ML20217G814
| ML20217G814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1994 |
| From: | Kevin Mulligan HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217G806 | List: |
| References | |
| 0PGP03-ZA-0101, PGP3-ZA-101, NUDOCS 9708080053 | |
| Download: ML20217G814 (32) | |
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. Attachment 3 r
Shutdown Risk Procedure :
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OPGP03-ZA-0101 Rev.2 General p,,,g Shutdown Risk Assessment Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: Available Effectist Date: 11/22/94 K. P. Mulligan N/A N/A operations PREPARER TEC11NICAL USER COGN!ZANT oRGANIZATloN Table of Contents Pace
1.0 Purpose and Scope
2 2.0 Definitions.
2 3.0 Responsibilities........................
4 4.0 Pre-Outage Review 5
5.0 Outage Review...................
7 6.0 References 8
7.0 Support Documents..................
9 Addendum 1, Flow Chart 10 Data Package 1 Mid-Loop Operations....
.....11 Data Package 2, l oss of Electrical Power.........
... 13 Data Package 3, Defueled............
.. 14 Data Package 4, Pressurization........
15 Data Package 5, Loss of Coolant Inventory................................ 16 Data Package 6, Loss of Cooling............
............................ 17 Data Package 7, Reactivity Management................................... 18 Data Package 8, Containment Integrity....................
... 19 Data Package 9, Risk Assessment Profile (Sample)
....................,.....20 Form I, Daily Plant Status Form, Modes 5 and 6 (Sample)...................... 22 Form 2. Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Cover Sheet (Sample)
................23 Form 3, Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Modes 5 and 6) (Sample)
...... 24 Form 4, Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Defueled) (Sample)
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OPGP03 ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Pase 2 orsi l
Shutdown Risk Assessment
1.0 Purpose and Scope
1.1.
Provide guidelines for performing an outage Shutdown Risk Assessment (SRA)
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station..
1.2 All situations are addressed on a case by case basis to ensure the safety of personnel, and general public are not compromised.
1.3 Forced or planned outages where the plant stays in Mode 3 or 4 are exempt.
1.4 This procedure is applicable to all refueling outages, all outages requiring M Operations, and other non refueling outages below Mode 4 as determined by the Manager.
2.0 Definitions 2.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY: As specified in Technical Specifications 3.9.4 and 3.9.9.
2.2 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY: The ability to maintain Reactor Coolant
' System (RCS) temperature, pressure and Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) temperature below specified limits following a shutdown.
2.3 DEFENSE IN DEI'fH: For the purpose of managing risk during shutdown, defense in depth consists of:
2.3.1 Providing systems and components to ensure redundancy of key engineered safety functions 2.3.2 Planning and Scheduling outage activities in a manner that optimizes safety system availability 2.3.3 Providing administrative controls that support and/or supplement the above elements.
2.4 DEFUELED
All fuel assemblies have been removed from the reactor vesse placed in the spent fuel pool. (The ICSA is NOT considered an extension'of the spent fuel pool.)
2.5 FUNCTIONAL
A component or system is capable of fulfilling its intended safety functions but may NOT be operable per definition 2.8.
2.6 HIGHER RISK EVOLUTIONS: Outage activities, plant contigurations, or conditions during shutdown where the plant is susceptible to an event involving the loss of a key engineered safety function.
OPGP03 ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Pue 3 or 31
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Shutdown Risk Assessment 2.7 MID LOOP: When the RCS water level is below the top of the flow area at the junction of the hot legs with the reactor vessel and fuel is in the vessel. (level less than or equal to 33 feet 5.5 inches.)
2.8 OPERABLE / OPERABILITY: A system, subsystem, train, component or device is OPERABLE or has OPERABILITY when capable of performing intended function (s)
AND all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication and other auxiliary equipment required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform intended function (s) as defined by Technical Specification definition 1.20.
2.9 OUTAGE
Entry into Modes 5,6 or Defueled (refueling outage).
2.10 REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT: Measures established to preclude inadvertent dilutions, criticalities, power excursions or losses of shutdown margin. Fuel behavior prediction and monitoring in tne Reactor Vessel, ICSA and Spent Fuel Pool.
2.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY: The ability of the RCS pressure boundary to function as a principal safety barrier.
2.12 ' REDUCED INVENTORY: Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) condition with the reactor vessel and RCS level is lower than three feet BELOW the reactor vessel Gange. (Level less than or equal to 36 feet 3 inches.)
2.13 RISK MANAGEMENT: Integrated process of assessing and reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of an event that may effect the health and safety of the public and/or plant personnel.
2.14 SHUTDOWN: Modes 4,5,6 or Defueled in accordance with Technical Specifications Table 1.2.
2.15 START UP: Plant status commencing with activities to heatup the RCS above 350*F and to bring the reactor core to a critical condition and up to 5% of rated thermal power. (Mode 2) 2.16 QUORUM: For the purposes of SRAG meetings, a quorum shall consist of the Operations Manager or designee (SRO), a Risk and Reliability Analysis Engineer, an outage representative, and either a Nuclear Assurance and Nuclear Licensing representative or Shift Technical Advisor.
