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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20046C3131993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-015-00:on 930630,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Indicated Flow During Surveillance.Caused by Foreign Matl That Plugged Portion of Restricting Orifice.Restricting Orifice Removed,Cleaned & reinstalled.W/930728 Ltr ML20046B5241993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-007-01:on 930317,automatic Closing of RCIC Sys Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valves Occurred Due to High Steam Flow Signal.Increased Frequency of Valve Testing from Monthly to weekly.W/930726 Ltr ML20045F8601993-06-30030 June 1993 LER 93-014-00:on 930531,automatic Scram Occurred,Resulting from Operation of Auxiliary Transformer Differential Relay During Power Ascension.Uat Phase B & C Differential Relays Left Interchanged as Investigative aid.W/930630 Ltr ML20045E2301993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-013-00:on 930530,RCIC Sys Declared Inoperable & 7 Day TS 3.5.D.2 LCO Entered Due to Speed Oscillations Which Occurred After Several Minutes of steady-state Operation. Caused by Actuator Failure.Actuator replaced.W/930625 Ltr ML20045E2251993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-012-00:on 930529,unplanned PCIS Group I Isolation Signal Occurred While Opening MSIV During Startup,Resulting in Automatic Closing of Related Valves.Caused by Licensed Operator Error.Group 1 Isolation reset.W/930625 Ltr ML20045D6941993-06-23023 June 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930525,determined That Initial as-found Popping Pressures of Pilot Valves for Three Target Rock Main Steam Relief Valves Out of TS Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Reworked & Reassembled by Target Rock Corp ML20045D1861993-06-18018 June 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930519,SUT Became de-energized During Planned Calibr of Turbine/Generator Relays Lockout Test While Shut Down.Caused by Personnel Error.Discussion Conducted W/Personnel Re Attention to detail.W/930618 Ltr ML20044H0441993-06-0202 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930504,circuit Breaker Did Not Close During Planned Bus Transfer Due to Loose Control Circuit Wire.Lug Replaced & Reterminated on 930505 & Post Work Testing Completed W/Satisfactory results.W/930602 Ltr ML20024G7451991-04-24024 April 1991 LER 91-005-00:on 910325,diesel Generator Inoperable,Causing Loss of Ac Power to Train B Components of Safety Sys & Actuating Portions of Primary/Secondary Containment Sys. Caused by Voltage Regulator failure.W/910424 Ltr ML20029A6721991-02-25025 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910125,automatic Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Group 5 Actuation Occurred,Resulting in Closing of RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valves. Caused by High Flow conditions.W/910225 Ltr ML20028G9731990-09-20020 September 1990 LER 89-036-01:on 891122,determined That HPCI Sys Inoperable Due to Inoperable Gland Seal Condenser Blower Motor.Caused by age-related Wear of Motor.Blower Motor Replaced & Blower Tested W/Satisfactory results.W/900920 Ltr ML20028G9121990-09-18018 September 1990 LER 89-037-01:on 891130,primary Containment/Traversing in-core Probe Ball Valve Discovered to Be Almost Full Open. Caused by Damage to Valve Stem Due to Manual Manipulation of Stem.Ball Valve & Solenoid Actuator replaced.W/900918 Ltr ML20043G3541990-06-12012 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900513,automatic Scram Resulting from Load Rejection Occurred While at Full Power,Resulting in Trip of Generator Field Breakers.Caused by Fault on Offsite 345 Kv Transmission sys.Loss-of-field Relay replaced.W/900612 Ltr ML20043F8291990-06-0606 June 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 900507,discovered That Drywell to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Startup in 1988.Caused by Misunderstanding of requirements.W/900606 Ltr ML20042F5911990-04-30030 April 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900330,determined That Position of Primary Containment Sys Isolation Valve Not Recorded Daily,Per Tech Specs.Review Performed to Determine If Other Problems Existed.Plant Shut Down & Review performed.W/900430 Ltr ML20012F5751990-04-0606 April 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900311,automatic Actuation of Main Steam Sys Group 1 Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Occurred.Caused by False High Reactor Vessel Water Level Signal.Procedure Developed Re backfill.W/900406 Ltr ML20012E9831990-03-30030 March 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900228,determined That Max Fraction of Limiting Power Density Not Checked Daily During Reactor Power Operation,Per Tech Spec 4.1.B.On 900323,addl Tech Spec Issue Discovered.Tech Specs changed.W/900330 Ltr ML20012C4871990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900209,24 H Limiting Condition for Operation Entered When Two RCS Instrumentation Excess Flow Check Valves Inappropriately Verified Operable During Testing.Cause Undetermined.Two Valves replaced.W/900312 Ltr ML20005G0981990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 89-038-00:on 891208,unplanned Automatic Reactor Protection Sys Scram Signal & Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by False Low Reactor Vessel Water Level Signal.Local Level Indicators Satisfactorily calibr.W/900108 Ltr ML20005F8481990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 89-039-00:on 891209,automatic Actuation of RHR Sys Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Occurred.Caused by Hydrodynamic Transient That Actuated Protective High Pressure switches.W/900108 Ltr ML20005E8551989-12-30030 December 1989 LER 89-037-00:on 891130,discovered That Traversing in-core Probe Ball Valve,Mfg by Consolidated Controls,Inc,Closed,In Violation of Tech Specs.Caused by Damage to Valve Stem.Ball Valve & Actuator replaced.W/891230 Ltr ML20011D1361989-12-11011 December 1989 LER 89-035-00:on 891111,inadvertent Actuation of Portion of Secondary Containment Sys During Surveillance Testing Occurred.Caused by Location of Radiation Isolation Control Sys Channel a Logic Relay.Procedure revised.W/891211 Ltr ML20005D7421989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-033-00:on 891106,automatic Actuation of Group 1 Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys (PCIS) Occurred.Caused by High Reactor Vessel Water Level.Manual Valve Closed & PCIS Logic Circuitry reset.W/891206 Ltr ML19351A4581989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-034-00:on 891108,determined That Reactor Pressure Exceeded 150 Psig on 891107 W/O Performing Surveillance Procedure 8.5.4.4, HPCI Valve Operability Test. Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure initiated.W/891206 Ltr ML19332D1421989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-031-00:on 891024,closing Times for Two in-series Primary Containment Isolation Valves Exceeded Acceptance Criteria During Shutdown Testing.Cause Undetermined.Closing Time Retested W/Satisfactory results.W/891122 Ltr ML19332D6231989-11-20020 November 1989 LER 89-032-00:on 891020,pneumatic Pressure Drop for Two of Four Automatic Depressurization Sys Accumulators Discovered Greater than Max Acceptable Value.Caused by Leakage from Seat of Supply Check Valves.Seat replaced.W/891120 Ltr ML19324C3181989-11-0909 November 1989 LER 88-002-01:on 880117,full Reactor Protection Sys Scram Trip Signal Occurred During Surveillance Test,Resulting in Incomplete Actuations.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Logic Relay Replaced & Procedure revised.W/891109 Ltr ML19324B1131989-10-21021 October 1989 LER 89-030-00:on 890926,control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Sys Flowrate non-conservative Due to Procedure Error.Caused by Transcription Error.Procedure Revised & Test Reperformed Using Corrected procedure.W/891021 Ltr ML19325D4681989-10-16016 October 1989 LER 89-029-00:on 890914,locked High Radiation Area Door Found to Have Been Unsecured Contrary to Tech Spec 6.13.2. Caused by Failure to Adhere to Approved Procedures. Training on Access Requirements initiated.W/891016 Ltr ML19325D1861989-10-10010 October 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 890907,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable Because Mechanical Overspeed Trip Occurred During Surveillance Test. Caused by Failure of Ramp Generator Signal Converter Module. Module Removed & Sent to Mfg for exam.W/891010 Ltr ML17277B8221984-07-20020 July 1984 LER 82-049/01X-1:on 821102,main Steam Line Safety Valve a Set W/Nitrogen at Steam Relief Setting.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Removed & Replaced W/Properly Set Spare Valve. Procedure revised.W/840720 Ltr ML20024C3231983-06-24024 June 1983 Updated LER 82-038/03X-1:on 820817,RCIC Steam Line High Differential Pressure Alarm Received.Caused by Air in Sensing Lines to Pressure Switches.Cross Threaded Cap Found on in-line Snubber.Snubber replaced.W/830624 Ltr ML20024C2211983-06-24024 June 1983 Updated LER 80-053/03X-1:on 800814,0907 & 14,HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Snubber 23-3-36 Determined Inoperable.Caused by Transient Hydrodynamic Shock During Startup & Shutdown. Snubbers upgraded.W/830624 Ltr ML20024B8451983-06-24024 June 1983 LER 83-031/03L-0:on 830528,HPCI Sys Made Inoperable to Repair Steam Leak on AO 2301-31.Caused by Leaking Stem Packing.Packing Replaced.Valve Tested Satisfactorily.Sys Returned to svc.W/830624 Ltr ML20024B8321983-06-24024 June 1983 LER 83-030/03L-0:on 830527,both HPCI Area Smoke Detection Sys Alarmed in Main Control Room.Caused by Valve A02301-31 Steam Leak Causing False Indications.Valve repaired.W/830624 Ltr ML20024C3101983-06-21021 June 1983 Updated LER 79-007/03X-1:on 790212,while Performing Test 8.7.4.3,valves AO-5033A,CV-5065-10,15,16 & 17 Failed to Give Proper Position Indication When Cycled & to Close within Specified Tolerance.Cause Not stated.W/830621 Ltr ML20024A8861983-06-16016 June 1983 LER 83-027/03L-0:on 830518,during Routine Insp,Folding Fire Door Found Inoperable.Caused by Operating Cable Becoming Detached from Pulley Due to Slack.Cable Reattached & Operating Mechanism adjusted.W/830616 Ltr ML20023D1691983-05-0909 May 1983 Updated LER 82-008/01X-1:on 820331,HPCI Injection Valve MO-2301-8 Failed to Open in Required Manner.Caused by Missing Wire Jumper Intended to Bypass Motor Operator Torque Switch.Jumper Installed & Valve Tested Satisfactorily ML20023D0671983-05-0909 May 1983 LER 83-021/03L-0:on 830411,during Surveillance Test 8.7.4.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valve AO-5033B Failed to Meet 10-s Closing Time Requirements.Caused by Lubricant Infiltrating Solenoid Valve Components.Components Replaced ML20023D0181983-05-0404 May 1983 LER 83-022/03L-0:on 830413,overload on Valve Motor 1301-17 Resulted in Loss of High Pressure Core Cooling Backup Capability.Caused by Oxidation in Motor End Bell & Motor Brushes,Due to Humidity Caused by Leaking Valve Packing ML20028G1591983-01-28028 January 1983 LER 83-002/01T-0:on 830116,flow Ref off-normal Alarm Received.Average Power Range Monitor Flux Scram Trip Settings Affected.Cause Under Investigation.Flow Inputs Monitored & Amplifier B Recalibr ML20028F4121983-01-17017 January 1983 LER 83-002/01X-0:on 830116,while Clearing off-normal Alarm for Flow Comparators,Average Power Range Monitor Flux Scram Trip Settings Found in Nonconservative Direction.Caused by Drifting Proportional Amplifiers.Settings Checked Daily ML20028B0421982-11-16016 November 1982 LER 82-049/01T-0:on 821102,main Steam Line Safety Valve a Set W/Nitrogen at Steam Relief Setting of 1240 Psig, Exceeding Tech Specs.Caused by Personnel Error.Set Valve Removed,Procedure Adherence Stressed & Procedure Revised ML20027C9801982-10-20020 October 1982 LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820920,timing Tests of Three Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Valves 1201-2,-5 & -80 Not Completed within Allowed Time.Caused by Operational Constraints Requiring Testing at Reduced Power ML20027C9941982-10-20020 October 1982 LER 82-040/03L-0:on 820920,found Reactor Protection Sys Initiation Function of Turbine Stop Valve Completed 1 Day Late.Caused by Decision to Defer Test Due to MSIV D Line Isolation.Tracking Sys Implemented to Prevent Recurrences ML20052B9141982-04-23023 April 1982 LER 82-010/03L-0:on 820326,during Review of Testing