alert range E 1.3 E 1.4 86 .

before failing and treing declared inoperable. Also, the increased testing F1.1 F 3.1 frequency for items in the alert range from quarterly to month!y resulted in F 4.1 ,

another burden on operators to accomplish testing.  ;

2.2.2 Less than Fully Effective Preventative Maintenance Program Maintenance and Testing

a. In developing the initial PM program before plant licensing 9e licensee identified 17 F 4.2 V.C.4 approximately 33,000 PM tasks. In the late 1980's the licensee revise the ORP 82,83 ,

program to include approximately 11,000 ' active" tasks,12,000

• inactive" (no I

longer scheduled) tasks, and the remaining tasks either cancelled or superseded.

The licensee selected the inactive tasks based on "importance factors: that had i been assigned to the individual PM activities when they were developed. After .;'

the *importance factors' screening the only review performed to determine which individual PM tasks would be classified as inactive or active, was a non-technical '

one by maintenance personnel. As a result of not performing these inactive PM tasks, , preventable events, equipment failures, and instances of poor ,

assurance of operability (mostly deahng with instrument calibration) occurred.

b. Appropriate PM tasks were not developed or included in the PM program for 18 F 4.2 V.C.4 some important equipment in the SDGs and support systems. Relay failures in ORP 82,83 the voltage-regulating circuit caused inoperable SDGs on two dderent occasions.

The relays had never been replaced not scheduled to be replaced. Main control ,

board meters used during SDG testing and SDG monitoring were not in the PM program and had not been calibrated since startup. In reviewing the issue of  ;

noncalibrated SDG meters the heensee identified approximately 150 additional main control board instruments the were not in the PM program. Some of these instruments monitored important parameters for the 125 VDC batteries and the battery chargers. ,

c. Incomplete or incorrect PM procedures resulted in poor equipment performance. 18 D 2.1 F 4.2 V.C.4 l Examples of equipment failures, malfunctions or inoperable equipment resulting ORP 82,83 ' l from procedural deficiencies were: 1) Repeated examples of 13.8 KV breakers  ;

failing to cycle due to inadequate PM tubrication instructions; 2) An ESF actuation from an improperly calibrated emergency cooling water transmitter because the PM instruction did not specify the type of M&TE equipment to be used. The improperly calibrated transmitter contributed to the ESF actuation; l and 3) Two relief valves having incorrect setpoints because the PM procedures specified the wrong setpoint.

d. The method for improving the PM program involved the use of PM " feedback" 18 D 1.1 F 4.2 Ill.C.2 l forms to identify errors and refinements for incorporation into the program. F 5.1 F 7.1 ORP 24 However, since 1991 a large backlog of PM feedback forms had accumulated.  ;

in 1992 over 2500 feedback forms were not processed on schedule. As of April, {

1993 the backlog of unprocessed PM foedback forms was approximately 5800.

Recentry, the licensee added personnel to address this large backlog.

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DER ACTION ORP l NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN  !

Maintenance Training Deficiencies Maintenance and Testing 2.2.3

a. In mid-1992, an industry organization determined the licensee's basic 18 D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.2.e maintenance craft skills training program was deficient. In response the licensee D 4.3 ORP 60  ;

established a recertification testing prog am for journeyman in the three disciplines. To allow continuation of work, craft qualification matrices were established. Each matrix listed individual craftsmen and the tasks in which they were currently

• qualified,'such as breaker maintenance. To compensate for a lack of " qualified

• individuals, a supervisor or qualified journeyman continuously observed the work of the unqualified personnet. {

b. The training for molded case circuit breakers did not include the correct method 19 D 2.1 D 4.1 lit.D.3 D 4.2 D 4.3 V.B.2.e l for determining the breaker settings based on the values (amperes) provided in the setpoint document. This lack of training and the complex procedural ORP 60 ,

instructions for determining the breaker settings resulted in incorrect breaker settings rendenng seven safety-related components inoperable.

c. I&C technicians introduced air intc, essential chillers and flooded a control panel 19 D 4.1 D42 V.B.2.e l with oil due to a lack of understanding of how the chillers function under vacuum. D 4.3 ORP 60  ;

This contributed to degraded equipment performance and lack of equipment operability.

d. Craft personnel were not trained on the need to expeditiously place battery 19 0 2.1 D 4.1 V.B.2.e chargers into service after performing discharge testing of 125 VDC station D 4.2 D 4.3 ORP 60 ,

batteries. This lack of training and omission from the testing procedure of this critical element of battery testing could have resulted in permanent damage to ,

the station battenes.

D 4.2 V.B.2.e C e. Beyond the basic skills training deficiencies, the licensee identified that training in 19 D 4.1 D 4.3 ORP 60 specialized skill did not match the necessary tasks to be performed. t 19 D 4.1 D 4.2 HLD.1

f. The Mechanical maintenance staff was not trained to maintain the TDAFWP D 4.3 V.B.2.e govemor or the TDAFWP overspeed trip mechanism. This contributed to the numerous unsuccessful attempts to resolve problems on the TDAFWP. ORP 29,60 19 D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.2.e

g. Training for reactor coolant pump motors was based on a generic 2000 horsepower motor and did not include the unique features of these motors. D 4.3 ORP 60 .

h. Training on the SDGs did not include the govemor or voltage regulator. 19 D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.2.e i D 4.3 ORP 60

i. I&C technicians assigned to work on the security system were not trained on 19 D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.2.e -l certain aspects of that system. Three of the five designated technicians had not D 4.3 ORP 60 received specific security system related training and the other technician received only limited training. l Deficiencies in the Replacement Parts Program Maintenance and Testing  ;

2.2.4

a. The lack of parts caused safety-related equipment to remain inoperable and 19 0 3.3 D 5.2 V.C.8 20 D 5.4 ORP 88,89 degraded the performance of equipment important to safety. The lack of readily ,

available parts contributed to the size of the maintenance backlog. ... Numerous i general usage material such as bolts, nuts, gaskets, and desiccant were not available as general issue items from the warehouse. To support emergent work, needed items were obtained by substituting parts that were reserved for other planned work.

b. In December 1992, during maintenance to repair an AFW turbine trip throttle 20 D 3.3 D 5.2 V.C.8 j D 5.4 ORP 88,89  ;

valve, a replacement disc and seat were not available in the warehouse. The valve was reassembled and the system declarect operable. This leaking valve ,

contributed to numerous overspeed turbine trips a January and February of ,j 1993.

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20 D 5.2 D 5.4 V.C.B i

c. The lack of spare parts contributed to valves within the primary containment F 6.1 ORP 88,89 being inoperable for a year. During the 1991 refuel outage, "T' drains were not available for installation into some new valve motors. . A faiNre of the work control system later resulted in the *T* drains not being installed in a timely manner.

20 D 5.2 D 5.4 V.C.8 I

d. The Unit 2 secondary side B PORV was inoperable because of an intemal E 1.1 E 1.2 ORP 88,89 [

hydraulic leak that caused premature failure of a pressure switch. The intemal E 1.3 E 1.4  !

leak caused the hydraulic pump to cycle frequently and eventually resulted in the high pressure switch failing low. The hydraulic pump ran continuously until its F 3.1 l

}

thermal overloads tripped. The switch was replaced but the leak was not fixed because of a lack of parts.

20 D 3.3 D 5.2 V.C.B  ;

e. Previously, several switches on the CH system failed and were replaced.

D 5.4 ORP 88,89  ;

However,if they had failed again no replacements were in the warehouse or on order when the inventories were reviewed by the team. ,

f Occasiona!!y, maintenance personnel installed or attempted to install the wrong 20 D 1.1 D 3.3 Ill.C.3 t f.

part in safety-related systems at the facility. The major reason for these D 3.6 05.2 V.C.5 F 7.1 ORP 25 - 28, situations appeared to be in the parts sourcing process. The process to determine the correct replacement part was extremely difficult and cumbersome. 84 .{

The computerized parts reference system consisted of two databases requiring  :

the viewing of multiple screens. The overall response of the system was slow. l Numerous part numbers were

• flagged" for revision because of the large _{

engineering document backlog. Sometimes part numbers, as in some Rockwell valve components, were wrong. ... When computer information was questionable, l such as being flagged, design and purchase documentation had to be used. l However, a number of these documents had unincorporated revisions due to the large engineering backlog.

g. During repair activities to stop a jacket water leak on the inlet header of a SDG, 20 D 4.2 D 4.3 Not Applicable .l the discha,ge header gasket was installed. This occurred twice before the F 5.1 F 5.3 l mechanics recognized that the gasket was not the correct size. ,t

h. During repair activities to return an essential chiller to service, the correct type of 20 D 3.3 D 3.6 Not Applicable I l

pressure switch was installed but was not qualified as safety.related [ sic). The I switch was replaced before the chi!!er was placed back into service.

