ML20057B538
| ML20057B538 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1982 |
| From: | Kenneke A NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049A457 | List:
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| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 SECY-82-353, NUDOCS 9309220206 | |
| Download: ML20057B538 (27) | |
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3, August 20, 1982 f**%s SECY-82-353 ADJUDICATORY 1SSUE The CommissGemm SSiOn Meeting)
I FOR:
FROM:
Albert P. Kenneke, Acting Director Office of Policy Evaluation.
SUBJECT:
TMI-l RESTART BOARD PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON CHEATING AND RESPONSE TO STAFF ENFORCEMENT PLAN PURPOSE:
To provide OPE's analysis of these documents.
DISCUSSION The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has issued its third Partial Initial Decision (PID) in the matter of TMI-l Restart.
The third and final PID dated July 27, 1982 decides the cheating and related issues heard in a reopened proceeding.
The Board's decisions of August 27, 1981 and December 14, 1981 resolved management, hardware, separation of Units 1 and 2, and Emergency Planning issues in favor of restart. This latest decision, the result of a reopened proceeding conducted by a Special Master, Judge Gary Milhollin, into the allegations of cheating by licensed operator candidates, resolves the cheating and related issues in favor of restart.
The Board's major conclusion is that the integrity of the training and testing program failed due to quality assurance weakness.
It nevertheless found in favor of restart because it believed the remedy could be handled on a icng-tenn basis.
The Board has required additional conditions as a result of the reopened proceeding and is now satisfied that the Commission orders of August 9, 1979 and March 6,1980 have been complied with and that the immediate effectiveness of the original shutdown order can be lif ted.
Since the Commission advised the parties by Order of March 10, 1982 that it would not make its immediate effectiveness decision regarding TMI-l restart until the cheating decision had been rendered, and that decision has now been completed, the Comission may now make decisions regarding the desirability of additional oral argument and other options for completing the Comission immediate effectiveness review process.
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" > C C dd CONTACT:
John Montgomery (OPE) m rW 3 ^, ": 19 Fn h at irtrmma 634-3295 f.t t. Um / ~
Jim Milhoan (OPE)
F0la 634-3295 9309220206 930428 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION PDR FOIA GILINSK92-436 PDR
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Enclosures:
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Summary of July 27, 1982, Partial Initial Decision en Restart of TMI-1 Operator Examina:ica Cheatinc anc Relatec ssues 2)
Summary of Soard's Respense to Staff Enforcement Plan' i
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TMI-1 Restar: Commission Review Documentation
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ENCLOSURE 1
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SUMMARY
OF JULY 27, 1982 PARTIAL I.l!TIAL DECISICtl CN RESTART OF TMI-1 OPERATOR EXAMINATION CHEATING AND RELATED ISS INTRODUCTION The reopened proceeding into cheating occurred due to discovery of cheating by two operators on the NRC SR0 exams administered in A 1981. The Board decided that the supplementary proceeding would the following issues:
The broad issue to be heard in the reopened "The Broad Issue.
proceeding is the effect of the information on cheating in the April examination on the management issues considered or left o in the Partial Initial Decision, recognizing that, depending on the facts, the possible nexus of the cheatiAg incident in the NRC examination goes beyond the cheating by two particular individu and may involve the issues of Licensee's management integrity, t quality of its operating personnel, its ability to staff the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC d licensed.
1rwass by which the operators would be tested an Pr cicular Issues.
The extent of cheating by THI-l operator license candidates on 1.
the NRC license examinations in April 1981, and on any other Licensee-or NRC-administered examinations, including but not the Kelly examinations (including limited to the following:
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Category T) in April 1980; Category T make-up examinations subsequently administered by the company; the ATTS mock examinations in early April 1981; and such other examinations These latter shall as the Special Master shall deem relevant.
include any other Licensee-administered qualification or mock exam or NRC-administered exam since the acciden
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2 The adequacy of the Staff's investigation of, ano hRC response il 2.
to, the cneating incident and rumors of cheating in the Apr i
1981 NRC examinations.
The adequacy of Licensee's investigation of, and Licensee's.
3.
response to, cheating or possible cheating in the examinations!
listed in Issue 1 above.
[ProposedIssue4wascombinedwithIssue3.]
4.
The extent of Licensee management knowledge of, encourageme 5.
of, negligent failure to prevent, and/or involvement in cheating in the above mentioned NRC and Licensee examinatio i
The existence and extent of Licensee management involveme 6.
cheating as alleged by the Aamodts in paragraph 7 in response
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to the Board's Order of August 20, 1981.
The existence and extent of Licensee management constraints o[
7.
the NRC investigation of cheating and rumors of cheating in the NRC April 1981 examinations.
P The adequacy of Licensee management response.to the incident]
in July,1979, referred to in the OIE investigation report and 8.
involving one of the two operators terminated as a result of cheating on the NRC April 1981 examinations.
