ML20043B568

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LER 89-027-01:on 891113,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group 1 Isolation Occurred During Surveillance Testing. Caused by Burnt Out Window Light Bulbs on Alarm Window. Light Bulbs Replaced & Jumpers installed.W/900523 Ltr
ML20043B568
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/23/1990
From: Crowl D, Diederich G
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-027, NUDOCS 9005300232
Download: ML20043B568 (7)
v • d • e


Text

. 1 .

l : Commonwestth Edison LaSalle County Nuclear Station

* Rural Roate #1, Box 220 Marseillen, Illinois 61341 Telephons 815/357-6761 ~

May 23, 1990 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory cannission Mall Station PI-137 Washington 0.C. 20555

Dear $1r:

Licensee Event Report 809-027-01 Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office to superceed previously submitted Licensee Event Report #99-027 40.

This report is being submitted to clarify and update the event and corrective actions.

4O

&k G. J. Olederl h et Station Manager LaSalle County Station GJO/DRR/msh Enclosure ac: Nuclear Licensing Administrator NRC Resident inspector NR6 Region 111 Aeninistrator INP0 - Records Center l

90033o 1 b00hhhy3 nc 162a

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. l

.- LICENSEE EVEW1 REPORT (LER) facility Wme (1) Docket Natier (2) _ Pane (3)

L W ile County Station Unit 1 01 51 01 of 01 31 71 3 I of 0 6 i I

iltle (4) Primary Contalrunent Isolation During Surveillance Testing Due to turned Out Annitncletor Window Lloht Bulbs _

Event Date (5) LER Wustier (6) Reoort Date (7) Other Feel 11 ties involved (0)

Month Day Year Year /// Sequential /j/j

/ Revision Month Day Year Facility Wars Docket Natier(s)

  • fj/j Natier f/// Noter

//

01 51 01 01 01 1 1 01 1 11 1 11 3 el 9 el 9 01217 015 al3 91 0 of 51 01 01 01 l l l l TH15 REPOR1 15 $UBMli1ED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR OPEW M (Check one or more of the followino) (11)

MODE (0 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(lv) 73.71(b) 0 20.402(b) ,_, .J._ _,

POWER ,_., 20.405(a)(1)(l) _., 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) _,. 73.71(c)

LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ll) 50.36(c)(2) _ 50.73(a)(2)(vil) _,

Other (Specify 0! 0! 0 110) ,. 20.405(a)(1)(lin) 50.73(a)(2)(l) ._ 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) in Abstract

// / / / /////// / / 20.405(a)(1)(lv) ._,. 50.73(a)(2)(ll) , 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(B) below and in

/ / // // / ,,,20.405(a)(1)(v) ._, 50.73(a)(2)(lli) 50.73(a)(2)(x) Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THis LER (12)

Name ,,,,_

TELEPHONE NUSER  ;

AREA CODE Don Crowl. b ulatory Assurance. extension 2860 8 l 1 15 315111-l617161I COMPLETE OWE LINE FOR EACH CO@0NENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COPP0NENT t MiWUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSEl SYSTEM C0ff0NENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE TURER 10 WPRDS '

TURER TO WPRDS D I I I I l l l W l I l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month l Day l Year Submission I

~

US) l lyes (if ves. complete EDJUED SUBMISSION DATF) TlNO l ll ll ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On Noventner 13,1989 at 1823 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.936515e-4 months <br /> with Unit I defueled, a Primary Contalrunent Isolatlan Systun (PCIS) Group i 1 Isolation occurred while perfonning LaSalle Instroent Surveillance LIS-MS-1078, " Unit i Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1 and Level 2 Isolation Instrunent Channels B and D Refuel Calibration." A full PCl$ Group 1 Isolation occurred because the other half of the isolation logic was tripped due to the loss of leak detection power from the AC electrical bus 135X and 135Y outage. No valve movement occurred because all the Main Steam system isolation valves were previously deenergized due to other scheduled refuel outage work.

The alarm windows were extinguished and the light bulbs for alarm window F504, 'CHAN Al/A2 MSly ISOL TRIP,"

were determined to be burnt out. This prevented the Unit I Wuclear Station Operator (WSO, licensed Reactor Operator) and the Instrenent Malntenance technician from detecting that half of the isolation logic was present due to AC electrical bus 135X being de-energized.

