ML20078Q402

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Rev 7 to OPOP01-ZA-0001, Plant Operations Dept Administrative Guidelines
ML20078Q402
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/1994
From:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18065B259 List:
References
NUDOCS 9502210235
Download: ML20078Q402 (63)


Text

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HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION i

PLANT PROCEDURES MANUAL DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE NON SAFETY-RELATED (O) l Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines WPOP01-ZA4001'

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Rev.7 Page I of 31 APPROVED:

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Of/24/9V Unit Operation M ger D/efpfroved D' ate Effective Usage Control: IN HAND (See Table oFContents for exceptions)

Usage Table of Contents Egge G

4 1.0 Purpose 3

3 2.0 System Lineup User's Guide 3

3 3.0 Owner Communication Plan 4

3 3.1 Purpose 4

3 3.2 Dermitions 5

3 3.3 Immediate Notifications 6

3 3.4 Operations Reports 7

3 4.0 Emergency Operations Equipment Control 7

3 5.0 Locked Component Program 8

3 5.1 Purpose 8

3 5.2 Scope 8

3 5.3 Definitions 9

4 9502210235 950216

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PDR ADOCK 05000498 v

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s Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 2 of 31 Usage Table of Contents Egge 3

5.4 locked Component Program Guidelines 10 3

5.5 Independent Verification Guidelines 10 3

5.6 Dual Verification Guidelines 14 3

5.7 Locking Guidelines 15 l

3 5.8 Locked Component Key Control 16 i

3 5.9 locked Component Deviations 16 4

6.0 References 18 4

7.0 Support Documents 20 1

3 7.1 Addendum 1, Plant Systems Requiring Independent Verification 21 3

7.2 Addendum 2, POD Standard for Determining Valve Position 23 2

7.3 Addendum 3, Locked Component Deviation Log (Typical) 24 1

7.4 Emergency Operations Equipment Inventory Checklist (-1) 25 Usace 1 - IN HAND 2 - IN HAND CONTROLLING STATION 3 - REFERENCED 4 - AVAILABLE l

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s Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 3 of 31 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to establish a central location for the following inventories and programs that are specific to Plant Operations Department conduct of business:

o System Lineup User's Guide o

Owner Communication Plan o

Emergency Operations Equipment Control o

Locked Component Control 2.0 SYSTEM LINEUP USER'S GUIDE (Ref 6.15) 2.1 System Lineups serve as a baseline configuration upon which further operations are based. System Lineups SHALL be performed as described below:

2.1.1 Locked In Place components aligned in the System Lineups are initial settings and MAY be adjusted as required to maintain proper flow rates.

i 2.1.2 ALIGN all components as indicated on the checklist and initial the appropriate block. The position of all components SHALL be verified using the visual inspection techniques or remote indications specified in Section 5.0, Locked Component Program, of this procedure (Ref 6.16 and 6.20). The lineup performer SHALL ensure that pipe caps are properly installed while performing the lineup (Ref. 6.21).

2.1.3 E any component / label discrepancies are discovered, THEN NOTE the discrepancy on the checklist to allow resolution.

i 2.1.4 WHEN all checklist items have been completed, THEN the operator who completed the checklist SHALL sign and date the checklist j

AND present the checklist to his/her supervisor.

2.1.5 E Supervisory personnel direct an Independent Verification to be performed for those components requiring Independent Verification THEN initial the appropriate block on the checklist.

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t Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 i

Admini<trative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 4 of 31 2.1.6 WHEN the IndeF='+nt Verification is completed, THEN the j

operator who performed the W-g--#+nt Verification SHALL sign -

and date the checklist and present the checklist to his/her supervisor.

2.1.7 '

The completed checklist SHALL be reviewed by the Unit / Shift Supervisor or Chemical Operations Supervisor, as appmpriate, to verify the Lineup is complete and to note any exceptions or unusual conditions.

2.1.8 The responsible supervisor SHALL address exceptions on a case by case basis to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications and reliable system / component operation.

2.1.9 Copies of the completed checklist SHALL be inserted in the Control Room system status file or the watchstation system status file, as appropriate.

2.1.10 The superseded checklist SHALL be forwarded for record retention -

l or discarded as appropriate.

I 2.2 Exceptions noted on a System Lineup SHALL be tracked using the i

Configuration Management ~ System to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications and reliable system / component operation.

i 2.3 IE the performance of the alignment will result in a significant radiation l

er.posure, serious personnel safety hazard or if the associated components are located in the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Valve Pit, THEN Independent Verification may be waived by the Shift Supervisor.

2.4 Valves located in the AFWST valve pit are not required to be checked unless the security barrier is breached. _IE the AFWST valve pit security barrier is breached, THEN valves in the AFWST valve pit SHALL be verified and Independently Verified according to the system lineup just prior to final closure of the security barrier.

3.0 OWNER COMMUNICATION PLAN 3.1 PURPOSE The Plan describes the communication methodology for providing information to the owners of South Texas Project.

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Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 5 of 31 3.2 DEFINITIONS 3.2.1 IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS - A notification that provides information to owner top management regarding significant events at the STP that involve a major impact on the Station's operation, cost, or have potential for media coverage. Examples include:

Major personnelinjury or fatality o

Regulatory violation that could result in a civil penalty o

o Major equipment failure o

Event requiring plant shutdown i

Event activating the emergency plan o

o Event leading to load reduction 3.2.2 OPERATIONS REPORTS - Reports that advise each owner of the expected net effective generating capability, operational constraints j

and the schedule for delivery of power and energy from STP. This information is provided utilizing routine daily reports (obtained by l

OPOP01-ZQ-0022, Plant Operations Shift Routines) in addition to i

real-time communications between HL&P and Co-owner System Controllers and STP Operations personnel.

3.2.3 DUTY PLANT MANAGER - The individual responsible for overall plant operation and initiating Immediate Reports as identified in this plan. The Plant Manager will normally perform this function. During weekends, holidays, etc., the Duty Plant Manager will be the designated individual. The rotational list of the Duty Plant Manager is maintained on the Prime Computer under the call-out list and in the Control Rooms. Requests for information from Co-owners during weekends and outside normal working hours should be directed to the Duty Plant Manager.

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Plant Ooerations Department -

OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 6 of 31 3.3 IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS l

l Any problem reports which meet the criteria for severity level 1 per OPGP03-ZX 0002, Corrective Action Program, will initiate action per this section of the communication plan. The Duty Plant Manager will funher screen these repons to determine if immediate Co-owner reports are required.

3.3.1 WHEN an event occurs which meets the criteria for a severity level i

I problem report,.IIEN the Shift Supervisor SHALL ensure the appropriate immediate notifications listed below are made:

3.3.1.1 NRC (if required) - the NRC will be notified if the activity or event meets the guidelines established is the Reporting Manual.

3.3.1.2 Anoropriate Plant Support Deptubuents (as required)-

the appropriate personnel will be contacted to provide necessary support to resolve the problems.

3.3.1.3 HL&P Energy Control Department ECD) - will be notified immediately of any event or activity which can affect a unit's power production capabilities including:

o Unit trips or automatic runbacks, including the reason for the trip or runback and the estimated recovery time; o

Events requiring unit load reduction or shutdown, including the reason, amount, estimated duration, and estimated load change rate; o

Events resulting in activation of the station emergency plan, including the classification, reason and time the emergency was declared, and its effect on plant power production.

3.3.1.4 Duty Plant Mananer - will be expeditiously notified of any activity or event which could result in a severity level 1 problem report.

Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Gui&Haas Rev.7 Page 7 of 31 3.4 OPERATIONS REPORTS 3.4.1 STP Operations to HL&P Energy Control Center f

In addition to providing information conceming unit trips, load reductions, and activation of the emergency plan as described above, the Shift Supervisor SHALL ensure the HL&P system controller is notified of any unusual or abnormal limitations on operations which j

currently exist or are expected to exist during the forecast period and which may inhibit ability to change generator output or respond to changing conditions on the Co-owners' systems.

3.4.2 HL&P ECD to STP Operations 3.4.2.1 Requests for unit power output changes required to meet scheduled allocation requirements or respond to transmission system emergencies.

3.4.2.2 Provide unit reactive load requirements.

3.4.2.3 Provide switching orders.

4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS EOUIPMENT CONTROL 4.1 Emergency Operations lockers have been set aside to ensure tools required during emergencies are readily available.

4.2 The Emergency Operations Equipment lockers are inventoried quarterly by POD personnel as follows:

4.2.1 INVENTORY each locker on both units in accordance with the Emergency Operations Equipment Inventory Checklist (-1).

4.2.2 DOCUMENT any discrepancies found during the performance of the Emergency Operations Equipment Inventory PM.

4.2.3 CORRECT all discrepancies identified and RECORD the resolution on the Emergency Operations Equipment Inventory PM.

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Plant Operations Deoartment OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 8 of 31 5.0 LOCKED COMPONENT PROGRAM (Ref. 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.13, & 6.14) 5.1 PURPOSE The Locked Component Program ensures that components required by Technical Specifications, system design, or good engineering practice are administratively locked and checked periodically to ensure conformance to the established locked position.

5.1.1 A component locked in accordance with this program:

5.1.1.1 Provides some assurance the component is operated by plant personnel with the appropriate permission to operate the component.

5.1.1.2 Reminds plant personnel of the importance of the t

component.

5.1.2 A component locked in accordance with this program does NOT:

r 5.1.2.1 Prevent a component from being misoperated as a direct result of sabotage.

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5.1.2.2 Totally restrict valve motion when appropriately locked 1

(i.e. handwheel may move with valve locked).