The adequacy of Licensee's plans for improving the l
9.
administration of future Licensee qualification examinations for licensed operators and candidates for operator licenses, including the need for independent administration and gradinf of such examir.ations, t
The adequacy of the administration of NRC licensing 10.
examinations for TMI-l personnel, including proctoring, grading, and safeguarding the integrity of examination i
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4 Partial Initial Decision on the Reopened Proceeding 27, 1982 The July to restart.
into cneating resolves the issues in f avor of allowing TH-:
if not all, cheating had been icentifiec, anc The Scara found that most, h t that, despite the fact that a small percentage of operators cic c ea (approximately 105), "...our overall impression is that, as a group, they have performed well under very demoralizing and stressful I
Since there will be an adequately trained staff circumstances."
available, the Board saw no safety consequences resulting from the Rather, its major finding was that licensee's cheating episodes.
oversight of the training delivery system was deficient, and it prop The Board also found that license conditions and a fine as a remedy.
TMI-1 upper level management was not involved in the cheating and provided a satisfactory response to it.
THE EXTENT OF CHEATING O and W were shift supervisors whose cheating on the April 0 and W.
1981 NRC examinations was the cause of the reopened proceeding on An NRC consultant, in grading the April SR0 exams, originally _
cheating.
discovered similar and in some cases identical answ Later substantial similarities were also found in their answ i
exams.
to company-administered examinations and the NRC April R0 examin They subsequently admitted to cheating, were asked to resign by t The Special Master concluded that additional licensee, and did resign.
sanctions were warranted in this case and recommende While the Board adopted the Special Master's findings prosecution.
regarding the fact of O's & W's cheating, it did not endorse the recommendation for criminal prosecution, as it felt there was no saf benefit from such action and the Department of Justice' has already indicated that it is not interested in such a prosecution.
G and H are reactor operators who came under suspicion of G and H, cheating based on marked similarities in a number of their answers on The similarities were identified company-administered weekly quizzes.
by a licensee consultant hired after the original cheating incident the April NRC exams came to light for the purpose of reviewing lic
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Due to greater similarity in answers between GG anc W Master's Report.
on tnis quiz, the Special idaster conciuceo tney cocperatec, ar.c the Fowever, like the Special Master, the Boaro acepted no l
Ecarc agreec.
sanction, mainly due to tenuousness of the analysis and tne fact tnat only one instance was involved.
After inquiries Mr. Shioman Respondino to a Cuestion During the Exams.
5 into cheating had begun at TMI-1, Mr. Shipman, the plant operating engineer, voluntarily came forward and reported to TMI-1 Vice Hukill that he, Shipman, had probably aided a test-taker by answeri:
Shipman stated that he was question during exams given in April 1981.
at the coffee machine wnen a presumed license candidate asked hi He responded with an question which Shipman believed was on the exam.
answer without thinking and only became concerned that this might No other evidence was ever presented cheating at a later time.
- kill, regarding this incident, and throughout separate inquiries by Hu t NRC investigators, GPU Nuclear President Arnold, and throughouI h
nation at the hearing, Shipman maintained that he could not rememb The licensee formally the individual was who asked the question.
The reprimanded Shipman for using poor judgment in providing an answer l
Special Master, while accepting this discipline as appropriate, w concerned that Shipman was knowingly concealing the identity of th Having reached this conclusion, questioner, i.e., protecting a cheater.
l the Special Master recommended that Shipman not be allowed to h The Board disagreed l
operate TMI-1 until he identifies the questioner.
with this recommendation, stating that the evidence was not so conclusive as to support beyond doubt that Shipman does remem The Board was satisfied without imposing additional i
asked the question.
sanctions.
Mr. Husted, a Mr. Husted Soliciting Help from P on the NRC Exams.
licensed operator instructor, took the April NRC exams in a roo During only one other test-taker, a shif t supervisor identified as P.
an interrogation of P by NRC investigators, P reportedly stated th Husted had asked him, P, for an answer to an exam question wh At the hearing i
room was unproctored, and that P refused to provide it.
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t The adequacy of the Staff's investigation of, ano isRC response 2.
to, the cneating incident and rumors of cneating in the April 1981 NRC examinaticns.
I The adcquacy of Licensee's investigation of, and Licensee's 3.
response to, cheating or possible cheating in the examinationsi listed in Issue 1 above.
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[ Proposed Issue 4 was combined with Issue 3.]
4 The extent of Licensee management knowledge of, encouragemen 5.
of, negligent failure to prevent, and/or involvement in cheating in the above mentioned NRC and Licensee examination 1
The existence and extent of Licensee management involvement 6.
cheating as alleged by the Aamodts in paragraph 7 in response to the Board's Order of August 20, 1981.,
l The existence and extent of Licensee management constraints on!
7.
the NRC investigation of cheating and rumors of cheating in the NRC April 1981 examinations.
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The adequacy of Licensee management response to the incident-f 8.
in July,1979, referred to in the OIE investigation report and involving one of the two operators terminated as a result of cheating on the NRC April 1981 examinations.
