ML20011A822
| ML20011A822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1981 |
| From: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111030255 | |
| Download: ML20011A822 (75) | |
Text
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMPANY P O BOX 5000 m CLEVEL AND. OHIO 44101 e TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 e ILLUMINATING BLOG e 55 PUBLIC SOUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation Da!wyn R. Davidson Vlf'S PRESIDE NT SYSTEM ENGINE ERING AND CONSTRUCTION
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\M il@/fro October 30, 1981 x&
e-@ ~
Mr. Robert L. Tedesco 2ksf$:f g
Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50 440; 50-441 Response to Request for Additional Information -
Structural Engineering
Dear Mr. Tedesco:
This letter and its attachment is submitted to provide draft responees to the concerns identified in your letter dated September 16, 1981, in regard to Structural Engineering. It is our intention to incorporate these respo.nses in a subse- _
quent amendment to our Final Safety Analysis Report.
Very truly yours, S
- Av1 Dalwy R. Davidson Vice President System Engineering and Construction DRD: dip Attachment cc: G. Charnoff, Esa.
M. D. Houston NRC Resident Inspector F
kg\,s 8111030255 811000 PDR ADOCK 05000440 A PDR
'9 D , 220.06 Provide procedures by which venting, if considered,~is used (3.3. 2) to reduce the tornado vacuum in your Category I structural
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design. .
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Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.3.2.2.
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. jE.I' 220.07 In your barrier design procedures there is not enough information (3.5.3) in tb evaluation of overall response of structural elements subjecced to impactive'or impulsive load, such as impacts due to missiles. A copy of the draft Appendix A to Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.5.3 is attached herewith for your reference (Attachment 1). Please take notice of the staff position on the acceptable ductility ratios for reinforced concrete and structural steel elements subjected to impactive and impulsive loads. Express your intention to comply with this staff position.
Response
Section 3.5.3 has been revised to include a more detailed evaluation of overall response of structural elements. Regarding Appendix A to SRP Section 3.5.3, it is our intent to comply with the requirements.of this.
staff position.
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220.08 You stated that_for the dynamic analysis used in this plant, (3. 7.1) . the hysteretic damping in combination with small percentage theoretical viscous damping 'is used as a conservative approach.
Please explain in detail and discuss the' technical' basis for l the assessment of the conservatism of the approach..
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.1.3.
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, 9l 220.09 Demonstrate that the frequency intervals at which spectra
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0.7.1) values are calculated from the design time history are small
- enough that any reduction in these intervals does not result in more than.10% change in the computed values.
Responsa The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.1.2.-
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220.10 - With. regard to the issue of interaction of non-Category-I-(3. 7.1) structures with seismic-Category I structures, discuss the
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basis for the selection of the three inches structural gap.
'Also list the analyti/ al results (displacement) and demonstrate that adequate sept . ion among structures has been provided.
Response
The response this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.2.8 and revised Table-3.7-5.
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220.11 With respect to FSAR Section 3.7.2.1-seismic analysis. method, (3.7.2) you didn't state clearly how many significant modes were included in the modal analysis. It is the staff's position
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that a: sufficient number of modes should be considered; the criterion for sufficiency is that the inclusion of additional modes does not result in more than 10% increase in response.
- Please indicate your compliance 'with this position or justify any deviation from the position.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.2.1.1.
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220.12' With respect to Section 3.7.2.4 sof1-scructure interaction (3. 7. 2) analysis for diesel generator building and off-gas building, you stated that finite element method was used. It is the staff's position that modeling methods for implementing the soil-structure interaction analysis should include both the half-space and finite element approaches. Category I structures, systems and components supported on soil should be designed to accommodate responses obtained by one of the following: (a) envelope cf results of the two methods, (b) results of one method with conservative design considerations of effects from use of the other method, and (c) combination of (a) and (b) with provision of adequate conservatism in design. Express ycur intention to comply with this staff position.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.1.4.
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220.13 With respect to FSAR Section 3.7.3.9.1 you' stated that (3. 7.3) equipment supported at different locations is analyzed by imposing a single conservative response spectrum at each ,
location, this response spectrum is considered in such a way that it conservatively envelopes the pertinent response spectra of the different locations. Please provide more 3
details and give an example of krw the relative displacement between supports e-e generated and used in the static analysis of systems with di_~ferential support motion.
Response
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The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.7.3.9.1.
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a 220.14 With respect to FSAR Table 3.8.1, please provida in a tabular
-(3.8.1) format the design moments, shears, and.the required reinforcements .
corresponding to various governing 15ad combinations for:
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(1) Shield building cylinder wall ring girder at the junction of dome.
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(2) Shield buil ling cylinder wall at the junction of foundation
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- Response-l The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.8.1.1. I 1
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220.15 With respect to FSAR Section 3.8.1.1, description of the (3.8.1)' containment (shielding building, p. 3.8-4) you stated -that typical details of the cylinder wall foundation mat junction are shown in Figure 3.8-3. The title and content o'f Figure 3.8-3
- show the. typical reinforced section for the shield building wall
, and dome. Please correct the discrepancy.
Response
i i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.8.1.1.
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s 220.16~ With reference to FSAR Section 3.8.1.2, 3.8.3.2, 3.8.4.2 and (3. 8 '.1, 3.8.5.2, applicable' codes, standards and specifications, 3.8.3 it is the staff's position that ACI 349-76' Code should be 3.8.4 and used in conjunction with Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.142.
3.8.5 Identify deviations of Category I structural design from the requirements of the code and the Regulatory Guide and justify your deviations.
Response
The extent of compliance to ACI 349-76 is given in Section 3.8.3.3.7. A new Section 3.8.1.3.7 has been added to reference this Section. Section P 3.8.4.3.3 also references Section 3.8.3.3.7.
The extent of ar compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.142 has been added in revised FSAR Sections 3.8.1.2.2, 3.8.3.2.3, 3.8.4.2.2, and 3.8.5.2.2.
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4 220.11 With respect to FSAR Table 3.8-2, provide in A tabular format (3.8.2) the stresses corresponding to various governing loading combinations for the steel.vess'el at key locations, such as:
(1) At the junction of steel shell and foundation mat.
(2) At the junction of steel shell and dome.
(3) At the junction of steel shell and polar crane support.
Also show that the design stresses at these points comply.
with the requirements of the ASME Section III, Division I Code.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.E.2.5, which includes a new table, Table 3.8-11.
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o 220.18 With respect to FSAR Section 3.8.2.4, design'and analysis
'(3.8.2) procedures, you stated that the buckling investigation of the containment' vessel cylinder consists of two approaches.
First the shell and stiffeners ara verified to'Ina i'n compliance with all the. requirements _of subsection NE-3133.of-ASME Code,Section III and. secondly, a. detailed buckling analysis is1 performed using equations from " Structural Analysis of Shells". 'Please indic' Ate: ' ,
(1) Your rationale for using the method of analysis from reference 9, of Section'3.8 of FSAR.
(2) The loads and load combinations that have the potential of buckling the containment vessel and how each load or load combination is applied to the vessel. The method given in Section.5of the NUREG/CR 0793 report--
" Buckling Criteria and Application of Criteria to Design of Steel Containment.Shell," is recommended for the analysis. Discuss, if appliceble, the difficulties or problems which you'may encounter in using the method.
A comparison between the method that you used and the one recommended in NUREG/CR 0793 should be made to indicate that your : method is conservative. .
Response
The response to this question is p Ovided-in revised Section 3.8.2.4.3.f.
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220.19 Provide a containment capacity analysis of the stael containment (3. 8. 2) respording to the internal pressure build up due to hydrogen burning. The guideline and staff position of this subject is enclosed (Attachment 2).
Response
The response to this question is being prepared as part of the response to the request of Mr. Robert. L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated December 18,~1089. to Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson, Vice President, Engineering, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, to perform an " Ultimate Capacity Analyses of the Mark III Containment." The results of the studies will be available (
in November 1981.
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220.20 With reference'to the issue of fluid / structure interaction, (3. 8. 2) you: stated, in Section 2.1.4, Appendix 3A of FSAR,,t, hat for (3.8. 3) fluid modeling three different modeling techniques were used to represent the water, and ANSYS Computer Program was used for all three analyses. You concluded the concentrated mass method adequately represented the fluid and is used in the reactor building analysis. Discuss in detail of your technical basis for the conclusion and provide the results of the hydrodynamic loads analysis.
Respons3 A comparison of accelerations of the structures resulting from a representative SRV load showed that when the concentrated mass methodology was used it produced higher radial and vertical accelerations than the other methodologies. Therefore, concentrated mass methodology was used to produce conservative results.
Based on the transcript of the ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on Hydrodyramic Loads held in San Francisco, California, September 24, 25, 1981, NRC consultant Dr. Economos (Brookhaven National LaFaratories) stated that
" fluid / structure interaction has very little effect and that when it does have an effect, the effect is to add conservatism to the load specification."
220.?1 With respect to the loads t .d load combinations for steel (3.8.2) containment vessel -(Section .3.8.2.3), steel and concrete (3.8.3) internal structures (Section 3.8.3.3), a load summation method
. for static and dynamic loads due to pool swell and safe.y 1 relief valve discharge is recommended in Section 3BA.8.4, Appendix 3B of FSAR. Discuss the relative degree of conservatism between the use of the absolute sum method and that of the AC/DC method proposed. For your-information, presently, the absolute sum method (ABS) of combining dynamic loads is acceptable to the staff.