5.2 SCOPE I

The program does not contain every valve shown as locked on a P&ID. The l

valves in the program were selected based on the following criteria-i i

5.2.1 Components required to ensure operability, ensure containment l

integrity, and support specific STPEGS safety analysis (e.g., Boron Dilution Analysis).

5.2.2 Components locked on systems requiring Independent Verification as listed in Addendum 1, Plant Systems Requiring Independent Verification.

5.2.3 Components selected by the Plant Operations or Chemical Operations and Analysis Department that are locked as a good operating practice.

Plant Operations Denartment OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 9 of 31 5.3 DEFINITIONS 5.3.1 LO: Locked Open 5.3.2 LC: locked Closed I

5.3.3 LIN: Locked In Neutral i

5.3.4 LIP: Locked In Place j

5.3.5 LOCK: The mechanism used to provide et least a limited physical restraint on the operation of a component. This may include l

padlocks or other types of sealing devices.

l 5.3.6 OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY: The Supervisor in direct control over the operation of a component or system. The Operational l

Authority for the following are:

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Plant Operations Department is the Unit / Shift Supervisor.

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Chemical Operations is the Chemical Operations Supervisor.

o Facilities Management is the Manager Facilities Management.

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o Chemical Analysis is the Chemical Technican Supervisor.

l 5.3.7 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION: The act of checking a condition, i

such as a component position, separately from activities related to i

establishing the condition or component's position. Independent l

Verification shall apply to valves, breakers, switches, jumpers, lifted i

wires, blind flanges, plugs, electrical equipment links, control cards,-

field instmments and transmitters, or any other component that could, j

if improperly installed or mispositioned, degrade a safety function.

j 5.3.8 DIRECT INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION: Independent Verification by means of physical or visual indication of the component locally.

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5.3.9 INDIRECT INDEPENDENT. VERIFICATION: Ind p ident Verification performed by observing known reliabli ; or itise -

l indicating instruments, annunciators, and valve posin, indicators.

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i Plant Oncrations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 l

Page 10 of 31 l

5.3.10 DUAL VERIFICATION: The act, by a second individual in conjunction with the performer, of checking the performance of an activity, prior to or concurrent with the activity, to ensure that the conect activity is being performed on the correct component.

5.4 LOCKED COMPONENT PROGRAM OUIDELINES j

5.4.1 Locked components are periodically verified to be in the conect position and appropriately locked by either:

5.4.1.1 A Surveillance Test, or i

5.4.1.2 A System lineup required to be performed on a periodic basis.

5.4.2 Documentation of locked component deviations SHALL be performed and tracked using either an approved procedure with the appropriate verifications OR by tracking the deviation on the Locked Component Deviation log. (Refer to Addendum 3) i 5.4.3 Locked components on systems requiring Independent Verification SHALL be verified in accordance with the Independent Verification methods described in Section 5.5, Independent Verification Guidelines.

5.4.4 Locked valve positions SHALL be verified as described in f

Addendum 2, POD Standard For Detennining Valve Positions.

I 5.5 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION GUIDELINES j

l 5.5.1 Independent Verification Policy

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5.5.1.1 Independent Verification should be performed as soon as practical after the associated task is performed.

3 5.5.1.2 The act of performing the Independent Verification i

SHALL be separate from and independent of the initial alignment, installation, or verification. The Independent Verifier SHALL NOT observe the actions of the individual performing the initial alignment or verification. Verifier independence SHALL be maintained to ensure the integrity of the Independent Verification. The Independent Verifier SHALL not base i

his verification on observation of the actions or reports l

of a performer or initial verifier.

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j Piant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 i

Administrative Guidelmes Rev.7

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Page 11 of 31 I

5.5.1.3 In cases where special conditions must be established to I

allow Independent Verification (e.g. opening security barriers, special entry inside the Reactor Conrainnwar Building), the verifier and I=M+-A-_-t Verifier MAY f

coordinate their verifications. The Independent Verifier SHALL take measures to ensure his verification is I

independent and not based on actions or observations of the verifier.

I 5.5.1.4 JE alignment changes or alteration of status does E render the components / systems incapable of performing the designated safety function, TP EN Independent i

Verification is not required.

i 5.5.1.5 Independent Verification as described herein SHALL be j

implemented except in cases which involve significant i

radiation exposure, a reduction in personnel safety, or during emergency conditions. In such cases, Indirect j

Independent Verification should be used.

5.5.1.6 Indirect Independent Verification or functional testing SHALL ONLY be used when the indication is positive and immediate.

5.5.1.7 Alignment changes or alterations in status of components / systems identified in Addendum 1 SHALL j

be Independently Verified when:

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A component / system is retumed to service following a j

period when the component / system was inoperable for maintenance or testing.

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b) Component / system which provide safety functions are 4

required to be operable.

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A component /sy tem alignment is altered during the performance of a surveillance test, special test, or f

engineering test.

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Plant Operations Deoartment OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 12 of 31 5.5.1.8 Provisions for documenting Independent Verification SHALL be:

a) Provided in applicable procedures b) Include, as minimum, space for the initials or signature of the individuals performing the alignment and verification.

c)

Incorporate these requirements by Field Change in cases where these provisions are not made.

5.5.2 Independent Verification Methods 5.5.2.1 Direct Independent Verification is the preferred method and may be completed by one of the following methods:

(Other acceptable means exist and may be employed to complete the Independent Verification.)

a)

Manual valves to be Independently Verified LOCKED OPEN should be moved slightly in the closed direction and then moved in the open direction until the valve is considered in the fully open position.

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Visual observation of the stem, (i.e., grease i

markings indicating normal valve travel, valve stem

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extended on rising stem valves) and mechanical position indication should also be performed.

2)

Valves required to be positioned slightly off backseat to prevent binding should be fully opened and retumed to the procedurally established position during Independent Verification.

b) Manual valves to be Independently Verified LOCKED CLOSED should be moved, or attempted to be moved, only in the closed direction using normal closing torque.

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Visual o'aservation of the stem (i.e., grease markings indicating normal valve travel, valve stem inserted on rising stem valves) and mechanical position indication should also be performed.

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Plant Onerations Der-r==rf OPOP01-ZA-0001 M=iaimative Guidelin_,gs Rev.7

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Page 13 of 31

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c)

Visual observation and comparison with the requirement of stem position, local indicat.ns, or other suitable valve component should be used 'a W=g='=tly verify the position of throttled valw position.

d) Throttled valves SHAIL NOT be moved to verify i

position unless specifically authorized by the Unit / Shift i

Supervisor or Chemical Operations Supervisor.

e)

Control valve position should be Independently Verified i

by ensuring that power or air, as appropriate, is available

'l to the valve operator and that no physical obstructions which could prevent proper operation are apparent.

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Indicating lights may be used for Independent

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Verification of valve and breaker positions when required for manipulation of a system configuration, however; local verification of position SHAll be performed when restoring a component to service after maintenance which j

could have affected the indicating lights.

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g) Methods of performing direct observation for Independent Verification of breakers include, but are not i

limited to:

1)

Visual observation of local breaker position I

indicating mechanical flags.

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Visual observation of breaker switch or handle position.

5.5.2.2 Indirect Independent Verification MAY be utilized when significant radiation exposure or a reduction in personnel I

safety prevents direct Independent Verification as determined by the Supervisor. Any of the following methods may be utilized. (Alternate methods are also i

available and may be utilized at the discretion of the i

Supervisor.)

a)

Visual observation of remote indicating lights for breaker

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operation.

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u Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 14 of 31 b) Visual observation of an actuation indication for verification of a setpoint.

c)

Visual observation of flow indicators as applicable to opening and closing valves, and/or remote valve position indicating lights (valve positions).

d) Functional testing ONLY if plant safety is NOT compromised AND the indications are positive and j

immediate.

l 5.6 DUAL VERIFICATION GUIDELINES 5.6.1 Dual Verification Policy 5.6.1.1 Dual Verification is only required to be performed when directed by a procedure step.

l 5.6.1.2 Dual Verification is i'ntended to be used when Self Verification does not provide an adequate barrier to prevent adverse consequences including risk of Reactor Protection System or Engineered Safety Features actuation, significant equipment damage, or personnel injury.

e 5.6.2 Dual Verification Method 5.6.2.1 Prior to step performance, the performer and verifier

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SHALL independently read or have read the step to be

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performed. The performer and the verifier SHALL agree that the step is understood.

5.6.2.2 The performer SHALL perform the four step Self l

Verification process (STAR). At the "Think" Step, the verifier SHALL verbally concur that the correct component has been touched.

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5.6.2.3 Before the "Act" step the performer SHALL verbally state his intention. The verifier SHALL verbally state I

his concurrence.

l Plant Onerations Ds: ant OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 15 of 31 5.6.2.4 Upon completion of the step the performer and verifier SHOULD document the performance / verification as specified in the controlling pmcedure. The documentation MAY be delayed if the record copy is at a remote location or if ALARA or work practice concerns make it undesirable to inurvMiately document i

completion.

5.7 LOCKING GUIDELINES 5.7.1 Valves may be locked to the pipe to which the valve is attached or the hanger / support providing restraint for the valve.

5.7.2 Valves may be locked to another valve on similar size piping (e.g.,

do NOT lock a valve on an eight inch lice to a valve on an instrument line). This locking practice prevents valves on larger lines from damaging valves on small lines during seismic or vibrational events.

5.7.3 Valves may be locked to piping, conduit, or tubing lines that are similar in size to the line to which the valve is attached (e.g., do NOT lock a valve on an eight inch line to instrument tubing). This locking practice prevents valves on larger lines from damaging smaB lines during seismic or vibrational events.

