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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217G0801999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,staff Conducted mid-cycle PPR of Farley & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Will Conduct Regional Insps Associated with SG Removal & Installation ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212J8391999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards RAI Re Request for Amends to Ts.Addl Info Needed to Complete Review to Verify That Proposed TS Are Consistent with & Validate Design Basis Analysis.Request Discussed with H Mahan on 990930.Info Needed within 10 Days of This Ltr ML20212J8801999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01,suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util 980731,990607 & 03 Ltrs Provided Requested Info in Subj Gl.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Unit 1 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212E7031999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util Requested to Submit Plans & Schedules for Resolving Y2K-related Issues ML20212F1111999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C8041999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun Requesting Review of J Sherman Re Y2K Compliance.Latest NRC Status Rept on Y2K Activities Encl ML20212D4581999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun,Requesting Review of J Sherman Expressing Concerns That Plant & Other Nuclear Plants Not Yet Y2K Compliant ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N8041999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That on 990930 NRC Issued GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Condition, to Holders of Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20212C0071999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-05 & 50-364/99-05 on 990627- 0807.No Violations Noted.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Farley Plant Facilities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Engineering ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS ML20211G6851999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That During Insp,Technical Issues Associated with Design,Installation & fire-resistive Performance of Kaowool Raceway fire-barriers Installed at Farley Nuclear Plant Were Identified L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210T2021999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Draft SE Accepting Licensee Proposed Conversion of Plant,Units 1 & 2 Current TSs to Its.Its Based on Listed Documents ML20210Q4641999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr to La Reyes,As Listed,With List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210J8341999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Util 990430 Amend Request to Allow Util to Operate Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Based on risk-informed Probability of SG Tube Rupture & Nominal accident-induced primary-to-second Leakage ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210G8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-04 & 50-364/99-04 on 990516- 0626.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation IR 05000348/19990091999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses Insp Repts 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09 on 990308- 10 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Intercept Adversary During Drills,Contrary to 10CFR73 & Physical Security Plan Requirements ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20196J6191999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Final Dam Audit Rept of 981008 of Category 1 Cooling Water Storage Pond Dam.Requests Response within 120 Days of Date of Ltr 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed ML20196J7471999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Cycle 16 Extension Request.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20196J5781999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981201 & s Requesting Amend to TS Associated with Replacing Existing Westinghouse Model 51 SG with Westinghouse Model 54F Generators.Respond within 30 Days of Ltr Date ML20196J6571999-07-0202 July 1999 Discusses Closure to TAC MA0543 & MA0544 Re GL 92-01 Rev 1, Suppl 1,RV Structural Integrity.Nrc Has Revised Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid,Version 2 as Result of Review of Responses ML20196J3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards SE of TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at Westinghouse 3-Loop Pwrs 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed L-99-024, Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC1999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-224, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-217, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-225, Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants1999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F0621999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195E9581999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195C6941999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program L-99-021, Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included L-99-203, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195F2101999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests That Farley Nuclear Plant Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re W WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 L-99-180, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206F4321999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI L-99-017, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers ML20206C8021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept, for Alabama Power Co.Encls Contain Financial Statements for 1998,unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 990331 & Cash Flow Projections for 990101-991231 