Response
The absolute sum method was used to combine all loads for the steel containment vessel, steel, and concrete structures.
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I Provide the analysis details of the lower region of
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220.22 (1)
(3.8.3) drywell wall with regard to transfer of shear force to the foundation mat and the anchorage-provision for uplift force.
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- (2) Provide design details for the drywell wall at main-steam line whip restraints.
Response
(1) Analysis details of the drywell wa.11 anchorage are provided.in'the revised Section 3.8.3.1.3. Final evaluations of the drywell structure are currently under way for revised steam relief valve bubble pressure =
and other loads; therefore, these values should not be considered I . final until completion of these evaluations.
t (2) A reference to Figure 3.8-98 showing the main sieam line penetration-anchor sleeve detail has been added on-page 3.8-98 of Section 3.8.3.1.3.
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220.23 With respect to FSAR Section 3.8.4.4 Design Methods of (3.8.3) Drywell Wall, you stated that-che drywell wall diagonal reinforcement was~ designed to the criteria for tangintial shear requirement of ASME Code,Section III, Division 2.
Provide design.and analysis details to support your statement.
Refer to SRP Section 3.8.1, II-4 for the exceptions taken by the staff, indicate your compliance with the staff's position, or justify any deviation from the position.
Response
Our design approach followed the tangential shear requirements of ASME Code,Section III, Division 2. Supplemental calculations deranstrate that sufficient diagonal reinforcement was provided such~that for the abnormal /.
severe and abnormal / extreme environmental load combinations as listed in Table 3.8-3, the tangential shear stress carried by the concrete will not exceed 40 and 60 psi, respectively. Reanalysis of the drywell structure is ongoing fer final definitions of SRV and other loads. Upon completion of this analysis, the FSAR will be revised.
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l 220.24- With respect to FSAE Jection 3.8.4.1.3, Fuel Handling Building,.
- (3. 8. 4) discuss, in detail, the design of spent fuel pool racks.
Enclosed is a copy-of staff position on "The minimum requirements for design of spent fuel pool racks" (Attachment 3). Modify your analysis arl design, if necessary, to agree with this j position.
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Response
The response to this question is providedLin revised Section 3.8.4.1.3.1-and revised Section 9.1.2.3.4.
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. 220.25 (1) With respect to the design and analysis of reactor (3.8.5) building mat, please provide your analysis results such as the design moments and shears for the foundation mat at various critical sections. Provide a detailed discussion of how these moments'and shears are accommodated in the design.
(2) Provide design calculations of reactor building foundation mat reinforcement at the junction of:
(al Concrete shield building wall; (b) Drywell wall; and (c) Reactor pressure vessel pedestal wall.
4 (3) Demonstrate that applicable code provisions are fully met in your design.
Response
l The response to this question is provided in revised Section.3.8.5.4.1.
However, the plot of the calculated design moments could change subject to completion of evaluations of changed SRV and other loads.
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220.26 Provide detail stability analysis of Category I structures (3. 8. 5) and demonstrate that the factors of. safety against floating, Table sliding and overt'urning as shown in SRP Section 3.8.5 II 3.8-10 are met.
Response
Table 3.8-10 has been revised to incorporate the factors of safety against flotation, overturning and sliding. The revised table lists the t
actual factors of safety _for the Off-Gas Building and incorporates the revised factors of safety for the Reactor Building Complex.
, A detailed stability analysis procedure for Category I structures is provided.
This procedure was provided in Attachment 1 of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Underdrain System presentation to the NRC on January 31, 1975.
The procedures used in calculating the values presented in Table 3.8-10 are.
as fallows:
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- a. Flotation - considered for normal operation only.
Factor of Safety =
i Overturning is considered about the toe at base of foundation mat as illustrated in Figure..l.
r By definition, the overturning moment is H Y+M.E the restoring moment is l (D - G - V E)
- Xcg>
and the factor of safety
- (D - G - VE) Xcg F.S. =
H+Y + ME where VE and ME are zero for normal operation.
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f 220.26 (Cont'd, pg. 2) '-
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i It should be noted that when F.S. = 1, X = 0 and the resultant vertical.
} . resisting ~ force is located at the toe (See Figure 1), which means the soil.
, contact pressure has become infinite.
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CI.MTR010 0F RESULTANT VERTICAL APPLIED FORCE X
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T0E OF MAT y
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RESULTANT LATERAL RESISTIMG L FORCE BASE OF FOUNDATION MAT RESULTANT VERTICAL
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RESISTING FORCE FIGURE I STATIC MODEL D DEAD WEIGHT OF STRUCTURES INCLUDING EQUIPMENT G = VERTICAL HYDROSTATIC FORCE H : RESULTANT APPLIED LATERAL FORCE DUE TO HYDROSTATIC, BACKFILL, AND/OR 8UILDING SURCHARGE LOADS HE= HORIZONTAL SElSMIC FORCE DUE TO OBE OR SSE AT THE BASE OF THE MAT ME: SEISMIC MOMENT DUE TO OBE OR SSE VE: VERTICAL SEISMIC FORCE DUE TO OBE OR SSE X = DISTANCE FROM RESULTANT VERTICAL RE5l STING FORCE TO TOE OF MAT X :
eg DISTANCE FRON CENTROID OF RESTORING FORCE (D- EV - G) TO TOE OF MAT Y : CENTROID OF RESULTANT APPLIED LATERAL FORCE, H, MEASURED FROM BASE OF MAT
220.27 With respect to FSAR Section 3.8.5.1, you stated that where (3.8.5) possible shear transfer from the bearing material to the reinforced concrete foundation is by frictions,'otherwise shear transfer is by a combination of friction and passive soil' pressure against shear keys. Provide the shear key i
design analysis for auxiliary building,. fuel handling building, control building, intermediate building and the oil-gas building.
Response
4 The procedures used in the design analysis of the shear keys are provided
- in Attachment A to this response.
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h Procedure for Design of Shear Keys in Rock Shear keys are necessary to prevent sliding when the horizontal restoring force (friction) is unable to provide an adequate factor of safety when divided by the horizont.a1 driving forces:
Restoring Force F.S. =
Driving Forces For ease in computations, this equation will be used in the form:
Restoring Forces - (F.S.) (Driving Forces) =0 E
, If the left hand side is equal to or greater than zero, frictionalong V
prevents sliding. If the left hand side is less than zero, shear keys
.are necessary. ,,
- The safety-factore against sliding are 1.1 for SSE and 1.5 for OBE. For rock bearing a safety factor of 3 is used.
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Lateral Soil Forces .
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i Lateral forces er calculat per a _.m "'r:14 r" r**r^ri
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A: Lu;c. cl " u l rc m . u " Lj u. C. Lules ..u w , T tr- ry I?, 177t.
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3 of 5 Nctation J
D Structural Dead Load (k) ,
.A Structure Area =
LW (sf) 1 Structure Length .
W Structure Width G Buoyant Force =
(.0624-kef) (A) (h2)
VE Vertical' Earthquake Force (k)
H Horizontal Wrthquake Force (k)
E Lateral Soil Forces P Static Soil Pressure H
Pg Hydrostatic Pressure P Static Surcharge of Adj. Building g ,
P Dab Dynamic Surcharge of Adj. Building
& P Static Construction Surcharge SS P
DS Dynamic Construction Surcharge Ry Vertical Force Resultant O
R Horizontal Force Resultant H
F R Restoring Force =p Ry F
D
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DIFF Restoring Force Minus Driving Force; Shear Key Steel Designed to Resist PDIFF P
p (3) (Pp7pp); Shear Key Bearing against Rock Designed to Resist P p
( p = Coefficient of Static Friction for Membrane) l l
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lDY khhI Procedure
' l. Determine the vertical force resultant Ry .
Ry = D-G-V E
- 2. Multiply Ryby the coefficient of friction between the mat.and the waterproof membrane (ju = 0.5) to determine the restoring force FR*
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0.5 Ry F =
R ,
- 3. Dete aine the horizontal force resultant Rg, usin.$ the grea.er of 1he values from the following:
R H
=
PH+Pg+PSab + PDab + HE' #I R =
g;j- H PH+IG+HE+ SS + DS
= 1.1) to determine the driving force F *D f FD = 1.5 Rgfor OBE F = 1.1 RH f r SSE D
- 5. Subtract FD from FR* DC81" 2 DIFF" a) If P DIFF 0, no shear keys are needed.
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b) If P DIFF < , shear keys will be designed to withstand a total load (k) of P DIFF. Multiply P by 3 to get P p, the design load - .
DIFF for the shale.
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.g In' tabular form:
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Ry (k) F(R H(k) F.S. l FD(k) PDIFF( ) P(k)
OBE l1.5 ,
SSE. 1.1 t
- 6. Choose the larger P f r shear key design and the larger P p for key '
DIFF
- depth determination.
- 7. Choose a length (E g) for shear key. (Usually- =
1 or W)
- 8. Using the expression Pp= 15Th13 + cos-d.h is + ch'is , solve for h.
sin p f = Unit Weight of Shale = .152 kef G h = Depth of Shear Key 1
3
Length of Shear Key Q = Min. Aver. Contact Pressure:
(D - G - VE )/A c '= Undrained Shear Strength of Shale :260 ksf p = Angle of inclined shear failure = 35*
f Note: The first term of the equation above is insignificant compared to
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I of I Shear Key Width & Reinforcing
(,,/ Procedure for Design
- 1. Width (b) determined by shear capacity F
3 < btg=.2f; where .2f' = /u (ACI 11.15.3) and ,b and 13 arein. inches;f; = 3,000 psi b 2, F
_D 613
- 2. In order to satisfy ACI 11.15.3 b 2, d
- 3. Shear-Friction reinforcing (vertical) in the key
,Ayf =
JB1 (ACI 11-30) 9fy V =
u FD
,p= .85 (shear), f y
=
60 ksi,ju = 1.
