ML19276E262

Forwards Response to Items 11-15 of NRC 790119 Request for Addl Info.Responses Will Be Included in Amend 61 to Fsar. Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Will Be Installed During 790430 Refueling Outage

ML19276E262
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	03/06/1979
From:	Gilleland J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7903120214
Download: ML19276E262 (10)

Text

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c-: rx.cc;v rz sesstr 2:42 500C Chestnut Street Tower II MAR 6 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Varga:

In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 Enclosed is TVA's response to items 11 through 15 of your letter to N. B. Hughes dated January 19, 1979, requesting additional information on Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP). These responses will be incorporated in Amendment 61 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as questions 13.13 through 13.17.

TVA, in the response to Sequoyah.Q3.19, stated that a loose parts moni-toring system would be installed at the first refueling outage. This was incorporated in the FSAR by Amendment 48 dated September 15, 1977. The staff informed TVA verbally on January 9, 1979, that a loose parts moni-toring system would be required before initial startup after fuel loading, and this was made official on January 19, 1979. TVA initiated emergency purchasing procedures and awarded a contract on February 1, 1979, to Technology for Energy Corporation, Knoxville, Tennessee, to provide their TEC Model 1430 Loose Part Detection System.

The TEC contract specifies complete equipment delivery by April 30, 1979.

TVA is already proceeding with the design and installation of the inter-connecting wiring and is making every effort to have the system operational before initial startup testing for unit 1. However, the schedule contains no contingency for unforeseen difficulties such as late parts delivery, and we can make no guarantee that the system will be operational by that time.

A description of the system is provided in Enclosure 2.

The responses to items 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 of your letter will be incorporated into the SNP FSAR by Amendment 60 as a revised response to question 5.27 and as questions 6.50, 6.59, 6.60, and 6.61, respectively. Amendment 59 incorporated the response to item 4 into the SNP FSAR as a revision of question 15.16.

D 79031202li

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation IAAR 6 1979 A response to item 8 of your letter was transmitted to you by my letter dated February 8, 1979. This response will be incorporated in the SNP FSAR by Amendment 61.

TVA will respond to items 3 and 10 of your letter by March 15, 1979.

Very truly yours,

. n

, Af ,yj '

. E. Gilleland Assistant bbnager of Power Enclosure

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ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO ITEMS 11 THROUGH 15 0F JANUARY 19, 1979, LETTER FROM S. A. VARGA TO N. B. HUGHES Questions on Secuovah Nuclear Plant FSAR 13.13 The approved two-week reactor operation training - Oak Ridge (Item 11) National Laboratory was changed by Amend =ent 55 to a single day. This change is unacceptable.

Response to 13.13 Attachment 1 addressed the changes as agreed on in our meeting in your office on January 23, 1979.

fuestion 13.14 The approved observation training at an operating PWR plant was l (Item 12) changed to read " observation training at an operating nuclear plant." This is unacceptable unless the facility is a PWR.

Response to 13.14 Attachment 2 reflects the informal understanding of an acceptance observation program.

Question 13.15 Amendment 55 describes the hot-license program utilizing the

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(Item 13) Additional information is required to further evaluate this previously unapproved program pursuant to hot-licensc eligibi-lity. Infor=ation should describe the training and length of courses involving lecture series, on-the-job training, reactivity changes, and simulator training, if any.

Response to 13.15 Amendment 59 restored the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Final Safety Analysis Report to that previous to the changes made by Amendment 55. There was no mention of the hot-license program before Amendment 55. A program content is included as Attachment 3.

Attachment 1 13.2.1.1 Program Content Reactor Oncrations Training - This course consists of training on a small reactor 1nvolving at least ten startups and other basic nuclear subjects such as approach to critical experiments, health physics procedures, vaste disposal, rod calibration, ion chamber calibration, importance functions of a neutron absorber, xenon experizents, and radioactive material handling under water.

One week of the two-week cour'se is conducted at OR:iL and involves use of the PCA or BSR reactors in achieving the above experi ents and startups. The other week which relates to basic nuclear ,

subjects is incorporated in the basic nuclear course described in 13.2.1.1 above.