05000348/LER-1998-007, Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed1999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed L-99-015, Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20206B4391999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Corrected ITS Markup Pages to Replace Pages in 981201 License Amend Requests for SG Replacement L-99-172, Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.21999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205S9501999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205R0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20064A7131990-09-17017 September 1990 Advises That Due to Reassignment,Jj Clark No Longer Needs to Maintain Senior Reactor Operator Licenses ML20059J2811990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards List of Key Radiation Monitors Which Will Be Used as Inputs to Top Level Radioactivity Status Bar Re Spds.List Identifies Monitors Which Would Provide Concise & Meaningful Info About Radioactivity During Accidents ML20065D5961990-09-13013 September 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-19 & 50-364/90-19.Response Withheld ML20059J1661990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Rev 10 to ODCM ML20059L0751990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to Rev 3 to, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2911990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedules for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-07.Requalification Schedules & Estimated Number of Candidates Expected to Participate in Generic Fundamental Exam,Also Encl ML20064A7111990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Relief Request RR-1, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2891990-09-12012 September 1990 Confirms Rescheduling of Response to Fitness for Duty Program Notice of Violation 90-18-02,per 900907 Telcon ML20065D6621990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards NPDES Permit AL0024619 Effective 900901.Limits for Temp & Residual Chlorine Appealed & Stayed ML20064A3431990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Corrected Insertion Instructions to Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant ML20059D4711990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 ML20059B5101990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990.No Changes to Process Control Program for First Semiannual Period of 1990 Exists ML20056B2751990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Relief Requests from Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Testing Program for Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves. Request Incorporates Commitments in 891222 Response to Notice of Violation ML20056B2741990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Unit Inservice Testing Program,For Review & Approval.Rev Incorporates Commitments Addressed in Util 891222 Response to Notice of Violation & Other Editorial & Technical Changes ML20058Q1481990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to FNP-1-M-043, Jm Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Second 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program,Asme Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20058P6201990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to FNP-2-M-068, Ten-Yr Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components, Per 891207 & 900412 Responses to NRC Request for Addl Info ML20055G7701990-07-18018 July 1990 Updates 900713 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount ML20055F7411990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 & Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1989 Through May 1990.Repts Revised to Correct Typo on Value of Cumulative Number of Hours Reactor Critical ML20055F3781990-07-10010 July 1990 Submits Final Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.3 & 4.2.4.Util Position That Procedures Currently Utilized by Plant Constitute Acceptable Ongoing Life Testing Program for Reactor Trip Breakers & Components ML20055D4861990-07-0202 July 1990 Requests Authorization to Use Encl ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Case N-395 Re Laser Welding for Sleeving Process Described by Oct 1990,per 10CFR50.55a,footnote 6 ML20055D1001990-06-26026 June 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-12 & 50-364/90-12 on 900411-0510.Corrective Actions:Electrolyte Level Raised in Lights Identified by Inspector to Have Low Electrolyte Level ML20044A6191990-06-26026 June 1990 Suppls 900530 Ltr Containing Results of SPDS Audit,Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.One SPDS Console,Located in Control Room,Will Be Modified So That Only SPDS Info Can Be Displayed by Monitor.Console Will Be Reconfigured ML20043G4741990-06-11011 June 1990 Submits Addl Info Re 900219 Worker Respiratory Protection Apparatus Exemption Rev Request.Proposed Exemption Rev Involves Features Located Entirely within Restricted Area as Defined in 10CFR20 ML20043C1851990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Proposed Schedules for Submission & Requested Approval of Licensing Items ML20043B5941990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Rept of Unsatisfactory Performance Testing,Per 10CFR26,App A.Error Caused by Olympus Analyzer Which Allowed Same Barcode to Be Assigned to Two Different Samples. Smithkline Taken Action to Prevent Recurrence of Scan Error ML20042G7461990-05-10010 May 1990 Certifies That Plant Licensed Operator Requalification Program Accredited & Based Upon Sys Approach to Training,Per Generic Ltr 87-07.Program in Effect Since 890109 ML20042F0831990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Rev 18 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20042G3081990-04-25025 April 1990 Forwards Alabama Power Co Annual Rept 1989, Unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 900331 & Cash Flow Projections for 1990 ML20042E4121990-04-12012 April 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per