ML20044D557

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LER 93-010-00:on 930414,DG Cooling Water Pump Automatically Tripped on Magnetic Overload.Caused by Inexperienced Trainee in Operation of Control Lever.Lesson Plans & Training Programs for Operators to Be reviewed.W/930514 Ltr
ML20044D557
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/14/1993
From: Shearer L, Spedl G
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER-93-010-02, LER-93-10-2, NUDOCS 9305190310
Download: ML20044D557 (6)


Text

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. Commonwe:lth Edi:on LaSafie County Nuclear Station 2601 N. 21st. Rd.

Marseilles, Illinois 61341 Telephone 815/357-6761 I

May 14, 1993 -

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station PI-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #93-010-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)

G. F.

qp-edl Station Manager LaSalle County Station GFS/DLL/grv Enclosure xt: Nuclear Licensing Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III Administrator INPO - Records Center  ;

IDNS Resident Inspector l

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180043 i

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i 9305190310 930514 ADDCK 05000373

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT i LER) ,

! Facility Name. (1) Docket Nsmter (2) Pace (3) '

t < ell e Cour.in ts a ti on Uni t 1 0 15 10 10 10 13 17 13 1 l ef! 0 ! 4 Title (4)

Diesel Generater Coolinc Vater Pumo Automatically f riered Due To Trai*ee's Unf amiliarity of Specific Ecuipment a

Event Cate (5) LER Number if)  ! Cepert Cate ( H Other Facilities Involved (B)

Month Day Year Year // Sect.en ti al // Revision Month Day tear Facility Names Dec6et Numter(s)

/,/p/, 7f,/ ,

/ Nsmber /// Namter ,.

O IS 10 10 10 1 ! ! l

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0l4 1 14 9!3 9!3 011 10 0i0 015 1 14 9!3 0 15 10 !O 10 1 ! 1 OFERATING l (Check one or more ef the followin ) (11) 1 20.402(b) _ 20.405(c) _ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) _ 73.71(b)

PCVER _ 20.405(a)(1)(i) _ 50.36(c)(1) 1 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.71(c)  !

LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Cther (Specify l9 l0 _ _ _

(10) 0 _ 20.405(a)(1)(iii) _ 50.73(a)(2)(i) _ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract

////////////////////////// _ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _ 50.73(a)(2)(ii) _ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in

////////////////////////// _ 20.405(a)(1)(v) _ 50.73(a)(2)(iii) _ 50.73(a)(2)(s) Tent)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) l Name TFLEPHONE NUwBER l

AREA CODE linda M. Shearer. Oceratino Staff Est. 2B03 8l1 15 3 15 17 I -16 17 !6 11 l COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EaCH CC+'PO T FATtVEE DESC:IBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE / CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE j ,

TUEER TO NPRDS / TURER TO NPRDS I I I !  ! 1 i N .

/ I I I I I I l l l I I i i I '/  ! l i 1 1 ! I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month i Day ? Year ,

Submission lyes (If ves. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DaTE) *'

X 1 NO 1 l1 ll ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, apprcximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 14,1993. Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 (Run) at 90 percent power. At 0843 hours0.00976 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.207615e-4 months <br />, while starting the 1B Diesel Generator during LOS-DG#3, "1B(2B) Diesel Gererator Operability Test", the 1E22-C002 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water Pump auto-tripped on magnetic overload.

The DG Cooling Water Pump automatically started when the DG speed increased above 150 rpm. While manually controlling engine speed per the surveillance procedure, the diesel engine speed dropped below the 150 rpm DG cooling water pump shutdown setpoint as a trainee pulled back en the injector control lever causing the DG Cooling Water Pump to shut off. The Diesel Generater speed was subsequently increased using the injector control lever, giving a second start signal to the cooling water pure. Receipt of the start signal with the pump still coasting down caused excessive current inrush and the purc breaker tripped on magnetic overload.

The 1B DG was shutdown.

The 18 DG and High Pressure Core Spray Systems were declared ino;erarle, and appropriate actions to meet Technical Specifications were initiated.

This Event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) due to the loss of a Safety System.

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. LICENSEE EVEN7 REo0RV (LER) TEXV COWUJATION Form Ree 2.0_.

FACILITY hAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER hLwEER J6) Pace (3)

Year Sequential Revision Number // Number  ;

taSalle County Station Unit 1 015101010131713 913 - 0l1 10 - 0 'I O 01 2 0F 014  !

VEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the test as [XX)

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PLA%1 AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: l General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor s

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX). '

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A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT i

Unit (s): 1 Event Date: 04/14/93 Event Time: 0843 Hours .

