ML20028B527

Submits Interim Rept Re CF Braun Independent Analysis of HVAC Sys.Requests Further Specific Info Not Included or Discovered to Complete Final Rept

ML20028B527
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	11/19/1982
From:	Devine T, Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20028B528	List: ML20028B527 ML20028C345
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NUDOCS 8212020230
Download: ML20028B527 (11)

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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILIT( PROJECT +

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Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W.. Washington. D.C. 20009 (202)234 9382 November 19, 1982 Mr. Harold P. Denton <

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation '

Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: C.F. Braun Independent Audit LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant

Dear Mr. Denton:

On November 9, 1982, we received a four-volume report of the C. F. Braun Company's independent analysis of the heating, venti-lation, air conditioning system (HVAC system) at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station in Illinois.

Although we are submitting a report to your office today, we must poirt out that it is an interim report. We have detailed our concerns, and in some cases provided some detailed justification for those concerns. We were not able to get back to the two Zack witnesses, Mr. Terry Howard and Ms. Sharon Marello, whose input into this analysis is critical.

Our final report will contain those comments, a review of the Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECO) failures to identify the HVAC quality assurance violations, and a more detailed justification of the items highlighted in this report.

Within the context of this interim' report by the Government i Accountability Projecti (GAP) is a request for further specific information not included or discovered wi. thin the C. F. Braun four-volume report. -

It is imperative for our consultants and staff to have this additional information in order to draw final conclusions about the reliability of this audit and the implications of the l~

findings affecting the safety of the public and of the site l employees. -'

Our' interim findings follow.

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l November 19,~1982 Mr. Harold P. Denton-1

' The C.F. Braun independent review of the safety-related and seismic supported non-safety related systems at LaSalle comes to the conclu-sion that the " installation by the Zack Company is in accordance with l the Sargent and Lundy design and the workmanship to be of adequate l

quality."

! The Government Accountability Project takes general and specific exception to this conclusion. We urge the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to take a number of I specific actions in response to this audit:

Require Commonwealth Edison to recall C.F. 'B'raun; modify' 1) the terms of Brawn's contract, and continue with the probe at the La Salle facility. The scope of their work simply i

must include a more comprehensive view of the -safety systems at the f acility.

2) Restrict the La Salle license to 48% power until there is further work done to identify the Zack errors that need to be repaired, replaced, or reworked, and that required repairs i .

are completed.

3) Request Region III to consider enforcement action against Commonwealth Edison for f ailing to adequately supervise sub-contractor in their procurement and' supply of materials to be used in the plant.

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4) Assign a Region IV vendor inspector to audit / review these conclusions in the light of specific C.F. Braun statements I

which disregard 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

5) To consider this letter as an interim A more report, prepared for detailed analysis of-the your immediate consideration.

specific Zack allegations, as well as review by Zack Nuclear witnesses will follow this report by a few days.

As you are aware se are specifically engaged in both the Midland and the Zimmer plants--both'of which are in intensely active stages of NRC involvement. At the William H. Zimmer plant in Ohio, GAP Legal Director Tom Devine is working with officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigations to review the massive amounts of evidence and talk to nuclear witnesses. His comprehensive knowledge of the Zimmer plant is irreplacable and therefore he has been delayed from finishing the

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significant portions of his analysis. .

Bille Garde, Director of GAPS Citizens Clinic has beed equally as involved in the investigation of the Midland Nuclear Plant in Midland,-

Michigan. The GAP investigation on the Midland site has become a full scale probe, and as you are aware this is a particularly critical time period at Midland. .

Mr. Harold P. Denton November 19, 1982 Further, those experts and analysts who have made their services available to GAP have had only a very short time period to deal with an incredible amount of almost totally unorganized raw data.

The first opportunity that was provided for us to review this four-

' volume report came last Tuesday, after GAP had contacted the NRC to receive a copy of the C.F. Braun study. We understand that there was a September 5th interim report provided to the NRC, of which we did not receive a copy; and that other individuals in the press and Illinois received copies as much as ten days prior to our receipt of the final copy. This oversight unfortunately has caused unnecessary delay and expense for all parties.

