ML18201A492
ML18201A492 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Waterford |
Issue date: | 07/20/2018 |
From: | Geoffrey Miller NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
References | |
EA-18-020 IR 2017009 | |
Download: ML18201A492 (46) | |
See also: IR 05000382/2017009
Text
July 20, 2018
Mr. John Dinelli, Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-0751
SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - INSPECTION OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL
INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
COMMUNICATION/STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS -
INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2017009 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On September 21, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the
on-site portion of the subject inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, and
continued in-office review and inspection through June 2018. On June 7, 2018, the NRC
inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with you and other members of your
staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the
implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049
and EA-12-051) and emergency preparedness communication, staffing, and multi-unit dose
assessment plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the
conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of
selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station
personnel.
The enclosed report discusses a violation associated with a finding of very low safety
significance (Green). The NRC evaluated this violation in accordance Section 2.3.2 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy, which can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/
enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The violation met the requirements for treatment as a non-cited
violation; however, because the violation is associated with a failure to meet the requirements of
an Order issued by the Commission which will require subsequent, specific follow-up inspection
to ensure compliance has been established, the NRC determined the issuance of Notice of
Violation (Notice) is appropriate in this case.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRCs review of your response will also
determine whether further enforcement action or inspection is necessary to ensure your
compliance with regulatory requirements.
J. Dinelli 2
Additionally, the NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green)
in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a
regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the
Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Waterford Steam
Electric Station, Unit 3.
This letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available for public inspection and
copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Geoffrey Miller, Branch Chief
Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-382
License No. NPF-38
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 05000382/2017009
w/Attachment
cc: Electronic copy for Waterford 3
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-382
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 License No. NPF-38
During an NRC inspection conducted from September 18, 2017, through June 7, 2018, a
violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy,
the violation is listed below:
Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated March 12, 2012,
Section IV.A.2, requires, in part, that all licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order
comply with the requirements described in Attachment 2 of this Order except to the extent
that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license.
Order EA-12-049, Attachment 1, identified Entergy Operations, Inc., Waterford Steam
Electric Station, Unit 3, (Waterford 3) as a power reactor licensee subject to Section IV of
the Order.
Order EA-12-049, Attachment 2, requires, in part, that licensees develop, implement, and
maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event. The transition
phase requires providing sufficient, portable, on-site equipment and consumables to
maintain or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with resources brought
from off site. Licensees must also provide reasonable protection for the associated
equipment from external events, and full compliance includes, in part, the staging or
installation of equipment needed for the strategies.
ENTGWF081-REPT-001, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Final Integrated Plan,
Revision 1, dated July 20, 2016, provides the necessary guidance on strategies to maintain
or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a
beyond-design-basis external event.
- Section 2.2, Strategies, states, in part, that Phase 2 strategies support the
transition from installed plant equipment to FLEX equipment which is deployed by
the on-shift personnel to maintain essential functions.
- Section 2.3.2, Phase 2 Strategy, states, in part, that the capability for reactor core
cooling is accomplished from a pre-staged FLEX core cooling pump to provide
feedwater to the steam generators in the event the turbine-driven emergency
feedwater pump fails or sufficient steam pressure is no longer available to drive the
turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump turbine, and that the FLEX core cooling
pump is powered by the FLEX diesel generator. Section 2.3.2 also states, in part,
that reactor coolant system inventory control involves the use of refueling water
storage pool or boric acid makeup tank inventory through a repowered charging
pump which receives its power from the FLEX diesel generator. Section 2.3.2 further
states, in part, that the FLEX diesel generator is capable of supplying power to a
battery charger such that DC power for controls and instrumentation continues to be
available to support the reactor coolant system core cooling function.
Enclosure 1
- Section 2.4.2, Phase 2 Strategy Modes 1-4, states in part, that the capability to
provide spent fuel pool make-up and/or spray during Phase 2 is accomplished using
the component cooling water make-up pumps which are powered by the FLEX diesel
generator.
- Section 2.7, Planned Protection of FLEX Equipment, states, in part, that in order to
assure reliability and availability of the FLEX equipment required by the FLEX
strategy, Waterford 3 has sufficient equipment to address all functions on-site, plus
one additional spare (i.e., an N+1 capability). Section 2.7 further states, in part,
that the N+1 diesel generator provides the capability to restore the N function by
relocating the N+1 diesel generator to the reactor auxiliary building from the N+1
storage building.
- Section 2.15.1, Method of Storage and Protection of FLEX Equipment, states, in
part, that to assist with unanticipated unavailability of the N set, evaluations have
been performed and pre-planned strategies have been developed to provide
reasonable protection of specific N+1 equipment for predictable external events
with pre-warning (i.e., Mississippi River flood and hurricanes) and instances where
the N set is unavailable for conditions other than conduct of routine maintenance
and testing during normal operations.
Contrary to the above, from June 1, 2016, to June 7, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately
develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-
basis external event. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish appropriate design and
procedures associated with providing electrical power using the N+1 FLEX diesel
generator to support transition phase (Phase 2) strategies necessary to maintain or restore
the core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in mitigating a beyond-design-basis
external event.
This violation is associated with a Green Significance Determination Process finding.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc., is hereby required to
submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511, and a copy to the
NRC resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice of Violation (Notice), within
30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as
a Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-18-020 and should include for the violation: (1) the reason
for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the
corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will
be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other
action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will
be given to extending the response time.
2 Enclosure 1
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy or proprietary
information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy
or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide
a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a
redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of
such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have
withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the
disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential
commercial or financial information).
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days of receipt.
Dated this 20th day of July 2018
3 Enclosure 1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s): 05000382
License Number(s): NPF-38
Report Number(s): 05000382/2017009
Enterprise Identifier: I-2017-009-0006
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location: Killona, Louisiana
Inspection Dates: September 18, 2017 to June 7, 2018
Inspectors: R. Alexander, Senior Project Engineer (Team Leader)
J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Speer, Resident Inspector
E. Uribe, Project Engineer
D. Loveless, Senior Reactor Analyst
Approved By: G. Miller
Chief, Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance
by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/
Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans at Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-
revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish Appropriate Electrical-Related FLEX Strategies for Mitigating a Beyond-
Design-Basis External Event
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green Notice of Violation H.14 - TI 2515/191
Strategies VIO 05000382/2017009-01 Conservative
Open Bias
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding and associated violation in that the
licensee failed to adequately develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following
a beyond-design-basis external event. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish appropriate
design and procedures associated with providing electrical power using the N+1 FLEX diesel
generator to support transition phase (Phase 2) strategies necessary to maintain or restore the
core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in mitigating a beyond-design-basis
external event.
Failure to Adequately Consider the Impacts on FLEX Phase 2 Equipment from Large Internal
Flooding Sources Which Were Not Seismically Robust
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green Finding P.2 - Evaluation TI 2515/191
Systems FIN 05000382/2017009-02
Closed
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to
adequately consider the impacts from large internal flooding sources that are not seismically
robust on the design, protection, and staging of the FLEX core cooling pump on the -35 ft.
elevation of the reactor auxiliary building.
2 Enclosure 2
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed
activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with
Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS
TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose
Assessment Plans
The inspection verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to
Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are
being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of
staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012,
request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment
information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on
Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013,
(ADAMS No. ML12339A262).
(1) Based on samples selected for review, the team inspected to determine whether the
licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible
Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals [including the
Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS No. ML16203A321)] and the associated safety evaluation
(ADAMS No. ML17045A148), and to determine whether the licensee is in compliance
with NRC Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. Specifically, the team
inspected to determine whether the licensee satisfactorily:
a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX
strategies for postulated external events;
b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and
departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;
c) protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards;
d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment
to ensure their availability and capability;
3 Enclosure 2
e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of
beyond-design basis events; and
f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be
available from off-site locations.
(2) Based on samples selected for review, the team inspected to determine whether the
licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as
described in the plant specific submittals [including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS
No. ML16203A321)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17045A148),
and to determine whether the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051,
Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation.
Specifically, the team inspected to determine whether the licensee satisfactorily:
a) installed the spent fuel pool instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to
provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific
submittals and safety evaluation;
b) installed the spent fuel pool instrumentation display in the location, environmental
conditions, and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals;
c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and
use of the spent fuel pool instrumentation; and
d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable
spent fuel pool instrumentation.
(3) The team reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal
and in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS
No. ML12053A340), and inspected to determine whether the licensee satisfactorily
implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3.
Specifically, the team inspected to determine whether:
a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an
extended loss of all ac power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) scenario;
b) emergency preparedness communications equipment and facilities were sufficient
for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and
c) the licensee implemented multi-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including
releases from the spent fuel pool) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment
software and approach.
The team verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the
inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
4 Enclosure 2
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Establish Appropriate Electrical-Related FLEX Strategies for Mitigating a Beyond-
Design-Basis External Event
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green Notice of Violation H.14 - TI 2515/191
Strategies VIO 05000382/2017009-01 Conservative
Open Bias
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding and associated violation in that the
licensee failed to adequately develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
following a beyond-design-basis external event. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish
appropriate design and procedures associated with providing electrical power using the N+1
FLEX diesel generator to support transition phase (Phase 2) strategies necessary to maintain
or restore the core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in mitigating a beyond-
design-basis external event.
Description: To meet the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-049, the licensee committed in
its Final Integrated Plan (FIP) to meet the requirements contained in NEI 12-06, Diverse and
Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Revision 0, as endorsed by the
NRC. As described in the NEI 12-06 guidance, Section 3.2.2, in order to assure reliability
and availability of the FLEX equipment required to meet these capabilities [in responding to
an ELAP/LUHS event], the site should have sufficient equipment to address all functions at all
units on-site, plus one additional spare, i.e., an N+1 capability, where N is the number of
units on-site. As such, for the single unit Waterford 3 site, the N (or N-set) equipment was
generally designated as the primary or minimum FLEX equipment for a given function or set
of functions, and the N+1 equipment is the one additional backup piece of equipment for the
same functions/set of functions.
However, the licensee requested alternatives to the NEI 12-06, Revision 0, guidance, in part,
because the Waterford 3 site location along the banks of the Mississippi River raised potential
challenges to moving FLEX equipment from the N+1 storage building during postulated
flooding or hurricane events. The alternatives, in part, included:
(1) the pre-staging of one 480 VAC FLEX diesel generator (the N FLEX DG) within a
robust structure inside the Nuclear Plant Island Structure (NPIS) on the reactor auxiliary
building roof at the +41 foot MSL elevation; and
(2) storage of some N+1 FLEX equipment (including the N+1 FLEX DG) in the N+1
storage building located outside of the NPIS, though the N+1 storage building is not
protected against flooding or wind driven missile hazards.