OPGP03 ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Pye 4 of 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment 2.17 SHUTDOWN RISK ASSESShiENT GROUP (SRAG): The group assembled which performs this procedure, consisting of the following personnel: (SPR 92-0587) 2.17.1 Operations manager or designee (SRO) 2.17.2 Shift Technical Advisor 2.17.3 Risk and Reliability Analysis Engineer from Nuclear Fuel and Analysis 2.17.4 Nuclear Assurance and Nuclear Licensing department representative
- 2. ; 7.5 An Outage Representative 2.18 SRAG LEADER: The Operations hianager or designee.
2.19 SHUTDOWN RISK ASSESSMENT PROFILE (SRAP): A table, similar to (-9), which indicates the status of the equipment required to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
3.0 Responsibilities J
3.1 The Plant Manager is responsible for the following:
3.1.1 Ensuring a SRA is performed for refueling outages and outage involving mid loop operation (SPR 92-0123).
3.1.2 Determining if a SRA is required for an outage other than a refueling outage.
3.1.3 Assigning additional members to the SRAG as necessary.
3.1.4 Assigning a SRAG Leader 3.1.5 Final approval for the SRA Report 3.2 The Outage Support Manager is responsible for the following:
3.2.1 Supplying the SRAG with an Outage Representative.
3.2.2 Providing the necessary Outage Schedule information to the SRAG.
3.2.3 Assisting the SRAG Leader as required.
3.2.4 Requesting a special review by the SRAG to evaluate developing plant conditions and compensatory measures as deemed necessary.
3.2.5 Approving the SRA Report prior to plant manager review and approval.
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OPGP03-ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Page 5 or 3i 1
Shutdown Risk Assessment 1
3.3 The Unit Operations Manager or designee is the SRAG Leader and is responsible for implementing SRAG recommendations.
3.4 The Nuclear Fuel and Analysis Director is responsible for supplying the SRAG with an engineer experienced in Shutdown RSk Assessment.
3.5 The General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Nuclear Licensing is responsible for supplying the SRAG with a member.
3.6 The SRAG Leader is responsible for the following:
3.6.1 Scheduling meetings and ensuring quomm requirements are met.
3.6.2 Documenting the meeting transactions via meeting minutes 3.6.3 Assigning appropriate shutdown risk related actions to SRA members 3.6.4 Issuing Reports 3.6.5 Providing post outage critique input to the Outage Manager for inclusion in the Station Outage Critique 3.6.6 Ensuring that a daily shutdown risk assessment (SPR 931941) is performed.
4.0 Pre-Outage Review 4.1 Prior to issuing the Level 2 outage schedule a team comprised of, as a minimum, an outage coordinator, an outage scheduler and an individual from the Plant Operaticas Department possessing an SRO license on STP will be assembled under the direction of the Outage Suppot Manager, to evaluate the Level 2 outage schedule and devise a defense in depth plan for shutdown risk criteria.
4.2 The SRAG will review the Level 2 Outage schedule to ensure the outage is carefully planned to keep the plant in the safest possible conditions during implementation of the outage schedule.
4.3 Items to be addressed by the SRAG will include, but are not limited to, the following:
(See Data Packages 1 through 8) 4.3.1 Mid-loop operations (fuel in Reactor Vessel and RCS below the top of the hot legs) 4.3.2 Loss of electrical power (bus outage) 4.3.3 Defueled (Reactor Core off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool)
OPGP03 ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment s'
4.3.4 Pressurization (inadvertent pressurization of RCS) 4.3.5 less of coolant inventory (loss on RCS or Spent Fuel Pool exposing spent fuel) 4.3.6 Loss of cooling (loss of shutdown cooling capability) 4.3.7 Reactivity Management (inadvertent boron dilution and operation with Rods Locked Out in Rapid Refueling Position) 4.3.8 Containment integrity 4.4 A thorough review of the outage schedule will be made by the SRAG to ensure safety of the plant at various shutdown configurations throughout the outage. This will be done by reviewing the outage schedule to the guidelines on Data Packages I through 8 ensuring that compensatory measures or other remedial actions appropriately address shutdown risk concerns and completing a shutdown Risk Assessment Profile, Data Package 9.
4.4.1 All applicable issues should be evaluated to determine if they meet the
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shutdown guidelines identified in this procedure.
4.4.1.1 IE the guidelines are NOT met, THEN these items shall be documented in the report to the Outage Support Manager. The SRAG should identify HIGHER RISK EVOLUTIONS for which additional review per Step 5.3 is recommended.
4.4.1.2 If the guidelines are NOT met, THEN corrective action and/or contingencies should be developed and implemented as necessary (i.e., schedule changes, deletion from outage, compensatory measures, training, etc.).