A review of the guidance for what an alarm window test requires will be perfonned.

This event is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(lv) due to the actuation of an l Engineered Safety Feature System.

LLCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINuAfl0N Fem Rev 2.Q, FACILliT IIRE (1) DOCKET NUSER (2) LER NUMER (6) Pm (3) -i Year /// Sequential //./l Revision  !

ff

/N Neber ///#

Ihster -j

% 11e County station unit 1 0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 31 11 3 e19 -

0_l 2 1 7 - 01 I of 2 0F 016 l' l TEXT Energy industry identification Syst a (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XX] l PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENT!flCATION General Electric - tolling E ter Reactor EnergyIndustryidentificationSystem(Ells)codesareidentifiedinthetextas[XX). -l A. COND1110N PRIOR TO EVENT Unit (s): I Event Date: _11/13/09 Event Time: 1823 Hours Reactor Mode (s): Defueled Mode (s) ume: Defueled Power Levet(s): 1 B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On November 13, 1999 at 1823 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.936515e-4 months <br /> with Unit I defueled, a Primary Containment isolation System (PCl$,

PC) [JM) Group 1 Isolation occurred while perfoming LaSalle Instroent Surveillance LIS4-1078, " Unit 1 Reactor vessel Low Water Level 1 and Level 2 1 solation Instr uent channels B end 0 Refuel Calibration." Both Inboard and Outboard Main Stem Line Isolation valves (MSIV, MS) [$8) and Main Stem line drain valves were deenergized prior to the isolation due to planned refuel outage wort. - No valve l motion took place during this event. The PCl$ Group 1 isolation only resulted in relay and alarm actions. .

i-At'0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> on November 13, 1999 the 'A' channel callbration was coupleted in accordance with LaSalle

(

Instruent Surveillance LISM-101A, " Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Low Wter Level 1 and Level 21 solation instrument Channels A and C Refuel Calibration."

At 0725 hours0.00839 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.758625e-4 months <br /> "C" channel calibration was started in accordance with LIS-MS-107A.

' At 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br /> the Olvision 1 AC Electrical Distribution Buses 135X and 135Y (AP) [ED) were doenergized and taken out-of-service in accordance with LaSalle Administrative Procedure LAP-900-4, " Equipment Out-of-Service Procedure," for scheduled refuel outage work. The bus 135X and 135Y outage deenergized the Division I Leak Detection logic (LD/E31) [lJ). (Relays lE31A43A and IE31A43C doenergized.)

Relays IE31A43A and IE31A43C cause relays 1821H47A and 1821H47C to deenergize on loss of power, high area anblent tenperature or high differential tenperature signal. When relays 1821H47A and 1821H47C ,

deenergire, a channel Al and A2 MSIV isolation signal occurs. This occurred during the day shift and caused no consequence to testing the Division I logic per LIS-MS-107A. (Only half of the isolation logic was made up at this time.) Alarm window F504, "CHAN Al/A2 MSIV ISOL TRIP" should have been energized at this time.

At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> the calibration of the "C" channel per LIS-MS-107A was stopped for the shift to allow shlft turnovers (the exchange of day shift personnel with afternoon shift personnel) to take place.

At 1540. hours the calibration of the *C" channel was resumed per LIS-MS-107A.

p

' 1 tlCENSLE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONilNuAflal ' Fem new 2.0 FACit11Y NAPE (1) 00CKET NupeER (2) tiR 1RpeElt (6) P m (3)  !

Year //j/ Sequential /// Revision .

V4 Notwe V4 Numer 1

.3 Lasalle County Station unit 1 0 I $ 101010131713 e19 - 01217 - 0I I 013 0F of 6 TEXT EnergyIndustryidentificationSystem(Ells)codesareidentifiedinthetextas[KK) l i

t. DESCRIPil0N OF EVENT (Continued)

At 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> the instrement mintenance (IM) personnel completed the calibration of the *C" channel per. i ilS-MS-107A. ,

i At 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> the calibration of *t" channel was started in accordance with LIS-MS-1078. The surveillance test was authorized by the Shift Engineer (SE, licensed Senior Reactor Operator), Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE, licensed Senior Reactor Operator) and Unit 1 Nuclear. Station Operator (WSO,.