Insufficient Support to Maintenance Maintenance and Testing l 2.2.5 1

a. Maintenance department senior supervisors provided limited reinforcement of 21 A 1.1 A 2.1 V.B.2.a i expected quahty performance standards. Their time was dominated by D 5.1 D 5.2 ORP 59 l preparation for meetings, attending meetings, and performing administrative D 5.4 ' D 5.5 i tasks. F 5.2 .j

b. The staff size was insufficient to accomplish corrective maintenance given the 21 D 1.1 D 5.1 Not Applicable  ;

i productivity achieved using the existing system, the unique three-train design of D 5.2 D 5.4 the facility, and the untimely resolution of design deficiencies. The balance of F 1.1 j plant corrective maintenance effort suffered mostly due to the lack of personnel {

resources.

c. From the end of the Unit 2 refuel outage (December 1991) until the beginning of 21 D 1.1 F 1.1 111. 8  !

the Unit 1 refuel outage (September 1992) both unit were essentially operating at V.B.2.f I power. However, during these 9 months, the backlog of non-outage SRs V.B.2.g (

increased by 1600, an increase of approximately 50 percent. ORP 13 21, l 62  ;

i I

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NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN

d. Recognized design deficiencies for numerous equipment had not been resolved. 21 A 4.1 D 5.2 lit.C Examples included the Brown Boveri breakers for the TSC diesel generators. D 5.4 05.5 Ill.D.4 E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.3 E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 3 F 3.1 ORP 22 - 28, 32, 33, 63 - 75 '

e. Recognized design deficiencies for numerous equipment had not been resolved. 21 A 4.1 D 5.2 Ill.C Examples included the obsolete fire protection computer. D 5.4 D 5.5 V.B.1.b(3)  :

E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.3 >

V.B.4 i E 1.3 E 1.4 F 3.1 ORP 22 - 28, "

53, 54, 63- 75

f. Recognized design deficiencies for numerous equipment had not been resolved. 21 A 4.1 D 5.2 Ill.C Examples included water intrusion into the startup feedwater pump's lubrication D 5.4 D 5.5 V.B.3 system. E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.4 ,

E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 22 - 28,

• F 3.1 63- 75

g. Recognized design def;ciencies for numerous equipment had not been resolved. 21 A 4.1 D 5.2 til.C Examples included refrigerant and oil contamination mitigation devices had not D 5.4 D 5.5 til D.2 been permanently installed on essential chillers even though air and moisture E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.3 ,

intrusion had reduced their reliabiity. E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 .

F 3.1 ORP 22 - 28,  !

.30, 31,63 - 76

h. In an outage cond: tion, substantial, routine use of overtime was used to try to 21 A 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.2.c accomplish the scheduled tasks. . In some instances Technical Specification C 5.1 C 5.2 overtime guidelines were exceeded without appropriate management review and D 5.2 D 5.3 approval. D 5.4 D 5.5 F 4.2  ;

f

i. Staffing limitations impaired the amount of vibration monitoring accomplished 22 D 5.2 F 4.2 Not Applicable under the predictive maintenance program. j

j. Dunng a vibration analysis in May 1990, the Unit 1 main generator seal oit 22 D 2.1 D 5.2 Not Applicable  ;

backup pump exceeded alarm limits. However, over 21/2 years passed before F 4.2 j the next vibration readings were taken in January 1993. Subsequently, the  ;

deteriorated motor and pump bearing had to be replaced. .

k. Since the plant began commercial operation the vibration of the Unit 1 HHS1 22 D 2.1 D 5.2 Not Applicable ,

pump motors exceeded the alarm limits of the predictive maintenance program. F 4.1 F 4.2 However, more than 27 months passed between vibration readings on the 1C i pump and 18 months passed for the 1 A pump. Eventually, unsatisfactory oil samples were taken on the 1 A and 1C motor bearings. j

l. As much as three years passed between vibration readings on the Unit 1 22 D 2.1 D 5.2 Not Applicable  ;

auxiliary feedwater pumps. F 4.1 F 4.2  ;

2.2.6 Inefficient Work Control Process Maintenance and Testing

a. The large amount of emergent work significantly contributed to the inefficient 22 A 4.1 A 4.2 111. 8 work control process. This was due, in part, to the large corrective maintenance C 4.1 D 1.1 V.B.2.b  :

backlog which inhibited the timely repair of deficiencies before their condition D 5.2 D 5.4 ORP 13 21. l degraded. . The excessive amount of emergent work prompted the staff to D 5.5 F 1.1 ,

postpone previously planned or partially planned jobs, adding to the backlog.

b. A major detractor [in the planning and preparation to accomplish work) was the 22 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5 quahty of management information systems. D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 84 D 3.5 D 3.6 D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 H 1DETyAtt susPLAN# ATRIX. DER MTx 10/15%3 (Fnday) 9 20mm Page to

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i DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION

^ PG. PLAN 4

23 D 2.1 D 4.2 V.C.2

c. Planner periormance was inhibited, in some cases, by incorrect component D 4.3 F 6.1 ORP 79,80 identification within the facility on SRs. This necessitated walkdowns of all equipment to verify correct component number against design documents. ,.

23 D 3.2 D 3.3 V.C.5

d. The computer hindered schedular performance because it did not allow for changes in workforce size or show support discipline ties to performing the job. D 3.4 D 3.7 ORP 84 [

D 5.2 D 5.4 r

e. The [ work) senedule was only published every other day with handwritten 23 C 4.1 updates needed when it was not published, Due to previous training program deficiencies, there were numerous unqualified 23 D 4.1 D 42 ~V.B.2.e f.

maintenance personnel requiring increased supervisor observation and direction. D 4.3 D 5.2 ORP 60 D 5.5 23 ~3 1.1 D 1.1 V.B.2.a  ;

g. Coordination and communication weaknesses contributed to poor maintenance  ;

while work package quality and parts availability deficiencies decreased D 3.3 D 5.2 ORP 59 F 6.1 efficiency.

23 D 4.2 D 4.3 Not Applicable

h. During an uncoupled run of the reactor coolant pump, the lower motor bearing failed as a r att f tube oil starvation. The starvation occurred when a D 5.5 F52 -

main' er, attempting to correct a suspect high lube oil level, drained ,

y appi . , 3 gallons of tube oil before the run. The maintenance worker failed to notify the control room that the lube oil had been drained. The ,

maintenance worker's supervisor, stationed in the control room, stated that he did not know of the suspect high lube oil level and would have stopped the job if he  ;

had known that 3 gallons had been drained.

i. Several SDG failures resulted from broken fuel oil injector pump hold dowr 23 C21 F 3.1 V.B.3 .

V.B.4 l studs, many of which were installed using a deficient stud driver tool desigred ay ORP 63 - 75 the system engineer. The system engineer failed to consult design erpaering or the SDG vendor while designing the tool. '

23 F 5.2 Not Applicable J. An inadequate tumover contributed to maintenance personnel f!us' ng two  !

feedwater isolation valve hydraulic systems with used coolant frori the balance-of-plant diesel generator instead of the proper flushing fluid.

23 D 4.2 D 4.3 Not Applicable l

k. An inadequate pre-job brief contributed to a HHSI motor pump bearing reservoir sight glass being improperly installed. As a result, tube oil was introduced into F 5.2 j the motor windings.

Coordination of the various support groups did not always occur as evidenced by 23 D 1.1 D 5.4 V.B.1.b (2) [

1.

the team observing two work activities which could not continue because support F 5.1 F 6.1 ,

workers did not erect the designated scaffolding. ,

m. Approximately 20 percent of the work packages were revised to correct errors or 23 D 1.1 D 42 V.B.1.b (2) ,

to change the scope of the work activity. D 4.3 F 6.1 ,

23 - D 2.1 D 4.2 Not Applicable

n. The work procedures occasionally contained unneeded information and did not  ;

match the experience of the individual using the procedures. D 4.3 F 6.1  ;

i

o. Procedures were sometimes ignored. . Contractors testing motor operated 23 A 1.1 D 2.1 Not Applicable j valves did not take the procedure to the field or taped all four comers of the 200 D 4.2 D 5.3 4

plus page procedure shut. D 5.5 23 D 3.3 D 3.6 Not Applicable

p. When the job required parts not originally anticipated, the parts had to be sourced for availability and usually deallocated from another planned job. D 3.7 D 3.9 l However the General Maintenance Supervisor, who had to approve the l deallocation, and numerous line supervisors were not sufficiently trained to use ]

the computer which detracted from the parts sourcing effort j

NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVAL.UATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN  !

2.2.7 Post-Maintenance Testing Program Not Always Effective Maintenance and Testing i

a. The PMT reference manual used by planners to select the appropriate test 24 B 3.1 D 1.1 V.C.7 requirement did not specify appropriate detail and occasionally spqcified the D 2.1 D 5.5 ORP87 wrong test. F 6.1

b. The planners lacked appropriate training, experience and guidance that would 24 D42 D 4.3 V.C.7 allow them to compensate for the [PMT reference] manuals deficiencies. D 5.4 F 6.1 ORP87

c. IDeficiencies in the PMT reference manual and planner experience and training] 24 B 3.1 D 1.1 V.C.7 resulted in planners listing all possible PMT that might be necessary and D 4.2 D 4.3 ORP 87 specifying PMTs to be performed as 'if required." This required the already D 5.2 D 5.4 heavily burdened shift supervisor to review the scope of work completed in order F 6.1 to specify the appropriate post maintonance test to be performed. .

r

d. Periodically, the shift supervisor selected inappropriate PMT and in some 24 C 5.1 C 5.2 Not Applicable instances inoperable equipment was not identified such as: SDG 13 was D 1.1 D 2.1 inoperable for 2 weeks because of the failure to perform adequate PMT after F 6.1 painting activities. The correct PMT had been specified in the work package but .

was inappropriately cancel led due to a concem over excessive SDG starts.

c. Periodically, the shift supervisor selected inappropriate PMT and in some 24 C 5.1 C 5.2 V.C.7 instances inoperable equipment was not identified such as: PMT was not D 1.1 D 2.1 ORP87 performed on a SDG output breaker after a fuel oil injector pump was repaired. F 6.1  ;

During that maintenance activity, the output breaker was racked out to support work on the injector pump and later improperly racked in. For PMT the SDG was started but breaker closure was not tested. During a subsequent surveillance test, the SDG output breaker would not close onto the bus.

f. Periodically, the shift supervisor selected inappropriate PMT and in some 24 C 5.1 C 52 V.C.7 ORP 87 instances inoperable equipment was not identified such as: After work was D 1.1 D 2.1 performed on the feeder breaker for essential chiller 21C, no PMT was F 6.1 i performed, yet the chiller was declarod operable. The fo!!owing day the chiller's  !

f feeder breaker tnpped during a routine start attempt due to breaker problems.