4.4.2 All corrective actions should be evaluated for the following: (Reference Addendum 1 for the flow chart of the evaluation process.)
4.4.2.1 Effectiveness to ensure actions taken, especially schedule revisions, have NOT affected shutdown issues elsewhere 4.4.2.2 To ensure safety of the plant and plant personnel have been maintained.
4.5 The Shutdown Risk Assessment performed before each refueling outage should evaluate SPRs/CRs flagged by the Corrective Action Group (CAG) as outage related, or the CAG Refueling Outage Summary Report if generated, to determine the effect these problems may have on the outage.
OPGP03-ZA-0101 Rev. 2 Page 7 or at Shutdown Risk Assessment 4.6 Upon completion of the review, a repoit shall be written to the Outage Support Manager including the following:
4.6.1 Data Package 1 through 8.
4.6.2 A summary of the evaluations performed per steps 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
4.6.3 Attach a Risk Assessment Profile to the report, Data Package 9.
4.6.4 The SRA Report shall be retained for five years. (SPR 93-1941) 4.7 The Outage Support Manager will review and approve the report and forward to the Plant Manager for final approval.
5.0 Outage Review 5.1 Once the outage has started, the Outage Manager or designee will maintain a current status of key engineered safeguard systems.
5.2 The SRAG Leader should attend outage meetings throughout the outage to determine if any work activity scheduling changes (i.e., adds, deletes) impact the results and conditions of the SRA Report. If additional SRAG review is required, then the SRAG Leader should notify the Outage Support Manager and schedule a meeting of the SRAG.
5.3 Additional risk assessments should be performed prior to HIGHER RISK EVOLUTIONS. The fregrency is determined by the SRAG Leader. Identified impacted systems or situations of increased risk should be brought to the attention of management prior to beginning the evolution in order to increase awareness of plant personnel. Meeting minutes will be provided to the:
Unit Operations Manager Outage Manager Unit Plant Manager SRAG Members
OPGP03-ZA-0101 R ev. 2 Page 8 of 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment 5.4 The SRAG Leader shall ensure that a daily shutdown risk assessment (SPR 93-1941) is performed which considers:
Reactor Coolant or SFP inventory control Decay heat removal capability Emergency and off-site power CRE and FilB llVAC Reactivity control and shutdown monitoring 5.4.1 Forms 2 through 4 show typical forms that may be used for this assessment.
(SPR 93-1941) 5.4.2 The person performing the daily shutdown risk assessment shall immediately inform the Shift Supervisor of any condition discovered during the l
assessment that should be addressed or controlled to minimize the potential for fuel damaging events during shutdown.
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6.0 References 6.1 OPOP03-ZG-0009, Mid-Loop Operation 6.2 OPGP03-ZO-0035, Reduced RCS Inventory Operations 6.3 NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management dated December 5,1991 6.4 Nuclear Group Policy 181, Shutdown Risk Assessment 6.5 OPSP03-CV-0014, CVCS Equipment Verification 6.6 OPOP04-RC-0007, Mode 5 LOCA.
6.7 USQE 92-028, TI-FC-92-035, OPOP04-FC-0001, Loss of SFP Level or Cooling 6.8 Quality Assurance Audit 92-20 (CA) 6.9 SPR 931941 6.10 NRC Information Notice 93-72 Observations from recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections.
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j OPGP03.ZA 0101 Rev. 2 Pne 9 or 31 Shutdown Hisk Assessmern j
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6.11 OPOP03 ZG 0012, Operations with Rods in the Rapid Refueling Position.
6.12 SPR 92 0123 6.13 OPGP03 ZA 0102, Refueling Outage Scheduling and Scope Control
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7.0 Suppori Documents 7.1 Addendum 1.
Flow Chart 7.2 LTata Package 1.
hild Loop Operations 7.3 Data Package 2, Loss of Electrical Power 7.4 Data Package 3, Defueled 7.5 Data Package 4, Pressurization 7.6 i Package 5, loss of Coolant Inventory 7.7 Data Package 6, Loss of Cooling 7.8 Data Package 7, Reactivity hianagement 7.9 Data Package 8,-
Containment Integrity 7.10 Data Package 9 Risk Assessment Profile (Sample )
7.11 Form I, Daily Plant Status Form, blodes 5 and 6 (Sample) 7.12 Form 2, Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Cover Sheet (Sample) 7.13 Form 3, Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (htodes 5 and 6)(Sample) 7.14 Form 4 Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Defueled)(Sample)
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OPGP03.ZA 0101 Rev.2 l'agetoorsi
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
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Addendutn 1 Flow Chart l' ape i of I MOIN 86AlfDOWN kr$K ASSttsNENT ktVitW AM,h. h.tPo.,hfh(j hk y ;rja>=;,N, j -
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OPGP03 ZA.0101 Rev.2 l'are is or 3:
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Shutdown Hisk Assessment Data Package 1 Mid Loop Operations l' age 1 of 2 NOTE A "NO" answer does nai necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatery measures.