NRC 890803 Request.Relief Request RR-30 Requested Reduced Holding Time for Hydrostatically Testing Steam Generator Secondary Side ML20012E9571990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.12.Rept Provides Number of Tests (Valid or Invalid),Number of Failures for Each Diesel Generator at Plant for 1989 & Info Identified in Reg Guide 1.108 ML20012D9661990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Annual ECCS Evaluation Model Changes Rept,Per Revised 10CFR50.46.Info Includes Effect of ECCS Evaluation Model Mods on Peak Cladding Temp Results & Summary of Plant Change Safety Evaluations ML20012D8901990-03-20020 March 1990 Clarifies 891130 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Use of Q-List at Plant,Per NRC Request.Fnpims Data Base Utilized as Aid for Procurement,Maint,Operations & Daily Planning ML20012C4701990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900201 Ltr Re Emergency Planning Weaknesses Identified in Insp Repts 50-348/89-32 & 50-364/89-21. Corrective Actions:Cited Procedures Revised.Direct Line Network Notification to State Agencies Being Implemented ML20012C6241990-03-14014 March 1990 Informs of Resolution of USI A-47,per Generic Ltr 89-19 ML20012C4651990-03-13013 March 1990 Provides Verification of Nuclear Insurance Reporting Requirements Specified in 10CFR50.54 w(2) ML20012C2051990-03-0505 March 1990 Forwards SPDS Critical Function Status Trees,Per G West Request During 900206 SPDS Audit at Plant.W/O Encl ML20012A1621990-03-0202 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info Inadvertently Omitted from Jul-Dec 1989 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Including Changes to Process Control Program ML20012A1301990-03-0101 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire Encl ML20043A7481990-02-0202 February 1990 Forwards Util Exam Rept for Licensed Operator Requalification Written Exams on 900131 ML20006D2311990-01-31031 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003 Re Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Procedures Will Be Revised to Incorporate Guidance That Will Preclude Inadvertent Loss of Shutdown ML20006A9091990-01-23023 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Has Program to Perform Visual Insps & Cleanings of Plant Svc Water Intake Structure by Means of Scuba Divers ML20005E4931989-12-28028 December 1989 Provides Certification That fitness-for-duty Program Meets 10CFR26 Requirements.Testing Panel & cut-off Levels in Program Listed in Encl ML20005E3681989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-28 & 50-364/89-28 on 891002-06.Corrective Actions:All Piping Preparation for Inservice Insp Work in Containment Stopped & All Participants Assembled to Gather Facts on Incident ML20005E1971989-12-27027 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22 on 890911-1010.Corrective Actions:Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Closed & Core Operations Suspended.Shift Supervisor Involved in Event Counseled ML20011D5041989-12-22022 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-26 & 50-364/89-26.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Preparation of Inservice Test Procedures Counseled. Violation B Re Opening of Pressurizer PORV Denied ML19332F2111989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Final Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Updated Inservice Insp Program,Summarizing Results of Addl Reviews & Providing Exam Listing Info ML19332F0791989-12-0707 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22.Corrective Actions:All Managers Retrained on Intent of Overtime Procedures & Sys Established to Provide Independent Check of All Time Sheets Each Pay Period ML19332F1141989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Description of Instrumentation Sys Selected in Response to Generic Ltr 88-17, Loss of DHR, Per Licensee 890127 Commitment.Hardware Changes Will Be Implemented During Unit 1 Tenth & Unit 2 Seventh Refueling Outages ML19332F1241989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per 891005 Ltr ML19353B0071989-12-0606 December 1989 Forwards Rev 1 to Safeguards Security Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld 1990-09-17
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- Alabama Power Company 600 North 18tn Street Post Office Box 264I Birmingnam. Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 323-5341 bboWc',' ,hfint AlabamaPower b
the sournem electnc system October 5, 1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
This is in response to your letter of September 17, 1979 concerning potential environmental interaction between non-safety grade systems and safety grade systems. This subject was further addressed in IE Information Notice 79-22, issued September 14, 1979.
Alabama Power Company, in conjunction with Bechtel Power Corporation Southern Company Services and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, has re-viewed for Plant Farley-Unit i the specific non-safety grade systems listed in Table 1 of tne Enclosure to this letter for potential environmental inter-actions. The basic conclusion of this re7iew is that these potential en-vironmental interactions do not constitute an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) has determined the probability of severe consequences from one of these high energy line breaks (for a typical nu lear plant) ranges from 2 x 10-6 per rea:. tor year to less than 10-7 per reactor year.
The information contained in this transmittal, including the improbability of the postulated scenarios as they apply to the Farley Nuclear Plant, the acceptability of the consequences and commitments made concerning this issue, justifies continued operation of the Farley Nuclear Plant.
I certify that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Yours truly,
~ . . . . .
_U _.L J % . ,~
h FLCj r/TNE/imnb L Clayton, Jr.
cc: See Attached g (\
\
Sworn to and subscribed before me this_ day of October, 1979.