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The adequacy of Licensee's plans for improving the administration of future Licensee qualification examinations f
9.
for licensed operators and candidates for operator licenses, l
including the need for independent administration and grading of such examinations.
The adequacy of the administration of NRC licensing l
10.
examinations for TMI-l personnel, including proctoring, grading, and safeguarding the integrity of examination
3 caterials; the acecuacy of the Staff's review of tne administration of Licensee's Category 7 e>:aminaticas; anc tne aceouacy of the Staff's clan fer retest 1rg operat:rs ara monitoring its NRC examinations to assure precer acherence to "RC testing requirements in order to assure tnat tne purposes of the NRC examinations, because of the nature of tne cuestions, canr.ot te defeated by cheating, Ine use of crib sheets, undue coaching or other evasive devices.
The potential impact of NRC examinations, including retests, 11.
and operator terminations on the adequacy of staffing of TMI-l operations.
The sufficiency of management criteria and procedures for 12.
certification of operator license candidates to the NRC with respect to the integrity of sucn candidates and the sufficiency of the procedures with respect to the competence of such candicates."
A Special Master, Gary Milhollin, was appointed by the Atomic Safety an Licensing Board to conduct hearings into allegations of accitional 28, 1982. To protect cheating and issued a report to the Board on April the privacy of individuals, an agreement was reached between the partie stipulating that names of those so desiring would be represented by Those designations are used throughout the record.
letter designations.
The Special Master's findings and conclusions were not bincing, but served as advice and recommendations to the Licensing Board, which remained responsible for making the initial decision and all findings and conclusions regarding cheating. Because the Special Master and Boa differ significantly on many of the issues, this summary identifies and Attachment I discusses both similarities and differences as they occur.
to this Enclosure presents the issues and notes the special Master's and The issues are presented in the order Board findings in tabular form.
used by the Board in its PID, which differs slightly from that found in the Special Master's Report.
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4 Partial Initial Decision on the Reopened Proceeding The July 27, 1982 to restart.
into neating resolves the issues in f avor of allowir.g TM-:
The Scaro found that most, if not all, cheating had been icentifiec, and that, despite the fact that a small percentage of operators cic cheat (approximately 10%), "...our overall impression is that, as a group, they have performed well under very demoralizing and stressful Since there will be an adequately trained staff circumstances."
available, the Board saw no safety consequences resulting from the Rather, its major finding was that licensee's cheating episodes.
oversight of the training delivery system was deficient, and it propos The Board also found that license conditions and a fine as a remedy.
TMI-1 upper level management was not involved in the cheating and provided a satisfactory response to it.
THE EXTENT OF CHEATING O and W were shif t supervisors whose chea, ting on the April 0 and W.
1981 NRC examinations was the cause of the reopened proceeding on An NRC consultant, in grading the April SR0 exams, originally cheating.
discovered similar and in some cases identical answer Later substantial similarities were also found in their answe l
exams.
to company-administered examinations and the NRC April R0 examin They subsequently admitted to cheating, were asked to resign by the The Special Master concluded that additional licensee, and did resign.
sanctions were warranted in this case and recommended c While the Board adopted the Special Master's findings prosecution.
regarding the fact of O's & W's cheating, it did not endorse the recommendation for criminal prosecution, as it felt there was no safet benefit from such action and the Department of Justice' has already indicated that it is not interested in such a prosecution.
G and H are reactor operators who came under suspicion of G and H.
cheating based on marked similarities in a number of their answers on The similarities were identified f
company-administered weekly quizzes.
by a licensee consultant hired after the original cheating incident o
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the April NRC exams came to light for the purpose of reviewing lice J
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5 exams for instances of cneating. The Special Master conclucea that five j
f se'.s of nearly icenticai responses on tnese quizzes were oue to
" cooperation," i.e., cneatinc. He reacred ;his ccnclusion after cbtaining no believacle explanation frcm G cr H as to how else their answers could be so similar, particularly sir.ce some were wrong anc no evicence was presented to support the claim that the similarities were due to tneir memori:1ng training material together. The Board agreed that four of the five nearly identical responses were due to cooperation. While the Special Master recommended as a remedy pro-hibiting G and H from operating TMI-1, the Board concluded that such a sanction was too strong and was inappropriate without notice and opportunity for a hearing. The Board chose to recommend instead that the licensee and G and H voluntarily accept a two-week suspension of G and H without pay as a substitute for initiation of a proceeding to consider suspending G's and H's licenses.
(By notice of August 6,1982, licensee notified the Board and parties that G and H had elected to accept the suspension and that licensee had already placed it into effect.)
S and Y.
S:and Y, a shift supervisor and reactor operator, respectively, were found to have submitted one identical and some other It was determined very similar answers to questions on a company quiz.
during the hearing that the responses were virtually verbatim recitals of licensee training materials. The Special Master concluded that their joint memorization of training material was the most plausible explanation for these similarities and that cooperation was not sup-ported by the evidence. The Board agreed with this finding.
GG, W and MM.
GG, W, and MM provided very similar answers to two questions on a company quiz.