licensed Reactor Operator) prior to beginning the surveillance test. l At the beginning of the surveillance test, the conputer points (CX/C91) [LD) wre verlflod to indicate ,

as follows: ,

4. 09H 'LO LO RK WIR LYL OlV $1 -#-LO"
b. C500, 'VERY L0 RK W1R LYL DIV 81 - N-Lo*
c. C581, "RPS CH B1 INSTR GROSS Fall - AVAIL"
d. C582, "RPS CH tl INSTR POER LOSS - AVAIL *
e. C584, *RPS CH B2 INSTR GROSS f All - AVAIL"
f. C585, 'RPS CH B2 INSTR POER LDSS - AVAIL" At the Control Room panel lH13-P603 the following alarus (AN) [18] wre verlflod reset or clear (slow j flash or extinguished):  ;
a. 8401,~*DIV 1 RK VESSEL WTR LVL 2 LO"
b. 8412, "DIV 2 RX VESSEL WIR LVL 2 LO"
c. 8405, *CHAN A1/B1 PRI CNMT PRESS Hl*
d. 8409, "CHAN A2/B2 PRI CNMT PRESS Hl*
e. A210, *CHAN A1/81 RX VESSEL WTR LYL 1 LO-LO-LO" I

Il At the Control Room panel 1H13-P601 alam E504, "CHAN B1/82 MSiv ISOL TRIP,* was verlflod reset or clear

! (slow flash or extinguished).

i L15-MS-1078 did not require the IM's to check the Aux 111ery Electric Room panels IH13-P622 anti IHl3423 l Main Ste m isolation Valve (MSIV, MS) solenoid valve status lights if the MSIV's were closed. The solenoid status lights are normally energized when no isolation signal is present.

The alarm windows were extinguished and the light bulbs for alarm windows f504, 'CHAN Al/A2 MSiv ISOL TRIP," and E504,

  • CHM B1/82 MSIV ISOL TRIP,* on the Control Room panel IH13-P601 were later determined to be burnt out when testing was done, i

INen the test switch 1821-5208, *MSL ORN ISOL LOGIC,* was turned to test in accordance with Lis-MS-1078, I

a PCIS group 1 outboard Isolation occurred because the other half of the Isolation logic was trlpped due to loss of leak detection power from the AC electrical bus 135X and 135Y outage. No valve movement occurred because all the min Stem Line drain Isolation valves were previously deenergized (out-of-service) due to other scheduled refuel outage work. Both the Unit 1 NSO and the IM did not realize a Main Stem Line drain outboard isolation had occurred at this time because no valve motion took place.

i R j

i (LCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LtR) TEri CONTINu4 TION fom Rev 2.0 FACILITY NAME (1) 00CKE1 NueER (2) LER NHeER (6) Foot (3)

Year // Sequential y/ Revision

/

y//

/ Wunber i// thseer l LaSalle County Station unit 1 015101010131713 e19 - 01211 - 01 1 01 4 0F 01 6 l  ;

TEXT Energy Industry identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [KK)

8. DESCRIP110N OF EVENT (Continued)

The Instrwnent Melntenance personnel proceeded to the fleid and isolated 1821 4 4028 Division 11 reactor level transmitter and attached the test equipment to sinulate lowering reactor water vessel level. Imen the trip setpoint was reached, the Olvision 11 reactor water level trip unit opened contacts in the -

logic which deenergized the 1821H478 relay. The Olvision 11 reactor vessel water level trip indicator unit trip light and alam window A210, 'A1/81 LVL 2 LO LVL,' 111uminated. The alam window E504 did not illuminate at this point. The IM's stopped testing to investigate why the alam window E504, 'CHAN 81/82 MSly ISOL TRIP,* did not illuminate. The IM's requested the WSO to make an annunciator check and it was discovered that both alam window E504 and f 504 had no indication because the window Ilght bulbs were burnt out. At this point the IM's notified the IM foreman of the problem.