However, the most significant delay in finishin'g our analysis has come from the shocking conclusions reached by,the C.F. Braun audit team. It has lef t us no option but to go back into the raw data of the report --almost item by item -- to scrutinize each conclusion reached by Braun. The NRR staff can expect our final analysis no later than Tuesday, November 23, 1982.

Critique of C.F. Braun Summary The following comments summarize the major flaws that GAP' analysts have.found to date in the C. F. Braun audit of Zack's work at the Further LaSalle Nuclear Power Station near LaSalle, Illinois.

development of each item will follow in our expanded response to the C. F. Braun assessment.

1. The methodology employed by C. F. Braun in selecting the hangers, ducts, and other pieces of equipment invalidate the Co nclu sions .

During the August 24, 1982 Region III meeting, and in his September 4, 1982 letter, GAP warned that the criteria to select items _for the audit could prejudice the project. Unfortunately, our concerns were realized.

In our opinion, it is clear that the study's conclusions were biased by tha sample. Expert industrial quality control analysts contacted l

l by GAP reiterate that for any sample to validly reflect the entire population (in this case total number of hardware items), that.. sample must be randomly selected from the entire range of possibilities. -

C.F. Braun did noc employ this basic industry quality assurance -

standard. The " Summary of Work" is clear; the selection process is subjective:

These selections for inspection we,re made based on their own engineering knowledge and experience in con-junction with some basic guidelines as follows.

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v Mr. Harold P. Denton November 19, 1982 If Braun intended to limit its review to less than a 100% inspection effort, it should have employed a random selection process for all i pieces of equipment reviewed -- not for just a few systems.

The consequences of Braun's risk are extremely serious. The NRC and the public are left with only two options:

1) Reject the Braun report because of a basic generic flaw in its methodology; or ,,

2) Accept the Braun report, pretend that it was a valid assessment and do an analysis of the conclusions based on the mythical assumption. -

After several consultations with nuclear power analysts, statisti-cians, and industrial quality control professionals, it became clear that the only option available to the NRC is to reject this report's general conclusions. In fact, it was the unanimous opinion of the f .

analysts we contacted that without a random sample the conclusions are meaningless. As one person put it: " Virtually all of the techniques used to analyze data require that this data be obtained in accordance with well-specified rules of random sampling."

Although it would have been reasonable to conclude our review with a rejsetion of the Braun assessment purely on the grounds of a flawed Our methodology, we nevertheless proceeded with our own assessment.

review, however, should not imply that we accept the 335 selected pieces of HVAC equipment as a valid sample.

Despite the conclusions, the substance of the Braun report confirms Mr. Howard's and Ms. Morello's concerns. It demonstrates that GAP's initial reservations about the weaknesses of the audit were well- ~

founded. In fact, each unresolved concern raised by GAP in the series of meetings and correspondence surrounding the beginning of Braun's work has proved to be a forewarning.

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2. Of the 335~ pieces of equipment reviewed, Braun concluded that 34 % (117 items) had discrepancies of varying significance.

The extrapolation of a 34% error rate to the What entireeven remains HVAC system more at frightening the LaSalle plant is frightening.

is the significance that this error rate has for the rest of.th,e

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HVAC system. If the Braun sample truly is representative, clearly one-third of the HVAC system at LaSalle is in a disqgepant condition.

One NRC inspector estimated that there are 45,000 potential pieces j of HVAC equipment (safety and non-safety) on the LaSalle site.

Because it has been impossible to turn up more realistic data,

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' that number is offered merely to illustrate'the significance of Braun's audit findings. A 100% review of the 45,000 pieces could _

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November 19, 1982 Mr. Harold P. Denton predictably produce 900 " findings," Given 30,600that observations, and only the 335 pieces actually 12,150 non-discrepant conditions.

used reflected a biased sample, it is probable that the actual review would produce even worse results.