YES/NO 1.0 is on site electrical work which could penurb mid loop operation work minimized or avoided during mid loop conditions? (including movement of Cranes, etc., near transmission lines and transformers) 2.0 1s switchyard electrical work which could perturb mid loop operations minimized or avolded during mid loop conditions?
3.0 Are Loss of Off site Power (LOOP) precursor surveillances minimized or i
avoided during mid loop conditions?
4.0 Are LOOP precursor activities minimized or avoided in the operational unit during mid loop conditions? (Verify daily during mid loop)
$.0 Does the schedule support the implementation of mid loop procedural prerequisites?
6.0 Arc adequate controls in place to ensure RCB containment integrity during mid loop conditions?
7.0 Arc heavy load lifts in the RCB avelded during mid-loop operations?
8.0 1s the time in mid-loop configuration minimized?
9.0 Are potential fire inducing activities minimited or avoided during i
mid loop configuration?
10.0 Are RilR modifications, work requests, and tests, not covered by mid loop procedure requirements, prohibited during mid loop?
This page when completed, shall be retained.
UPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 Pace 12 of 31 Shutdown 1(Isk Assessment Data Package 1 l
Mid Loop Operations Page 2 of 2 YES/NO 11.0 Are RilR power supply modifications avoided during mid loop?
12.0 is an adequate RCS vent path available when the nozzle dams are installed?
13.0 Are there adequate controls to ensure proper RCS level in place during mid loop?
14.0 Are rnid loop conditions avoided for at least 7 days after shutdown?
15.0 JE the answer :o any of the above is "NO", THEN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules. The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03 ZA 0101 R cv. 2 Page 13 of 3i
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Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 2 Loss of Electrical Power Page 1 of i NOTE A "No" answer does p.p1 necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identines an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO 1.0 Will the emergency transformer (ET) be available during mid loop conditions?
l 2.0 is work on the BT scheduled during periods when the ESF trains and the main and auxiliary transformers are available7 3.0 Will two Standby Diesel Generators (SDO) be operable during all hiode 5 or 6 operations?
4.0 Are two sources of offsite power continuously maintained throughout the outage?
5.0 1s SDG backfeed capability maintained throughout the outage?
6.0 Are switchyard activities coordinated with Outage hianagement to minimize or avoid impact on operable power supplies?
7.0 is the use of non standard electrical line ups minimized or avoided to meet electrical requirements?
8.0 JE the answer to any of the above is "NO", THEN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or reconunendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
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Ol'GP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 Page 14 sr si
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Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 3 Defueled Page I of1 I
NOTE A "NO" answer does noi necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require funher evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO 1.0 Are activities scheduled such that a minimum of two FIIB llVAC trains are functional once irradiated fuel from the current outage has been transferred to the SFP7 2.0 Will one or more ESF DGs be operable throughout Defueled operation?
(At least one operable ESF DG muit suppon an operable SFPCCS Train) 3.0 Will one SFPCCS train be operable and another SFPCCS train be operable or functional prior to, during, and immediately following Defueled operations?
4.0 Do llad monitor maintenance activities support Defueled and fuel movement activities 7 5.0 Are contingencies to provide SFP make up readily available in case of loss of SFP cooling? (Ref. OPOP04 FC-0001) 6.0 is a functional LilSI pump available in case of loss of SFP cooling?
7.0 is the functional LilSI pump supponed by an operable SDG7 8.0 Are activities avoided or minimized that could penurb the functioning of the SFPCCS7 9.0 Are there two ESF clectrical buses operable while defueled? (one bus backed by a SDG) 10.0 JF the answer to any of the above is "NO", TilEN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
Ol'Gl*03 ZA 0101 Itev. 2 I'ase is or si Shutdown Risk Assessment 1
Data Package 4 Pressuritation l' age 1 of 1 i
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NOTE A "NO" answer does NOT necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO, i
1.0 is Cold Overpressure Mitigating System (COMS) operable as required?
2.0
, Is a vent path established as required? (Minimum of 2 sq. in.)
3.0 Are high pressure inlection systems rendered inoperable at cold shutdown conditions? (i.e.,1111S1) 4.0 1E one or both pressurizer PORVs are inoperable are the required RilR pumps and discharge relief valves operable?
5.0 1E the answer to any of the above is "NO", TIIEN the action should be
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reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
Ol'Gl'03 ZA 0101 Rev. 2 l'ese 16 or si Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 5 Loss of Coolant Inventory Pase i of 1 NOTR A "NO" answer does agi necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YESMO 1.0 is a source of borated RCS makeup maintained throughout the outage?
(e.g., RWST, DATS) 2.0 is work on valves or other components that could lead to an RCS draindown minimized or avoided while fuel is in the vessel?