Additionally, given that the N+1 storage building was not designed to protect the backup
equipment stored within it from all hazards applicable to the station, the licensee proposed
that should any of the pre-staged N-set equipment inside the NPIS (including the N FLEX
DG) be out-of-service or non-functional, the licensee would initiate actions within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
and implement compensatory actions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the N capability of that
equipment. These actions included providing protection for the N+1 equipment (e.g., N+1
5 Enclosure 2
FLEX DG) by moving them to within the NPIS within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed to implement
compensatory measures. The NRC staff documented in its Safety Evaluation
(Sections 3.14.4 and 3.14.5) that although the guidance of NEI 12-06 has not been met, if
these alternatives are implemented as described by the licensee, they will meet the
requirements of the order.
The licensees FLEX electrical strategy (as described in the FIP Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.11)
includes shedding of non-critical DC electrical loads early in the event to allow the stations
DC battery coping time to be extended from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to approximately 12.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Upon
connection and starting of a FLEX DG, the station batteries could then be recharged providing
continuous DC power to critical instruments and valves throughout Phase 2 of the event.
Further, in addition to repowering the DC battery chargers, the FLEX DG was designed to
provide or restore electrical power to the following Phase 2 equipment: (1) permanently
installed charging pumps (to provide reactor coolant system makeup capability), (2) FLEX
core cooling pumps (which are backups to the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump to
supply steam generator makeup capability), (3) permanently installed component cooling
water makeup pumps (to provide spent fuel pool makeup capability), (4) fuel oil transfer
pump, (5) battery room exhaust fan, and (6) various lighting.
During the course of the on-site inspection, the team identified that the licensee had
developed procedures during final implementation which were inconsistent with the FIP and
the NRC Safety Evaluation and failed to ensure that the key FLEX safety functions continued
to be met. Specifically:
(1) The team determined that the licensee procedures and guidelines were implemented
such that the N+1 FLEX DG would only be moved inside the NPIS (and protected) for the
concurrent conditions of both the N FLEX DG out-of-service and when the station was
forecast to experience predictable external events with pre-warning (e.g., hurricane,
Mississippi River flooding). The team determined that this was contrary to the approved
alternative described in the NRC Safety Evaluation in which the NRC staff understood that the
licensee would move the N+1 FLEX DG inside the NPIS when the N FLEX DG was out of
service or when the station was forecast to experience predictable external events to ensure
that the N FLEX DG capability was continuously met under all hazards.
(2) Additionally, the team determined that if the licensee were to move the N+1 FLEX DG
inside the NPIS for the conditions described above, the licensee had not established
procedures or provisions to be able to run the N+1 FLEX DG inside the NPIS as described by
NEI 12-06, Revision 0, Sections 6.2.3 and 7.3.2. Specifically, the licensee had not
established a means to appropriately fuel or ventilate the N+1 FLEX DG had it become
necessary to operate the engine inside of the enclosed reactor auxiliary building during a
persistent flood or hurricane. Therefore the capability of the FLEX DGs could not be met
under all hazards by the N+1 FLEX DG if the N FLEX DG was non-functional.
(3) Finally, the team determined that the licensee implemented part of the provisions of
NEI 12-06, Revision 2, Section 11.5, which allows an outage time of 45 days for the N FLEX
DG when the N+1 FLEX DG was in a location that was not fully protected under all hazards.
The team determined that the licensee implemented this revised allowed outage time for a
25-day period beginning in February 2017 when the N FLEX DG was out of service due to a
failed component when there was not a concurrent predicable external event, and therefore
6 Enclosure 2
the licensee staged the N+1 FLEX DG outside the NPIS at the ground elevation of the station
unprotected from potential high winds, hurricanes, seismic, and/or flooding hazards.
The inspection team further determined that in implementing the approved alternatives
described in the NRC Safety Evaluation for the protection of the N+1 FLEX DG when the
N FLEX DG was out of service for other than planned maintenance, the licensee had created
a Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement
that was inconsistent with the approved alternatives. Specifically, TRM Limiting Condition for
Operation 3.13.2, Action b.1, correctly implemented the approved alternatives in the Safety
Evaluation and NEI 12-06, Revision 0, stating:
With one or more N RAB [Reactor Auxiliary Building] FLEX Components specified in
Table 3.13-1 [which includes the FLEX DG] relocate the N+1 Building FLEX
component to meet N RAB FLEX capability within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and restore the N RAB
FLEX component within 90 days if the N+1 Building FLEX component relocation can
satisfy the FLEX functions for all events.
However, TRM Limiting Condition for Operation 3.13.2, Action b.2, went further by
implementing elements of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, in stating:
With one or more N RAB FLEX Components specified in Table 3.13-1 relocate the
N+1 Building FLEX component to meet N RAB FLEX capability within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and
restore the N RAB FLEX component within 45 days if the N+1 Building FLEX
component relocation cannot completely satisfy the FLEX functions for all events.
The 45-day allowed outage time as described in NEI 12-06, Revision 2, was intended for
situations where FLEX equipment could be pre-staged as risk reduction measures in
locations not fully protected from all hazards to facilitate shorter FLEX implementation
timelines when the unit was in Modes 5 or 6 (i.e., during refueling outages). In implementing
the reduced allowed outage time described in Revision 2, the N-set FLEX capability was still
required to be met, which was not the situation for the 25-day period for the N+1 FLEX DG as
identified by the inspection team. However, the licensees FIP clearly stated that the
licensees strategies were developed based on the guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 0, and
the NRC Safety Evaluation stated that the staff evaluated the strategies against that standard
(Section 3.1, page 8).
Because the licensee committed to NEI 12-06, Revision 0, which does not have the revised
allowed outage time for the unprotected equipment, the inspection team determined that the
allowed outage time for the N FLEX DG should have been 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with the N+1 FLEX DG
staged in the location outside of the NPIS. As such, the licensee failed to ensure the N
capability was met for the FLEX DGs for a period of at least 25 days in early 2017, until the
failed component was replaced and the N FLEX DG returned to a functional and available
status.
The inspection team determined that the issues described above were examples associated
with the licensees overall failure to develop, implement, and maintain guidance and
strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling
capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event as required by NRC
Order EA-12-049.
7 Enclosure 2
Corrective Actions: Following teleconferences with the Region IV-based inspection team and
the NRC Headquarters Beyond-Design-Basis events subject matter experts in October
through November 2017, the licensee acknowledged the concerns raised by the inspection
team and documented in the corrective action program that the strategies to utilize N+1 FLEX
DG were not consistent with the guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 0, nor the approved
alternatives. Additionally on November 16, 2017, the licensee used the correct 90-day action
statement in TRM Limiting Condition for Operation 3.13.2 for the N+1 FLEX DG not being
available under all conditions with the procedures currently in place for the station, while the
licensee continued to take actions to correct the issues identified by the inspection team.
Subsequently, on January 10, 2018, the licensee declared the N+1 FLEX DG functional (and
exited the Technical Requirements Manual Action Statement), with additional administrative
controls in place should the N FLEX DG become non-functional, while the licensee pursues
long term corrective actions to revise the strategy for the protection and utilization of the N+1
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-WF3-2017-09150; CR-WF3-2017-09152
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspection team identified that the licensee established their
FLEX strategies for the protection and utilization of the N+1 FLEX Diesel Generator (DG)
which were inconsistent with the requirements of NEI 12-06, Revision 0, and the approved
alternatives to the guidance described in Section 12.5 of the licensees Final Integrated Plan,
and Section 3.14 of the NRC Safety Evaluation, which was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, the licensee established the FLEX strategies such that the N+1 FLEX DG could
not be used under all hazards, and implemented a revised allowed out-of-service time
inconsistent with the NEI 12-06, Revision 0, and approved alternative guidance.
Screening: The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects
its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, in
establishing the FLEX electrical strategy the licensee failed to ensure the N capability of the
FLEX DGs remained available under all hazards.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix O,
Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated October 7, 2016. The team
determined that the performance deficiency did not impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation
order (EA-12-051) (question 1). However, the team determined that the performance
deficiency included an exposure period of greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and involved both
unavailable equipment and deficient procedures associated with the N+1 FLEX DG that
would result in the complete loss of one or more FLEX functions (questions 2 and 3).
Additionally, using available information, the product of the findings exposure time and the
applicable external event initiating event frequencies was greater than the 1E-6 threshold [in
this case the hurricane event was the most dominant contributor] (question 4). Further, the
team determined that the performance deficiency could involve significant programmatic
issues in the areas of equipment/strategy design, procedural guidance, and training such that
the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategy program is reduced (question 5). Therefore,
8 Enclosure 2
further evaluation of the finding was directed in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M,
Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria.
In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, the senior reactor analyst completed a bounding
quantitative evaluation which provided an upper bound incremental conditional core damage
probability (ICCDP) of 1.32E-5, where the ICCDP contribution is dominated by a hurricane-
induced external event, with an exposure period capped at one year (from date of Order
compliance [May 31, 2016] through the date in which the inspectors identified the issue
[September 21, 2017]). The evaluation used a frequency of 4.6E-2/year for a hurricane-
initiated loss of offsite power (LOOP). This was the best estimate based on actual data given
that Waterford has experienced one hurricane-induced LOOP during the plant life (i.e., during
Hurricane Katrina, 2005).
Additionally, FLEX equipment and strategies required by Order EA-12-049 provide a level of
defense-in-depth for beyond-design-basis events resulting in an ELAP/LUHS in a similar
manner to the equipment and strategies required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) which are intended
to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or
fire. As such, the inspectors reviewed the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix L, B.5.b
Significance Determination Process, for an additional qualitative bounding assessment for
this performance deficiency. In that the licensee failed to ensure the N-set capability of the
FLEX DG was maintained under all hazards, multiple FLEX strategies (i.e., core cooling
and spent fuel pool cooling) could not be assured under all hazards. Therefore, analogous
to the unavailable, unrecoverable loss of multiple functions intended to mitigate
beyond-design-basis events described in the IMC 0609, Appendix L, this FLEX-related
performance deficiency involved the loss of multiple functions intended to mitigate
beyond-design-basis events. As such, this deterministically developed methodology provided
a qualitative bounding assessment of low-to-moderate safety significance.
Finally, the NRC considered additional qualitative factors associated with (1) effects on
defense-in-depth; (2) extent the performance deficiency affected other equipment; (3) degree
of degradation of the equipment failure; (4) effects of exposure time on the performance
deficiency; (5) likelihood of the licensees recovery actions to mitigate the performance
deficiency; and (6) other qualitative circumstances. As further described in the attachment to
this report, the qualitative factors considered together with the bounding evaluations
described above support the final determination that the finding is of very low safety
significance (Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated
with conservative bias, in that the licensee failed to use a decision-making process that
emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable. Specifically, the licensee
established the FLEX electrical strategy based in part on a review of the changes in
NEI 12-06, Revision 2, which appeared to allow the licensee to establish alternative controls
and procedures for the N+1 FLEX DG. However, in establishing this element of the strategy,
the licensee failed to consider the core requirement to ensure the N+1 FLEX DG would be
capable of providing the N-set capability under all hazards [H.14].
