ML16145A325

2016-04 - Final Operating Test

ML16145A325
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	04/25/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16145A325 (448)

Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Perform STP I-1A Channel Checks Conduct of Operations 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make M, R operational judgments based on operating (NRCL141-A1) characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(4.4)

(modified from NRCL061-A1)

Determine Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement (NRCL141-A2) procedures.

(2.5)

(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)

Determine Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements Equipment Control M, R 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

(NRCL141-A3) (4.1)

(modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)

Evaluate Does Limits and Margin for RHR System Work Radiation Control N, R 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit (NRCL141-A4) requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

(3.5)

(New)

Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, M, R curves, tables, etc.

(NRCL141-A5) (4.2)

(modified from Bank LJC-014)

Review Determination of Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement (NRCL141-A6) procedures (3.4)

(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)

Determine Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements Equipment Control M, R 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

(NRCL141-A7) (4.3)

(modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)

Authorize Gas Decay Tank Discharge Radiation Control 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

M, R (3.8)

(NRCL141-A8) (from NRCADM061-RC-SRO)

Classify Inability to Establish Control of the Plant Following a Control Room Evacuation Emergency Procedures/Plan N, R 2.4.41 Emergency Procedures/Plan.

(NRCL141-A9) (4.6)

(New)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A1

Title:

PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for RO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• Partial STP I-1A Routine Shift Checks Required by Licensee, Rev 133

• Photos of the Pressurizer and Steam Generator level channels (Attachment 1)

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 3.2, 3.3 Job Designation: RO Rev Comments Modified from NRCL061-A1 Gen KA # G2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make 4.4 operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO / JOHN BECERRA DATE: 03/31/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• Partial STP I-1A Routine Shift Checks Required by Licensee, Rev 133

• Photos of the Pressurizer and Steam Generator level (Attachment 1)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to CHANNEL CHECK the current Steam Generator and Pressurizer Levels per STP I-1A, Mode 1 Shift Checklist, Sections 12, steps 12.32 and 12.36.

Use the attached images of Pressurizer and S/G Level channels to determine which channel(s) meet or do not meet the requirements.

Document your results on in the table below before reporting out. The Shift Foreman will address any required tracking documents or corrective actions needed.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: The following instruments correctly identified as UNACCEPTABLE CHANNEL CHECKS:

• SG1 Level Channel LI-519

• SG3 Level Channel LI-538 NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 2 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 12.1.1 - Prepares to perform 1.1 Reviewed the performance guidelines CHANNEL CHECK per STP I-1A prior to performing this surveillance, step 12.1 1.2 Reviewed Notes 1 and 2 Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. Step 12.31 - Performs Pressurizer 2.1 Performed a CHANNEL CHECK on the Level Instrument CHANNEL CHECK following instruments:

• LI-459A

• LI460A

• LI-461 2.2 Determined that all channels meet the CHANNEL CHECK requirements per Ops Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 3 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Performs Steam Generator Water 3.1 Performed a CHANNEL CHECK on the Level Instrument CHANNEL CHECK following instruments:

a. SG1

• LI-517, 518, 519

b. SG2

• LI-527, 528, 529

c. SG3

• LI-537, 538, 539

d. SG4

• LI-547, 548, 549 3.2 Determined that LI-519 is greater than 5.0% lower than the other two channels and therefore did NOT meet the CHANNEL CHECK requirements per Ops Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria **

3.3 Determined that LI-538 is greater than 5.0% lower than the other two channels and therefore did NOT meet the CHANNEL CHECK requirements per Ops Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 4 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Notifies Shift Foreman 4.1 Documented that 2 Steam Generator Channels did not pass the channel check.

4.2 Placed a circled note number at surveillance step

• 12.36.1.a

• 12.36.1.c 4.3 Recorded the following in the comments section:

• Note number

• Step number Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 5 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

Pressurizer Level Channel Value Deviation LI-459A 53 -7 -1 LI-460A 60 +7 +6 LI-461 54 -6 +1 Steam Generator Levels Channel Value Deviation Channel Value Deviation LI-517 66 -1 +6 LI-537 67 +6 0 LI-518 67 +1 +7 LI-538 61 -6 -6 LI-519 60 -7 -6 LI-539 67 +6 0 LI-527 65 +3 +2 LI-547 66 -2 -3 LI-528 62 -3 -1 LI-548 68 +2 -1 LI-529 63 +1 -2 LI-549 69 +1 +3 NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 6 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY Pressurizer Levels Channel Met Not Met LI-459A X LI-460A X LI-461 X Steam Generator Levels Channel Met Not Met Channel Met Not Met LI-517 X LI-537 X LI-518 X LI-538 X LI-519 X LI-539 X LI-527 X LI-547 X LI-528 X LI-548 X LI-529 X LI-549 X NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 7 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 8 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 9 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 10 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 11 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 12 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to CHANNEL CHECK the current Steam Generator and Pressurizer Levels per STP I-1A, Mode 1 Shift Checklist, Sections 12, steps 12.32 and 12.36.

Use the attached images of Pressurizer and S/G Level channels to determine which channel(s) meet or do not meet the requirements.

Document your results on in the table below before reporting out. The Shift Foreman will address any required tracking documents or corrective actions needed.

Pressurizer Levels Channel Met Not Met LI-459A LI-460A LI-461 Steam Generator Levels Channel Met Not Met Channel Met Not Met LI-517 LI-537 LI-518 LI-538 LI-519 LI-539 LI-527 LI-547 LI-528 LI-548 LI-529 LI-549 NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 13 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ATTACHMENT 1 - LEVEL READINGS NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 14 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ATTACHMENT 1 - LEVEL READINGS NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 15 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: PERFORM STP I-1A CHANNEL CHECKS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A1 ATTACHMENT 1 - LEVEL READINGS NRCL141-A1 rev PAGE 16 OF 16 REV. 2 2.docx

PARTIAL PROCEDURE - EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R133 Page 10 of 115 U1 Section 12: Page 1 of 28

12. MODE 1 Shift Checklist PERF 12.1 Preparation 12.1.1 Review the following performance guidelines prior to performing this surveillance: _____

NOTE 1: Place keeping in this surveillance is NOT required.

NOTE 2: Unless otherwise specified in the step, subsections may be performed out of order. For example, subsection 12.4 may be performed before 12.3.

a. IF the step does NOT meet MODE applicability or other conditions, THEN check subsection N/A box.

b. Check applicable box to record the instrument used to check parameter.

c. Complete the following to check operability:

• M&TE information if required

• Any required calculations

• Parameter values

d. IF provided, THEN check parameters against operability criteria.

e. IF parameter is acceptable, THEN initial line to record acceptance.

NOTE: A step is NOT acceptable if any part of the check or verification is unacceptable for any reason.

f. IF a step is NOT acceptable, THEN perform the following:

1. Notify SFM.

2. Place a circled note number at the surveillance step.

3. Record the following in the Comments Section:

• Note number

• Step number

• Tracking document number (TS sheet number for all TS or ECG items)T35501

• Notification or Order number(s)

STP_I-1Au1r33.DOC 1130.1350

PARTIAL PROCEDURE - EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R133 Page 29 of 115 U1 Section 12: Page 20 of 28 12.30 Overtemperature Delta-T Setpoint Instruments Applicability Requirement Instrument MODE 1 SR 3.3.1.1 Overtemperature Loop (Table 3.3.1-1) Delta-T Setpoint Instruments 12.30.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the following instruments: _____

• TI-411C

• TI-421C

• TI-431C

• TI-441C 12.31 Pressurizer Pressure Instruments Applicability Requirement Instrument MODE 1 SR 3.3.1.1 (Table 3.3.1-1) Pressurizer Pressure SR 3.3.2.1 (Table 3.3.2-1) Instruments 12.31.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the following instruments: _____

• PI-455A

• PI-456

• PI-457

• PI-474 12.32 Pressurizer Level Instruments Applicability Requirement Instrument MODE 1 SR 3.3.1.1 Pressurizer Level Instruments 12.32.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the following instruments: _____

• LI-459A

• LI-460A

• LI-461 STP_I-1Au1r33.DOC 1130.1350

PARTIAL PROCEDURE - EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R133 Page 32 of 115 U1 Section 12: Page 23 of 28 12.36 Steam Generator Water Level Instruments Applicability Requirement Instrument MODE 1 SR 3.3.1.1 Steam Generator Water SR 3.3.2.1 Level Instruments ECG SR 4.4.4 12.36.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the following instruments:

a. SG 1: _____

• LI-517

• LI-518

• LI-519

b. SG 2: _____

• LI-527

• LI-528

• LI-529

c. SG 3: _____

• LI-537

• LI-538

• LI-539

d. SG 4: _____

• LI-547

• LI-548

• LI-549 12.37 Condensate Storage Tank Volume Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 SR 3.7.6.1 Condensate Storage Tank Volume 12.37.1 Select instrument used: _____

[ ] LI-148, Condensate Storage Tank 1-1

[ ] LR-100, Condensate Storage Tank 1-1 Recorder 12.37.2 Record Condensate Storage Tank Level: _______% _____

12.37.3 Check tank level 54% [200,000 usable gallons]. _____

STP_I-1Au1r33.DOC 1130.1350

PARTIAL PROCEDURE - EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R133 Page 62 of 115 U1 Section 13: Page 25 of 25 13.41 Control Room Pressurization System Radiation Monitors Applicability Requirement Instrument MODE 2 ECG SR 23.7.1 Control Room Pressurization MODE 3 System Radiation Monitors 13.41.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the following instruments: _____

• RM-51

• RM-52

• RM-53

• RM-54 COMMENTS:

PERFORMERS AND VERIFIERS (Section 13)T35030 Name Signature Date/Time Initial

/

/

/

/

/

/

STP_I-1Au1r33.DOC 1130.1350

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A2

Title:

DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Rev 52.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.4, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.11 Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: Modified from NRCADM061C-A1 Gen KA / Rating: G2.1.42 - Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement 2.5 procedures.

Note: This is an admin JPM (RO), intended for the classroom setting.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Attachments 3 and 4, Rev 52

• Examinee Handout - VB1 Screen Image and Aux Building U1 Operator rounds sheets (partial)

• Calculator Initial Conditions Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 with fuel offload in progress during 1R19.

Plant parameters are as follows:

• MODE 3 was entered 5 days ago at 0730

• Todays date is October 10, 2015

• Current time is 1930

• Current shift is Nights

• 120 fuel assemblies have been offloaded to the spent fuel pool

• Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1-1 is secured

• Local CCW Hx indications are inaccessible due to area scaffolding Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to complete Attachment 3, Core Offload Rate and Attachment 4, Spent Fuel Pool Parameters, of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, and determine if parameters are acceptable or unacceptable by completing the table below.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Attachments 3 and 4 of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, completed properly and the following parameters are correctly classified:

• Core offload rate is ACCEPTABLE

• Spent Fuel Pool temperature is ACCEPTABLE

• CCW Flow Rate is ACCEPTABLE

• CCW Hx temperature on TI-181 is UNACCEPTABLE (high)

• CCW Hx temperature on TI-182 is ACCEPTABLE

• DP for Spent Fuel Pool pump 1-2 is UNACCEPTABLE (low)

NRCL141-A2 PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Examinee should use 10/05/15 for date and 0730 for the time.

1. Determine MODE 3 Entry, date & time. 1.1 Determined MODE 3 entry date and time and entered on Attachment 3.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2.** Determine current offload rate. 2.1 Entered 10/10/15 and 1930 on Attachment 3.

2.2 Determined that 132 hours0.00153 days <br />0.0367 hours <br />2.18254e-4 weeks <br />5.0226e-5 months <br /> have elapsed from start of core offload and enters data on Attachment 3.

2.3 Determined that number of fuel assemblies offloaded is 120 and enters data on Attachment 3.

2.4 Determined that elapsed time and number of assemblies removed is within the acceptable area of chart. Checks Yes.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A2 PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Determine Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 3.1 Entered 10/10/15 and 1930 on Attachment 4.

System Status.

Note: The following steps do not need to be performed in this sequence.

3.2 Determined that Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is 124°F and enters data on Attachment 4.

3.3 Determined that Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is acceptable.**

3.4 Determined CCW flow rate from FI-197 is 3050 gpm and enters data on Attachment 4.

3.5 Determined that CCW flowrate is acceptable.**

Note: Temperature recordings are limited to accuracy no greater than half way between two tick marks (2.5 °F).

3.6 Determined that the CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperatures are approximately 77.5°F on TI-181 and 72.5°F on TI-182 and enters data on Attachment 4.

3.7 Determined that CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature is NOT acceptable.**

3.8 Determined that SFP Pump 1-1 D/P is N/A (or 0 psid or blank) .

3.9 Determined that SFP Pump 1-1 D/P is acceptable (pump is out of service).

3.10 Determined that SFP Pump 1-2 D/P is 36 psid and enters data on Attachment 4.

3.11 Determined that SFP Pump 1-2 D/P is unacceptable.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A2 PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Notifies Shift Foreman 4.1 Noted that Spent Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters (Attachment 4) are not met due to high CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature and low Spent Fuel Pool pump DP.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A2 PAGE 5 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET ATTACHMENT 3 NRCL141-A2 PAGE 6 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET ATTACHMENT 4 Note: temperature recordings for VB-1 are limited to accuracy no greater than half way between two tick marks (2.5 oF).

Acceptable/ N/A Unacceptable Offload Rate X SFP Temperature X FI-197 X TI-182 X TI-181 X SFP pump 1-1 DP N/A SFP pump 1-2 DP X ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A2 PAGE 7 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A2 LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 with fuel offload in progress during 1R19.

Plant parameters are as follows:

• MODE 3 was entered 5 days ago at 0730

• Todays date is October 10, 2015

• Current time is 1930

• Current shift is Nights

• 120 fuel assemblies have been offloaded to the spent fuel pool

• Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1-1 is secured

• Local CCW Hx indications are inaccessible due to area scaffolding Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to complete Attachment 3, Core Offload Rate and Attachment 4, Spent Fuel Pool Parameters, of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, and determine if parameters are acceptable or unacceptable by completing the table below.

Acceptable/ N/A Unacceptable Offload Rate SFP Temperature FI-197 TI-182 TI-181 SFP pump 1-1 DP SFP pump 1-2 DP NRCL141-A2 PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 2

PARTIAL PROCEDURE - EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM OP B-8DS1 R52 Page 26 of 28 Core Offload Rate U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 1 of 2 NOTE 1: Level of use for this attachment is Continuous.

NOTE 2: Tracking offload rate is not required if 148 hours0.00171 days <br />0.0411 hours <br />2.44709e-4 weeks <br />5.6314e-5 months <br /> have elapsed since MODE 3 entry.

1. The Control Operator shall ensure every four hours that the rate of core offload does not exceed the ability of the SFP cooling system to dissipate the heat load by ensuring that the offload rate is within the parameters shown on the chart.

2. MODE 3 Entry, Date/Time: ________/________

Current Hours Since Number of Fuel Offload Rate Date/Time Mode 3 Entry Assemblies Acceptable?

Offloaded Yes No

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

________/________ [ ] [ ]

OP_B-8DS1u3r52.doc 1019.2213

Acceptable Number of Offloaded Fuel Assemblies Vs. Time Since Shutdown 200 Core Offload Rate 175 OP_B-8DS1u3r52.doc 1019.2213 UNACCEPTABLE 150 125 100 Number of Fuel Assemblies Offloaded 75 50 ACCEPTABLE 25 0

OP B-8DS1 R52 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 Hours Since Mode 3 Entry U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 2 of 2 Page 27 of 28

OP B-8DS1 R52 Page 28 of 28 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Parameters During Core Offload U1&2 Attachment 4: Page 1 of 1 NOTE 1: Level of use for this attachment is Continuous.

NOTE 2: Monitoring and logging of SFP parameters is required until core is fully reloaded.Ref 6.2.3a

1. Record SFP cooling data every two hours when the core is not fully loaded.

2. Notify the SFM immediately if any parameter is approaching limits.

3. Upon completion of core reload, forward Attachment 4 Data Sheets to the SFM for inclusion in the Operations Shift Log.

Sheet # Date Time SFP temp FI-197 TI-182 TI-181 SFP pp 1 p SFP pp 2 p

< 125°F T35464 3000 - 4040 (VB1) (VB1) 53 psid AND 37 psid AND gpm OR OR 55 psid 39 psid 6 TI-898 TI-895

< 75°F < 75°F

[ ] Continued on next sheet OP_B-8DS1u3r52.doc 1019.2213

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A3

Title:

DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING REQUIREMENTS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP2.ID2, Tagging Requirements, Rev 21 OVID 107713, Sheet 2, Rev 39 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2 Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: Modified from NRCADM061-EC-RO Gen KA / Rating: G2.2.13 - Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. 4.1 Note: This is an admin JPM (RO), intended for the classroom setting.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 04/19/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 04/19/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 3

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A3 TAGGING REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required

• OP2.ID2, Tagging Requirements, Rev 21 Materials:

• OVID 107713, Sheet 2, Rev 39 Initial SFP Pump 2-1 is to be shut down and cleared for pump and motor preventive Conditions maintenance. The work package specifies the pump casing is to be drained.

Maintenance does not require the local cabinet disconnect switch, LPG-66, to be included as part of the clearance boundary.

SFP Pump 2-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Shift Foreman directs you to identify clearance points, cleared positions, and appropriate tagging requirements for this clearance.

Complete attachment below before reporting out.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: All clearance points are identified with required position and proper tagging. The following critical steps are identified and documented on examinee handout:

• SFP Pump 2-1 normal supply breaker 52-2G-66, DANGER tag, cleared OPEN

• SFP Pump 2-1 alternate supply breaker 52-2F-68, DANGER tag, cleared OPEN

• SFP Pump 2-1 suction valve SFS-2-8756, DANGER tag, cleared CLOSED

• SFP Pump 2-1 discharge valve SFS-2-8762, DANGER tag, cleared CLOSED NRCL141-A3 PAGE 2 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A3 TAGGING REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Remove power from SFP Pump 2-1. 1.1 Determined OUT OF SERVICE or CAUTION tag should be used for the pump start push button.

1.2 Identified SFP Pump 2-1 normal motor breaker 52-2G-66 to be in the OPEN position.**

1.3 Determined DANGER tag should be used for the normal pump breaker.**

1.4 Identified SFP Pump 2-1 alternate motor breaker 52-2F-68 to be in the OPEN position.**

1.5 Determined DANGER tag should be used for the alternate pump breaker.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2.** Identify valves required to be closed to 2.1 Identified following valves to be in the isolate SFP Pump 2-1. CLOSED position.

• SFS-2-8762, SFP Pump Discharge Valve **

• SFS-2-8756, SFP Pump Suction Valve **

2.2 Determined DANGER tag should be used for both valves.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A3 PAGE 3 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A3 TAGGING REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Identify valves required to be opened to 3.1 Identified following valves to be in the OPEN vent and drain SFP Pump 2-1 casing. position.

• SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT

• SFS-2-10, Pump Casing Vent Valve Note: Drains and vents may be identified as NO TAG clearance point per DCPP Clearance Procedure OP2.ID1.

3.2 Determined CAUTION tag should be used for both valves.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A3 PAGE 4 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A3 TAGGING REQUIREMENTS ANSWER KEY Answer Key The following table summarizes the tagging points and positions that should be in order to meet the task standard. Critical steps are identified in the body of the Evaluator Worksheet.

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT OUT OF SERVICE SFP Pump 2-1 Start Push Button N/A or CAUTION#

SFP Pump 2-1 normal breaker 52-2G-66 OPEN DANGER SFP Pump 2-1alternate breaker 52-2F-68 OPEN DANGER SFS-2-8762, SFP 2-1 Discharge Valve CLOSED DANGER SFS-2-8756, SFP 2-1 Suction Valve CLOSED DANGER SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT OPEN CAUTION*

SFS-2-10, SFP Pump Casing Vent Valve OPEN CAUTION*

1. Either tagout is allowable per procedure. Examinee may use CBC abbreviation to designate point as a Control Board Caution.

• Per OP2.ID1, Clearances, drains and vents may be identified as NO TAG clearance points.