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Attachment 2 Observation Training at Comoarable Ooerating PWR Plant - This is a formal, documented, two-month program conducted by TVA at an operating PWR. It consists of overall plant f amiliarization, system walkthroughs, work assignments, participation in, and observation of operating evolutions. All cold license applicants who have not previously held an operator's license at a comparable licensed reactor facility will participate in this program. Since all ,f the applicants will participate in system lectures at their own plant, tnis program will stress participation in and observation of operating evolutions. The participants will be encouraged to learn the cause and means of correcting problems encountered with equipment similar to their own plant. The progress of all participants in this program will be closely monitored by the tra'.ning coordinator who will receive weekly reports of the time spent or. particular systems for each week. The weekly time reports will be used to verify that all safety-related systems are studied during this program.

Those applicants with no prior license who have extensive operating experience or have completed an organized four-week observation period at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant will complete four weeks of this program at an operating PWR,

Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 Nuclear Student Generatine Plant Ooerator Trainine Procram - The TVA Nuclear Student Generating Plant Operator (NSGPO) Training Program is a joint program between TVA and the International 3rotherhood of Electrical Workers.

The objective of the NSGPO program is to provide qualified personnel for operating positions in the nuclear plants of the Of fice of Power of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The NSGPO program is 22 months in length and is divided into 4 steps.

The first three steps are presently taught at the TVA Power Production Training Center, while the fourth step (six months), which is basically on the job training, is conducted at one of TVA's nuclear plants.

The portion of the program which covers basic nuclear .heory and primary system technology is approximately 19 weeks in length. The students are taught by lecture, video tapes, plant tours, and simulator utilization.

The following subjects are covered in the. basic nuclear and pri=ary system technology portions of the program.

1. Review of Math

2. Basic Nuclear Physics

3. Reactor Theory and Engineering

4. Nuclear Instru=entation

5. Neutron Economy, Coefficients, Kinetics, and Control

6. Design Basis Accidents

7. Core Ther=al Hydraulics

8. Reactor Vessel and Core Design, Flow, Materials, Instrumentation, and Control Rod Drive System

9. Radiological Hygiene, Radiation Types, Effects, Dose, Limits, Monitoring, Shielding, Instruments, and Regulations

Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2

10. Reactor and Associated Equipment

11. ECCS Systems, Diesel Generators, Emergency Power Systems, Demineralizers, Fuel Handling, and Radioactive Waste

12. Control Rod Drive System, Reactivity Control, Reactor Pressure Control, Spent Fuel Cooling, and Primary and Secondary Containment

13. Main Steam and Reactor Protection Systems, Normal and Emetgency Cooling Water Systems, Ventilation Systems, and Radiation Monitoring Systems Approximately one-half of the students' time during the above 19 weeks is formal classroom training.

13.2 Nuclear Systems Operator Training - Hot License The applicant must meet all requirements to qualify for the hot-license examinations as specified in Appendix F, " Eligibility for Examination with No Reactor Startup Demonstration," of the NRC Operator Licensing Guide, NUREG-0094 The hot-license operator training program is designed to prepare the trainee fe. -ke NRC reactor operator written examination and operating test. f ae first 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> include classroom lectures, and an audit type exam'_aation presented at the plant to prepare the trainee for the Nuclear Regulatory Con =ission (NRC) written examination.

The last 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> of training, which include 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> for review and certification examination, are scheduled at the Power Production Training Center. This training shall satisfy reactor startup eligibility require-ments to qualif y for the NRC examination and prepare the trainee for the NRC operating test. Si=ulator instruction is limited to no more than four trainees in the control room at one time.

Presentations totaling 500 lecture hours listed in ANSI NIS.1-1971, Section 5.2.1 relate to subjects and prerequisites courses. This 500-hour requirement is included in the Nuclear Student Operator Training Program as described in section 13.2.1.1.

A certification examination is administered at the end of the simulator training se.3sion.

The above will be included in a future FSAR amendment.

_0.uc stion 13.16 Specify the reactivity centrol =anipulations that will be (13.2.6.2) perfor ed by licensed personnel as part of the retraining program.

(Item 14) NRC cust approve the control =anipulatiens pursuant to 10 CFR Part 55, Appendix A.

Resnonce to 13.16 The following control manipulations are used at the plant during nor=al operation and/or at the simulator to meet the required 10 reactivity control manipulations.

D:ployees with SRO licenses are credited with these activities if they direct or evaluate control =anipulations as they are performed. A minimu= of 10 reactivity control =anipulations in any cc binations of startup, shutdowns, or other manipulations will be performed by each operator each year.