5.7.4 WHEN locking a valve to another valve, pipe, conduit, or tubing line, TijEN the locking cable should have sufficient slack to allow I

for thermal expansion. This will prevent excessive stress on the locked valve and the components locked to the valve.

5.7.5 SECURE locked components using either:

5.7.5.1

~ Locking cables with key operated padlocks;

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5.7.5.2 Locking cables with seal tabs; 5.7.5.3 Built-in features with key operated padlocks; or

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5.7.5.4 Built-in features with seal tabs.

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5.7.6 DELETED E

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Plant ODerations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 16 of 31 5.8 LOCKED COMPONENT KEY CONTROL (Ref. 6.10) 5.8.1 Keys to Operations key operated locks are controlled by the Unit / Shift Supervisor per the requirements of OPOP01-ZA-0019, Locked Component Key Control.

5.8.2 Separate locksets SHALL be used by Unit One and Unit Two to provide positive locking control between units.

5.8.3 Common unit components should be locked with the Unit One lockset.

5.9 LOCKED COMPONENT DEVIATIONS 5.9.1 General Guidelines NOTE A Locked Component Deviation occurs ANYTIME a locked Component is unlocked.

5.9.1.1 Locked component deviations SHALL be performed and tracked using either an approved procedure with the approprate verifications OR by tracking the deviation on the Locked Component Deviation Log.

5.9.1.2 Locked components SHALL NOT be repositioned without permission from the cognizant Operational Authority or in accordance with an approved procedure.

5.9.2 Locked Component Deviation Log 5.9.2.1 The Locked Component Deviation Log SHALL be maintained in the applicable unit's Control Room.

j 5.9.2.2 The Unit / Shift Supervisor or the Chemical Operations Supervisor, as applicable, is responsible for ensuring an entry is made into the Locked Component Deviation Log PRIOR to performance of a locked Component Deviation. This entry is not required for Locked Component Deviations performed in an approved procedure with the appropriate verifications.

Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 17 of 31 5.9.3 Initiating a locked Component Deviation Img Entry 5.9.3.1 The Unit / Shift Supervisor or the Chemical Operations Supervisor, as applicable, completes the following on the IAcked Compcnent Deviation Log.

4 (Refer to Addendum 3) i a)

COMPONENT NUMBER - RECORD the device number for the component being repositioned.

b) REQUIRED POSMON - RECORD the normal locked position of the component.

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REASON - RECORD a brief description of the reason for the changing component position.

d) NEW POSmON - RECORD the deviation position (i.e.

LO, LC, Closed, etc.) of the locked component.

5.9.3.2 JE the Unit / Shift Supervisor is satisfied with the request.

THEN the Unit / Shift Supervisor INITIALS.A_ND RECORDS the date/ time on the Locked Component -

Deviation Log.

i 5.9.3.3 The Operational Authority ASSIGNS an Operator to reposition the locked component.

j 5.9.3.4 The Operator SHALL inform the Unit / Shift Supervisor or Chemical Operations Supervisor, as applicable, PRIOR to unlocking the component.

i 5.9.3.5 The Operator positioning the component, INITIALS in the POSmONED BY block of the locked Component Deviation log. The Operational Authority may INmAL the POSmONED BY block for the operator per telephone or radio communications.

5.9.4 Closing a Locked Component Deviation Log Entry 5.9.4.1 The Operational Authority ASSIGNS an Operator to j

return the locked component to its required position.

j 5.9.4.2 The Operator positioning the component, INmALS in the RESTORED TO REQUIRED POSITION BY block j

AND RECORDS the date/ time.

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Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 18 of 31 5.9.4.3 The Operatior) Authority ASSIGNS another Operator to Independantly Verify the position of the component AND the adequacy of the locking mechanism.

5.9.4.4 WHEN satisfied with the position AND locking mechanism, THEN verifying Operator INITIALS in the IV'D BY block of the Locked Component Deviation Log.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 SER 87-0004, Failure of Air Operated Valves to Operate, MATS # 8500549-936.

6.2 OMR 86-298, Unmonitored Release From Boric Acid Hold Tanks, MATS # 8600694-936.

6.3 UFSAR 6.3.55, Valve Position Indication, 8601304-936.

6.4 ST-HL-AE-2107, Power Lockout of RHR and CCW Valves, LCTS# 8700524-936.

6.5 ST-HL-AE-2141, High Radiation Containment Isolation Signal for Supplementary Purge, LCTS# 8700550-936.

6.6 SPR 900375/LER l-90-006, AFW Recirculation Valve Found Open Following A Reactor Trip, LCTS# 9000955-936.

6.7 INPO 85-017, Guidelines for Conduct of Operations at Nuclear Power Stations.

6.8 UFSAR Q211.29, Administrative Control of Valves, LCTS# 8601304-860 6.9 PORC Meeting 87-001, Unit Specific Designations, LCTS# 8700015-866 6.10 IEN 84-058, Inadvertent Defeat of Safety Functions Caused By Human Error, MATS # 8500067-866 6.11 ST-HL-AE-1765, Boron Dilution Analysis, LCTS# 8801608-936

Pir.nt Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Pge 19 of 31 6.12 SPR 900210, Seal Broken on Valves 1-PC-0012B, -0016A, &

-0016B, MATS # 9000558-936

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6.13 SPR 900394, Configuration Management, MATS # 9001003-936 6.14 OPGP03-ZA-0010, Plant Procedure Adherence and Implementation and

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Independent Verification 6.15 SER 82-075, Mispositioned Containment Spray Header Manual Isolation Valve, MATS # 8501200-936 i

6.16 SER 84-056, Mispositioning of Valves and Controls Disabled Safety Systems, MATS # 8401858-936,8500004-867,8500031-866,8500090-860

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6.17 SPR 910128,1-CS-0017A Found Unlocked, MATS # 9100414-936 6.18 RFA 91-0771 6.19 OPGP03-ZO-0039, Operations Configuration Management 6.20 IEN 84-046, Circuit Breaker Position Verification l

Mats # 8400055-860,8402181-936,8500015-860 t

6.21 NOl 87-08-41, Pipe Caps, LCTS#8700441-936 6.22 Owner Communication Plan 6.23 SPR 910010. EHC leak 6.24 OPOP04-ZO-0001, Control Room Evacuation i

6.25 Locked Valve Reduction Program 6.26 Operational Readiness Plan,Section V.C.3 i

6.27 OPOP01-ZA-0019, locked Component Key Control g

6.28 ST-HS-AE-4895, Response to NRC Inspection Report 94024 l8

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Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 20 of 31 7.0 SUPPORT DOCUMENTS I

7.1 Addendum 1, Plant Systems Requiring Independent Verification i

7.2 Addendum 2, POD Standard For Determining Valve Position l

7.3 Addendum 3, Locked Component Deviation Log (Typical) 7.4 Emergency Operations Equipment Inventory Checklist (-1) 6 0

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Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines TOI01-ZAG 01 Rev.7 Page 21 of 31 l

ADDENDUM 1 PLANT SYSTEMS REOUIRING INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION (Page 1 of 2) 1)

Auxiliary Feedwater (AP) 2)

Chemical Volume and Control System (CV) 3)

Component Cooling Water System (CC) 4)

Containment HVAC - RCFC's & Carbon Units (HC) 5)

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System (CG) l 6)

Containment Isolation Valves, Piping, Supports, & Penetrations 7)

Containment Spray System (CS) 8)

Control Room & EAB HVAC Systems (HE) 9)

Essential Chilled Water System (CH) 10)

Essential Cooling Water (EW) 11)

ESF Diesels & Support Systems (Fuel Oil downstream of locked closed isolations) l (DG, DO, SD downstream of air receivers, PD) i 12)

ESF & Class IE Electrical (DJ, PC, PK, PL, PM, VA) 13)

ESF Status Monitoring System (SM) 14)

Feedwater - FWIV's to Steam Generators (FW) 15)

Fire Protection Systems (FP) 16)

Fuel Handling Building HVAC (HF) 17)

Gaseous Waste Release System (Portions of WG downstream and inclusive of VE-0032 and VE-0033)

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Leak Rate Testing System (IL) j i

19)

Liquid Waste Release System (Portions of WL downstream and inclusive of WL-FV-4077 to OC)

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Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines

@OP01-ZAG 01 Rev.7 Page 22 of 31 ADDENDUM 1 PLANT SYSTEMS REOUIRING INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION (Page 2 of 2) 20)

Main Steam - Steam Generators to MSIV's (MS) 21)

Mechanical Auxiliary Building HVAC (HM) i 22)

Post Accident Sampling System - to OCIV (AP) 23)

Primary Sampling System - to OCIV (PS) 24)

Reactor Coolant System (RC) 25)

Reactor Makeup Water System (RM) 26)

Residual Heat Removal System (RH) 27)

Safety Injection System (SI) 28)

Solid State Protection System (SP) 29)

Spent Fuel Cooling System (FC) 30)

Steam Generator Blowdown System - to OCIV (SB)

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Plant Operations Department i

Administrative Guidelines TOP 01-ZAC01 Rev.7 Page 23 of 31 ADDENDUM 2 POD STANDARD FOR DETERMINING VALVE POSITION (Page 1 of 1)

Hand Wheel Operated Valves mising Stem. Non-rising Stem. Globe. Butterfiv) :

Count the number of tums from the fully closed position when the handwheel engages the stem. Count tums only to the nearest 1/8 tum.

Knocker Valves:

Count the number of tums from the fully closed position when the handwheel engages the stem. Count tums only to the nearest 1/8 tum.

T-handle Valves:

Determine the number of degrees open from the closed position.

P Notched Valves:

Count all notches from the closed position NOT including the closed notch as shown in the figure below.