S A = F vf D 71.4 1 3 (13 in feet)
This is area of steel per lineal foot of shear key and must be distr'ibuted evenly across the key. -'
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/ of Shear Key in Lean Concrete ,
V Procedure for Design
- 1. Following Procedure for Design of Shear Kevs in Rock determine values for:
R,F,R' y R H D' DIFF
- 2. Select shear key. length (13 ) - usually equal to mat dimension 1 to
. direction of F p.
- 3. Calculate shear key depth (d) {use the larger of two values)
(a) bearing criteria (against vertical' face of key) 1 Pyryy 1 1 3 d$.85fj { note: 1.7 is load factor for earth pressure) where t= .7 (ACI 9.2.1.4)
[U f' - = -1,500 psi (specification)
.85(f' = allowable bearing stress (ACl 10.14.1)
S = appropriate safety factor 1.5 OBE or 1.1 SSE d 'l P l DIFF i 1.7 l Ag Q .85 t' g
> SP DIFF where d&1 are 3 in inches
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1.52 1 3 and P DIFF is in kips (b) Crushing lean concrete on sliding plane (potential crack)
(R H + yR ) sin 45 5(.85$f'1 d/ 3 sin 45*)X2(ACI10.14.2) d 1 .23 Rg+RV where d and 13 are in inches I and R &R yare in kips S H l
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. .. 242
- 4. Calculate shear key width and reinforcing following Procedure for V
Design of Shear Key Width and Reinforcing.
Ry -
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fe' - 2000 pi .
Y p ,
p a ra:<,t:at crack
~ Leon Concre.fs .'
fe I5 0 M*
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ts' y=(p,ig,)s,y45' P-(SRg - Ry) hin 45'-
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- 5. Check for scability.
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l P. <
-pN + bond whereje = 1.4'(ACI 11.15.4) and bond (shear) : 2 (1 d3 / sin 4 P-< l.4N+.110 Igd {t & d are in inches }
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== n**me LATIRAL SOIL FORCIS DESIGN CRITIR1A A. Static Soil pressures (See Figure 1)
- 1. The "at :es " soil pressure vill be used fer calcultting static .
lateral soil pressures against valls except during construction when." active" soil pressures shall be used.
- 2. The "at rest" lateral pressure equals Y ka/r where 7 = unit weight of the soil, a
~3. The unit of weight of s' oil varies with the type of soil and position above or below the water table.
Exa=ple: Class 3 fill T above water table = 128 pef ,
l' i belov varer table (buoyan ) = 65.6 pef (i.e., 128 - 62.4)
- 4. The static piessure includes a hydros:atic head belev the water table.
This is not a soil pressure and should be calculated separately fron
) the "at rest" or " active" pressure since, as dese 1 bed in Section C, a different load facter is used.for soil loads and water pressure.
Grcund varer pressure = g h, where g = 62.4 pef and h = depth belov l va:er table.
- 5. Lateral pressure from curcharge loads is found by multiplying the j vertical surcharge pressure times the "at rest" or " active" coefficient.
l For surcharge leads spread over large area, q, =ay be conservatively considered as constant over the depth of the vall and q,ka/r is a untfor pressure. 1 000 lead but only as a c$eck. psfIfshall this be beccces used'as .a a ecnstruction governing surcharge design condition, l
see your Coordinating Engineer. For a concenjrated surcharge lead, the designer shall consider redue:1cn of the eoil pressure with depth and distance from :he lead in accordance with Figure 10-6 of NAVFAC DM-7 (attached). ,
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- 3. Dyn2=ic Soil Pressures
- 1. Lateral dyns=ic soil pressures are nc: inc.' uded in seis=ic lunped = ass nodel analysis er ever:urning calcula:icas. La:eral dyns=ic soil pressures i.re used in vall design for va:er a: Eleva:1en 590'-0" as described in See:icn C.
- 2. The dyna =ic pressure due :o stil is described by a trape:cid where the pressure a: the. cp cf the scil is .6 Y Ek and 3 the pressure at the bo::cm of the v:ll is .15 7 Ek as shown in Figure 2.
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Y = saturated weight of scil regardless of water table p level E = total depth of sci 2 ag'ainst vall kn= seis=ic coefficient = .075 for OSE and .15 for SSI
- 3. Based en item 2 above; Total force /ft of vall ='3/8 H2 k,E -
c.g. of force = .6H above base
- 4. Dyna =le lateral coil pressures due to surcharge loads are calculated by treating the surcharge dyna =ic load as an equivalent settic lead (See Figure 2) . During an earthquake, the increase in soil pressure under a structure (surcharge) is qse. The lateral dynamic pressure on adjacent underground valls due to the qse lead is qse ka/r. This dyn=~4 c surcharge lateral load should be calculated separately frcp the static surcharge lateral load so that each =ay be included under the appropriate category in the leading ce=binations.(See Section C of this procedure).
C. Load Conditicas
- l. The lead co=binations for concrete structurem given in the PSAR are applicable with the additional criteria:
(a) "At rest" soil pressure, ground water (hydrostatic) pressure and dynamic soil pressure act concurrently during earthquakes.
(b) The "at rest" soil pressures, Pg and P ss should be included under the '*H" load sy=bol as defined by the PSAR.
(c) The ground water pressure, Pc, should be included under the "G" load sy=bol as defined by the PSAR.
(d) The dyna =ic soil pressures, PD and Pas, should be included under the "Feqo" or "Fegs" loads as su=bols defined by the PSAR.
- 2. A ce=plete description of design conditions affecting lateral soil loads is given in FY-STR-ll7. In general, the folleving load cc=bina-tiens should be considered:
(a) Vater at Elevatien 590'-0" Design of Walls (Saf ety Class) f or Nor=al Operation U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.4G + 1.7H + 1.3To + 1.3Ro D
8-110A-3 Rev.: 7-3-79
Design of Valls (Safty Class) for Extre=e Envirencent (Seis:1c)
CSE: U = 1. 4 D + 1. 7L + 1. 4 G + 1. 7H + 1. 9 Fe go + 1. 3To + 1. 3 Ao 03E: U = 1.2D + 1.4G + 1.3H + 1.97,qo SSI: U = 1.0D,+ 1.0L + 1.0H + 1.0To + 1.0". + 1.07,q, vi.c5 .
(b) .,ater at Elevatic: 618 ' -O
Design of Walls (Safety Class) fer Nor=al Operatic: and Massive spill (See Page 4 of ?Y-STR-ll7)
U = 1.4D + 1.7L '+ 1.4G + 1.7H + 1.3To + 1.3Ro (c) Vater at Ilevation 568'-6" (Non-Safety Class with Underdrain)
Static Design of Walls U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.4G + 1.7H + 1.3To + 1.3Ro t
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5-110;.-4 Rev.: 7-3-79
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8-110A-7 Rev.: 7-3-79
220.28 With respect to FSAR Section 3.8.5.5, p. 3.8-209 the expression (3.8.5) 30f'c should be 30/f'c please correct. the error.
Resoonse The response to this question is provided in revised Section 3.8.5.5.
220.29 Prepare for the structural design audit scheduled for the week of November 23, 1981. A copy of requirements for implementation of structural design audits is enclosed (Attachment 4). The audit guidelines will be sent to you by September 28, 1981.
You ar- requested to fill in the audit guidelines prior to the audiu meeting in order to expedite the audit work.
Response
CEI will prepare for the Structural Audit, presently scheduled for the week.of November 30, 1581.
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3.3.2.2 Determination of Forces on Structureg The velocity pressure corresponding to the 360 mph wind velocity is calculated using the equation in Section 3.3.1.2 as follows:
q = 0.00256 V2 = 0.00256 (360)2 q = 332 psf Effective velocity pressures on structures are calculated using the following criteria:
- a. Horizontal wind distribution is used based on the fact that the rotational velocity of the tornado varies with the distance from the vortex centec in accordance with Reference 3. The maximum pressure of 332 psf applies to small structures or components. Lower average pressures apply in determining total load on larger structures.
- b. Pressures are assumed to be constant at any elevation.
- c. Coefficients from Sections 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 of ANSI A 58.1(I) are used for distributing the effective velocity pressure to walls and roofs of rectangular plan buildings.
i d. Tornado wind pressure is distributed on the shield building cylinder and dome using the coefficients described in Section 3.3.1 for wind.
- e. Total tornado drag force on the shield building is determined by applying the drag coefficient of 0.45 (stated in Section 3.3.1.2) to the average pressure for the building.
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Category I structures are considered to be non-vented and, therefore, are l3A designed for a tornado pressure drop. ASCE paper 7949(3) states that the maximum pressure drop occurs at the center of the tornado vortex and diminishes with distance from the vortex center. Therefore, the maximum tornado rotational speed and pressure drop are not 3.3-4
P
- b. Structural-walls and slabs in conjunction with' equipment location create a labyrinth effect which precludes missile contact with the equipment. i
- c. Adjacent structures prevent missile incidence at an angle which would permit contact with safety related components.
