ML20057B573

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Partially Withheld Commission Paper Providing Ofc of Policy Evaluation Immediate Effectiveness Analysis of ASLB 821103 Partial Initial Decision Re Full Power Operation
ML20057B573
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/1983
From: Zerbe J
NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20049A457 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-92-436 SECY-83-041, SECY-83-41, NUDOCS 9309220248
Download: ML20057B573 (5)
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' j SECY-83-41 January 28, 1983 ADJUDICATORY ISSUE (Commission Meeting)

FOR:

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FROM:

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- Office of Policy Evaluation

SUBJECT:

NOVEMBER 3, 1982 ATOMIC SAFETY M D 1ICENSING BOARD PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION RELATED TO FULL POWER OPERATION OF WATERFORD UNIT 3 PUPPOSE:

To provide OPE's immediate effectiveness analysis of the Waterford ASLB Partial Initial Decision D_I M'% ION:

'he Licensing Board for the Waterford Stean Electric Station Unit 3 issued on November 3,1982 the first of two Partial Initial Decisions (PID) related to full-power operation.

The Waterford facility is located on the west bank of the Mississippi River approximately 24 mil?s west of New Orleans, Louisiana, and utilizes a nuclear steam supply system designed by Ccimbustion Engineering (CE).

The applicant's present expected date of plant completion is May 12, 1983.

In the hearing the Board addressed Joint Intervenors' contentions on the potential synergistic effects of icw-level radiation and chemical carcinogens and en emergency planning (EP) issues. The Board was unable to resolve, because of an incomplete hearing reccrd, one EP issue involving the emergency planninc brochure.

The Board has scheduled a further hearing on the brochure in February and will issue a second PID (now expected in mid-April 1983).

On the contested issues that were addressed in the first PID, the Licensing Board fcund in favor of the applicant and, pending favorable resolution of the remaining EP issue and subject to a number of conditions, authorized issuance of an operating license for Waterfcrd.

In its PID the Licensing Board also addressed as an uncontested issue the unresolved safety issue en shutdown decay heat removal and ccncluded they wanted to " bring this issue to the attention of the Commission and urge that an in-cepth assessment of the reliability cf the Waterford Unit 3 shutdcwn l

decay heat renoval systen be made by an incependent laboratory..."

Contact:

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The Commissioners 2

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, Enclos_ure 1 providesysummarvd-the decision.

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CONTESTED ISSUES Synergism At issue was whether, as a result of synergistic actions between radiation frcm 1laterford-3 and chemical carcinogens from nearby industries, the total health effects would exceed the sum of the health effects from each agent (i.e., radiation or chemicals) acting independently.

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,.appli.callt had not previous]y_ evaluated thisaffect.)

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,(l CPE believes Emeroency Planning Joint Intervenors' contentions focused on two aspects of the offsite emergency planning. One of the Joint Intervenors' major contentions en the EP was that the State plan did not include provisions for predistribution of-potassium iodide (KI) to the general population.

Based on the staff's and applicant's testimony, the Board found that the State's decision not to predistribute KI was not inconsistent with NRC and FEMA gui.fance (i.e., the decision to dispense KI is the prerogative of the state).

The second area of contention concerned alleged inadequacies in certain aspects of planning for evacuation of individuals within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ, namely:

notification to residents of evacuation procedures; the roads and highways necessary for evacuation; the evacuation warning system; the command decision structure; the content of the evacuation drills; and evacuation of people with special needs (e.g., the sick or hospitalized).

Although the Board found that the provisions for evacuation were adequate and met the Comission's regulations, the Board did impose several conditions on OL issuance related to arrangements with neighboring parishes (counties) on use of emergency vehicles, evacuation of prisoners, and the content of emergency public notification messages.

These conditions are listed in By the conclusion of the hearing the emergency planning brochure had not yet been drafted and in this respect the Board determined the record to be inadequate.

The Board reopened the record and, at the Board's cirection, the applicant submitted his draft emergency planning brochure and the staff, FEMA and Joint Intervenors submitted ccmments to it. Joint Intervenors, in addition, requested that a further hearing be held on the centent of the brochure. The applicant agreed that a hearing would be the most expedient methcd for resolving this issue. but asked that it be permitted to submit a revised brochure to address the other partiet ' comments.

Subsecuently, the Board ordered a further hearing (scheduled fo-February 8-11, 1983) and announced that the adequacy of the revised brtchure will be the subject of a g PID (expected mid-April 1983).

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UNRESOLVED GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE Shutdown Decay Heat Removal The Board was concerned whether Waterford can be operated safely prior to a generic resolution of the need for an alternative means of shutdcwn decay heat removal.

The Waterford reactor coolant system design does not include power-operated relief valves (PORVs) on the pressurizer.

In addition, the high-pressure coolant-injection system (HPIS) cannot inject coolant at the pressure setpoint (2500 psi) of the pressurizer safety valves. Hence, an alternative high-pressure shutdown heat removal capability known as " feed and bleed" is not available at Waterford.

Earlier the Board in its March 18, 1982 Memorandum and Order had raised sua sponte the issue of shutdown decay heat removal.

In a subsequent Memorandum ano Order of April 27, 1982, the Boaro explained its reasons for withdrawing i

this sua sponte consideration, stating that it was granting the Applicant's Motion for Reconsideration based on the fact that sua sponte authority in this instance is precluded by 10 CFR 92.760a.

Although the Board withdrew its sua sponte question, the Beard stated in its April 27 Memorandum and Order:

"We do not agree... that feed-and-bleed back-up for the EFWS is not a serious matter.

We believe that it is and that the matter should be i

pursued.

Moreover, we are now convinced that the issue should and will be explored on a generic basis."

l Notwithstanding the April 27 Memorandum and Order, the Bcard addressed in its PID this shutdown decay heat removal issue within the scope of its review of 13 unresolved generic safety issues in compliance with the Appeal Board policy established in the decision in Viroinia Electric and Power Comoany (Ncrth Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 hPC 245 i

(1978). The Boaro stated in the PID its dissatisfaction with the Staff's treatment of this issue and urged "an in-depth assessment of the Waterford 3 shutccwn decay heat removal system... by an indepenoent laboratory, such as Sandia National Laboratory."

The staff, as part of its plan to resolve generic issue A-45, is conducting a cetailed tecFnical stuoy at Sandia Naticnal Laboratory on shutdown decay heat removal. This study will include a representative sample of plant-specific shutdown decay heat removal system evaluations and will provide recommendations to determine the adequacy of existing shutdown decay heat removal system requirements and the desirability of, and pcssible design requirements for, alternetive shutdown decay heat removal system (s).

Cre specific subtask of this study is to deternine, using probabilistic and deterministic methods, the reliability cf existing shutdown decay heat removal systems.

  • ,m' The Comissioners 5

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SUMMARY

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Enclosures:

As stated This paper is tentatively scheduled for discussion at a Closed Meeting during the Week of February 28, 1983.

Please refer.to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OPE OIA SECY

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