NRCL141-A3 PAGE 5 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: DETERMINE CLEARANCE POINTS AND JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A3 TAGGING REQUIREMENTS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: SFP Pump 2-1 is to be shut down and cleared for pump and motor preventive maintenance. The work package specifies the pump casing is to be drained.

Maintenance does not require the local cabinet disconnect switch, LPG-66, to be included as part of the clearance boundary.

SFP Pump 2-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Shift Foreman directs you to identify clearance points, cleared positions, and appropriate tagging requirements for this clearance.

Complete attachment below before reporting out.

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT NRCL141-A3 PAGE 6 OF 6 REV. 3

• • • ISSUED FOR USE BY: _______________________ DATE: ____________ EXPIRES: ____________ ***

D IABLO C ANYON POWER P LANT OP2.ID2 INTERDEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Rev. 21 Page 1 of 11 Tagging Requirements 12/16/14 Effective Date QUALITY RELATED Table of Contents

1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 1

2. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 1

3. DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................. 1

4. RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 2

5. INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................. 3 5.1 General Requirements for Hanging and Removing Tags ................................ 3 5.2 Red Tags and Locks ....................................................................................... 4 5.3 Danger Tag ..................................................................................................... 6 5.4 Man-on-Line (MOL) Tag ................................................................................. 7 5.5 Caution Tag .................................................................................................... 7 5.6 Information (INFO) Tag ................................................................................... 8 5.7 Out of Service (OOS) Tag ............................................................................. 10 5.8 Notification Tags and AR Tags...................................................................... 10 5.9 Tag Colors .................................................................................................... 11

6. RECORDS.................................................................................................... 11

7. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 11

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure provides instructions for the use of tags.

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 Changing from PIMS to eSOMS to implement and manage the clearance process resulted in introducing or modifying several tag terms. For example, man-on-line tag becomes danger tag. This procedure uses the correct tag terminology. Other procedures containing outdated tag terminology will remain as-is and will be corrected at the next revision.

2.2 During this interim period, until all tag terminology is updated, the following terminology translation guidance may be used:

• Man-on-line tag means danger tag.

2.3 eSOMS clearance tags (danger, caution, information, and out of service) are "shared" within a tagout. These tags have a unique serial number traceable to the clearance(s) to which they are associated.

3. DEFINITIONS None OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 2 of 11

4. RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Individuals or organizations identified in the instructions are responsible for hanging and removing specific types of tags.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 3 of 11

5. INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 General Requirements for Hanging and Removing Tags 5.1.1 Multiple tags may be hung on a single component.

5.1.2 When hanging a tag, if a conflict develops regarding the position of a device, the tag already hanging shall govern.

5.1.3 A tag hierarchy is used to resolve conflicts that develop when multiple tags are hung on a single component. The hierarchy, from highest to lowest tag, is as follows:

a. Red tag

b. Danger or MOL tag

c. Caution tag

d. Information tag

e. Out of Service tag 5.1.4 All tags should be properly filled out before being placed on equipment. When a name is required enter the person's last name or watchstation. For example, "SFM."

5.1.5 Clearance Danger tags shall be attached to the component by a non-releasable, non-reusable means capable of withstanding a 50 pound pull (such as a "ty-wrap").

a. Low-voltage panel breakers shall be cleared in the open position using an OSHA-compliant lockout device (such as a MasterLock #493B, or a similar device), which shall be affixed to the breaker handle after it has been opened.

The danger tag shall then be attached directly to this device. The device shall not be modified except as permitted by the manufacturer's instructions.

b. Danger tags may be attached to cleared MCC breakers using the affixed white adhesive eyelets, since Maintenance has the option of locking these breakers open with their own padlocks.

5.1.6 Plastic tag holders or weather resistant tags should be used when hung outdoors for long time periods or during adverse weather conditions.

5.1.7 Tags shall not be erased or otherwise defaced.

5.1.8 Tags associated with a clearance may be temporarily removed per OP2.ID1, "Clearances."T31327 OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 4 of 11 5.1.9 Tags placed on or near a control device:

a. Shall be placed or modified so they do not obscure indications, labels or other operator visual aids.

b. Shall be placed so that it is clear to which device the tags belong.

5.1.10 The number of tags placed on plant controls boards should be minimized.

5.1.11 Tags may be a sticker type to facilitate tag placement.

5.1.12 Tags that are no longer required shall be removed and destroyed.

5.1.13 Any tags which are to be hung inside the containment structure shall meet the requirements called out in AD4.ID9.

5.2 Red Tags and Locks 5.2.1 At least one red tag shall be hung anytime a craft performs work associated with a clearance containing danger tags.

NOTE: The requirement to install a maintenance-controlled padlock on 480V breakers is waived when a bus mimic board is established since equivalent protection is provided by the bus feeder breaker being racked to disconnect.

5.2.2 When work is to be performed on any rotating or otherwise moving element downstream of a low-voltage electrical breaker, maintenance shall lock the breaker in the open position with a maintenance-controlled padlock.

5.2.3 The maintenance-controlled padlock may be attached to the breaker with a lockout hasp that can accommodate multiple padlocks. The last available hole in the hasp should not be occupied with a padlock; a second hasp shall be added through the last available hole and subsequent padlocks attached to the second hasp.

5.2.4 Red tags and maintenance locks shall only be hung on active points associated with the holder's clearance.

5.2.5 Every padlock shall have a red tag attached to it.

5.2.6 Red tags shall be filled out with the name of the tag holder and the clearance, procedure, or order number.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 5 of 11 5.2.7 The clearance holder should ensure the red tag(s) and lock(s) are hung and tracked as follows:

a. Attach the red tags and any associated locks to one or more points assigned to the clearance.

b. Record the tag and lock(s) in the order package or on Form 69-11636, "Configuration Documentation Sheet."

c. Detach the red tag stub.

d. The red tag stubs should be retained until the work is completed by one of the following:

• By the clearance holder

• By the assigned craft

• Attached to the order package associated with the clearance 5.2.8 The clearance holder should ensure the red tags and locks are removed as follows:

a. Red tags may only be removed after the red tag stub holder releases the matching stub to the clearance holder.

b. Record the removal of the red tags and locks in the order package or on Form 69-11636, "Configuration Documentation Sheet."

5.2.9 In an emergency, the SFM may remove a red tag and/or maintenance padlock.

This shall not be delegated.

a. Verify:

1. All associated work activities are stopped.

2. All workers are clear.

3. System integrity.

b. Notify the red tag stub holder.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 6 of 11 5.3 Danger Tag 5.3.1 Danger tags shall be used to protect personnel by tagging devices used to isolate sources of liquids, steam, gases, or electrical power or place equipment in a safe condition for maintenance, repair, or testing.

5.3.2 Maintenance activities controlled by procedures or loop tests that are of minimal personnel safety risk do not require danger tagging. Examples include:

• Transmitter calibration

• Gauge replacement

• Filter change 5.3.3 Human clearances shall not be used in lieu of an danger tag. See OP2.ID1, "Clearances."

5.3.4 Danger tags shall not be hung in the plant unless the installation and removal is specified by an approved clearance, procedure or loop test.

5.3.5 Equipment that is tagged with danger tags shall not be operated or adjusted except to apply force to the component handle in the direction of the required position.

5.3.6 A 4 kV or 12 kV breaker with a danger tag on its control switch or its breaker cubicle door may be placed in the test position when directed by the appropriate procedure.

5.3.7 Danger tags shall be filled out with the following information:

a. The description or number of the device to which the tag will be attached.

b. The tag serial number.

c. The device position.

5.3.8 In an emergency the SFM may remove any danger tag. This shall not be delegated

a. Verify:

1. All associated work activities are stopped.

2. All workers are clear.

3. System integrity.

b. Notify the tag holder.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 7 of 11 5.4 Man-on-Line (MOL) Tag NOTE: MOL tags are only used for clearances involving non-plant equipment or by company utility personnel from outside Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Refer to OP2.DC1, "Work Group Clearances," for further guidance.

5.4.1 MOL tags shall be used to protect personnel by tagging devices used to isolate sources of liquids, steam, gases, or electrical power or place equipment in a safe condition for maintenance, repair, or testing for non-plant equipment.

5.4.2 MOL tags shall be filled out with the following information:

a. The description or number of the device to which the tag will be attached.

b. The name of the tag holder.

c. The clearance or procedure number.

d. The device position.

5.4.3 In an emergency the SFM may remove any MOL tag. This shall not be delegated.

a. Verify:

1. All associated work activities are stopped.

2. All workers are clear.

3. System integrity.

b. Notify the tag holder.

5.5 Caution TagT31327 5.5.1 Caution tags are used for plant equipment configuration control and should not be manipulated except upon specific instructions from the individual or watchstation named on the tag.

5.5.2 Caution tags shall be hung, removed, and documented by an approved clearance, procedure, loop test, or a order activity.

5.5.3 Caution tags should be used to mark valves that are normally open for a clearance (such as vents and drains), for ground switches that are closed for a clearance, and for grounding devices.

5.5.4 Caution tags shall not be used when a danger tag is required for personnel safety.

5.5.5 A control board caution (CBC) tag may be hung on or near control board devices to indicate which plant equipment has been cleared or otherwise removed from service.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 8 of 11 5.5.6 If generated from an eSOMS clearance, a control board caution (CBC) tag shall be placed in the position designated by the clearance.T32566

a. The position stated is the desired condition of the device or component.

b. For control switches where the desired position cannot be maintained (e.g., spring return to neutral), the first part of the designated position should be the desired condition of the device or component and the second part being the ending position of the switch.

c. For example, "OPEN-THEN NEUTRAL" or "CLOSE-THEN-AUTO."Ref 7.2 5.5.7 Caution tags should be filled out with the following information:

a. The description or number of the device to which the tag is to be attached.

b. The name of the person who initiated the tag (NA for clearance tags).

c. The tag serial number, procedure, loop test, or order activity number.

d. In an emergency the SFM may authorize the operation of any caution tagged component verify:

1. All associated work activities are stopped.

2. All workers are clear.

3. System integrity.

e. Notify the tag holder.

5.6 Information (INFO) Tag 5.6.1 INFO tags are meant to be used for short term, abnormal situations. If the information is of long term significance, a more permanent method of conveying the information should be used, such as a procedure change or a lamicoid.

5.6.2 An INFO tag shall not be used in lieu of a danger tag, caution tag, or notification tag.

5.6.3 INFO tags may be hung by anyone who needs to provide information regarding the status of equipment.

5.6.4 An INFO tag hung on installed plant equipment should be documented with an approved procedure, clearance, notification, loop test, or work activity that documents the hanging and removal of the information tag.

5.6.5 A control board information (CBI) tag may be hung on or near control board devices to provide information affecting that piece of equipment.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 9 of 11 5.6.6 Information tags shall not be used where the control switch is required to be positioned while hanging a clearance.

5.6.7 An INFO tag hung due to a problem associated with plant equipment, but not hung directly on the plant equipment (e.g., a drip bag with a tygon tube installed to catch the drips of a leaking valve) should be documented within the body of the notification describing the problem of the installed plant equipment.

5.6.8 INFO tags do not need to be documented for:

• Non-plant equipment

• Tools and material which are stored within the plant OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 10 of 11 5.6.9 An INFO tag should be filled out with the following information:

a. The date hung.

b. The name of the person who is hanging the tag (NA for clearance tags).

c. The document number that lists the hanging and removal of the tag, when applicable.

d. The information to be conveyed.

5.7 Out of Service (OOS) Tag 5.7.1 OOS tags should be used to identify instruments, controls, or equipment that are affected by maintenance, testing, or a clearance.

5.7.2 An OOS tag hung on installed plant equipment should be documented with an approved procedure, clearance, notification, loop test, or work activity that documents the hanging and removal of the OOS tag.

5.7.3 An OOS tag shall not be used in lieu of a danger tag, caution tag, or notification tag.

5.7.4 OOS tags should be filled out with the following information:

a. The description or number of the device to which the tag is to be attached.

b. The name of the person who initiated the tag (NA for clearance tags).

c. The tag serial number, procedure, loop test, or order activity number.

5.7.5 A control board OOS tag may be hung on or near control board devices to indicate which plant equipment has been cleared or otherwise removed from service.

5.8 Notification Tags and AR TagsT35551 5.8.1 Notification tags should be hung by the person who initiates the notification.

5.8.2 The fact that the notification tag has been hung shall be indicated on the notification by filling out the section provided for that purpose and indicating the location of the tag on the equipment (not the location of the equipment).

a. Notification tags (or AR tags) should be removed by the person who has corrected the problem.

5.8.3 The person closing the notification shall ensure that all notification tags (or AR tags) have been removed.

OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

Tagging Requirements OP2.ID2 R21 Page 11 of 11 5.9 Tag Colors 5.9.1 Tags should have the background color specified below:

• Danger Tags: RED

• Caution Tags: YELLOW

• Information Tags: GREEN

• Out of Service Tags: GREEN or RED and WHITE

• Notification Tags: WHITE

6. RECORDS None

7. REFERENCES 7.1 AD4.ID9, "Containment Housekeeping and Material Controls" 7.2 SAPN 50208097, "U1 CCPs Powered Up WITH Recirc Isolated" 7.3 QA Commitment: FSAR Chapter 17.2, 17.14 7.4 QA Commitment: Reg Guide 1.33 OP2!ID2u3r21.DOC 1125.1030

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A4

Title:

EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR SYSTEM WORK Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for RO candidates in a classroom setting

References:

• RP1.ID6, Personnel Dose Limits and Monitoring Requirements, Rev.14

• RP1.ID16, Radiation Worker Expectations, Rev, 6

• Radiation Work Permit 16-0036-00

• Radiation & Contamination Survey Form for RHR Pump Rm 1-2, 60 ft el

• Current Radworker Personnel Dosimetry Data - NRC Form 4 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 3.3, 3.4 Job Designation: RO Rev Comments New Gen KA # / Rating: G2.3.7 - Ability to comply with radiation work permit 3.5 requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/15/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/16/16 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required

• RP1.ID6, Personnel Dose Limits and Monitoring Requirements, Rev.14 Materials:

• RP1.ID16, Radiation Worker Expectations, Rev, 6

• Radiation Work Permit 16-0036-00

• Radiation & Contamination Survey Form for RHR Pump Rm 1-2, 60 ft el

• Current Radworker Personnel Dosimetry Data - NRC Form 4 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• The Work Control Shift Foreman (WCSFM) has assigned you to support RHR Pump 1-2 preventative maintenance work under RWP16-0036-00, RHR SYSTEM WORK.

• Work Planning expects the job to take 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes to complete.

• Transit time dose may be considered negligible.

Initiating Cue: Review the associated radiation work permit (RWP), radiation survey form, and your radiation exposure for the past 365 days (recorded on NRC Form 4) and evaluate ALL Exposure Guideline Categories.

• Determine whether or not you can successfully complete the assigned task within the Exposure Guidelines of the RWP.

• Determine any applicable actions required before, during, or after performance of work.

Provide associated calculations to justify your response.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard:

• Determined that job CAN NOT be performed under proposed RWP based on expected Dose per Entry Alert of 10 mrem being reached within the timeframe of the work plan. - Ref RP1.ID16, section 5.13.1 o (Dose per Entry calculations indicate15 to 18.75 mrem to complete the job based on area dose rates of 12 - 15 mrem/hr.)

• Determined work should NOT commence without prior authorization and guidance from Radiation Protection.

NRCL141-A4 rev 1.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions NOTE: Exposure Guidelines may be evaluated in any order.

NOTE: Per RCP D-200, definitions, Dose Margin is the dose remaining after an individual's accrued dose has been subtracted from the applicable dose limit

1. Evaluate Dose Margin 1.1 Determined accrued dose (TEDE) from NRC Form 4, block 17 = 1515 mrem.

1.2 Determined adequate margin exists to perform assigned work based on Annual Limit - TEDE > RWP Dose Margin Required

• 2000 mrem - 1515 mrem = 485 mrem which is more than the 225 mrem RWP minimum requirement Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-a4 rev 1.docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

2. Evaluate Dose Rate setpoints 2.1 Compared Work Area Survey Form against RWP Dose Rate Alert and Alarm setpoints.

2.2 Determined highest expected dose rate for assigned work fell below both Alert and Alarm setpoints

• (12 - 15 mrem/hr are < 50 & 250 mrem/hr)

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-a4 rev 1.docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Evaluate Dose setpoints 3.1 Reviewed RWP Dose Alert and Alarms setpoints.

3.2 Calculated expected dose for assigned work based on work area dose rate.

3.3 Determined the job total dose was greater than the allowable Dose per Entry Alert value.

Lowest = 1.25 hr x (12 mR/hr) = 15 mR (15 mrem > 10 mrem Alert setpoint)**

NOTE: Receiving an anticipated PED alarm or alert outside the guidance of Radiation Protection is considered a willful violation of Radiation Worker expectations and can lead to restricted RCA Access (RP1.ID16, sec 5.13.1) 3.4 Determined Radiation Protection must be contacted regarding the anticipated dose rate alert prior to starting the work.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page) nrcl141-a4 rev 1.docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

ANSWER KEY NRC Form 4 indicates the following:

• EDEX 1321 mrem

• CEDE 194 mrem

• TEDE 1515 Admin limit of 2000 mrem - 1515 = 485 mrem which is >than the min required 225 mrem for the job.

Area dose rates based on review of the Survey MAP are 12 to 15 mrem/hr, both are < the Dose rate alert limit of 50 mrem/hr and the Dose rate alarm limit of 250 mrem/hr.

Based on a job completion time of 1hr 15min (1.25 hrs) and area dose rates of 12 to 15 mrem/hr the total dose for the job is 15 to 18.75 mrem. 18.75 mrem is < the 25 mrem dose per entry alarm, however 15 to 18.75 mrem exceed the dose per entry Alert limit of 10 mrem.

Assigned work should not be commenced without prior authorization from Radiation Protection. Doing so could result in an anticipated PED alert outside the guidance of Radiation Protection, and would be considered a willful violation of Radiation Worker expectations.

(RP1.ID16, sec 5.13.1).

nrcl141-a4 rev 1.docx PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: EVALUATE DOSE LIMITS AND MARGIN FOR RHR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A4 SYSTEM WORK EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• The Work Control Shift Foreman (WCSFM) has assigned you to support RHR Pump 1-2 preventative maintenance work under RWP16-0036-00, RHR SYSTEM WORK.

• Work Planning expects the job to take 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes to complete.

• Transit time dose may be considered negligible.

Initiating Cue: Review the associated radiation work permit (RWP), radiation survey form, and your radiation exposure for the past 365 days (recorded on NRC Form 4) and evaluate ALL Exposure Guideline Categories.

Determine whether or not you can successfully complete the assigned task within the Exposure Guidelines of the RWP.

Determine any applicable actions required before, during, or after performance of work.

Provide associated calculations to justify your response.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE nrcl141-a4 rev 1.docx PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 1

PAGE _____ OF _____

NRC FORM 4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0005 EXPIRES: 08/31/2017 (04-2015) 10 CFR PART 20 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 37 minutes. This information is required to record an individuals lifetime occupational exposure to radiation to ensure that the cumulative exposure to radiation does not exceed regulatory limits. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy, and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CUMULATIVE OCCUPATIONAL DOSE HISTORY Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0005), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to the information collection.

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL) 2. IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 3. ID TYPE 4. SEX 5. DATE OF BIRTH MALE (MM/DD/YYYY)

Candidate U. R. 0909090909 OTH FEMALE 02/01/1970

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10. ROUTINE ESTIMATE PSE 04/18/2015 - 04/17/2016 Pacific Gas and Electric Company DPR-080, DPR-082 NO RECORD 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE 1321 902 21 122 549 194 28 1515 930

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10. ROUTINE ESTIMATE PSE

- NO RECORD 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10. ROUTINE ESTIMATE PSE

- NO RECORD 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10.

ROUTINE ESTIMATE

- PSE NO RECORD 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10.