Penetrations which have not been.providea with. unique missile shields'are listed in Table 3.5-6, along with the method considered for protection of safety related -
systems. Walls and slabs considered as missile shields are two foot thick
~
(minimum) reinforced concrete with minimum-3,000 psi compressive' strength at 28 days, unless noted otherwise. Barrier design approach is discussed in Section 3.5.3.
Systems or components located outside Seismic Category I structures and not provided with a unique concrete missile shield (see also Table 3.5-5) are identified in Table 3.5-7, along with the method of providing missile protection.
3.5.3 BARRIER DESIGN EP.0CEDURES
~
The exposed walls and roofs of Seismic Category I structures have a minimum concrete thickness of 24 inches an'd are reinforced each way on each face with a minimum of 'o. 8 bars at 12-inch center-to-center for walls and No. 9 bars at 12-inch center-to-center for slabs. Typical elements were evaluated for local.
effects of penetration, perforation, and scabbing as well as overall structural response.
Local effects were determined to be of a non-critical nature by comparison of the Perry missile spectrum and Perry missile barriers to full-scale test results(4,5) Overall structural response was evaluated for typical concrete structural elements by demonstrating that actual target ultimate capacity 7 exceeded the required capacity to resist the predicted peak force due to impact y of the missile plus anticipated design loads as established by design loading d combinations. The pipe missile impact force is estimated from full scale' test.
results(4) to be 350 kips applied as a triangular pulse (0) The wooden and .
automobile missiles were considered as deformable missiles since the wood pole 3.5-12
splinters and the automobile crushes as evidenced by full-scale tests (4,5) ,
Peak impact force was imparted by the automobile _as determined by the equation ( ):
2 PE + pV where PB =_ crushing strenFth of the missile (uncrushed mass times deceleration) p = mass density per unit length p o
V = residual velocity at instant being considered d A
For a rectangular pulse (6) and limiting ductility ratio of 10(7) , required target strength was 420 kips. Barriers having the minimum thickness with equal positive and negative reinforcing were evaluated using a limiting ductility of 10 for flexural elements. Capacity of the Perry missile barrier and its supporting elements was sufficient to resist the assumed loadings.
The lightest steel column section supporting a missile barrier was evaluated for a peak impact load of 640 kips based on a ductility factor of 1.3. The section was deternined adequate to resist the assumed load in combination with design dead and live loads supported.
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- 8. Haley, J. L., Jr., and Turnbow, J. W.,
" Total. Reaction Force Due to an g
. Aircraft Impact into a Rigid Barrier", Final Report AVSER 68-3, 29 April 68, t' A-Dynamic Science, The AVSER Facility, Phoenix, Arizona. g b
3.5-13a
3.7.1.1 Design Response Spectra Design response spectra for the SSE and OBE, as shown in Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4, comply with Regulatory Guide 1.60. As shown in these figures, the vertical component is 2/3 of the horizontal component in the frequency region lower than 2.5 cps and the vertical and horizontal components are equal in the frequency regions higher than 3.5 eps. These have been developed as described i Section 2.5.2, which also contains the following information:
- a. Historical data showing the distance and depth of reported earthquakes relative to the plant site.
- b. No earthquake record exists at or near the plant site for calculating amplification factors.
- c. Earthquake duration is estimated as 10 seconds.
Safety class structures are founded in shale or on eaterials with equivalent seismic properties ~(see Section 3.7.1.4 for further discussion), and hence, no site dependent analysis is used. A 12-inch layer of porous concrete is used betwe en the shale and foundation slabs of safety class structures. The porous 0
concrete has a modulus of elasticity in excess of 1.2 x 10 psi and a minimum shear wave velocity of 4,400 fps, which is equivalent to that o.f the underlying shale.
l 3.7.1.2 Design Time History The response spectra derived from synthetic earthquake time-motion records are as shown on Figures 3.7-5 through 3.7-10. The synthesized OBE time-history l accelograms are shown in Figures 2.5-75, 2.5-76 and 2.5-77. Since a time history simulating ground design response spectrum with I percent damping is not used, e the comparison is not shown in these figures.
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The method of time history generation is as described in Section 2.5.2.6.1. The spectrum values were calculated for each damping value at 200 points equally 6
spaced on a logarithmic scale between 0.02 sec. and 4 sec. The same time history o.
was generated to match spectra with 2,.5, 7, and 10% damping values. Thus, many y iterations were required to match all four damping values at 800 calculated 2 points. With so many points calculated to match the target design response spectra, there should be no concern about values in between calculated points.
3.7-2a
3.7.1.3 Critical Damping Values The specific percentage of critical damping values for safety class structures and soil-structure interaction are as shown in Table 3.7-1. These values comply with Regulatory Guide 1.61. A weighted damping technique described in ,
Reference 1 is used. Theoretically, the weighted damping technique considers the hysteretic and the viscouc soil damping contributions. The hysteretic soil damping is strain dependent and is determined from tests as reported in Section 2.5.2. The viscous soil damping is due to radiatiamal energy lost to the semi-infinite half space. For the seismic analysis used in this plant, the hysteretic damping in combination with a small percentage of theoretical viscous I
damping is used as a conservative approach.
The justification of using viscous damping was demonstrated in the NRC NUREG/CR 1665 report, which compares the calculated responses vs. observed 6, responses. The calculated response value was based on 100% of the viscous *(
s damping and was 2 to 9 times higher than the original design value, yet there was 4 essentially no damage to the El Centro Steam Power Plant due to the 1979 El A Centro earthquake.
3.7.1.4 Supporting Media for Seismic Category I Structures 2
Seismic Category I structures that are supported on soil are as follows:
Approximate Distance Between Soil Layer Rock and Bottom at Bottom of Structure of Foundation (ft) Foundation Diesel Generator Building 50 Upper Till Off-Gas Buildings 15 . Upper Till Radwaste Building 6 Lower Till The lower till is a dense granular material with material properties similar to ,
the underlying rock for seismic design, therefore no amplification of seismic input will occur due to the thickness of lower till between the foundations and rock. See Section 2.5.4. for a discussion of the properties of soil as affecting seismic analysis. Design of foundations is discussed in Section 3.8.5.
3.7-3 y, . ,--, y - - - . , .-,---rv.w- --m --,+e- --m r ,----r -- m '- -- e r-*-
For foundations extending down only into upper till, the upper till material was removed down to the lower till and backfill was placed consisting of compacted granular material described as Class A fill in Section 2.5.4. The material and dynamic properties of Class A fill are given in Section 2.5.4. The amplification of seismic responses due to Class A fill was taken into account by utilizing a two dimensional plane strain finite element model which includes the structure and foundation bearing materials. The structure was modeled using beam elements and the Class A fill was modeled using plane strain elements. The thicknesc of the plane strain element was taken as the width of the structure. Time history excitation was input at the base of the model. Therefore, any amplification at the foundation level is reflected by the dynamic analysis of the sttacture.
A linear finite element method is used to evaluate the soil structure interaction for the diesel generator and off-gas buildings sittirg on Class A fill. For this analysis, the upper and lower soil shear modulii and strain dependent soil properties were used in two separate analyses to cover any significant variation of soil properties.
In the finite element analysis, the deconvolution of the SSE value from the grade f
to the base rock was not applied. The SSE value was conservatively applied at O the base rock and amplified through the soil. Furthermore, the energy absorbing d boundary was not applied to the model. Due to the above two conservative steps N used, the analytical results are expected to be higher than actual responses.
! 3.7.2 SEISMIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS 3.7.2.1 Seismic Analysis Methods 3.7.2.1.1 Balance of Plant i
Seismic Category I structures, except for the cooling water tunnels, were
! analysed by using the simulated time history as described in Section 3.7.1.2 as input.
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described "n S2ction 3.7.3.5. The significant modes are as shown in Table 3.7-4. 1:
Since higher modes have smaller participation factors and smaller spectral d 5
values, the inclusion of additional modes should not result in more than 4 10% increase in response. Time histories of structural responses, at mass points of interest, were used to generate the floor response spectra. Analysis and design of structures for dynamic loads including stress criteria are discussed in Section 3.8. The concrete structural elements were assumed to have linear elastic properties.
The responses due to two horizontal and one vertical input were combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares, i.e.:
Total Response = R2+R2+R2 x y z Where:
R,, R , and Rg = Responses due to 'Sc x, y, and z inputs, respectively.
Examples of lumped mass models are shown in Figures 3.7-11 and 3.7-14. The mass points of a building are chosen at the points of physical mass concentration (e.g., heavy floors, and include the masses of floors, equipment and walls as required).
For details of the asalysis of the tunnels for the cooling water system, see Section 3.8.4.4.
Floor response spectra are used in the seismic specification and issued to vendors of purchased safety class equipment and components. The vendors are responsible for equipment qualification based on the issued floor response spectrum. See Section 3.7.3 for more information.
A summary listing of various methods for seismic analysis of Seismic Category I structures is given in Table 3.7-2.
3.7-5
Seismic Category I structures and precludes interaction during a seismic event.
In addition, the non-Category I structures are designed to prevent collapse against Seismic Category I structures. The non-Category I structures are designed for the loads calculated for Zone 3 of the Uniform Building Code (1976 Edition). As stated in Figure 1 of this Code, Zone 3 corresponds to a Modified Mercalli Scale of VIII or higher and exceeds the UBC recommended Zone 1 design accelerations for the Site location. It is also higher than the modified Mercalli scale of VII to VIII which forms the basis for selection of the 6.15; ground acceleration used in the SSE ground response spectra (see Section 2.5.2).