3.0 is the use of freeze plugs in conditions where a failure could cause a loss of inventory avoided?
4.0 Is the Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) calibrated and operable prior to shutdown and during the outage?
5.0 is an alternate source of water available for RCS make up? (e.g.,
Firewater, RMWST) 6.0 Are there adequate controls to ensure instrument air is available to the spent fuel pool gates?
7.0 JF the answer to any of the above is "NO", T11EN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommend:ilons provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
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OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 Pese 17 of 31 l
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Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 6 Loss of Cooling Page 1 of i NOTE A "NO" answer does.ugl necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO 1.0 Are the required number of RilR trains operable for the plant shutdown conditions?
2.0 Are the required RilR trains supported by operable SDGs?
3.0 Are LilSI pumps functional to mitigate loss of cooling conditions?
4.0 Although not required by Technical Specifications, are 1111S1 pumps functional to mitigate loss of cooling conditions?
5.0 Does the schedule support system / equipment releases to mialmize potential for interrelated system LOCAs? (i.e., RCS via RilR release)
(Ref. OPOP04-RC-0006, OPOPO4 RC 0007) 6.0 Arc electrical activities avoided that could perturb the operable RilR trains?
7.0 Are RCS related activities minimized or avoided that could penurb the operable RilR trains?
8.0 Will Loss of Cooling heatup rate information be available at the start of the outage?
9.0 Jll the answer 6, any of the above is "NO", T11EN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessay or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
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Ol'GP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 i'ase is or 3:
Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 7 Reactivity Management Page 1 of I l
NOTE 1
A "NO" answer does pm necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO 1.0 is one CCP operable during mades 5 and 67 2.0 1s the required boron injection path operable?
3.0 Are the source range monitors supported by an operable SDG (SDG
- 11(#21)] during critical evolutions?
4.0 WilEN fuel is in the vessel, TilEN are there two source range or extended range neutron detectors operable and supported by an operable 13attery?
5.0 is work on Boron Dilutlen Paths avoided? (Reference OPSP03 CV-0014) 6.0 Are hydrostatic testing activities scheduled to prevent an inadvertent RCS 11oron dilution?
7.0 1s the tirne minimized that the control rods are locked out?
8.0 Is Control Rod Lockout avoided in modes 3 or 47 9.0 Are RCS dilution paths isolated when control rods are locked out in Mode 57 10.0 With the Reactor Vessel Head in place and the control rods in the' Locked Out Condition can the control rods be inserted in a timely manner?
11.0 JF the answer to any of the above is "NO", THEN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
4 OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev. 2 l' age 19 or 31
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Shutdown Risk Assessment Data Package 8 Containment Integrity I' age 1 of i NOTE A "NO" answer does no1 necessarily represent an unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an area that may require further evaluation or other compensatory measures.
YES/NO 1.0 Are the openings and closings of the RCD scheduled appropriately relative to fuel movements and mid loop conditions?
2.0 Do the openings and closings of the RCD conform with Technical Specification?
3.0 Do Rad monitor maintenance activities support containment integrity requirements?
4.0 Can RCD integrity be rapidly restored during mode 5 conditions?
5.0 Is there an alternate / temporary source of electrical power available to power the equipment hatch hoists to close the equipment hatch? (i.e. In the event of a loss of power incident) 6.0 JE the answer to any of the above is "NO", TIIEN the action should be reviewed relative to the associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or recommendations provided for management resolution.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03.ZA.0101 Rev. 2 Pese 20 or 3:
Shutdown Hisk Assessment j
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Data Package 9 Risk Assessment Profile (Sample)
Page 1 of 2 Plant Conditions Modo 5 Modo 5 or 6 Modo 5 or G Loops Low Lovel Low Lovel Modo 6 i
Filled Rods Locked Out Rods High Loyol Dofuelod (1)
(2)
Inserted (3)
(4)
(5) i ESF Diosol 2
Generators B or C 2
RHR Systems Not Required ESF 2
Etoct Busos 2
ECW 2
Systems I
CCW Systems 2
1 SFPCCS 1
N to LHSI 1
CCP 1
Stdby XFMR1 Stdby XFMR2 2 out of 3 Main und Aux XFMR Emergency XFMR CRE HVAC 2
FHB HVAC 2
RAD Monitors CRE 1
FHB RCB Rod Control Systems (800 Form 3, Roq'd.
Sect. 6)
Nuclear W2 Sourco Not 2/4 3/4 2/4 instrumentation Range Required RVWL Coro Exit TCs This page, when completed, shall be retained, f_....
OPGP03.ZA 0101 Hev.2 P:n 21 or 3 Shutdown Risk Assessment
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Data Package 9 Sample Risk Assessment Profile Pap 2 of 2 NOTES:
(1)
Mode 5 - Loops Filled: The RCS level is above the reactor vessel flange AND any steam generator is available as a heat sink.