2.2.8 Periodic Testing Not Always Effective Maintenance and Testing

a. Numerous instances had been identified where { surveillance] procedures were 24 See ORP V.C.6 inadequate to meet TS surveinance requirements, thereby reducing assurance ORP 85,86  ;

that the ettuipment was operable. Among these was a failure to completely test  !

a manual reactor trip handswitch and the nonconservative setting of one of the four reactor protection channels during a reactor startup. ,

b. In a followup, the team questioned the licensee concerning an engineering test of 25 A 4.1 C 2.1 V.C.6 the control room emergency ventilation recirculation charcoal adsorbers. E 1.1 E12 ORP B5,86 .

I Subsequently, the licensee determined the surveillance requirements had not E 1.3 E 1.4 been satisfied in that a defective method had been devised to determine when '

adsorber testing should be performed. The failure to send the charcoal sample for testing within the required interval resulted in a 3 month delay in determining that the charcoal bed was below required standards for iodine adsorbtion.

c. The licensee committed to expand the scope of the enhancement program to 25 See ORP V.C.6 ,

meet the original [all surveillance procedures] intent. ORP 85,86 2.3.1 Weak Support in Resolving Plant Problems Engineering Support '

a. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 E 1.1 E12 V.B.3 l and correctivo actions include: The licensee did not determine the root cause of E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 repetitive failures of the fuelinjector pump hold-down studs associated with the E 4.2 F 3.1 V.C.1 SDGs. Nine separate failures occurred between 1987 and 1993, including five ORP 63 75, failures on SDG 22. The failure of these studs was a significant contributor to 78 the high unavailability of SDG 22.

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PG. PLAN l

b. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.3 I and corrective actions include: The RCAs and accompanying corrective actions E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 were ineffective in preventing repeated failures of the toxic gas monitors and F 3.1 V.C.1  ;

containment ventilation isolation system. ORP 63 75, 78 Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 A 4.1 E 1.1 lit.B.6 c.

and corrective actions include: Widespread, longstanding problems with the E 1.2 E 1.3 V.B.3 application and performance of Target Rock solenoid-operated valves (SOVs) E 1.4 E 4.1 V.B.4 ,

were not resolved. These valves were used extensively in several safety-related F 3.1 V.C.1  ;

systems. . . Temporary modifications were installed to bypass containment ORP 35, 63 -

isolation valves to allow steam generator sampling. Previous corrective actions, 75,78 l such as re-orienting the main steam isolation valve above the seat drains, did not prevent additional failures. .I

d. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3 1 and corrective actions include: The licensee started up with a significant design E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.4  !

deficiency that resulted in excessive water hammer in the auxiliary feedwater E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 63 - 75 l system. Engineering's resolution to the issue was to install mechanical stops on F 3.1 '

the AFW valves to prevent them from closing, which created additional operational cor*.cems. Operators could no longer effectively throttle valves during certain plant conditions to control flow to the steam generators. As a result, operators controlled flow by cycling the stop check valves, resulting in an excessive number of thermal cycles on steam generator nozzles.

e. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3 and corrective actions include: Corrective actions for numerous safety and E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.4 -;

nonsafety related circuit breaker problems were not aggressive or complete. The E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 63 - 75 '

licensee evaluated each breaker failure and took corrective actions for safety- F 3.1  !

related circuit breakers. Many of these actions were incomplete. Further, the licensee was slow in resolving problems and taking corrective actions for many nonsafety-related breakers.

f. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3 and corrective actions include: After a reactor trip, the startup feedwater pump E 1.1 E 1.2 V.C.1 i (SUFP) failed to start upon demand because of low oil pressure. Repeated E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 occurrences of moisture intrusion had caused the oil filters to be clogged, F 3.1 ORP 63 - 75,  ;

reducing the lube oil pressure. A previous SUFP trip on low tube oil pressure 78 had not been properly evaluated, resulting in the failure to recognize design deficiencies.  ;

i

g. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses 27 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3 and corrective actions include: During oil pump transfers, the steam generator E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.4 ,

feed pump turbine tripped repeatedly because the oil pressure decreased rapidly. E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP 63 75 Engineering mistakenly accepted the recommendation vf a vendor to drill holes in F 3.1 .;

the pump casing to prevent air binding, which, when implemented, exacerbated  ;

the problem. ,

28 C 2.1 C 3.1 til.B.4 I

b. Examples of ineffective engineering support, investigations, root cause analyses and corrective actions include: The Technical Support Center diesel generator E 1.1 E 1.2 V.B.3  !

was not reliable, as evidenced by repeated failures to start and load during E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 )

V.C.1 I testing. Contributing to the poor reliability was exposure to the environment. F 3.1 design weaknesses, and poor circuit breaker reliability. The licensee only ORP 32,33, partia!!y implemented proposed resolutions to these problems. 63 75,78

i. The engineering staff did not always adequately evaluate equipment operability 28 C 2.1 E 1.1 V.B.3 as lttustrated below: In August 1992, a system engineer discovered that seismic E 1.2 E 1.3 V.C.1 hold-down screws were missing from the Unit 1 quality display parameter system E 1.4 ORP 63 - 72, (ODPS) card racks, but did not understand the seismic consequences and did 78 not request an evaluation for operability. The licensee did not properly evaluate the effect of the deficiency on operability until so requested by the team in April 1993. The ODPS was subsequently declared inoperable.

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T DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVAltJATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN 28 C 2.1 V.B.3

j. The engineering staff did not always adequately evaluate equipment operability as illustrated below Torque measurements and computations associated with V.B.4 ORP 63 - 75  !

testing of motor operated valves were not evaluated to verify valve operability.

The licensee discovered, upon evaluating previous test data, that several residual heat removal valves had been torquod above design values because of a l deficiency in the test procedure and associated engineering documents to measure or compute torque. l

k. The installation of plant modifications to effect plant improvements was not 28 8 1.1 C '3.1 V.B.3 E 2.1 V.B.4 l always successful.

ORP 63 - 75 i TMs were not thoroughly evaluated and were not aggressively pursued to closure 28 A 1.1 A 4.1 til.C.3 a I.

as illustrated in the following: Sixteen TMs were installed for more than 2 years, A 4.2 C 3.1 V.B.3 i l

D 5.2 F 3.1 V.B.4 including some that cause problems for operators. Some TMs were originally ORP 25,63 -

assigned a long restoration period (1 to 2 years) or given an extension without adequate justification. Some were later converted to permanent modifications 75 and remained open until the permanent modifications were closed.  ;

I

m. TMs were not thoroughly evaluated and were not aggressively pursued to closure 28 A 1.1 A 4.1 til.C.3.a as illustrated in the following: In p?rforming engineering evaluation for TMs A 4.2 C 3.1 V.B.3 r D 5.2 F 3.1 V.B.4 affecting the CH system and steam generator sample valves, the engineering I staff failed to realistically evaluate required operator action in a potential high ORP 25. 63 -

radiation field, to compensate for failed safety-re!ated automatic valve actuators. 75 System Engineering Program Not Effectively implemented Engineering Support 2.3.2 t

28 A 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.3.a

a. Program expectations for the system nngineers greatly exceeded the resources 29 C 3.1 D 5.1 V.B.3.c .;

provided. Some system engineers were assigned the primary responsibility for D 5.2 D 5.3 ORP 63,64 - i as many as 10 systems, with an additional 10 systems assigned as backup.

D 5.4 D 5.5 h

29 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.a

b. Most system engineers could not remember what backup systems they were D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.3.c .l assigned. and were not knowledgeable in their backup system assignment.

D 4.3 D 5.2 ORP 63,64 D 5.3 D 5.4 j D 5.5 ,

Staff ng allocation was roughly based upon other two-unit f acilities, however, the 29 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.c j c.

three-train safety system design resulted in an increased work load for the D 5.2 D 5.3 l system engineers when compared to otherwise equivalent nuclear facilities with D 5.4 D 5.5 two trains. i 29 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.a  :

d. System engine:. generally did not complete their monthly walkdowns or did not D 5.2 D 5.3 ORP 63,64 l sufficiently document them when performed. Some system engineers performed D 5.4 D 5.5 j walkdowns of multiple systems in both units on the same day, indicating a cursory review at best.