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saA B $$D @QSIT tvE

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STop CCLOSED) 4 4

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AAlsto POSITIVE Stop

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l Plant Operations Department OPOP01-ZA-0001 Administrative Guidelines Rev.7 Page 24 of 31 ADDENDUM 3 l

LOCKED COMPONENT DEVIATION LOG CTYPICAL)

(Page 1 OF 1) i l

l STP 2099 (10/91)

SOUTil TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION Locked Component Deviation Log l

UNIT COMPONENT REQUIRED SS/US NEW POSITIONED RESIDRED TO IV'D NUMBER LOCKED REASON APPROVAL POSITION BY REQUIRED BY POSITION INITfrIME/DATE POSITION BY INIT/I1ME/DATE THIS FORM, WHEN COMPLETED, SHALL BE RETAINED FOR A MINIMUM OF 5 YEARS.

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Plant Operat:,ons Department Administrat:.ve Guidelines OPOP01-ZA-0001 Rev. 7 Page 25 of 31 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS EQUIPIGNP INVENTORY CHECKLIST OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 1 of 7)

LOCATION CONTENTS SFP Emergency Fill 9 - 1 1/2 inch 100 ft Fire Hoses Hose Box (68 ft FHB Operating 3 - 1 1/2 inch Male X 1 inch Female Fittings Deck)

SFP Gate Seal 1-Na cylinder (greater than 800 psig)

Emergency N2 Bottle (68 ft FHB operating Deck - Unit 1 inside PASS room)

Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (10 ft MAB

'C' l

Train CCW Pump 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord Room 067F) 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60, SA-1(SC-1), 5A-2(SC-2) 1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001, Control Room Evacuation

.)

Emergency Operations 1 - 8 inch Crescent Wrench Locker 11(21)

(MAB 10 ft Inside 1 - 12 inch Crescent Wrench North Stairwell) l 1 - Wire Cutters 2 pr - Leather Gloves j

1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench 1 - 1 7/8 inch Eye Bolt 1 - Oxygen Sniffer (Check Batteries) 1 - Safety Belt 3 - Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Ratchet with 1 inch allen head socket 1 - Set of EOPs i

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e Plant Operat:Lons Deoartment Administrat: Lye Guidelines OPOP01-EA-0001 Rev. 7 i

Page 26 of 31 t

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS EQUIPpMNT INVENTORY CHECKLIST j

OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 2 of 7) t LOCATION CONTENTS Emergency Operations 1 - 8 inch Crescent Wrench Locker 12(22)

(41 ft MAB Next.to 1 - 12 inch Crescent Wrench Elevator) i 1 - Wire Cutters l

2 pr - Leather Gloves 1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench 1 - Safety Belt 3 - Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Ratchet with 1 inch allen head socket 1 - Set of EOPs Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (60 ft EAB

'C' TRAIN SWGR, Room 318) 1 - 50 ft Headset Extension Cord t

1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Flathead Screwdriver 1 - Contactor Depressing Device 1 - Fuse Disconnect Tool l

1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60 i

1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001 t

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l Plant Operat:.ons Deoartment Administrat:.ve Guidelines OPOP01-ZA-0001 Rev. 7 Page 27 of 31 ENERGENCY OPERATIONS BOUIPMENT INVEffrORY CHECKLIST OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 3 of 7) i LOCATION CONTENTS Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (10 ft EAB "A"

Train SWGR, Room 010) 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Flathead Screwdriver 1 - Contactor Depressing Device 1 - Fuse Disconnect Tool 1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60 1

1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001 Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (10 ft EAB Auxiliary Shutdown 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord Panel, Room 015) 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Keys:

CAT 50, CAT 60, 5A-1(5C-1), SA-2(SC-2) 1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001 Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (35 ft EAB

  • B" l

Train SWGR, 1 - 50 ft Headset Extension Cord Room 212) 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) j 1 - Flathead Screwdriver 1 - Contactor Depressing Device l

1 - Fuse Disconnect Tool 4

1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60 1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001 l

s.

e Plant Operat: ons Department Administrat:,ve Guidelines OPOP01-ZA-0001 Rev. 7 Page 28 of 31 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS EOUIPMENT INVENTORY CHECKLIST OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 4 of 7)

LOCATION CONTENTS Emergency Operations 1 - 8 in Crescent Wrench Locker 13(23) (35 ft EAB Hallway Between 1 - 12 in Crescent Wrench CR and Kitchen) 1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench j

1 - Wire Cutters l

1 - Safety Belt 1 - Sound Powered Headset 1 - Fuse Puller 1 - 3 Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Set of EOPs 1

Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (35 ft DG BLDG,

  • A" Train)

'l - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60, 5A-1(SC-1), 5A-2(SC-2) 1 - Procedure:

OPOPO4-ZO-0001 I

Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset I

Box (35 ft DG BLDG,

  • B* Train) 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60, SA-1(SC-1), 5A-2 (5C-2 )

1 - Procedure:

OPOPO4-ZO-0001 l

m Plant ODerat:,ons DSDartment Administrat:.ve Guidelines OPOP01-EA-0001 Rev. 7

+

Page 29 of 31 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS EOUIPMElfr INVENTORY CHECKLIST OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 5 of 7)

LOCATION CONTENTS Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (35 ft DG BLDG, "C" Train) 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Keys: CAT 50, CAT 60, 5A-1(5C-1), 5A-2(5C-2) 1 - Procedure: OPOPO4-ZO-0001 Emergency Operations 1 - 8 inch Crescent Wrench Locker 14(24) (10 ft IVC Stairwell) 1 - 12 inch Crescent Wrench 1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench 1 - Wire Cutters 2 pr - Leather Gloves 1 - Safety Belt 2 - Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Set of EOPs t

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Plant Coerat:.ons Denartment Administrat:,ve Guidelines OPOP01-EA-0001 Rev. 7 Page 30 of 31 M ENCY OPERATIONS EOUIPMENT INVENTORY CHECKLIST t

OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 6 of 7)

LOCATION CONTENTS l

Emergency Operations 1 - 8 inch Crescent Wrench Locker 15(25) (55 ft

'IGB Next to SE Exit 1 - 12 inch Crescent Wrench Door) 1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench

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1 - Wire Cutters r

1 - Safety Belt l

2 - Sound Powered Headsets 2 - 75 ft headset extension cords 2 pr - Leather Gloves 3 - Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Set of EOPs 1 - SG PORV Manual Hycraulic Pump With Hoses Emergency Operations 1 - 8 inch Crescent Wrench

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Locker 16(26) (29 ft i

TGB Next to Basement 1 - 12 inch Crescent Wrench Shelter) 1 - 14 inch Pipe Wrench 1 - Wire Cutters 1 - Safety Belt 1 - Fuse Puller 2 pr - Leather Gloves 3 - Portable Lanterns (Check Batteries) 1 - Set of EOPs 3

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'8 Plant Operat:,ons Denartment i

Administrat:.ve Guidelines OPOP01-ZA-0001 Rev. 7 Page 31 of 31 ENERGENCY OPERATIONS EQUIPMENT INVENTORY CHECKLIST OPOP01-ZA-0001-1 (Page 7 of 7)

LOCATION CONTENTS Sound Powered Phone 1 - Sound Powered Headset Box (29 f t TGB 13.8 KV SWGR Room) 1 - 25 ft Headset Extension Cord 1 - Flashlight (Check Batteries) 1 - Key: CC334 1 - Procedure:

OPOPO4-ZO-0001 EHC Response Locker 3 - Plastic Suits-(83 ft TGB, Turbine Deck) 3 - Pairs of Plastic Gloves 3 - Pairs of Tyvec Shoe Covers 3 - SCBA Respirators (Respirators are located in I

the 83 ft TGB East Stairway Access)

Emergency Operations 1 - Universal Spanner Wrench Locker 17(27) (Top of AFWST) 2 - 2 1/2 inch, 50 foot Fire Hoses DGFOST Emergency Fill 1 - 4 inch female to 2 1/2 inch female coupling Locker 1 - Wire Cutters 2 - 1 1/16 inch wrench 2 - Face shields 1 - 12 inch cressent wrench 4 - 2 1/2 inch, 50 ft fuel hoses All Boxes Locked Closed

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Plant Procedures OPAP01-ZA-0102 g

Rev.O Page 53 of 53 ko \\

Field Change Form 0 PAP 01-ZA-0102-10 (Page 1 of 1)

SECTION A - DESCRIPTION

1. One-Time-Only FC? l l YES l X l NO
2. FC No.

94-1062

3. Procedyre No1 Rev. No.:

OPOP07-ZA-0001 Rev. 7 m

4. Procedure

Title:

Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines

5. Classifications:

l l Safety Related lX lNon-Safety Related l

lPORC lX lOuality Related l

lNon-Ouality Related l

l Station lX l Department

6. Description of Changes (s): Deleted Step 5.7.6 Added Reference 628, ST-HS-AE-4895.
7. Reason for change Check all that apply (Refer to Addendum 3) l X l Administrative / Clarification l

l Procedure technically incorrect l X l Plant condition / Method Chg. l l Regulatory change l

l Internal commitment UTec/ Design Document

[X]Other i.pecify)

ST-HS-AE-4895 8

FCs against this Rev.

9. Affected/ additional pgs.
10. Procedure changes (s) required to 1

Excluding One-Time-Only 15.19 other un rain. (Y/N, tracking no.)

11. PREPARER <swaiwr>

Date 9/28/94 f/

g A J. Ochs

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SECTION B - APPROVAL

12. TECHNICAL REVIEWER cswann Date 5

V 13 COGNIZANT MANAGER CONCURRENCE < sic.8+aiwr>

Date w sno.,=.a..

