ML17277B822

LER 82-049/01X-1:on 821102,main Steam Line Safety Valve a Set W/Nitrogen at Steam Relief Setting.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Removed & Replaced W/Properly Set Spare Valve. Procedure revised.W/840720 Ltr

ML17277B822
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/20/1984
From:	Hamilton P, Harrington W BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
84-112, LER-82-049-01X, LER-82-49-1X, NUDOCS 8408100046
Download: ML17277B822 (4)

Text

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The isolation logic was reset, the system returned to normal lineup and the procedure successfully completed.

C The cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error in that the I8C Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic as required by the procedure.

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Primary Containment (NSSSS - Group 1) in an isolation condition. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the Public or Plant personnel.

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YEAR 8+'EOVENTIAL REVISION HUM ER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 39 787 0 21 0 0 2 OF 0 3 TE(T IN'more <<ece io (oooo'oo akNonollYl(C Ann ~'ol (171 Plant Conditions a) Power Level - OX b) P lant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown)

Event Descri tion On July 3, 1987 at 2207 hours0.0255 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.397635e-4 months <br />, an inadvertent isolation of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS - Group 1) occurred during the performance of Plant Procedure 7.4.3.2.1.17, "Isolation - Hain Steam Line Pressure Low-CFT.R The procedure provides instructions for performing Divisions 1 and 2 Channel Functional Tests (CFT) of Hain Steam Pressure Switches 15A, 15B, 15C and 15D.

The isolation was the result of the failure of Plant Instrument and Control (I8C) Technicians to have Plant Operators reset th'e half-trip logic prior to continuing with the procedure. During the first part of the procedure, the test for HS-PS-15A (Division 1), the Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic, and verify that the associated annunicators were not in an alarm state as required by the procedure. With a Division 1 half-trip condition in existence, the technicians continued with the procedure by performing the test on HS-PS-15B (Division 2). As a result, when the bypass was removed for MS-PS-15B, another half-trip signal occurred which completed the NSSSS, Group 1, full-trip logic. The result was the automatic closure of HS-V-22A-D (HSL Isolation Inboard), HS-V-16 (MSL Drain Inboard), MS-V-19 (HSL Drain Outboard) and HS-V-67A-D (MSL Drain Outboard). The Hain Steam Outboard Isolation Valves (HS-V-28A-D) were already closed due to Plant Conditions.

The cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error in that the I8C Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic as required by the. procedure. The technicians also apparently failed to confirm logic reset status by not verifying that the associated annunciators were not in an alarm state as required by the procedure.

Imaediate Corrective Action The isolation logic was reset, the system returned to normal lineup and the procedure successfully completed.

Further Corrective Action

1. The personnel involved in this event have been counseled regarding proper communications with Operations and the required verification of actions during the performance of surveillance procedures.

NIIC FORM 5OOA

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2. While not a factor in this event, the Channel Functional Test procedure for these pressure switches will be divided into two procedures, one for Division and one for Division 2.

1 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Primary Containment (NSSSS - Group 1) in an isolation condition. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the Public or Plant Personnel.

Similar Events None EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System BD HS-PS-15A-D SB PS HS-V-22A-D (Inboard I so 1 ation) SB ISV HS-V-16 (Inboard Drain) SB V HS-V-19 (Outboard Drain) SB V HS-V-67A-D (Outboard Drain) SB V NIIC FORM 34EA (043 l