1135 320 7910010 m :3f3 y
ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTI0tl ISSUE w
Background:
On September 18, 1979 Westinghouse presented to the NRC Staff a sumary of the investigation that had been conducted which led to the identification of four (4) potential interaction scenarios where the affect of adverse environments, result-ing from high energy line breaks, on control systems could lead to consequences more limiting than the results presented in the Safety Analysis Report. Table 1 sumarizes the scope of the investigation. Tha scope includes systems that could potentially affect core reactivity or primary or secondary inventory.
The seven (7) c:ntr:1 systems include control systems directly addressed in the cur?ent Westinghouse functional requirements. The seven (7) accidents considered encompass postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) environments, including all break locations and a range of break sizes. Of the forty-nine (49) combinations of control system and accident environment investigatedfifteen (15) interaction scear.rios, denoted by an X in Table 1, were identified which could result in consequences more severe than reported in the Safety Analysis Reports. The fifteen (15) interactions identified are bounded by the four (4) interactions discussed in IE Information Notice 79-22. The following section discusses the applicability of these postulated scenarios with respect to Farley Nuclear Plant-Unit 1.
Probability of Postulated Interactions:
Implicit in the four (4) potential interaction scenarios identified by Westinghouse are worst case assumptions concerning the break size and location, and the type and extent of potential consequential failures in centrol systems induced by the adverse environment. These assumptions are therefore in addition to the already conservative set of assumptions ascribed to the analysis of the Design Basis Events reported in the Safety Analysis Report. It follows that
_ these scenarios represent a significantly less probable subset of the Design Basis Events that are dependent on the occurrence of additional events, each hav-ing an associated uncertainty of cccurring. The attachments define, for each of the scenarios considered as applicable to the Farley Nuclear Plant, the conserv-ative assumptions already contained in tne Design Basis Event analysis reported in the Safety Analysis Report and the additional conservative assumptions to be made to derive the postulated interaction scenario.
As can be seen from the attachments, for each of the scenarios consider d, the improbability of all the additional sets of assumed conditions occurring simul-taneously, over and above the already low probability of the Design Basis Event itself, leads to the conclusion that continued operatio'n of the Farley Nuclear Plant can be justified.
Since the electrical design of control and protection systems conforms to the separation requirements of IEEE-279, the only interaction mechanisms identified in the above scenarios result from conservatively assuming an adverse environment at the location of the control systems and the consequential equipment failure in the worst direction.
hbb b h
i / _ . . . ..
Consequences of Postulated !nteratticns:
In lieu of performing a plant specific analysis in an effort to address each of the potential postulated interactions involving a feedline break, Westinghouse has referred to bounding accident analyses. that have been submitted to the NRC in WCAP-9600, Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse NSSS. Section 4.2 of the report provides transient results following a total loss of main and auxiliary feedwater. Sensitivity studies as a function of time of auxiliary feedwater initiation and opening of the pressurizer power operated relief valves are presented folicwing the initial transient. Calculations have been performed to show that the consequences following the control interactiom scenarios for the steam gererator PORV control system, main feedwater control system and pressurizer
_ PORV con:rol system are in fact bourded by the analyses in WCAP-9600. For these accident scenarios, the calculations indicated that the operator need not take corrective action to mitigate the consequences for at least thirty (30) minutes following initiation of the event.
A typical bounding analysis has been performed to address the rod control system interaction scenario. The results of the analysis indicate that no fuei damage occurs and the consequences are within the assumptions made in the Safety Analysis Reports.
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s EONTROL STEAM M PRESSURIZER GENERATOR STEAM REACTOR PRESSURE LEVEL FEEDWATER PRESSURE DUMP TURBINE ACCIDENT CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL Small Steamline Rupture X X X Large Steamline Rupture X X Small Feedline Rupture X X X X Large Feedline Rupture X X X Small LOCA X X X Large LOCA Rod Ejection TABLE 1 Z PROTECTION SYSTEM CONTROL SYSTEM POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION u
t_r. I t
u X -
P01cNTIAL IflTERACTION IDENTIFIED TilAT COULD DEGRADE ACCIDENT AFALYSIS e rv *
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NO SUCli INTERACTION MECilANISM IDENTIFIED a
[. I ATTACHMEilT 1 MAlft FEEDWATER C0flTROL SYSTEM
- 1. Sumary of Postulated Sce1ario Following a small feedline ruature the main feedwater control system mal-functions in such a manner that the liquid mass in the intact steam generators is less than for the worst case presented in Safety Analysis Reports. The reduced secondary liquid mass at time of automatic reactor trip results in a core severe reactor coolant system heat up following reactor trip.