(Note that W had already been identified as having cheated on other tests.) The similarities were particularly suspicious because all three individuals misspelled the word challenge in the same way, as "challange".
Both the Special Master and Board found that the evidence was inconclusive regarding MM, apparently because the similarities were minimal, MM had little motive to cheat as he was not required to take the quiz, and MM provided a plausible explanation for the similarities in his written comment to the Special
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o Due to greater similarity in answers between GG and W Master's Report.
on tnis quiz, the Special Master conciucea tney cocperatec, arc ne Fowever, like the Special Master, the Boarc acc ted no Board agreec.
sanction, mainly due to tenuousness of the analysis and tne f act tnat only one instance was involved.
After inquiries Mr. Shipman Resconding to a Question During the Exams.
into cheating had begun at TMI-1, Mr. Shipman, the plant operating engineer, voluntarily came forward and reported to TMI-1 Vice P Hukill that he, Shipman, had probably aided a test-taker by answering Shipman stated that he was question during exams given in April 1981.
at the coffee machine when a presumed license candidate asked him He responded with an question which Shipman believed was on the exam.
answer without thinking and only became concerned that this might No other evidence was ever presented cheating at a later time.
- Hukill, regarding this incident, and throughout separate inquiries by NRC investigators, GPU Nuclear President Arnold, and throughou h
nation at the hearing, Shipman maintained that he could not rememb The licensee fomally the individual was who asked the question.
The reprimanded Shipman for using poor judgment in providing an answe Special Master, while accepting this discipline as appropriate, w concerned that Shipman was knowingly concealing the identity of th Having reached this conclusion, questioner, i.e., protecting a cheater.
l the Special Master recommended that Shipman not be allowed to he The Board disagreed operate TMI-1 until he identifies the questioner.
with this recommendation, stating that the evidence was not so conclusive as to support beyond doubt that Shipman does remem The Board was satisfied without imposing additional asked the question.
sanctions.
Mr. Husted, a Mr. Husted Solicitina Help from P on the NRC ExamsL.
licensed operator instructor, took the April NRC exams in a roo During only one other test-taker, a shif t supervisor identified as P.
f an interrogation of P by NRC investigators, P reportedly stated th Husted had asked him, P, for an answer to an exam question w At the hearing room was unproctored, and that P refused to provide it.
7 Husted denied the allegation. More importantly, P denied at the hearing that he had made the statement curing the. interview.
The Special Master, choosing to believe the NRC investigator's view of what happenec, and having concluded from his cbservation of P's demeanor at the hearing that he was lying, founo that Husted had solicited an answer from P and hence cheated. The Board disagreed, finding that the original reported allegation occurred during the course of an interview in which two investigators were trying to " trick" P into supplying derogatory information. The Board chose to believe that the NRC investigator misinterpreted or misunderstood P's response and that P was l
not lying during the hearing. Since the investigators did not take l
notes regarding this incident or have it included in a statement by P, the Board believed _ there was an opportunity for confusion. The Special Master also found that P was not truthful in failing to admit that other operators had cooperated on quizzes at times. The Board, however, decided to reach no conclusion unfavorable to P or Husted.
Mr. Husted's Attitude. Mr. Husted generally displayed an uncooperative attitude regarding the NRC investigation. He initially refused to discuss rumors with investigators and displayed what was termed a flippant manner in his testimony. He stated that he disapproved of the way in which 9 2 investigation was being conducted.
It appeared that he showed ditrespect to both the investigation and the reopened proceeding.
The Sp+cial Master would have sanctioned Husted, but did.not know what sanction would be appropriate. The Board agreed that Husted's attitude reflected adversely on his ability to impart a sense of responsibility and seriousness to the operators he must teach. The Board recommended that Husted's performance as an instructor be one of the specific topics of a general review of the training program which was separately recommended by the Board.
Allegations Concerning U.
U is a shift foreman who was rumored to have been involved in a number of instances of cheating. First, it was rumored that he was stationed in Mr. Husted's office near the exam rooms during the second set of April exams for the purpose of helping license candidates, and that this was done with the knowledge of someone higher
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i Second, someone identifying nimself as U called a for up in the ccmpany.
shif t tecnnical aavisor, KK, curing the examinaticns anc asrec d Last, it was rumcred among employees' wives tne answer to a cuestion.
i NRC and y
that U used crib sheets anc notes written on his hand dur ng company-acministarec exams. The evidence regarding tnese incide in consisted of the fact that U did spend his time during the exams He claimed to be studying there, question in Mr. Husted's office.
although he had just completed the'NRC exams on the two previo d
U denied having called KK to ask a question in order to chea The Special Master did not believe U's i
the other cheating rumors.
Both testimony and the Scard was uncertain as to U's innocence.
reluctantly gave U the benefit of the doubt and recommended no t
sanctions.
WW, a shift technical advisor, received WW Answerino an Exam Ouestion_.
during a telephone call while on duty in the shift supervisor's office The caller asked a question administration of the Kelly examination.
l WW later discovered that his response would have which WW answered.
