ML20209G446

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Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying 3.6.3 Action B,Clarifyin Use of Check Valve with Flow Through Valve Secured as Means to Isolated Affected Containment Penetrations
ML20209G446
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/13/1999
From:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20209G433 List:
References
NUDOCS 9907190166
Download: ML20209G446 (6)
v • d • e


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NOC-AE-000551 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 6 ATTACHMENT 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARKED-UP PAGES i

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l NOC-AE-000551 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 6 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS l l l

Reference:

letter from T. H. Cloninger, STP Nuclear Operating Company, to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, dated March 2,1999 l

_ (NOC-AE-000450)

I The Technical Specification and Technical Specification Bases pages listed below are marked-up to identify the proposed changes associated with this submittal and are enclosed in this attachment. The attached pages (including insens) supersede and replace the marked-up pages submitted in the referenced letter above.

l Pages:

3/4 6-17 B 3/4 6-4 l l

.s T8I -001 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 - The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to the required isolation times.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1; 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

inoperable, maintain at least one With one or more of the isolation valve (s) d penetration that is open and:

isolation barrier

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s)' to CPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, l or Isolate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least l

. b.

one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation positio or. IpssRT 0

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least l l one closed manual valve or blind flange, or di Be in- at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD I SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1 - The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit

- by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE duritig the COLD

. SHUTDOWN.or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 monthr. by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase 'A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; .

b.- Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates'to its isolation position; and

c. Verifying that on a Phase 'B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
d. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolatim test signal, coincident with a low charging header pressure signai,. that each seal injection I valve; actuates to its isolation position.

4.5.3.3- -The. isolation time of end power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to.be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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-+ Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4,3^,0. 53,- 59 500TH TEXAS - UNITS 1 &'2 3/4 6-17 Unit 2 - Amendment No. *1,"..C,47 )

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l Proposed inserts to Technical Specification Page 3/4 6-17, Specification 3.6.3 i

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A Insert 1

, or check valve with flow through the valve secured" Insert 1A "A check valve may not be used to is.olate an affected penetration flow path in which more than one isolation valve is inoperable or in which the isolation barrier .

is a closed system with a single isolation valve (i.e., General Design Criteria 57 j penetration).

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l BASES 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM (continued)

STPEGS has three groups of Reactor Containment Fan Coolers with two fans

. in each group (total of six fans). Five fans are adequate to satisfy the safety requirements including single failure. The fan cooler units are designed to remove heat from the containment during both normal operation and accident conditions. In-the event of an accident, all fan cooler units are 1 automatically placed intn operation on receipt of a safety injection signal.

During normal operation, cooling water flow to the fan cooler units is

)'. supplied by the non-safety grade chilled water system. Following an accident, cooling. water flow to the fan coolers is supplied by the safety grade component cooling water system.- The chilled water system supplies water at a lower temperature than that of the component cooling water system and therefore requires a lower flow rate to achieve a similar heat removal rate.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMEhT ISOLATION VALVES l The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. {

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation '

valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

A NSERT 1 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL k I The OPERABILITY of the equipment and' systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of

- metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, Control of Combustible Gas .

/

Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," Revision 2, November 1978.

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2- .

B 3/4 6-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 40,48,74 Unit 2 - Amendment No. GhM,63

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- Proposed Insert to Technical Specification Bases Page B 3/4 6-4, Section 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves Insert 2 in the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetrations is inoperable, and the inoperable valve (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status

- . within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the affected penetration (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be j adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this

/; - criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic isolation valve, a closed . manual valve,'a, blind flange, or a check valve with flow through the valve secured (a check valve may not be used to isolate an affected penetration flow path in which

- more than one isolation valve is inoperable or in which the isolation barrier is a closed system with a single isolation valve). For a penetration flow path isolated in accordance with Action b or c, the device used to isolate the penetration

- should be the closest available one to containment and does not have to be a General Design Criteria containment isolation valve.

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