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14. AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUAlcswaiwr>

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G M-c, B eA 9 - >r-S y PROCEDURES THAT REQUIRE PORC per ADDENDUM 1 15 Approved by Plant Manager <sicurraiwr>

Date Training Required?

YES X

NO

g Rev. 1 April-16, 1993 PORC Review Evaluation 8 7 M __

SPR sub$ect i

e Does the subject SPR meet any of the following criteria:

XES liq 1)

Concerns a REPORTABLE EVENT 7 Concerns a sianificant operating 2) abnormality or _sionificant deviation f

from normal and expected performance of v

plant equipment or systems that affect nuclear safety?

Concerns unanticipated deficiencies ini

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3) the desion or operation of structures, systems, or components that affect nuclear safety?

  • Concerns any accidental, unplanned, or

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4) j uncontrolled radioactive release?

5)

Concerns the violation of:

Codes Regulations Orders J

Technical Specifications Operating Licensing Requirements having nuclear safety significance?

Concern the abnormal degradation of 6) systems designed to contain radioactive material?

If any of the above questions are answered YES, THEN the subject i

SPR SHALI,be itted to PORC.

aw Wm/w 6[ tvaluat'or M Date An SPR that concerns uncontrolled radioactive release requires review and approval by the Plant Manager.

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STATION PROBLEM REPORT SPR 940777 REV O PAGE (1) of ( )

In EVENT... DESCRIPTION Station Problem Report (SPR) 94-0777 states that MSSD personnel failed to obtain Operations work start approval for service request (SR) LG-170195 on

  • 03/22/94*. The service request was generated to support MSSD opening the Aux Feedwater Storage Tank (AFWST) C, valve pit to repair a broken light fixture.

Subsequent initiator reviews verified the AFWST Valve Pit was entered on

  • 03/22/94, but valve lineup verifications required by Operations Procedure "OPOPO2-AF-000l* prior to the valve pit closure could not be found.

The SPR identified the only Operations work start approved opening of the AFWST valve pit for MSSD lighting repairs occurred on 12/10/93, (OTL l 479).

Upon completion of a pre-job inspection of the light, Control Room Personnel were notified parts were not available and the repair would have to be rescheduled. The AFWST valve pit hatch was then re-closed and sealed.

Reviews of the (SR) Work Package documentation, Operations Control Room and Security Force Posting Logbooks, RMS records and an interview with the responsible MSSD Supervisor, revealed the following:

o Contrary to the stated SPR concern, Equipment Clearance Order (ECO-40873) was authorized and issued to MSSD to open the Unit 1 AFWST valve pit hatch and perform the light fixture repairs on *03/22/94*.

o Unit 1, AFWST (A - D) train valve pits were opened several times for work activities from al2/03/93 - 03/24/94*, without the procedure required valve lineup verifications being performed. Only one security posted AFWST valve pit logbook entry for Operations inspections was found to have occurred, (during this period).

I:

ATTACEMENT Provides a Chronological listing of the Unit 1 AFWST valve pits opening and closing activities, (during this period).

II:

EVENT SIGNIFICANCE Failure to perform Operations procedure valve lineup verifications can adversely affect system \\ component operability and STP Technical Specification requirements. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained including the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 1978. Item 1 of Appendix A states that the licensice will have administrative procedures to control safety-related activities. Configuration control was not maintained contrary to the following requirements:

1)

Feedwater procedure 'OPOPO2-AF-0001, step 4.17' and Plant Operations Department Administrative procedure "OPGPOl-ZA-0001, Step 2.4, require in part, if the AFWST Valve pit security barrier is breached, THEN valves in the AFWST valve pit shall be verified according to the applicable lineup, just prior to the final closure of the security barrier.

2)

OPGO3-ZO-ECOL, Equipment Clearance Orders, procedure section 5.14.7, states in part, WHEN all Acceptors have released the ECO, THEN the Issuing Authority shall ensure that the restoration position shall be completed for all components. Section 5.14.7.1/8.2, states in part, ENSURE restoration positions are complete for locked and throttled valves and that they are consistent with Plant Conditions and Technical Specifications.

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STATION PROBLEM REPORT sFm 940777 REV d FAGE (2) of ( )

III: EVENT AMALYSIs Per Operations SupporE the AFWST pit valves were not unlocked and therefore the event is not repoltable.

sEE ATTACEMEWF ZZ: July 5,1994 MEMO # POD 94070655 From W. S. Blair to Unit 1 Shift Supervisor Reportability Review for SPR 940777*.

IV CAUsE OF EVENT The apparent causes for this event are as follows:

1)

Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) procedure 'OPOPO2-AF-000l* and Operations Administrative Procedure "OPGPOl-ZA-000l* have a potential unnecessary requirement to perform valve lineup verifications when the AnfST valve pit is opened, just prior to closure. The AF Technical Specification pump suction in line valves to the tank are locked in there required position.

2)

Lack of Operations ECO\\0TL AFWST valve pit configuration control and the subsequent failure by Operations to perform procedural locked valve position verifications. The investigation reveled the lost Aux Feedwater procedure OPOPO2-AF-0001-10, valve lineup documentation was not found due to Operations taking credit, (in some cases) for past lineups dating back to November 1993. Without verification of the valve pits hatch actual opening and closing status, lineups have been waived and\\or credit taken by Operations assuming that the AFWST valve pits had remained closed, lock 1td and un-opened.

Operations personnel on three different occurrences would not consider reportability reviews or re-verification of the AFWST pit valve lineups.

The AFWST pit valves were not re-inspection until June 1994, after the investigation had proven potentially all of the of AFWST valve pits had been opened \\ closed without the required lineup verifications. Operations personnel feel the identified valve lineup requirements are not valid and an SPR investigation is necessary.

3)

Procedures do not define limitations and\\or requirements for opening locked barriers. Per Security, in the past if personnel had Operations work start authorized ECOs, barriers have been unlocked and posted.

Security Access Control Procedure *0SDPO2-ZS-0027*, Rev. 16, section 3.3 and 4.1.5.,

Does not require Security Force personnel to notify Operations Shift \\ Unit Supervisors prior to the opening or closing of any site barriers or locks.

\\

3.a - Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines Procedure N

  • OPOPOl-ZA-0001, REV 7*,

Section 5.3.6, locked valve program does not clarify \\ identify STP Security Forces as authorized to unlock N

Operations controlled barriers and/or have keys to their locked components.

4)

Ineffective utilization of ' SECURITY BARRIER BREACH PERMIT

  • pro' cess.

Permits are not scheduled, Per the Security Force Supervisor permit requirements can and are waived. Security uses manual posting logsheets not the permits. AFWST valve pit work package SR:LG-170195 contained security permits, but were not completed for the work performed and do not have the required dates, times, and craft responsible supervisor information for breaching and/or restoring the barrier.

b L

STATION PROBLEM REPORT SPR 940777 REY.0 PAGE (3) of ( )

IV:

CAvsE Or avENT 5)

Work Process Prograr. Froa dure 'OPGPO3-ZA-0090" requirements for the

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planning, scoping, schedulMg, and control of work activities were not effectly implemented and\\or t:llowed.

Sa The SR LG-170195 was scoped as a General Lighting activity and was coded with a general lighting *LG' system identifier. The work was then Scheduled as a " fill in activity" and viewed as a non-train j

safety related issue with no izqpact to plant startup a.:tivities.

Sb The SR work package instructions did not identify Operations or i

Security requirements for performing AFWST valve pit activities.

  • 0PGP03-ZA-0090' section 3.3.2.7, requires in part, that Planners shall identify work for penetrations or barriers that could provide unauthorized access into plant vital or protected areas and a review of these with the Security Force Supervisor will be performed (DR 90-30; IEN 85-079).

Sc A review of the Unit 1, Cue schedule reports for the Aux Feedwater System indicates the only job scheduled for the pit was the light fixture repair. Security logbooks indicate the pit was opened several times to support work activities.

I I:

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

No, immediate remedial corrective actions where taken.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

I C1 Operations will revise the applicable sections of Auxiliary Feedwater procedure 'OPOPO2-AF-0001", Operations Administrative Department Guidelines procedure 'OPOPol-ZA-000l*, and as necessary Equipment i

Clearance Orders, "OPGPO3-ZO-ECOL

  • an Operations Configuration Management Procedure, 'OPGPO3-ZO-0039 to incorporate the following:

i a.

Delete \\ change the AFWST valve lineup verification requirements.

Example, for outages the AFWST valve pit should only be required 2

to be inspected one time for system restoration and testing.

b.

Clairify requirements to ensure valve lineups are properly identified, tracked, scheduled and performed; including after the opening and closing of locked barriers \\ doors.

C2 Identify to Security, access limitations and requirements for opening barriers that require prior notification of Control Room Staff, such as (Fuel Handling Bldg Doors, AFWST Valve Pits, ECW Roof Plugs, etc) for incorporation into their procedures.

C3 Attach infomation labels to barriers identifing requirements.

DUE DATE I

4 RESP MGR TE (C1,8 a',

b, 2 & 3)

Operations Support MGR C4 Ops. Managers will provide training to p rsonnel en procedure changes.

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STATION PROBLEN REPORT SPR 94077 REV.o PAGE (4) of ( )

Z CORRECTIVE ACTIONS C5 Nuclear Security will revise the applicable sections of Access Control j

Procedure 'OSDP02-ZS-0027' to incorporate the following:

i l

a.

Incorporate requirements to notify Operations Shift \\ Unit Supervisors prior to the opening or closing of to be " identified" site barriers, doors and locks that can effect system components or plant operability, (Example, A WST valve pits, ECW Doors, etc).