9 Enclosure 2
Enforcement:
Violation: Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for
Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated March 12, 2012,
Section IV.A.2, requires, in part, that all licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order
comply with the requirements described in Attachment 2 of this Order except to the extent
that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license.
Order EA-12-049, Attachment 1, identified Entergy Operations, Inc., Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3, (Waterford 3) as a power reactor licensee subject to Section IV of the Order.
Order EA-12-049, Attachment 2, requires, in part, that licensees develop, implement, and
maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event. The transition
phase requires providing sufficient, portable, on-site equipment and consumables to maintain
or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with resources brought from off site.
Licensees must also provide reasonable protection for the associated equipment from
external events and full compliance includes, in part, the staging or installation of equipment
needed for the strategies.
ENTGWF081-REPT-001, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Final Integrated Plan,
Revision 1, dated July 20, 2016, provides the necessary guidance on strategies to maintain
or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a
beyond-design-basis external event.
- Section 2.2, Strategies, states, in part, that Phase 2 strategies support the transition
from installed plant equipment to FLEX equipment which is deployed by the on-shift
personnel to maintain essential functions.
- Section 2.3.2, Phase 2 Strategy, states, in part, that the capability for reactor core
cooling is accomplished from a pre-staged FLEX core cooling pump to provide
feedwater to the steam generators in the event the turbine-driven emergency
feedwater pump fails or sufficient steam pressure is no longer available to drive the
turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump turbine, and that the FLEX core cooling
pump is powered by the FLEX diesel generator. Section 2.3.2 also states, in part, that
reactor coolant system inventory control involves the use of refueling water storage
pool or boric acid makeup tank inventory through a repowered charging pump which
receives its power from the FLEX diesel generator. Section 2.3.2 further states, in
part, that the FLEX diesel generator is capable of supplying power to a battery charger
such that DC power for controls and instrumentation continues to be available to
support the reactor coolant system core cooling function.
- Section 2.4.2, Phase 2 Strategy Modes 1-4, states in part, that the capability to
provide spent fuel pool make-up and/or spray during Phase 2 is accomplished using
the component cooling water make-up pumps which are powered by the FLEX diesel
generator.
- Section 2.7, Planned Protection of FLEX Equipment, states, in part, that in order to
assure reliability and availability of the FLEX equipment required by the FLEX
strategy, Waterford 3 has sufficient equipment to address all functions on-site, plus
10 Enclosure 2
one additional spare (i.e., an N+1 capability). Section 2.7 further states, in part, that
the N+1 diesel generator provides the capability to restore the N function by
relocating the N+1 diesel generator to the reactor auxiliary building from the N+1
storage building.
- Section 2.15.1, Method of Storage and Protection of FLEX Equipment, states, in
part, that to assist with unanticipated unavailability of the N set, evaluations have
been performed and pre-planned strategies have been developed to provide
reasonable protection of specific N+1 equipment for predictable external events with
pre-warning (i.e., Mississippi River flood and hurricanes) and instances where the N
set is unavailable for conditions other than conduct of routine maintenance and testing
during normal operations.
Contrary to the above, from June 1, 2016, to June 7, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately
develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external
event. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish appropriate design and procedures
associated with providing electrical power using the N+1 FLEX diesel generator to support
transition phase (Phase 2) strategies necessary to maintain or restore the core cooling and
spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in mitigating a beyond-design-basis external event.
Disposition: This violation met the requirements for treatment as a non-cited violation;
however, since the violation is associated with a failure to meet the requirements of orders
issued by the Commission which will require subsequent specific follow up inspection to
ensure compliance has been established, the NRC determined the issuance of Notice of
Violation is appropriate.
Failure to Adequately Consider the Impacts on FLEX Phase 2 Equipment from Large Internal
Flooding Sources Which Were Not Seismically Robust
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green Finding P.2 - Evaluation TI 2515/191
Systems FIN 05000382/2017009-02
Closed
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to
adequately consider the impacts from large internal flooding sources that are not seismically
robust on the design, protection, and staging of the FLEX core cooling pump on the -35 ft.
elevation of the reactor auxiliary building.
Description: As described in the licensees FIP Section 2.3, the stations FLEX strategy for
core cooling utilizes the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump during Phase 1 of an
extended loss of ac power/loss of ultimate heat sink (ELAP/LUHS) event response (starting in
Modes 1-4) to feed the steam generators with feedwater from the condensate storage pool
and exhausting the steam via the atmospheric dump valves. In Phase 2 of the response, the
stations strategy continues to employ the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump since
sufficient steam pressure is expected to be available to drive the pump turbine, drawing
feedwater from the condensate storage pool and subsequently from the wet cooling tower
basins. However, as backup should the pump fail or steam pressure drop below that which is
necessary to drive the pump turbine, the licensee pre-staged an electric driven FLEX core
11 Enclosure 2
cooling pump (FCCP) at the reactor auxiliary building -35 ft. elevation. This pre-staged
backup pump is the N-set FCCP, while the N+1 FCCP is stored in the N+1 storage building.
Either FCCP can be powered the FLEX power panel connected to either the N or N+1 480
VAC FLEX DG (once placed into service), and can feed the steam generators once the plant
is cooled down to below 400 ºF, drawing feedwater suction from the condensate storage pool,
wet cooling tower basins, or refueling water storage pool, and discharging into one of two new
FLEX connections in the emergency feedwater lines. Additionally, the FCCP provides an
additional backup to the charging pumps (one of three which are repowered from the FLEX
DG) for reactor coolant system makeup and cooling.
Further, as described in the licensees FIP Sections 2.3.5.4 and 2.3.10, for an ELAP/LUHS
event that occurs when the plant is in Modes 5 or 6 (with the steam generators not available
for heat removal/core cooling), the FCCP serves as the primary method for making up water
to the reactor coolant system that would start to boil off from the residual decay heat in the
core. In this condition, the FCCP would take suction from the refueling water storage pool
and discharge into the reactor coolant system via one of two new FLEX connections in the
high pressure safety injection lines.
During walkdowns of the reactor auxiliary building -35 ft. elevation, the inspection team noted
that the N FCCP was installed on a pedestal which elevated the base of the pump
approximately 18 inches above the floor grade. The licensee stated that the FCCP was
elevated to account for the potential for internal flooding caused by a seismic event rupturing
a large water source that was not seismically robust. This consideration in the FLEX strategy
was required by NEI 12-06, Revision 0, Section 5.3.3, item 2, which states Consideration
should be given to the impacts from large internal flooding sources that are not seismically
robust and do not require ac power (e.g., gravity drainage from lake or cooling basins for
nonsafety-related cooling water systems). However, the inspection team noted that the
electrical cable connection for the FCCP did not have a waterproof cap, nor was the cable
secured such that the cable end would not drop below the base of the pump, potentially
exposing the electrical connection to damaging internal flood waters.
The inspection team reviewed engineering calculation ECM 15-004, Waterford 3 FLEX
Internal Flooding Calculation, Revision 0, and determined that the licensee had considered
several internal water sources, in particular piping and a tank associated with the fire
protection system, that were determined to not be seismically robust and could contribute to
flooding of the reactor auxiliary building -35 ft. elevation. The licensee considered the critical
maximum flood level on the elevation to be 15 inches, and validated that the non-robust
internal flooding sources would not exceed that elevation. However, the team noted that the
licensees calculation did not consider the FCCP electrical cable connections length and
capability to fall into the potential internal flood waters. The team further reviewed the
sections in FSG-005, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Revision 6,
associated with the staging and deployment of the FCCP under various conditions, and
determined there was no procedural guidance provided to ensure the assumptions made in
ECM 15-004 calculation were maintained by way of administrative controls.
The team determined that the lack of physical or procedural controls to ensure the FCCP
electrical cable connection met the assumptions of the internal flooding calculations could
affect both the pre-staged N FCCP and the backup N+1 FCCP. However, the team
determined that the N+1 FCCP would only be affected in the situation where the pump was
moved from the storage building and staged at the reactor auxiliary building -35 ft. elevation
12 Enclosure 2
to restore the N-capability of the FCCP prior to the seismic event causing the internal
flooding. While the N+1 FCCP is skid mounted, it had similar critical dimensions and an
electrical cable connection similar to the pre-staged N FCCP.
Corrective Action(s): In response to the inspection teams questions, the licensee
documented the concerns in the corrective action program and initiated actions to secure the
FCCP electrical cable connection to the top of the pump casing to preclude the connection
from falling into the potential internal flood waters following a seismic event. The licensee
also made changes to procedure FSG-005 to include the use of cable stands (procured and
staged for use in a FLEX equipment box in the reactor auxiliary building) to ensure the cable
from the FLEX distribution panel connecting to the FCCP is maintained above potential
internal flood waters.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-WF3-2017-07709; CR-WF3-2017-07712
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: That the station did not give adequate consideration to the impacts
from large internal flooding sources that were not seismically robust was a performance
deficiency. Specifically, the electrical connection to provide power from the FLEX DG to the
FLEX core cooling pump (FCCP) on reactor auxiliary building -35 elevation was not protected
from potential impacts of seismically-induced internal flooding from non-seismic fire protection
piping in the area either by design or by procedure, contrary to NEI 12-06, Revision 0,
Section 5.3.3, item 2. The electrical connection for the FCCP was not water resistant or
otherwise protected from flooding. Following a seismically-induced internal flooding event,
the connection could potentially either be damaged or otherwise fail from water exposure,
potentially rendering the pump unable to function.
Screening: The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects
its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically,
without design or procedural protections in place to address the performance deficiency, a
seismically-induced internal flood could render either the N-set or N+1 FCCP unable to fulfill
its functions during an ELAP event.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix O,
Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated October 7, 2016. The team
determined that the performance deficiency did not (1) impact the spent fuel pool
instrumentation order (EA-12-051); (2) did not involve unavailable equipment, deficient
procedures, or deficient training that would result in the complete loss of one or more FLEX
functions (where both the N and N+1 equipment were completely lost) with an exposure
period of greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; and (3) did not involve programmatic deficiencies that
reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Further the product of the findings
exposure time and the applicable external event initiating event frequency (i.e., in this case a
seismic event) was not greater than 1E-6. Therefore, the finding was of very low safety
significance (Green).
13 Enclosure 2
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting
aspect associated with evaluation, in that the licensee failed to completely consider the
impacts of the potential internal flood height on all electrical components for the FCCP [P.2].
Enforcement: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated
with this finding.
Observation TI 2515/191
The Waterford 3 site is unique in that there are approximately 15 permanent, large chemical
industry facilities within 5 miles of the station along the Mississippi River. As such, the
licensee has design basis analyses documenting the potential hazards from the wide variety
of flammable and toxic materials produced and/or stored at these industrial facilities described
in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 2.2.3. Additionally, because of
these hazards, the licensee (1) utilizes Technical Specification-required, broad range gas
detection equipment to detect and initiate automatic isolation of the control room ventilation
system (described in UFSAR, Section 6.4), and (2) established comprehensive toxic chemical
contingency (i.e., emergency) procedures to address actions to ensure the safety of station
personnel during such releases from nearby facilities. The equipment and procedures have
been described in the UFSAR and established since early in the operations of Waterford 3,
well before the development of the FLEX strategies in accordance with Order EA-12-049.