Requirements,Surveillance Test 8.I.4 Standby Liquid Control Sys Found Not Verified.Caused by Breakdown in Multidiscipline Review of Results ML20052F2071982-04-14014 April 1982 Updated LER 81-060/03X-1:on 811020,determined Potential Exists to Reduce Number of Operable APRM & IRM Instrument Channels in Rod Block Trip Sys to Below Tech Spec Min ML20050A6321982-03-19019 March 1982 Updated LER 82-055/01T-1:on 810926,during Shutdown,Yarway Level Indicators Started Oscillating.Drywell Temp Was 240 F at 81-ft W/Elevation Coolant Temp 220 F.Caused by Ineffective Drywell Cooling.Ventilation Returned to Svc ML20050A4521982-03-19019 March 1982 LER 82-006/01T-0:on 820304,while Performing Maint Re SIL 352 on Pressure Adjustment Mechanism HPCI Stop Valve,Three Broken cap-screws Found.No Cause Determined.Screws Examined, Replaced & Sys Returned to Svc ML20050A4331982-03-19019 March 1982 Updated LER 81-062/01X-1:on 811116,Wyle Labs Informed Util That Two Target Rock Safety Relief Valves Had Not Passed Setpoint Tests.Caused by Setpoint Shift Due to Changes to Designed Differential Forces from Excessive Pilot Leakage 1993-07-28
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20046C3131993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-015-00:on 930630,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Indicated Flow During Surveillance.Caused by Foreign Matl That Plugged Portion of Restricting Orifice.Restricting Orifice Removed,Cleaned & reinstalled.W/930728 Ltr ML20046B5241993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-007-01:on 930317,automatic Closing of RCIC Sys Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valves Occurred Due to High Steam Flow Signal.Increased Frequency of Valve Testing from Monthly to weekly.W/930726 Ltr ML20045F8601993-06-30030 June 1993 LER 93-014-00:on 930531,automatic Scram Occurred,Resulting from Operation of Auxiliary Transformer Differential Relay During Power Ascension.Uat Phase B & C Differential Relays Left Interchanged as Investigative aid.W/930630 Ltr ML20045E2301993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-013-00:on 930530,RCIC Sys Declared Inoperable & 7 Day TS 3.5.D.2 LCO Entered Due to Speed Oscillations Which Occurred After Several Minutes of steady-state Operation. Caused by Actuator Failure.Actuator replaced.W/930625 Ltr ML20045E2251993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-012-00:on 930529,unplanned PCIS Group I Isolation Signal Occurred While Opening MSIV During Startup,Resulting in Automatic Closing of Related Valves.Caused by Licensed Operator Error.Group 1 Isolation reset.W/930625 Ltr ML20045D6941993-06-23023 June 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930525,determined That Initial as-found Popping Pressures of Pilot Valves for Three Target Rock Main Steam Relief Valves Out of TS Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Reworked & Reassembled by Target Rock Corp ML20045D1861993-06-18018 June 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930519,SUT Became de-energized During Planned Calibr of Turbine/Generator Relays Lockout Test While Shut Down.Caused by Personnel Error.Discussion Conducted W/Personnel Re Attention to detail.W/930618 Ltr ML20044H0441993-06-0202 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930504,circuit Breaker Did Not Close During Planned Bus Transfer Due to Loose Control Circuit Wire.Lug Replaced & Reterminated on 930505 & Post Work Testing Completed W/Satisfactory results.W/930602 Ltr ML20024G7451991-04-24024 April 1991 LER 91-005-00:on 910325,diesel Generator Inoperable,Causing Loss of Ac Power to Train B Components of Safety Sys & Actuating Portions of Primary/Secondary Containment Sys. Caused by Voltage Regulator failure.W/910424 Ltr ML20029A6721991-02-25025 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910125,automatic Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Group 5 Actuation Occurred,Resulting in Closing of RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valves. Caused by High Flow conditions.W/910225 Ltr ML20028G9731990-09-20020 September 1990 LER 89-036-01:on 891122,determined That HPCI Sys Inoperable Due to Inoperable Gland Seal Condenser Blower Motor.Caused by age-related Wear of Motor.Blower Motor Replaced & Blower Tested W/Satisfactory results.W/900920 Ltr ML20028G9121990-09-18018 September 1990 LER 89-037-01:on 891130,primary Containment/Traversing in-core Probe Ball Valve Discovered to Be Almost Full Open. Caused by Damage to Valve Stem Due to Manual Manipulation of Stem.Ball Valve & Solenoid Actuator replaced.W/900918 Ltr ML20043G3541990-06-12012 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900513,automatic Scram Resulting from Load Rejection Occurred While at Full Power,Resulting in Trip of Generator Field Breakers.Caused by Fault on Offsite 345 Kv Transmission sys.Loss-of-field Relay replaced.W/900612 Ltr ML20043F8291990-06-0606 June 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 900507,discovered That Drywell to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Startup in 1988.Caused by Misunderstanding of requirements.W/900606 Ltr ML20042F5911990-04-30030 April 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900330,determined That Position of Primary Containment Sys Isolation Valve Not Recorded Daily,Per Tech Specs.Review Performed to Determine If Other Problems Existed.Plant Shut Down & Review performed.W/900430 Ltr ML20012F5751990-04-0606 April 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900311,automatic Actuation of Main Steam Sys Group 1 Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Occurred.Caused by False High Reactor Vessel Water Level Signal.Procedure Developed Re backfill.W/900406 Ltr ML20012E9831990-03-30030 March 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900228,determined That Max Fraction of Limiting Power Density Not Checked Daily During Reactor Power Operation,Per Tech Spec 4.1.B.On 900323,addl Tech Spec Issue Discovered.Tech Specs changed.W/900330 Ltr ML20012C4871990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900209,24 H Limiting Condition for Operation Entered When Two RCS Instrumentation Excess Flow Check Valves Inappropriately Verified Operable During Testing.Cause Undetermined.Two Valves replaced.W/900312 Ltr