C6 Nuclear Security will review and identify the requirements for the utilization of " SECURITY BARRIER BREACH PERMITS".

The information will be provided to the Work Control Department for incorporation into Work Process Procedure 'OPGPO3-ZA-0090' and the Planner \\ Schedulers Se Guide.

'7/ 6 M u.

D ATE 8

RESP MGR im tt D e- _ - m (C5, a & C6)

Security MG'R.

C7 Work Control will evaluate and revise the applicable sections of the Planners & Schedulers Guide and\\or the Work Process Program Procedure "OPGPO3-ZA-0090', to incorporate the following:

a.

Section 3.3.2.7 - Define preparation responsibilities and clarify t

planning requirements for security related barrier \\ penetration packages.

b.

Evaluate, develop and issue work planning and scheduling guidelines for security barrier \\ penetration permits, system coding, and area locations to support management of OTL\\ECO configuration control requirements. Identify security breach boundary areas in planners & schedulers guide.

C8 Evaluste flagging Security Barriers \\ Penetrations in the applicable work management system databases and ECO\\0TL Computer system with indicators, to lock and keep work documents from printing until breach and operability reviews have been completed.

h DUE DATE /

d~ 94 RESP HGR M44D 4211Ad%/-

(C7,'a, b & C8) iork Control MCR.'

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0

  • VII: TREND CODES pf D

{

1) EA413-OPS, Configuration ControlyQ '* ELIC -Operations
2) EH2D -Admin Procedure Adherence ELlH -Security i
3) EH3A -Admin OPS Procedure Accuracy ELlD -Maintenance
4) EJ1N -Maintenance Improper Planning n4 (J h.efit% -System Alignment requirements not verified I

C',Jk

-Inadequate work package

( P4 ff.9stti -F2wdnec n.;ccaats T)c(.apM g h CL5a

-OPS Untimely Problem Response CD/m q

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

i

ATTACHMENT I SPR 940777 AFWST ACTIVITY MATRIX IETE AFWST Owner

L/N.

ACTIVITY COMMENTS PIT:

12/03/93 N/W OPS NO Estch Opened and closed.

  1. 3, Personnel worked in OPS Opened OTL for MSS 6 C pit Pit Light Repair 12/10/93 N/E MSSD NO Fixture Removed under OTL, Parts not available hatch NOT ECO closed and resealed.

01/03/94

MSSD, NO MOD, I&C & Painting work Hatch opaned & closed W

I&C, performed in pits per 01/05/94 security.

01/09/94

?

CO&A NO Sample Taken Ratch Opened Time in pit to collect

& Closed sample, approx. 2 min.

01/18/94

?

NO Log indicates personnel in Hatch Opened & Closed l

Pit performing work 02/04/94 S/W

?

Eatch Opened & Closed, 2 AFWST West viv lineup RPOs logged as being in hard copy data sheet Pit states credit taken for lineup performed on I

1/19/947 This does not support i

1 Oc3/ 07 / 94 ALL OPS

?

OPS OTL indicates valves i

in required operable lineup configuration ALL OPS

?

Plant enters Mode 3, 1800 Hrs 02/10/94 2/8/94 OPS

?

Initical Crit 02/28/94 7

OPS

?

SG TUBE LEAK FORCED OUTAGE 03/19/94 ALL OPS

?

Plant MODE 3 03/20/94 ALL OPS

?

MODE 2, 2003 RRS 03/22/94 N/W MSSD NO Ratch Opened & Closed MSSD Replaced PIT Light 03/24/94

?

MSSD NO Hatch Opened & Closed Work in pit performed 06/22/94 ALL OPS NO OPS did not find valve lineups G6/23/94 ALL OPS Y

OPS pulled hatch cover for C Pit & verified lineup.

Advised them other pits also opened.

i i

July 14, 1994

~

Houston Lighting & Power Campany OFFICE MEMORANDUM To Unit 1 Shift Supervisor July 5,1994 POD 94070655 from W. S. Blair i

Subject Reportability Review for SPR 940777 SPR 940777 identified that the AFWST Valve Pit had been entered and the required valve lineup verification had not been performed prior to closing the pit cover. Subsequent investigation revealed that several entries had been made into the valve pit without perform the valve lineup. A reportability review of these events was requested due to the possibility of making a mode change with AFW inoperable and possible missed surveillances due to not verifying manual valve position per the surveillance requirements.

Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.7.1.2.1 requires, in part:

"Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

a.

3)

Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;..."

All manual (non automatic) valves in the auxiliary feedwater flowpath, including the valves located in the AFWST valve pit, are locked in their correct position. Therefore, no monthly (31 days) manual valve position verification is required to fulfill this surveillance requirement.

Current procedural guidance (OPOP02-AF-0001) on performing alignment of the valves in the AFWST valve pit is as follows:

4.18 Valves located in the AFWST valve pit are not required to be checked unless the security barrier is breached lE the AFWST valve pit security barrier is breached, THEN valves in the AFWST valve pit SHALL be verified according to the applicable lineup just prior to the final closure of the security barrier.

This guidance was in response to the 1989 Configuration Management Assessment.

It was identified that an exemption from performing routine lineups and verification of these valves did not exist. The above guidance was to address administrative guidance concerning perfonnance of lineups, not to address Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

As shown above, the requirement to perform a valve position verification prior to the final closure of the security barrier is an administrative requirement to allow exemption from routine lineups of the valves located in the pit. Technical Specification surveillance requirements are satisfied, thus no surveillances were missed and no mode changes were mad with AFW inoperable. Therefore, this event is determined to be NOT REPORTABLE.

sn/

Nuclear Licensing Concurrence RLG! rig

e......,

Hsuston Lighting & Pawar Ccmpany i

OITICE MEMORANDUM To D.A. Daniels September 6,1994 g

POD 94090830 from D.L. Musick vt m

O subjea Supplement to SPR 940777 CAUSE OF EVENT 1) of SPR 940777 identified the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) procedure *0 POP 02-AF-0001" and Operation Administrative Procedure "0 POP 01-ZA-0001" as having a potential unnecessary requirement to perform valve lineup and verifications when the AFWST valve pit is opened, just prior to closme.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Cl) states that Operations will revise the applicable sections of Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) procedure "0 POP 02-AF-0001" and Operation Administrative Procedure "0 POP 01-ZA-0001". and as necessary, Equipment Clearance Orders "0PGP03-ZO-EC01" and Operation Configuration Management Procedure "0PGP03-ZO-0039".

Plant Operations Management has reviewed the proposed corrective actions and determined that the current requirements for performing a AFWST valve lineup as established in Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) "0 POP 02-AF-0001" and Operation Administrative "0 POP 01-ZA-0001" procedures are appropriate. By ensuring the AFWST valve lineup is performed just prior to final closure of the valve pit, Plant Operations can TAKE CREDIT FOR the AFWST Pit Lineup being performed as long as it can be demonstrated that the AFWST Pit has NOT been breached. This action precludes the requirement to access the pit whenever a routine valve lineup is performed.

Plant Operation Management believes that the additional specified CORRECTIVE ACTIONS of SPR 94077 more than adequately address necessary corrective actions and that no Plant Operations procedure changes are required.

Plant Operations considers CORRECTIVE ACTION C1 of SPR 940777 closed.

Please delete Corrective Actions C4a and C4b since no procedure changes are required, then no training is necessary.

1$/,

f 3

V~

e Coficurrence" i

RAS / alm RECElvED c:

SPR 940777 file UCI O 3 N g.,m..x G W"

l SPR SCREENING CRITERIA FOR START-UP ISSUES

s'st r m stais:st,,,, _Q 07W CRITCRXA

/

Ys:::

14 0 Is the problem described in the SPR needed to comply trith the STP Technical Specifications

()

or other license commitments?

Do the consequences of not correcting the i

problem affect the ability of a safety systesa l

(J

{

to satisfy its design function?

[]

[

Do the consequences of not correcting the problem create or could creat.e a condition that jeopardizes the safe or reliable operation of the UnitsI Do the consequences of not corr d ing tb problea create or have the potential to. create

[]

[

a conditica that will or could affec6 the-

. station's ability to effectively support, unit i

operation or mitigate emergency situa,tions?

a

?

Does the problea describ'ed in the SPR impact

[

~G the r=14=hi14ty of.the. system to per(orm its design h iion?

Is the problem dMW in the SPR odnsidered.

'e h*

g

[]

O to be a mode restraint?

, - (which mode - 1[], 2[], 3 [], 4 [],, 5[])

If the answer to any of the above criteria is Yss, the problem -

described in the SPR needs to be corrected prior to mode change or unit start-up, unless justification for deferral is provided.

5 QS+

OPERATION &,f.

D 3

COGNIZANT DEPT.

V S

d DATE CAG DATABASE UPDATED _

t

=

e-1 I

t Corrective Action Pronram OPGP03-ZX-0002 i

Rev.4 Page 35 of 39 ADDENDUM 6 TYPICAL SPR APPROVAL / CLOSURE FORM (Page 1 of 1) i STATIDN PROBLEM REPORT SPR # $ 9 O *7 7 7 f

REGARDING Category H MO ST /aksP M kT Eco Cemcfad mal bat \\aos % pr.be RP o o an ti st L iar 119 5 l

APPROVALS ORIGINAL REV 1 REV 2

[

(Sigr)ature/Date)

(Signatuee/Date)

(Signature /Date)

PREPARER Jw pf4q Approval Authority J

REVIEW / APPROVAL PORC ORIGINAL REV 1 REV 2

() YES

[ NO (Signature /Date)

(signature /Date)

(Signature /Date)

/

g

}

cAG

/

r OA (!* IJPL! TABLE)

{

PORC (ptg No./Date)

PLANT MGR i

CLOSURE APPROVALS ORIGINAL REV 1 REV 2 (Signature /Date)

(Signature /Date)

(Signature /Date)

CAG ADMIN.