The inspection team reviewed the licensees FLEX strategies and planning to determine if the
licensee had considered whether one of the beyond-design-basis external events that could
affect Waterford 3 would also adversely affect the nearby industrial facilities. The team
considered that the external event may consequently cause those facilities to experience
failures in electrical power and safety systems resulting in a release of toxic gas which could
affect Waterford 3 and the stations ability to implement the FLEX strategies. In particular, the
licensees FLEX strategy includes actions to ventilate the control room envelope by opening
up several doors to the outside environment. Normally this area is operated at a positive
pressure to limit in-leakage and with monitoring using broad range gas detection equipment
that can automatically initiate control room envelope isolation. Additionally, the licensees
FLEX deployment strategy requires operations and other staff to work in the outside
environment to stage, operate, and monitor the FLEX equipment during Phases 1 and 2 of an
ELAP/LUHS event.
The Waterford 3 staff indicated that they had not considered those offsite effects because
NEI 12-06 (Section 2, Boundary Conditions, page 8) did not require licensees to consider
independent, concurrent events in establishing FLEX strategies. However, the inspection
team noted that NEI 12-06 also states in Section 3.2.2, Item 11, that Plant procedures/
guidance should consider accessibility requirements at locations where operators will be
required to perform local manual operations. procedures/guidance should identify the
protective clothing or other equipment or actions necessary to protect the operator, as
appropriate.
While the station maintains personal protective equipment (i.e., self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA)) which could be employed to protect staff should an offsite toxic gas
release encroach the site, the inspection team determined that the licensee had not evaluated
whether the supply of breathing air on-site (and other necessary personal protective
consumables) would be sufficient for the duration of a beyond-design-basis event until
14 Enclosure 2
additional offsite resources arrived (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or later). Similarly, the licensee had not
evaluated the potential impacts on the FLEX strategy in opening the control room envelope,
nor variations in the FSG-directed actions to account for the potential concurrent toxic gas
impacts on the site.
Licensee Actions: Considering the conflicting requirements in NEI 12-06, the licensees
design bases SSCs, and the specifics of the industrial environment surrounding the station,
the licensee documented the inspection teams questions in the corrective action program
with an action to convene a cross-discipline team of Operations, Engineering, and EP
[emergency preparedness] to develop and assess potential enhancements to implementation
of the FLEX mitigating strategy to address coincident toxic chemical release during a Beyond
Design Basis Event.
Subsequently, the licensee initiated actions to address the observations and questions,
including:
- Established/enhanced processes with the local large chemical industrial facilities and St.
Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center (EOC), whereby the licensee will be able
to obtain the status of the industrial facilities, and any information on potential toxic gas
releases, directly from the St. Charles EOC during beyond-design-basis events
- Procurement of additional handheld toxic gas detection equipment
- Procurement of additional breathing air resources to support field and control room
FLEX activities during potential on-site impacts from a nearby, concurrent toxic gas
release
- Conducting additional GOTHIC thermodynamic analyses to support development of
contingency FLEX strategies for situations where the control room and switchgear rooms
may need to be maintained closed or re-closed (rather than ventilated) due to on-site
impacts from a nearby, concurrent toxic gas release
monitoring equipment, etc.) at locations in the plant near FLEX equipment staging areas
- Enhancements to the overall FLEX strategies/FSGs and severe weather preparation
procedures, including triggers to implement toxic gas response contingencies during a
beyond-design-basis event
- Evaluation and documentation of the enhancements to the FLEX strategies in
accordance with the guidance in NEI 12-06, Section 11.8, Configuration Control
- Additional staff training on the revised FLEX contingency strategies and equipment
Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2017-07689; CR-WF3-2018-00998
Planned Actions: As of the end of the inspection, the licensee had not completed all of the
actions to address the observations/questions, though they were tracked within the corrective
action program, with anticipated completion in 2018. These actions may be subject to further
NRC inspection.
15 Enclosure 2
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 22, 2017, the inspectors presented the on-site inspection results in a
management debrief to Mr. R. Gilmore, Director, Regulatory and Performance Improvement,
and other members of the site staff.
- On June 7, 2018, the inspectors presented the complete inspection results in a telephonic
exit meeting to Mr. J. Dinelli, Vice President, and other members of the site staff.
16 Enclosure 2
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose
Assessment Plans
Condition Reports (CR-xx-xxxx)
CR-WF3-2016-0795 CR-WF3-2016-2493 CR-WF3-2016-3467 CR-WF3-2016-5404
CR-WF3-2016-5991 CR-WF3-2016-6267 CR-WF3-2017-0854 CR-WF3-2017-1884
CR-WF3-2017-2019 CR-WF3-2017-2305 CR-WF3-2017-5336 CR-WF3-2017-6474
CR-WF3-2017-7491 CR-WF3-2017-7572* CR-WF3-2017-7610* CR-WF3-2017-7640*
CR-WF3-2017-7653* CR-WF3-2017-7662* CR-WF3-2017-7689* CR-WF3-2017-7694*
CR-WF3-2017-7709* CR-WF3-2017-7711* CR-WF3-2017-7712* CR-WF3-2017-7722*
CR-WF3-2018-0998* LO-WLO-2017-0058
- - Notes CRs written as a result of the inspection
Procedures Revision
(Number) Title or Date
EN-FAP-EP-010 Severe Weather Response 06
FIG-001 FLEX Implementing Guideline - Extended Loss of AC 004
Power
FSG-001 Long Term Inventory Control 003
FSG-002 Alternate EFW Suction Source 002
FSG-003 Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater 002
FSG-004 ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management 002
FSG-005 Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging 006
FSG-005 Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging 008
FSG-006 Alternate CSP Makeup 001
FSG-007 Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power 001
FSG-008 Alternate RCS Boration 000
FSG-009 Low Decay Heat Temperature Control 000
FSG-010 Safety Injection Tank Isolation 000
FSG-011 Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Makeup and Cooling 001
FSG-012 Alternate Containment Cooling 000
FSG-013 Transition from FLEX Equipment 001
FSG-100 BDBEE/ELAP Emergency Response Organization FSG 000
FSG-101 BDBEE/ELAP Communications FSG 003
OI-004-000 Move FHB Rounds to RCA Watch 029
OI-004-000 Update order of log points 029
OP-901-513 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Malfunction 021
OP-901-521 Severe Weather and Flooding 324
OP-902-005 Station Blackout Recovery 021
SAMG-Intro Introduction 002
S-SAMG-01 Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to Fire/Explosion 019
17 Enclosure 2
Work Orders Revision
(Number) Title or Date
00462201-01 FS ILI3000, Perform Functional Test (FLEX Standby
PM)
52697490-01 FLEX Standby PM-1 Year Operational Test-
FLEXMDSG0001
52698032-01 FLEX Standby PM- 6 Month Functional Test-
FLEXMDSG0001
52703445-01 FLEX Standby PM-1 Year Fluid Analysis-
FLEXMDSG0001
52706314-01 FLEX Standby PM- 1 Year Filter Replace/Lube - 6/6/2017
FLEXDRE001
52706797-01 FLEX Standby PM - 1 Year Inventory - Aux Bldg 6/21/2017
52730989-01 FLEX Standby PM- 6 Mo Functional - FLEXMPMP0006
Pump
52730990-01 FLEX Standby PM- 6 Month Functional -
FLEXMPMP0003 Pump
52730991-01 FLEX Standby PM-6 Month Inspection Debris Removal - 6/6/2017
FLEXDRE001
52754363-01 FLEX - Sullivan Air Compressor Elec PM, Check Battery 7/31/2017
52754364-01 FLEX Sullivan Air Compressor Mech PM, Check Fluids 7/22/2017
and Run
52758030-01 FLEX Standby PM- 3 Mth Walkdown/PMP Rotation -
FLEXMPMP0001
52758033-01 FLEX Standby PM- 3 Mth Walkdown/PMP Rotation -
FLEXMPMP0005
52758034-01 FLEX Standby PM- 3 Month Walkdown -
FLEXMPMP0003 Pump
52758035-01 FLEX Standby PM- 3 Month Walkdown -
FLEXMPMP0006 Pump
52767007-01 FLEX Standby PM-1 Month Walkdown Inspection 8/2/2017
FLEXDRE001
52772909-01 FLEX Standby PM-1 Month Walkdown Inspection 8/29/2017
FLEXMDSG0001
Miscellaneous Revision
Documents (Number) Title or Date
95-0019-000 Godwin Installation, Operation and Maintenance 12
Manual
D-G971.0015 FLEX Diesel Generator Vendor Manual 0
EC 77588 N+1 FLEX Diesel Generator Overturning and Sliding 5/3/2018
Due to Wind
Form Number Blancett B2800 Flow Monitor Programming and
02-DSY-PM-00111 Installation Manual
SD400 Industrial Diesel Generator Set
TD-G200.0085 Goulds Pump Model 3316 Installation, Operation, & 1
Maintenance Instructions
TD-M924.0015 EFP-IL Signal Processor Operators Manual 0
TD-M924.0025 EFP-IL Signal Processor Technical Manual 0
TD-M924.0035 SFP-1 Level Probe Assembly Technical Manual 0
18 Enclosure 2
Miscellaneous Revision
Documents (Number) Title or Date
TD-W120.3085 Westinghouse Molded Case Circuit Breakers Series C, 2
F-Frame, For Type EHD, FDB, FD, HFD, FDC, DW,
HFW, FWC
TRM Section Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) 136
3/4.13.2 Equipment
TRM Section FLEX Fluid and Electrical Connections 136
3/4.13.3
WF3-CS-16-00003 Design Requirments and Vendor Documentation for 0
FLEX N+1 Storage Building
WF3-SA-14-00002 Waterford 3 FLEX Strategy Development 02
Work Standard-FLEX FLEX Equipment # FLEXMPMP0003 Diesel Driven 0
Water Transfer Pump Operations
19 Enclosure 2
IMC 0609, Appendix M - Quantitative Evaluation
Waterford 3 N+1 FLEX Diesel Generator Issue
Summary:
The analyst performed a bounding analysis of the subject finding in accordance with Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process using
Qualitative Criteria. The analyst quantified the following items that were common to all
initiators:
1. The conditional core damage probability for an unrecoverable loss of offsite power given
that the N FLEX diesel generator was out of service and the N+1 FLEX diesel generator
failed from an external event;
2. The estimated baseline conditional core damage frequency given the N+1 FLEX diesel
generator was successful; and
3. The estimated probability that the N FLEX diesel generator would be out of service at
the time of an external event occurring.
For each external event, the analyst then preformed the following:
1. Estimated the initiating event frequency that would result in an unrecoverable loss of
offsite power;
2. Calculated the baseline incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP);
3. Calculated the failure case ICCDP; and
4. Subtracted the baseline from the failure case to determine the combined ICCDP over the
1-year exposure period.