ML20005G0981990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 89-038-00:on 891208,unplanned Automatic Reactor Protection Sys Scram Signal & Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by False Low Reactor Vessel Water Level Signal.Local Level Indicators Satisfactorily calibr.W/900108 Ltr ML20005F8481990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 89-039-00:on 891209,automatic Actuation of RHR Sys Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys Occurred.Caused by Hydrodynamic Transient That Actuated Protective High Pressure switches.W/900108 Ltr ML20005E8551989-12-30030 December 1989 LER 89-037-00:on 891130,discovered That Traversing in-core Probe Ball Valve,Mfg by Consolidated Controls,Inc,Closed,In Violation of Tech Specs.Caused by Damage to Valve Stem.Ball Valve & Actuator replaced.W/891230 Ltr ML20011D1361989-12-11011 December 1989 LER 89-035-00:on 891111,inadvertent Actuation of Portion of Secondary Containment Sys During Surveillance Testing Occurred.Caused by Location of Radiation Isolation Control Sys Channel a Logic Relay.Procedure revised.W/891211 Ltr ML20005D7421989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-033-00:on 891106,automatic Actuation of Group 1 Portion of Primary Containment Isolation Control Sys (PCIS) Occurred.Caused by High Reactor Vessel Water Level.Manual Valve Closed & PCIS Logic Circuitry reset.W/891206 Ltr ML19351A4581989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-034-00:on 891108,determined That Reactor Pressure Exceeded 150 Psig on 891107 W/O Performing Surveillance Procedure 8.5.4.4, HPCI Valve Operability Test. Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure initiated.W/891206 Ltr ML19332D1421989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-031-00:on 891024,closing Times for Two in-series Primary Containment Isolation Valves Exceeded Acceptance Criteria During Shutdown Testing.Cause Undetermined.Closing Time Retested W/Satisfactory results.W/891122 Ltr ML19332D6231989-11-20020 November 1989 LER 89-032-00:on 891020,pneumatic Pressure Drop for Two of Four Automatic Depressurization Sys Accumulators Discovered Greater than Max Acceptable Value.Caused by Leakage from Seat of Supply Check Valves.Seat replaced.W/891120 Ltr ML19324C3181989-11-0909 November 1989 LER 88-002-01:on 880117,full Reactor Protection Sys Scram Trip Signal Occurred During Surveillance Test,Resulting in Incomplete Actuations.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Logic Relay Replaced & Procedure revised.W/891109 Ltr ML19324B1131989-10-21021 October 1989 LER 89-030-00:on 890926,control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Sys Flowrate non-conservative Due to Procedure Error.Caused by Transcription Error.Procedure Revised & Test Reperformed Using Corrected procedure.W/891021 Ltr ML19325D4681989-10-16016 October 1989 LER 89-029-00:on 890914,locked High Radiation Area Door Found to Have Been Unsecured Contrary to Tech Spec 6.13.2. Caused by Failure to Adhere to Approved Procedures. Training on Access Requirements initiated.W/891016 Ltr ML19325D1861989-10-10010 October 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 890907,HPCI Sys Declared Inoperable Because Mechanical Overspeed Trip Occurred During Surveillance Test. Caused by Failure of Ramp Generator Signal Converter Module. Module Removed & Sent to Mfg for exam.W/891010 Ltr ML17277B8221984-07-20020 July 1984 LER 82-049/01X-1:on 821102,main Steam Line Safety Valve a Set W/Nitrogen at Steam Relief Setting.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Removed & Replaced W/Properly Set Spare Valve. Procedure revised.W/840720 Ltr ML20024C3231983-06-24024 June 1983 Updated LER 82-038/03X-1:on 820817,RCIC Steam Line High Differential Pressure Alarm Received.Caused by Air in Sensing Lines to Pressure Switches.Cross Threaded Cap Found on in-line Snubber.Snubber replaced.W/830624 Ltr ML20024C2211983-06-24024 June 1983 Updated LER 80-053/03X-1:on 800814,0907 & 14,HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Snubber 23-3-36 Determined Inoperable.Caused by Transient Hydrodynamic Shock During Startup & Shutdown. Snubbers upgraded.W/830624 Ltr ML20024B8451983-06-24024 June 1983 LER 83-031/03L-0:on 830528,HPCI Sys Made Inoperable to Repair Steam Leak on AO 2301-31.Caused by Leaking Stem Packing.Packing Replaced.Valve Tested Satisfactorily.Sys Returned to svc.W/830624 Ltr ML20024B8321983-06-24024 June 1983 LER 83-030/03L-0:on 830527,both HPCI Area Smoke Detection Sys Alarmed in Main Control Room.Caused by Valve A02301-31 Steam Leak Causing False Indications.Valve repaired.W/830624 Ltr ML20024C3101983-06-21021 June 1983 Updated LER 79-007/03X-1:on 790212,while Performing Test 8.7.4.3,valves AO-5033A,CV-5065-10,15,16 & 17 Failed to Give Proper Position Indication When Cycled & to Close within Specified Tolerance.Cause Not stated.W/830621 Ltr ML20024A8861983-06-16016 June 1983 LER 83-027/03L-0:on 830518,during Routine Insp,Folding Fire Door Found Inoperable.Caused by Operating Cable Becoming Detached from Pulley Due to Slack.Cable Reattached & Operating Mechanism adjusted.W/830616 Ltr ML20023D1691983-05-0909 May 1983 Updated LER 82-008/01X-1:on 820331,HPCI Injection Valve MO-2301-8 Failed to Open in Required Manner.Caused by Missing Wire Jumper Intended to Bypass Motor Operator Torque Switch.Jumper Installed & Valve Tested Satisfactorily ML20023D0671983-05-0909 May 1983 LER 83-021/03L-0:on 830411,during Surveillance Test 8.7.4.