- 2. Accident Consecuences A de ailed review of tne rain feedwater control system showed that the postulated accident scenario for this case does not result in a liquid mass in the steam generator less conservative than the worst case presented in the FSAR. Therefore, no further action is required.
t ""
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ATTACHMENT 2 STEAM GENERATOR PORV CONTROL SYSTEM
- 1. Summary of Postulated Scenario Following a feedline rupture outside containment in the auxiliary building, the steam generator PORV's are assumed to exhibit a conse-quential failure due to an adverse environment. Failure of the PORV's in the open position results in the depressurization of multiple steam generators, two of which are the source of steam for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Eventually, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwa ter pump will not be capacle of deliverirg auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generators.
- A ootential exisu that inadequate auxiliary feedwater will be injected into the intact steam generators until the operator takes corrective action to isolate the auxiliary flow spilling e ' the rupture.
- 2. Proba bili ty Assumotions Affectino Event Probability and Consequences:
- a. Standard Safety Analysis Report Assumptions Concerning Feedline Break Conservative initial assumptions -
. . . Appendix K decay heat model .
... Engineered safeguards power plus calorimetric error.
... Programmed RCS temperature plus control deadband and instrument errors.
... Initial conservative S/G inventory.
. . . Conservative core physics.
-. Conservative accident assumptions -
... Break (all sizes) in Safety Class 2 feedline piping.
... Maximum adverse environmental errors for protection ins trumenta tio n.
... Worst single active failure (loss of one motor-driven auxiliary feed pump) .
- b. Discussion of FNP Steam Generator PORY Control System One PORV is p:ovided on each main steam line upstream of the MSIV's outside of containment. (See FSAR Figure 10.3-1, sheet 1) . The valves are air-operated, are of fail closed design, and will close on loss of the required air or electrical supply.
The only components in tne PORV control circuit which may be exposed to a steam /feedline break environment outside the containment are the 1135 325
L . l Attachment 2 Page 2 ,
required electrical cabling, the air supply piping, and the valves themselves. Other control components are isolated from the postulated environment by design.
The control cabling can safely withstand the ptstulated environment and the cables are physically routed such that a break associated with one steam generator will not adversely affect the cables routed to PORV's on the other genera tors.
The air supply header, which provides the air suppiy required to open the PORV's will be exposed to the break environme-t. Failure of the air supply header will resolt in closure of the PORV's.
~
As cutlined in Ac:endix 3K, separation walls and/or physical separation has been provided to protect the Class 2 portions of the main steam and feedwater piping associated with the steam generator from t eing directly affected from breaks associated with the other generators. Thus, jet impingement on more than one PORV has been eliminated by design.
The only control component whose performance in the postulated environ-ment can not be fully defined is the valve positioner, which is mounted on the PORV, and which, in conjunction with a control signal, controls the opening air supply to the PORV. It could be postulated that if air is available, and the positioner fails in some adverse direction, the PORV's could be opened. It is extremely unlikely that the PORV's will fail in an
_ adverse direction as they are designed to fail safe and will close on loss of air or electrical supply. Further design evaluations are being con-ducted to determine appropriate steps to eliminate this concern.
- c. Additional Assumptions Required for This Scenario
... Break must occur outside containment between the penetration and feedline check valve. (
Reference:
See FSAR Figure 3K 4-4)
... Adverse environment resulting from the rupture can impact the steam generator PORV control systems associated with the ruptured loop and the intact loops. Control systems associated with PORV's cor.3ists of pressure transmitters, air-operated valves, and inter-connected calbe. The only components which could potentially be affected by the adverse environment are the valve positioners on each pressure-operated relief valve.
...The single active failure is a motor-driven auxiliary feed pump.
The loss of a turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump as the single active failure or no active failure would invalidate the postulated scenario.
(
Reference:
See FSAR Section 6.5)
...Due to the adverse environment, the steam generator PORV control system initiates a spurious signal to open the PORV(s). Should the control system continue to operate within specification or initiate a spurious signal to close the PORV(s) the scenario is invalidated.