+

29 B 1.1 B 2.1 V.B.3

e. System health reports lacked useful detail and trending information. Most system engineers received no feedback on the content of the system health reports from B 3.1 C 2.1 ORP 63 - 72 {~

their supervisors, did not review and track service requests on their assigned C 3.1 D 3.2 systems, did not know how many service requests were outstanding on their D 3.3 D 3.4 i systems, did not know how many modifications affected their systems, and did D 3.6 D 3.7  !

not track and trend problems or particular attributes of their systems. F 4.2 ,

The licensee indicated that trending will not be performed until the end of 1993 29 D 3.2 D 3.3 V.B.3.d(3) f.

D 3.4 D 3.6 ORP 71,72 #

when the software becomes available.

D 3.7 F 4.2 .

t i

29 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3

g. Several engineers were deficient in training or equivalent work experience, which with the demands on time available for daily responsibilities and a perception of D 4.1 D 4.2 ORP 63 - 72 limited resources, resulted in system engineers receiving little training for specific D 4.3 D 5.2  ;

D 5.4 jobs, components. or systems. {

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L DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN 29 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.a I

h. Those lsystem] engineers who were

• hands-on* oriented and focused more on

• D 4.2 D 4.3 ORP 63,64 the equipment aspects of their systems tended not to be as involved in technical monitoring and analysis which included design basis issues, system tracking and F 4.2 trending, and proactive activities.

29 A 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.3.a

i. Management did not oversee and direct the { system engineer) program in a C 3.1 D 5.5 ORP 63,64  ;

consistent manner. System engineers reported to different supervisors who had differing standards for implementing the system engineering program.

Because of the reactive nature of system engineering work, and networking 29 A 1.1 A 2.1 V.B.3.a k.

between operations and maintenance, first line supervisors maintained minimal B 1,1 C 2.1 ORP 63 control over work assigned to the system engineers, who spent over 40 percent C 3.1 C 4.1 i of their time supporting emergent work of other site organizations. Thus, the D 5.2 D 5.4 system engineer received support requests that had not been screened for D 5.5 ,

validity by PED supervision. ,

Engineering Work Backlogs Were Large, Poorly Tracked, and Not Well Managed Engineering Support 2.3.3 30 A 1.1 A 2.1 til.C

a. The licensee did not have an effective method to determine the size and '

B 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.3 composition of the engineenng backlog. This conclusion is based on the fact that the data initially given to the team was grossly inaccurate and it C 3.1 F 7.1 V.B.4 ORP 22 - 28, subsequently took more than four weeks to provide reasonably accurate data.

The backlog consisted of approximately 10,800 work items on May 1,1993. 63 - 75 The backlog did not include work assignments of administrative or contractor personnel.

b. The number of work items in the backlog was increasing at a net rate of 428 30 A 1.1 A 2.1 Ill.C cach calendar quarter (seven person-years each quarter). To compensate for B 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.3 c this workload, numerous individuals worked more than 70 percent overtime and C 3.1 D 5.2 V.B.4 some worked more tnan 100 percent overtime in a pay period. D 5.3 D 5.4 ORP 22 - 28,  ;

F 7.1 63- 75 l a

c. The licensee was not incorporating amendments into site vendor drawings in a 30 D 5.2 D 5.4 111.C.2 timely manner. On March 19,1993, approximately 11,500 vendor drawings D 5.5 E 4.2 fil.C.3.c (approximately 50 percent being safety.related) had one or more unincorporated F 7.1 ORP 27 amendments. Drawings with many unincorporated amendments rendered the associated vendor drawings cumbersome to use and impeded work planning and execution. Previous initiatives to reduce this backlog were not effective.

Use of Industry and Site Operational Experience was inadequate Engineering Support l 2.3.4 1

a. Industry and site OERs performed by the licensee were not comprehensive or 30 D 4.2 D 4.3 Ill.C.3.b timely, and failed to corrrietely address problems or recommendations. In D 5.4 05.5 V.B.3 several instances, engineering failed to review and benefit from industry E 4.1 F 7.1 V.B.4 ORP 26, 63 -

experience, such as described in NRC information roticas and bulletins, vendor service bulletins, and industry reports, or site operational wperience, which led to 75 l i

avoidable site events, repetitive equipment failures, and additional engineering time expenditures.

b. The following are examples in which the licensee failed to properly implement the 30 C 2.1 C 3.1 Ill.C.E.b OER program: NRC Information Notice 91-046,

• Degradation of Emergency 31 04.2 D 4.3 V.B.3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Delivery Systems,* listed instances where inadvertent D 5.4 D 5.5 V.B.4 E 4.1 ORP 26, 63 -

painting of fuel injector assemblies, including metering rods, rendered emergency diesel generators inoperable. The licensee's response to the notice indicated 75 .(

,. that adequate controls were in place and that no further actions were necessary.

However, during painting activities, paint dripped into the holes which contained the fuel metering rods, rendering a diesel inoperable as later discovered during  ;

the performance of a surveillance test.

l H CE TyAUBUSPLAMM atrix,DE R MTX 10'1553 (F nday) 9 20am Page 15

DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN i

c. - The following are examples in which the licensee failed to properly implement the 31 D 2.1 D 4.2 lil.C.3.b D 4.3 D 5.1 V.B.3 i OER program: During tests in March 1993, the licensee discovered that 36 control rods in Unit 1 were thermally locked. The event occurred following a D 5.5 E 4.1 V.B.4  ;

ORP 26, 63 -

reactor cooldown in February 1993, with the control rods energized on the core E 4.2 bottom. The licensee could have avoided the event by following the guidance in 75  ;

Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB.92-05 of May 21,1992. The licensee received the bulletin in June 1992 but failed to route it to Reactor Engineering  ;

and Operations Support Groups. Therefore, its contents were not incorporated j

into operating procedures by cognizant operational groups.

d. The following are examples in which the licensee failed to properly implement the 31 D 4.2 D 4.3 Ill.C.3.b D 5.5 E 4.1 V.B.3 OER program: When replacing SDG rocker arms with a modified design, the ,

licensee failed to include specific Cooper-Bessemer service bulletin requirements E 4.2 V.B.4 l ORP 26,63 -  !

for torquing and installing modified parts. This could have prevented the replaced rocker arms from functioning properly. 75 i

e. The following are examples in which the licensee failed to properly implement the 31 C 2.1 C 3.1 Not Applicable OER program: Dunng an uncoupled run of a reactor coolant pump, the lower D 4.2 D 4.3 motor bearing failed from a lack of tube oil (LO) after a maintenance worker E 1.1 E 1.2 drained approximately 3 gallons of LO in an attempt to correct a suspect high LO E 1.3 E 1.4 +

level. An investigation showed that the reactor coolant pump motor bearing oil E 4.1 levels had a history of erratic readings and that a lower reactor coolant pump bearing was damaged during a previous outage because of insufficient LO in the lower bearing.

The following are examples in which the licensee failed to properly implement the 31 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3 f.

OER program: In May 1990, the licensee detected high vibration readings on the F 4.1 V.B.4 1 Unit 1 turbine generator seal oil backup pump, but did not monitor the pump until ORP 63 - 75

[

completing the 1992 outage and inspection of the main turbine and auxiliaries.

During turbine startup, high vibration readings were again observed on the seal oil motor and pump bearings that necessitated repair.

g. The licensee assigned limited personnel and hardware resources to the VETIP to 31 A 1.1 E 4.2 Ill.C.2 receive, distribute, and track vendor information. The licensee added staff F 7.1 Ill.C.3.c ORP 24,27  :

temporarily to correct problems, but did not take long term corrective actions, thus permitting the problem to recur. . . Many examples of inadequate incorporation of vendor information were repeatedly noted by QA, ISEG, and 7 other audit groups without substantive corrective action being taken.

h. The licensee had not updated the PRA database to reflect actual plant 31 C 2.1 C 3.1 Not Applicable  !

32 F 3.1 l equipment failure data. . The licensee was not using the unique capabilities of the PRA group to identify plant equipment reliability or to help in ranking (

+

modification or maintenance work. During this evaluation, the licensee used PRA to address team concems with the reliability of the SDGs, in particular for SDG  !

22, but onlyin response to specific and repeated team requests.  !

t 2.3.5 insufficient Support to Engineering Engineering Support  ;

s

a. Management assigned inadequate information systems to aid engineering in 32 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.d evaluating system performance, trending maintenance history, accessing industry D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5  ;

and site experience, performing investigations and root cause analyses, and D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 71,72,  ;

D 3.5 D 3.6 84  !

making informed decisions.

D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 D 5.2  ;

F 3.1 F 4.1 l

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i DER ACTION ORP  !

NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVAL UATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION  !