ROUTINE ESTIMATE

- NO RECORD PSE 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE

6. MONITORING PERIOD (MM/DD/YYYY - MM/DD/YYYY) 7. LICENSEE NAME 8. LICENSE NUMBER 9. RECORD 10. ROUTINE ESTIMATE

- PSE NO RECORD 11a. EDEX 11b. DDE 12. LDE 13. SDE,WB 14. SDE,ME 15. CEDE 16. CDE 17. TEDE 18. TODE

19. SIGNATURE OF MONITORED INDIVIDUAL 20. DATE SIGNED 21. CERTIFYING ORGANIZATION 22. SIGNATURE OF DESIGNEE 23. DATE SIGNED NRC FORM 4 (04-2015)

INSTRUCTIONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT COMPLETION OF NRC FORM 4 NRC FORM 4 (All doses should be stated in rems) CUMULATIVE OCCUPATIONAL DOSE HISTORY

1. Type or print the full name of the monitored individual in 11A. EDEX - Enter the EDEX for the entire monitoring period Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3), enacted into law by Section 3 of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law the order of last name (include Jr, Sr, III, etc.), first (e.g., year). EDEX is the sum of the EDEX component 93-579), the following statement is furnished to individuals who supply information to the U.S. Nuclear name, middle initial (if applicable). determined using NRC-approved special dosimetry methods Regulatory Commission (NRC) on NRC Form 4. This information is maintained in a system of records (see RG 8.40) and the EDEX component estimated by the designated as NRC-27 and described at 77 Federal Register 67223 (November 8, 2012), or the most

2. Enter the individuals identification number, do not include DDE for those time periods when not using NRC-approved recent Federal Register publication of the NRC's Systems of Records Notices that is located in NRC's punctuation. This number should be the 9-digit social special dosimetry methods. Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

security number if at all possible. If the individual has no social security number, enter the number from another Note: If EDEX has been determined by measuring the DDE 1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 7902; 29 U.S.C. 668; 42 U.S.C. 2051, 2073, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2133, 2134, official identification such as a passport or work permit. (at the highest exposed part of the whole body - see 10 CFR and 2201(o); 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 34; Executive Order (E.O.) 9397, as amended by E.O.

20.1201(c)) for the entire monitoring period, then box 11a 13478; E.O. 12196, as amended; E.O. 12610.

3. Enter the code for the type of identification used as shown and 11b will have the same value.

below:

CODE ID TYPE 11B. DDE - Enter the DDE measured at the highest point on the 2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): The information is used by the NRC in its evaluation of the risk of whole body for the entire monitoring period (e.g.,year - exposures to radiation and radioactive material associated with licensed activities and in exercising SSN U.S. Social Security Number including those time periods when EDEX was being its statutory responsibility to monitor and regulate the safety and health practices of its licensees.

PPN Passport Number determined using NRC-approved special dosimetry The data permits a meaningful comparison of both current and long-term exposure experience methods). among types of licensees and among licensees within each type. Data on your exposure to radiation CSI Canadian Social Insurance Number is available to you upon your request.

WPN Work Permit Number 12. Enter the eye dose equivalent (LDE) recorded for the lens of the eye. 3. ROUTINE USE(S): In addition to the disclosures permitted under subsection (b) of the Privacy Act, PADS PADS Identification Number information may be used to provide data to other Federal and State agencies involved in monitoring OTH Other 13. Enter the shallow dose equivalent recorded for the skin and/or evaluating radiation exposure received by individuals monitored for radiation exposure while of the whole body (SDE,WB). employed by or visiting or temporarily assigned to certain NRC licensed facilities; and to return data

4. Check the box that denotes the sex of the individual being provided by licensee upon request. Information may be disclosed in accordance with any of the monitored. 14. Enter the shallow dose equivalent recorded for the skin of the Routine Uses listed in the Prefatory Statement of General Routine Uses, including to an appropriate extremity receiving the maximum dose (SDE,ME).

Federal, State, local or Foreign agency in the event the information indicates a violation or potential

5. Enter the date of birth of the individual being violation of law; in the course of an administrative or judicial proceeding; to an appropriate Federal, monitored in the format (MM/DD/YYYY). 15. Enter the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). State, local and foreign agency to the extent relevant and necessary for an NRC decision about you or to the extent relevant and necessary for that agency's decision about you; in the course of

6. Enter the monitoring period for which this report is filed. 16. Enter the committed dose equivalent (CDE) recorded for the discovery under a protective order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and in presenting The format should be (MM/DD/YYYY) - (MM/DD/YYYY). maximally exposed organ. evidence; to a Congressional office to respond to their inquiry made at your request; to NRC-paid experts, consultants, and others under contract with the NRC, on a need-to-know basis; or to

7. Enter the name of the licensee or facility not licensed by 17. Enter the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). The TEDE appropriate persons and entities for purposes of response and remedial efforts in the event of a NRC that provided monitoring. is the sum of items 11a and 15. suspected or confirmed breach of data from this system of records.

8. Enter the NRC license number or numbers. 18. Enter the total organ dose equivalent (TODE) for the 4. WHETHER DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL OF maximally exposed organ. The TODE is the sum of items NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: It is voluntary that you furnish the requested information,

9. Place an X in Record, Estimate, or No Record. Choose 11b and 16. including the Social Security number (SSN) in block #2. The SSN is used to assure that NRC has an Record if the dose data listed represent a final accurate and unique identifier not subject to the coincidence of similar names or birth dates among

19. Signature of the monitored individual. The signature of the the large number of persons on who data is maintained and to assure that there are no missed determination of the dose received to the best of the monitored individual on this form indicates that the doses or monitoring periods and an individual gets a complete dose history when requested. The licensees knowledge. Choose Estimate only if the listed information contained on the form is complete and correct to licensee must complete NRC Form 5 on each individual for whom personnel monitoring is required dose data are preliminary and will be superseded by a the best of his or her knowledge. under 10 CFR 20.1502. In addition, licensees must submit this information to NRC in accordance final determination resulting in a subsequent report. An example of such an instance would be dose data based with the requirement under 10 CFR 20.2206. Failure to do so may subject the licensee to

20. Enter the date this form was signed by the monitored enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2401.

on self-reading dosimeter results and the licensee intends individual.

to assign the record dose on the basis of TLD results that are not yet available. If the individual or an organization 21. [OPTIONAL] Enter the name of the licensee or facility not 5. SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS: REIRS Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Regulatory has indicated that the individual was monitored, but the licensed by NRC, providing monitoring for exposure to Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

monitoring records could not be obtained, enter No radiation (such as a DOE facility) or the employer if the Record for this monitoring period. The individual would individual is not employed by the licensee and the employer not be available for a PSE. For monitoring periods during chooses to maintain exposure records for its employees.

the current year where records are not available, reduce the individuals allowable dose by 1.25 rems for each quarter for which records were unavailable as required by 22. [OPTIONAL] Signature of the person designated to represent 10 CFR 20.2104(e)(1). the licensee or employer entered in item 21. The licensee or employer who chooses to countersign the form should have

10. Place an X in either Routine or PSE. Choose Routine on file documentation of all the information on the NRC if the data represent the results of monitoring for routine Form 4 being signed.

exposures. Choose PSE if the listed dose data represents the results of monitoring of planned special 23. [OPTIONAL] Enter the date this form was signed by the exposures received during the monitoring period. designated representative.

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Pacific Gas and Electric Company Radiation Work Permit 16-0036-00 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1&2 Worker Instructions RP Work RHR System Work Description Radiological Medium Radiological Risk Work is allowed on this RWP contact RP for specific 0 precautions.

Risk No Elevated or High Radiological Risk Work is allowed on this RWP. 0 Dose per Entry Alarm Dose Rate Alarm Dose margin required Exposure (mrem - gamma) (mrem/hr) (mrem)

Guidelines 25 250 225 Dose per Entry Alert Dose Rate Alert (mrem - gamma) (mrem/hr) 10 50 Stop Beta-Gamma Contamination Stop 1.00 100k dpm/100 cm2 Work Condition Work Airborne Stop Work Condition 2.00 0.3 DAC Conditions Radiation Stop Work Condition 3.00 250 mrem/hr Alpha Contamination Stop Work 4.00 100 dpm/100 cm2 Condition Beta-Gamma/Alpha Ratio Stop 5.00 300 Beta-Gamma/Alpha Ratio Work Condition HRA Entry Posted High Radiation Area entry requires:

-RP Technician escort with a dose rate monitoring device, -or-Requirements -Knowledge of area dose rates AND

-RP technician surveillance with a dose rate monitoring device, -or-

-Self-monitoring qualified with a dose rate monitoring device, -or-

-An Alarming Dosimeter -or-

-Telemetry or video coverage as provided by RP Dosimetry TLD and PED required 0 Required Posted Area Entry Limitations 0.00 No Entry Into Alpha Level 3 Areas 3.00 No Entry Into Posted Red Contamination Area 4.00 No Entry Into Posted Airborne Radioactivity Area 6.00 No Entry Into Posted Locked High Radiation Area 7.00 No Entry Into Posted Very High Radiation Area Protective Clothing 11.00 Set A - Inspections and light work in Yellow CA's.

12.00 Set B - Full Set of PCs - Routine work in Yellow CA's 13.00 Set C - Routine work in Yellow CA's with double SOP's.

14.00 Set D - Performing work involving moderate moisture, heavy physical exertion, or significant contact with contamination in Yellow CA's.

16.00 Set F - Contact RP for work in WET areas or on WET components.

Briefings Required 0.00 Alpha brief required for Alpha Level 2 Area entry 22.00 High Radiation Area Briefing Required for HRA Entry

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM Pacific Gas and Electric Company Radiation Work Permit 16-0036-00 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1&2 Contact RP to: Move or adjust shielding.

Move radioactive material >5 mR/hour at 30 cm.

Reach or climb above 8 feet into the overhead.

Release material from a Contamination or Radiologically Controlled Area.

Breach contaminated systems.

Perform radiation and contamination surveys prior to removing insulation from contaminated systems.

Open a radioactive material container containing items with removable contamination outside a CA or >10,000 dpm/100 cm2 in a CA.

Weld, grind or cut on contaminated equipment.

RWP redacted due to potential SUNSI concern.

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A5

Title:

Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

OP AP SD-0, Loss of, or Inadequate Decay Heat Removal, Rev 13.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments Modified from Bank LJC-014 Gen KA # G2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as 4.2 graphs, curves, tables, etc.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP AP SD-0, Loss of, or Inadequate Decay Heat Removal, Rev 13.

• Calculator Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 was shut down seven days ago for a refueling outage.

• Nozzle dams are installed, and 26 fuel assemblies have been offloaded.

• Reactor cavity level began lowering at the beginning of this shift as the result of seal failure on the RHR 1-2 pump.

• The pump tripped on overcurrent, and RHR Pump 1-1 could not be started.

• Mechanical Maintenance is addressing the failure and level has stabilized at 108 ft.

• Current RCS Temperature is 115°F.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to determine the time to reach 200°F, per OP AP SD-0, Loss of, or Inadequate Decay Heat Removal, Rev 13.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• The time to reach 200oF is determined to be 20.8 minutes (19.7 to 22.0) minutes NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Step 1 - Determined predicted heat 1.1 Referred to Appendix B of OP AP SD-0.

load from graph.

1.2 Used predicted heat load curve and determined load to be approximately 10.5 MW (between 10 - 11 MW).**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Step 2 - Determined refueled core 2.1 Used predicted heat load from previous reduction factor. step.

2.2 Calculated fraction of previously used assemblies installed in core (193-26)/193 = 86.5%

(86%-87%)**

2.3 Calculated Estimated Decay Heat Load =

0.865*10.5 MW = 9.085 MW (8.6 MW- 9.6 MW)**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 3 - Heat-Up Rate Prediction. 3.1 Used estimated decay heat load from previous step.

9.085MW

• 0.45 = 4.088 oF/min (3.87 oF/min - 4.32 oF/min)**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Step 4 - Estimated Time to Reach 4.1 Calculated current temperature 200oF. difference.

200oF - 115oF = 85oF **

4.2 Calculated time to reach 200oF 85 oF / 4.088oF/min = 20.79 min (19.68 min - 21.96 min) **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 5 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 ANSWER KEY Appendix B of OP AP SD-0 NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 6 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 7 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

JPM TITLE: Determine Decay Heat and Heatup Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A5 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 was shut down seven days ago for a refueling outage.

• Nozzle dams are installed, and 26 fuel assemblies have been offloaded.

• Reactor cavity level began lowering at the beginning of this shift as the result of seal failure on the RHR 1-2 pump.

• The pump tripped on overcurrent, and RHR Pump 1-1 could not be started.

• Mechanical Maintenance is addressing the failure and level has stabilized at 108 ft.

• Current RCS Temperature is 115°F.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to determine the time to reach 200°F, per OP AP SD-0, Loss of, or Inadequate Decay Heat Removal, Rev 13.

Examinee Response:

NRCL141-A5 rev PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 2 2.docx

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A6

Title:

REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Rev 52.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 2.6, 2.8 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: Modified from NRCADM061C-A1 Gen KA / Rating: G2.1.42 - Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement 3.4 procedures.

Note: This is an admin JPM (SRO), intended for the classroom setting.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Rev 52 with Attachments 3 and 4 completed as Examinee Handouts.

• Examinee Handout - VB1 Screen Image and Aux Building U1 Operator rounds sheets (partial)

• Calculator Initial Conditions Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 with fuel offload in progress during 1R19.

Current Plant parameters are as follows:

• Mode 3 was entered 5 days ago at 0730

• Todays date is October 10, 2015

• Current time is 1930

• Current shift is Nights

• 120 fuel assemblies have been offloaded to the spent fuel pool

• Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1-1 is secured.

• The Unit 1 Control Operator has just completed Attachments 3 and 4 of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, for verification of Spent Fuel Pool heat load/removal parameters.

Initiating Cue: Perform a review of the completed OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Attachments 3 and 4 and determine if they are completed properly. If not, document any identified discrepancies below.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Attachments 3 and 4 of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading have been reviewed and the following errors are noted:

• Number of hours since Mode 3 entry is 132 hours0.00153 days <br />0.0367 hours <br />2.18254e-4 weeks <br />5.0226e-5 months <br />, not 128 hours0.00148 days <br />0.0356 hours <br />2.116402e-4 weeks <br />4.8704e-5 months <br />

• Core offload rate is acceptable

• CCW Hx temperature on TI-181 is NOT acceptable (high)

• DP for Spent Fuel Pool pump 1-2 is NOT acceptable (low)

NRCL141-A6 PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Verified MODE 3 entry date / time and entered 1.** Review OP B-8DS1, Attachment 3. 1.1 correctly (i.e., 10/05/15 and 0730).

Verified Current Date/Time is entered 1.2 correctly (10/10/15and 1930).

Identifies error in Hours Since Mode 3 1.3 Entry. Should be 132 hours0.00153 days <br />0.0367 hours <br />2.18254e-4 weeks <br />5.0226e-5 months <br />, not 128 as recorded.**

Verified Number of Fuel Assemblies 1.4 Offloaded is entered correctly (i.e., 120)

Verified the elapsed time and number of fuel 1.5 assemblies offloaded is within the acceptable area of the chart with corrected time.**

Corrects the Yes box for offload rate 1.6 acceptable.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A6 PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: The following steps do not need to be 2.** Review OP B-8DS1, Attachment 4.

performed in this sequence.

2.1 Verified Sheet # is complete.

Verified Date is entered correctly (i.e.,

2.2 10/10/15).

Verified Time is entered correctly (i.e.,

2.3 1930).

Verified Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is 2.4 acceptable.

2.5 Verified CCW flow rate is acceptable.

Determined that CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature is NOT acceptable due to TI-181 2.6 outlet temperature reading greater than 75°F.**

Determined SFP Pump 1-1 D/P is N/A (or 0 2.7 psid or blank).

Determined that SFP Pump 1-2 D/P is NOT 2.8 acceptable.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A6 PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 POOL HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Documents discrepancies. 3.1 Documents:

a. Core Offload rate is acceptable

b. Spent Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters are not acceptable due to both:

• High CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature on TI-181

• Low DP on Spent Fuel Pool pump 1-2 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A6 PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL POOL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS ANSWER KEY ATTACHMENT 3 ATTACHMENT 4 ANSWER KEY NRCL141-A6 PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW DETERMINATION OF SPENT FUEL POOL JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A6 HEAT LOAD/REMOVAL PARAMETERS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 with fuel offload in progress during 1R19.

Current Plant parameters are as follows:

• Mode 3 was entered 5 days ago at 0730

• Todays date is October 10, 2015

• Current time is 1930

• Current shift is Nights

• 120 fuel assemblies have been offloaded to the spent fuel pool

• Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1-1 is secured.

• The Unit 1 Control Operator has just completed Attachments 3 and 4 of OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, for verification of Spent Fuel Pool heat load/removal parameters.

Initiating Cue: Perform a review of the completed OP B-8DS1, Core Unloading, Attachments 3 and 4 and determine if they are completed properly. If not, document any identified discrepancies below.

NRCL141-A6 PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 2

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM OP B-8DS1 R52 Page 26 of 28 Core Offload Rate U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 1 of 2 NOTE 1: Level of use for this attachment is Continuous.

NOTE 2: Tracking offload rate is not required if 148 hours0.00171 days <br />0.0411 hours <br />2.44709e-4 weeks <br />5.6314e-5 months <br /> have elapsed since MODE 3 entry.

1. The Control Operator shall ensure every four hours that the rate of core offload does not exceed the ability of the SFP cooling system to dissipate the heat load by ensuring that the offload rate is within the parameters shown on the chart.

2. MODE 3 Entry,Date/Time: _10/05/15 _/ 0730 Current Hours Since Number of Fuel Offload Rate Date/Time Mode 3 Entry Assemblies Acceptable?

Offloaded Yes No

_10/10/15 _/_ 1930 _ 128 120 [ ] [X]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

_ _/_ _ [ ] [ ]

OP_B-8DS1u3r52.doc 1019.2213

Acceptable Number of Offloaded Fuel Assemblies Vs. Time Since Shutdown 200 Core Offload Rate 175 OP_B-8DS1u3r52.doc 1019.2213 UNACCEPTABLE 150 125 100 Number of Fuel Assemblies Offloaded 75 50 EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM ACCEPTABLE 25 0 OP B-8DS1 R52 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 Hours Since Mode 3 Entry Page 27 of 28 U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 2 of 2

EXAMINEE HANDOUT - NRC EXAM EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A7

Title:

VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING REQUIREMENTS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP2.ID2, Tagging Requirements, Rev 21 OVID 107713, Sheet 2, Rev 39 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: Modified from NRCADM061-EC-SRO Gen KA / Rating: G2.2.13 - Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. 4.3 Note: This is an admin JPM (SRO), intended for the classroom setting.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP2.ID2, Tagging Requirements, Rev 21

• OVID 107713, Sheet 2, Rev 39 Initial Conditions SFP Pump 2-1 is to be shut down and cleared for pump and motor preventive maintenance. The work package specifies the pump casing is to be drained.

Maintenance does not require the local cabinet disconnect switch, LPG-66, to be included as part of the clearance boundary.

SFP Pump 2-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Shift Foreman has requested you to review the proposed clearance to verify all points, cleared positions, and appropriate tagging requirements are all satisfactory.

Complete attachments and/or document all discrepancies before reporting out.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: All clearance points are identified with required position and proper tagging requirements. The following errors are identified and documented on examinee handout:

• 52-2H-79 incorrectly entered as SFP Pump 2-1 normal supply breaker.

Correct breaker number is 52-2G-66.

• 52-2F-43 incorrectly entered as SFP Pump 2-1 alternate supply breaker. Correct breaker number is 52-2F-68.

• SFP Pump 2-1 suction valve SFS-2-8756 incorrectly omitted from clearance. Point is added as a DANGER tagged, cleared CLOSED valve.

NRCL141-A7 PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Review power removal from SFP Pump 1.1 Verified Out Of Service tag appropriate for 2-1. use on the pump start push button.