(2)
Mode 5 or 6 Low Level (Control Rods locked out): Irradiated fuel in the vessel when the reactor water level is lower than the reactor vessel flange or the steam generators are not available as heat sinks and Control Rods are locked out of the core in the Rapid Refueling position.
(3)
Mode 5 or 6 Low Level (Control Rods inserted): Irradiated fuel in the vessel when the i
reactor water level is lower than the reactor vessel flange or the steam generators are not
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available as heat sinks and all control rods are fully inserted into the core.
(4)
Mode 6 liigh level: Reactor Vessel head removed and the Refueling Cavity Pooded with irradiated fuel in the vessel.
(5)
Defueled: All fuel assernblies removed from the reactor vessel and containment and placed in the spent fuel pool.
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OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 rege 22 or si Shutdown Risk Assessment Form 1 Daily Plant Status Form Modes 5 and 6 (Sarnple) page i of UNIT DATE:
TIME:
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8 SYSTEM A
B C
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ECW CCW SFPCCS A F DCP BSFPCP CCP B CCP
- s,7.
A CCP LHSI l
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OPGP03.ZA.0101 Rev. 2 l'ere 23 or 3 Shutdown Risk Assessment Fonn 2 Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Cover Sheet (Sample) l' age 1 or i Plant Conditions:
Por.
Unit:
Dato:
Timo:
formor:
Modo:
RCS Pross:
RCS Temp:
RCS Lovel:
i Plant Status (l.o. Pzr Bubblo, Mid Loop, Solid Plant Ops, Rods Locked Out, etc.):
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Toch. Spec. LCO Actions in ollect:
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Toch Spec /Significant Equipment Out of Service:
Plant Evolutions / Activities in Progress or Plannod:
i This page, when completed, shall be retained.
i Ol GP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 Pace 24 or 31 1
Shutdown Risk Assessment Daily Shutdown itisk Assessment Form (Modes 5 and 6)(Sample)
I'8' I "
DATE:
TIME:
UNIT:
PER-FORMER:
CAUTION IF THE ANSWER IS NO TO ANY QUESTION,IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR.
INVENTORY CONTROL AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL STATUS l
L STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)
- SYSTEM TRAIN A TRAIN B TRAIN C I
STANDBY OFN OFN OFN DG RHR O F f4 OFN OFN ECW OFN OFN OFN CCW OFN OFN OFN SFPCC FN FN CCP A i
t OFN CCP B OFN 4
LHSI OFN OFN OFN RVWL
'FN t
FN CORE EXIT FN FN TCs 3
- 1. INVENTORY CONTROL AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
ARE TWO TRAINS EACH OF RHR, ECW, AND CCW OPERABLE AND BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG IN ORDER TO YES NO REMOVE DECAY HEAT GENERATED BY THE REACTOR?
B.
IS ONE SFPCC FUNCTIONAL AND BACKED BY ITS OPERABLE STANDBY DG AND ASSOCIATED ECW/CCW TRAINS IN ORDER YES NO TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT GENERATED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL 7 C.
IS ONE CCP OPERABLE AND ONE TRAIN OF LHSI OPERABLE OR FUNCTIONAL AND BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG YES NO TO COMPENSATE FOR A LOSS OF RHR CASUALTY?
CIRCLE 'O*, 'F', OR *N' BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
"O" means to be OPERABLE per technical specifications ior the current Modo
'F" means to be Functional, NOT 'O', but capable of fulfilling intended safety functions.
'N' means to bo NOT 'F" and NOT "O*.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03/LA.0101 Rew 2 Pare 25 or 3:
Shutdown Risk Assessment j
Fonn 3 Sample Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Modes 5 and 6)
Pap 2 oM OFF SITE POWER AVAILABILITY I
SYSTEM STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)
- UNIT 1 STBY XFMR O
F N
UNIT 2 STBY XFMR O
F N
MAIN AND AUX XMFRS O
F N
2.
OFFSITE POWER ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
ARE TWO OF EITHER THE UNIT 1 STBY XFMR, UNIT 2 STBY XFMR, OR MAIN AND AUX XFMRS OPERABLE?
YES NO l
l l
4 CIRCLE 'O', 'F", OR 'N' BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
'O' means to be OPERABLE per technical specifications for the current Mode "F" means to bo Functional, NOT 'O", but capablo of fulfilling intended safety functions.
'N' means to bo NOT *F" and NOT 'O'.
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 rese 26 or 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment I, "" 3 Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form
'I (Modes 5 and 6)(Sample) l' age 3 f 6 HVAC STATUS l
l STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)
F N
O F
N O
F N
FHB EXHAUST FANS O
F N
O F
N O
F N
FHB EXHAUST FILTER O
F N
O F
N CONTROL ROOM INTAKE RAD 0
F N
O F
N MONITORS (RT 8033,8034)
SPENT FUEL POOL EXHAUST RAD O
F N
O F
N MONITORS (RT 8035, 8036)
RCB PURGE RAD MONITOR O
F N
O F
N (RT 8012,83013)
- 3. IIVAC ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
ARE TWO TRAINS EACil OF CRE IIVAC AND Fill! EX11AUST FANS YES NO OPERAllLE AND llACKED llY AN OPERAllLE STANDilY DO?