In order to produce a more accurate assessment, GAP analysts need significant additional information missing from the' current version of the report --

1) The total number of pieces of HVAC equipment on the ~

LaSalle site, broken down by safety or non-safety related functions;

2) The total number of pieces in each system,.rather than just the percentage of hangers in the system that were reviewed; 1

3) .The total number of possible " finding" if all potential saf ety-related defects were actualized; and

4) In each instance, the variance for acceptable limits of error as specified by the approved design.

The most dramatic cxample of C. F. Braun's disrespect for NRC reg 61ations is evident in the study's conclusions on welder quali-fications:

The Zack welding performance qualification records (PQR) were reviewed. Although some PQRs are incomplete, Braun does not feel that this degrades the welding program since Zack was not required to conform to a specific code or standard. It'has been determined that the weld quality is consistent on all supports regardless of who performed the welding.

Clearly, the Nuclear Regu'latory Commission First, cannot Braun's accept Zack's obser-willingness to waive nuclear safety laws.

vation that "Zack was not required to conform to a specific code or standard" is simply wrong. The Atomic Energy Act requires welders to'be qualified. Regardless of Braun's conclusion that "all is well" despite an inability to prove welder qualifications, 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criterion II is clear that personnel J

participating in a quality assurance program must be properly '

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trained and qualified. The only way to avoid this requirement' would be to remove safety-related HVAC welding from ,0A coverage --

an illegal loophole that Braun tacitly accepts.

i At Zimmer the problem of welders whose qualifications could not including a l be verified has led to severe enforcement actionContinuing doubts about massive recertification program.

proof of welder qualifications played a major role in the .

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a November 19, 1982 Mr. Harold P. Denton Commission's November 12, 1982 shutdown of the facility.

In the documentation provided in the Braun report there is little room for doubt about the qualification of Zack's welders.

In .the September 14, 1982 review, of the 111 welders tested 4 2 failed the test; in the second round of tests given in earl'y October, 24'of 123 failed to qualify. Even in the final qualification review on October 26, 1982, there were 12 unqualified welders from the 52 tested. ,

Braun's "f eeling" that the lack of qualification for Zack's welders does not degrade the welding program casts serious doubt on all of Braun's assessments. It should not be necessary to debate that weld quality has a significant relationship to the verifiable qualifica-tions of individual welders.

Other examples of major flaws that we have discovered within the Braun assessment are highlighted below:

1) It is apparent that numerous design changes, designer justifications, and changes in the drawings resalted from the errors found.

It is not clear that the initially approved NRC design was signifi-cantly' changed as a result of hundreds of changes, revisions, and resolutions. Further, in most cases, Braun did not analyze the Sargent & Lundy justification; Braun merely accepted at f ace value whatever S&L concluded.

2) A review of the Inspection Report log reveals that out of 335 alleged system inspections 7 pieces that were covered by-the sample did not receive full inspections.

The comment, " Hanger could not be inspected due to location," was noted for S-978, S-964,(S-987, S-986, S-973, S-1327 and S-1332.

So even the number 335 1s not an accurate reflection of what was inspected. .

3) There are numerous examples of Braun ' conclusions based on CECO's regularly scheduled tests or start-up tests.

As we had f eared, the Braun audit appears to amount _tg little more than an industry rubber stamp.

4) It is not clear how many findings were reported to the Braun Internal Review Committee and Commonwealth Edison Company from the site team.

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Mr. Harold P. Denton November 19, 1982 We do know that eventually three w'ere repor'ted-to the NRC; however, since there were two levels of review prior to NRC notification, it is impossible to determine whether more of the observations were being considered as findings.

5) on page 23 of the summary there is an interesting but significant typographical error.