^ PG. PLAN 32 C 2.1 C 3.1 lit.C.3.c b.~ The equipment maintenance history database was not accurate and current D 3.1 D 3.2 V.B.3.d ,

because of the poor quality of information loaded into the system, and because D 3.3 D 3.4 V.C.5 of the large backlog of outstanding entries, estimated by the licensee to be D 3.5 D 3.6 ORP 27, 71, ,

approximately 6-8 months. 72,84  ;

D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 F 4.1 F 7,1 lll.C.3.c -t

c. A sample of various databases showed conflicting and incomplete information 32 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.B.3.d f concoming the maintenance history of CH chillers, failure histories for the SDGs, D 3.3 D 3.4 lists of TMs, and MOV issues. D35 D 3.6 V.C.5 i D 3.7 D 3.8 ORP 27,71, .;

D 3.9 F 4.1 72,84 F 7.1 ,

d. The heensee could not retrieve design basis variances concerning MOV 32 C 2.1 D 3.1 V.B.3.d setpoints, and could not track or index Plant Change Forms by system or type. D 3.2 03.3 V.C.5 [

D 3.4 D 3.5 ORP 71,72,  ;

D 3.6 D 3.7 84 03.8 D 3.9 D 5.2 D 8.1 F 7.1

e. The licensee had to manually search service requests to determine where 32 03.1 D 3.2 til.C.3.c j modified SDG rocker arms were installed, and whether they were instaHed in D 3.3 D 3.4 V.B.3.d ,

accordance with a Cooper-Bessmer bulletin. D 3.5 D 3.6 V.C.5 .j D 3.7 D 3.8 ORP 27,71, D 3.9 E 4.2 72,84 I

• V.B.3.d The effectiveness of engineering was hampered by sparse computer resources 32 C 2.1 C 3.1 i

1. '

D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5 and analytical tools to mon: tor and assess component and or system D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 71,72, performance. Until the end of 1992, only five percent of the system engineers had a computer to aid in performing their job function. D 3.5 03.6 84 D 3.7 D 3.8  !

D 3.9 D 5.2 F 4.1  :

'I Ill.C

g. Backlogged engineering work continued to increase at the rate of seven person- 32 A 1.1 D 5.3 ,

D 5.4 D 5.5 V.B.3 l years each quarter, even though most groups in PED and DED worked F 7.1 V.B.4 >

substantial amounts of overtime. ORP 22 28, ,

63 - 75

h. Management support for training was weak and inequitable. PED was weaker 32 A 4.1 C 1.1 V.B.3.b than DED in terms of background and experience, had more staff (179 vs.148), C 3.1 D 4.1 V.B.3.c but were assigned only one-seventh the training budget of DED. D 4.2 D 4.3 ORP 65 - 70 i O 5.5 The licensee fell behind its schedule in completing many [ engineering] 33 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.B.3 l 1.

improvement programs and cancelled some after investing substantial resources. A 4.2 C 1.1 V.B.4 - l Some corrective actions resulting from improvement programs produced no D 5.5 ORP 63 - 75 improvement in performance and were later cancelled. The licensee appeared to classify improvement program action items as ' closed

• without evaluating their effectiveness. lfr J. Substantial recurrent problems noted by maintenance, operations, engineering or 33 A 4.1 B 1.1 Ill.C.3 j cther groups often resulted in design modifications to resolve the problem. C 4.1 D 5.4 V.B.4 i However, the modifications were not installed in a timely manner. F 3.1 ORP 22 - 28, '

73,75 i

k. The licensee failed to make effective use of studies critical of engineering 33 C 2.1 C 3.1 Not Apphcable activities. D 5.5 ~ E 3.1 Page 17  ;

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NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN  !

Configuration Control Weaknesses Engineering Support )

2.3.6 3 33 A 1.1 A 2.1 Not Applicable f

a. Configuration control weaknesses which adversely affected safety-related plant equipment nre noted in severalinstances, such as molded case circuit D 3.1 D 32 ,

breakers, . .s, and environmental qualification of MOVs. In other instances, D 3.3 D 3.4 l such as vendor drawings, the team observed weaknesses in configuration control D 3.5 D 3.6 j that, if left uncorrected, could adverse!y affect plant operations. Ineffective D 3.7 D 3.8 7 management oversight and direction, including insufficient resources, were D 3.9 D 52 l significant contributors to these weaknesses. D 5.5 l 33 D 1.1 D 2.1  !!1.D.3 i

b. The Electrical Setpoint index for molded case circuit breakers was not properly understood or implemented in the field. ... Although the index contained 34 D 42 D 4.3 V.B.3 appropriate criteria, the licensee had not prepared detailed work or procedural D 5.5 F 6.1 V.B.4 instructions for craft personnel to use in interpreting or scaling the index ORP 63 - 75  ?

guidance.

c. While performing maintenance on molded case circuit breakers, the licensee 34 E 1.1 E 1.2 Ill.D.3 discovered that the magnetic trip settings were adjusted using the electrical E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.3 1 penetration test point calculations for permissible currents rather than trip values F 5.2 V.B.4 ORP 63 - 75 t obtained from the index. The licensee later determined that the instantaneous trip (magnetic) settings were improperly adjusted for approximately 30 breakers [

in Units 1 and 2. The licensee found operability concems with 10 breakers i l

powering MOVs such as containment and accumulator isolation valves.

d. When installing SDG rocker arms with a modified design, the licensee failed to 34 D 2.1 E 1.1 lit.C.3.b include specific Cooper-Bessmer service bulletin requirements for torquing and E12 E 1.3 V.B.3 installing the modified part, which could have cause the replaced rocker arms to E 1.4 E 4.1 V.B.4 i E42 ORP 26, 63 -

function improperly.

75

e. Once alerted to the bulletin requirements, installation of the rocker arms was still 34 E 1.1 E12 V.B.3 l not completed correct!y, i.e., the requirement to replace both the intake and E 1.3 E 1.4 V.B.4 i exhaust rocker arms as a set was not accomplished. E 4.1 E42 ORP 63 - 75 j F 5.2 F 6.1

1. The licensee also had to resort to hand searches of service requests to locate 34 C 3.1 D 3.1 V.B.3.d where the modified rocker arms were installed. D 32 D 3.3 V.C.5 ,

D 3.4 D 3.5 ORP 71.- 72, l D 3.6 D 3.7 84  ;

D 3.8 D 3.9  :

F 7.1  !

g. The licensee did not maintain the environmental qualification of valve actuator 34 C 2.1 C 3.1 Not Applicable [

motors in containment by installing 'T" drains as required by design. The D33 D 5.2 .!

licensee found five actuator motors that did not have "T" drains. The engineering D 5.4 F 6.1  ;

staff evaluated three of the five, concluded that no action was required, and was evaluating corrective actions for the remaining two valve actuator motors.

i

h. The many unincorporated amendments to vendor drawings remained significant 34 D 52 D 5.4 lit.C.3.c  !

and could impede work planning and execution. E42 F 7.1 ORP 27 i

2.3.7 Functional and Programmatic Weaknesses Could Adversely Affect r the Operability of the Essential Chilled Water System Engineering Support

{

a. The licensee did not complete an analysis for the CH system under low heat load 35 F 3.1 Ill.D.2 conditions. If an accident occurred during cold weather and all chillers operated, ORP 30,31 the chillers would be under loaded, causing surging and failure, resulting in loss of CH cooling of safety re'.ated equipment. ... The licensee made a commitment to the team to evaluate under-loading of chillers during accident conditions. l l

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r DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION PG. PLAN 35 See ORP lll.D.2

b. Preoperational, surveillance, and post-maintenance testing performed on the CH ORP 30,31 system did not demonstrate that the system would be operable for extended periods of time under design basis heat load conditions. The piping design configuration did not allow the CH system to be tested with heat loads representative of those anticipated during accident conditions, 35 A 4.1 C 1.1 til.D.2 ,

c. Compressor refrigerant and oil contamination was a long term problem that I C 4.1 F 3.1 ORP 30,31 significantly affected reliability. The vendor proposed installing a proven '

refrigerant clean-up kit that would allow uninterrupted chiller operation. Although '

the modification was approved in September 1991 for installation in 1992, its installation date was deferred to October 1994 for Unit 1 and April 1995 for Unit

2. ,

35 A 1.1 C 1,1 111.D.2

d. In 1993, after further evaluation and repeated attempts at insta!!ation, the C 4.1 ORP 30,31 licensee cancelled plans to install proximity vibration probe assemb!y '

recommended by the vendor in 1988 to detect high speed thrust bearing displacement and an automatic compressor trip function for the 300-ton '

compressors to prevent catastrophic failure.

e. In 1989, the licensee implemented a temporary modification to remove an ECW 35 A 4.1 F 3.1 til.D.2  :

ORP 30, 31 valve actuator which automatically controlled flow to the chiller condensers by l

using an upstream manual valve rather than correcting automatic control system I

design and material deficiencies.

After maintenance work was performed on the feeder breaker for essential chiller 36 E 1.1 E 1.2 V.C.7 f.

21C, the chiller was declared operable without PMT. The following day the E 1.3 E 1.4 ORP87 chiller tripped during a routine start attempt because of breaker problems. F 6.1 ,

36 D 4.1 D 4.2 V.B.2.e

g. The maintenance craft personnel introduced air into the essential chillers and flooded a control panel with oil because they did not understand how the chillers D 4.3 D 5.5 ORP 60 function under vacuum. Inadequate training caused poor maintenance work and F 5.2 contributed to degraded performance of the equipment and lack of availability.

