ML19321B324

Advises That short-term Items & Two long-term Items Listed in NUREG-0011 Re Main Control Room Design Review Have Been Corrected.Util Committed to Investigate Feasibility of Correcting Remaining Items of First Refueling Outage

ML19321B324
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	07/28/1980
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0011, RTR-NUREG-11 NUDOCS 8007310396
Download: ML19321B324 (4)

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400 Chestnut Street Tower II July 28, 1980 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328

Reference:

Letter from L. M. Mills to L. S. Rubenstein dated February 14, 1980 Supplement 1 to the Safety Evaluation Repo"t (SSER) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (NUREG-00ll) listed several items to be corrected as a result of the main control room design review (SSER section IV). In a telephone conference on February 14, 1980, TVA agreed to correct the "short-ters" items before initial criticality, and a schedule for completion of the "long-term" items was also established. TVA also agreed to correct one -

"long-tern" item (Lack of Labeling and Marking of Systems) before full power operation. TVA committed to investigate the feasibility of cor-recting the remaining long-term" items at the first refueling outage.

Since that time, TVA has corrected the "short-term" items and two of the "long-ters" items. A discussion of each item is included as an enclosure.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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L. M. Mill's, >bnager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure (10) 5

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8 0 0731039 (p [ l

.- 4 ENCLOSURE Control Room Review Items

1. Inadequate Control Room Communication NRC Concern: Difficulty for operators to communicate orally over the length of the Control Room and while wearing protective equipment.

TVA Respcase: TVA has installed communication equipment at the current jack locations in the Control Room.

2. Inadeauate Protection for Inadvertent Switching NRC Concern: There was a potential for Control Room employees to unknow-ingly change switch position on certain bencn-board and vertical panels.

TVA Response: A railing has been installed on panels 151 through IM6 to prevent accidental contact. On vertical panels 1M7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 18 and vertical panels OM12, OM26, and OM27, warning tape has been placed at the base to warn employees against approaching the panels unless performing a required task.

3. Procedures s

NEC Concern: a. Procedures should be maintained in a specific location for quick access.

b. An index should be provided for quick reference of procedures.

c. Cross-referencing should not be made in the immediate action section of the procedures. However, referencing 4,

'could be included in subsequent actions.

TVA Response: TVA has made those changes necessary to ensure compliance.

with the NRC reco=mendations.

4. Lack of Alarm Priority NRC Concern: There did not appear to be any means for the operator to distinguish those alarms requiring high priority from less pressing alarms, i

TVA Response: Safety-related alarms which require high priority response have been color coded with a contrasting color.

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5. Demarcation of Unit 1 Unit 2, and Common NRC' Concern: In those areas where panels contain unit 1, unif 2, and common plant monitocs, it is difficult to distinguish the separation from a distance.

TVA Response: In those areas _where demarcation is difficult, individual ,

unit designation have been indicated by color coding and specific numbering (i.e., 0-conmon, 1-unit 1, 2-uait 2) i visible from a significant distance.

6. Annunciators NRC Concern: Poor contrast of panels with background which =ake it difficult to read the monitors.

TVA Response: TVA has provided black borders (bezels) around the

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, panels to increase the contrast.

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7. Environment i

NRC Concern: a. The light intensity in the Control Room appears to be  ;

too high making reading of required monitors difficult.

b. The ambient noise (white noise) in the C.r. trol Rotn may be a significant barrie.r to oral co=munf. cation.

TVA Response: a. .Some light fixtures have been removed to reduce the ambient light 10 11.

< b. Carpeting has been installed to reduce ambient l

noise levels.

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l 8. Limitations'in Status Monitoring Panel i

l NRC Concern: Indication that a system is not available ds currently pro-  :

l vided by an extinguished light. If the bulb is blown, the system may still be available.

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[ TVA Response: -The procedures have been moditied to requi e that the operator use the test button to ensure that a system is not available and not just a burned out bulb.

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Long-Term Items

1. Incomplete Procedures

'NRC Concern: Emergency procedures.were not written and structured well.

TVA Response: . TVA has revised the emergency procedures for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. NRC staff members conducted a thorough review and walkthrough of these procedures during the week of July 21, 1980. No problems were identified with the revised procedures.

i. 2. Inadequate Operator Interface with Plant Process Computer i NRC Concern: Trending capability of selected parameters is not available.

, TVA Response: TVA will upgrada plant computer display capability as part of the overall TM1 information systems -

upgrade (i.e., technical support center, etc.).

This capability will be available by the first I

refueling outage.

3. Lack of Labeling or Markings on Control and Display Panels NRC Concern: No consistent means for labeling or marking of com-

} ponents on control or display-panels exists.

TVA Response: TVA has identified and highlighted the important component or system panels.

4. Lack of Correlation between Annunciator Panels and Associated Controls i NRC Concern: The locations of annunciator panels, control panels, and to a lesser degree, acknowledge stations were not well correlated.

IVA Response: TVA will continue to evaluate the feasibility of l regrouping alarms during the first refueling

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outage.

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