WW been useful in partially answering one of the exam questions.
brought this incident to light himself later in the investigation.
h While the Special Master concluded this was a cheating incident, t Both the Board and Special Master were Board was not so certain.
h concerned that this episode may mean an uncaught cheater r 1
While the Special Master did not propose any sanction, th Board recommended that WW be admonished f TMI-1 staff.
for his delay in reporting the information, l
VV, a prior TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, submitted a 3
I VV and 0_.
i ing take-home make-up exam in 1979 to help satisfy delinquent tra n It was discovered by the licensee that parts of the exam requirements.
Upon investigating the matter at that i
were in different handwritinc.
V admitted time, Gary Miller, then TMI-2 station manager, found that V O was VV's having 0 complete part of the make-up work for him.
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subordinate at the time and claimed not to have known he waf VV was permanently removed from his ting answers to a take-home exam.
operational job as a result and 0 was subsequently remov
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9 (This incident is relevant primarily in that 0 was on the NRC exam.
also caught cheating in etner instances anc that it serves as the backgreurc for Millar's conduct in sucsequently certifying VV fcr the The incident was also at NRC examination--discussed separately below.
issue regarding whether or not management responcec appropriately it).
The allegations regarding Mr. Ross, Allegations Reaarding Mr. Ross.
TMI-1 Manager of Plant Operations, are characterized by the Boa h
most serious in the proceeding, as the Board views Ross as perhaps t f Ross was accused of single most important person'in TMI-1 management.
h intentionally keeping the NRC proctor away from the exam room duri April 1981 NRC exams and of improperly influencing the answer The accusations originated with an allow more liberal scoring.
ex-employee, YY, who informed the NRC that he had heard Ross gotten the NRC to expand the answer key and that he (Ross YY testified proctor out of the exam room for a long period of time.
Two that he had facilitated cheating.
that he believed Ross meant other employees testified, however, that they believed that Ross' comments were meant to describe Ross' success in making the sc Ross denied that his fairer and his effort to cheer up the operators.
The actions were improper or that he intended to facilitate cheating.
Special Master on the basis of his belief in YY's testimony and The Board disagreed.
disbelief in Ross' concluded that Ross was guilty.
It stated that YY's accusation was based on YY's interpretatio dif-remarks and that those remarks could be and had been interpreted Additionally, the Board did not conclude, as had ferently by others.
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the Special Master, that the uncertainty in Ross' testimony ind cat It found this uncertainty understandable that he was being untruthful.
his given the circumstances and Ross' tendency to limit his testim The Special Master also concluded that Ross definite knowledge.
improperly expanded the exam answer key for certain answ!
normal review by licensee and NRC personnel of the test while it w The Board concluded the changes that_were made to the being taken.
The Board also concluded that no misconduct l answer key were proper.
could be imputed to the licensee due to allegations against Ross.
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10 LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO CHEATING At Resocnse to O's and W's Cheating and Sucsecuent NRC Investication.
GPU the beginning of I&E's investigation, licensee management wanted a i
nanagement official available to sit in on NRC investigator interv ews The matter was of employees. The NRC investigator balked and refused.
temporarily resolved by Mr. Arnold's calling Victor Stello, then j
Director of I&E, who directed the investigator to allow a management Subsequently, I&E representative to be present during interviews.
changed its position so that later interviews of employees were not The licensee was conducted with a management representative present.
i accused by intervenors of improperly hindering the investigation b The licensee testified that its action was intended to ensur action.
The Special proper treatment of its employees and to keep informed.
Master found this conduct improper, although he did not find that it The Board disagreed, believing actually constrained the investigation.
the incident was overemphasized and that management, was fulfil The Special l
it legitimately felt at the time was its proper role.
Master faulted the licensee for not pursuing more vigorously the reason i
While the licensee admitted in re-why 0 and W cheated on the exams.
h trospect that this should have been done, and the Board agreed, t e 1
Board simply accepted this as an oversight and not as a conscio omission intended to conceal operator disrespect for the NRC 1
examination.
Both the Special Master and Board Management's Meetinas With Employees.
discussed management's attempts to clearly communicate its position the seriousness of cheating to its employees through a series of These meetings were also used to impart the meetings on the subject.
The Board found importance of the examination process to the operators.
management's actions appropriate.
I The Special Master Manacement's Response to the Shipment Incident.
l faulted the licensee for not specifically asking each of the set of test-takers from which it was most likely that the questioner came, f
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whether or not he had been the one who asked Mr. Shipman the que l
11 The Board agreed that should nave Deen cone, but the coffee machine.
c1c not attribute Ine omission to a del;oerate latent cy management to not icentify cneaters.
P In criticizing the management Manacement's Resconse to Rumors About U.
licensee response, the Special Master pointed to instances in wnich the acmitted it did not thoroughly investigate rumors of U's misconduct, particularly a rumor regarding his being stationea outside the exam The licensee commented that in this instance, "by someone higher up."
llegation, i
with management involvement in cheating a direct part of the a it was particularly inappropriate for GPU to investigate before the N did--that this was an NRC responsibility first and the licensee was at risk of being accused of interference if it investigated this The Board agreed, but did fault the licensee for not being allegation.
more diligent in this area after the NRC finished its part of the investigation.
