ML20011D136

LER 89-035-00:on 891111,inadvertent Actuation of Portion of Secondary Containment Sys During Surveillance Testing Occurred.Caused by Location of Radiation Isolation Control Sys Channel a Logic Relay.Procedure revised.W/891211 Ltr

ML20011D136
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	12/11/1989
From:	Bird R, Ellis D BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BECO-89-175, LER-89-035, LER-89-35, NUDOCS 8912200373
Download: ML20011D136 (5)

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o- Pilgrim Nuclear Pow Station - .j s Rocky HillRoad i l'. Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 A.

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-< Ralph G. Bird ,

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[ 5enior Vice President - Nuclear .

December n, 1989-BECo Ltr 89-175 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

4 2 Attn: ' Document Control Desk 7 Hashington, D.C. 20555 l

Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35

Dear Sir:

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The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-035-00, " Inadvertent Actuation of a  :

Portion of the Secondary Containment System During Surveillance Testing due to Location of Logic Relay", is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.73.

Please-do not hesitate to contact me if there are any questions regarding this report.

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. DHEIbal

Enclosure:

LER 89-035-00 cc: Mr. Hilliam Russell

-Regional Administrator,- Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

475 Allendale Rd..

-King of Prussia, PA 19406 Sr. NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station

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On November 11,1989 at 1411 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.368855e-4 months <br />, an inadvertent actuation of a portion of Channel

'A' of the Reactor Building Isolation Control System (RBIS) occurred during a semi-annual surveillance test. The actuation resulted in the automatic closing of the Train 'A' Secondary Containment System (SCS)/ Reactor Building ventilation dampers.

The RBIS circuitry was restored to normal and reset, and the affected SCS dampers were reopened at 1437 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.467785e-4 months <br />, lhe cause for the actuation was the location of an RBIS Channel 'A' logic relay that adversely affected the ability to jumper a normally closed pair of contacts for the test. A critique that was conducted identified interim corrective actions for possible improvement for testing RBIS Channel ' A' (and 'B') logic relays. Long term corrective actions planned include improvements related to tests that involve the installation of jumpers, blocking relay contacts, lif ting wires, or the removal of fuses.

The actuation occurred during power operation with the reactor mode selector switch in the RUN position. The reactor power level was 93 percent. The Reactor Vessel (RV) l pressure was 1000 psig with the RV water temperature at 545 degrees Fahrenheit. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and the actuation posed no threat to the public heelth and safety.

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Tun w ee, e .ws ,< ,a sunne nc se muv em t EVENT DESCRIPTION On November 11, 1989 at 1411 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.368855e-4 months <br />, an inadvertent actuation of a portion of Channel

'A' of the Reactor Building Isolation Control System (RBIS) occurred during a semi-annual surveillance test.

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. The actuation resulted in the automatic closing of the Secondary Containment System (SCS)/ Reactor Building Train 'A' supply and exhaust ventilation dampers.

The surveillance was being performed per procedure 8.M.2-1.5.8.1 (Rev. 14), "High Drywell Pressure, Low Hater Level and High Radiation Logic System A - Inboard functional Test". The event occurred at step 19 [(d)(2)b) of Attachment 1 (one) of the procedure. This procedural step, installing a jumper to relay RPHA contacts 9-10, is performed to maintain electrical continuity for these normally closed pair of contacts. The 125 VDC coil of relay RPHA is normally de-energized but the coil later becomes energized at a subsequent procedural step. After connecting the jumper to the lead of (armature) contact number 10, the other end of the jumper was being connected to (stationary) contact number 9. The minor force exerted by the jumper to contact number 10 during the jumper installation to contact number 9 was sufficient for contact number 10 to become disconnected from contact number 9 and thereby result in the event.

The RBIS circuitry was restored to normal and reset. The affected Reactor Building ventilation dampers were reopened at 1437 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.467785e-4 months <br />. The test was terminated and its completion will be tracked via the Master Surveillance Tracking Program.

Failure and Malfunction Report 89-440 was written to document the event. The NRC i Operations Center was notified on November 11, 1989 at 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />.

