ML20195E470
| ML20195E470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1999 |
| From: | HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
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| Shared Package | |
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| References | |
| NUDOCS 9906110149 | |
| Download: ML20195E470 (17) | |
Text
~
NOC-AE-000465 Page 1 of 17 i
ATTACHMENT 4 PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
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n SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2.2' LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS-2.2.1~- The Reactor Trip' System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint' values shewn in Table 2.2-1.
APPLICABILITY:,As'shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.
' ACTION:
With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint a.
less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 2.2-1, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip
, Setpoint value.
b.
With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint
~1ess conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value
- column of Table 2.2-1,4:ith:n kntconsistentwitht
- Ri.puTrit value of Table 2.2-1 and e e-urs that Equation 2.2-1
. E *sti:fira ror the affacted channel, or M[ statement.requirementof. Specification 3.3.1untilthechannel eclare the channel ino'perable and apply the applicable ACTION is restored to OPERABLE status with its.Setpoint adjusted i
consistent with the Trip Setpoint_value.
Equation 2.2-1 Z + R + S 1 TA Where:
I'= The value Column Z of Table 2.2-1 for affected channel, R = The "as-measured" va in perc span) of rack error for the j
affected channel, S = Either the "as-me ed" value (in nt span) of the sensor
. error,.or th ue from Column S (Senso ror) of Table 2.2-1 for the
-ected channel, and TA -
e value from Columh TA (Total Allowance) of Table 2.
1 for the affected channel.
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2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal
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values at which the Reactor trips are set for ekch functional unit. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the consequences of accidents. The Setpoint for a Reactor Trip System or interlock function is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as-measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.
To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip Setpoints have been specified in Table 2.2-1.
Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Set-point but within the Allowable Value is acce) table since an allowance han been __
made in the safety analysis to acemdate tiin error.1 An optional prov'sio
'has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip /n Se t is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of thy option izesthe"asmeasured"deviationfromthespecifiedcalibrat'on point for r and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combi-natien of the o uncertaintiet of the instrumentation t,o me'asure the process varia'ble and the une inties in calibrating the inst'rumentation.
In Equa-tion 2.2-1, Z + R + 5 <
the interactive effecty-of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and.the "as-m red" values optfie errors are considered.
Z, as specified b Table 2.2-1, in p nt sp3n', is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis exclud
'those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of th 31 measu ont. TA or Total Allowance is i
3 the difference, in percent sp3n', between the "M Se point and the value used in the analysis for React y trip.
R or Rack Error he "as-measured" devia-tion, in percent spanf or the affected channel from-t
- Lec_ified Trip Set-f point.
S or Sensor' Error is either the "as-measured" deviatio f the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-percent span, from-the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows bra sensor-d' rift factor and an increased rack drift factor, and provides a t'hreshold yaMe for REPORTABLE EVENTS.
N The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining a.11 of the uncertainties in the channels.
Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensors and other instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Because there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 2-3
INSTRUMENTATION 3 /4.3. 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 Th'e Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in; Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of
~
Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Chapter 16 in the UFSAR.
. APPL 1CABILITY:- As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
a;. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or_ Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpof nt column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of
~ Table 3.3-4, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint j
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value.
J
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b.
' With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of le 3.3 g either:
1.
Adjus tent with th
" pv inM Table 3.3-4, and tar i..
E uation 2.2-1 p &et 6 i or the affected channel, or L
- / statement requirements of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is eclare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
quation 2.2-1 Z + R + S s TA Where:
Z'- The va from Column Z of Table 3.3-4 fo e affected
- channel, R - The "as-measured" va (in cent span) of rack error for the affected~ channel, S - Either the "as-sured" value (in cent span) of the sensor err, or the value from Column Sensor Error) of
. Table. -4 for the affected channel, and T
he value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table. -4
_ for the affected channel.
c.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take I
the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No ~M-a l
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eration with oints less. conservative than the Trip Setp ut within tie Allowable Value acceptable since an allowance.has made in the safety ' analysis to acco te this error. An optio provision has been included for determining the BILITY of a c el when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable e. T ethodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in con ion a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of t nstrumentatio asure the process variable and the uncertainties i brating the instrumen t on. In Equation 2.2-1, Z + R + S <; TA, the eractive effects of the errors e rack and the sensor, and th s measured" values of the errors are cons sted. Z, as specified able 3.3-4, in percent span, is the statistical suihmation of error ssumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor rack drift and the accuracy of the measurement. TA or Total Allowance' i SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-1 MM S. N r INSTRUMENTATION-BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) a m erence, in percent span, between the trip setpoint and the va used in is for.the actuation. R or Rack Error is t asured" deviation, in the pe for the affected c om the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Erro as measured" deviation of. the sensor'from its calibrat or t ecified in Table 3.3-4, in percent' span, nalysis~ assumptions. Use o 2.2-1 allows for a t factor, an increased rack drift factor, and pro deo-a, s old value for REPORTABLE EVENTS. The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all -of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack' drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation. The measurement of. response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the_ Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses; No_ credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification ~ may be demonstrated by either: (1) in ' place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant para-meters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combina-tions indicative of various accidents, events,.and transients. Once the re-quired logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by-the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident: (1) Safety In- -jection pumps start, (2) Reactor trip,-(3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the standby diese'l generators, (5) containment ' spray pumps start and automatic valves position, (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Tur-bine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) reactor containment fan coolers start, (11) essential cooling water pumps . start and automatic valves position, (12) Control Room Ventilation Systems start, and (13) component cooling water pumps start and automatic valves position. SOUTH TEXAS'- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-2 s .