^

Engineering Support >

2.3.8 Untimely Resolution of Fire Protection issues 36 D 1.1 F 3.1 Not Applicable.

a. Excessive shrinkage and resultant cracks of Hydrosil-type penetration seals f

allowed free air to pass between fire areas and raised questions of structural

• integnty, making the seals ineffective fire barriers. The problem was previously '

identified in 1990 and was thought to have been corrected after a 100 percent survey in 1991-92 and subsequent repairs / rework. The cracking was again identified in March 1993. The investigation of the problem was scheduled to be ,

completed by May 31,1993.

b. The Pyrotronics fire protection computer system, which monitors fires in various 36 A 4.1 C 4.1 V.B.1.b(3)

F 3.1 ORP 53,54 -

plant areas and alarms in the control room, was unreliable with numerous chronic problems, including defective detectors and electronic transmitter boards. l 6

Numerous false alarms frequently annunciated (20-30 each day) and controf I room operators could not quickly ascertain which detector was in alarm status.  ;

Replacement parts were not available [for the Pyrotronics) because the system 36 A 4.1 C 4.1 V.B.1.b(3) c.

F 3.1 ORP 53,54 was obsolete.. A!though a modification was proposed to replace the system, the modification received low priority, and was not scheduled for installation until 1996. The team raised concems about the system reliability and the ability of operators to determine if and where a fire existed.

d. At the time of the evaluation, the licensee had a large backlog of 361 open SRs 36 A 4.1 C 4.1 V.B.1.b(3) - ,

F 1.1 V.B.2.g  ;

for the fire protection systems. . The large backlog indicated that the reliability of ORP 53,54, ,

the fire protection system was questionable. '

62 B

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NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP  !

PG. PLAN

[ 37 D 4.2 D 4.3 Not Applicable

e. In April 1993, the licensee located significant quantities of transient combustibles such as wooden tables, waste oil, oil soaked rags, and miscellaneous 37 F 2.1 F 5.2  ;

combustible items located throughout the plant. The presence of such large amounts of transient combustibles was indicative of an inadequate control ,

program. s 2.4.1 Ineffective Direction and Oversight Management and Organization

a. Senior management failed to provide the staff clear direction and oversight in 38 A 1.1 A 2.1 V.A.2 several key areas including performance standards and station priorities. B 1.1 D 5.1 V.A.3 )

Frequent, conflicting messages about implementation of these standards and D 5.5 ORP 44 - 50 priorities were sent by senior management.

b. Numerous uncontrolled memoranda and orsi instructions were used to change 38 A 1.1 B 1.1 Not Applicable ,

standards and priorities. . Management's stated emphasis on "doing things right, B 2.1 B 3.1 not just doing them* often seemed to conflict with these rnemoranda and D 2.1 D 5.1 instructions. As a result, the staff questioned the credibility of senior D 5.5 D 6.2 management.

Middle managers often failed to obtain feedback on problems and give consistent 39 A 2.1 B 1.1 Not Applicable c.

B 2.1 B 3,1 direction because they did not interact frequently enough with people in the plant.

C 3.1 D 5.1 D 5.5 ,

d. Although the licensee initiated the management surveillance program in 1990 in 38 A 1.1 A 2.1 Not Applicable.

an attempt to increase management's presence in the plant, the plant staff did B 2.1 B 3.1 not fully accept this program. The perception by plant personnel was that the D 5.1 D 5.5 managers focused on minor housekeeping items rather than effectively F 2.1 interfacing with personnel and providing one-on-one direction and feedback. j

e. The lack of clear and consistent station management direction combined with 38 A 1.1 A 5.1 V.A.2 senior management's over-involvement in lower level issues created a A 5.2 A 5.3 V.A.3  !

widespread perception that middle managers had little authority. A 5.4 B 1.1 ORP 44 - 50 B 2.1 D 5.1 D 5.5

f. Over-involvement contributed to a high senior management workload, limited 39 A 1.1 A 2.1 V.A.2 their time available to focus and provide direction on higher level issues, and B 1.1 B 2.1 V.A.3 -

discouraged ownership and accountability at the lower levels of management. D 5.1 D 5.4 ORP 44 50 D 5.5 i

g. Many of the plant's more important activities and initiatives, such as root cause 39 A 1.1 A 2.1 V.A.2 {

analyses, didn't receive consistent and clear management direction and didn't C 1,1 D 5.5 V.A.3 have an owner that really felt accountable. E 1.1 E 1.2 ORP 44 - 50  !

E 1.3 E 1.4

h. Key performance issues were often not fully appreciated by senior management 39 A 1.1 B 1.1 V.A.2 5

even after they were identified by outside industry and regulatory agencies, B 2.1 D 5.5 V.A.3 despite precursors and warnings within the organization at STP, ORP 44 - 50  !

l Most managers at STP lacked commercial nuclear experience outside of STP. 39 A 2.1 D 4.2 Not Applicable [

Some managers had Navy nuclear experience, but had very limited experience D 4.3 D 5.5 at STP.

J. Many managers had recently been rotated into positions for which they had little 39 A 2.1 D 4.2 Not Applicable . j background. The majority of the department level managers had been rotated D 4.3 D 5.5 one or more times during the past year. ,

l

\  !

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l DER ACTION ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION '

PG. PLAN Poor Support and Resource Utilization Management and Organization 2.4.2

a. Management f ailed to provide and adequately focus sufficient resources to 39 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A2 maintain performance levels and standards for the existing plant conditions. A42 A52 V.A.3 C 1.1 D 52 ORP 44 - 48, Significant station activities were not adequately funded despite the clearly stated i D 5.3 D 5.4 50 objections of the responsible middle level managers.

D 5.5

b. Midd:e level managers perceived that resources would not be approved if the 39 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A.2 f' proposed line item caused the department budgets to exceed the target budget A42 A52 V.A.3 levels established by senior management. C 1.1 D 5.2 ORP 44 - 48.

D 5.5 50

c. STP management had not established management systems tnat would 39 A 1.1 A 5.2 V.A.2 effectively and efficiently accomplish the strategic goals listed in the MOP by B 2.1 C 1.1 V.A.3 C 1.2 D 5.4 ORP 44 - 48, implementing these goals into the daily work schedule.

D 5.5 50

d. The planning, scheduling, and work process controls did not support the timely 39 A 4.1 A 5.2 Ill.B.1 and reliable completion of work by maintenance, operations, and engineering. C 1.1 C 1.2 V.B.1.b (1)

Although station management had recognized this problem, they had failed, until C 4.1 D 1.1 V.B.2.b recently, to focus the necessary resources to correct this situation. D 5.2 D 5.3 ORP 14 F 1.1 i

e. Senior management's reaction to unforeseen, emergent work was to defer or 40 A 4.1 A 52 V.A.3 cancel other previousfy budgeted line items to maintain the target budget C 1.1 C 1.2 ORP 50 expenditure goals. . STP routinety experienced a significant end-of-year deficit D 5.3 D 5.5 in the accomplishment of planned, priority work because of the failure to ,

adequately anticipate and budget for emergent work.

f

\ '

f. Staffing levels were marginal or insufficient in several key areas. 40 A 4.1 - C 1.1 V.A.3 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.1.a C 5.1 C 5.2 V.B.3.c f D 52 ORP 50 - 52  ;

g. Recommended staffing levels in the most recent [outside contractor) study were 41 C 1.1 C 2.1 V.B.1.a r based on incorrect assumptions on productivity. C 3.1 C 5.1 V.B 3.c ,

C 5.2 ORP 51,52 j

h. Staff productivity was not effectively measured or understood by management. 41 A 1.1 D 1.1 Not Applicable Although the licensee identified inefficient work control processes as major D 3.1 D 32  ;

contributors to the large work backlog, the MIS did not provide adequate D 3.3 D 3.4 measures of staff productivity. The maintenance required to complete SRs was D 3.5 D 3.6 not accurately measured and no system existed to measure engineering staff D 3.7 D 3.8 i productivity. Additionally, the licensee did not account for all overtime worked by D 3.9 F 1.1 ]

salaried employees. j

l. In addition to staffing based upon incorrect assumptions on productivity, the 41 A 4.1 C 1.1 Not Applicable licensee generally appeared to be staffing based upon levels predicated on the C 2.1 C 4.1 station operating in a stable condition with only long term requirements and no C 5.1 C 52 significant backlogs or emergent workloads. D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4

j. Support of training, including funding, was weak. 41 A 4,1 C 1.1 V.A.3 l D 4.2 ORP 50 l D 4.1 D 4.3 D 5.2

k. The scope and duration of operations training was frequently altered to support 42 A 4.1 C 5.1 V.B.1.a ,

manpower shortages in the plant. C 5.2 D 4.1 ORP52_ j D 4.2 D 4.3 D 5.2 i

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NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN

\ 1. Management did not adequately budget for or effectively manage 42 A 4.1 A42 V.C.8 spare / replacement parts. C 1.1 D 52 ORP 88 - 89

m. Severat problems identified by the team indicated that this system [ master parts 42 See ORP V.C.2 list} may have been based on an inaccurate economic model, coupled with errors ORP 79,80, in the plant tabeling system. 88,89

n. It appeared that management considered the entire inventory as homogenous 42 A42 V.C.8 -

when assessing inventory turnover frequency rather than separating long-term ORP 88,89 strategic from rotating stock. When requested by the team to provide numbers identifying the turnover frequency of routinely used par 4, it was apparent that these figures were not considered or monitored by STP.