...PORV on steam generators supplying steam to terbine-driven auxiliary feed pump is assumed to open as a result of spurious signal. If this PORV is not affected or fails closed, the scenario is invalidated.
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Attachment 2 Page 3
- 3. Accident Cansequences Section 4.2 of WCAP-9600, Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse NSSS Systems, describes transient analyses for postulated loss of all main and auxiliary feedwater (no. pipe rupture). The results indicate that the op-erator has at least 4,000 seconds following the loss of all feedwater to re-initiate auxiliary feedvater flow to the steam generators before the core begins uncovering.
The interaction scenario postulated above is similar to that presented in
~
Section 4.2 of WCA?-9500. The only additional assumption rade is that a feedline rupture Occurs outside containment between the containment gene-tration and the feedline check valve. Conservatively assuming that all liquid inventory in the steam generator associated with the ruptured feedline is lost via the rupture without removing any heat (i.e., liquid blowdown), calculations have shown that the heat removal capability of the liquid inventory blowdown requires operator action 1200 seconds earlier than reported in WCAP-9600. Thus, if a feedline rupture is assumed coincident with the analyses performed in WCAP-9600 the operator still has at least 2800 second; to take corrective action to increase auxiliary feedwater to the intact s team r,enerators.
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- 4. Solution The operator will be alerted to the possibility of the steam generator PORV's failing in the open position following a secondary high energy line rupture outside containment in the auxiliary building and the operator will.be cautioned that the steam-driven turbine auxiliary feedwater pump could potentially be lost due to loss of steam supply. The operator can determine if the turbine-driven pump is running by a speed indicator on the Main Control Board.
If the turbine-driven pump fails, the operator must rely upon the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the minimum auxiliary feedwater requirements following a secondary line rupture.
Other than the caution to the operator discussed above, the actions that must be taken by the operator that are currently delineated in emergency operating procedures continue to be applicable. No additional actions are required to mitigate the consequences of the accident.
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ATTACHMEfiT III PRESSURIZER PORV C0flTROL SYSTEM
- l. Summary of Postulated Scenario Following a feedline rupture inside containment, the pressurizer PORV control system malfunctions in such a manner that the power-operated relief valves fail in the open position. Thus in addition to a feedline rupture between the steam generator nozzle and the containment penetration, a breach of the reactor coolant system boundary has occurred in the pressurizer vapce space.
- 2. Probability Assumotions Affecting Event Probability and Consequences
- a. Standard Safety Analysis Report Assumptions Concerning Feedline Break Conservative initial assumptions - .
. . . Appendix K decay heat model .
... Engineered safeguards power plus calorimetric error.
... Programmed RCS temperature plus control deadband and
' ~
instrument errors.
... Initial conservative S/G inventory.
.. . Conservative core physics.
Conservative accident assumptions -
... Break (all sizes) in Safety Class 2 feedline piping.
... Maximum adverse environmental errors for protective ins trumenta tion.
... Worst single active failure (loss of any one auxiliary feed pump).
- b. Additional Assumptions Required for This Scenario
... Break must occur inside the containment between the steam generator nozzle and the contair. ment penetration. (
Reference:
FSAR Figure 3.6-3, sheets 1 and 2)
... Double ended break leads to limiting consequences. Smaller breaks permit longer operator action times.
... Adverse environment resulting from the break can impact the pressurizer power operated relief valve control system. (
Reference:
FSAR Section 5.5.13)
...Due to the adverse environment the pressurizer PORV control system initiates a spurious signal to open the PORV(s). The system consists of pressure transmitters, solenoid valves, air-operated valves, and i135 328
L- / . . __
Attachment 3 Page 2 associated electrical cables and connectors. The only component failure due to the adverse enviro ment that would cause the PORV's to open or prevent the PORV's from closing is the solenoid valves on the PORV's.
...Should the PORV's fail to the preset safe position (i.e., closed) the scenario is invalidated.
- 3. Accident Consequences
_ Section 4.2 of WCAP-EO, Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse ilSSS Systems, descri es transient analyses for a postulated loss of all main and auxiliary feedwater (no pipe rupture). The results indicate that, in tke event that the operator cannot restore auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, the operator is required to open the pressurizer PORV's within 2,500 seconds to maintain adequate core coolant inventory.