The load combinations, design codes, and acceptance criteria for these non-Category I structures under the Uniform Building Code seismic loads are identical to those used for safety class structures under SSE loads, all as described in Section 3.8.4.
As shown in Table 3.7-5, the largest Category I structure OBE displacement is 0.42 inch. The non-Category I structure can be assumed to have a ductility rate of 3, and the yield displacement of 0.84 inch (conservatively assuming 2 times f maximum OBE displacement for all buildings) for the SSE. Consequently, it has a A largest displacement of about 2.52 in. The root sum square value of 0.82 and b 2.52 is 2.65, which is less than the 3 in. seismic gap used in design.
3.7.2.9 Effects of Parameter Variations on Floor Response Spectra The floor response spectra were generated for the two hocizontal and the vertical inputs for SSE and OBE using the most probable parameters. The peaks of the floor response spectra were broadened approximately 10 to 15 percent on'each side to account for variations in structural and soil properties.
3.7.2.10 Use of Constant Vertical Load Factor Dynamic analysis with vertical input was used instead of constant vertical load factors.
3.7-16
support movements are evaluated. The relative movements of pipe supports are considered separately in each of the spatial directions. The results are then combined by the SRSS method.
3.7.3.8.2 Components and Equipment Provided by the NSSS Vendor The analytical procedures for piping analysis are described in Section 3.7.2.1.2.
Methods to include differential pipings support movements at different support points are described in Section 3.7.2.1.2.5.
3.7.3.9 Multiply Supported Equipment Components with Distinct Inputs 3.7.3.9.1 Balance of Plant Scope There is no Balance of Plant Equipment that is supported at different locations lgQ (sic;'* ions and/or floors).
.i6 3.7.3.9.2 Components and Equipment Provided by the NSSS Vendor For components and equipment provided by the NSSS vendor, methods used to account for multiply supported equipment components with distinct inputs are given in Section 3.7.2.1.2.4.
3.7.3.10 Use of Constant Vertical Static Factors 3.7.3.10.1 Balance of Plant Scope The response spectrum method is used for the vertical seismic subsystem dynamic analysis. However, for the cases where the equipment's lowest frequency in the vertical direction is more than 33 Hertz, the maximum floor acceleration is used for equipment design.
3.7-30
TABLE 3.7-5 o 7
OBE RESPONSE LOADS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES $
A Acceleration (g) Displacement (in.)
Masg Elevation (kip-sec /ft) NS EW Vertical NS EW Vertical Recctor Building (Shield Building) 600'-6" 139.3 0.116(I) 0.124-- 0.040(I) 0.009 622'-6" 142.9 0.143 0.152 0.072 0.013 644'-6" 136.7 0.178 0.178 0.106 0.015 662'-7" 128.5 0.211 0.202 0.136 0.017 688'-6" 121.8 0.278 0.234 0.179 0.020 704'-0" 106.6 0.318 0.250 0.204 0.022 725'-0" 122.6 0.367 0.268 0.237 0.023 746'-0" 174.7 0.411 0.280 0.267 0.024 766'-0" 90.3 0.453 0.283 0.290 0.024 Auxiliary Building 568'-4" 483.9 0.089 0.090 0.101 0.003 0.003 0.007 599'-0" 465.8 0.155 0.177 0.168 0.015 0.019 0.015 620'-6" 434.8 0.249 0.257 0.206 0.025 0.029 0.018 652'-0" 375.9 0.348 0.338 0.231 0.035 0.039 0.020 Control Building 574'-10" 674.845 0.86 0.094 0.087 0.004 0.003 0.005 599'-0" 337.888 0.153 0.128 0.118 0.035 0.028 0.018 620'-6" 309.317 0.201 0.163 0.167 0.063 0.049 0.027 638'-6" 205.590 0.243 0.200 0.222 0.089 0.070 0.034 654'-6" 246.894 0.276 0.232 0.249 0.111 0.086 0.038 679'-6" 251.553 0.319 0.256 0.287 0.134 0.108 0.042 707'-2" 283.851 0.373 0.271 0.342 0.154 0.126 0.043
[ Intermediate / Fuel i
Handling Building l 574'-10" 493.5 0.090 0.086 0.097 0.008 0.007 0.005 599'-0" 377.9 0.141 0.134 0.122 0.032 0.025 0.010 l
620'-6" 291.9 0.190 0.182 0.175 0.056 0.047 0.014 639'-6" 219.1 0.241 0.211 0.221 0.077 0.090 0.019 654'-6" 258.1 0.281 0.220 0.235 0.095 0.133 0.019 66 -0" 211.2 0.302 0.239 0.250 0.108 0.164 0.026 6'c . ' -6" 388.4 0.336 0.280 0.265 0.128 0.217 0.034 707'-6" 261.2 0.398 0.424 0.270 0.153 0.293 0.034 721'-6" 15.2 0.431 0.516 0.270 0.163 0.331 0.034 l 753'-9" 4.1 0.509 0.728 0.258 0.189 0.417 0.021 NOTE:
- 1. North-South and Etd.-West components are identical due to symmetry.
3.7-47 i
L
Tha shield building cylindrical wall extends from the top of the foundation mat at (levation 574'-10", to elevation 749'-9" and has outside diameter of 136 feet with a wall thickness of 3 feet 0 inches. Shallow dome has a radius of 120 feet 0 inches, with a thickness of 2 feet 6 inches. There is no thickened ring girder, but the elevation of the wall at the junction of the wall and dome was raised to provide a greater section to help resist the outward thrust of the dome.
A cross section of the ring girder is shown in Figure 3.8-2. Details of the h)
N typical reinforced section for the shield building wall and dome are shown in 4 Figure 3.8-3. Typical details of the cylindrical wall foundation mat junction d can be found in Figure 3.8-82. b Access to the inside of the containment vessel through the shield building is provided by two personnel airlocks of approximately 9 feet 6 inches in diameter.
These are described in Section 3.8.2, and shown in Figure 3.8-4.
The equipment access opening is octagonal in shape, ard 20 feet across the flats.
This opening is shielded by removable reinforced concrete beams which are provided with seals to minimize the leakage of air. See Figure 3.8-5 for more details.
Details of mechanical and electrical penetrations are discussed in Section 3.8.2 and shown in Figures 3.8-6 and 3.8-7. The design of penetration sleeves is such that they allow differential movement between the shield building and the containment vessel. At the shield building wall the penetration sleeve is l designed to maintain the leak tightness requirements for the shield building.
l l
The functional criteria for the shield building does not require vacuum breakers.
Purge valves are required as part of the annulus exhaust gas treatment system.
The concrete will have a minimum 28 day cylinder compressive strength of 3,000 psi. The steel reinforcement is in accordance with the requirements of ASTM A615-72 grade 60.
Waterproofing of the portion of the sh. ld building below grade is described in Section 3.8.5.
3.8-4
A general reinforcing pattern of orthogonal bars arranged vertically and circumferential1y in both faces of the wall was used in the shield building wall.
A description of the reinforcement is provided below and in Table 3.8-12. )
Table 3.8-12 also shows design asial forces, moments, and transverse shears with o A
governing load combinations at critical sections of the shield building. A i
Due to local non-axisymmetric loadings, the reinforcement for the wall has three distinct designs around the circuaference as follows:
- a. Area subjected to soil pressures at centerline 97.5 degrees azimuth for Unit I has vertical reinforcement on the outside face of No. 18 at 12 inches alternated with No. 11 at 12 inches and an inside face reinforcement of No. 11 at 12 inches alternated with No. 9 at 12 inches. Unit 2 is similar.
- b. Steam tunnel area subjected to pressure and pipe anchor loadings at centerline O degrees azimuth has an outside face reinforcement of No. 14 at h
12 inches alternated with No. 11 at 12 inches and an inside face reinforcement of No. 11 at 6 inches.
- c. The remainder of the structure which is not subjected to any local loadings has an outside face reinforcement of No. 11 at 12 inches alternated with No. 9 at 12 inches and an inside face reinforcement of No. 11 at 12 inches alternated with No. 9 at 12 inches.
The horizontal reinforcement for areas a. and b., above, was No. 9 at 6 inches each face for the lower 30 feet of the wall. For the remainder of the structure at this elevation the reinforcement was No. 9 at 6 inches outside face and No. 9 at 12 inches inside face. The vertical reinforcement generally decreased above this region to No. 9 at 12 inches each face at the ring girder. The horizontal reinforcement also generally decreased above this elevation until just below the ring girder where it increased to No. 11 at 6 inches each face.
The reinforcing pattern for the dome is essentially radial and circumferential with the center section arranged orthogonally for ease of placing. Radial reinforcement for the dome is generally No. 9 at 12 inches decreasing to No. 8 at 3.8-5
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.142 (April, 1978), " Safety-Related Concrete Structures For Nuclear Power Plants (Other Than Reactor Vessels and .
O Containments)."~ We generally comply with this guide except the g 0.9 load factor for dead load was not used as required bj lte 11. d 1
u t
t l
L l
l 3.8-9a l
l
.- . _ = . .. - .-. _ ._ -- -
O e
3.8.1.3.7 Extent of Compliance to ACI 379-76 " Code Requirements for Nuclear 4 Safety Related Concrete Structures", American Concrete Institute. 7 a
A The extent of compliance to ACI 379-76 is discussed in Section 3.8.3.3.7.
t 1
l 4
i, i
p 4
l 3.8-16a
. . - - . . . - . . . ~ - -.. .- - - - .
