ML20207D965
| ML20207D965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1999 |
| From: | HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207D956 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903100108 | |
| Download: ML20207D965 (4) | |
Text
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' CONTAINMENT' SYSTEMS '
L 3 /4.613 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.
- LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t
3.6.3 - The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times t
- less than or. equal to the required isolation times.
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' APPLICABILITY: H0 DES I; 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
inoperable, maintain at least one With one or more of the isolation valve (s) d penetration that is open and:
l isolation' barrier *-OPERABLE in each affecte r
Restore the inoperable valve (s)' to 0PERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
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- a.
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Isolate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least l
one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position,.Q IMEET er
..l Isolate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least l
L c.
one closed manual valve or blind flange, or j
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d.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD
$HUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t
'4.6.3.1 The isolation val'ves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to.
' returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work J
lis performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time..
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< 4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be' demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
Verifying that on a Phase 'A" Isolation test 'si nal, each Phase "A" l
isolation' valve actuates to its isolation positkoni a'. ;
Verifying _ that on a Containment Ventilation ' Isolation test signal, b.
. each purge' and exhaust valve actuates to. its isolation position; and l
Verifying that on'a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" c._
isolation valve actuates to its' isolation position.
Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation' test signal, coincident with d._
t a _ low charging header pressure signal, that each seal in.iection valve actuates.to its isolation position.
~ 4.6.3.3 ~. The isolation. time-of each power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
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- An isolation barrier may either be a closed system _(i.e., General Design b'
Criteria 57 penetrations) or an isolation valve.
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_ SOUTH TEXAS --UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17 Unit 1 Amendment No, t,29,t2,53, 59 r
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Unit 2 - Amendment No. 21,0!.0:,-47 l
9903iOO108 990302 N~
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Proposed Insert to Technical Specification Page 3/4 6-17, Specification 3.6.3 Action b
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Insert 1 f
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, or check valve with flow through the valve secured 7
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT MOLING SYSTEM (continued)
STPEGS has three groups of Reactor Containment. Fan Coolers with two fans in each group _ (total of six fans). Five fans are adequate to satisfy the safety requirements including single. failure. The fan cooler units are designed to remove heat from the containment during both normal operation and
. accident conditions.
In the event of an accident, all fan cooler units are automatically placed into operation on receipt of a safety injection signal.
During nomal operation, cooling water flow to the fan cooler units is supplied by the non-safety grade chilled water, system. Following an accident, cooling water flow to the fan coolers is supplied by the safety grade component cooling water system. The chilled water system supplies water at a lower temperature than that of the component cooling water system and 1
therefore requires a lower flow rate to achieve a similar heat removal rate.
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1
i The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the l
containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or i
pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of j
General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
1 Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation
-valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
kN.$ERT 2 3 /4.6. 4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to
-maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable
-limit during post-LOCA conditions.
Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:
(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations ~ of Replatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a LOCA," Revision 2, November 1978.
. SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 30 44,74 7
Unit 2 - Amendment No. Eb41,63
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l c Proposed Insert to Technical Specification Bases Page B 3/4 6-4, Section l
3/4'.6.3, Containment isolation Valves Insert 2 l
l In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetrations is incperable, and the inoperable valve (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the affected penetration (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this i
L criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a b!!nd flange, and an inside containment check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration flow path isolated in accordance with Action b or c, the device used to isolate the penetration should l
be the closest availabie one to containment.
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