QA (IF APPLICABLE)

[

f l

v-3 POD 94090864 Trax #1809 l

SPR ACTION COMPLETION VERIFICATION FORM l

t 1.

SPR/:

SPR 940777 Action Item # (if known):._c2

)

i 2.

ACTION #(s) STATEMENT (s)

Identify to Security, access i

limitations and recuirements for ovenina barriers that i

reauire crior notification of Control Room Staff, such as (FHB doors. AFWST Valve Pits. ECW Roof Pluas. etc) for incorporation into their crocedures.

3.

THE ABOVE ACTION HAS BEEN VERIFIED COMPLETE BY:

Attached

  • Yes No a) Document (s)
  1. ccMail (Z) [ ]

b) Describe See attached 4.

DATE(s) COMPLETE:

09/19/94 5.

AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE:

The undersigned have verified the.t the above action (s) have been completed as described.

This complete form is subject to QA Audit and SHALL be filed with the.SPR file.

L.

...c,c j

Department Manager (Required)

Date Sl5C.

OEP i 9 GJ" EOSEGrst liOU,-

,d

  • VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR NRC RELATED ISSUES

a

~

Author: Willicm M Dowdy at FS2-2-STP-HLP Date:

9/19/94 12:04 PM Priority: Normal j

10: John R Lovell

+

TO: Ron L Gibbs Subject Re: security breaches


Message contents ------------------------------------

close it out, I can think of no other places or penetrations that would rcquire Security.

-F Reply Separator Subjects security breaches l

Author: Ron L Gibbs at FS2-2-STP-HLP Dato:

9/19/94 10:59 AM I sent this message to all SS's and received no response back. Based on that, I assume no other things need identified.

I am going to close this action out.

Forward Header

Subject:

security breaches Author: Ron L Gibbs at FS2-2-STP-HLP Date:

9/7/94 7:14 AM SPR 940777 identified that numerous entries had been made into the AFWST valve pit without the control room being notified, thus the required valve lineup was not performed. A corrective action from this SPR was for Oparations to identify other similar breaches where security should j

contact control room prior to opening the breach. Labels are to be placed on these and security will make necessary changes to ensure the control room is contacted prior to opening these.

Already identified are:

i AFWST valve pits ECW roof plugs FHB doors If you can think of any others, please respond back.

i i

~ ' Author: Ron L Qibb3 at FS2-2-STP-HLP r

Dato:

9/19/94 11:06 AM Pricrity: Normal TO: John H Tedens subjects security breaches

..--..--.......-.-.---.-....-..-..-- Message Contents ----------.---.--.--.-.~.---.----.-.

3:hn, Carrective action C3 of SPR 940777 requires POD to attach information Icbels to barriers to contact the control room prior to breaching.

I have c:ked all the SS's if there were any other areas that needed to be idtntified. Based on no response, I assume there were no others than what to on the below list.

I think all but the AFWST valve pits are labeled.

Forward Header i

subjects security breaches Author: Ron L Gibbs at FS2-2-STP-HLP Date:

9/19/94 10:59 AM t

I cent this message to all SS's and received no response back. Based on that, I assume no other things need identified.

I am going to close this cction out.

Forward Header subjects security breaches Author: Ron L Gibbs at FS2-2-STP-HLP i

Dste:

9/7/94 7:14 AM SPR 940777 identified that numerous entries had been made into the AFWST velve pit without the control room being notified, thus the required valve lineup was not performed. A corrective action from this SPR was for operations to identify other similar breaches where security should contact control room prior to opening the breach.

Labels are to be placed on these and security will make necessary changes to ensure the control room is contacted prior to opening these.

Already identified are:

AFWST valve pits ECW roof plugs i

FEB doors If you can think of any others, please respond back.

I

+

POD 94100911 Trax #1810 SPR ACTION COMPLETION VERIFICATION FORM 1.

SPRp:

SPR 940777 Action Item # (if known):_cL.

2.

ACTION #(s) STATEMENT (s)

Attach information labels to barrints identifyina recuirements.

3.

THE ABOVE ACTION HAS BEEN VERIFIED COMPLETE BY:

Attached

  • Yes No a) Document (s)
  1. Speedimemo

[1] [ ]

b) Describe See attached 4.

DATE(s) COMPLETE:

10/03/94 5.

AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE:

The undersigned have verified that the above action (s) have been completed as described.

This complete form is subject to QA Audit and SHALL be filed with the SPR file.

[.

L (1ur..c t

/

ic 3 -O/;

Department Manager (Required)

Date I

i i

Ifh of Om e,

(.Udf.hL - '

i l

  • VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR NRC RELATED ISSUES

STP. 67 '(0$/90)

OPEEDIMEMO HSUOTGN LIGHTING & POWER CO.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION P. O. BOX 289, WADSWORTH TEXAS 77488 hMU M f6 N6b 7-l Lb i

DATE SUBJECT

{

j

[Jcc3ss ca se SP d Q4/276 4 940777 a s Tue wa rawd encan e smo u nuc.

/3 cm PLEASE REPLY TO SIGNED X 7Y/

s f C. 't4 0 7 7 7 C3 u[/PC 94d2pp1 c-t (3ffeLSyt &c b s 4 tlosd.'n & cp d&4r ktz a tu le i

.tp w u hl 4 c % & c 6 w

9_ g4 4 gsgj_

sicNeo SEND PARTS 1 AND 2 INTACT.

PART 2 WILL BE RETURNED wiTH REPLY.

4 Corrective Action Program OPGP03-ZX-0014 Rev.O Page 33 of 38 1

i ADDENDUM 4 TYPICAL SPR ACTION COMPLETION VERIFICATION FORM (Page 1 of 1) 1.

SPR#: N#777 Action Item # (If Known): (_6 NRC Related [ ] Yes h4 No 2.

ACTION #(s) STATEMENT (s)

Welene bu$d, w'd/ A Ese M k 4 M x 4 m r

.%mbas w Aars (owrnal f20cGouw "oseM ts poz.7 * [Oscht z.sx29) 4 idcor.porale ruaiwrund do concv l%. rahaa %A.l dad kW+1ers y

Tr0e /p //,capemy ar colas of h gg "odea+,fid $He bxme,(,,}py1a &

lU< %+ rn ebhvsit,u romwras e plant mesm5.

g 3.

THE ABOVE ACTION HAS BEEN VERIFIED COMPLETE BY:

Attached

  • Yes No a)

Document (s) # 0$Wbf /J S39, 2Ev'. /

[]

M

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

b)

Describe hr to l h 48Wo2 7C.pp39 s1 M cu W 2au s D o d c

ich3/ad and emccr&s on sol to /9J.

t 4.

DATE(s) COMPLETE:

/O // T /9 M AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE: O O_,,

--s

/

tololqi

' '~

Date

  • VEIUFICATION DOCUMENTS SilALL BE PROVIDED FOR NRC RELATED ISSUES

pummmmwame

'c:::inirn

(

e STP3496.WP(01/N)

J

, SOUTH TEXA8 PROJECT ELECTRIC.0ENERATING STATION SYSTEH PAGE UNIT YEAR ECO NLTH9ER KOUZF#ENT CLEAAANCE ORDER 14 1

1 94 40873 9E301ELPO404

~ WHEN NUNG, 00NTACT SMORTY 6500 HAT IS BEING TAGGED IqNTING PANEL LP 15B CKT 30 3

l FOR WHAT REASON WHO PREPARED THIS ECO? JONN COLLINS ll REPLACE FIITtFRE

^

j J

WORC DOCUMENT (WAN T)

CRAFT ACCEPTOR (PRIki/SION/PMONE/PAA8 lADGE/DATE/ TIME)

RELEASED ST DATE/1IE 170195 EM 4 Me h80 O f

'38 3 p.t ;E-(

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([

APP At TO RE '

TAGS s.n -1 MIME p

.0 DATE/ TINE DAT /T L I B

V/

$1NGLE TAG TAG

$1NGLE hA REMOVED 1 1 0

COMPONTNT 1AGGED OR INSTRUCTION ADDITION E

CLEARANCE NUNG ST REMOVAr E

RESTORAfl0N SY

)!. E R

DATE/ TIME C

POSITION DATE/ TIME o

Postilok E ',C ' Y,', foi test tots, include craf t/ work docunent also ly j ly 1 0F'I ON D

. (29f f TGB, NEAR E A51 ENIRANCE)

LPT58 CEI 10' 1

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lg 10.14:40 Tels FORM, wtN COMPtETE, $ HALL sE RETAINED roe A MINixuM os s TEAas.

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I STAPLE TAG HERE I

south TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATING STATION

/7oe r 1

SERVICE REQUEST wAN s 8M//WE SECTION I PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION amas DiscOvEar coals tac ATTACHED O ES LOCAVON -

UNIT oO 12 20 DESCRtPVON CODES G NO STATUS-

['

ITEM DESC LDCAV Stuprou. A l'al f k N/ c'-

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ROOM COMPLETE TA Q.

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a Tr/w INEORMATOtt PROBLEM DESCRIPHON/ WORK REOUESTED - 4'#It' Ir #[u t. / ~' bPd O M..au NO

(,J g p,,,,4, j,,, / ),f g,, g,,],,,,f,,,

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[e- ' fenfAe r Areen le ' 75s y e i_s A S.S AvA # /00 C

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Js A [AC' S c'- lb 0A b ' ~ISC X 107 5

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ORIGINA1OR (PRINT)

EXT.