The second paragraph has obviously been "doctoredr" It is unclear by whom the changes were made. The purpose of the doctoring appears to be to remove certain statements about the Zack non-conformance reporting system. We would like to request that the NRC review the initial page 23 -- prior to doctoring -- and make a determination of .what was removed, why and by whom. This unfortunate slip-up reveals last-minute company changes in the Braun report and under-mines the credibility which it is supposed to guarantee.

The substance of Braun's comments suggests that the numerous %ack nonconformance reports should have been Quality Control Inspection Reports. Our experience with duplicate NR forms leads us to strongly disagree with this Braun conclusion. (At Zimmer, there was a similar change made to undermine the NR procedure. This replacement pro-cedure contributed significantly to the plant's condition being "ind.e te rmina te. " )

6) Other observations that our staff has made that will be further developed in our final report are listed below:

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-- The lack of organizational independence of C.F. Braun from CECO.

-- The lack of informational independence of C.F. Braun from i CECO.

-- The failure of C.F. Braun to make independent evaluations i

of CECO and S&L judgement.

-- The failure of C.F. Braun to extend the size of the sample after. discovering critical problems.

! -- The failure of C.F. Braun to follow through with disposition of their findings. .

-- The failure to cite relevant professional code requirements to justify their procedures. .

4- The failure to justify their conclusions with relevant pirofession l

code requirements. .

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-- The absence of hardware tests. _

-- The non-specific quantification of the numbers reviewed. --

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s Mr. Harold P. Denton November 19, 1982 The reliance of C.F. Braun on Zack, S&L, and CECO tests and analysis.

FAILURE TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED BY THE WHISTLEBLOWERS The extraordinary remedy that created Braun's review is the direct result of,whistleblowing disclosures from Mr. Howard, Ms.

Marello, Mr. Ronald Perry and other former employees of the Zack,.

Corporation. If subjective assessments are to repla~ce standard statistical sampling techniques, no opinions come with better credentials than theirs. Unfortunately, Braun chose not to even attempt token communication with the whistleblowers, despite their announced eagerness to assist. As a result, Braun's report does not even report to address the specific concerns targeted by those responsible for the probe.

To illustrate, the report failed to --

1) guarantee that all relevant Nonconformance Reports ("NCR")

were reviewed. Although the report discussed a review of 1756 NCR's; fewer than Mr. Howard and Ms. Marello estimated were included in the scope of their equivalent effort, and fewer than the 2200 figure that Braun concedes it received.

2) review and establish current HVAC site specifications at Lasalle, which were unknown to Zack when certain materials were originally purchased.

3) items never reached by the still-incomplete Zack internal document review.

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4) target items covered in the suspect February 1982 CECO audit which Mr. Perry challenged.

5) all site records generated after January 1982, when Sargent and Lundy ceased indpendent reviews of Zack site documentation.

6) purchase orders from unapproved vendors, either because they never qualified for or were removed from the Approved Vendors List.

7) purchase orders where there is evidence of questi.onable .

,_. records alteration or forgery. ..

CONCLUSION To some extent the explanation for the flaws in the Braun 4 -

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~'~ November 19, 1982 Mr. Harold P. Denton report is that the NRC exercised only token oversight. While CECO audited the " independent" reviewers, NRC site supervision was limited to one visit by one inspector. While staff priorities are understandable, the net result is that this third party report cannot legitimately serve as the basis for any final regulatory decision on Lasalle. The necessary facts will not be in until the staff releases its own reports.

If anything, the substance of the Braun finding's are both Despite its mandate, Braun ominous and understated in the extreme. It relied produced a paperwork review of a paperwork breakdown.

extensively on factfinding from the targets of the inquiry. It accepted at face value the suspect design changes approved without design requirements question by Sargent and Lundy, which rewrote the'To approve full power for as needed to " legalize" Zack's violations.

Lasalle on the basis of this report would represent a regulatory decision in spite of the facts.

Sincerely, Thomas Devine Legal Director Billie Garde i

Citizens Clinic Director cc: Mr. Thomas Novak TD:BG/my .

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