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valve AO-5033B Failed to Meet 10-s Closing Time Requirements.Caused by Lubricant Infiltrating Solenoid Valve Components.Components Replaced ML20023D0181983-05-0404 May 1983 LER 83-022/03L-0:on 830413,overload on Valve Motor 1301-17 Resulted in Loss of High Pressure Core Cooling Backup Capability.Caused by Oxidation in Motor End Bell & Motor Brushes,Due to Humidity Caused by Leaking Valve Packing ML20028G1591983-01-28028 January 1983 LER 83-002/01T-0:on 830116,flow Ref off-normal Alarm Received.Average Power Range Monitor Flux Scram Trip Settings Affected.Cause Under Investigation.Flow Inputs Monitored & Amplifier B Recalibr ML20028F4121983-01-17017 January 1983 LER 83-002/01X-0:on 830116,while Clearing off-normal Alarm for Flow Comparators,Average Power Range Monitor Flux Scram Trip Settings Found in Nonconservative Direction.Caused by Drifting Proportional Amplifiers.Settings Checked Daily ML20028B0421982-11-16016 November 1982 LER 82-049/01T-0:on 821102,main Steam Line Safety Valve a Set W/Nitrogen at Steam Relief Setting of 1240 Psig, Exceeding Tech Specs.Caused by Personnel Error.Set Valve Removed,Procedure Adherence Stressed & Procedure Revised ML20027C9801982-10-20020 October 1982 LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820920,timing Tests of Three Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Valves 1201-2,-5 & -80 Not Completed within Allowed Time.Caused by Operational Constraints Requiring Testing at Reduced Power ML20027C9941982-10-20020 October 1982 LER 82-040/03L-0:on 820920,found Reactor Protection Sys Initiation Function of Turbine Stop Valve Completed 1 Day Late.Caused by Decision to Defer Test Due to MSIV D Line Isolation.Tracking Sys Implemented to Prevent Recurrences ML20052B9141982-04-23023 April 1982 LER 82-010/03L-0:on 820326,during Review of Testing Requirements,Surveillance Test 8.I.4 Standby Liquid Control Sys Found Not Verified.Caused by Breakdown in Multidiscipline Review of Results ML20052F2071982-04-14014 April 1982 Updated LER 81-060/03X-1:on 811020,determined Potential Exists to Reduce Number of Operable APRM & IRM Instrument Channels in Rod Block Trip Sys to Below Tech Spec Min ML20050A6321982-03-19019 March 1982 Updated LER 82-055/01T-1:on 810926,during Shutdown,Yarway Level Indicators Started Oscillating.Drywell Temp Was 240 F at 81-ft W/Elevation Coolant Temp 220 F.Caused by Ineffective Drywell Cooling.Ventilation Returned to Svc ML20050A4521982-03-19019 March 1982 LER 82-006/01T-0:on 820304,while Performing Maint Re SIL 352 on Pressure Adjustment Mechanism HPCI Stop Valve,Three Broken cap-screws Found.No Cause Determined.Screws Examined, Replaced & Sys Returned to Svc ML20050A4331982-03-19019 March 1982 Updated LER 81-062/01X-1:on 811116,Wyle Labs Informed Util That Two Target Rock Safety Relief Valves Had Not Passed Setpoint Tests.Caused by Setpoint Shift Due to Changes to Designed Differential Forces from Excessive Pilot Leakage 1993-07-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217E3021999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station.With ML20212C2921999-09-16016 September 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Code Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216F3511999-09-0808 September 1999 ISI Summary Rept for Refuel Outage 12 at Pnps ML20216E6881999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20210R3401999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20209C4731999-07-0707 July 1999 Addendum to SE on Proposed Transfer of Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209H8251999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Commission with Evaluation of & Recommendations for Improvement in Processes Used in Staff Review & Approval of Applications for Transfer of Operating Licenses of TMI-1 & Pilgrim Station ML20209E6191999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196H2451999-06-29029 June 1999 SER Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative in Relief Request PRR-13,rev 2.Staff Determined That Proposed Alternative Provides Insufficient Info to Determine Adequacy of Scope of Implementation ML20209A8901999-06-28028 June 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-573 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209B9861999-06-23023 June 1999 Rev 13A to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR for Cycle 13 ML20217N9061999-06-21021 June 1999 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period of 970422-990621 ML20195K3431999-06-15015 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water System Piping for Plant ML20195G8231999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Pnps.With ML20207E7471999-05-27027 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Request Re Reduction of IGSCC Insp of Category D Welds Due to Implementation of HWC to License DPR-35 ML20206M1971999-05-11011 May 1999 SER Accepting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in ASME Code Class 3 Salt Svc Water Piping at Plant ML20206J6611999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20205L0221999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20207J5471999-03-0909 March 1999 Training Simulator,1999 4-Yr Certification Rept ML20207F9401999-03-0101 March 1999 Long Term Program Semi-Annual Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207H5451999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196E2151998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept.With ML20206Q2741998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20197J3591998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20195C9951998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20154K0721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20153D3901998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting 970707 Request to Use Guidance in GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water Sys Piping for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20197C5011998-09-0404 September 1998 Rev 12C,Pages 4 & 5 to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20197C5471998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 12C to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20151W8231998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20237E2251998-08-26026 August 1998 Suppl & Revs to SE for Amend 173 for Pigrim Nuclear Power Station ML20237A9941998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236U8201998-07-13013 July 1998 Rev 12B to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR (Cycle 12) ML20236P0151998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20249A3741998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.W/Undated Ltr ML20247H2081998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207B7601998-03-31031 March 1998 Final Rept, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Site-Specific Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedenss Prompt Alert & Notification System Quality Assurance Verification, Prepared for FEMA ML20216G3911998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J3741998-03-19019 