The analyst combined the ICCDPs for each external event initiator to get the total ICCDP for the
performance deficiency. The result was 1.32 x 10-5. This bounds the significance of the finding
to less than Red.
Performance Deficiency:
The inspection team identified that the licensee established their FLEX strategies for the
protection and utilization of the N+1 FLEX Diesel Generator (DG) which were inconsistent with
the requirements of NEI 12-06, Revision 0, and the approved alternatives to the guidance
described in Section 12.5 of the licensees Final Integrated Plan, and Section 3.14 of the NRC
Safety Evaluation, which was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee established
the FLEX strategies such that the N+1 FLEX DG could not be used under all hazards, and
implemented a revised allowed out of service time inconsistent with the NEI 12-06, Revision 0,
and approved alternative guidance.
More Than Minor Determination:
The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment
performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the
associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core
damage). Specifically, in establishing the FLEX electrical strategy the licensee failed to ensure
the N capability of the FLEX DGs remained available under all hazards.
Attachment
Evaluation using IMC 0609, Appendix O:
Using IMC 0609, Appendix O, Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and
Spent Fuel Instrumentation, dated 10/07/16, the inspectors performed a screening of the
finding in accordance with Section 0609O-04, Guidance. Based on this screening,
Appendix O directed that the inspection finding be assessed using Inspection Manual Chapter
0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process using Qualitative Criteria.
Evaluation using IMC 0609, Appendix M:
In accordance with Section 4.1, Initial Bounding Evaluation, the senior reactor analyst used the
best available quantitative methods and information to bound the risk significance of the finding.
The external initiating events evaluated were those beyond the design basis of the facility as
prescribed by Order EA-12-049 as follows:
- Seismic events
- External flooding
- Storms such as hurricanes, high winds and tornadoes
- Extreme snow, ice and cold, and
- Extreme heat
The following documents the assumptions used and the bounding evaluation for each of the
external initiators:
Assumptions:
1. The Waterford 3 SPAR Model, Version 8.54 is the best tool for quantifying the
conditional core damage probability related to this degraded condition, including the
unavailability of the N+1 FLEX diesel generator whenever the N FLEX diesel is out of
service.
2. The seismic evaluation procedures delineated in the Risk Assessment of Operational
Events Handbook, Volume 2, External Events, Revision 1.01 are the best available
method of determining the frequency of a seismically-induced loss of offsite power at the
Waterford 3 site.
3. The seismic hazard vector provided in Table 4A-1, Seismic Hazard Vectors for
the 72 SPAR Plants, of the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook,
Volume 2, External Events, Revision 1.01, is the best available information related to
the seismic hazard at the Waterford 3 site.
4. A seismic event at the Waterford 3 site that is large enough to cause a loss of offsite
power by exceeding the fragility of switchyard insulator stacks would result in a loss of
offsite power that is unrecoverable within a 24-hour period.
5. The risk from the failure to have a strategy that protects the N+1 FLEX diesel generator
from all hazards when staged outside the Nuclear Island east watertight doors
impacted the plant from May 31, 2016 to September 21, 2017. Therefore, an exposure
period of 1-year was used as described in the significance determination process.
2 Attachment
6. The probability of the N FLEX diesel generator being out of service for testing or
maintenance can be approximated by taking the total outage time and dividing it by the
total time that the FLEX strategies were in service since the date of full implementation
on May 31, 2016.
7. The maximum precipitation event postulated at the Waterford 3 site would not cause
flooding that would impact the staging of the N+1 FLEX diesel generator unless it was
accompanied by additional precipitation from a major hurricane.
8. The frequency of a postulated failure of the Mississippi river levee at the Waterford 3 site
can be approximated by the failure frequency of an earthen dam less than 50 feet high
that is more than 5 years since closure.
9. A failure of the Mississippi river levee at the Waterford 3 site would result in a loss of
offsite power that is unrecoverable within a 24-hour period.
10. The mean failure frequency of all earthen dams provided in Table 5A-1, Dam Failure
Rates, of the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 2, External
Events, Revision 1.01, is the best available information related to a Mississippi river
levee failure at the Waterford 3 site.
11. The estimated frequency of an F2 or larger tornado strike at the Waterford 3 site,
provided by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Research is the best available information
related to strong winds greater than 125 mph at the Waterford 3 site.
12. Any F2 or larger tornado striking the Waterford 3 site would result in a loss of offsite
power that is unrecoverable within a 24-hour period and the failure of the N+1 FLEX
diesel generator when staged outside the nuclear island.
13. The Waterford 3 reactor plant has been operating for approximately 32.8 calendar years.
14. Given that one hurricane-induced loss of offsite power occurred at the Waterford 3 site
during the operating life of the plant, the mean frequency of a hurricane-induced loss of
offsite power can be quantified as 4.6 x 10-2/year.
15. A hurricane-induced loss of offsite power at Waterford 3 would be unrecoverable within a
24-hour period.
16. If the Generac SD400 vendor manual provides a low operating temperature limit for a
subsystem of the generator skid, then the entire diesel generator is capable of operating
at ambient temperatures above this limit.
17. If the Generac SD400 vendor manual provides a maximum operating temperature limit
for a subsystem of the generator skid, then the entire diesel generator is capable of
operating at ambient temperatures below this limit.
18. The optional manufacturers enclosure for the Generac SD400 is installed over the
N+1 FLEX diesel generator skid and is sufficient to prevent the diesel generator from
being disabled by accumulated snow and ice at the Waterford 3 site.
3 Attachment
External Events Conditional Core Damage Probability:
The analyst determined that the only external initiators of concern are those that would
result in an unrecoverable loss of offsite power. Therefore, using the plant-specific
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model, Version 8.54, the analyst quantified the
conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for a non-recoverable, weather-related loss
of offsite power. The CCDP was 3.60 x 10-3. Because the SPAR does not model the
FLEX equipment, this CCDP (CCDPcase) was used as the case value for failure of the
FLEX functions. The dominant core damage sequences included a loss of offsite power
with failure of:
1. The Emergency Power Supply System
Operators to Isolate Controlled Bleedoff
Operators to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling
Operators to Restore Offsite Power in 2 Hours
Operators to Recover Emergency Diesel Generators in 2 Hours
Operators to Manually Control Emergency Feedwater Flow
Operators to Depressurize the Steam Generators
2. The Emergency Power Supply System
The Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
Operators to Restore Offsite Power in 1 Hours
Operators to Recover Emergency Diesel Generators in 1 Hours
3. The Emergency Feedwater System
Baseline Conditional Core Damage Probability:
Given the case CCDP of 3.60 x 10-3, the analyst calculated a baseline CCDP. To
establish a baseline CCDP, the analyst used a screening value of 0.1 consistent with
PRA analyst practices, for the failure of the FLEX equipment, and applied this to the
dominant sequences. The resulting estimated baseline CCDP (CCDPbase)
was 3.60 x 10-4.
Probability of N FLEX Diesel Generator Being Out of Service for Testing or Maintenance:
In accordance with Assumption 6, the analyst calculated the probability that the N FLEX
diesel generator would be out of service. The analyst used the following data:
1. The N FLEX diesel generator was unavailable for a 17-day period from
January 23, 2017 through February 9, 2017, when an alarm annunciated and the
licensee incorrectly interpreted the alarm as an indication problem.
2. The N FLEX diesel generator was unavailable for a 25-day period from
February 9, 2017, through March 6, 2017, because of a failed component.
3. The analyst estimated that quarterly testing of the N FLEX diesel generator
would remove the diesel from service for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> during each test.
4. The analyst estimated that annual testing of the N FLEX diesel generator would
remove the diesel from service for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
5. The total time that the FLEX strategy required the N FLEX diesel generator was
from May 31, 2016 when the licensee declared full FLEX implementation, until
the date the inspectors identified the issue on September 21, 2017.
4 Attachment
Based on Item 5, the N FLEX diesel generator was installed for 478 days. The sum of
the outage times for the N FLEX diesel generator was 42.4 days. Therefore, the
probability of the N FLEX diesel generator being out of service (P(Noos)) was calculated
to be 8.87 x 10-2.
The analyst noted that the unavailability of the N FLEX diesel generator was based on
limited information. Therefore, a sensitivity was performed to assess the range of
potential results. The analyst quantified the following 2 cases:
1. Assuming that the 17-day period from January 23, 2017, through February 9,
2017, was an anomaly, the analyst quantified the risk upon removing this period
from the total outage time of the N FLEX diesel generator. The resulting
unavailability was 5.31 x 10-2 which led to an ICCDP of 7.90 x 10-6.
2. Assuming that the performance deficiency could have reasonably increased the
calculated unavailability of the N FLEX diesel generator, the analyst added a
17-day period to the total outage time and quantified the change in risk. The
resulting unavailability was 1.24 x 10-1 which led to an ICCDP of 1.85 x 10-5.
The change in this value results in approximately 40% change in either direction.
Therefore, the sensitivity of the total ICCDP to this assumption is negligible.
Exposure Period:
In accordance with Assumption 5, the exposure period (EXP) during which the plant was
potentially impacted by the performance deficiency was 1 year.
Seismic Events:
The analyst followed the seismic procedures delineated in the Risk Assessment of
Operational Events Handbook, Volume 2, External Events, Revision 1.01. Section 4.0,
Seismic Event Modeling and Seismic Risk Quantification, provides a method of
calculating the frequency of a seismically-induced loss of offsite power (seismic-LOOP)
given the seismic hazard vector for the site. The analyst calculated a frequency of
2.27 x 10-5/year over the entire seismic hazard spectrum.
Using the values quantified above, the analyst calculated a bounding ICCDP for seismic
initiators as follows:
ICCDP = ICCDPcase - ICCDPbase
Where:
ICCDPcase = seismic-LOOP * CCDPcase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 2.27 x 10-5/year * 3.60 x 10-3 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 7.26 x 10-9
5 Attachment
And:
ICCDPbase = seismic-LOOP * CCDPbase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 2.27 x 10-5/year * 3.60 x 10-4 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 7.26 x 10-10
Therefore:
ICCDP = 7.26 x 10-9 - 7.26 x 10-10
= 6.53 x 10-9
External Flooding:
As stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 2.4.3.7, the only conditions
conducive to flooding of the Waterford 3 site are heavy precipitation and failure of the
Mississippi river levee. The inspectors determined that a maximum precipitation event
that was not exacerbated by a hurricane would not cause flooding to a height that would
have impacted the N+1 FLEX diesel generator. Therefore, the only external flooding
scenario of impact would be a postulated failure of the Mississippi river levee.
Using best available information, the analyst assumed that a postulated failure of the
Mississippi river levee would have the same frequency as an earthen dam less than
50 feet high and greater than 5 years since construction. According to the Risk
Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 2, External Events,
Revision 1.01, Table 5A-1, Dam Failure Rates, the mean failure frequency would be
1.634 x 10-4. It is noteworthy that all forms of dams have a failure rate between 1 x 10-4
and 4 x 10-4, even for blue sky events. The analyst assumed that failure of the levee
would result in an unrecoverable loss of offsite power (flood-LOOP) as well as failure of the
N+1 FLEX diesel generator.