1.2 Identified incorrect breaker listed for SFP Pump 2-1 normal supply breaker; entered correct breaker number, 52-2G-66. **

1.3 Verified normal motor breaker to be in the OPEN position. **

1.4 Verified DANGER tag should be used for the normal pump breaker. **

1.5 Identified incorrect breaker listed for SFP Pump 2-1 alternate supply breaker; entered correct breaker number, 52-2F-68. **

1.6 Verified alternate motor breaker to be in the OPEN position. **

1.7 Verified DANGER tag should be used for the alternate pump breaker. **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A7 PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 2.** Review valves required to be closed to 2.1 Verified SFS-2-8762, SFP Pump Discharge isolate SFP Pump 2-1. Valve should be in the CLOSED position and DANGER tagged. **

2.2 Identified missing clearance point along with associated tagging and position requirements:**

• SFS-2-8756, SFP Pump Suction Valve

• Required position: CLOSED

• Required tag: DANGER Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Review valves required to be opened to 3.1 Verified the following drain and vent valves vent and drain SFP Pump 2-1. should be in the OPEN position:**

• SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT.

• SFS-2-10, Pump Casing Vent Valve.

Note: Drains and vents may be identified as NO TAG clearance point per DCPP Clearance Procedure OP2.ID.

3.2 Verified CAUTION tag should be used for both valves

• SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT.

• SFS-2-10, Pump Casing Vent Valve.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL141-A7 PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A7 PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS ANSWER KEY Answer Key The following table summarizes the information provided to the examinee as well as the errors which should be identified to meet the task standard.

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT SFP Pump 2-1 Start Push Button N/A OUT OF SERVICE SFP Pump 2-1 Normal Breaker 52-2H-79 OPEN DANGER SFP Pump 2- Alternate Breaker 52-2F-43 OPEN DANGER SFS-2-8762, SFP 2-1 Discharge Valve CLOSED DANGER SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT OPEN CAUTION SFS-2-10, SFP Pump Casing Vent Valve OPEN/UNCAPPED CAUTION Discrepancies found:

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT SFP Pump 2-1 Start Push Button N/A OUT OF SERVICE SFP Pump 2-1 Normal Breaker 52-2H-79 52-2G-66 OPEN DANGER SFP Pump 2-1 Alternate Breaker 52-2F-43 52-2F-OPEN DANGER 68 SFS-2-8762, SFP 2-1 Discharge Valve CLOSED DANGER SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT OPEN CAUTION*

SFS-2-10, SFP Pump Casing Vent Valve OPEN/UNCAPPED CAUTION*

SFS-2-8756, SFP 2-1 Suction Valve CLOSED DANGER

• Per OP2.ID1, Clearances, drains and vents may be identified as NO TAG clearance points.

NRCL141-A7 PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: VERIFY CLEARANCE POINTS AND TAGGING JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A7 REQUIREMENTS EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: SFP Pump 2-1 is to be shut down and cleared for pump and motor preventive maintenance. The work package specifies the pump casing is to be drained.

Maintenance does not require the local cabinet disconnect switch, LPG-66, to be included as part of the clearance boundary.

SFP Pump 2-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Shift Foreman has requested you to review the proposed clearance to verify all points, cleared positions, and appropriate tagging requirements are all satisfactory.

Complete attachments and/or document all discrepancies before reporting out.

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT SFP Pump 2-1 Start Push Button N/A OUT OF SERVICE SFP Pump 2-1 Normal Breaker 52-2H-79 OPEN DANGER SFP Pump 2-1 Alternate Breaker 52-2F-43 OPEN DANGER SFS-2-8762, SFP 2-1 Discharge Valve CLOSED DANGER SFS-2-9, SFP Pump Casing Drain to MEDT OPEN CAUTION SFS-2-10, SFP Pump Casing Vent Valve OPEN/UNCAPPED CAUTION Discrepancies found:

DESCRIPTION CLEARED TAGGING POSITION REQUIREMENT NRCL141-A7 PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A8

Title:

AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

CAP A-6A, Gaseous Radwaste Sampling and Analysis for Release, Rev. 2 OP G-2:V, Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge, Rev 12A Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: Modified from bank NRCL061-RC-SRO Gen KA / Rating: G2.3.6 - Ability to approve release permits 3.8 Note: This is an admin JPM (SRO), intended for the classroom setting.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 04/19/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 04/19/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 3

JPM TITLE: AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A8 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP G-2:V, Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge, Rev 12A

• Completed CAP A-6A, Attachment 3, Gas Decay Tank Discharge Authorization

• ECG 39.4, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Initial Conditions It is April 21st, 2016. You are the Unit 1 Shift Foreman. Gas Decay Tank 1-1 is planned to be discharged today on your watch.

You have just received the Authorization for a Gas Decay Tank Discharge attachment from CAP A-6A, from the Aux Senior for your final approval.

Note: Any requirements of CAP A-6A are satisfied.

Initiating Cue: As the Unit 1 Shift Foreman, review the entire discharge authorization form for accuracy and completeness. Determine if the discharge should be approved or not approved based on your review.

Complete attachments and document any/all discrepancies and/or required actions before reporting out. Identify Tech Spec/EGC actions, if any are required.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Identifies two technical errors:

• Second sample of the GDT should have been completed, based on recorded operability status of RE-22 (listed as inoperable).

• ECG 39.4 14-day expiration date of 04/22/16 was incorrect. Correct expiration date of 04/20/16 has been exceeded.

Determines required actions:

• Discharge authorization should not be approved.

• ECG 39.4 action B.2.2 is required - Must explain in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report why RE-22 inoperability was not corrected within 14 days.

NRCL141-A8 PAGE 2 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A8 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: RE-22 Operability status appears on second page of Discharge Authorization Form, after Sample Information and Analysis section.

1. Review Sample Information and Analysis 1.1 Noted RE-22 identified as inoperable on page information for accuracy. 2, step 3 of the Gas Decay Tank Discharge Authorization Form.

1.2 Identified that a second sample of the GDT should have been completed, based on indicated operability status of RE-22.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Review Release Authorization (CHEM) 2.1 Determined that Release Authorization for accuracy. (CHEM) is correct.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Review Release Information and 3.1 Identified that 14-day expiration date Approval for accuracy. incorrectly recorded (22th vice the 20th) and subsequently exceeded. **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A8 PAGE 3 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A8 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.** Determine if Authorization should be 4.1 Determined that the Authorization should not approved. be approved, since 14-day expiration has been exceeded.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

5.** Evaluate ECG 39.4 required actions. 5.1 Determined ECG 39.4 action B.2.2 must be completed - Explain in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report why RE-22 inoperability was not corrected within 14 days.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL141-A8 PAGE 4 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A8 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

Evaluator Key - Technical Review Summary:

Section 1: Second sample not completed; required when RE-22 is listed as Inoperable (Step is not critical since date error causes 14 day limit to be exceeded, precluding a future release, regardless of sampling)

• OP G-2:V, Section 6.1.6.b-d.

Section 3: 14 day expiration date incorrectly recorded (22th vice the 20th) and subsequently exceeded.

• OP G-2:V, Section 6.17.

Required Actions:

Must perform ECG 39.4 action B.2.2 - Explain in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report why RE-22 inoperability was not corrected within 14 days.

[ ] APPROVE Discharge [ X ] DO NOT Approve Discharge NRCL141-A8 PAGE 5 OF 6 REV. 3

JPM TITLE: AUTHORIZE GAS DECAY TANK DISCHARGE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A8 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: It is April 21st, 2016. You are the Unit 1 Shift Foreman. Gas Decay Tank 1-1 is planned to be discharged today on your watch.

You have just received the Authorization for a Gas Decay Tank Discharge attachment from CAP A-6A, from the Aux Senior for your final approval.

Note: Any requirements of CAP A-6A are satisfied.

Initiating Cue: As the Unit 1 Shift Foreman, review the entire discharge authorization form for accuracy and completeness. Determine if the discharge should be approved or not approved based on your review.

Complete attachments and document any/all discrepancies and/or required actions before reporting out. Identify Tech Spec/EGC actions, if any are required.

Technical Review Summary:

[ ] APPROVE Discharge - all conditions are satisfactory

[ ] DO NOT Approve Discharge due to:

Applicable actions, if required:

NRCL141-A8 PAGE 6 OF 6 REV. 3

• • • ISSUED FOR USE BY: _______________________ DATE: ____________ EXPIRES: ____________ ***

1 D IABLO C ANYON P OWER P LANT OP G-2:V OPERATING PROCEDURE Rev. 12A UNIT Page 1 of 21 Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge 11/03/11 Effective Date QUALITY RELATED Table of Contents

1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 1

2. DISCUSSION.................................................................................................. 1

3. RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 2

4. PREREQUISITES........................................................................................... 2

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .............................................................. 2

6. INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................. 3 6.1 Discharging Gas Decay Tank 1-1.................................................................... 3 6.2 Discharging Gas Decay Tank 1-2.................................................................... 9 6.3 Discharging Gas Decay Tank 1-3.................................................................. 15

7. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 21

8. RECORDS.................................................................................................... 21

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure provides instructions to safely discharge/vent the gaseous contents of a waste gas decay tank (GDT).

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 The primary goal of this procedure is to control gaseous radwaste discharges/vents and prevent an inadvertent or unmonitored release.

2.2 This procedure should be performed in conjunction with CAP A-6, "Gaseous Radwaste Sampling and Analysis for Release" and CAP A-6A, "Gaseous Radwaste Release Permit Generation Using REMS."

2.3 GDT discharges are performed using a "Gas Decay Tank Discharge Authorization,"

Form 69-21595, referred to as the "discharge permit" throughout this procedure.

2.4 Valves for GDT alignment and discharge are controlled by the Aux Board Human-Machine Interface (HMI).

2.5 For the purposes of this procedure, the terms "discharge" and "vent" are synonymous.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 2 of 21 UNIT 1

3. RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 Operations personnel are responsible for operation of equipment in accordance with this procedure.

3.2 The Shift Foreman (SFM) is responsible for compliance with applicable Technical Specifications and Equipment Control Guidelines (ECGs), and authorizing the discharge permit.

3.3 Chemistry is responsible for sampling of GDT contents and preparation of the discharge permit.

4. PREREQUISITES 4.1 Verify the Gaseous Radwaste System is aligned PER OP G-2:I, "Gaseous Radwaste - Make Available."

4.2 Verify the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System is OPERABLE PER TS 3.7.12, "Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS)."

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Only one GDT can be discharged at a time.

5.2 Only a GDT NOT selected for fill or standby can be discharged.

5.3 A discharge operation will override a purging operation.

5.4 Compliance with the following shall be verified throughout the discharge:

• ECG 24.3, "Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Storage Tanks"

• ECG 39.4, "Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation" 5.5 Dilution flow shall be verified maintained throughout the discharge.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 3 of 21 UNIT 1

6. INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Discharging Gas Decay Tank 1-1 6.1.1 Check parts 1 and 2 of the discharge permit for GDT 1-1 are complete and signed by chemistry.

6.1.2 IF RE-22 high alarm set point (HASP) requires adjustment per Part 2 of the discharge permit, THEN direct maintenance to change the setpoint to the value prescribed by chemistry.

N/A 6.1.3 Verify RE-22 is operable by performing the following:

a. Verify the instrument calibration has NOT expired.

b. Perform a channel check as follows:

1. Check Power On light is lit.

2. Check Operation Selector switch in "Operate."

3. Check Range Selector switch in "Wide."

4. Check normal meter reading with slight movement of needle.

5. Check Low Alarm (red) light is NOT lit.

c. Perform a source check on RE-22 as follows:

1. Notify Control Operator to expect PK11-23, "RADIATION MON SYS IN TEST."

2. While holding the Operation Selector Switch in the "Check Source" position, read the source count rate.

3. Return Operation Selector Switch to "Operate."

4. Record the source count rate on Part 3 of the discharge permit.

N/A 6.1.4 IF RE-22 is OPERABLE, THEN GO TO step 6.1.8.

6.1.5 IF RE-22 is determined to be INOPERABLE, THEN notify SFM to perform the following:

a. Log date and time RE-22 is declared INOPERABLE in the shift log.

b. Initiate notification for repair of RE-22.

c. Review applicable portions of ECG 39.4.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 4 of 21 UNIT 1 6.1.6 IF RE-22 has been INOPERABLE for less than or equal to 14 days, AND discharge of GDT 1-1 is required prior to repair of RE-22, THEN notify SFM to perform the following:

CAUTION: Applicable ACTION statements in ECG 39.4 regarding gaseous radwaste discharges with RE-22 being declared INOPERABLE, ensure the limits of the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (CY2.ID1) are not exceeded. Discharges may continue for up to 14 days after RE-22 is declared INOPERABLE.

a. Review the applicable portions of ECG 39.4.

b. Request chemistry to obtain and analyze a second, independent GDT sample.

c. Verify the release rate calculations have been verified by at least two qualified staff members.

d. IF the tank activity is below the limits stated in CAP A-6A "Gaseous Radwaste Release Permit Generation Using REMS,"

THEN fill out the appropriate sections in Part 3 of the discharge permit.

6.1.7 IF RE-22 has been INOPERABLE for greater than 14 days, THEN notify SFM to perform the following:

a. Review the applicable portions of ECG 39.4.

b. Return discharge permit to chemistry.

c. Suspend performance of this procedure.

NOTE: Chemistry may waive the following step if GDT 1-1 is being discharged due to nitrogen purging for clearance activities.

6.1.8 Check GDT 1-1 is in holdup by performing the following:

a. Navigate to the Gaseous Radwaste System Unit 1 screen.

b. Check the following valves are CLOSED and "OOS".

• GW-1-PCV-94, GDT 1-1 Fill

• GW-1-FCV-407, GDT 1-1 Purge to LHUTs

• GW-1-FCV-411, GDT 1-1 N2 Supply 6.1.9 Check current GDT 1-1 pressure is in agreement with the pressure on Part 1 of the discharge permit.

6.1.10 Record the current GDT 1-1 pressure in Part 3 of the discharge permit.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 5 of 21 UNIT 1 6.1.11 Open 1-FCV-404, GDT 1-1 to Plant Vent Out Hdr, by performing the following:

a. Select Secure Holdup .

b. Select Select Vent Lineup .

c. Select GDT 1-1 .

d. Select Exit .

e. Select Set Vent Valves .

6.1.12 Sign for valve alignment AND record valve number in the discharge permit.

6.1.13 Obtain independent verification of valve alignment and signature in the discharge permit.

6.1.14 Obtain SFM review and authorization of the discharge permit.

6.1.15 Notify the Control Operator that the GDT 1-1 discharge is about to begin.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 6 of 21 UNIT 1 6.1.16 Open 1-FCV-410 by performing the following:

a. Navigate to the Unit 1 Gaseous Radwaste screen.

b. Select Open (double click) on FCV-410.

c. Select YES (double click).

d. Perform the following in the "Warning" pop-up:

1. Select Operator .

2. Enter "Performing Operator ID."

3. Select OK .

4. Select Shift Foreman .

5. Enter name of "Authorizing SFM."

6. Select OK .

7. Select Batch Number .

8. Enter "Discharge Permit Batch Number."

9. Select OK .

10. Select Click when Entries Made to Continue .

11. Verify all entries correct and select YES (double click).

12. Select Open FCV-410 to commence discharge of GDT 1-1.

6.1.17 Navigate to the Alarm Screen.

6.1.18 Acknowledge the following alarms:

• "GRW: U1:Vent in progress"

• "GRW: U1:FCV-410 is OPEN"

• "GRW: U1:GRW Blowdown Pressure" 6.1.19 Navigate to the U1 Gaseous Radwaste screen.

6.1.20 Log time and batch number in the shift log.

6.1.21 Record the release information required on the discharge permit during and following the GDT 1-1 discharge.

6.1.22 Notify chemistry the time GDT 1-1 discharge was started.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 7 of 21 UNIT 1 6.1.23 IF RE-22 alarms due to an actual high-rad condition during the discharge, THEN perform the following:

a. Check closed 1-RCV-17.

b. Select Close (double click) on FCV-410.

c. Notify the SFM that GDT 1-1 discharge has been terminated due to RE-22 alarm.

d. Notify chemistry that GDT 1-1 discharge has been terminated due to RE-22 alarm.

e. Complete the discharge permit and note the reason for discharge termination in the comments section.

6.1.24 IF RE-22 fails during the discharge due to a component problem, THEN perform the following:

a. Check closed 1-RCV-17.

b. Select Close (double click) on FCV-410.

c. Notify the SFM GDT 1-1 discharge has been terminated due to RE-22 component problem.

d. Notify chemistry GDT 1-1 discharge has been terminated due to RE-22 component problem.

e. IF RE-22 is repaired, THEN perform the following:

1. Check that GDT 1-1 was not selected to "FILL" or "PURGE" following the termination of the GDT 1-1 discharge.

2. Obtain permission from SFM and chemistry foreman to continue the GDT 1-1 discharge.

3. RETURN TO step 6.1.15.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Gaseous Radwaste - Gas Decay Tank Discharge OP G-2:V R12A Page 8 of 21 UNIT 1 6.1.25 IF GDT 1-1 is being discharged in preparation for clearing OR in conjunction with N2 purging, THEN perform the following:

a. Monitor GDT 1-1 pressure.

b. WHEN GDT 1-1 pressure reaches 0.5 psig, THEN select Close (double click) on FCV-410.

6.1.26 IF GDT 1-1 is being discharged for any other reason, THEN perform the following:

a. Monitor GDT 1-1 pressure.

b. WHEN GDT 1-1 pressure reaches 5 psig, THEN select Close (double click) on FCV-410.

6.1.27 Navigate to the Alarm Screen.

6.1.28 Acknowledge "GRW: U1:GDT 1-1 Pressure Lo" alarm.

6.1.29 Navigate to the U1 Gaseous Radwaste screen.

6.1.30 Select Secure Vent Valves to close FCV-404.

6.1.31 Log date and time GDT 1-1 discharge was terminated.

6.1.32 Complete Part 3 of the discharge permit.

6.1.33 Return the discharge permit to the SFM for review.

OP_G-2~Vu1r12.DOC 1031.1219

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 39.0 INSTRUMENTATION 39.4 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels for each function shown in Table 39.4-1 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm/trip setpoints set to ensure the limits of the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (CY2.ID1) are not exceeded. The alarm/trip setpoints of these channels shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the Offsite Dose Calculations (CAP A-8).

APPLICABILITY: In accordance with Table 39.4-1.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable radiation monitor channel.

The provisions of ECG 0.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately listed in Table 39.4-1 with referenced in Table 39.4-1 the required channel for the channel.

inoperable.

B. Less than required B.1.1.1 Perform independent Prior to release gaseous radwaste system analyses of tank contents.

noble gas activity monitor channel OPERABLE. AND B.1.1.2 Perform independent Prior to release verifications of release rate calculations and discharge lineup.

OR B.1.2 Suspend release of Immediately radioactive effluents via this pathway.

AND B.2.1 Restore the Monitor to 14 days OPERABLE status.

OR B.2.2 Explain in Effluent Release Next submittal of the Report pursuant to TS 5.6.3 Effluent Release why this inoperability was Report not corrected within the time specified.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 12/29/10 Effective Date:____________________ Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 1 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Less than required plant C.1.1.1 Take grab samples Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> vent system noble gas while release is in activity monitor channels progress OPERABLE. AND C.1.1.2 Analyze samples for Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of radioactivity. grab sample OR C.1.2 Suspend release of Immediately radioactive effluents via the associated pathway.

AND C.2.1 Restore one monitor 30 days channel to OPERABLE status.

OR C.2.2 Explain in Effluent Release Next submittal of the Report pursuant to Effluent Release TS 5.6.3 why this Report inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

D. Less than the required D.1.1.1 Implement a sampling 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> plant vent system iodine program with auxiliary sampler channel operable sampling equipment.

(cartridge only)

AND OR D.1.1.2 Collect samples Continuously Less than required plant following completion vent system particulate of Required sampler channel operable Action D.1.1.1, while (filter only). release is in progress OR D.1.2 Suspend release of Immediately radioactive effluents via this pathway.

AND (continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 2 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.2.1 Restore one sampler 30 days channel to OPERABLE status.