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Evaluate Elevated Tailpipe Temp on Safety Relief Valve SRV 203-3B ML20248L2241998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station ML20202G5251998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236M8511997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept ML20198L7701997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20203D6101997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20202D5761997-11-0808 November 1997 1997 Evaluated Exercise BECO-LTR-97-111, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station1997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20217D6431997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Class 3 SSW Piping for Pilgrim ML20217H5621997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J4131997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20210J3321997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 1999-09-08
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Text
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10CFR50.73 O :
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Pilgrim Nuclear t'bwer Station Rocky Hill Road i Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360
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Ralph G. sird November 9, 1989 Senior Vice President - Nuclear BECo Ltr. 89- 165 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory (,ommission Attn: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 i
Dear Sir:
The enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-002-01 " Full Scram l' Trip Signal During Surveillance and Resulting Incomplete Actuations" is I.
submitted in accordance with 10CFR Part 50.73.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions regarding this .
report.
h I. R.G. ird L
RLC/bl ,
1
Enclosure:
LER 88-002-01 cc: Mr. William Russell Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406 1
l Sr. Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station Standard BECo LER Distribution l-1.
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On January 17, 1988 at 0113 hours0.00131 days <br />0.0314 hours <br />1.868386e-4 weeks <br />4.29965e-5 months <br />, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) !
scram trip signal occurred during a surveillance test. The automatic actuations resulting from the trip signal were incomplete in that portions of ;
the "B" trains of the Primary Containment System (PCS) and Secondary f Containment System (SCS) did not actuate as designed. A Control Rod Drive (CRD) System vent valve did not close automatically. Following immediate investigation, the RPS trip signal and isolations were reset at 0135 hours0.00156 days <br />0.0375 hours <br />2.232143e-4 weeks <br />5.13675e-5 months <br />.
l The cause for the trip signal was inadequacy of the procedure being used for the surveillance. The cause for the incomplete automatic actuations was high contact resistance of two contacts of a logic relay. The cause for the CRD System vent valve not closing automatically was mechanical binding of the valve due to excessive corrosion buildup between the valve bonnet and valve stem.
Corrective actions consisted of revising the surveillance procedure and replacing the logic relay. Corrective actions for the CRD System vent valve included removal of the excessive corrosion buildup between the valve bonnet and valve stem that caused the valve to bind.
This event occurred during an extended outage with negligible core decay heat I and with the mode selector switch in the SHUTDOWN position. There were no control rods in the withdrawn position at the time of the trip signal. The Reactor Vessel (RV) pressure was zero psig and the RV temperature was 92 degrees Farenheit. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Amoveo oMe No mo.oio4 ExPiatt t/31/ul 9 Acelliv NAMG lti puCkt T NUMSER 42) 4tR NUMSER del 'A05 431 naa " W Pt' tyiG Pile;rtn Nuclear Power Station ;
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REASON FOR SUPPLEMENT l This supplemental report is being submitted to provide the results of our root cause investigation regarding the high contact resistance on logic relay l RPWBO, and the cause for the mechanical binding of vent and drain valve 1 CV-302-23B, EVENT DESCRIPTION On January 17,1988 at 0113 hours0.00131 days <br />0.0314 hours <br />1.868386e-4 weeks <br />4.29965e-5 months <br />, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip signal occurred. The signal occurred during a surveillance test performed in '
accordance with Procedure number 8.H.2-2.1.2 " Reactor Level and Pressure l
Instrument Calibration". The signal occurred when a non-licensed utility
! Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technician was returning a reactor water level instrument to service following a satisfactory calibration check.
The trip signal resulted in several actuations that arc summarized below.
Primary Containment System (PCS) Group 1 reactor water (Recirculation System Loop "B") sample valves closed automatically as designed.
PCS Group 3 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) shutdown cooling isolation valves closed automatically as designed.
L PCS Group 6 Reactor hater Cleanup (RWCU) System isolation valves closed automatically as designed.
PCS/ Containment Atmosphere Control System (CACS) Group 2 Drywell air purge inlet and exhaust isolation valves (AO-50358 and 5044B respectively) failed to close automatically as designed. The redundant in-series air purge inlet and exhaust isolation valves closed automatically.
The "B" Train Secondary Containment System (SCS) supply and exhaust ventilation dampers failed to close automatically as designed. The redundant in-series Train "A" SCS supply and exhaust ventilation dampers closed automatically.
- Train PCS personnel access lock supply and exhaust ventilation The "B" dampers failed to close automatically as designed. The redundant in-series Train "A" access lock supply and exhaust ventilation dampers l_
closed automatically.
l The "B" Train of the SCS/ Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) failed to start autometically as designed. The redundant "A" Train of the SCS/SGTS started automatically.