Using the values quantified above, the analyst calculated a bounding ICCDP for external
flooding as follows:
ICCDP = ICCDPcase - ICCDPbase
Where:
ICCDPcase = flood-LOOP * CCDPcase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 1.63 x 10-4/year * 3.60 x 10-3 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 5.21 x 10-8
6 Attachment
And:
ICCDPbase = flood-LOOP * CCDPbase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 1.63 x 10-4/year * 3.60 x 10-4 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 5.21 x 10-9
Therefore:
ICCDP = 5.21 x 10-8 - 5.21 x 10-9
= 4.69 x 10-8
High Winds - Tornados:
Using the methods described in Review of Methods for Estimation of High Wind and
Tornado Hazard Frequencies, prepared for the U. S. NRC by the Center for Nuclear
Waste Regulatory Analyses and the Southwest Research Institute, the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Research determined the frequency of exceedance for tornadic winds in excess
of 111 mph (F2 on Fujita Tornado Damage Scale) striking reactor sites in the United
States. The frequency for this storm was 2.41 x 10-5/year for Waterford 3. According to
the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 2, External Events,
Revision 1.01, Section 5.2, Scenario Definition and Quantification, weather-related loss
of offsite power initiating events occur with strong winds greater than 125 mph which is
the middle of the F2 scale. As stated in Assumptions 10 and 11, any F2 tornado striking
the Waterford 3 site would result in a loss of offsite power and damage the N+1 FLEX
diesel generator. Therefore, the tornado-induced loss of offsite power frequency
(tornado-LOOP) was estimated to be 2.41 x 10-5/year.
Using the values quantified above, the analyst calculated a bounding ICCDP for high
winds/tornados as follows:
ICCDP = ICCDPcase - ICCDPbase
Where:
ICCDPcase = tornado-LOOP * CCDPcase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 2.41 x 10-5/year * 3.60 x 10-3 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 7.69 x 10-9
7 Attachment
And:
ICCDPbase = tornado-LOOP * CCDPbase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 2.41 x 10-5/year * 3.60 x 10-4 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 7.69 x 10-10
Therefore:
ICCDP = 7.69 x 10-9 - 7.69 x 10-10
= 4.69 x 10-8
High Winds - Hurricanes:
On August 30, 2005, Waterford 3 divorced from offsite power based on instability in the
regional electrical grid as a result of Hurricane Katrina. No other hurricane-induced loss
of offsite power events have occurred during the life of the plant. The analyst noted that
Waterford 3 has operated approximately 32.8 years. Using a Jeffreys non-informative
prior, the analyst estimated the mean frequency of a hurricane-induced loss of offsite
power (hurricane-LOOP) to be 4.6 x 10-2/year. The analyst also reviewed information
provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This
Administration estimated that the return period for a major hurricane striking within
50 miles of the Waterford 3 site was 20 years. This is equivalent to a frequency of
5.0 x 10-2/year. Assuming that a Category 3 or higher hurricane is likely to cause a loss
of offsite power, this NOAA information corroborates the analysts approximation.
Using the values quantified above, the analyst calculated a bounding ICCDP for
hurricane initiators as follows:
ICCDP = ICCDPcase - ICCDPbase
Where:
ICCDPcase = hurricane-LOOP * CCDPcase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 4.60 x 10-2/year * 3.60 x 10-3 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 1.46 x 10-5
And:
ICCDPbase = hurricane-LOOP * CCDPbase * P(Noos) * EXP
= 4.60 x 10-2/year * 3.60 x 10-4 * 8.87 x 10-2 * 1 year
= 1.46 x 10-6
8 Attachment
Therefore:
ICCDP = 1.46 x 10-5 - 1.46 x 10-6
= 1.31 x 10-5
Extreme Snow, Ice and Cold:
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a freeze is expected
only about once in 7 years near the mouth of the Mississippi. The lowest recorded
temperature in New Orleans was 7°F on February 13, 1899. The average snowfall in
Louisiana is 0.2 inches per year. The maximum historical snowfall in New Orleans was
an unconfirmed 8.2 inches in 1895.
According to the inspectors, the N+1 FLEX diesel generator is housed in a manufacturer
supplied enclosure. This would limit the impact of snow and ice coverage on the diesel
generator components themselves. The analyst reviewed Document D-G971.0015,
Flex Diesel Generator Vendor Manual. The section on Cold start recommendations
provides recommended starting techniques for temperatures to -25° C (-13° F). While
no specific lower limit on ambient temperature was provided, this section implied that the
diesel generator skid mounted equipment was capable of operating at and below the
lowest recorded historical temperature in the New Orleans area. Using this (best
available) information, the analyst determined that extreme cold conditions would not
affect the operation of the N+1 FLEX diesel generator. Therefore, there is no increase in
risk from the performance deficiency on postulated extreme snow, ice and cold initiating
events.
Extreme Heat:
The maximum temperature ever recorded in St. Charles Parish was 102° F, according to
the St. Charles Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan dated January 2015. The analyst
reviewed Document D-G971.0015, Flex Diesel Generator Vendor Manual. The section
on Fuel lift pump provides for a maximum fuel inlet temperature of 55° C (131° F).
While no specific upper limit on ambient temperature was provided, this section implied
that the diesel generator skid mounted equipment was capable of operating at and
above the highest recorded historical temperature in the St. Charles Parish. Using this
(best available) information, the analyst determined that extreme heat conditions would
not affect the operation of the N+1 FLEX diesel generator. Therefore, there is no
increase in risk from the performance deficiency on postulated extreme heat initiating
events.
Initial Bounding Evaluation Summary:
Assuming that all the initiator-specific analyses were mathematically independent, the analyst
calculated the total ICCDP for Waterford 3 associated with the inappropriate staging of the
N+1 FLEX diesel generator by adding the individual external initiators ICCDPs. The result was
1.32 x 10-5. This bounds the significance of the finding to less than Red.
In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, Section 4.1.2, the inspectors evaluated the
applicable qualitative attributes because the bounding evaluation indicated that the risk
significance of the finding could be greater than green.
9 Attachment
IMC 0609, Appendix M - Qualitative Evaluation
Qualitative Decision-Making Attributes for NRC Management Review
NOTE: Where appropriate in this evaluation, the Region assigned qualitative terms as to the
potential impact the attribute/procedural action could have in mitigating (i.e., reducing or
increasing) the potential risk significance of the performance deficiency. The terms used in
order of relative increasing qualitative impact are:
NO IMPACT < LOW < MODERATE < LARGE
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Finding can be bounded using qualitative and/or Yes
quantitative information?
Basis for Input to Decision:
As described in the preceding SRA-generated bounding evaluation, an upper bound estimate
for ICCDP is 1.32 x 10-5, where the ICCDP contribution is dominated by a hurricane-induced
external event. The evaluation uses a frequency of 4.6 x 10-2/year for a hurricane initiated
LOOP (loss of offsite power). This is a best estimate given that Waterford has experienced
one hurricane-induced LOOP during the plant life (i.e., during Hurricane Katrina in 2005).
Additionally, FLEX equipment and strategies implemented to meet Order EA-12-049 provide
a level of defense in depth for beyond-design-basis events resulting in an extended loss of all
ac power and loss of access to the ultimate heat sink (ELAP/LUHS) in a similar manner to the
equipment and strategies required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) which are intended to maintain or
restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the
circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. As
such, the inspectors reviewed the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix L, B.5.b Significance
Determination Process, to support an additional qualitative bounding assessment for this
performance deficiency.
Per Table 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix L, the unrecoverable unavailability of multiple mitigating
strategies such that spent fuel pool cooling, injection to reactor pressure vessel, or injection to
steam generators cannot occur related to the equipment required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2)
would be characterized as a finding of low-to-moderate safety significance (White). In that
the licensee failed to ensure the N capability of the FLEX DG was maintained under all
hazards, multiple FLEX strategies (i.e., core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling) could not be
assured under all hazards. Therefore, analogous to the unavailable, unrecoverable loss of
multiple functions intended to mitigate beyond-design-basis events described in the
IMC 0609, Appendix L, this FLEX-related performance deficiency involves the loss of multiple
functions intended to mitigate beyond-design-basis events. As such, conservatively
assuming the functions as unavailable and unrecoverable, a qualitative bounding assessment
of low-to-moderate safety significance is consistent with this deterministically developed
methodology.
10 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Defense-in-Depth affected? Yes
Basis for Input to Decision:
For Beyond-Design-Basis (BDB) event response, the N+1 FLEX DG is identical to the
installed N FLEX DG (with the exception that it is mounted on a towable trailer) and provides
the redundancy for the N FLEX DG in accordance with Mitigating Strategies Order. However,
the licensee had not established procedures to use the N+1 FLEX DG from within the Nuclear
Plant Island Structure (NPIS). Additionally, when the N+1 FLEX DG was staged the outside
of the NPIS for 25 days (when the N FLEX DG was unavailable/non-functional) the N+1 FLEX
DG was available, yet unprotected from all hazards.
Note as discussed in a later attribute, the licensee did have procedural guidance in place to
protect the N+1 FLEX DG by moving it inside the NPIS with a Category 4 or greater hurricane
forecast to impact the site. In this limited situation, the N+1 FLEX DG, while not able to be
utilized when staged in the NPIS, would be protected from all hazards and potentially
available to be moved back outside the NPIS for use after the storm passed.
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Performance Deficiency effect on the Safety Margin No
maintained?
Basis for Input to Decision:
Safety Margins are not defined for the BDB events.
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
The extent the performance deficiency affects other Yes
equipment.
Basis for Input to Decision:
The station is required to have two FLEX DGs (N and N+1) per the Order and NEI guidance.
The N FLEX DG is installed inside the NPIS, protected from all hazards, and capable of
providing the necessary FLEX functions when available/functional. Per the NEI guidance for
complying with the Order, the N+1 FLEX DG is intended to be capable of fulfilling the same
functions provided by the N FLEX DG should the primary FLEX DG become non-functional.
The functions provided by the FLEX DG include repowering the DC battery chargers and to
provide or restore electrical power to the following Phase 2 equipment: (1) permanently
installed charging pumps (to provide reactor coolant system makeup capability), (2) FLEX
core cooling pumps (which are backups to the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump to
supply steam generator makeup capability), (3) permanently installed component cooling
water makeup pumps (to provide spent fuel pool makeup capability), (4) fuel oil transfer
11 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
The extent the performance deficiency affects other Yes
equipment.
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
pump, (5) battery room exhaust fan, and (6) various lighting. Therefore, the function of the
FLEX DG directly impacts the ability of the station to meet at least two of the three core FLEX
functions (core makeup/cooling and spent fuel pool makeup/cooling).
However, the licensee established the FLEX electrical strategies which were inconsistent with
the Order, the guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 0, and NRC Safety Evaluation. Had the
inspectors not identified this performance deficiency, it is possible that the flawed FLEX
electrical strategies would have continued to be implemented, in that the licensee incorrectly
believed that the strategy met the Order, industry guidance, and NRC Safety Evaluation.