OR D.2.2 Explain in Effluent Release Next submittal of the Report pursuant to Effluent Release TS 5.6.3 why this Report inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

E. Less than required plant E.1.1 Estimate flow rate. Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> vent system flow rate while release is in monitor channel operable progress OR OR Immediately Less than required plant vent system iodine E.1.2 Suspend release of sampler flow rate monitor radioactive effluents via channel operable. this pathway.

AND E.2.1 Restore one monitor 30 days channel to OPERABLE Status.

OR E.2.2 Explain in Effluent Release Next submittal of the Report pursuant to Effluent Release TS 5.6.3 why this Report inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

F. Less than required plant F.1 Verify an alternate method 7 days vent mid and high range of analysis is available.

radioiodine and AND particulate samplers OPERABLE.

30 days F.2 Restore principle method of analysis to OPERABLE Status.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 3 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 39.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. Prior to each release.

SR 39.4.2 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 39.4.3 ---------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------- 7 days The CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying that the iodine cartridge and particulate filter are installed in the sample holders.

Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

SR 39.4.4 Perform SOURCE CHECK. Prior to each release.

SR 39.4.5 Perform SOURCE CHECK. 31 days SR 39.4.6 --------------------------------NOTE----------------------------------- 18 months The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NIST. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

SR 39.4.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 39.4.8 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days (continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 4 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 39.4.9 ----------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------- 92 days The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exist:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

b. Circuit failure, or

c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or

d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 39.4.10 ----------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------- 92 days The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exist:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint (isolation and alarm), or

b. Relay control circuit failure (isolation only), or

c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure (alarm only), or

d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode (alarm only).

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 39.4.11 ------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------- 92 days The CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying that the iodine cartridge and particulate filter are installed in the sample holders.

Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 5 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 Table 39.4-1 Radiological Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation REQUIRED NUMBER ECG 39.4 OF REQUIRED ACTION SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CHANNELS MODE CONDITION REQUIREMENTS

1. Gaseous Radwaste 1 At all times B SR 39.4.1 System SR 39.4.4 noble gas activity monitor SR 39.4.6

- Providing alarm and automatic termination of SR 39.4.10 release

2. Plant Vent System

a. Noble gas activity 1 At all times C SR 39.4.2 monitor (If normal SR 39.4.5 range monitor is inoperable, Function SR 39.4.6 2.f, below, is also SR 39.4.9 inoperable)

b. Iodine sampler 1 At all times D SR 39.4.3 (cartridge only)

c. Particulate sampler 1 At all times D SR 39.4.3 (filter only)

d. Plant vent flow rate 1 At all times E SR 39.4.2 monitor SR 39.4.7 SR 39.4.8

e. Iodine sampler flow 1 At all times E SR 39.4.2 rate monitor SR 39.4.7 SR 39.4.8

f. Mid and high range 1 With fuel in F SR 39.4.8 radioiodine and containment SR 39.4.11 particulate sampler

3. Containment purge system TS 3.3.6 TS 3.3.6 TS 3.3.6 (In accordance with TS)

Noble gas activity monitor DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 6 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES BACKGROUND The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or postulated radiological releases. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM-TS 5.5.1) to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Details concerning compensatory sampling for inoperable instrumentation may be found in CY2.ID1. Heat tracing and isokinetic flow conditions are required for representative monitoring and sampling of radioactive iodine and particulates.

The gaseous radwaste system gas decay tank noble gas discharge monitor, RM-22 (channel R-22), detects radioactive noble gases and provides an alarm and automatic termination of release. When actuated, the instrument channel provides a control output signal initiating the closure of valve RCV-17 (Reference 6). When activity level is sufficiently low, these gases are released from the gas decay tanks, passed through a HEPA filter, and vented directly to the atmosphere via the plant vent system (Reference 4). The gas decay tanks are common to both units.

The plant vent system includes additional monitoring instrumentation in the release vents. Noble gas monitors RM-14 and RM-14R (channels R-14 and R-14R) provide an alarm when high radiation is detected in the plant vent. The plant vent iodine monitors, RM-24 and RM-24R (channels R-24 and R-24R), sample air exhausted through the plant vent to determine the radioactive iodine concentration. Similarly, the plant vent radioactive particulate monitors, RM-28 and RM-28R (channels R-28 and R-28R), sample the exhaust air for radioactive particulate concentrations. In conjunction, flow rate monitoring channels FT-813 and FT-814, (associated with iodine sampler channels R-24 and R-24R),

measure the flow rates, which are used as inputs in determining the iodine activity. Loop flow transmitter FT-12 or its redundant counterpart, FT-12R, feeds a signal to flow recorder FR-12, which monitors the gaseous effluent flow rate in the plant vent. (Reference 7). The containment exhaust radiation monitors, RM-44A and RM-44B (channels R-44A and R-44B), monitor the air exhausted from containment through the containment purge and exhaust lines, and are covered by TS 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

The extended range plant vent noble gas activity monitor RM-87 (channel R-87) monitors the plant vent when the radioactivity concentrations contained in the plant vent effluent are within the upper portions of, or exceed, the useful operating range of the normal range and redundant normal range plant vent radioactive gas monitors (R-14 and R-14R). The plant vent extended range monitor provides the capability for continuous monitoring and indication. This indication is not controlled by this ECG.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 7 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES BACKGROUND The plant vent extended range monitor also consists of a set of (continued) removable filter assemblies. The plant vent extended range sample assemblies (RF-87A and RF-87B) provide the capability to obtain samples of the particulate and iodine radioactivity concentrations in accordance with EP RB-12. The capability to analyze these filters is normally provided by the TSC gamma spectroscopy system, which is discussed in ECG 11.1 - Bases, Background. The normal range noble gas activity monitor (RM-14) automatically swaps (on high radiation) to the extended range plant vent noble gas activity monitor (RM-87). The microprocessor or pump control circuit for RM-14 is needed for automatic or manual actuation of RM-87, and if inoperable, will make RM-87 inoperable.

If RF-87A and RF-87B are both inoperable, the alternate method for monitoring plant vent iodine and particulate concentration is reading RE-24 or 24R, or collecting samples from RF-24 or RF-24R, as described in EP RB-12.

The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64. The sensitivity of any noble gas activity monitors used to show compliance with the gaseous effluent release requirements of the ODCM (commitment for operation Attachment 7 of CY2.ID1) shall be such that concentrations as low as 1 x 10-5 microcurie/mL are measurable.

The plant vent system is equipped with two channels of radioactive noble gas monitors, iodine monitors, and particulate monitors. Failure of any one of the two channels does not render the monitoring instrumentation inoperable. Sampling programs can be implemented to compensate for a failure of the channel required for operability.

APPLICABLE Several plant features are in place to limit the amount of activity that SAFETY could be released in the event of a design basis accident (DBA) gas ANALYSES decay tank rupture. Limits on primary coolant activity restrict the total curies present in the gas decay tanks as do the physical dimensions of each individual tank. Radiation monitors allow for the early detection and/or magnitude of release and isolation valves allow operators to terminate the release upon detection.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 8 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES (continued)

LCO The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation must be OPERABLE to ensure that radioactive gaseous releases are monitored and controlled in accordance with the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (CY2.ID1).

The following table describes the LCO requirement for each of the functions listed in Table 39.4-1:

For Table 39.4-1 The LCO requires that Function

1. Gaseous radwaste the single gaseous radwaste system noble system gas activity monitor channel (R-22) be OPERABLE at all times as a primary means Noble gas activity of detection and transmittal of an automatic monitor isolation signal in the event of a gas decay tank release that exceeds off-site release rate dose limits.

2. Plant vent system at least one channel of RM-14 or RM-14R radiation monitoring channels be OPERABLE

a. Noble gas activity at all times. In the plant vent system, these monitor channels detect the concentration of radioactive noble gases, providing alarm and indication. These monitors along with the plant vent flow monitor are used to determine discharge rates and amounts.

b. Iodine sampler at least one channel associated with the (cartridge only) iodine sampler cartridge be OPERABLE at all times. In conjunction, the required pump and the flow meters are used to determine the iodine activity.

c. Particulate sampler at least one channel associated with the (filter only) particulate sample filter be OPERABLE at all times. These sample the exhaust air for radioactive particulates.

d. Plant vent flow rate at least one channel associated with the plant monitor vent flow rate monitor be OPERABLE at all times. In the plant vent system, these monitor the gaseous effluent flow rate in the plant vent.

e. Iodine sampler at least one channel of the iodine sampler flow rate monitor flow rate monitor be OPERABLE at all times.

The iodine sampler flow rate is associated with iodine sampler channels R-24 and R-24R. It measures the flow rate and is used as an input in determining iodine activity.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 9 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES LCO (continued)

For Table 39.4-1 The LCO requires that Function

f. Mid and high range at least one channel of the extended range radioiodine and sampler be OPERABLE with fuel in particulate containment. The extended range sampler samplers provides particulate and iodine sampling for concentrations outside the useful operating range of the normal range particulate and iodine monitors.

3. Containment purge the containment purge system be controlled in system accordance with TS 3.3.6.

Noble gas activity monitor APPLICABILITY ECG 39.4 is applicable at all times for all the radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentations listed in this ECG except the mid and high range radioiodine and particulate sampler because the effects of an uncontrolled release of a gas decay tanks contents are not dependent on plant operational mode. For the mid and high range radioiodine and particulate sampler, it is only required with fuel in containment because it is used to monitor an accident with a high radioiodine and particulate release which is typical for an accident inside containment while the unit is online.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable radiation monitor channel.

The Conditions of this ECG may be entered independently for each radiation monitor listed in the LCO. The Completion Time(s) of each inoperable radiation monitor will be tracked separately starting from the time the Condition was entered for that radiation monitor. The ACTIONS have been modified by a second Note stating the provisions of ECG 0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation is inoperable.

This allowance is based on the Required Actions that are performed, the plant features that are in place to limit the amount of activity that could be released in the event of a DBA gas decay tank rupture, the limits on plant primary coolant activity that restrict the total curies present in the gas decay tanks, and the small probability of an uncontrolled release occurring.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 10 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

With one or more functions (as listed in Table 39.4-1) with the required channel inoperable, the appropriate actions must be taken to restore operability to the instrumentation in order to ensure adequate monitoring of gaseous releases. When one or more function is inoperable, the release of gaseous effluents is suspended or a compensatory action is taken to ensure the safe release of gaseous effluent until the equipment is made OPERABLE.

B.1.1.1, B.1.1.2, and B.1.2 Suspending release of radioactive effluents via this pathway ensures that no potentially radioactive gases are released from the decay tanks to the plant vent while the monitoring function is inoperable. In accordance with Actions B.1.1.1 and B.1.1.2, the contents of the tank may be released for up to 14 days provided that the compensatory analysis and verification are performed. To satisfy Action B.1.1.1, at least two independent samples of the tanks contents must be analyzed. To satisfy Action B.1.1.2, at least two technically qualified members of the facility staff must independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge valve line up.

B.2.1 and B.2.2 During the 14-day allotment the channel shall be repaired so that the activity in the gaseous effluent can be determined and the automatic valve closure function is available if the activity exceeds the alarm/trip setpoint. If the channel is not repaired in the allotted time, an explanation is required in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report. The 14 day completion time is reasonable based on the low probability of uncontrolled release and provides ample time to repair the channel.

C.1.1.1 and C.1.1.2 The purpose of the sampling program is to manually sample and analyze the gaseous effluent for radiation when the release vent radiation monitoring channels are inoperable. The gaseous radwaste system noble gas activity monitoring channel (R-22) ensures gaseous effluent release to the plant vent system via the gas decay tanks has sufficiently low activity. In addition to the gas decay tanks, several other release pathways are routed to the plant vent system, making it necessary to sample at this frequency.

C.1.2 Suspending release of radioactive effluents via this pathway ensures that no potentially radioactive gases are vented to the atmosphere while the radioactive noble gas monitoring channel in the release vent is inoperable and initiating a sampling program is not feasible.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 11 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES ACTIONS C.2.1 and C.2.2 (continued)

After suspending release of effluents via this pathway or initiating the sampling program, 30 days are allotted to repair the channel. The completion time is based on the time necessary to restore operability to the channel and the low probability of radioactive release concurrent with channel inoperability. If the channel is not repaired in the allotted time, an explanation is required in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report.

D.1.1.1 and D.1.1.2 Determine that a simple fix cannot be made and that an auxiliary sampler is needed, move the sampler in, and hook up and verify operation. A maximum of two hours is considered a reasonable time to initiate the continuous sampling program. Over two hours should be considered as exceeding the time limitation of this ECG.

D.1.2 Suspending release of radioactive effluents via this pathway ensures that no potentially radioactive gases are vented to the atmosphere while either the iodine sampler or particulate sampler is inoperable and continuous sampling is not possible.

D.2.1 and D.2.2 After suspending release of effluents via this pathway or initiating the sampling program, 30 days are allotted to repair the channel, based on the time demonstrated necessary by experience to restore operability. If the channel is not repaired in the allotted time, an explanation is required in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report.

E.1.1 Effluent release via the plant vent may continue for up to 30 days provided the flow rate is estimated at least once every four hours in order to ensure detection of significant releases.

E.1.2 Suspending release of radioactive effluents via this pathway is a conservative measure that ensures no potentially radioactive gases are vented to the atmosphere while the flow rate monitors are inoperable and the flow rate cannot be estimated per the frequency specified in Required Action E.1.

E.2.1 and E.2.2 After suspending effluent release, 30 days are allotted to repair the channel If the channel is not repaired in the allotted time, an explanation is required in the next submittal of the Effluent Release Report.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 12 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

The principle method of sampling the plant vent mid and high range radioiodines and particulates is RF-87A and RF-87B.

The principle method will be made inoperable if the normal range plant vent radiation monitor skid is inoperable. The normal plant vent skid controls the pump operation on the high range monitor. If the principle method is inoperable for this or any other reason, Required Action F.1 requires verifying an alternate method of analysis is available within 7 days. Acceptable alternate methods are

1. Read RE-24 or 24R.

OR

2. Collect sample from RF-24 or 24R (per EP RB-12)

F.2 Thirty days are allowed to restore the principle method of analysis to OPERABLE status. This completion time is consistent with that of Required Action C.3.1 for restoring at least one normal range channel to OPERABLE status and is acceptable based on experience.

SURVEILLANCE SR 39.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Performing a CHANNEL CHECK on the gas decay tank noble gas activity monitor (RM-22) ensures normal behavior of the channel prior to each release. By confirming operability, a CHANNEL CHECK also ensures that the instrumentation is able to send a high radiation signal to the isolation valve to terminate gaseous effluent release.

SR 39.4.2 A CHANNEL CHECK is performed on the noble gas plant vent monitors (RM-14 and RM-14R), the iodine sampler flow rate monitors, and the plant vent flow rate monitor (flow recorder, FR-12) once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

This surveillance ensures reliability of concentration measurements in the case of a gas decay tank rupture. The frequency is based on the low probability of an uncontrolled release.

SR 39.4.3 A CHANNEL CHECK is performed every 7 days on the iodine sampler and particulate sampler; the monitors associated with these samplers are RM-24 and RM-24R, and RM-28 and RM-28R, respectively. The CHANNEL CHECK consists of verifying that the iodine cartridge and particulate filter are installed in the sample holders.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 13 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 39.4.4 REQUIREMENTS A SOURCE CHECK is the qualitative assessment of channel response (continued) when the channel sensor is exposed to a radiological source of known activity. A SOURCE CHECK is performed on the gas decay tank noble gas activity monitor prior to each release to ensure that the radiation monitor (RM-22) is capable of accurate detection and measurement. The surveillance frequency ensures that the radiation monitor is functioning prior to a release and is based on the low probability of an uncontrolled release.

SR 39.4.5 A SOURCE CHECK is performed on the plant vent system noble gas activity monitors (RM-14 and RM-14R) every 31 days as a routine check of radiation monitor functionality. The surveillance frequency is based on the low probability of an uncontrolled release.

SR 39.4.6 and SR 39.4.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors.

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed on the gas decay tank noble gas activity monitor (RM-22),

the plant vent system noble gas activity monitors (RM-14 and RM-14R),

the plant vent system flow rate monitor (FR-12) and the iodine sampler flow transmitters (FT-813 and FT-814). These surveillances are performed every 18 months, which has been shown to be acceptable by experience.

SR 39.4.8, SR 39.4.9, and SR 39.4.10 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the plant vent flow recorder and its associated flow transmitters (FR-12 fed from FT-12 and FT-12R), the iodine sampler flow transmitters (FT-813 and FT-814), the plant vent system noble gas activity monitors (RM-14, RM-14R, and RM-87 [including sample flow which includes RF-87A and RF-87B]), and the gas decay tank noble gas activity monitor (RM-22) every 92 days to ensure channel OPERABILITY. The frequency is based on operator experience and the low probability of channel inoperability concurrent with a DBA.

SR 39.4.11 Verification is made on a 92-day frequency that cartridge and particulate filters are installed in the sample holders to support performance of spectrum analyses of the filters if required. The 92-day frequency has been shown to be acceptable by experience.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 14 of 15

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ECG 39.4 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. CY2.ID1, Radioactive Effluent Controls Program.

2. CAP A-8, Offsite Dose Calculations.

3. DCPP Technical Specifications, Sections 3.3.6, 5.4.1, 5.5.1, and 5.6.2.

4. FSAR, Chapter 11, Radioactive Waste Management.

5. FSAR, Chapter 15, Accident Analyses.

6. DCM S-39, Radiation Monitoring System.

7. DCM T-24, Design Criteria for DCPP Instrumentation and Controls.

8. EP RB-12, "Plant Vent Iodine and Particulate Sampling During Accident Conditions."

9. AR A0695020.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 12A ECG_39!4u3r12.DOC 1228.0955 Page 15 of 15

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE DUE DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

TECH SPEC 1-TS-15-0825 N44 POWER RANGE COT, STP I-37-N44.A 3.3.1 D.1.1 -----------NOTE--------------- Only required when the Power 20Apr16 8:15 21Apr16 8:15 NA NONE Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable. ------------------

3.3.1 D.1.2 Place channel in trip 20Apr16 8:15 23Apr16 8:15 NA NONE 3.3.1 E.1 Place channel in trip. 20Apr16 8:15 23Apr16 8:15 NA NONE ECG Action 1-TS-16-0205 RM22 Out of Service, Failed Calibration 39.4 B.2.1 Restore the Monitor to OPERABLE status. 06Apr16 13:50 20Apr16 13:50 NA NONE 1-TS-16-0087 FI-601: Pass RCS Module Sample Cal and FI-1000: Pass Rx Cool Mod Sample Cal 11.1 A.1 Restore PASS reactor coolant sampling capability to 18Apr16 8:10 17May16 8:10 NA NONE OPERABLE status.

11.1 B.1 Restore PASS containment sump (RHR) sampling 18Apr16 8:10 17May16 8:10 NA NONE capability to OPERABLE status.

ACTIVE RISK SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE TLS NO.

None ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

TECH SPEC 1-TS-15-0825 N44 POWER RANGE COT, STP I-37-N44.A 3.3.1 A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1 1 for the 20Apr16 8:15 20Apr16 8:15 NA NONE channel(s) or trains.