1. Plant or reactor startups to include a range that reactivity feedback from nuclear heat addition is noticeable

2. Plant shutdown

3. Manual control of steam generators during startup and shutdown 4

Operation cf turbine controls in manual during startup

5. Boration during power operation

6. Dilution of the reactor ecolant system

7. Refueling operatiens where fuel is moved into the core 8 Rod drop timing tests

9. significant (> 105) power changes in =anual red control

10. Ihnual red centrol prior to and during generator synchrenizaticn

11. Plant and reactor operation that involves emergency or transient procedures where reactivity is changing .

Question 13.17 A statement. should be' included in the program which indicates that individuals wno prepare and grade the annual retraining (Item 15) examination are exempt trom taking the examinatiens. A maximum of three licensed personnel may be exempt.

Response to 13.17 The following statement will be added to paragraph 13.2.2.4 in a future FSAR amendment.

Training coordinators who are licensed are exempt from taking the examinat.ica for which they had primary responsibility for administering. A maximum of three licensed personnel may be exempt.

ENCLOSURE 2 RESPONSE TO QUESTION 9 0F JANUA'.Y 19, 1979, LETTER FROM S. A. VARGA TO N. B. HUGHES QUESTION 3.19 The applicant has committed to keep informed of the technology of Loose Parts Monitoring Systems but has not yet provided a system. We require that a Loose Parts Monitoring System be provided for Sequoyah units 1 and 2 before initial startup testing after fuel load.

The following information must be provided for the Operating License:

1. A description of the Loose Parts Monitoring System including the location of all sensors and the method fcr monitoring them. A minimum of two sensors will be required at each natural collection region. For example, in a pressurized water reactor, two sensors should be included at the top and at the bottom of the reactor vessel and at each steam generator primary coolant inlet.

2. A description of the monitoring equipment including the levels and the basis for the alarm settings. In addition, the manufacturer's sensitivity specifications for the equipment shall be provided.

Anticipated major sources of internal and external noise shall be identified along with the plans for minimizing the effects of these sources on the ability of the monitoring equipment to perform its intended function.

3. A description of the seismic capabilities of the Loose Parts Monitor-ing System.

4. A description of the environmental qualifications of the Loose Parts Manitoring System.

5. The Loose Parts Monitoring System must be operational and capable of recording vibration signals for signature analysis at the time of initial startup testing. A detailed discussion shall be provided of the operator training program, planned operating procedures, and record keeping procedures for the operation of the system.

Response

1. The Sequoyah LPM system consists of sensors, differ ntial amplifiers, impact detectors, an alarm logic module. an audio conitor, and a 14-channel, automatic-start, FM tape recorder. The Sequoyah LP!1 system will accept signals from accelerometers mounted on each RPV and each steam generator. Two sensors are being mounted on the head lifting lugs of the RPV. On the bottom of the RPV, two sensors are being mounted on the in-core detector guide tubes. On each steam generator, two sensors are being mounted near the primary coolant inlet.

2. The Sequoyah LPM system uses impact detectors which discriminate against varying background noise conditions, especially those normally occurring during plant startup. The impact detectors provide optimum alert logic.

The alert level is set to correspond to detecting an impact energy of 0.6 Joules within three feet of a sensor during plant chutdown. Whenever varying operating conditions cause background noise which prevents achieving this sensitivity, the actual sensitivity is always the same percentage of the background noise. That is, the actual sensitivity is consistently optimized. If an alert level is exceeded, the channel's activity light latches. If repetivitive impacting occurs, the tape recorder starts and the alarm buzzer sounds. The identities of all involved channels are indicated on the front panel. The LPM system can be momentarily inhibited to prevent an alarm such as might be caused by transient acoustic signals produced by control rod drive mechanisms during plant maneuvers.

3. Following a seismic event (up to OBE), the Sequoyah LPM system will be capable of perforning detection, signal conditioning, audio monitoring alarming.

4. All LPM system sensors are high-temperature (700 F) piezoelectric devices which are not affected by humidity or moderately high radia-tion levels. The LPM instrumentation is designed to function without degradation in the anticipated environment of the auxiliary instrument room at the Sequoyah plant.

5. The Sequoyah LPM system will be capable of detecting loose metallic parts in the RPV and steam generators during startup testing, according to guidelines in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.133. TVA and the vendor are developing an operator training program and operating procedures. TVA intends to use the technical services of the vendor until these are completed at the time of initial startup.