Additionally, as a consequence of establishing the flawed strategy, the licensee implemented
an incorrect allowed outage time for the N FLEX DG. As such, the performance deficiency
adversely affected the aforementioned functions provided by the FLEX DG for several weeks
beyond the intended allowed outage period. Further, since the controlling Technical
Requirements Manual action statement would have only directed the licensee to continue to
take actions to restore the N FLEX DG to functional status if the allowed outage time was
exceeded, the risk related to this consequence of the performance deficiency could have
continued to increase.
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Degree of degradation of failed or unavailable Yes
component(s)
Basis for Input to Decision:
Survivability of the N+1 FLEX DG when staged outside of the NPIS:
Hurricane Winds
The licensee stated that Waterford Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding,
directs the N+1 FLEX DG to be relocated to inside the reactor auxiliary building when a
Hurricane Warning is issued for a Category 4 hurricane or greater for the area. The licensee
noted that while they had not developed a method or guidance to operate the N+1 FLEX DG
inside the reactor auxiliary building, it would potentially be available to be moved back outside
of the NPIS for use after the storm had passed.
Based on questions from the inspectors regarding the ability of the N+1 FLEX DG to survive
hurricane force winds if left exposed outside the NPIS, the licensee provided a Certificate of
Design Compliance from the manufacturer of the FLEX DGs. The certificate indicated that
the station procured the N+1 FLEX DG with a strengthened enclosure which was evaluated
to withstand wind forces up to 180 mph (in accordance with International Building Code 2009
12 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Degree of degradation of failed or unavailable Yes
component(s)
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
and 2012, and ASCE 7-05 and 7-10). However, the manufacturers certification for the
generator was for a configuration which differed from that of the N+1 FLEX DG (i.e., mounted
to a surface as opposed to a moveable trailer). Therefore, the licensee completed an
engineering calculation on May 3, 2018, to estimate the wind speeds necessary to cause the
N+1 FLEX DG to slide and/or overturn as configured on its transport trailer. The calculation
demonstrated that the N+1 FLEX DG would not slide, tilt, turnover, or move axially at wind
speeds below 159 mph, provided the station staged the unit in accordance with station
procedures. (Specifically licensee Procedure UNT-007-060, Control of Loose Items,
Section 5.2.4.1.8, requires in part that loose items with wheels are to be secured with wheel
locking devices or with the use of wheel chocks.)
NRC Considerations: The manufacturers certification provided that the enclosure for
the N+1 FLEX DG is capable of withstanding the impacts of, and the generator
operating in, wind speeds up to 180 mph. Further the licensees calculation
demonstrated that the N+1 FLEX DG, if staged outside the NPIS, would not displace
in wind speeds below 159 mph. A Category 5 hurricanes average minimum wind
speed is 157 mph measured at 10 meters. Additionally, the licensees analysis does
not take into account short bursts of wind (i.e., driving winds) which may be much
greater than 159 mph, nor potential impacts from wind-driven missiles.
Given that the licensee has a procedural trigger to move the N+1 FLEX DG into the
NPIS with a forecast Category 4 or greater (130 mph) storm (as discussed further in
a later attribute), the calculation demonstrates a level of margin for survivability should
the N+1 FLEX DG be staged outside the NPIS and a forecast Category 3 (or lower)
storm intensifies to a stronger storm with greater wind speeds just before landfall.
Additionally, the licensees calculation only assumed using wheel chocks to minimize
trailer movement. However, the inspectors identified that Procedure EN-FAP-EP-010,
Severe Weather Response, provides additional guidance for station personnel to
consider when preparing for and/or responding to severe weather conditions.
EN-FAP-EP-010, Attachment 7.1, Step 23 specifically states Tie-down trailers and
portable buildings with cables and ropes. These actions may provide further margin
relative to the survivability of the N+1 FLEX DG due to hurricane winds. Yet,
consistent with prior NRC actions/risk evaluations (e.g., Fort Calhoun flooding
significance determination EA-10-084, October 6, 2010), no risk credit is typically
given for potential licensee actions without comprehensive procedures developed and
trained on prior to the event occurring.
While the licensees additional analysis and procedural actions described above may
reduce the likelihood of the loss of the ac power provided by the N+1 FLEX DG, the
N+1 FLEX DG would be at risk during other elements of large storm-induced events
(as described below); thus the N capability is still not available for all hazards.
13 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Degree of degradation of failed or unavailable Yes
component(s)
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
Hurricane-Induced Flooding Impacts
A review of the licensee FSAR, Section 2.4, shows that the predicted flood water levels in the
vicinity of the NPIS following a hurricane is highly variable dependent on the approach path of
the storm, and the stage (water level) of the Mississippi River during the storm. The Probable
Maximum Hurricane (PMH) approaching from the south and not associated with a PMH-
induced river levee failure may result in an estimated still-water flood height of 18.1 ft MSL for
a period of 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />, and up to 23.7 ft MSL when considering wave action induced by the
storm (FSAR Sections 2.4.5.1 - 2.4.5.3). In that the N+1 FLEX DG was staged outside the
NPIS at a grade level of approximately 17.5 ft MSL, the estimated transient, flood water
heights would be approximately 0.5 - 6.2 feet above the grade level, thereby potentially
inundating and rendering the N+1 FLEX DG unusable if staged at that location.
Additionally, FSAR Section 2.4.5.6 notes that a PMH is capable of producing a stage in the
Mississippi River which is greater than the probable maximum flood and with significant wave
action such that river levee failure is possible, dependent on the path of the storm. In this
scenario, the maximum flood water height outside the NPIS is estimated to be 25.4 ft MSL
(7.9 feet above grade level), with the flood waters flowing at greater than 13 feet per second,
which would inundate and render the N+1 FLEX DG unusable if staged at that location.
NRC Considerations: Not included in the FSAR analyses, but of further concern in this
case, is that the run up of the aforementioned flood waters would have the potential to
create flash flood conditions which could also inundate, displace, and/or otherwise
disable the N+1 FLEX DG if staged at the location outside of the NPIS.
As previously noted, Procedure EN-FAP-EP-010, Severe Weather Response,
provides guidance for station personnel to consider when preparing for and/or
responding to severe weather conditions. EN-FAP-EP-010, Attachment 7.1, Step 34
includes Consider installing temporary flood barriers (sandbags or equivalent) in
areas which may be susceptible to flooding. Stage additional temporary flood
barriers near susceptible areas. Consider accessibility to FLEX and B.5.b staged
equipment. However, no further guidance or specificity is provided in the procedure
relative to how tall temporary flood barriers should be constructed for estimated
water heights or velocities. Consistent with prior NRC actions/risk evaluations
(e.g., Fort Calhoun flooding significance determination EA-10-084, October 6, 2010),
no risk credit is typically given for potential licensee actions without comprehensive
procedures developed and trained on prior to the event occurring. As such, the
survivability of the N+1 FLEX DG staged outside of the NPIS due to hurricane-induced
flooding is variable and uncertain.
14 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Degree of degradation of failed or unavailable Yes
component(s)
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
Hurricane-Induced Rain Impacts
A review of the licensee FSAR, Section 2.4.2.3, shows that the theoretical predicted Probable
Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event for the Waterford site is estimated at 30.7 inches of rain
in a 6-hour period, and up to 34.9 inches of rain in a 24-hour period. A review of the vendor
manual for the N+1 FLEX DG and design documents for the trailer mounting shows that the
engine itself sits approximately 3.5 - 4 feet above the ground level, and includes a rain cap on
the engine exhaust. Further the engine enclosure is constructed with limited openings,
including access doors with gaskets and air intake louvers, both which are designed to limit
water intrusion into the enclosure.
NRC Considerations: The design, orientation, and engineered features of the N+1
FLEX DG and enclosure should limit extensive water intrusion from a PMP event,
however, air intake clogging or other limited water intrusion due to wind driven rain
cannot be completely discounted.
Overall NRC Considerations for Survivability of the N+1 FLEX DG Staged Outside the
NPIS during Hurricane Conditions: In consideration of the elements described above
relative to hurricane impacts on the N+1 FLEX DG staged in a non-protected
configuration outside of the NPIS, there are several design and engineered features
relative to the N+1 FLEX DG and the manufacturer provided enclosure which provide
a moderate level of protection from anticipated winds up to 159 mph and associated
rain effects. When additional licensee procedural steps to enhance the potential
survivability of the engine are considered with the design and engineered features,
collectively these are assessed to provide a MODERATE RISK REDUCTION overall.
However, as noted above, should the station experience a PMH with an unfavorable
approach track, the survivability of the N+1 FLEX DG becomes more uncertain due to
the potential for flood inundation of the areas outside of the NPIS.
Complexity of the failure and corrective actions required for the N FLEX DG
The licensee has indicated that, if an ELAP had occurred concurrent with a hurricane during
the period the N+1 FLEX DG was replacing the N FLEX DG in February 2017, Waterford
maintenance personnel would have been called on to expedite troubleshooting and repair of
the N FLEX DG. The licensee indicated that the fault in the N FLEX DG was associated with
the Engineering Control Unit (ECU) was easily identifiable and the N FLEX DG would have
been expeditiously repaired by swapping the faulted ECU in the N FLEX DG with the good
ECU from the N+1 FLEX DG in that the FLEX DGs are identical. The licensees staff
indicated confidence that the repair could have been accomplished within a 12-hour period.
NRC Considerations: NO RISK IMPACT. Given that the FLEX DGs are identical, the
proposed repair strategy appears feasible and attainable for this specific fault
condition. However, the licensee chose not to pursue this repair option in
15 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Degree of degradation of failed or unavailable Yes
component(s)
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
February 2017 based in part on their incorrect interpretation and implementation of the
NEI 12-06 guidance (i.e., use of the 45 day allowed outage time). Further, the failure
experienced in February 2017 is not the only type of equipment failure which the FLEX
DGs could experience, and as such scavenging parts from the N+1 FLEX DG may not
be a viable solution in all situations. The inspectors did not identify any station
procedures which would have driven the licensee to pursue an expedited repair option
(scavenging from the other FLEX DG or otherwise) had the failure of the N FLEX DG
occurred during Hurricane Season (June - October), or during any other adverse
environmental condition. Finally, consistent with prior NRC actions/risk evaluations
(e.g., Fort Calhoun flooding significance determination EA-10-084, October 6, 2010),
no risk credit is typically given for potential licensee actions without comprehensive
procedures developed and trained on prior to the event occurring.
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Period of time (exposure time) effect on the performance Yes
deficiency.