3.3.1 S.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. 20Apr16 8:15 20Apr16 8:15 NA NONE 3.3.1 T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. 20Apr16 8:15 20Apr16 8:15 NA NONE ECG Action April 21, 2016 4:21:19AM Page: 3

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-12-0039 ECG 18.7.1 APPENDIX R FIRE BARRIERS - LOSS OF RCP SEAL COOLING / MSI FAILURE 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 26Jan12 18:00 26Jan12 19:00 See Instructions for multi NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the zone 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 26Jan12 18:00 26Jan12 19:00 See Instructions for multi NONE zone 1-TS-13-0081 18.7.2 Fire Barriers inop that have evaluation complete [A4 action ONLY, NO ROVES]

18.7.2 A.4 Perform an ECG 18.7.2 Fire Rated Assembly Impairment 25Feb13 9:09 25Feb13 10:09 See Instructions for multi Evaluation zone 1-TS-14-0367 Fire dampers SD-26/27 and FD-26/27 inaccessible for surveillance 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 07Apr14 10:05 7Apr14 11:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 07Apr14 10:05 7Apr14 11:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE 1-TS-14-0654 Various Doors Won't Secure with Vent. Dampers Closed (zones A-3 and A-4) 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 01Aug14 7:44 1Aug14 8:44 See Instructions for multi NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the zone 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 01Aug14 7:44 1Aug14 8:44 See Instructions for multi NONE zone 1-TS-15-0366 Door 343 Replacement 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 31May15 5:08 31May15 6:08 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 31May15 5:08 31May15 6:08 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE 1-TS-15-0437 Missed Fire Damper Inspections (VAC-1-FD-4/5) 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 23Jun15 15:31 23Jun15 16:31 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 23Jun15 15:31 23Jun15 16:31 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE SR 0.3 Perform risk assessment in accordance with SR 0.3 23Jun15 15:04 24Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE 1-TS-16-0005 Concrete Removal Unit 1 Turbine Building, elev.140', North East corner between Column F.1 & G Line.

18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 11Feb16 19:11 11Feb16 20:11 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 11Feb16 19:11 11Feb16 20:11 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE April 21, 2016 4:21:19AM Page: 4

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-16-0154 Maronite fire stop broken 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 09Mar16 16:45 9Mar16 17:45 A8 VC Pen 8 NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 09Mar16 16:45 9Mar16 17:45 A8 VC Pen 8 NONE 1-TS-16-0205 RM22 Out of Service, Failed Calibration 39.4 B.1.2 Suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway 06Apr16 13:50 06Apr16 13:50 NONE INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

TECH SPEC 1-TS-08-0038 INCORE THERMOCOUPLES - TRAIN A: TT-17 (III) / TRAIN B: TT-36 (II), TT-28 (III), TT-54 (III) 3.3.3 A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. 27Sep08 10:07 NA None ECG Action 1-TS-14-0367 Fire dampers SD-26/27 and FD-26/27 inaccessible for surveillance 18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 07Apr14 10:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

1-TS-14-0901 Hosereel FW-A25-1 replace 18.2 A.1 Fire Brigade route fire hose from an OPERABLE* fire 21Jan15 9:56 B5 Auxiliary Feedwater NONE hose station up to the entrance of fire area(s) protected by 1-TS-15-0199 Info only FS-11 spurious alarming/fail to reset (fire areas 11D and 13E) 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an 27Mar15 4:25 See Instructions for multi NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of zone 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 27Mar15 4:25 See Instructions for multi NONE zone April 21, 2016 4:21:19AM Page: 5

EXAMINEE HANDOUT- NRC EXAM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-15-0437 Missed Fire Damper Inspections (VAC-1-FD-4/5) 18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 23Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

18.7.1 A.3 Perform a temporary penetration seal repair in 23Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE accordance with STP M-70A.

18.7.1 A.4 Implement alternate compensatory measures(s). 23Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE 1-TS-15-0825 N44 POWER RANGE COT, STP I-37-N44.A 37.2 A.1 Verify AFD within limits for each OPERABLE excore 31Mar16 20:17 NA NONE channel.

1-TS-16-0005 Concrete Removal Unit 1 Turbine Building, elev.140', North East corner between Column F.1 & G Line.

18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 11Feb16 19:11 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

18.7.1 A.3 Perform a temporary penetration seal repair in 11Feb16 19:11 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE accordance with STP M-70A.

18.7.1 A.4 Implement alternate compensatory measures(s). 11Feb16 19:11 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE 1-TS-16-0154 Maronite fire stop broken 18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 09Mar16 16:45 A8 VC Pen 8 NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

TS SHEETS EXITED W/IN LAST 12 HOURS LCO DESCRIPTION DATE SHEET CLOSED 1-TS-15-0249 Door 521 Door Replacement 18.7.2 A. One or more Appendix A fire rated assemblies 20Apr16 03:45 inoperable.

1-TS-16-0155 85' Access and Chem Lab sprinklers cleared for FS-10 maintenance (dectection zones B4 and D6) 18.4 A. With one or more of the above spray and/or sprinkler 20Apr16 02:04 systems inoperable for areas containing redundant 18.7.1 A. One or more Appendix R fire rated assemblies 20Apr16 02:04 inoperable.

April 21, 2016 4:21:19AM Page: 6

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-A9

Title:

CLASSIFICATION OF INABILITY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OF THE PLANT FOLLOWING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

EP G-1, Accident Classification and Emer Plan Activation, Rev.44 Forms 69-21608, 69-21609, 69-21610 (06/19/12, 07/24/13, 12/5/11)

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # / Rating: GEN.2.4.41, Emergency Procedures / Plan 4.6 (SRO)

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO / JOHN BECERRA DATE: 03/15/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/16/16 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: CLASSIFY CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• EP G-1, and EAL Wall Charts.

• Vol 11, Emergency Plan, App D (classification bases), should be available to the examinee.

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 is at 100% power with no planned MOWs.

Unit 2 is in an outage.

• Core offload is complete

• DG 2-3 is OOS for maintenance At 13:00, an earthquake measuring 3.0 g resulted in a loss of ALL offsite power to both units.

• DG 1-1 and 1-2 started in auto and all equipment loaded as expected

• DG 1-3 tripped on activation of the Shutdown Relay

• DG 2-1 failed to start in auto and manual

• DG 2-2 tripped on activation of its Shutdown Relay At 13:05, a fire erupted in the control room resulting in excessive smoke.

• At 13:08, the control room implemented OP AP-8A due to the excessive smoke

• At 13:15, the fire was extinguished At 13:22, Unit 2 established control from the U2 HSDP At 13:25, Unit 1 established control from the U1 HSDP following the removal of debris that resulted earthquake structural damage.

Initiating Cue: Given the initial conditions, classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: CLASSIFY CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: In < 15 minutes classifies the event as:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS5.1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established per OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 min.

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: CLASSIFY CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure 1.1 References EP G all pages of wall chart provided Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. ** Accurately classify the event. 2.1 Classified the event as Site Area Emergency, HS5.1 **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

3.** Classification time < 15 minutes 3.1 Classified the event < 15 min. of the Event Initiation Time. **

Classification Time: _____________

Event Initiation Time: _____________

(Event initiation time is JPM Start Time)

Difference: ____________ min**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: CLASSIFY CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 is at 100% power with no planned MOWs.

Unit 2 is in an outage.

• Core offload is complete

• DG 2-3 is OOS for maintenance At 13:00, an earthquake measuring 3.0 g resulted in a loss of ALL offsite power to both units.

• DG 1-1 and 1-2 started in auto and all equipment loaded as expected

• DG 1-3 tripped on activation of the Shutdown Relay

• DG 2-1 failed to start in auto and manual

• DG 2-2 tripped on activation of its Shutdown Relay At 13:05, a fire erupted in the control room resulting in excessive smoke.

• At 13:08, the control room implemented OP AP-8A due to the excessive smoke

• At 13:15, the fire was extinguished At 13:22, Unit 2 established control from the U2 HSDP At 13:25, Unit 1 established control from the U1 HSDP following the removal of debris that resulted earthquake structural damage.

Initiating Cue: Given the initial conditions, classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

Classification: _________________________________________________________________

Justification: ___________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 1

EVALUATOR ANSWER KEY JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-A9 Correct Classification: SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS5.1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established per OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 min*

• (Based on Unit 1 establishing control 17 minutes after OP AP-8A was implemented)

Lower Level Classifications:

ALERT HA1.1 on Units 1 & 2 for Operating Basis Earthquake (> 0.2 g on the X or Y axis or > 0.133 g on the Z axis) exceeded ALERT HA 5.1 on Unit 2 for Entry into OP AP 8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, for Control Room evacuation ALERT CA1.1 on Unit 2 for Loss of ALL offsite and onsite AC power to Unit Vital 4kV buses F, G and H for > 15 min.

Potential Incorrect Classifications SAE SS1.1 (APPLICABLE IN MODES 1-4) is an incorrect classification for Unit 2 since Unit 2 is DEFUELED (MODE 6).

ALERT HA2.1 is an incorrect classification for both Units since Fire did not cuase any visible damage to any Table H-1 plant structures containing safety systems or components, nor was there any indication of degraded performance.

UE HU2.1 is an incorrect classification for both Units since the fire within the Protected Area was extinguished within 10 minutes.

NRCL141-A9 rev 1.docx PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 1

69-21608 (06/19/12) EP G-1 Page 1 of 1 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the gaseous radioactivity exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE environment that exceeds 200 times the Radiological Effluent environment that exceeds two times the Radiological Effluent thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release for the actual or projected duration of the release Technical Specifications (RETS) limits for 15 minutes or longer Technical Specifications (RETS) limits for 60 minutes or longer using actual meteorology 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RG1.1 RS1.1 RA1.1 RU1.1 Valid reading on ANY monitors that exceeds or is expected Valid reading on ANY radiation monitors that exceeds or is Valid reading on ANY LIQUID monitors > Table R-1 column Valid reading on ANY LIQUID monitors > Table R-1 column to exceed Table R-1 column "GE" for > 15 min. (Note 1) expected to exceed Table R-1 column "SAE" for > 15 min. "Alert" for > 15 min. "UE" for > 60 min.

(Note 1)

Note 1: If dose assessment results are available at the time of Note 1: If dose assessment results are available at the time of RA1.2 RU1.2 declaration, the classification should be based on dose assessment declaration, the classification should be based on dose assessment Valid reading on ANY GASEOUS monitors > Table R-1 col- Valid reading on ANY GASEOUS monitors > Table R-1 col-instead of radiation monitor readings. While necessary declarations instead of radiation monitor readings. While necessary declarations umn "UE" for > 60 min.

should not be delayed awaiting results, the dose assessment should be should not be delayed awaiting results, the dose assessment should be umn "Alert" for > 15 min.

1 initiated / completed in order to determine if the classification is initiated / completed in order to determine if the classification should be warranted. See EAL RG1.2 subsequently escalated. See EAL RS1.2 RA1.3 RU1.3 Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases RG1.2 RS1.2 indicate concentrations or release rates > 2 x RETS limits for Offsite Rad indicate concentrations or release rates > 200 x RETS limits Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses for > 15 min. > 60 min.

Conditions

> 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE at or > 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE at or beyond beyond the site boundary the site boundary RG1.3 RS1.3 Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates Field survey indicates closed window dose rate

> 1,000 mRem/hr expected to continue for > 1 hr, at or > 100 mRem/hr that is expected to continue for > 1 hr, at or beyond the site boundary beyond the site boundary OR OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of Field survey sample analysis indicates thyroid CDE of 5,000 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation, at or beyond the site > 500 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the site boundary boundary R Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Unexpected Increase in plant radiation 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Abnormal RA2.1 RU2.1 Rad Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will Valid low water level alarm indicating uncontrolled water level Level Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor decrease in the reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or vessel resulting in a valid high alarm on ANY of the following fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remain-Rad Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE radiation monitors: ing covered by water Effluent - New Fuel Storage Area Rad Mon RM-59, Hi Rad AND 1(2)-RM-14/14R ----- ----- Offscale hi 8.0E+4 cpm (6.5 mR/hr) Unplanned direct area radiation monitor reading increases

- Spent Fuel Pool Area Rad Mon RM-58, Hi Rad Gaseous 2.0E-3 µCi/cc (20 mR/hr)

Plant Vent 1(2)-RM-24/24R ----- ----- 1.0E-6 µCi/cc 1.0E-8 µCi/cc - Contmt Area Mon High Rad RM-2, Hi Rad RU2.2 1(2)-RM-28/28R ----- ----- (21 mR/hr) 1.0E-5 µCi/cc 1.0E-7 µCi/cc - Containment Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor Unplanned valid direct radiation area monitor reading None None increases by a factor of 1000 over normal* levels 1(2)-RM-87 3.0E-9 amps 3.0E-10 amps RM-44A/B high alarm

---

----- Normal levels may be considered as the highest reading in the past twenty four 2

(1.35E-4 µCi/cc) (24) hours excluding the current peak value 2.0E+1µCi/cc 2.0E0µCi/cc 1(2)-RM- RA2.2 71/72/73/74 A water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel Onsite Rad With Steam Dump or 3.0E+5 cpm 3.0E+4 cpm 3.0E+3 cpm 3.0E+2 cpm pool or fuel transfer canal that will result in irradiated fuel Main Steam one or more SRVs Conditions, becoming uncovered open on affected SG Spent Fuel Events Release of radioactive material or increases in radiation levels Oily Water Separator within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to 0-RM-3 ----- -----

Effluent 6.0E+4 cpm

• 6.0E+2 cpm

• maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Liquid Liquid Radwaste 0-RM-18 ----- ----- RA2.3 Discharge Line Effluent Offscale hi

• 1.0E+5 cpm

• Valid radiation monitor readings > 15 mR/hr in areas requiring SGBD Tank Liquid continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

1(2)-RM-23 ----- -----

Effluent Offscale hi

• 2.0E+4 cpm

• Control Room (0-RM-1)

OR

• With effluent discharge not isolated Central Alarm Station (by survey)

RA2.4 Valid radiation monitor readings > 2 R/hr in the following areas requiring infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions:

- Auxiliary Building

- Fuel Handling Building

- Turbine Building

- Intake Structure Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the plant Vital Area Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Table H-1 Vital Areas HA1.1 HU1.1 EFM "Alert" alarm or CP M-4, "Earthquake" indicates Seismic event identified by ANY TWO of the following:

- Containment Operating Basis Earthquake (> 0.2 g on the X or Y axis or - Earthquake felt in plant

> 0.133 g on the Z axis) exceeded - Seismic event confirmed by PK15-24 main

- Auxiliary Building annunciator "SEISMIC INSTR SYSTEM"

- Fuel Handling Building - U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

- Turbine Building HA1.2 HU1.2

- Intake Structure Tornado or high winds > 80 mph (36.36 m/sec) within Report by plant personnel of tornado or high winds > 80 mph Protected Area boundary and resulting in visible damage to (36.36 m/sec) striking within Protected Area boundary

- RWST ANY Table H-1 plant structures / equipment or Control Room

- CST indication of degraded performance of those systems 1

HA1.3 None Vehicle crash within Protected Area boundary and resulting in Note 2: If vehicle crash is a hostile action, see Subcategory H.4 EALs visible damage to ANY Table H-1 plant structures or equipment for possible classification Natural & or control room indication of degraded performance of those Destructive systems (Note 2)

Phenomena HA1.4 HU1.3 Turbine failure-generated missiles result in ANY visible Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to or penetration of ANY Table H-1 area damage to turbine or generator seals HA1.5 HU1.4 Uncontrolled flooding in ANY Table H-1 area that results in Uncontrolled flooding in ANY Table H-1 area that has the degraded safety system performance as indicated in the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the Control Room or that creates industrial safety hazards (e.g., current operating mode electric shock) that precludes access necessary to operate or monitor safety equipment HU1.5 Hurricane warning or tsunami (actual or warning) affecting the Protected Area Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems Fire within Protected Area boundary not extinguished within 15 required to establish or maintain safe shutdown minutes of detection 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA2.1 HU2.1 2 Note 3: If the fire or explosion is a hostile action, see Subcategory Fire or explosion resulting in EITHER:

- Visible damage to any Table H-1 plant structures containing safety systems or components Fire in buildings or areas contiguous to ANY Table H-1 area not extinguished within 15 min. of Control Room notification or validation of a Control Room alarm (Note 3)

None H.4 EALs for possible classification Fire - Control Room indication of degraded performance of or Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area systems required to establish or maintain safe Explosion shutdown (Note 3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU2.2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion H

within Protected Area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment (Note 3)

Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases within or Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases deemed contiguous to a Vital Area which jeopardizes operation of systems detrimental to normal operation of the plant required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Hazards 3

1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA3.1 HU3.1 Report or detection of toxic, corrosive or asphyxiant gases Report or detection of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or Toxic within or contiguous to ANY Table H-1 area in concentrations flammable gases that have entered or could enter the Owner None None and that may result in an atmosphere Immediately Dangerous to Controlled Area in amounts that can adversely affect normal Flammable Life and Health (IDLH) plant operations Gas HA3.2 HU3.2 Report or detection of gases in concentration > the Lower Recommendation by local, county or state officials to Flammability Limit within or contiguous to ANY Table H-1 area evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the facility Hostile action within the Protected Area Hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a potential or airborne attack threat degradation in the level of safety of the plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG4.1 HS4.1 HA4.1 HU4.1 A hostile action has occurred such that plant personnel are A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A security condition that does not involve a hostile action as 4 unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions OR Protected Area as reported by the Security Watch Commander Owner Controlled Area as reported by the Security Watch Commander OR reported by the Security Watch Commander OR A credible site-specific security threat notification Security A hostile action has caused: A valid notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat OR Failure of Spent Fuel Cooling systems within 30 min. of the site A valid notification from NRC providing information of an AND aircraft threat Imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off loaded reactor core in pool Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot Control Room evacuation has been initiated be established 5 None HS5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF None Control Control Room evacuation has been initiated Entry into OP AP 8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, for Room AND Control Room evacuation Evacuation Control of the plant cannot be established per OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 min.

Other conditions existing which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED Other conditions existing which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED Other conditions existing which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED Other conditions existing which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED warrant declaration of General Emergency warrant declaration of Site Area Emergency warrant declaration of an Alert warrant declaration of a UE 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG6.1 HS6.1 HA6.1 HU6.1 6 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED indicate that events are in process or have Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED indicate that events are in progress or have Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED indicate that are in progress or have occurred Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM/SEC/ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of Judgment degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment plant functions needed for protection of the public. ANY of the level of safety of the plant. ANY releases are expected safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material integrity or security events that result in an actual loss of releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels (1 Guideline exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid further degradation of safety systems occurs expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE) beyond the site CDE) exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE) boundary offsite for more than the site boundary Damage to a loaded cask confinement boundary Table E-1 ISFSI Events/Conditions Mode applicability is N/A for ISFSI E

Natural Phenomena Accidents EU1.1

- High wind - Cask drop - Vehicle impact Damage to a loaded cask confinement boundary as None - Tornado - Cask tip-over - Airborne missile indicated by EITHER:

- Earthquake - Cask air inlet/outlet - Transmission tower Occurrence of ANY Table E-1 event/condition ISFSI - Lightning strike blockage collapse OR

- Fire - 500kV transmission Beyond normal ISFSI radiation reading

- Explosion line drop Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Action Level Wall Chart 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Mode key: Power Operation Startup Hot Standby Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Sheet 1 of 3 Modes: ALL Revision Date: 6/19/12

69-21610 (12/5/11) EP G-1 Page 1 of 1 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power to vital buses AC power capability to vital buses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in station blackout 5 6 DEF 5 6 CA1.1 CU1.1 Loss of ALL offsite and onsite AC power to Unit 1(2) Vital 4kV AC power capability to Unit 1(2) Vital 4kV buses F, G and H buses F, G and H for > 15 min. reduced to a single power source (e.g., one DG, supply line 1 None None from unaffected unit or one offsite power source) for > 15 min. such that ANY additional single failure would result in loss of ALL AC power to vital buses Loss of Unplanned loss of required DC power for greater than 15 minutes Power 5 6 CU1.2 Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC buses based on < 105 VDC bus voltage indications AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 min. from the time of loss Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory affecting Fuel Clad integrity with Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory affecting core decay heat Loss of RCS/RPV inventory with Irradiated fuel in the RPV Unplanned loss of RCS inventory with irradiated fuel in the Reactor Containment challenged and irradiated fuel in the Reactor Vessel removal capability Vessel 5 6 5 5 6 6 CG2.1 CS2.1 CA2.1 CU2.1 Containment challenged as indicated by ANY of the With Containment closure not established: Loss of inventory as indicated by EITHER: Unplanned RCS level decreasing below the Reactor Vessel following: RVLIS full range < 62.1% Reactor Vessel level < bottom of the RCS hot leg as flange for > 15 min.

- Containment closure not established OR indicated by ANY of the following:

- Containment hydrogen concentration > 4% Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored for > 30 min. - RVRLIS, LI-400 standpipe or ultrasonic sensor

- Unplanned rise in containment pressure with unexplained increase in ANY Table C-1 sump/tank < 105 ft. 9 in.