- 11. IS ONE EACll OF RCil FURGE, CONTROL ROOM INTAKE, AND YES NO SPENT FUEL FOOL lixilAUST RAD MONITORS OPERAllLE, AND DAT111RY llACKED7 C,
1S ONE TRAIN OF Fill! EXilAUST FILTERS OPERAllLE AND YES NO IIACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDilY DG7 CIRCLE "0", "F", OR "N" D ASED ON Tile FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
"O" means to be OPERAllLE per technical specifications for the current Mode
- F" means to be Functional, NOT *O", but capable of fulfilling intended safety functions.
"N" means to be NOT *F" and NOT *O".
This page, when completed, shall be retained,
Ol'GP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 Pere 27 or si Shutdown Risk Assessment I
rni 3 Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Modes 5 and 6)(Sample)
"*8# # ""'
REACTIVITY MONITORING STATUS MONITOR STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)*
NI NE 0045, SDM
)
(ODPS APC A1)
O F
N NI NE 0046, SDM (ODPS APC C1)
O F
N NI NE 0031, (120V AC VITAL CH.1)
O F
N NI NE 0032, (120V AC VITAL CH. 2)
O F
N
- 4. REACTIVITY MONITORING ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
ADEQUATE SilUTDOWN MONITORING CAPABILITY PRESENT7 (AT LEAST 2 MONITORS OPERABLE AND SOURCE RANGE AUDIO COUNT RATE CilANNEL IN
,ES NO OPERATION.)
CIRCLE "O", "F", OR "N" BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
"O" means to be OPERABLE per technical specifications for the current Mode
- F" means to be Functional NOT "O", but capable of fulfilling intended safety functions.
"N" means to be NOT "F" and NOT *O".
This page, when completed, shall be retained.
B
l 01'Gl'03 ZA.0101 Ilev. 2 i Pare 28 of 31 4
Shuidown IUsk Assessment Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Fonn 1
Fonn 3 (Modes 5 and 6)(Sample)
Pare 5 of 6 IlORATION FLOW PATil STATUS NOTH 1.
Place an O or C for OPEN or CLOSED as applicable in the square adjacent the vahc or breaker.
2.
litcaker position can be determined by status of valve indication status lights.
3.
Cir-le YES or NO as app!! cable for pump operability.
i 4.
Er r tank level in gallons and concentration in PPM 11oron from most recent sample, 5.
Trace out the operable boration flow path (s).
.EM.
,E$,
.. n. t.
n n....
Q x
x x
m o..n.
t,t.
O-X R
cm, o., n....
e.....
o....,
o..u.
f.bte TT. ass.
~
~
~
POW' 41(3) 4
~
4 t(f).t.dt t v.woy.ep i g
.a f tg n..
N 8
<=
~
tv..let Puut 4 6(3).
~
t v.. lu
~
E v-.i. r.
0 'I8/#8 UU "II y ] (V tV..I.4 om a'-u
.,g.,,
em.
o
.... u nm.....
~
u.,,
r x
o.o g3 y
no....
u,.
n.....,.
fil/M.
.,o-.,,_
-,.....n n...,,
n.m..u.
,as opin tvin**
cv364.
n,,,,...,,,
C
~
\\/
o...J......
t u.
n., n..,..
~
W.
~o
- n. 3.=
.4 5.
Il0 RATION l' LOW PATil ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONii)
A.
IS ONil llAT OR RWST OPERAllLE YES NO 11.
IS ONE BORIC ACID 11.OW PATil OPERAllLE AND llACKED IlY AN OPERAllLl! STANDilY DG.
YES NO C.
IS ONE CCP OPliRAllLE AND llACKED llY AN OPERAllLli STANDIlY DG.
YES NO This page, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev. 2 Pne 29 or 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment I' f* 3 Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form i
(Mode 5 and 6)(Sample)
Pye 6 of 6 ARE RODS LOCKED OUT WITH RX VESSEL YES NO HEAD IN PLACE 7 (lF NO, DISREGARD THIS SECTION)
- 6. REACTIVITY CONTROL AND MONITORING STATUS SYSTEM / CONDITION STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)*
ROD CONTROL MO SET #1 (LC 1K1 (2K1))
"" F # '
F N
ROD CONTROL MG SET #2 (LC 1L1 (2L1))
L F
N RX TRIP SWGR TRAIN A CONTROL PWR O
F N
(E1(2)A11 125V DC)
RX TRIP SWGR TRAIN D CONTROL PWR O
F N
(E1(2)B11 125V DC)
ARE RX TRIP SIGNALS PRESENT7 L
YES NO DRPI(DP003, NON CLASS 120V AC) i F
N ROD CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL POWER F
N (DP0004, NON CLASS 120V AC) o Nl NE 0045. EXTENDED RANGE AND SDM O
F N
(ODPS APC A1)
NI NE 0040, EXTENDED RANGE AND SDM O
F N
(ODPS APC C1)
NI NE 0031, (120V AC VITAL CH.1)
O F
N NI NE 0032, (120V AC VITAL CH. 2)
O F
N 6.