The licensee Management's Response to Cheating on Weekly Guizzes.
conducted its own investigation of potential cheating on company-administered examinations by having consultants review past exams f i
parallelisms and by having a company attorney, Mr. Wilson, interv ew (Mr. Hukill also operators regarding specific suspicions of cheating.
interviewed operators separately regarding the general subject of While the consultants found examples of parallelisms on cheating.)
tests, in particular, on G's and H's tests, Mr. Wilson's interviews The resulted in denials by both G and H which he readily accepted.
i Special Master f aulted Mr. Wilson's investigation of these paralle and found that licensee's investigation into these matters was While the Board criticized Mr. Wilson's naivete and The Board inadequate.
nonobjectivity, it imputed no adverse motive to his failures.
admitted that a lack of standards existed with regaro to judging the adequacy of licensee's investigation, yet rated its design as passi While its execution as borderline, and its overall grade as acequate.
the Board could find specific failings with the licensee investigativef effort, it found that the licensee's results were little improved on by the subsequent extensive hearings and NRC investigation.
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i This incident Manacement Resoonse to Cheatino by VV and 0 in 1979.
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Dio licensee acecuately ceal wita VV?
raised three issues.
Anc did licensee prcperly recertify VV kncwing someone else had Both the Special Master and contributed to his requalification work?
Board founo that the licensee probaoly was correct in not cealing more In the case of VV, the Special Master criticized severely with 0.
The Boarc cisagreed.
licensee for not dealing with him more severely.
I Mr. Miller, VV's immediate superior, recommended a stronger punishment Mr. Arnold, after,considering all than was subsequently meted out.
factors, chose to remove him from the operations career track instead.
.l This was a result which the Board found to be consistent wi I
of how organizations actually handle such problems, and hence, the B; found it an acceptable response.
l The certification, subsequent to this episode, of VV to the NRC by Mr. Miller, led to concern that Miller so certified despite knowing that By VV had met his requalification requirements through cheating.
certifying VV, Miller was stating that VV had satisfactorily met the requalification program requirements of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 5
.i At issue is whether or not he knowingly made a material false statementl by certifying that VV had passed a particular section with a grade i 89.1%, when he, Miller, knew that 0 had contributed material which f
.l The Board found that additional investigation t
resulted in that score.
As other members of management, including Mr. Herbein,
]
was warranted.
were involved in the certification decision, the Board believed they j
also should be involved in any reinvestigation of this certification Additionally, the Board imposed a license condition requiring matter.
that any involvement by Miller in TMI-1 startup activities or operation be done under the direct supervision of an appropriately qualified licensee official.
THE TRAINING AND TESTING PROGRAM Additional training and testing requirements were levied on THI-1 by The Board, in Commission's Orders of August 9, 1979 and March 6, 1980.
PID on management issues, found that the licensee's its August 27, 1981 4
13
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efforts in improving its training pregram satisfied the Cemission's The Board nad foreseen :nat results from the cneating l
concerns.
prcceecing mignt have implications for that earlier fircing :f the Scara i
and had asked the Special Master to look into this area.
\\
The proceeoing on cheating produced a number of examples of failings in For l
the actual implementation of the training and testing program.
example, weekly quizzes were often not proctored, cooperation was apparently permitted on some company quizzes, confusing operators as to:
what was or was not permissible. It appeared that memorization was overly emphasized in teaching--in lieu of imparting understanding of Take-home exams and weekly quizzes were sometimes assigned concepts.
1 without clearly stating whether they should be open or-closed book.
The Special Master analyzed both the training program administration a His conclusion was that it was inadequate to meet l
its actual content.
The Board disagreed with this conclusion.
the Comission's Order.
I However, the Board believed the doubts raised by the evidence in the While the program reopened proceeding impacted their earlier finding.
design was found to be adequate, the Board stated that evidence on program delivery indicated inadequate quality control of the training f
Given that the operators had subsequently done well on the program.
October 1981 NRC exams, the Board found that the program was still adequate, subject to additional quality assurance measures to be
[
i These measures satisfied during the first two years after restart.
l would include an in-depth audit of the testing and training program by the NRC staff, additional criteria for training instructors, a licensee internal audit procedure, and procedures for sampling answers on company exams to detect cheating.
The Board did not believe additional training or testing of operators i
Since the operators had passed all of would be a constructive remedy.
l the hurdles placed before them over the past two years, the Board felt that no further demonstration of their competence was necessary.
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14 CERTIFICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR NRC LICENSING cf The cneating prcceecing raisec cuestions regarding the acceptability licensee's program for determining wnether candidates are qualified to sit for the NEC exam. The Special Master founc it adequate despite some l
The certification proceoure was determined to be too criticisms.