The IM personnel were requested to return reactor level transmitter 1821-W4028 to service and the Olvision 11 isolation was reset. The light bulbs were replaced for alam windows E504 and f 504 and the Operating Department requested the IM's to jisper the IE31A-K3A and IE31A43C relays for Division I to I allow testing of Division 11 logic to continue. This was done in accordance with LaSalle Adminlstrative Procedure LAP-240-6, "Tenporary System Change," and testing was conpleted without any further event, This event is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CfR50.73(a)(2)(lv) due to the actuation of an Engineered Safety feature System.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT An alann window F504, 'CHAN A1/A2 MSlY ISOL TRIP" had no indication because the window light bulbs were l

burnt out, which caused both the Unit 1 W50 and the IM to proceed with Lis-MS-1078 believing that no other isolation signal was present at this time. When the test switch 1821-5208, 'MSL DRN ISOL LOGIC

  • l was turned to test in accordance with Lis-MS-1078, a Main Steam Line drain valve outboard PC15 group 1 isolation occurred.

When AC electrical bus 13SX was deenergized for planned outage work, a Division i PCl$ Group 1 Isolation

( signal resulted (Only half of the isolation logic was made up at this time.) due to the loss of power to the Leak Detection system logic which inputs to the PCls logic. This was done during the day shift i

(0700-1500 hours). After shift change the afternoon shift (1500-2300 hours) Unit I W50 checked the Main i- Control Room panel alams per LaSalle Operating Surveillance LOS-AA-51, 'Shiftly Surveillance,' and did not notice any extinguished alann window light bulbs. The Unit 1 W50 desunded an alann sisenary to print out on the Sequential Event Recorder typer (alann typer, AN) [1Q). A detailed review of the printout wasn't perfonned due to the work load during the shift and the nisnerous amount of 41anns Ilsted on the typer. Many alanns were caused from the amount of work requiring systems to be in an off-nonnal condition during a refueling outage.

The LaSalle Instrument Surveillance procedure did not require verification of the alanns printed out by the Sequential Event Recorder sisunary. This procedure also did not require the IM to verify the MSiv solenoid status lights energized in the Aux 111ery Electric Room if the MSIV's are closed. The MSIV's were closed due to planned refuel outage work and were deenergized to allow work to continue. Checking the alann sunnary printout may have allowed the W50 or IM to identify that an isolation signal was present. Checking the solenoid status lights for the MSIV's would not have helped in this event because the MStV's wers out of service and the solenoids deenergized to support planned outage work.

L  ;

LICENSEE EVLW1 REPORT (lik) TEXT COWilWuA110N Fors nev 2,0 l FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET WupeER (2) LER Nipt u (6) Paet D) ,

Year /// Sequential /,/,/, Revision  !

fff

/// Weber W/ Weber Lasalle County station unit 1 0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 31 71 3 sIg - 01211 - 01 1 015 0F 016 IEKI Energy Industry identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the ted as [XX) i C. APPARLW1 CAUSE OF EVENT (Continued)

?

When AC electrical bus 135X was deenergized the Unit 1 W50 on the afternoon shift did not realize that power was also lost to the Olvision 1 Leak Detection system which inputs to the PCl$ system to provide Isolations. Normally the W50 would be aware of the condition of the system by the Indication of Control Room 41ams. There are no specific procedures or lists (outside design drawings) which identify every effect a bus outa;pe has.

The SCRE who prepared and reviewed the AC electrical bus 135X and 135Y outage knew that the valves associated with the PC15 Group 1 Isolation logic were all out of service closed or in their isolated position. The $CRE felt that it would not be a concern during subsequent testing that would cause an isolation because no actual valve movement would take place, only relay actuation. The SCRE used LaSalle Energency Plan impismenting procedure LZP-13101, ' Notifications,' as a reference for making  ;

this interpretation. This evaluation was not conewnicated to afternoon shift personnel.  ;

D. SAftTY ANALYSl$ OF EVEW1 Bus outages are performed for modification work during planned unit outages. A loss of power to the

The safety significance of this event is minimal since the unit was cefueled and the valves that would have Isolated were already in the closed position due to planned outage work.

E. CORRFCilVE AC110ers At 1945 hours0.0225 days <br />0.54 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.400725e-4 months <br /> the IM personnel were requested to return reactor level transmitter 1821 4 4028 to service and the Olvision 11 isolation was reset.