OATE UME DIVISION SECTION 11 EVALUATION ISSUING AUTHORITY GROUP ES NO SPR INITIATED.

OwS

@NO

$8 g

COMMENTS ~~'" ^

0 o' s 26%i.aEs SC-cu ed W S4 F Pd To W

COND REL REQUIRED CHM D 5 p, ;-

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B TECH SPEC EQUIP PRI 4 [-]

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2 3A 3B 3C D ES ONO g 'sicNATvRcf _

DATE TECH SPEC SECDONS

/

G MILESTONE

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= REQUIRES. SHIFT SUPV. SIGNATURE DATE TIME MODE ArtW WORK START AUTHORITY I

FACIUTIES CHEM CHEM C HP O uxNAcEuCNT O OPS O ANALYSIS O uniNT O IR SECURITY $ OPS O DEo SECTION !!!

PLANNING EVALUATION / MINOR WORK VOID MINOR mal JJCE WORK RDER g

I ASSIGNED OWNER A &bhu'bS*)

f f

OWNER /DJG!NEER COMMENTS 1 5771LL Alt to / ic/4 b ITu177.

6N4 2_?-9_?

U O USE-AS-is O 50.59 CONSIDERED PCF ATTACHED 0 YES O No

/

O WORK START AUTHORITY ENGINEEH SIGNATURE DATE iluE INFORMED i

NAME N ((E U" U or uAuc

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closeout:

/

oxi tiwt ENSEN?I' UI

~d 3

m..wr n

i.m TOTAL MEN -

TOTAL MANHOURS COMPLETED SR FOR OUALITY-RELATED ITEMS SHALL DE RETAINED FOR LIFE Of PLANT.

COMPLITED SR FOR 840N O'J AUTY-RELATID ITEuS SHALL DE RETAINED TOR fiVE ITAR.

PAGE 1 Of COMP 1f7ED SR FOR INFORu ATION O'4LY RETLt4T10N t40T REQUIRED. UNLESS W,

~

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(

DOCUnmiNT f,4 I70i ff

. In both the pre-job briefing and actual work performance.The following f 1.

Sof-Checking A. A work practice that is consciously and douberately used by a worker in respo i

indicate heightened risk is present to ensure the conect action is appled to the corr B. Results:

ect component.

1.

Improvedhuman performance 3.

Fewerinjuries 2.

Fewerpersonnelerrors 4.

More-proficient utilization & operation of equip.

1. b l,. b AdDRwd h

12-7-f.5 le-Fiene 4.F G,. % a 6,

t2. 59 versaraman NAM [ h..

CRAFT /DATE E*J4E 3

. CRAFT /DATE

/ *TH (p

i. - 9.3 s.

E'?X CRAFT /DATE E'JaE 3.s. h Awt le t3 -o 13 CRAFT / DATE NAME CRAFT / DAThE"-

STEPS INITIAL AND DATE APPROPRIATE BLOCK AFTER YOUR VERIFIC

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Oci~you hevethe:ri w m. ~ _.. ~h 4 -

tools;,' materials 7andP

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1 ITH$YI5NNYDEIU1NViEEWE6T3E lI550t#5?MSN?$$E Pa3 Do'not act hastily if the wrong response occure R view 16etaskperformanceforcompletenessandcorrectness. 46 -

fc,.%lnlorm your supervis,or of the results.'; ' //y$.

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t WORK ORDER

/

SR # 14-1-170195 Priority

(?

l 4B }

SET.TICN I

(

WAN # 93011418 TAG /TPNS #:

IESYSTD4 Cmuum.nt Desc. : FOWAL AC LIGfTING SYSTDi Isad Work Group:D4 B16g:

TGB Support Groups:

Rocan:

BAY C Area /Other:

AUX FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK Elevation:

32 1

UNIT:

Problem

Description:

OF AUX FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK NEEDS TO BE LIGHT FIXTURE IN BAY C (N.E. COMPARTMBE)00C.

REPLACED. ACCESS TO BAY C IS AFST DOOR #1 SECTICN II Environment Qualified:

N Quality Related:

N NPRDS:

N ASME Class:

ASME Sec XI Trvl Req:

[YES]

NO] )

QA/QC Engr.:

N PMT Required:

N Seismic II/I:............................................................................................

WORK PACKAGE APPROVAL l

REV'1 APPROVAL l

REV 2 APPROVAL M_i l

l

-..,_....... W 13.l.....................l..................................

Planner

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I

.............I...........................

d....17g.l oeer

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Cog Engrl:..................Nd.........I......1.......................................................

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.....................................................lDate l

Signature lDate l

Signature

.................................'e Signature lDat REV 1 Description i

REV 2 Description

....................s.........................................................

l I

lPMT Anrum

[YES}

[NO)

PMT AFFECTED

[YES)

[NO) eq

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n.....................................................

m

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OOS#: l-U- /M 0

34 vare

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WORK START E hetor Operations

............c...

i..........................,...................................

Tine when ccrqaanent 11 4

/

N/A/f/

111 Rev 0

/.L must be returned 11 11 Rev 1 to service 11 11 Rev 2 DD,$

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SR # IG-1-170195 MORK INSTRUCTIWS ('

WAW # 93011418

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1.0 PRuwNISITES

I N

2NITIAL h h DATE 1.01 PERFORM PRE-JOB BRIEFDG.

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  • RO CCNTACT HE WORK SUPERVISOR OR GENERAL MNINTENANC FOR DGDEERING/NCNCII@OWRCE EVAI11ATIW.

2.02 P04ER SUPPLY: 9E301E1P0404 (LP-15) BKR 10 l

(BACK-UP)

N/A (SPACE HTR)

N/A 3.0 WORK INSTRUCTIONS:

P 3.01 DENT / SCOPE THE DmNT OF REV d IS 70 REPLACE DE Dtru;nVE LINT FIX7URE, THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN DO STEPS:

3.01.01 STEP QE IS TO REMOVE THE COVER FR04 THE EAY RO DETERMIN THE TYPE OF FIXTURE (REPLACE IF GE OF BE TYPE IS FOUND IN THE W/HS) STEP TWO WILL BE USED (IF NOE WAS FOUND IN THE W/HS) 70 REPLACE THE FDGURE W THE REPIACEMENT ARRIVES ON SINT.

THIS WILL BE PERFORMED AS A SKILL OF DE CRAFT.

TE SCOPE OF REV 0 WORK INSTRUCTIGG WILL BE WITHIN TH 3.01.02 FOUIMING BOUNDARIES:

A) EQUIPMENT TPIG: LGSYSTEM B) AUX FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK BAY "C" Page 21 of Ff.c

._,.s; SR # I4-1-170195

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WOFXINSTRUCTIONS(

WAN # 93011418 P

PRIOR 'IO STARTDC ANY WORK ACTIVITIES REDRD 7HE TAG

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Parts Needed for Root Cause

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Parts Discarded [YES) [

]

Parts to be Rebuilt [YES) [to [N/A) WR#

Area Clean:

[

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[N/A]

Insulation Renoved:

[YES]

[NO]

[N/A]

'Ibols Removed:

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[N/A)

Insulation Reinstalled:

[YES)

[NO

[N/A]

/

Itardware Bestored:

[

]

[N/A)

Scaffolding Removed:

[YES]

[NO)

[N/A)

...-------_.-____-._-____-________..--____--___.--___--___-_-....._7_~.uC__----____-___

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Page id of l

Sol Texas Project Electric Generating (

tion y,,,

PERMIT TO BREACH SECURITY BARRIER

  • ONLY ONE BARRIER MAY BE ADDRESS BY EACH PERMIT.

1 Permit #

03 h b

Worh Control Document (s)

'70/

b Location of Barrier (Be Specific) b bN don U l00C AF3T PopR FIvoc Penetration / Door / Damper #'s l

l New Penetration (s) b Design Details EC O El Drawing Affected

/d !/E ! kd

[} [*'06 Estimated Beginning of Breach Date Time 7

Estimated Duration of Breach (In Hours) b Estimated Completion / Securing of Breach

/

/

Date Time SIGNATURES

/l. 'W 4.7 //O [9J df09 APPROVED:

d- __ s

, Security Force Supervisor Date Time

/

[

BARRIER BREACHED Date Time Foreman or SupervP.,or

/

/

BARRIER RESTORED Date Time Foreman or Supeivisor RESTORATION

[

[

VERIFIED BY Security Force Supervisor / Lieutenant /ESS Lead Analyst Date Time THIS FORM, WHEN COMPLETED, SHALL BE RETAINED WITH THE APPLICABLE WORK CONTROL DOCUMENT PACKAGE.

=

Rev. 1 April 16, 1993 PORC Review Evaluation 8779__

SPR Subject Does the subject SPR meet any of the following criteria:

YES.

EQ 1)

Concerns a REPORTABLE EVENT?

Concerns a sienificant operating 2) abnormality or sianificant deviation f

from normal and expected performance of V

plant equipment or systems that affect nuclear safety?

Concerns unanticipated deficiencies in<

[

3) the desian or coeration of structures, systems, or components that affect nuclear safety?

  • Concerns any accidental, unplanned, or

[

4) uncontrolled radioactive release?

5)

Concerns the violation of:

Codes Regulations Orders Technical Specifications

+

Operating Licensing Requirements having nucienr safety significance?

Concern the abnormal degradation of 6) systems designed to contain radioactive material?

If any of the above questions are answered YES, THEN the subject SPR SHALL be itted to PORC.

n saw Wp/hv

(( Evaluator

~

M Date An SPR that concerns uncontrolled radioactive release requires review and approval by the Plant Manager.

-. -