REACTIVITY CONTROL AND MONITORING ASSESSMENT WITil (CIRCLE ONE)
CONTROL RODS LOCKED OUT A. IS 1 MO SET AND ROD CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL POWER FUNCTIONAL.
YES NO B. CAN Tile TRIP BKRS DE SilUT7 (NO RX TRIP SIGNALS. RX TRIP SWOR CONTROL POWER ALLOWS FOR REMOTE CLOSING. TRIP BKRS CAN DE CLOSED LOCALLY IF YES NO REQUIRED.)
C. ADEQUATE SDM MONITORING CAPABILITY PRESENT? (DRPI AND AT LEAST 3 OUT OF 4 SOURCE RANGE / EXTENDED YES NO RANGE NI OPERABLE.)
l CIRCLE "O", "F", OR "N" DASED ON Tile FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
"O" means to be OPERABLE per technical specil'ications for the current Mode "F" means to be Functional, NOT "O", but capable of fulfilling intended safety functions.
"N" means to be NOT "F" and NOT 0".
This page, when compicted, shall be retained, i
OPGP03.ZA.0101 Rev.2 Pese 30 or 31 Shutdown Risk Assessment
)
Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Fonn (Defueled)
Form 4 (Sample) p,,,,og DATE:
TIME:
UNIT:
PER.
FORMER:
CAUTION IF THE ANSWER IS NO TO ANY OUESTION,IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR.
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL STATUS
^
STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)
SYSTEM TRAIN A TRAIN B TRAIN C STANDBY O
F N
O F
N O
F N
DG l
SFPCC F
N F
N l
PUMPS ECW O
F,N O
F N
O F
N CCW F
N F
N F
N LHSI F
N F
N F
N
- 1. DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
IS ONE TRAIN EACH OF SFPCC, CCW AND ECW, FUNCTIONAL YES NO AND BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG7 B.
ARE BOTH SFPCC PUMPS FUNCTIONAL WITH ONE PUMP YES NO BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG7 C.
IS ONE LHSI PUMP FUNCTIONAL AND BACKED BY AN OPERABLE YES NO STANDBY DG7 CIRCLE '0" 'F', OR 'N' BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
'O' means to bo OPERABLE por technical specifications for the current Modo
'F' means to bo Functional, NOT 'O*, but capable of fulfilling intended safoty functions.
'N' means to bo NOT 'F" and NOT 'O*.
This pago, when completed, shall be retained.
OPGP03 ZA 0101 Rev.2 iv e 31 or 3:
r Shutdown Risk Assessment
)
p 4
Daily Shutdown Risk Assessment Form (Defueled)
(Sample) 2on GFFSITE POWER AVAILAlllLITY SYSTEh1 STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)*
UNIT 1 STHY XFMR O
F N
UNIT 2 STHY XFMR O
F N
MAIN AND AUX XMFRS O
F N
EMERGENCY XFMR F
N 2.
OFFSITE POWER ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A. ARE TWO OF EITilER Tile UNIT 1 STBY XFMR, UNIT 2 STBY YES NO XFMR, OR MAIN AND AUX XFMRS OPERABLE.
HVAC STATUS STATUS (CIRCLE ONE)
- SYSTEM TRAIN A TRAIN B TRAIN C FHB EXHAUST FANS O
F N
O F
N O
F N
FHB EXHAUST FILTER O
F N
O F
N
^
g SPENT FUEL POOL EXHAUST RAD O
F N
u#
M O
F N
MONITORS l%y c
(RT-8035, 8036) io'+ +
F N
O F
N O
F N
- 3. HVAC ASSESSMENT (CIRCLE ONE)
A.
ARE TWO TRAINS OF FHB EXHAUST FANS OPERABLE AND YES NO BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG7 B.
IS ONE TRAIN OF FHB EXHAUST FILTERS OPERABLE AND YES NO BACKED BY AN OPERABLE STANDBY DG7 C.
IS ONE TRAIN OF CRE HVAC OPERABLE AND BACKED BY AN YES NO OPERABLE STANDBY DG7 CIRCLE 'O', 'F' OR 'N' BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:
"O' means to bo OPERABLE por technical specifications for the current Modo "F" means to bo Functional, NOT "O', but capablo of fulfilling intended safoty fanctions.
'N' means to be NOT "F" and NOT "O".
This pago, when completed, shall bo retained.