Basis for Input to Decision:
The exposure time for the performance deficiency was developed from the date in which the
licensee declared to be in compliance with the Order (June 1, 2016) until the date the
performance deficiency was identified by the inspection team (September 21, 2017) - a
period of 477 days. This period was capped at one year per the standards established for the
significance determination process (see Quantitative Assessment, Assumption 5, Attachment
page 4). As discussed previously, the licensee established the FLEX electrical strategies
which were inconsistent with the Order, NRC Safety Evaluation, and the guidance in
NEI 12-06, Revision 0 (i.e., the performance deficiency). Had the inspectors not identified
this performance deficiency, it is possible that the flawed FLEX electrical strategies would
have continued to be implemented, in that the licensee had incorrectly believed that the
strategy met the Order, industry guidance, and NRC Safety Evaluation.
Additionally, as a consequence of establishing the flawed strategy, the licensee implemented
an incorrect allowed outage time for the N FLEX DG, which increased the unavailability of the
N FLEX DG during the period of the performance deficiency. Specifically, the N FLEX DG
was declared out of service for 25 days (February 9 - March 6, 2017). However, the FLEX
functionality was not provided under all conditions with the N+1 FLEX DG in the unprotected
location (i.e., susceptible to damage from natural phenomena). As such, the licensee should
have entered the Technical Requirements Manual action statement to restore the FLEX
functionality within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Additionally, following the on-site inspection, the inspectors
discovered that the licensee had written Condition Report CR-WF3-2017-00385 on
16 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Period of time (exposure time) effect on the performance Yes
deficiency.
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
January 23, 2017, which documented the initial discovery of the low temperature alarm on the
N FLEX DG. Yet the licensee did not fully troubleshoot the alarm to establish a reasonable
assurance of functionality of the N FLEX DG at that time. This total period of unavailability for
the N FLEX DG was considered as an input to the senior reactor analysts bounding risk
evaluation (see Attachment page 4).
NRC Considerations: As noted, because the licensee established a flawed electrical
strategy from the date of compliance (i.e., the performance deficiency), the exposure
period was determined capped at one year in accordance with the significance
determination process. The total unavailability of the N FLEX DG (42 days) (i.e., a
consequence of the performance deficiency) was taken into account in the senior
reactor analysts quantitative bounding risk evaluation in the calculation of the
probability of the N FLEX DG being out of service for maintenance and testing.
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
The likelihood that the licensees recovery actions would Yes
successfully mitigate the performance deficiency.
Basis for Input to Decision:
Per OP-901-521, Severe Weather & Flooding (Rev 324) (the adverse weather off normal
procedure), the licensee established several procedural actions which could mitigate the risk
of the performance deficiency in response the hurricane-induced events.
Section E0, Step 4. Upon receipt of a Tropical Storm Watch/Warning, or a Hurricane
Watch/Warning from the National Weather Service, the Operations staff will enter Section E4
of OP-901-521, and take the following actions:
E4, Step 2. Review equipment out of service per OP-100-010 and expedite restoration of
vital plant systems and components to service.
NRC Considerations: The availability of FLEX equipment which directly implements
one or more of the core FLEX strategies (including the FLEX DGs) is controlled
through the licensees Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Section 3.13.
Procedure OP-100-010, Equipment Out of Service provides instructions on the
documentation and control of equipment operability in accordance with the Technical
Specification (TS) and TRM Limiting Conditions for Operations. However, there are
no definitions in OP-100-010, or other licensee documents or training identified, which
define what is included as vital plant systems and components.
17 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
The likelihood that the licensees recovery actions would Yes
successfully mitigate the performance deficiency.
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
E4, Step 3. If a Hurricane Watch/Warning is issued, then perform the following:
1st Bullet. Start and then place in standby each Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) in
accordance with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator. (A note prior to this step
restricts testing the EDGs one at a time, and an EDG is not required to be started if it had
been run within the prior 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.)
NRC Considerations: Testing of the EDGs and validating their operability prior to the
onset of hurricane conditions may offset some of the risk contribution due to an EDG
failure to start upon demand.
E4, Step 7.1. If Temporary Emergency Diesels [TEDs] are installed, then ensure a walkdown
of the TED is performed per Attachment 4.
NRC Considerations: The TEDs are not protected from the BDB external events and
the assumed probability of survival is considered low.
E4, Step 13. Advise Shift Manager to evaluate the need to call in additional personnel for the
duration of the storm. [i.e., Augmented ERO sequestration on-site].
NRC Considerations: The additional on-site emergency response organization [ERO]
staff who may be sequestered on-site for hurricane response are unlikely to have a
significant impact in reducing the risk associated with the performance deficiency
without pre-established procedural guidance in place for the staging and utilization of
the N+1 FLEX DG inside the NPIS. This is consistent with prior NRC actions/risk
evaluations (e.g., Fort Calhoun flooding significance determination EA-10-084,
October 6, 2010) in not giving risk credit for potential ERO actions without
comprehensive procedures developed and trained on prior to the event occurring.
E4, Step 14. If a Hurricane Warning is issued, then perform the following:
4th Bullet. If the hurricane warning is for greater than or equal to a Category 4 Hurricane,
then the N+1 FLEX DG is to be moved into a location inside the NPIS regardless of the
functional status of the N FLEX DG. (Similar action taken if in Section E3 (Mississippi River
flooding) and river level at the levee fronting the site is 25 ft MSL.)
NRC Considerations: As discussed in a prior attribute, the licensee provided a vendor
certification and additional engineering evaluation which demonstrated that the N+1
FLEX DG could survive without sliding or overturning in hurricane wind speeds up to
159 mph if staged outside of the NPIS. In that those wind speeds are greater than
those of a Category 4 storm, the calculation demonstrates a level of margin for
18 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
The likelihood that the licensees recovery actions would Yes
successfully mitigate the performance deficiency.
Basis for Input to Decision:
(Contd)
survivability should the N+1 FLEX DG be staged outside the NPIS and a forecast
Category 3 (or lower) storm intensifies to Category 4 or weak Category 5 storm just
before landfall. However, while the additional analysis and procedural actions reduce
the likelihood of the loss of the ac power provided by the N+1 FLEX DG, the
N+1 FLEX DG survivability would still be at risk during a large storm-induced flooding
event (also as discussed in a previous attribute); thus the N capability is still not
available for all hazards.
E4, Step 17. Twelve (12) hours prior to the arrival of hurricane conditions on-site, as projected
by the National Weather Service, perform the following: (a) Commence a Plant Shutdown in
accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown; and (b) When Plant Shutdown is complete,
then commence a plant cooldown, as directed by Plant Management, in accordance with
OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown. (Notes prior to this step indicate that the shutdown is
performed in anticipation of a Loss of Offsite Power, and the shutdown should be completed
two hours prior to the expected hurricane conditions on-site).
NRC Considerations: As described in the FIP and FLEX program document, the
station timelines for an ELAP event assume the event starts with the unit in
operation (Mode 1). Under this assumption, the FLEX DG function is not required until
T+12.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (for repowering the battery chargers) and T+17 hours (for RCS makeup
via repowering 1 of 3 charging pumps or the FLEX core cooling pump).
As stated in the FIP, the passive injection of borated water from the safety injection
tanks and the reduced RCP seal leakage with the use of Flowserve N-9000 seals
ensure adequate shutdown margin and RCS natural circulation until 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> from
event initiation. RCS makeup is necessary after 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> to compensate for the
assumed RCP seal leakage and to prevent transition into reflux boiling.
The actions in OP-901-521, Step 17 to initiate shut down of the unit 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to,
and attain hot standby 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the onset of hurricane winds on-site would
reduce the heat assumed in the FLEX program analysis and increase the margin in
the timeline to implement the FLEX strategies. Therefore, while shutting down the unit
prior to the onset of hurricane force winds on-site may provide additional time for the
licensee to re-establish the FLEX electrical function, the level risk reduction is variable
based on the factors described above.
Overall NRC Consideration for Recovery Actions: Collectively considered, the stations
Adverse Weather Off Normal Procedure (OP-901-521) described above contains several
actions which could provide a LOW RISK REDUCTION from the performance deficiency.
19 Attachment
Decision Attribute: Applicable to Decision?
Additional qualitative circumstances associated with the Yes
finding that regional management should consider in the
evaluation process.
Basis for Input to Decision:
Performance Deficiency Occurrence Outside of Hurricane Season
NRC Considerations: NO RISK IMPACT. The licensee established the electrical portion of
the FLEX strategy which did not ensure that the N-set capability of the strategy could be
ensured by either the N or N+1 FLEX DG under all hazards. One of the consequences of the
performance deficiency was that the licensee incorrectly implemented an extended (45 day)
allowed outage time when the N FLEX DG was non-functional due to a failed component, and
they did not restore this N-set capability with the N+1 FLEX DG within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as required
by the guidance the station was committed to meet. The fact that this consequence of the
performance deficiency occurred outside the nominal Hurricane Season (June - October) is
not directly applicable to the risk-informed (quantitative bounding) evaluation, in that there
were no clear procedural actions established which would have specifically changed the
licensees actions during the Hurricane Season. As also discussed in a previous attribute,
since the controlling Technical Requirements Manual action statement would have only
directed the licensee to continue to take actions to restore the N FLEX DG to functional status
if the allowed outage time was exceeded, the risk related to this consequence of the
performance deficiency could have continued to increase.
That said, based in part on prior licensee response to hurricane threats, despite the lack of
procedural guidance, and notwithstanding that the NRC has not historically provided risk
credit for procedure development by the ERO (see previous attribute), the licensees actions
to troubleshoot and repair the N FLEX DG were not conducted at the level of urgency that
would be expected had the station been under threat of a possible hurricane.
Availability of Phase 3 Equipment from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC)
NRC Considerations: NO RISK IMPACT. As described in the licensees FIP (Table 12), the
licensee expects to receive a 1000 KW 480 VAC turbine generator from the NSRC as part of
the standard deployment of equipment that all stations would receive for Phase 3 response.
However, Phase 3 equipment from the NSRC is not expected to begin arriving on-site for any
station until ~24 hours after initiation of the event and with completion of delivery by T+72
hours. Therefore, the Phase 3 equipment would not improve the timeline for the recovery of
the FLEX electrical strategy.
(Continued on the next page)
20 Attachment
Result of Management Review:
Result of Management Review (COLOR): GREEN
In consideration of the bounding quantitative risk evaluation in the Yellow band and the
qualitative factors described above, there is sufficient evidence to support that this finding
should be characterized as having very low safety significance (Green).
However, since the violation is associated with a failure to meet the requirements of orders
issued by the Commission which will require subsequent specific follow up inspection to ensure
compliance has been established, the NRC determined the issuance of Notice of Violation is
appropriate in this case, requiring the licensee to provide a written response describing
corrective actions to restore compliance, as permitted by Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the
21 Attachment
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: GMiller Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002
OFFICE SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRS/EB2 PE:DRS/IPAT RI:DRP/D SRA;DRS/PSB2 SES:ACES
NAME RAlexander JMateychick EUribe CSpeer DLoveless JKramer
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA via E/ /RA via E/ /RA via E/ /RA via E/ /RA via E/
DATE 07/17/18 07/16/18 07/17/18 07/17/18 07/20/18 07/18/18
OFFICE BC:DRP/D
NAME GMiller
SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 07/20/18