D
- f. Buckling Analysis i
- ' 1. Cylinder Buckling-i i
The buckling investigation of the containment vessel cylinder consists I of two approaches. First the shell and stiffeners are verified to be
- i. in compliance with all the requirements of' Subsection NE-3133 of the 1 -
ASME Code,Section III, and second a detailed buckling analysis is performed using equations from " Structural Analysis of Shells"( ). For l
[ general instability of the vessel, i.e. considering the stiffeners to buckle with the shell, the factor of safety against buckling is found :
! to be approximately 240. The'most likely mode of buckling is'founa to
! be that of buckling of the plate between the stiffeners. Considering_
the sections between the stiffeners as simply supported cylinders
], subjected to pressure and axial loadings, and using the equations from
! ASME Code, Section.III, Division 1, Subsection NE, the lowest factor of safety against buckling is 1.24. The interaction for a shell subjected I
to both axial compression and external pressure is given in " Structural
- Analysis of Shells"( ), and shows a buckling factor of srfety of 2.2.
i As requested by NRC, NUREG/CR-0793 was reviewed and compared with the
!' method used here. The most critical loading combination in the j_ evaluation for buckling is deadload plus seismic plus negative
- pressure. NUREG/CR-0793 offered an alternative method of performing . L j buckling analysis. It also stated that the Subsection NE-3133 of -
i- ASME III Section NE was conservative for uniform state of stress.
I b p Since the maximum compressive stress was assumed to be' uniformly
) distributed over the shell, the result is conservative enough to j satisfy design purpose.
- 2. Dome Buckling Buckling of the done under internal pressure loading is investigated using the equations from " Stability of Elastic Systems"( }. The equations in Reference 9 calculate the local winkle type buckling 4
r 4
3.8-74 4
4
- w,e-+- , wvro w s-y = g -,-,,,wr+-a w w - hwyvw e -y,,rg ,srye,_ m .cy-,.w- y w,w - g y v y.--*.*ry-,-e---<,_ m.-e++.y.~e~,-m..y-p*, my, g g.--y.-.9,-p ,e ~ re n--m.-ay ., g. %,-,g.--*-e _e -w y, = v 7 '
. 6g stress in the circumferential direction of an ellipsoidal head under l's A
internal pressure. The factor of safety against buckling for this type A of loading is 4.25. Buckling of the dome due to ex..ernal loadings is investigated using the MARC computer program. To account for construction tolerances and local imperfections two computer models are used. The first model shown in Figure 3.8-22, represents a " flat" dome approximately a 6:1 ellipse, starting at the minimum tolerance of
-6 inches in the center and assuming a drop of 1-1/2 inch in the sixth course of 90 inches, the fifth course of 170 inches assumes a circular arc of radius of 863.5 inches, with the remainder an ellipse to the maximum radial tolerance of +3 inches. The second model, also shown in Figure 3.8-22 accounts for circumferential imperfections. The shape of this model l
}
i l
l l
l l
r 3.8-74a mA-.
- 2. For a stiffened vessel, the meridional compressive allowable stress shall be either:
(a) S LA = 1.0 [0.5E[1.3(T/L)2 + 0.125(T/R))), or (b) S LA = 0.0625 E(T/R) + 0.5 (aaer)
- 3. In order to be able to consider the stiffening effect of internal pressure, accr, stiffeners must be spaced more than 6/Rt apart.
The validity of the design is also demonstrated by the structural integrity test described in Section 3.8.2.8.1. Table 3.8-11 provides a comparison of the 8 s
containment vessel stresses for the governing load combinations at key Ice-tions j(
with the appropriate ASME Section III Division I allowables. A 3.8.2.6 Materials Quality Control and Special Construction Techniques The free standing portion of the containment vessel is designed, fabricated, and erected in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME Code Section III for Class MC vessels. Material specifications and quality control provisions are in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code and supplementary requirements, both summarized in this Section. Organization, responsibilities, and general prcvisions for the Quality Assurance Program are described in Chapter 17. Quality control provisions that are imposed for the structures are i described herein.
3.8.2.6.1 Steel for Containment Vessel, Penetrations, Locks and Hatch l
l 3.8.2.6.1.1 Codes and Standards l
The following codes and standards are used to establish the approved design documents governing the containment vessel and penetrations, and related work.
l The date of a particular standard may vary for different items because of the difficulty in purchasing material to an outdated standard. Since the latest standards reflect industry practice used for fabrication and erection, it was permitted to use an updated standard where no unacceptable loss of quality would result.
l l
l 3.8-85
1 1
) .-
l l
! designed to carry all membrane tensile forces in this region. At elevation 574'-10", the vent region is anchored to the containment base at by means of 4
vertical tension ties in the form of anchor bars made of ASTM A 537 CL.2 steel l 1
for the transfer of any uplift forces to the base mat. The anchor plate and I stiffeners at the bottom of the anchor bars are sized for the capacity of the anchor bars. There are a total of 144 anchor bars on each face of the drywell.
Anchor bars are 1 1/2" by 8" and 1 1/2" by 4" on the outside and inside faces of the drywell wall, respectively. The maximum forces in the anchors occur under A.
the abnormal / extreme environmental load combinations as sh'own on in Table 3.2-3 4 and result in a maximum tensile stress in the anchor bars'of 47.5 Ksi 0.F., and l q 49.1 Ksi I.F. , as compared to an allowable of 54 Ksi. Anchor bars are embedded 4 d
6'0" into the reactor building mat and develop the required anchor capacity. f
- j The entire drywell cylindrical wall is recessed into the reactor building I foundation and provides a continuous shear key for resisting radial / transverse shear forces by direct bearing of the drywell wall base on the foundation mat. >
Radially oriented structural tees have been provided to resist the l tangential /in-plane shear forces by bearing on the foundation mat concrete. A total of 81 of these structural tees have been provided for the drywell structure l and are welded to both faceplates of the drywell vent structure. Anchor details l are as shown in Figure 3.8-28.
The upper drywell wall region is designed as a reinforced concrete cylinder connected to the lower vent region by cadwelding all vertical and diagonal rebars to the ring girder at elevation 600'-10", as shown in Figure 3.8-28. The main i l reinforcement consists of No. 18 vertical rebars spaced radially at a centric
( angle of 2* 30', No 18 hoop rebars spaced vertically 12 inches center to center, j and diagonal No. 14 rebars inclined approximately 45* to the vertical rebars and running in both directions. These rebars are provided on both faces of the
- cylinder and are spaced at 24 inches center to center. On the outside face of l the cylinder, additional No. 11 rebars are placed midway between the No. 18-vertical rebars and extended to elevation 612'-1". The upper drywell wall extends up to elevation 660'-7" where it is integrally connected to the l 4 feet-0 inch thick drywell top slab. A typical section of the drywell reinforcement is shown in Figure 3.S-29.
l 3.8-97 l
L
I valls which are part of the upper pool wall system. Figure 3.8-29 shows the l typical reinforcement in a section of the drywell wall and top slab. A plan view is provided as Figure 3.8-87.
The personnel access air lock has an outside diameter of 9 feet-8 inches and is located at the 599'-9" elevation floor to provide access to the drywell. For large pieces of equipment, an 11 foot-0 inch square clear opening, bolted, double gasket sealed, equipment access hatch is provided at elevation 599'-9". 'For j details of the lock and hatch, see Figures 3.8-31 and 3.8-32. To facilitate the- )
movement of equipment from the containment vessel equipment hatch to inside the drywell, two 30 ton cunorail systems are provided to service the hatch'; one inside the drywell and one inside the contaiteent (outside of the drywell). The personnel air lock and the equipment hatch are integrally connected by full penet.ation welds to steel frames designed to act as end anchorage for all of the drywell wall reinforcement in the vicinity of the lock and hatch. Additional )
reinforcement is provided to take account of stress concentrations around these ;
l large openings as shown in Figures 3.8-88 and 3.8-89. l 1
l l
Penetrations through the drywell wall for piping and electrical systems are of !
the single barrier leak tight type, as shown in Figures 3.8-6 and.3.8-7. The main steam lines are anchored at the drywell and are provided with guard pipes . h A
through to the isolation valves outside containment, as shown in Figure 3.8-6. .
3 The main steam line penetration anchor sleeve detail is shown in Figure 3.8-98. 4 6
A number of major reinforced concretc compar*ments are attached to the exterior of the drywell wall. The fuel storage and transfer pools are rectangular shaped compartmented structures, constructed of reinforced concrete lined with stainless steel, approximately 44 feet w!de by 102 feet long. This structure is supported l on the drywell and the drywell top slab.
3.8.3.1.4 Structural Steel Floors and Framing i
The structural steel used for floors and framing of the reactor building complex conforms to the requirements of ASTM A 36.
3.8-98 i L
- 4. Steel Plate: Section 3.8.2.7.1 and 3.8.1.6.4.
- 5. Structural Steel: Section 3.8.3.6.5.
- 6. Stsinless Steel: Section 3.8.3.6.6.
3.3.3.2.3 Applicable Regulatory Guides to Design Regulatory guides pertaining to seismic design classification and seismic deeign
~
are referenced in Sections 3.2 and 3.7, respectively.
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.10, " Mechanical (Cadweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Seismic Category I Concrete Structures". This guide was used with modifications specified in Section 3.8.1.6.3.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.15, " Testing of Reinforcing Bars for Category I Concrete Structures", This guide was used with modifications as set forth in Section 3.8.1.6.2.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.31, " Control of Stainless Steel Welding".