The interaction scenario postulated above is similar to that presented in Section 4.2 of WCAP-9600. The additional assumptions made are the following:
- a. A feedline rupture is assumed to occur between the steam generatJr nozzle and the containment penetration.
~
- b. Auxiliary feedwater is injected into the intact steam generator following the feedline rupture.
Conservatively assur.ing that all liquid inventory in the stean't generator associated with the ruptured feedline is lost via the rupture without removing any heat (i.e., liquid blowdown), the loss of heat sink due to the liquid in-ventory blowdown of the ruptured steam generator is more than counterbalanced by the auxiliary feedwater being injected into the intact steam generators following reactor trip. Therefore, the result:; of the analyses present in WCAP-9600, Section 4.2, which illustrates that the operator is not required to take corrective action for at least 2,500 seconds following the loss of feedwater, also applies to this scenario.
- 4. Solution The operator will be alerted to the possibility of the pressurizer PORV's failing in the open position following a high energy line rupture inside contai nment. Af ter identifying a high energy line rupture inside contain-ment the operator has instructions to close the block valves in the relief lines of the pressurizer PORV's, Closure of the block valves will ensure that a secondary high energy line rupture inside containment will not resuit in a break of the primary pressure boundary integrity. Emergency operating procedures instruct the operator to close the pressurizer PORV's af ter a high energy line rupture is diagnosed.
After the operator closes the PORV relief line block valves, no additional actions are required to mitigate the consequences of-this scenario.
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ATTACHMENT IV ROD CONTROL SYSTEM
- l. Summary of Postulated Scenario Following an intermediate steamline rupture inside containment, the auto-matic rod cr 1 trol system exhibits a consequential failure due to an adverse environment which causes the control rods to begin stepping out prior to receipt of a reactor trip signal on overpower delta-T. This scenario results in a lower DflB ratio than presently presented in Safety Analysis repsets.
- 2. Probability Assumotions Affectinc Event Probability and Consequences
- a. Standard Safety Analysis Report Assumptions Concerning Steamline Break -
Conservative initial assumptions -
... Nominal rated power plus calorimetric error.
~
...Progra :med RCS temperature plus control deadband and ins tru er.: errors.
... Conservative end of life core physics.
Conservative accident assumptions -
... Break (all sizes) in Safety Class 2 steamline piping.
... Maximum adverse environmental errors for protective ins trumen ta tion.
... Worst single active failure (loss of any one Safety Injection pump).
- b. Additional Assumptions Required for This Scenario -
... Break must occur inside the containment between the steam generator nozzle and the containment penetration.
... Intermediate steamline breaks (0.1 to 0.25 sq. ft. per loop) at power levels from 70 to 100 percent. Other break sizes and power levels invalidate the scenario.
...The Nuclear Instrumentation Systen (NIS) consists of excore neutron detectors, connectors, and cabling. The components that are exposed to the adverse environment are the excore detectors, the connectors, and cable. The only component that could potentially be affected by the adverse environment was determined to be the excore detectors.
Should the NIS equipment not be affected until af ter reactor trip (i.e., later than 2 minutes) the scenario is invalidated.
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Attachment 4 Page 2
...Due to the adverse environment the NIS system initiates a spurious low power sigr.a1 without causing a reactor trip on negative flux ra te . Should the NIS continue to operate within specification, initiate a spurious high power signal or cause a reactor trip on negative power rate the scenario is invalicated.
- 3. Accident Consecuences A typical bcur.dirg aralysis of the intermediate steanline rupture was performed to calculate the extent of fuel damage due to rod control system withdrawal prior to reactor trip. Based upon the reduction in radial peaking factor with burn-up and conservative end-of-life physics parameters, no fuel damage was calculated to occur following the intermediate steamline rupture with a consequential rod control system failure.
- 4. Solution As discussed above, typical bounding analysis of an intermediate steamline rupture inside contaircent which results in control rod withdrawal due to a control system er.vironmental interaction prior to reactor trip was analyzed.
The resuits of the analysis indicated that no fuel damage occurred, which is consistent with the conclusions made in the Safety Analysis Reports.
1I35 331
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