The licensee recognized the prcblems arc the consecuences of informal.
its actions and was instituting voluntary changes to make the proceaure more formal and reliable. The Board accepted such steps as an important l
safeguard against a recurrence of such an event as the licensee certifying individuals such as 0 and W, and considered this an l
l acceptable response to criticisms of past certification problems.
3 ISSUES INVOLVING THE NRC The Special Master and Board found the administration l
NRC Examination.
As a result of the l
of the April 1981 NRC exams lax and inadequate.
i April 1981 cheating, new procedures were instituted to improve
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proctoring of NRC exams and to sample exams for evidence of cheating as I
Even so, the Special Master and Board still had a standard procedure.
The Board reservations regarding the test procedures and test content.
I concluded that the degree of emphasis on memorization should be additionally examined. Also, the Board found that the review process, f
l whereby the licensee provides a " quality control" check on the NRC to ensure accuracy of the exam, can result in lack of credibility of the exam and potentially inaccurate questions.
The Board recommended that l
the Commission encourage improving the process as a generic matter, f
Staff's Response to Cheating. The Special Master and Board had specific i
i
- However, j
criticisms of various aspects of the staff's investigations.
the Board found the staff response adequate. The Board was particularly l
critical of the staff for infonning all parties that it did not intend to place any special attention on auditing the licensee's training and The i
testing program, despite the problems identified in the proceeding.
staff would have relied solely on the results of the NRC exam as a I
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As a result, measure of adecuacy of tne licensee's training program.
the Scara imoosec a condition recuirirg sucn an aucit Oy :ne s aff.
Attachment:
As Statec I
i, 1
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w___-_____________________-_-______________________-____-__
Attachment to Enclosure 1 "i
Board Special 11 aster
- Sanction Finding Recommended Basis Finding Recommended Basis Sanction Jssua confession individual Cheating 1.
0 & W - copying on guil ty criminal confession guilty none (licensee fired prosecution 0 & W)
NRC and other exams 2.
G & 11 - copying on guilty prohibited analysis of guil ty 2 weeks analysis of suspension -
quizzes and from operat-quizzes and licensee and lack of ex-G & 11 accept planation company quizzes ing THI-1 lack of explanation Board penalty comparison comparison not gdilty none of answers not guilty none of answers to training 3.
S & Y - copying on quizzes to training materials materials analysis GG & W - yes none - as W analysis of GG - yes.
none testimony answers and HM - maybe 4.
GG, W MM - copying and GG one HM - no on qdizzes instance only testimony judgment disbelief of not sure none 5.
Mr. Shipman - giving dullty of not prohibited (licensee answer at coffee mess informing from operat-testimony reprimandad ing THI-1 based on Mr. Shipman) demeapor N/A judgment of judgment of liusted not tes timony llusted guilty none guilty testimony 6.
P & Mr. Ilusted
- rumors, not gutity none testimony
- rumors, 7.
U - helping others probably none testimony admonishment confession guilty confession guilty none 8.
WW - enswering an gutity testimony none exam question testimony, guilty both removed 9.
VV & 0 - O did VV's guilty none other by licensee work on homework evidence e
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,g Sanction Sanction Issue Finding Recommended Basis Finding Recommended Basis Individual Cheating (continued)
- 10. Mr. Ross expanding guilty licensee YY accusation, not guilty none testimony answer key -
condemna tion Ross demeanor distracting proctors
- 11. Miller - certify guilty licensee written evi-guilty Miller to be evidence and VV falsely condemnation dence and supervised, testimony tes timony investigated Management Issues 1.
Management involvement yes
' adverse find-overall no none different read-in cheating ing to restart conclusion ing of evidence 2.
Management's response inadequate none overall adequate none overall conclu.
conclusion sion to cheating overall conclu-3.
Licensee's investi-inadequate none overall marginally none conclusion adequate sion gations 4.
Training program inadequate adverse overall adequate 2-year pro-overall conclu-finding to conclusion bation, im.
sion restart prove QA of training 5.
Certification of inadequate none case of VV inadequate none - ac-judgment, case cepted licen-of VV operators see improve-ments NRC's performance 1.
Administration of inadequate none N/A lax generic review N/A exams 2.
Cantent of exams inadequate none N/A problematic generic review N/A 3.
Exam review inadequate none N/A problematic generic review N/A 4.
Adequacy of uneven none N/A adequate none investigation t'
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SUFFARY OF BOARD'S RESPONSE TO STAFF ENFORCEMENT PLAN General In its December 14, 1981 Partial Initial Decision (PID)on plant design and unit separation, the Board explained that,-th"roughout the PID,
references were made to the Board's reliance on various Staff requirements, licensee commitments and Board-imposed conditions without studied regard to whether these terms were intended to be conditions or legally binding technical specifications attached to the TMI-1 licensee.
The Board directed the Staff to present a plan l
identifying which of these it would impose as technical specifications or other forms of license conditions. The Board also directed the Staff to report how it intended to be assured that the licensee would l
either abide by any the Staff did not impose as license conditions or seek relief in an appropriate manner.