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.55, " Concrete Placement in Category I Structures."
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.57, " Design Limits and Loading Combinations for Metal Primary Reactor Containment System Components".
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.69, " Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants."
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.71, " Welder Qualification for Areas of Limited Accessibility".
,8 . Regulatory Guide 1.142 (April,1978), ' Safety-Related Concrete Structures k
For Nuclear Power Plants (Other Than Reactor Vessels and Containments)". We 6
generally comply with this guide except the 0.9 load factor for dead load 4 was not used as required by Item 11.
3.8-105
The fuel handling building is provided with four pits for fuel handling and starage:
- a. Cask storage pool and decontamination peel.
- b. Spent fuel pool. l
- c. Fuel transfer pool.
- d. Fuel preparation pool. .
t A
E The pools are interconnected by means of gates, to allow the underwater passage '
of fuel assemblies from one pool to another.
Each pool is a stainlcss steel lined and reinforced concrete structure (See Figure 1.2-5). The wall liners consist of 1/4 inch stainless steel plates welded together and anchored to the concrete by 3" x 2" x 1/4" angle stiffeners placed vertically at 15 inch center-to-center spacing. The floor liner consists of 1/2 inch stainless steel plates welded together and anchored to floor embedments placed horizontally at 4 foot center-to-center spacing. These angles and floer embedments effectively anchor the liners to the concrete structure. Where attachments to the pool walls or floors are required, embedded plates are g provided to transfer the attachment loads directly into the concrete. The liners d are cut out around and welded to each embedmen* plate. Attachments are made to 6
{ the embedded plates and not the liners. A system of leak chases, divided into A
~, d zones, are provided behind the liner plate welds to channel the postulated leakage to a central collection point for leak ijentification and evaluation.
The pool concrete structure with the liner is designed to Seismic Category I l
requirements to prevent damage to the stored fuel. Storage and handling of spent fuel is accomplished as described in Section 9.1.2.2.2. The spent fuel is stored l in the fuel handling pools in densified racks described in Section 9.1.2. These racks are free standing (no pool wall attachments) and are designed to withstand
- \
the postulated loads including a drop accident, as described in Item 9.1.2.1.2 and Item 9.1.2.3.4. Embedded plates anchored to the pool floor slab support the l
l racks by transferring all rack loads into the concrete slab.
.\
! " An overhead Fantry crane is provided to handle and maneuver fuel assemblies
'between the three pits. A bridge crane travelling at right angles to the gantry
, i l \ %
4 .,
3.8-135
- ^
a The date of a particular standard may vary for'different items because of the' difficulty in purchasing material to'an outdated standard. Since the '
latest ASTM standards reflect industry practice used for fabrication and ,
~ erection, it was permitted to use an updated standard.where no unacceptable j loss of' quality would result.
- b. Applicable Regulatory Guides
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.10, " Mechanical (Cadweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Category I Concrete Structures". This guide was used with-modifications specified in Section 3.8.1.6.
3
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.15, " Testing of Reinforcing Bars for Category I i Concrete Structures". This standard was used with the modifications specified--in Section 3.8.1.2. l
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.31, " Control of Stainless Steel Welding".
! 4. Regulatory Guide 1.55, " Concrete' Placement in Category I Structures".
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.69,." Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power b Plants."
! 6. Regulatory Guide 1.142 (April, 1978), " Safety-Related Concrete
-Structures For Nuclear Power Plants (Other Than Reactor Vessels and f Containments)" We generally comply with this guide except the A O.9 load factor for dead load wa's not used as required by Item 11. 0 3.8.4.2.3 Principal Plant Specifications I
The principal specifications prepared by the engineer for the safety class i structures are-
-a. Fabrication and erection of structural steel.
- 3.8-148
- b. Applicable Regulatory Guides Regulatory guides pertaining to seismic design classification and seismic design are referenced in Sections 3.2 and 3.7, respectively.
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.10 " Mechanical (Cadweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Category I Concrete Structures". This standard was used with modifications specified in Section 3.8.1.6.3.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.15 " Testing of Reinforcing Bars for Category I Concrete Structures". This standard was used with the modifications specified in Section 3.8.1.6.2.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.55, " Concrete Placement in Category I Structures."
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.142 (April, 1978), " Safety-Related Concrete \0s Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (Other Than Reactor Vessels and. f Containments)". We generally comply with this guide except the N 0.9 load factor for dead load was noi used as required by Item 11.
d.
3.8.5.2.3 Principal Plant Specifications The principal specifications prepared by the engineer for the foundation structures are:
- a. Concrete supply.
- b. Placement of structural concrete.
- c. Fabrication and placing or reinforcing steel.
- d. Plant excavation and backfill.
- e. Fabrication of embedded steel.
- f. Supply and installation of waterproofing and waterstops.
i 3.8-200
)
~ .-, - . - , - . -- .- , . ,. .,. . . _ - - - - - . -. ~ . . _ , , - - - - . . - .
3.8.5.4 _ Design and Analysis Procedures-
.3.8.5.4.1 Analytical Techniques As indicated in Section 3.8.5.1, most of the safety class structures have constant thickness mats. Loads are transmitted to the mats.from walls, columns,.
water, and internal equipment-in accordance with the principles of statics and stress analysis. As an example, the shield building is treated as a_ thin-walled cantilever beam. Accelerations obtained from the dynamic analysis are converted into static axial load, shear, and bending moment. Shield building stresses obtained from these equivalent static loads are then applied to the reactor building mat as loads. The loads are transmitted through the mat, thereby
- developing internal mat bending, axial load, and shear, ta the bearing material which is represented by an elastic half-space, Winkler springs, or as having a conservative linear reaction capability. Reinforcing steel is sized on the basis of the internal axial loads, shears, and moments developed in the mat. Stress criteria are based on the strength design concept of ACI 318-71. Since no single loading combination governed throughout the mat section, results of the various load combinations were enveloped to establish maximum shear and moment h' requirements for the mat. A plot showing the various design moment envelopes 4
g versus reinforced section moment capacity is provided in Figure 3.8-96. Plots d are provided for both top and bottom reinforcing in the radial and circumferential directions. Figure'3.8-97 shows a similar plot for shear capacity versus an envelope of design shear forces. A typical plan and section of the reinforcement for the reactor building foundation mat are shown in Figures 3.8-82 and 3.8-83.
- a. Reactor Building Mat
- 1. Analysis The static analyses are performed using the finite-element computer program ELAD. ELAD is based on a linearly-elastic continuum finite 3.8-203 e
The stresses and strains expected for porous concrete underlying the foundation mats are less than those permitted by applicable sections of ACI 318-71. For example, expected stresses at the toe of the reactor building sat for the SSE combined with normal loads and with groundwater at elevation 590'-0" are:
- a. Normal vertical compressive stress
- 210 psi.
- b. Horizontal shearing stress % 80 psi.
- c. Corresponding pr3- ' pal compression stress % 240 psi.
- d. Principal tension stress
- 30 psi.
In the calculation of principal stress, no credit is taken for lateral confinement.
The maximum normal vertical compressive stress of 210 psi is well within the ultimate bearing value of 0.85 $f' (595 psi for f' = 1000 psi and $ = 0.70), as specified by ACI 318-71 (Section 10.14.1).
The maximum horizontal shearing stress in the porous concrete (80 psi) is considered acceptable since a coefficient of friction of 0.5 results in a shearing stress capacity of 105 psi for a normal stress of 210 psi.
Finally, concern for diagonal cracking is eliminated by comparing the 30 psi n principal tension to a conservative capacity of 3 $[f' (81 psi for $ = 0.85 and )
f' = 1000 psi). 6 Assurance that in place strength is achieved as specified (i.e. f' = 1000 psi) is discussed in Section 3.8.5.6.d.
3.8.5.6 Material Specifications, Quality Control and Special Construction Techniques The material specifications, quality control provisions, and special construction technique for concrete construction, reinforcing steel, and cadweld splices are discussed in Section 3.8.1.6. Other items are as discussed below:
3.8-209
- 3. John M. Biggs, " Introduction to Structural Dynamics," McGraw-Hill 1964.
. ~ .
N 1
- 4. R..D.Brunell," HEATING 2,"AtomicInternational,ComputerTechnolog/I Group, AI-64 Memo-l','7.
- 5. "Cadweld Rebar Splicing," Erico Products Catalogue No. RB20M-173, Cleveland, Ohio.
- 6. " Inspection of the Cadweld Rebar Splice," Erico Products publication RB-SM768.
- 7. IEEE 317, " Standards for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Generating Station," The Institute of Electrical and-Electronic Engineers, Inc., 1971.
- 8. E. H. Baker, L. Kovalevsky and F. L. Rish, " Structural Analysis of Shells",
McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- 9. Vol'mir, A. S., " Stability of Elastic Systems."
{A
- 10. A. Gahli, " Finite Element Analysis of Perforated Shells," Proceedings of IASS Symposium "Shell Structures and Climatic Influences," University of Calgary, July 3-6, 1972. '
- 11. M. A. Boling and W. A. Rhoads, "ANISIN/DRFII, " Atomics International, Computer Technology Group, AI-66 Memo-171.