o. Station improvements were adversely impacted due to budget pressures. 42 A42 C 1.1 V.A.3 Examples: Plant Labehng Program; Engineering Improvement Program. D 5.2 D 5.5 ORP 50,79, 80 2.4.3 Communications and Teamwork Were Weak Management and Organization

a. Expectations regarding competing priorities between budget, schedule and 42 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A.2 safety performance were not communicated wel!. A42 B 1.1 ORP 44 - 48 C 1.1 C 1.2 C 4.1 D 5.2 D 5.4 D 5.5

b. Vertical communications were particularly weak. Senior managers did not foster 42 A 1.1 B 1.1 V.A.2 frank, open feedback from lower managors and staff. B 2.1 D 5.1 V.A.3 D 52 D 5.3 ORP 45,47, D 5.5 48

c. Horizontal communications and interface problems added to the difficulty of 42 A 1.1 B 1.1 V.A2 completing work using established processes. There was a lack of coordination D 1.1 D 5.1 ORP 47,48 and accountability between disciplines during routine work. As a result, an D 5.2 D 5.3 excessive number of task forces. outside the normal organization, seemed to be D 5.4 D 5.5 required to accomplish work. F 5.2 F 6.1

d. The level of routine administrative workload and the reactive mode of the 43 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A.2 organization tended to leave little time for communications and coordination A 42 B 1.1 within work groups ar.d with other groups. This problem existed, to some extent, C 4.1 D 5.4 at alllevels of the organization.

e. The team observed during meetings to discuss the Unit 1 workload and startup 43 A 2.1 C 1.1 V.B.1.a schedule that senior management did not appreciate the impact of their startup C 4.1 D 52 ORP 52 scheduto expectation on the operations department workload and had not D 5.3 D 5.4 accurately weighed the competing priorities of safety and schedule adherence D 5.5 partly due to a lack of operation's inpui, into the startup schedule.

f. Management had failed, in some cases, to clearly define and communicate 45 A 1.1 B 1.1 V.A.2 appropriate standards and priorities for personnet and plant performance. In D 5.5 addition, there were often conflicting messages sent in the implementation of these standards.

g. The threshold of SPR initiation and depth of root cause analyses were not well 43 A 1.1 B 1.1 V.C.1 defined, and communicated to the staff. As a result, the quality of root cause E 1.1 E 1.2 ORP 78 analyses was often weak but varied significantly between groups and individuals E 1.3 E 1.4 within a group. E 2.1

h. The MOP goal of increased reusDty was in conflict with the deferral of 43 A 1.1 .C 1.1 Not Applicable maintenance. C 1.2 C 4.1 D 5.5 F 1.1 H OET.MAUBUSPLAv# ATRurCER MTX 1045'93 {Frday) 920mm Page 22

m. _ _ . - ~ . . . - -

l 1

s DER AC ON ORP NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION The team attended meetings wtiere senior rnanagement dominated the meeting 43 A 2.1 B 1.1 V.A.2  ;

1.

to such an extent that there was little communication except top down. On B 2.1 B 3.1 t several occasions after senior management left the meeting. the team observed B 4.1 D 5.1 D 5.3 D 5.4 markedly improved communications and coordination.

D 5.5 1 43 B 2.1 B 3.1 V.C.10 l' J. Although both programs [Speakout and Employee Assistance) were supposed to E 2.1 ORP 90 be anonymous, there was a perception among many employees that these S programs were not, which limited their effectiveness.

44 A 1.1 B 1.1 ' V.A.2

k. There was also a perception that management was not interested in hearit:g ,

B 2.1 D 5.1 V.A.3  :

about problems as demonstrated by the lack of results when issues were brought '!

D 5.3 D 5.5 forward.  !

Management and Organization 2.4.4 Ineffective Corrective Action Process 44 A 4.1 A 4.2 V.A.3 l

a. Poor problem identification, shallow root cause analyses, inadequate safety C 1.1 C 1.2 V.C.1 .

impact evaluations. and lack of aggressive problem resolution, combined with D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5  !

noor information systems and budgetary constraints, resulted in short term rather .

D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 50,78.  !

than long term solutions to station problems.

D 3.5 03.6 84 D 3.7 D 3.8 ,

D 3.9 E 1.1 l E 1,2 E 1.3  ;

E 1.4  !

44 D 4.2 D 4.3 V.C.1

b. The team found several examples where confusion and tack of training resulted D 5.4 0 5.5 ORP 78  ;

in SPRs not being issued in a timely manner on safety-related equipment. The .

E 1.1 E 1.2 ficensee's OA department had repeatedly notified management of a weakness in E 1.3 E 1.4 ,

the definition of ' conditions adverse to quality" which resulted in licensee E 2.1 j personnet not being aware of when to write a SPR.

44 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.C.1  ;

c. Additionally, lack of effectiveness in reporting problems reflected workers' i

-A 4.2 B 1.1 ORP 78 wilkngness to live with problems, due at least in part to conflicting management D 5.1 D 5.2 expectations and standards regarding material condition.

D 5.3 D 5.5 E 2.1 F 5.2  :

45 D 4.2 D 4.3 V.B.3.b l

d. Several individuals outside of the CAG who performed root cause analyses had D 5.5 E 1.1 V.C.1  ;

not been adequately trained. Also, in the case of engineering, individuais ORP 65 75, E 1.2 E 1.3 .;

performing root cause analyses often were not knowledgeable on the system or 78 i E 1.4 F 3.1 component of concem.

V.C.1 I 45 D 5.1 D 5.3

e. Additionally, until very recently, the licensee had not identified fatigue as a root ORP 78 D 5.4 D 5.5  ;

cause of personnef errors.

E 1.1 E 1.2 j E 1.3 E 1.4 ,

45 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.C.1

1. The team identified severalinstances where inadequate safety evaluations D 4.2 D 4.3 ORP 78 t resutted in ineffective corrective actions.  ;

D 5.5 45 D 5.5 E 1.1 V.C.1 .l

g. The team identified several examples where timely and effective corrective E 1.3 ORP 78 E 1.2 actions were not taken.

E 1.4 45 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A.3

h. Although senior management expressed the desire to become more responsive ORP 50 A 4.2 C 1.1 on corrective actions, it appeared from documentation and interviews that little C 1.2 C 4.1 progress had been made and that budgetary pressures had an adverse impact E 1.1 D 5.5 .

on corrective actions. E 1.2 E 1.3 l E 1.4 Page 23 H 'DET,pMDBUSPLANM ATRmDER MTX 10/1593 Feday) 9 20mm

NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN L The CAG had been budgeted to perform . However, the current workload was 45 A 4.1 C 1.1 V.C.1 rnore than twice this amount as well as additional scope.(paraphrased) C 1.2 D 5.1 ORP 78 D 5.2 D 5.3 D 5.4 D 5.5 .

E 1.1 E 1.2 E 1.3 E 1.4 1

j. The team found that the CAG had been funded by reducing or eliminating the 45 C 1.1 C 1.2 V.C.1 corrective action funds of other departments. In fact, the corrective action D 5.1 D 5.2 ORP 78 workload had increased in maintenance, operations, and engineering since the D 5.3 D 5.4 establishment of the CAG. The limited staffing available for SPR review and root D 5.5 E 1.1  ;

cause analysis had contributed to shallow and hurried efforts. E 1.2 E 1.3  !

E 1.4

]

k. The team found the CAG lacked ownership of the corrective action program with 46 A 1.1 D 5.5 V.C.1 respect to the SPR reviews and root cause analysis not performed by CAG. E 1.1 E 1.2 ORP 78 E 1.3 E 1.4

l. The effectiveness of ISEG in identifying root causes of problems and proper 46 A 4.1 D 5.1 V.C.1 corrective actions was also limited. The scope and detail of work assigned to D 5.2 D 5.3 ORP 78  ;

ISEG had exceeded the capability of the assigned staff to meet those functions D 5.4 D 5.5 required by technical specifications in a timely manner. E 4.1

m. Coordination of the OER program suffered severely from ISEG's overloaded and 46 A 4.1 D 5.2 Not Applicable limited staff. D 5.4 D 5.5 E 4.1

n. Managements failure to provide more than the technical specification minimum 46 A 4.1 D 5.1 Not Applicable ,

staffing for ISEG and the frequent change or absence of ISEG directors were D 5.2 0 5.3 further evidence of management's lack of support for corrective actions. D 5.4 D 5.5 l 2.4.5 Ineffective Utilization of Self-assessment and Quality Oversight Functions Management and Organization

a. Managers did not respond effectively to the findings, concerns, and 46 A 1.1 A 4.1 V.A.2 recommendations of their principal self-assessment and quality oversight D 5.1 D 5.3 V.A.3 functions, including the NSRB and QA. In addition, management had not fully D 5.4 D 5.5 ORP 44 - 50 ,

supported the ISEG review for lessons learned. E 3.1  !

2.4.6 Inadequate Information Systems Management and Organization l

a. The computerized information system consisted of several non-integrated 47 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.B.1.b (4) hardware configurations, including seven local area networks. There were also D 3.3 D 3.4 V.C.5 1 several uncontrolled computer programs utilized in the control room for various D 3.5 D 3.6 ORP 55,84 work control processes. There was no interactive interface between the different D 3.7 D 3.8 computers which meant that similar data was duplicated on different computers. D 3.9 D 5.2 ,

I This method of managing data was inefficient and increased the probability of error due to multiple entry at different time intervals. The team found that data in ,

several areas was unreliable, i

b. STP was experiencing significant delays in processing data from its main 47 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5  !

computer system due to hardware and processing limitations. 48 D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 84  !