1 The vent valves of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System scram discharge instrument volume (SDV) tanks (west and east) closed automatically as designed except for CV-302-23B (redundant vent valve for west SDV tank).
Tne drain valves of the CRD System SDV tanks all closed automatically as designed.
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1 nxw . , ,-c -., nn Following immediate investigation, the RPS trip signal and isolations were ;
reset on January 17, 1988 at 0135 hours0.00156 days <br />0.0375 hours <br />2.232143e-4 weeks <br />5.13675e-5 months <br />. The "A" loop of the RHRS was returned to the shutdown cooling mode of operation at 0215 hours0.00249 days <br />0.0597 hours <br />3.554894e-4 weeks <br />8.18075e-5 months <br />. The "B" train of the SGTS was returned to standby service at 0810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br />. The RHCU system was returned to service following the reset of the isolation. ;
Failure and Halfunction Report (F&MR) 88-12 wat written to document the ,
reactor scram trip signal. F&MR 88-13 was written to document the incomplete ;
actuation of the SCS/ ventilation dampers SCS/SGTS, and PCS/CACS isolation valves; a priority Maintenance Request (MR 88-30) was issued to further .
investigate. F&MR 88-14 was written to document the failure of the SDV tank vent valve to close automatically; MR 88-31 was issued to further ;
investigate. Notification of the trip signal and incomplete actuations was made to the NRC Operations Center on January 17, 1988 at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />.
1 This event occurred during an extended outage with plant conditions that were as follows. The mode selector switch was in the SHUTDOHN position. There was negligible core decay heat with the reactor water temperature at approximately 92 degrees Fahrenheit. The "A" loop of the RHRS was in the shutdown cooling '
mode of operation with the "A" pump in service. The RHCU System was in service. The process computer was out of service (from 0020 to 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />).
CAUSE l The cause for the RPS trip signal was procedural inadequacy. The procedure did not contain sufficient instructions or cautions to alert the technician that air introduced into the sensing lines of local level indicator (LI-263-59A) during calibration could affect other instruments mounted on the same RPS Instrumentation Rack (C-2205). The (trapped) air introduced a fluctuation in the sensing lines when LI-263-59A was being returned to ,
service. The fluctuation was sensed by level indicating switches LIS-263-57A
-57B -72A and -72C as an abnormal reactor water level that was sufficient to generate the RPS trip signal. These level indicating switches share a sensing line that is common to the local level indicator.
1 The cause for the failure of the "B" trains of the PCS and SCS to actuate automatically was the failure of logic relay RPHBO contacts 3 (three) and 4 l
(four) to establish electrical continuity when the relay became de-energized.
The relay is normally energized with the contacts in the open position. The designed response of the relay is to become de-en..cized as a result of an RPS signal. The relay functioned properly except for cc,* tacts 3 and 4 that did not close sufficiently for electrical continuity. ihe contact resistance of the contacts was measured in the meg-ohms region when the relay was tested in the de-energized state. To further determine root cause and identify corrective t.ction to preclude recurrence, a representative sample of 21 type l HFA relays that had been set-up or installed during the outage was selected to check if the contact wipe fell within the General Electric (G.E.)
specification. The inspection and testing was performed utilizing the appropriate sections of maintenance procedure 3.M.3-30, "HFA Relays /Preinsta11ation Testing and Adjustment, Removal / Installation and Testing Coil Replacement, Preventive Maintenance".
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1 Of the 21 relays tested, 3 were found to have contact wipe adjustment out of '
tolerance. One additional relay was added to the sample group because the relay was noted to have contact arms bent opposite to that which would be expected for proper wipe adjustment. When tested this relay also failed to fall within the specified tolerance.
- As part of the review of the root cause, a G.E. factory representative was l contracted to consult on the problem. The G.E. representative reviewed the .
station procedure for setting up HFA relays and observed workers testing and I adjusting relays in the field. The G.E. representative found the procedure ;
adequate but he indicated that the practice of setting the wipe adjustment near the minimum tolerance probably contributed to the reason why the three ,
relays were found out of specification. G.E. also concurred with a BECo proposal to narrow the tolerance envelope in the procedure to decrease the likelihood of drifting outside of the qualified published tolerance envelope.
The practice of isolating contacts by " booting" the contact was also observed to determine if contact arm bending was occurring during the " booting" process. Both the G.E. representative and the Systems Engineer who observed the process agreed that the " booting" would not likely cause contact arm bending. The cause of the contact arm bending could not be established with certainty.
In order to preclude any additional in-service relay failures, the remaining HFA relays replaced during the extended outage were visually inspected by the Systems Engineer for contact wipe misadjustment. The inspection included checking for indication that the contact arm had been bent in the wrong direction and comparing adjacent contacts for alignment and contact arm spring compression. This inspection identified 4 relays which were suspect. The i
G.E. factory representative performed an independent inspection on the same l group of relays. The representative's inspection identified one additional L
suspect relay with a possible bent stationary contact arm. Maintenance l Requests were written for the (five) 5 suspect relays to test them per l Maintenance Procedure 3.M.3-30. No incidence of contact wipe misadjustment was found for any of the five suspect relays.
l The cause for the west SOV tank vent valve (CV-302-23B) failing to close L automatically was confirmed to be mechanical binding of the valve. The valve I is controlled by air from a solenoid operated valve that also controls the l west SDV tank drain valve CV-302-228. Drain valve CV-302-22B closed I automatically as designed. The air to the vent valve was disconnected in order to investigate the possibility that the vent valve did not close because of a pneumatic problem. The vent valve did not close as a functional valve would when the air was removed. The vent valve did not close when a manual attempt was made using the valve's handwheel. The vent valve is a one inch Y-pattern globe valve, model 105 DAB 6-001, manufactured by the Borg-Harner Corporation.