Reactor Mode (s): 1 Mode (s) Name: Run Power Level (s): _95 i

i B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 1 On April 14,1993 Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 (Run) at 90% power. At approximately 0840  !

hours, Operating surveillance LOS-DG-M3, *iB(28) Diesel Generator (DG)[EK) Operability Test" was being <

1 performed. A Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) was coordinating the surveillance from the Control Room,  ;

while two Equipment Operators (EO), the DG System Engineer, and a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) License Trainee were present locally in the "1B" Diesel Generator Room to perform the controlled start of the diesel. A briefing had been conducted to review roles; the System Engineer was assigned to eonitor diesel speed, one EO was assigned the task of starting the diesel while the other E0 monitored and I coached the trainee as the trainee controlled diesel speed using the Injector Control Lever during the engine start sequence. The trainee had performed this evolution during the operability surveillance of ,

another diesel generator and was familiar with the task and the procedure.

At approximately 0843, the E0 at the local control panel started the Diesel Generator As diesel speed ,

increased above 150 rpm, the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump automatically started as designed. The -6 trainee began to pull back on the Injector Control Lever to control engine speed at approximately ,

400-500 rpm per the procedure. In the process of stabilizing the engine, speed dropped to less than 150 rpm causing the DG Cooling Water Pump to shutdown and the diesel air start motors to engage. The 1 trainee relaxed the Injector Control lever to increase engine speed, causing a second start signal to the DG Cooling Water Pump as the diesel passed through 150 rpm. Because the second start signal was i generated with the DG Couling Water Pump still coasting down, excessive starting current caused the  ;

breaker for the cooling water pump to trip on magnetic overloa 1

I The DG was quickly stablitzed at 400-500 rpm. The E0 at the local control panel observed no cooling water flow on the local indicator and verified with the Control Room NSO that the cooling water pump had tripped. The E0 at the local control panel then manually tripped the DG. The Shift Engineer and Shift Control Room Engineer ($CRE) were notified of the event.

This Event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) due to the 1 css of a Safety System.

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LICENSEE EVENT cEp097 (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev 2.q_ ,

4 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMEER (2) leo v>MBER (6) Pace (3)

Year /,,/,/ Sequential /// Revision  ;

} /// Nseber ,/,/,/ Number j tasalle Ceunty Station Unit 1 015 ? O I O I O I 3l 713 9I3 -

0!1 l0 -

0 IO O! 3 0F 014 T EXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!IS) codes are identified in the test as [XX)

C. AFFARENT CAUSE OF EVENT The trip of the 18 DG Cooling Water Pump was caused by successive start signals within a short time f pe ri od . With the cooling water pump still coasting down when the second start signal was received, the

, breaker tripped on magnetics.

j The root cause of this event was the inexperience of the trainee in the operation of the injector

] control lever on the 1B DG.

3 A contributing cause was the procedure did not identify the 150 RPM setpoint as a critical speed in regard to the starting / stopping of the DG Cooling Water Punp. i Another contributing cause was a training program weakness. The training program did not stress the impertance of the 150 RPM setpoint of the DG or the differences in the manual controls of the DGs.

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D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT i

The safety significance of this event was minimal. Prior to and during the time that the 18 DG and High Pressure Core Soray were inoperable, both Division I and Division II Emergency Core Cooling, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, and the "0". "1A", and "2A" Diesel Generators were operable.

1 E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The 1B DG and Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray System were declared inoperable while an investigation was onducted to verify no damage had occurred to the Cooling Water Pump Motor.
2. An inspection of the 1B DG Cooling Water Pump, and its motor and breaker was performed. No damage ,

or abnormalities were found. The air start motors were visually inspected and no damage was obse rved.

3. LOS-DG-M3, "1B(2B) Diesel Generator Operability Test", was completed satisfactorily and the 1B DG and High Pressure Core Spray system were declared operable at 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br /> on April 14, 1993.
4. LOS-DG-M3 "1B(2B) Diesel Generator Operability Test", will be reviewed for enhancements regarding cooling water pump start signals, control of engine speed using the injector control lever, and differences in injector control lever arrangement between diesel generators. This action will be tracked by Action Item Record (AIR) #373-180-93-0028501.
5. The Training Department will review lesson plans and training programs to ensure that operators are adequately trained on the operation of the injector control lever on the various emergency diesel generators and the precautions to be observed in regulating diesel engine speed. This action will be tracked by AIR #373-180-93-002E502.

LICENSEE EVENT RED 03T (LER) TEXT CONTNJATION Form Rev 2.0 FACILITY M ME (1) 00CKET NUMEER (2) LER W NEER (6)

. Pace (3)

Year // Sequential //j/ Revision  ;

,/ ,/,/ jf

/ Number /// Number LaSalle County Station Unit 1 0151010l0131713 913 i- 0I1 10 -

O l0 01 4 Or 014 TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are idectified in the text as [XX) i F. PREVIOUS EVEk1S A review cf the LER Database was performed with key words: Training, Trainee and Instruction. No l previous events were found.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA None.

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SUMMARY

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CALSE CODES

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l Lost generation Reactor trip , NRC violation, levei__.

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Cost > $25,000 ESF actuation

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GSEP event, class ____ .

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Hazard or Spill NRC reportable Tech Spec LCO

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Personnel injury LER Potential or future load Component ,Ta. PSEtture mode ~ SALP functional aret .

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