D 3.5 D 3.6  ;

D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 D 5.2 D 5.4

c. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 D 3.1 D 3.2 ll1 C.3.c systems: Equipment history records were incomplete and approximately eight D 3.3 D 3.4 V.C.5 l weeks behind in being updated. This resulted in the licensee's tendency not to D 3.5 D 3.6 ORP 27,84 j rely on these records. D 3.7 D 3.8 l D 3.9 D 52 05.4 F 7.1 H CET_MAIUBusPLANJAATRI(DE R MTX 10'1s93 (Fmiay) 920am Page 24

NRC DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT OBSERVATION DER ACTION ORP PG. PLAN

d. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5 D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 84,88 systems: The acquisition of parts information was cumbersome, slowing down maintenance work package preparation. D 3.5 03.6 D 3.7 D 3.8 0 3.9 D 5.2 D 5.4 D 5.5 '

F 6.1

e. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 C 4.1 D 3.1 V.C.5 systems: The information cystem used for outage planning was not capable of D 3.2 D 3.3 ORP 84 i performing assessments of critical path items. D 3.4 D 3.5 D 3.6 D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 0 5.2 The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 C 2.1 C 3.1 V.B.3.d f.

D 3.1 D 3.2 ORP 71,72 {

systems: Computer assistance to aid the system engineer in documenting and trending system performance and condition was not generally available. The D 3.3 D 3.4 licensee had purchased epproximately 700 personal computers in 1992, D 3.5 D 3.6 ,

i however, most of these remained in the warehouse at the time of the evaluation. D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 D 5.2 ,

i

g. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 D 3.1 D 3.2 Not Applicable systems: The PRA database was not updated to reflect actual plant failure data. D 3.3 D 3.4 D 3.5 D 3.6 i D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 D 5.2

h. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 C 1.1 C 1.2 V.C.5 systems: Information used to derive plant performance indicators was inaccurate D 3.1 D 3.2 ORP 84 i f

and misleading. D 3.3 D 3.4 D 3.5 D 3.6 ,

D 3.7 D 3.8 D 3.9 j

i. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 C 1.1 C 1.2 V.C.5 systems: Information to support management in budget justification was missing D 3.1 D 3.2 ORP84 l or inaccurate. D 3.3 D 3.4 D 3.5 D 3.6 D 3.7 D 3.8 i D 3.9 D 5.4 D 5.5 i j

j. The team identified and confirmed the following weaknesses in information 48 A 1.1 C 1.1 V.C.5  ;

systems: Staff productivity measurements were nonexistent or misleading. C 1.2 03.1 ORP 84 i D 3.2 D 3.3 l D 3.4 D 3.5 D 3.6 D 3.7  ;

D 3.8 D 3.9 .;

D 5.2 D 5.5

k. The Mensee was in the process of purchasing a new computer program directed 48 D 3.1 D 3.2 V.C.5 -

at improving information systems. However, managements errors in establishing D 3.3 D 3.4 ORP 84 the current system were being repeated in the information improvement program D 3.5 D 3.6 in that input and feedback from end users was not being adequate!y D 3.7 D 3.8 incorporated. D 3.9 D 5.3

1. Management's lack of support for information systems improvement was further 48 A 1.1 A 2.1 Not Applicable '

- evidenced by the failure to rep ace, in a timely manner, the manager responsible D 5.4 D 5.5 for the improvement program following his promotion to another on-site organization. ,

l wCET.MM$UsPLAMATRmDER MTX 10/1s93 U ncay) 920am Page 25 i i

FOCUS AREA INITIATIVES ACTION PLANS index t

J Focus Area Action Plan

- Leadership and Management A1.1 Establish a.: ; communicate goals.

A2.1 Technical supervisory / people skill requirements.

A3.1 Develop processes that are used to implement changes on site. l A4.1 Balance between short-term costs and long-term investment.

A4.2 Demonstrate a commitment to long-term imprevement by investment in programs that have long-term benefits.

AS.1 Identify inequities between organizations. ,

A5.2 Employee incentive Program.

AS.3 Facilities and Work Areas equity.

A5.4 Corporate and station policy application.

Communication and Teamwork B1.1 Foster a culture and develop processes, promote station standards for communication and teamwork.

B2. i increase individual involvement, improve personnel and customer involvement. ,

B3.1 Develop the most effective communication tools for conducting business.

B4.1 Implement a continuous improvement process.

Resources C1.1 Planning / Budgeting guidelines.

C1.2 Integrated management systems. ,

C2.1 Cicarly define responsibilities / site expectations for System Engineers.

C3.1 Improve System Engineering organization performance.

C4.1 Establish priority system (s) and scheduling support plan.  ;

' C5.1 Short-term (pnor to each unit start-up) Operator staffing.

C5.2 Short-term and long-term operator staffing.

C6.1 Cost-benefit analysis for a second control room simulator.

Human Performance D1.1 Analyzing, improving, and maintaining effective work processes.

D2.1 Administration, control, standards, etc. for STP procedures.

D3.1 Establish a site Management information Systems Users Group. l D3.2 Long Range Information Systems Plan.

D3.3 Local area netswork centralized databases.

D3.4 Short-term Plan for automation and communication. .

D3.5 Long-term Plan for ainomation and communication.

D3.6 Improve Information Systems business processes.

D3.7 Information Systems end user training.

D3.8 Ensure Station software is developed and maintained.

D3.9 Data / Validation Control procedure for Databases.

D4.1 Improve coordination between Plant and Training department.

D4.2 Establish personnel training as a Station priority.

D4.3 Develop and implement a long-range training vision and plan.

D5.1 Improve environment promoting individual respect and teamwork.

D5.2 Assess station philosophy regarding resources.

D5.3 Improve morale and work ethics to enhance human performance.

D5.4 Time management standards that promote human performance.

D5.5 Philosophy promoting empowerment of employees / develop O D6.1 responsibility / accountability.

Short-term Technical Specifications enhancement. I DS.2 Long-term Technical Specifications enhancement, l s.

M OET,_DAAILU3J$PLARMATR:KhTRIX2 MEF 1 of 2 I

l

4, Focus Area Action Plan fk Evaluate existing external commitments.

D7.1 D7.2 Improve external commitment management process.

D8.1 Consolidate and maintain the licensing and design basis of facility.'

Self Assessment & Corrective Action ~ E1.1 Ensure adequate and effective problem identification, etc.

E1.2 Ensure adequate and effective root cause analysis.-

E1.3 Ensure adequate and effective corrective action selection and implementation.

E1.4 Ensure adequate and effective trend analysis and oversight.

E2.1 Educate station personnel / correcting problems.

E3.1 Culture that promotes continual self-assessment and problem .

correction.

E4.1 Enhance site OER program.

E4.2 Enhance vendor Technical Information program.

Material Condition & Plant Reliability F1.1 Reduce backlog of material condition deficiencies.

F2.1 Housekeeping and equipment / structure preservation practices.

F3.1 Equipment failure / repetitive maintenance root cause analysis program.

F4.1 Improve Preventive / Predictive Maintenance program.

F4.2 Enhance reliability centered Maintenance program.

F5.1 Enhance elements that facilitate quality work performance.

FS.2 Enhance performance standards / measures / expectations.

F5.3 Improve interface between Quality Control and Maintenance.

F6.1 Improve work package planning process.

F7.1 Backlog of engineering documents and unincorporated amendments.

)

l O

l 94 CET.uAIL$U$PLANMATRUOMATRiK2 REF 2 of 2 I

i

i HL&P 3 O OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN Index 6

J i

i F

l. Introduction and Purpose q i

11. Integrated Schedule for Resumption of Power Operation j i

111. Material Condition and Equipment Readiness  !

- A. - System Certification

]

i B. Maintenance Backlog Management General Criteria for Resumption of Power Operation Backlog Reduction Goals C. Engineering ,

Generai '

Criteria for Resumption of Power Operation j Backlog Reduction Goals by Engineering Category  ;

O- D. Specific Equipment issues ,

l Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump  ;

j Essential Chillers Molded Case Circuit Breakers Technical Support Center Diesel Generator f Inoperable Automatic Functions j

Target Rock Solenoid Valves Components on increased Test Frequency l Surveillance Flow Instruments l IV. Assessment Process V. Specific Operational Readiness issues  ;

A. Management Structure and Effectiveness _  ;

Management and Organizational Changes  ;

Management Commitment and Communication Initiatives Management Effectiveness O  :

1 H CET.MAtL$U$ PLAN MATRIX 6RFIBL.CNT

i I

I HL&P

..h. OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN index

_j t

B. Organizational Readiness [

Operations .l Maintenance i System Engineering i

Overall Nuclear Engineering Support Technical Services 3 C. Other Program Enhancements ,

Station Problem Reporting Equipment Labeling r

Locked Valves Preventive Maintenance (PM) Program ,

Station Information Systems Surveillance Procedure Enhancement Program Post Maintenance Test Program Spare Parts Program .

Operations Policies and Procedures  !

O ,

h i

i I

i h

I.

i I

f i

O  :

1 HOET_ MAIL \BUSPLANWl A7R'KCRPTBL CNT 2

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