N%C FORM 346A
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Subsequent disassembly and inspection of valve CV-302-23B determined the valve binding was the result of excessive corrosion buildup between the valve bonnet and the valve stem during the extended outage, i Prior to the performance of surveillance testing associated with fuel loading (Fall 1987), the SDV vent and orain valves had not been cycled since January 1987. The Technical Specifications require the vent and drain valves to be cycled quarterly when the CRD System is required to be operabic. Because the CRD System was not required to be operable during this' time period, the vent !
and drain valves were not cycled. Cycling of the valves on a regular (quarterly) basis would have precluded the excessive corrosion buildup that occurred.
CORRECTIVE ACTION The surveillance procedure (8.M.2-2.1.2) was revised following review, and approved on January 30, 1988. The additional instructions provided to maintenance personnel for isolating, connecting and disconnecting test ,
equipment, and returning local level indicators LI-263-59A and -598 to service l are expected to preclude the likelihood of a recurrence in the future.
The relay (RPHBO) was replaced with a new relay. The new relay was tested prior to installation and post work tested witn satisfr.ctory results following !
installation. The removed relay was controlled and delivered to General Electric's Relay Test Laboratory to determine the cause for the high contact resistance.
Maintenance Procedure 3.M.3-30, Rev. 5 was approved on February 3,1989 which narrowed the HFA relay contact wiping tolerances. The narrowing of these {
tolerances will increase the reliability for contacts closing on HFA relays. >
l l The corrosion was recoved from the valve stem and bonnet of valve CV302-23B ,
L (MR 88-31) using an approved solvent. Following cleaning of the valve stem !
i and valve bonnet, a tolerance check was performed on the clearance between the L stem and bonnet. The clearance was found to be out of specification. The 3 required clearance specification is based on preventing the stem packing from '
being pulled into the clearance space between the bonnet and stem. ESR 88-472 I was written to request NED to evaluate the use of an alternative type packing based on the vendor's recommendation. The recommended alternative packing is l
I a type that would not be extruded (pulled) into the stem / bonnet space. Based on the engineering evaluation (ERM 88-557) and vendor recommendation, valve CV302-23B was re-assembled using a anti-extrusion packing arrangement as an interim repair. The valve bonnet will be replaced as a long term action.
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0l1 0l 6 or 0l 7 Additionally, Procedure 8.3.3, " Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valve Quarterly Operability," was revised to require the vent and drain ,
valves to be full-stroke exercised each quarter as part of the In-Service Testing (IST) Program.
SM ETY CONSEOUENCES This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public.
The event occurred during an extended outage while in the cold shutdown condition with negligible core decay heat and with no control rods in the withdrawn position.
Had this event ocrerred during operation with any or all control rods in the withdrawn positiol., the control rods would have been inserted automatically into the core thereby placing the reactor in a shutdown condition.
The portions of the PCS and SCS that failed to actuate automatically were i compensated for by the redundant portions that actuated automatically as designed.
The failure of a SDV tank vent or drain valve to close automatically is compensated for by the automatic closing of the redundant vent or drain valve installed for each SDV tank. Each vent or drain valve may also be operated
- t. through the use of a handwheel. In the unlikely event that both vent valves or both drain valves of a SDV tank did not close automatically or could not subsequently be closed manually, the water from the tank (s) would be directed to the Reactor Building equipment sump. The function of the CR0 System to ,
insert the control rods into the core would not be affected by the open
, position of both vent valves or both drain valves of either or both SDV tanks.
l l
Control Room operator corrective actions for response to alarms or I malfunctions are addressed in procedures that include: 2.1.6, " Reactor Scram";
- l. 2.2.50, " Standby Gas Treatment"; 2.2.70," Primary Containment Atmosphere l Control System; 2.4.25, " Loss of Shutdown Cooling"; and 2.4.27, " Reactor Water Cleanup System Halfunctions".
The RPS trip signal was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because the signal was not an expected part of the surveillance.
The interruption in the operation of the RHRS/ shutdown cooling and RHCU System l
was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(iv) because the automatic closing of the isolation valves of those systems, although an expected part of the RPS trip signal, was an unnecessary challenge to the valves. The failure of the "B" trains of the SCS and PCS to actuate was i
determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii) because a single i- cause (relay RHPBO) resulted in the failure (incomplete actuation) of one l train in more than one system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
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- *"IfRIEXMN"NMils EVENTS I i
A review of Pilgrim Station Licensee Event Reports (LERs) written since January 1984 was conducted. The review focused on LERs submitted pursuant to i 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) involving actuation of the RPS that were caused b) I procedural inadequacy.
1-The review identified a similar event reported in LER 50-293/84-014-00. For I that event, a full RPS scram signal occurred during a refueling outage. The signal occurred during maintenance for the SDV (half signal generated)
~
concurrent with a loss of power to the "B" RPS motor generator set. The cause for the loss of power was procedural inadequacy.
The review also included a review of Pilgrim Station LERs written since January 1984 for which the cause was identified as the failure of a 125 VDC HFA relay. No previous failures were identified.
ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES The EIIS codes for this event are as follows:
i COMPONENTS CODES Relay (RPWBO) RLY Valve (CV-302-23B) XCV SYSTEMS Containment Combustible Gas Control System (CACS) BB Containment Isolation Control System (PCIS/RBIS) JM j Control Rod Drive System (CRD) AA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (PCIS/RBIS/RPS) JE ;
Primary Containment System (PCS) JM Reactor Building (SCS) NG l Reactor Water Cleanup System (RHCU) CE Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS/ shutdown cooling) B0 i Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) BH -
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