The actuation occurred during power operation with the reactor mode selector switch in the RUN position. The reactor power level was 93 percent. The Reactor Vessel (RV) pressure was approximately 1000 psig with the RV water temperature at 545 degrees Fahrenheit.

CAUSI A critique of the event was conducted and attended by appropriate personnel including the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians who were performing the test.

The cause for the actuation was the location of relay RPHA that adversely affected the

' ability to install jumpers to relay contacts for the test. The relay is a surface mounted relay (General Electric type HFA). The relay is located within Panel C-7 on the rear left hand side at a height of approximately six feet. Hiring and related components located adjacently above and below the relay precluded the use of the ,

relay's external electrical terminations for the testing being performed.  !

There were no component or system failures that caused or resulted from this event.

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0l0 0 13 oF 0 l4 CORRECTIVE ACTION Corrective actions being considered include possible revision of the test procedure (8.M.2-1.5.8.1) to modify the test steps or to identify an RBIS actuation as part of the test. Additional corrective actions being considered include possible relay relocation and/or the installation of an external terminal strip.

Long term improvements for testing are within the scope of the Long Term Plan (item 224). The improvements are related to tests that involve the installation of jumpers, blocking relay contacts, lifting wires, or the removal of fuses. The implementation of the improvements will be tracked via the Long Term Plan.

SAFETY CONSEOUENCES This event posed no threat to the public health and safety.

The RBIS actuation that occurred was the designed response to the relay RPHA contacts (9-10) becoming disconnected during the test.

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because the RBIS actuation, although a designed response, was not an expected part of the test being performed.

SIMILARITY TO PREVIOUS EVENTS A review was conducted of Pilgrim Station Licensee Event Reports (LERs) written since January 1984. The review focused on LERs submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) involving an RBIS actuation that occurred during a surveillance type activity. The review identified related events reported in LERs 50-293/85-015-00, 85-017-00, 88-011-00 and 89-003-00.

For LER 85-015-00, an RBIS actuation occurred during power operation while performing ,

a daily check (procedure 2.1.15) of the SCS/ Reactor Building refuel floor ventilation exhaust radiation monitors. The event occurred on June 24, 1985 at 0718 hours0.00831 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.73199e-4 months <br /> when the cover of an RBIS Channel 'A' monitor (located at Panel C-910) was closed too hard. The closure of the cover resulted in an upscale trip signal that together with a concurrent RBIS Channel 'B' trip signal, resulted in the event. The cause was attributed to utility licensed operator error.

For LER 85-017-00, an RBIS actuation occurred during power operation while performing a semi-annual surveillance test (procedure 8.M.2-1.5.8.2). The event occurred on July 12, 1985 at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> when the contacts of two logic relays (RBIS Channels 'A' and 'B') were incorrectly opened contrary to the procedure. The cause was attributed to utility non-licensed technician error.

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0l 0 0l 4 or oj4 text m - . w. - ==c % asu w m, For LER 88-011-00, an RBIS actuation occurred during an outage while performing a daily check (procedure 2.1.15) of the four SCS/ Reactor Building refuel floor exhaust radiation monitors located at Panel C-910. The event occurred on March 31, 1988 at 1242 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.72581e-4 months <br /> as a result of incorrectly resetting each of the first three monitors prior to checking the fourth monitor. The cause was attributed to utility licensed operator error.

For LER 89-003-00, an RBIS actuation occurred during an outage while performing a semi-annual surveillance test (procedure 8.M.2-1.5.8.1). The event occurred on January 15, 1989 at 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br /> when the keylocked RBIS Channel 'A' control switch, located at Panel C-7, was inadvertently moved to the TEST position instead of the TEST LOGIC position during the test. The cause was attributed to utility licensed operator error.

ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES The EIIS codes for this report are as follows:

COMPONENTS COES Relay (RPHA) RLY SYSTEMS Containment Isolation Control System (RBIS) JM Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (RBIS) JE Panels System (C-7) JL Reactor Building (SCS) NG Reactor Building Environmental Control System (RBIS) VA Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) B0 g,oa m.