The light bulbs were replaced for alarm windows E504, 'CHAN 81/82 MSiv 150L TRIP,' and F504, 'CHAN A1/A2 ,

M$1V 150L TRIP."

1 On Novsaber 14,1989 at 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> the IM's installed jupers in accordance with LaSalle Administrative Procedure LAP 2404, 'isaporary System Change,' (TSC 1-983 -09) to prevent Malp Steam isolation Valve (MSly) Group 1 PCl$ isolation from occurring while a half isolation signal is present due to AC electrical bus 135K/Y outage. This was done to allow testing of Olvision 11 logic to continue.

At 1240 hours0.0144 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.7182e-4 months <br /> on November 14,1999, LIS-MS-1018 was coupleted satisfactorily without any further event.

The operating department has reviewed the LaSalle Operating Surveillance procedure LOS-AA-51, 'Shiftly Surveillance" and revised it to provide more guidance on what an alarm window test requires, such as checking each window to determine if both bulb:, are working properly when tested. Action item Record (AIR) 313-200-89-11201 has been completed.

The LaSalle Adninistative Procedure (AP-1600-2, ' Conduct of Operations" has been revised to require a check of the status of relays (when appilcable) on panels 1(2)H13-P609 and P611, prior to the performance of the surveillances or test that will cause a half scram or half isolations.

' thCENSEt EVENT REPopi (t1R) itti q EilWuAT10W . f ore Rev 2.0 fACILlif WAE (1) 00CKLI NU SER (2) Ltt WHSER (6) Pone (3)

//,/, Seqcentlet Revision

  • Year ///

f fff

/T/ #weer /// #weer Wile County Station Unit 1 0 l 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 31 71 3 _8 1 9 - 01217 - 0l 1 01 6 0F 016 l .

TEKI Energy industry identification $ystem (Elis) codes are identified in the text as [KK)

E. CORRECTIVE Acil0WS (Continoed) f A review will be cogleted to detemine if dividers will be installed to divide the two annunciator light bulbs (or other potential igrovements) to allow the operating shift personnel to easily detemine when one of the two bulbs are burnt out. Action Itee Record (AIR) 373-200-89-11205 will track this corrective action.

A review of Ll5-4tS-107A(207A) and 1078(2078) has been cagleted to insure procedural steps are provided to verify both 41ers windows (504 and F504 are verlfled deenergized prior to testing. Also a review was vione to determine if in addition to the alars check it would be necessary to verify the M51V solenold .

status lights in the Auxillary Electric Equipment room. Because of the additional guidance provided to I operating shif t personnel in the performnce of alars status checks and the revision to (AP-1600-2, it was determined that this would increase the rellability of the annunciators and this check would not be necessary.

All alarm windows for both Unit I and 2 main Contral Room have been check < $ to verify both Ilght bulbs in each window are working properly.

AC electrical bus outage procedures will be developed ts anist the operating personnel in identifying potential problems which will arise due to de-energizing c1 ult,pment or logic system powsr supplies. AIR 373-200 4 9-11202 will track these procedures.

The training department has reviewed this event and has developed additional tralning to insure proper I turnover information that could effect Engineered Safety featured system actuation reportability is performed. AIR 373-200-89-11203 has been cagleted.

A General Information Notification (GIN) has been developed and a review this event with operating, l mintenance and technical staff personnel saphasizing the importance of verifying or reverifying the required inlilal conditions just prior to performing a test or surveillance to prevent inadvertent Engineered Safety featured System actuation has been conpleted. AIR 373-200-89-11204 has been ccupleted.

l l

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS LER Wunber iltle l

373/84 4 49-00 Secondary Containment isolation During Testing 373/84-074-00 Reactor Water cleanup Isolation 373/87-009-00 Group tv Isolation During Surveillance Test Due to Instrument Nintenance Procedure inadequacy 373/87-030-00 Reactor Scram While Shutdown During Survelliance Due to Comunication Error 374/88-017 4 0 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation During Modification lest Due to inadequate Reset 374/89-003-01 Engineered Safety feature Actuation During Performnce of Instrument Nintenance functional Tests Due to Personnel Error l 374/89 4 13-00 Primary Contantenent isolation During Instrwnent Surveillance Testing of Lis-4ts-401 G. COMPONENT fAlLURE DATA Not appilcable.

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