AND level - RVLIS upper range < 60% CU2.2 Core uncovery for > 30 min. as indicated by EITHER: - RVLIS full range < 63.3% Loss of inventory as indicated by unexplained increase in RVLIS full range < 56.6% CS2.2 OR ANY Table C-1 sump/tank level OR Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored for > 15 min. AND With Containment closure established:

Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored with core with unexplained increase in ANY Table C-1 sump/tank Reactor Vessel water level cannot be monitored RVLIS full range < 56.6%

uncovery indicated by ANY of the following: level OR

- Containment radiation (RE-30 or RE-31) > 20 R/hr Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored for > 30 min.

- Erratic source range monitor indication

- Unexplained increase in ANY Table C-1 sump/tank with EITHER:

level - Unexplained increase in ANY Table C-1 sump/tank 2 level

- Erratic source range monitor indication Reactor Vessel Level Thresholds RCS Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory affecting core decay heat Table C-1 Sumps/Tanks removal capability with irradiated fuel in the Reactor Vessel Elev. RVLIS Level

- Containment Structure Sump 1-1 (2-1) 6 RV flange 114 ft 81.5% upper

- Containment Structure Sump 1-2 (2-2) 83.3% full CS2.3

- Reactor Cavity Sump

- PRT With Containment closure not established: Hot leg 105 ft 9 in. 60% upper C

- RCDT RVLIS full range < 62.1% bottom 63.3% full

- CCW surge tank OR

- Auxiliary Building sump Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored with 6 in. below 105 ft 3 in. 62.1% full

- RWST indication of core uncovery as evidenced by EITHER: hot leg

- Containment radiation (RE-30 or RE-31) > 20 R/hr Cold SD/ - Erratic source range monitor indication Top of 103 ft 56.6% full active fuel Refuel, System CS2.4 Malfunct. With Containment closure established:

RVLIS full range < 56.6%

OR Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored with indication of core uncovery as evidenced by EITHER:

- Containment radiation (RE-30 or RE-31) > 20 R/hr

- Erratic source range monitor indication Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown with irradiated fuel in the Unplanned loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel Reactor Vessel in the Reactor Vessel 5 6 5 6 3 None Table C-3 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds Containment and RCS Barrier Status Duration CA3.1 An unplanned event results in RCS temperature > 200°F for > Table C-3 duration CU3.1 An unplanned event results in RCS temperature > 200°F RCS OR CU3.2 Temp. RCS pressure increase > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS

1. RCS intact (Containment closure N/A) 60 min.* Loss of ALL RCS temperature and Reactor Vessel level cooling indication for > 15 min.

2. Containment closure established Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities AND 20 min.* 5 6 RCS not intact 4

Table C-2 Communications Systems CU4.1 Onsite Offsite None System Loss of ALL Table C-2 onsite (internal) communications

3. Containment closure not established (internal) (external)

Comm. capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations AND 0 min. OR

- Unit 1, Unit 2 and TSC Radio Consoles X X RCS not intact - DCPP Telephone System (PBX) X X Loss of ALL Table C-2 offsite (external) communications

• If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and - Portable radio equipment (handie-talkies) X capability RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable - Operations Radio System X X

- Security Radio Systems X RCS Leakage

- Central Alarm Station (CAS) and X X 5 Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Consoles 5 - Fire Radio System X CU5.1 None

- Hot Shutdown Panel Radio Consoles X X

- Public Address System X Unable to restore or maintain EITHER of the following due None None RCS - NRC FTS X to RCS leakage for > 15 min.:

Leakage - Mobile radios X Pressurizer level > 17%

- Satellite phones X X OR

- Direct line (ATL) to the County and State X Above the low end of the target level control band Office of Emergency Services (OES) (If pressurizer level was intentionally lowered < 17%)

None Inadvertent criticality 6

Inadvertent None None CU6.1 5 6 Criticality An unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation EAL Identifier XXX.X Category (R, H, C, S, F, L, E) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

COLD CONDITIONS (RCS 200°F)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Action Level Wall Chart Mode key: 1 Power Operation 2

Startup 3

Hot Standby 4

Hot Shutdown 5

Cold Shutdown 6

Refueling DEF Defueled Sheet 3 of 3 Modes: COLD (RCS 200°F)

Revision Date: 12/5/11

69-21609 (7/24/2013) EP G-1 Page 1 of 1 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Prolonged loss of all offsite power and prolonged loss of all onsite Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power to vital buses AC power capability to vital buses reduced to a single power source Loss of all offsite power to vital buses for greater than 15 minutes AC power to vital buses for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in station blackout 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1

SG1.1 SS1.1 SA1.1 SU1.1 Loss of ALL offsite and onsite AC power to Unit 1(2) Vital 4kV Loss of ALL offsite and onsite AC power to Unit 1(2) Vital AC power capability to Unit 1(2) Vital 4kV buses F, G and H Loss of ALL offsite AC power to Unit 1(2) Vital 4kV buses buses F, G and H 4kV buses F, G and H for > 15 min. reduced to a single power source (i.e., one DG or one offsite F, G and H for > 15 min.

Loss of AND EITHER: Loss of all vital DC power power source) for > 15 min.

Power Restoration of ANY Vital 4kV bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not 1 2 3 4 likely OR SS1.2 CSFST Core Cooling-RED or MAGENTA path Loss of ALL vital DC power based on < 105 VDC bus voltage indications for > 15 min.

Automatic trip and ALL manual actions fail to shut down the reactor Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and manual actions Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and the manual actions and indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core taken from the reactor control console are NOT successful in taken from the reactor control console are successful in shutting exists shutting down the reactor down the reactor 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 SG2.1 Automatic trip and ALL manual actions fail to shut down the SS2.1 An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SA2.1 An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor None reactor AND AND RTS Manual actions taken at the reactor control console Manual actions taken at the reactor control console AND EITHER of the following have occurred due to Failure do not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by continued power generation:

power > 5% reactor power < 5%

CSFST Core Cooling-RED OR CSFST Heat Sink-RED 3

Inability to Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical Specification limits 1 2 3 4 Reach or None None None SU3.1 Maintain Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Shutdown Technical Specifications LCO action statement time Conditions S Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciation or indication in control room with either (1) a significant transient in progress, or (2) compensatory non-alarming indicators are unavailable Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciation or indication in the control room for greater than 15 minutes System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Malfunct. SS4.1 SA4.1 SU4.1 Loss of greater than approximately 75% of the Unplanned loss of greater than approximately 75% of the Unplanned loss of greater than approximately 75% of the 4

annunciators or indicators associated with safety systems annunciators or indicators associated with safety systems on annunciators or indicators associated with safety systems on None on Vertical Boards 1 through 5, and Control Consoles 1, 2 Vertical Boards 1 through 5, and Control Consoles 1, 2 and 3 Vertical Boards 1 through 5, and Control Consoles 1, 2 and 3 and 3 for > 15 min. for > 15 min.

Inst. / AND AND EITHER:

Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities Comm. Significant transient is in progress A significant transient is in progress AND OR 1 2 3 4 Compensatory non-alarming indications (PPC, SPDS) are Compensatory non-alarming indications (PPC, SPDS) are SU4.2 unavailable unavailable Loss of ALL Table C-2 onsite (internal) communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations OR Loss of ALL Table C-2 offsite (external) communications capability Table C-2 Communications Systems Fuel clad degradation Onsite Offsite 1 2 3 4 5

System None (internal) (external) SU5.1 None With letdown in service, EP-RB-14A Dose Point radiation

- Unit 1, Unit 2 and TSC Radio Consoles X X > 3 R/hr Fuel Clad - DCPP Telephone System (PBX) X X

- Portable radio equipment (handie-talkies) X SU5.2 Degradation

- Operations Radio System X X Coolant activity > 60 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131

- Security Radio Systems X OR

- Central Alarm Station (CAS) and X X Coolant activity > 600.0 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Consoles

- Fire Radio System X RCS Leakage 6 None Hot Shutdown Panel Radio Consoles Public Address System NRC FTS X

X X

X Note 4: See Fission Product Barrier Inventory thresholds (Table F-1) for possible escalation above the Unusual Event due to RCS leakage SU6.1 1 2 3 4 RCS - Mobile radios X Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm Leakage - Satellite phones X X OR

- Direct line (ATL) to the County and State X Identified leakage > 25 gpm Office of Emergency Services (OES) 7 Inadvertent criticality None None 3 4 Inadvertent SU7.1 Criticality An unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation FG1.1 1 2 3 4 FS1.1 1 2 3 4 FA1.1 1 2 3 4 FU1.1 1 2 3 4 F Loss of ANY two barriers AND Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1) (Note 5)

Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers (Table F-1) (Note 5)

ANY loss or ANY potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS (Table F-1) (Note 5)

ANY loss or ANY potential loss of Containment (Table F-1) (Note 5)

Fission Note 5: The logic used for these initiating conditions reflects the following considerations:

Product o The Fuel Clad barrier and the RCS barrier are weighted more heavily than the Containment barrier. UE EALs associated with RCS and Barriers Fuel Clad barriers are addressed under System Malfunction EALs o At the Site Area Emergency level, there must be some ability to dynamically assess how far present conditions are from the threshold for a (Notes 5) General Emergency. For example, if Fuel Clad and RCS barrier "loss" EALs existed, that, in addition to offsite dose assessments, would require continual assessments of radioactive inventory and containment integrity. Alternatively, if both Fuel Clad and RCS barrier "Potential Loss" EALs existed, the SM/SEC/ED would have more assurance that there was no immediate need to escalate to a General Emergency o The ability to escalate to higher emergency classes as an event deteriorates must be maintained. For example, RCS leakage steadily increasing would represent an increasing risk to public health and safety Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Fuel Cladding Barrier Reactor Coolant System Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss A.CSFST 1. CSFST Core Cooling- 1. CSFST Core Cooling- 1. CSFST RCS Integrity-RED 1. CSFST Containment-RED RED MAGENTA None OR None OR CSFST Heat Sink-RED and heat CSFST Heat Sink-RED sink required and heat sink required B.Core Exit TCs 2. Core exit TCs > 1,200°F 2. Core exit TCs > 700°F 2. Core exit TCs > 1,200°F AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

None None None 3. ALL of the following:

- Core exit TCs > 700°F

- Reactor Vessel water level < Table F-2 thresholds

- Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

C.Radiation 3. Containment radiation 1. Containment radiation 4. Containment radiation (RM-30 or RM-31) > 80 R/hr (RM-30 or RM-31) (RM-30 or RM-31)

> 20 R/hr > 6 R/hr None None None

4. With letdown in service, EP-RB-14A Dose Point radiation > 15 R/hr D.Inventory 5. SGTR in progress 3. Reactor Vessel water level 2. RCS leak rate > available 2. Unisolable RCS leak exceeding 1. Rapid unexplained Containment pressure drop 5. Containment pressure 47 psig and increasing AND < Table F-2 thresholds makeup capacity as the capacity of one charging pump following initial increase MSL radiation indicated by a loss of RCS in the normal charging mode 6. Containment hydrogen concentration > 4%

(RM-71, 72, 73 or 74) subcooling (150 gpm) 2. Following LOCA, Containment pressure or sump

> 5.0E4 cpm (> 5 min. level response not consistent with LOCA conditions 7. Containment pressure > 22 psig with < one full after reactor shutdown) 3. SGTR that results in an train of depressurization equipment operating ECCS (SI) actuation 3. Ruptured S/G is also faulted outside of Containment Note: One Containment Spray pump and two CFCUs comprise one full train of depressurization equipment

4. Primary-to-secondary leakage > 10 gpm with non-isolable steam release from affected S/G to the environment E.Other 6. Coolant activity 5. Valve(s) not closed

> 300 µCi/gm Dose AND Equivalent I-131 None None None None Direct pathway to the environment exists after Containment isolation signal F. Judgment 7. ANY condition in the 4. ANY condition in the 4. ANY condition in the opinion 3. ANY condition in the opinion 6. ANY condition in the opinion of the 8. ANY condition in the opinion of the SM/SEC/ED opinion of the opinion of the SM/SEC/ED of the SM/SEC/ED that of the SM/SEC/ED that SM/SEC/ED that indicates loss of the that indicates potential loss of the Containment SM/SEC/ED that that indicates potential loss indicates loss of the RCS indicates potential loss of the Containment barrier barrier indicates loss of the Fuel of the Fuel Clad barrier barrier RCS barrier Clad barrier Table F-2 Reactor Vessel Water Level Thresholds RVLIS No. Level RCPs Full Range None 32%

Dynamic Head 4 44%

3 30%

2 20%

EAL Identifier 1 14%

XXX.X Category (R, H, C, S, F, L, E) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

HOT CONDITIONS (RCS > 200°F)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Action Level Wall Chart Mode key: 1 Power Operation 2

Startup 3

Hot Standby 4

Hot Shutdown 5

Cold Shutdown 6

Refueling DEF Defueled Sheet 2 of 3 Modes: HOT (RCS > 200°F)

Revision Date: 7/24/2013

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,E,EN,L,N,S 2

c. (S3) (006.A4.02) Isolate Accumulators Following a LOCA (LJC-048) A,D,E,L,S 3

d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,E,L,N,S 4P

e. (S5) (076.A2.02) Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low Pressure N,S 4S

f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7

h. (S8) (007.A1.01) Respond to High PRT Parameters N,S 5 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (010.A2.02) Transfer Pressurizer Heaters to Backup Power (LJP-029) D,E,L 3

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following A,D,E,L 8 Control Room Evacuation (LJP-003A)

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,E,EN,L,N,S 2

c. (S3) (006.A4.02) Isolate Accumulators Following a LOCA (LJC-048) A,D,E,L,S 3

d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,E,L,N,S 4P e.

f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7

h. (S8) (007.A1.01) Respond to High PRT Parameters N,S 5 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (010.A2.02) Transfer Pressurizer Heaters to Backup Power (LJP-029) D,E,L 3

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following A,D,E,L 8 Control Room Evacuation (LJP-003A)

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,E,EN,L,N,S 2 c.

d.

e.

f.

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7 h.

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i.

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following A,D,E,L 8 Control Room Evacuation (LJP-003A)

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS1

Title:

Makeup Control - Dilute Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _____ minutes Comments:

References:

OP B-1A:VII, CVCS - Makeup Control System Operation, Rev. 57 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.2, 6.2, 9.1, 10.1, 15.1 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: Modified Bank LJC-075 Gen KA / Rating: 004.A02.25 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 3.8 / 4.3 following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Uncontrolled boration or dilution.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, section 6.6, and then return the makeup system to automatic operation. Equalization of Pressurizer boron concentration using heaters is desired. All precautions and limitations are complete.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: A 100 gallon dilution has been performed at 50 gpm Primary water flow = 0 gpm on Reactor Makeup Control YIC-100 (CC2)

Dilution terminated by one or more of the following prior to total dilution reaching 241 gallons*:

FCV-111A CLOSED (VB2)

AND/OR FCV-111B CLOSED (VB2)

AND/OR Primary Water Pump 1-1 STOPPED (VB2)

• 241 gallon limit is based on over dilution of 141 gallons which correlates to an unplanned reactivity change of 1% RTP (Significance Level 3 Event)

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 2 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References OP B-1A:VII, Section 6.6.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 6.6.1 - Select ON from AUTO on 2.1 Read NOTE regarding step is applicable for at least two backup heaters to place performance of batch dilution vice a slow, them in service. continuous dilution.

2.2 Note: Examinee may place one or more additional backup heaters in service per procedure.

2.3 Selected ON from AUTO on second backup Pressurizer heater group (CC-1).

2.4 Read CAUTION regarding need to operate HC-455K slowly when raising demand.

2.5 Placed HC-455K in MAN, and slowly raised demand to 45% (CC-2).

2.6 Returned HC-455K to AUTO.

2.7 Monitored spray valves and RCS pressure to ensure was pressure controlling properly (CC-2).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 3 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 6.6.2 - Press STOP on Makeup 3.1 Pressed STOP on Makeup Control screen Control screen. (CC-2).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

4.** Step 6.6.3 - Press DILUTE on Makeup 4.1 Read NOTE regarding ALT DILUTE and Control screen. impact on RCP seals. Note does not apply

- ALT DILUTE not being used.

4.2 Pressed DILUTE on Makeup Control screen.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

5. Step 6.6.4 - Ensure control switches 5.1 Ensured boration/dilution flow control in AUTO. valve switches in AUTO (VB-2):

• FCV-110A

• FCV-110B

• FCV-111A

• FCV-111B Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 4 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** Step 6.6.5&6 -Set TARGET BATCH to 6.1 Read two NOTES regarding maximum flow desired gallons of water to add. rate. NOTE 2 applies and was met with flow rate specified in cue.

6.2 Set TARGET BATCH to 100 gallons of water.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

7. Step 6.6.7 -Ensure BATCHED 7.1 Ensured BATCHED GALLONS reset.

GALLONS reset.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. Step 6.6.8 - IF primary water flow to 8.1 Read NOTE on primary water pumps (back the blender will be set for less than 80 down at lower flow rates). Determined gpm AND the flow rate will be note is applicable, but pump is not at risk maintained for more than an hour, of dead-heading due to short time THEN place the Primary Water Pump duration for dilution.

currently in "AUTO" to the "OFF" position.

8.2 Determined flowrate is less than 80 gpm, but will NOT be maintained for more than an hour. Left Primary Water Pump 1-2 in AUTO (VB-2).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 5 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Step 6.6.9 - Ensure PRI-WATER FLOW 9.1 Set PRI-WATER FLOW SP to 50 gpm. **

SP set to desired flow rate.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10.** Step 6.6.10 - Press START. 10.1 Pressed START. **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

11. Step 6.6.11 - Check expected primary 11.1 Verified flow, flowrate, and audible water flow and audible beeping. beeping:

• FI-111 (VB-2)

• FCV-110A/B, FCV-111A/B (VB-2)

• FR-110, Blue Pen (CC-2)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 6 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

12. Step 6.6.12&13 -IF desired to divert 12.1 Read NOTE regarding feed & bleed; NOTE RCS letdown to the LHUT, THEN place does not apply. If asked, provide the LCV-112A, VCT Level Control Divert following cue.

Valve, in "DIVERT".

12.2 **********************************

Cue: What do you recommend?

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

13. Step 6.6.14 13.1 Read Note regarding action required to IF desired to temporarily stop the stop/restart the dilution as desired. (No dilution prior to reaching the TARGET action required)

BATCH value, THEN perform the following:

a. Press STOP.

b. Ensure dilution stops.

c. IF desired to restart the dilution, THEN RETURN TO step 6.6.10.

d. IF the dilution is NOT to be restarted, THEN GO TO step 6.6.16.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 7 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 6.6.15 - WHEN the number of 14.1 Recognized Make-Up Controller gallons entered in TARGET BATCH is completed dilution by:

reached,

• Control screen color changed to THEN ensure primary water flow grey (CC-2) stops.

• Control title changed to Dilute Stopped (CC-2)

• Primary Water Pump 1-2 stopped (VB-2) 14.2 Determined Primary Water Flow did NOT stop:

• Make-Up Water control screen indication showed positive (non-zero) value for primary water flow (CC-2)

• Make-Up Water control screen showed rising value for batched gallons (CC-2)

• Audible indication from Make-up Controller still active

• Continued Primary Water flow indicated on FR-110(CC-2)

• Continued Primary Water flow indicated on (FI-111, VB-2) 14.3 Recognized Primary Water control valves did NOT close:

• FCV-111A (THROTTLED, VB-2)

• FCV-111B (FULL OPEN, VB-2)

(step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 8 OF 12 REV.

JPM TITLE: Makeup CONTROL - DILUTE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

Note: Any combination of the following actions may be used by the Examinee to terminate the on-going dilution (VB2).

15.** Implements OP1.DC10, Conduct of 15.1 Stopped Primary Water Flow:**

Operations, Attachment 11.4.b:

• CLOSED FCV-111A

• Take manual actions when

• CLOSED FCV-111B automatic actions do not occur.