On February 1, 1982, the Staff filed the requested plan with the Boa rd, j
The Staff plan addressed:
(1) Commitments / requirements to be completed prior to restart.
(2) License conditions / technical specifications to be imposed at restart.
'l (3) NUREG-0737 items.
(4) Method of assuring compliance with items that are not license conditions.
- .... (
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Reactor vessel water level instrumentation.
(5) Grcuna water monitoring.
(7) Systems interaction studies.
i In its reply of February 22, 1982, the licensee challenged some
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aspects of the plan.
On February 17, 1982, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the only other party to reply, criticized the Board's approach to enforcement and faulted some aspects of the Staff's plan as being vague and inconsistent with the December 14, 1981 PID.
On March 10, 1982, the Staff, by leave of the Board, filed a response to the licensee's position. The Staff reported that it and the licensee were now in agreement on most of the disputed areas.
The Board responded to the UCS and licensee comments in its April 5,1982 1
" Memorandum and Order Modifying and Approving NRC Staff's Plan of Implementation."
I Board Findings i
The Board found that the Staff report was generally sufficient, but l
that some modifications and additions were necessary:
(1)
The Board reiterated its requirement that, prior to restart, the licensee demonstrate prooress in initiating a long-term solution to the steam generator by:> ass logic problem (possibility of feedwater isolation due to failure in the rupture detection system).
l (2)
The Board accepted staff rewording in response to licensee comments of a proposed license condition on correction of control room deficiencies. Four items--two related to Bailey controllers, one to detection of burned-out indicator bulbs, and one related to in-plant communications--are now to be addressed in the j
l licensee's detailed control rcom design review report for THI-1.
4
3
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(3) The Board accepted rewording of the proposed license condition on suspension of work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel hancling building whenever Uni: 2 fuel is being moved.
The criginai Staff proposal reflected botn tne language anc the intent of the
]
Board's December 14, 1981 PID, in that it would have requireo an absolute bar to any work in the Unit 1 area during Unit 2 fuel movements.
In response to licensee comments, the Board stated it now agreed that the record did not require such a complete bar.
The Board modified the proposed license condition to require suspension of work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building during any Unit 2 fuel movements unless the licensee submitted for Staff review the procedures for fuel movements and evaluation of the potential impact of fuel movements, and the Staff agreed that work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building could proceed.
(4) The Board accepted licensee rewording of a proposed license condition concerning the engineered safety features (ESF) filtration system for the Unit 1 fuel handling building.
The reworded condition requires that the licensee, prior to movement of irradiated fuel within the Unit 1 fuel handling building, have an operable ESF filtration system for the Unit 1 fuel handling building and assure system operability whenever irradiated fuel is being moved.
(5) The Board modified the Staff proposal concerning enforcement of items that are not being made license conditions.
The Staff had stated that "the normal enforcement procedures relied on by the Staff to assure compliance by all licensees with items not specifically addressed in Technical Specifications or license conditions will be relied on by the Staff to assure that the licensee for TMI-1 operates TMI-1 safely." To this the Board added: "unless otherwise required by the initial decision." The Board stated that although it was not aware of any special verification required to be performed outside the subject matter
4
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ENCLOSURE 3 l
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m-TMI-l RESTART C0hMISSICt; FE'/IEM CCCLtENTATICri Licensing Board Documents 1.
Part 'i Ir.itial Decision of August ' 7,1981 (f:anagement Issues) i 2.
Partial Initial Decision of December 14,1981 (Hardware, Separation, and Emergency Planning) 3.
Board Memorandum and Order of April 5, 1982 Modifying and Approving NRC Staff's Plan of Implementation.
4.
Partial Initial Decision of July 27, 1982 (Reopened Proceeding).
OPE Memoranda 1.
OPE memo to Comission of August 7,1981, re:
TMI Restart Proceeding: Appellate Review of Merits of Board Initial Decisions 2.
OPE memo to Commission of September 24,1981, re:
OPE Review of Partial Initial Decision on TMI-1 Restart (Mariagement Issues) 3.
OPE memo to Commission of October 9, 1981, re:
Follow-up to October 6 Commission meeting on TMI-1 Management Issues 4.
OPE men i to Commission of November 3,1981, re:
TMI-l Restart --
Management Competence 5.
OPE memo to Commission of December 18, 1981, re:
TMI-l Restart --
Vessel Level Instrumentation 6.
OPE memo to Commission of December 22, 1981, re:
TMI-1 Shift Staffing 7.
OPE memo to Commission of December 22, 1981, re:
THI-l Restart Hearings on Cheating 8.
OPE memo to Commission of January 8, 1982, re:
OPE Analysis of December 14, 1981 Partial Initial Decision on TMI-l Restart:
Hardware, Separation of Units 1 and 2, and Emergency Planning Issues 9.
OPE /0GC Memo to Commission of March 1, 1982, re:
TMI-1 Restart:
Analysis of Parties' Comments and Decision-Making Options
.