, 12. Proctor and White, " Rock Tunneling with Steel Supports" published by 1
Commercial Shearing and Stamping Co., 1946.
l l
3.8-212 l
TABLE 3.8-10
- FACTORS OF SAFETY AGAINST FLOTATION, OVERTURNING AND SLIDING (Water at El. 590'-0" w/Underdrain System)
Structure Factor of Safety Flotation Overturning Sliding OBE SSE OBE SSE Auxiliary Building _
2.5 2.8 1.7 *
(Mat Bottom at El. 564'-4")
Control Building 3.1 2.1 1.2 *
(Mat Bottom at El. 568'-10") 4 A
Radwaste Building 3.7 2.2' 1.4
- f (Mat Bottom at El. 569'-10") 4 Reactor Building Complex 5.8 3.7 2.0 2.05 1.11 -
(Mat Bottom at El. 562'-3")
Intermediate Building 3.9 4.5 2.5 *
(Mat Bottom at El. 568'-10")
Off-Gas Building 6.6 3.5 1.8 *
(Mat Bottom at El. 580'-0")
i 3.8-232
c, .
TABLE 3.8-11 -
COMPARISON OF CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRESSES FOR THE GOVERNING LOAD COMBINATIONS AT KEY LOCATIONS WITH ASME SECTION III DIVISION ALLOWABLES Location Governing Load - STRESS INTENSTITY WITH ALLOWABLE (PSI)
Combination Reference Figures 3.8-17 " Containment Primary Allowable Local Allowable Primary Membrane Allowable Vessel Finite Element Membrane Primary Membrane Plus Model" and 3.8-18 (Pm) Plus Primary Bending
" Containment Vessel Primary Bending Plus Embedment Model" (P1 + Pb) Secondary (P1 + Pb + Q)
Junction of Cylinder S=D+L+G+ 6002 38,000 - - 56,279 57,900 and Foundation Mat- F +P +
Section Above Nodal T*98 +P 'f*T* +
Points 377-384 in R**
9 Y#*
Figure 3.8-18 @ El 574'-10" in Doubler Plate Junction of Cylinder ,
S=D+L+C+ 2377 38,000 - - 41,800 57,900 D.
and Foundati n Mat- oo
~
F +P +
Section Above Nodal -*
" T*9' + PI T* +
d Points 377-384 in R*'I Y i Figure 3.8-18 in e S*= D I L + G + 18,773 19,300 - - 32,056 57,900 d 0 Containment Shell b F +P +
" To~ T*9" + P'U* T*
+
-4 w
R*7 a
Y e Stiffener No. 1 S=D+L+C+- 14,964 19,300 23,197 57,900 Flange at El 581'-2" F +P +
As Shown in Figure T*9' + P' 3 T * +
3.8-18 Element Nos. R'* S Y'
- 444, 445, 446 Junction of Cylinder (Stres es At This Level Are Bounded By Stress Summaries At El 720'-7" Below) and Polar Crane Girder Junction of Cylinder S=D+L+G+ 5410 38,000 12,156 57,900 and Dome 9 El 720'-7" F +P +
at Location of Modal T'9' + P 3 T' +
Point 72 in Figure R'T Y' .
3.8-17
- NOTES: 1. These stresses must still be considered preliminary because of the evaluations underway to investigate a w loads such as steam relief valve redefinition, condensation oscillation, and chugging.
TABLE 3.8-12 DESIGN AXIAL FORCES, MOMENTS, AND 1RANSVERSE SHEARS AND REINFORCEMENT PROVIDED FOR THE GOVERNING LOAD COMBINATIONS AT CRITICAL SECTIONS OF THE SHIELD BUILDING Location Governing Load Forces (Kips Per Foot and Kip-Feet Per Foot) Reinforcement Combination (-M is Tension 0.F.) Provided Reference Fig. Vertical Vertical Horizontal Horizontal Transverse Vertical Horizontal Shear 3.8-9 " Analytical Membrane Bending Membrane Bending Shear Model of Shield N$ Moment NO Homent V Building" M$ M0 Junction of Cylinder and Usl.4D+1.7L+ -55.1 K/g -123.6 183.3 K/g -21.4 K-f/g- 36.2 K/g #9 @ 12" #11 @ 6" #5 @
Ring Girder-Section 1.4G+1.9F + K-f/ I E.F. E.F. 24" Above Nodal Points 1.3T +1.7ES Horiz.
445-451 1.7P + and 15"
+1.3T, Vert.
1.3R, Junction of Mat and Usl.2D+1.4G+ 159.4 K/g -296.6 32.2 K/g -53.7 K-f/g 82.6 K/g #18 @ 12" #9 @ 6" f-Cylinder Section Above 1.3H+1.9F + K-f/ I Alt W/fil E.F.
D Nodal Points 1-7. 1.4 P '9" @ 12" 0.F.
d or P Soil Pressure U=1.0D+1.0L+ 146.1 K/' -293.2 118.9 K/ I 66.9 K-f/ I 79.7 K/ fil @ 12" g
? 1.0G+1.0H+ K-f/ f Alt. W/f9 0 AreaAbt.{thas 97.5* Azimu 1.0F + @ 12" I.F.
- 1.0P'9*+
Described in Section 3.8.1.1.a 1.0T* "+1.0P +
1.0T*II.0R+}.0 (Y,+f)+Y,)*
Steam Tunnel Area U=1.0D+1.0L+ 163.8 K/g 74.3 K-f/, 31.0 K/g 11.9 K-f/g 41.6 K/g fl4 @ 12" #9 @ 6" #6 @ 24" 1.0G+1.0F + Alt. w/fil E.F. Horiz.
Abt{0* Azimuth As Described In 1.0P +1I0i + @ 12" and Section 3.8.I.1.b I .0P'fI.0T +*" 0.F. and- 15" 1.0R'+ #11 @ s" Vert.
Y,) , 1.0(i,+Y + I.F.
General Area U21.0D+1.0L+ 109.8 K/g 221,8 10.9 K/g 40.1 K-f/g 60.4 K/g fit @ 12" #9 @ 6" #6 @ 24" As Described In 1.0G+1.0F + K-f/ Alt. 'J/f9 0.F. and' Horiz.
Section 3.8.1.1.c 1.0P +170i + @ 12" #9 @ 12" and 1.0P*II.07 +* " E.F. I.F. 15" Vert.
1.0R*+1.0(t Y,,)
r +Y)+
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.pNpp PERRY HUCLE AR POWER PL ANT THE CLEVEL AND l'LLCTQlC
- lLLUMINATING COMPANY Reactor Building Basemat: Design Moment vs. Reinforced Section Moment Capacity Figure 3.8-96 .
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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
' PNP THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY Reactor Building Mat: Design Shear. Envelope vs. Mat Shear Capacity Figure 3.8-97
8, (FP(TYP) 9 ,.
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The nominal module cverall dimensions and weight are as follows:
Dry Module Size "A" (in.) "B" (in.) "C" (in.) Weight (1bs.)
10 x 10 181.375-182.875 68.875 68.875 11,500 7 x 10&5MP 181.375-182.875 68.875 62.250 10,200 The rack is designed to withstand a lifting force of 4,000 pounds applied to the top at any fuel bundle location. Also, the rack is designed to withstand a horizontal force of 1,000 pounds applied to the top of the rack at any fuel bundle location and at a varying angle from 0* to 45* from the horizontal.
The rack is designed to withstand the impact of a fuel bundle dropped from 18 inches above the racks on the middle of the top casting, on the corner of the top casting or through an empty cavity on the bottom casting without exceeding allowable stress limits. Additionally, the rack is designed to withstand the impact of a fuel bundle dropped from seven feet above the rack on the middle of the largest top cas'.ing without causing rack deformation which would allow kgfy to exceed .95.
The capability of the spent fuel storage facilities to prevent damage to the fuel racks due to flooding, tornadoes, hurricanes and missiles is discussed in Chapter 3.
'fa Detail design of the densified storage racks is provided in Reference 2. j 6
9.1.2.3.5 Spent Fuel Storage Facilities Protective Features - GE Racks The polar crane and the 8 inch schedule 40 pipe of the containment spray system are the only potential missiles of significant consequences that could effect the integrity of spent or new fuel in storage, or in transit within the containment refueling canals. The containment spray system piping is Safety Class 2, Seismic Category I and is of adequate structural integrity to withstand all design basis loads applied. The polar crane is des,igned to Seismic Category I requirements and a safety factor of 5. Both the bridge and 9.1-22
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ J
%c - - 1-
)
t The microprocessor control and proximity type sensors also provide monitor and status conditions of the fuel transfer operation on each of the two operator's consoles, one located in the fuel building and the other on the RPV refueling floor. Monitor indicators and interlocks are provided in the reactor control room to indicate whenever personnel have accessed radiation hazardous areas along the transfer tube's route.
'O
'9.'.4,5.3 Fuel Support Grapple Although the fuel support grapple is not essential to safety, it has an instrumentation system consisting of mechanical switcher and indicator lights.
This system provides the operator with a positive indication that the grapple is properly aligned and oriented and that the grappling mechanism is either extended or retracted.
9.1.4.5.4 Other Refer to Table 9.1-7 for additional refueling and servicing equipment not requiring instrumentation.
9.1.4.5.5 Radiation Monitoring The radiation monitoring equipment for the refueling and servicing equipment is evaluated in Section 7.6.1.
9.
1.5 REFERENCES
FOR SECTION 9.1 j 1. Martin, C.L., " Lattice Physics Methods," NEDO-20913, General Electric Co.
I l
- 2. Programmed and Remote Systems Corporation (PAR) Document DC-3156-1 hk
- 4 l
" Design and Fabrication Criteria, Spent Fuel Storage Racks", for Perry 6 ,
A Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, Revision 2, dated 11-30-79. A 1
l l
9.1-67