• STOPPED Primary Water Pump 1-1 15.2 Rechecked Primary Water flow indications to confirm flow stopped.

• Reactor Makeup Control, Primary water flow = 0 gpm (CC2)

• Primary Water Flow FI-111 = 0 gpm (VB1)

• BA Blender Flow, FR-110 = 0 gpm (CC2, top, Blue Pen will be at far left of recorder)

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 9 OF 12 REV.

EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 10 OF 12 REV.

JPM

Title:

Makeup Control - Dilute JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS1 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-11 (75%, MOL).

Perform the following:

1. Go to RUN.

2. Simulate preparation for a load ramp to 90% by:

• Placing MW IN feedback in on the DEHC panel.

• Setting in a 3 MW/min ramp rate to a TARGET of 1080 MW.

3. Leave ramp on HOLD.

4. Go to FREEZE.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS1.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 11 OF 12 REV.

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, section 6.6, and then return the makeup system to automatic operation. Equalization of Pressurizer boron concentration using heaters is desired. All precautions and limitations are complete.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 12 OF 12 REV.

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS2

Title:

Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: JPM performance follows two potential paths for completion. Critical steps are dependent of path select.

References:

EOP E-1.1, SI Termination, Rev 30 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: E-1.1, step 9 RNO path: 1.5, 2.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7 (see Comments abv) E-1.1, FOP path: 1.5, 2.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: New alt path JPM 013.A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Gen KA # / Rating: 4.6/4.8 following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions - LOCA.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the student. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 was operating at low power, when an RCS leak developed.

• OP AP-1 for RCS Leakage was entered, and the leak rate required the initiation of a Safety Injection.

• The crew completed EOP E-0; EOP E-1 progressed to step 8, where SI Termination Criteria was checked, and met.

• Transition was made to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination. The procedure has been performed through step 6.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to continue actions to reduce ECCS flow in EOP E-1.1, starting at step 7.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: ECCS Injection may be re-established per E-1.1, step 9 (JPM step 3 or by Foldout Page Item #3 (JPM step 4). Either method is acceptable, and is covered by the JPM. Specific of Task Standard detailed in table below:

ECCS Injection flow re-established by completion of the following alignments prior to restoration of normal letdown (completion of step Appendix R, step 1).

Step 9 Method Foldout Page Method

• CCP 1-2 running

• CCP 1-2 running

• SIP 1-1 running

• SIP 1-1 and/or 1-2 running

• SIP 1-2 running

• CVCS-1-8801A and/or CVCS-

• CVCS-1-8801A and CVCS 1-8801B OPEN 8801B OPEN

• CVCS-1-8803A and/or CVCS-

• CVCS-1-8803A and CVCS 1-8803B OPEN 8803B OPEN Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 2 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Step 7 - Checks if SI pumps should be 1.1 Referenced E-1.1, and begins stopped. performance at step 7.

1.2 Checked RCS pressure stable or rising (it is, due to small size of current leak).

1.3 Checked RCS pressure greater than 1650 psig (pressure is in the normal range at this point).

1.4 Checked that NO SI pp flow is indicated (no flow).

1.5 Stopped both SI pumps. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: When the first RHR pump is secured, the RCS leak size will increase, so that Pzr level will drop to < 12 .

2.** Step 8 - Checks if RHR pumps should 2.1 Observed that both RHR pumps are be stopped. aligned to the RWST.

2.2 Stopped both RHR pumps. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 3 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: If the FOP Item #3 (SI reinitiation) is referred to and acted on at any point, skip to JPM step 4, and mark the unperformed parts of step 3 N/A.

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - START POINT >>

3.** Step 9 - Ensures ECCS flow is NOT 3.1 Checked RCS subcolled margin > 20 F required.

3.2 Checked Pzr level > 12% (it is either below 12%, or will be while observing; ie, dropping rapidly), proceeds to RNO part of step.

3.3 Restarted CCP 1-2**

3.4 Restarted both SI pumps

• SIP 1-1**

• SIP 1-2 **

3.5 Restarted a RHR pump (may start both).

3.6 Opened second off charging injection valve:

8803A and 8803B.**

3.7 Opened first off charging injection valve:

8801A and 8801B.**

3.8 Closed 8107 and 8108.

(Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 4 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3(cont) Step 9 - Ensures ECCS flow is NOT 3.9 Transitioned to EOP E-1.

required (continued)

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - END POINT >>

Cue: Other operators will continue with performance of EOP E-1.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 5 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: This JPM step is only performed if the FOP Item #3 is acted on. If E-1.1, step 9 used, mark JPM step 4 N/A.

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - START POINT >>

4.** Evaluates Foldout Page (FOP) Item 4.1 Evaluated FOP #3, and determined Pzr level

1. 3, SI Reinitiation. could not be maintained > 12%.

NOTE: FOP states "Manually start ECCS pumps as necessary". If asked for direction from SFM, provide the following cue:

Cue: What do you recommend?

4.2 Restarted CCP 1-2**

4.3 Restarted one or more SI pumps

• SIP 1-1 and/or SIP 1-2**

4.4 Restarted one RHR pump.

4.5 Opened second off charging injection valve:

8803A and/or 8803B.**

4.6 Opened first off charging injection valve:

8801A and/or 8801B.**

4.7 Closed 8107 and 8108.

(Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 6 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4(cont) Evaluates Foldout Page (FOP) Item 4.8 Transitioned to EOP E-1.

1. 3, SI Reinitiation (continued).

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - END POINT >>

4.9 Cue: Other operators will continue with performance of EOP E-1.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

Nrcl141-Ljcs2 Rev2.Docx PAGE 7 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

nrcl141-ljcs2 rev2.docx PAGE 8 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize the simulator to IC-156 (Based on HSB for S/U, MOL).

Run lesson file NRCL141-LJCS2 Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

nrcl141-ljcs2 rev2.docx PAGE 9 OF 10 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 was operating at low power, when an RCS leak developed.

• OP AP-1 for RCS Leakage was entered, and the leak rate required the initiation of a Safety Injection.

• The crew completed EOP E-0; EOP E-1 progressed to step 8, where SI Termination Criteria was checked, and met.

• Transition was made to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination. The procedure has been performed through step 6.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to continue actions to reduce ECCS flow in EOP E-1.1, starting at step 7.

nrcl141-ljcs2 rev2.docx PAGE 10 OF 10 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS3

Title:

Isolate the Accumulators Following a LOCA Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: (Note: Any unsat step requires a numbered comment; Use back as needed.

References:

EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown & Depressurization, Rev 23 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 6.3 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank alternate path JPM Gen KA # / Rating: 006.A4.02 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) - Ability 3.8 / 4.0 to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Valves.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/12/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/12/16 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• A small break LOCA (SBLOCA) has occurred on U1.

• The operating crew has completed EOP E-0, transitioned to EOP E-1, and is now working in EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown &

Depressurization.

• An RCS cooldown is in progress, and the crew has just completed step 24 to ensure ECCS flow is not required.

Initiating Cue: You are directed by the SFM to evaluate the accumulator isolation criteria and, if required, isolate the accumulators as directed by EOP E-1.2, Step 25.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Accumulators have been isolated or vented in accordance with Step 25 of EOP E-1.2:

• Accumulator Outlet Valves 8808A, 8808B, 8808D CLOSED

• Accumulator 1-3 Vented (PI-964 and PI-965 = 0 psig)

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtained the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced EOP E-1.2.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 25.a - Check Subcooling RCS 2.1 Observed that RCS SCM is > 20 °F (VB2 Subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - vertical section bottom, or Appendix C).

GREATER THAN 20°F.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. Step 25.b - Check PZR Level - 3.1 Observed that PZR level is > 12%, and GREATER THAN 12% continues to next step (VB3 vertical section right side).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

4.** Step 25.c - Check Power to Note: Valve position lights are powered Accumulator Outlet Isol Vlvs - from DC and will be illuminated with AVAILABLE breaker in normal OPEN position.

Normal OPEN position is identified by lamacoid next to valve control switch.

4.1 Contacted watch stander to close accumulator isolation valve breakers: **

• 8808A: 52-1F-46 and 52-1F-46R

• 8808B: 52-1G-07 and 52-1G-07R

• 8808C: 52-1H-14 and 52-1H-14R

• 8808D: 52-1G-05 and 52-1G-05R (Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Step 25.c - Check Power to **********************************

Accumulator Outlet Isol Vlvs - Cue: Using time compression, Watch AVAILABLE (continued). stander reports back that all breakers are closed.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

5.** Step 25.d - Close 8808 A, B, C, and D. 5.1 Selected CLOSE on

• 8808A**

• 8808B**

• 8808C

• 8808D**

5.2 Ensured 8808A, 8808B, and 8808D closed.

5.3 Identified 8808C failed mid-position.

5.4 **********************************

Cue: If operator dispatched to investigate, report back breaker has tripped on thermal overload.

5.5 Referred to Step 25.d RNO.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

6.** Step 25.d. RNO - If Any Accum Note: RNO actions are used to Outlet Isol Vlv does NOT close, depressurize any Accumulator that can perform the following: not be isolated by venting it to containment.

Step 25.d. 1 RNO - Close 8880, 6.1 Ensured 8880 closed.

Accum N2 Isol Fill Vlv.

Step 25.d. 2 RNO - Open 8875 A, B, 6.2 Opened 8875C **

C, or D Accum Vent and N2 Fill, to affected Accum.

Note: HCV-943 is a Hagan Hand Control Valve. The valve is opened by turning the control nob clockwise; full open position is 100 on the control display.

Step 25.d. 3 RNO - OpenHCV-943, 6.3 Opened HCV-943**

Accum N2 Vent Control Valve 6.4 Ensured Accumulator 1-3 pressure was lowering on PI-964 and PI-965 6.5 Note: Once the examinee has noted lowering pressure, the console operator will use time compression and quickly depress the accumulator. Once noted, provide the following cue.

Cue: Accumulator 1-3 is being depressurized using time compression (Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.(cont) Step 25.d.3 RNO - When Accum is 6.6 Checked Accumulator pressure depressurized, close HCV-943 approximately 0 psig PI-964 and PI-965 6.7 Closed HCV-943 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

7. Step 25.d. 4 RNO - Close 8875 A, 7.1 Closed 8875C B, C, or D Sat: ______ Unsat _______

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-LJCS3.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-157 .

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS3.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

nrcl141-ljcs3 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• A small break LOCA (SBLOCA) has occurred on U1.

• The operating crew has completed EOP E-0, transitioned to EOP E-1, and is now working in EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown &

Depressurization.

• An RCS cooldown is in progress, and the crew has just completed step 24 to ensure ECCS flow is not required.

Initiating Cue: You are directed by the SFM to evaluate the accumulator isolation criteria and, if required, isolate the accumulators as directed by EOP E-1.2, Step 25.

nrcl141-ljcs3 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 1 rev1.docx

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS4

Title:

Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling, Rev 25.

Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 6.7, 6.10, 6.11 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New for L141 Gen KA / Rating: 074.EA2.02 - Ability to determine or interpret the following 4.3 / 4.6 as they apply to Inadequate Core Cooling:

Availability of main or auxiliary feedwater.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/12/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/13/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has experienced a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident coincident with a loss of secondary side heat sink.

• All ECCS Pumps have tripped on overcurrent.

• AFW Pump 1-3 has been restarted. AFW Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 remain unavailable.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP FR-C.1 starting at step 10, Check Intact Steam Generators.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Temporary Core Cooling established by opening:

Pressurizer PORVs -

• PCV-455C OPEN

• PCV-456 OPEN

• PCV-474 OPEN Reactor Vessel Head Vents (order is NOT of safety significance) -

• 8078A and 8078D OPEN

• 8078B and 8078C OPEN Before commencing depressurization of Steam Generators (step 12.b or step 20 of FR-C.1).

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 2 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Examiner Note:

The Alternate Path portion of this JPM commences when AFW Pump 1-3 trips, requiring the examinee to address a loss of secondary heat sink per the step 10 RNO column. When this occurs, proceed directly to step 4 (page 6) of this JPM. Unperformed steps prior to step 4 are not required and should be marked as N/A.

The AFW Pump 1-3 trip will occur at 16% NR S/G level or 2 seconds following a manual block of Low Steamline Pressure SI, whichever comes first.

Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Bracketed S/G level is used for minimum acceptable value due to Adverse Containment conditions.

1. (Caution 1, before Step 10) - AFW Pp 1.1 Read Caution 1 prior to step 10.

suction could be lost IF CST Level lowers to LESS THAN 10% AND NO Alternate AFW supply is provided.

(Caution 2, before Step 10) - A Faulted 1.2 Read Caution 2 prior to step 10.

or Ruptured S/G should not be used in subsequent steps unless NO Intact S/G is available.

(Step 10.a - Continuous Action) - 1.3 Noted adverse containment values for S/G Check Intact S/Gs At least ONE intact level apply.

S/G NR Level GREATER THAN 15% Determined ALL S/G NR levels were < 25%,

[25%] OR Total feed flow - GREATER but total AFW flow to S/Gs 1-3 and 1-4 THAN 435 GPM. was > 435 GPM.

(Step 10.b - Continuous Action) - 1.4 Maintained AFW flow to S/Gs 1-3 and 1-4 Control feed flow to maintain ALL to recover levels.

intact S/G NR levels between 15%

[25%] and 65%.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 3 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

2. (Step 11) - Check RCS Vent Paths 2.1 (Step 11.a) - Power to Pzr PORV Block 2.2 Determined power is available to PORV Vlvs - AVAILABLE block valves (VB2 right side).

(Step 11.b) - Pzr PORVs - CLOSED 2.3 Determined all PORVs closed.

(Step 11.c) - Block vlvs - AT LEAST 2.4 Determined all PORV block valves open.

ONE OPEN (Step 11.d) - Ensure Reactor Vessel 2.5 Determined all Reactor Vessel Vent Valves Vent Vlvs - CLOSED closed (PAM1 behind VB5).

• 8078A - CLOSED

• 8078B - CLOSED

• 8078C - CLOSED

• 8078D - CLOSED Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. (Caution before Step 12) - After the 3.1 Read Caution prior to step 12.

low steamline pressure SI is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate is exceeded (120 psi/min).

(Note before step 12) - Partially 3.2 Read Note prior to step 12.

uncovering S/G tubes is acceptable in the following steps.

(Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 4 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions (3 (Step 12) - Depressurize ALL Intact cont) S/Gs To Inject Accumulators:

a. Block low Steamline pressure SI:

1) Check RCS pressure - LESS 3.3 Checked RCS Pressure less than 1915 psig THAN 1915 PSIG

2) Check PK08-06, "PZR SI 3.4 Checked PK08-06 PZR SI PERMISSIVE P-PERMISSIVE P-11" - ON 11- ON.

3) Block low Steamline 3.5 Blocked Lo Steamline Pressure SI for Train pressure SI: A and B.

• Train A

• Train B

4) Ensure PK08-17, "LO STM 3.6 Checked PK08-17 LO STM LINE PRESSURE LINE PRESSURE SI BLOCKED" - SI BLOCKED- ON.

ON Note: If not yet tripped on S/G level >=

16%, AFW Pump 1-3 will trip 2 seconds after Low Steamline Pressure SI is blocked. Examinee should return to continuous action, Step 10 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 5 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

Step 10 (Continuous Action) - Check

4. 4.1 Determined ALL S/G NR levels were <25%,

Intact S/Gs:

and there was NO AFW flow. Entered RNO At least ONE intact S/G NR Level column.

GREATER THAN 15% [25%] OR Total feed flow - GREATER THAN 435 GPM.

Note: Loss of AFW Pump 1-3 will result in a RED path for Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Provide the following cue when required.

(Step 10.a RNO) - IMPLEMENT

5. ***********************************

Appendix F, "Establish Secondary Heat Sink" CUE: Another operator will implement Appendix F.

AND ***********************************

GO TO step 19. Observe NOTE prior 5.1 Went to Step 19 per Step 10 RNO.

to step 19.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 6 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** (Step 19) - Restore Temporary Core 6.1 Observed NOTE prior to Step 19 regarding Cooling. normal conditions for starting RCPs.

(Step 19.a) - Core Exit T/Cs - 6.2 Determined that Core Exit T/Cs >1200 oF GREATER THAN 1200 oF (Step 19.b) - Check if an idle RCS 6.3 Determined that ALL S/G NR levels were cooling loop is available. Check Loop <25%, and there was NO AFW flow. Went 2 last: to Step 19.b RNO.

• Narrow range S/G level -

GREATER THAN 15% [25%]

• RCP in associated loop -

AVAILABLE AND NOT OPERATING (Step 19.b.1 RNO) - Ensure SI signal - 6.4 Determined SI was previously Reset - VB1 RESET SI Red Light out, PK08-22 AUTO SI BLOCKED - ON. May reset again.

(Step 19.b.2 RNO) - Containment Isol 6.5 Determined Containment Isolation Phase Phase A - RESET A was reset - VB1 PH A Red Lights out.

May reset again.

(Step 19.b.3 RNO) - Open FCV-584. 6.6 Determined FCV-584, Instrument Air to Containment, was in the required (OPEN) position - VB4 apron.

(Step 19.b.4 RNO) - Open all Pzr 6.7 Opened all 3 PORVs - VB3 right side.

PORVs and block valves.

• PCV-455C**

• PCV-456**

• PCV-474**

6.8 Determined all PORV block valves were open (Step continued on next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 7 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6 (Step 19.b.5 RNO) - 6.9 Determined core exit T/Cs still >1200 oF.

(cont) IF Core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 1200°F, THEN Open the second off Reactor 6.10 Opened second off Reactor Vessel Head Vessel Head Vent valves (8078 A Vent valves (PAM1 behind VB5):

and D), followed by the first off

• 8078 A**

Reactor Vessel Vent valves (8078 B and C).

• 8078 D **

6.11 Opened first off Reactor Vessel Head Vent valves (PAM1 behind VB5):

• 8078 B **

• 8078 C**

7. (Step 19.b.6 RNO) - GO TO step 20 7.1 Went to Step 20.

CUE: Another operator will continue with this procedure.

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 8 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 9 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM

Title:

RESTORE TEMPORARY CORE COOLING DURING AN ICC EVENT JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS4 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-158 Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS4.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 10 OF 11 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 Initial Conditions:

• Unit 1 has experienced a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident coincident with a loss of secondary side heat sink.

• All ECCS Pumps have tripped on overcurrent.

• AFW Pump 1-3 has been restarted. AFW Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 remain unavailable.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP FR-C.1 starting at step 10, Check Intact Steam Generators.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS5

Title:

Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low Pressure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/HDR PRESS, Rev. 21A OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Rev 18.

Alternate Path: Yes ______ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 8.2, 8.4, 9.1, 10.1 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 076.A2.02 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 2.7 / 3.1 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Service Water Header Pressure AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/HDR PRESS, Rev. 21A OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Rev 18.

Initial Conditions Given:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Initiating Cue: PK01-01 has just alarmed. The SFM directs you to respond to the alarm.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Identified Component Cooling Water (CCW) outlet temperature high and placed second Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) pump and CCW Heat Exchanger in service per OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Section 6.1, Preferred Method.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 2 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/ HDR PRESS Note: Standby ASW pump auto-start has been temporarily disabled. Examinee may recognize 40.5 psig as high end of auto-start setpoint and take manual action to start ASW Pp 1-2.

1.2 Identified input 168 for Aux Salt Wtr To CCW Ht Exch 1-1 Press Lo and continued to step 2.1 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. PK01-01, Step 2.1.1 - IF a loss of ASW 2.1 Observed ASW Pump 1-1 is still in service has occurred THEN GO TO ONE of the with stable amps and flow (VB-1).

following as applicable to current Proceeded to next step.

mode.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 3 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. PK01-01, Step 2.1.2 & 2.1.3 - Read 3.1 Read CCW HX 1-1 Outlet Temperature on CCW HX outlet temperature. IF CCW TI-181 85 oF (VB-1) and transitioned to HX outlet temperature is greater than OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two the following as appropriate: CCW Heat Exchanger Operation.

• MODES 1-3: 80°F THEN place a second ASW pump and CCW HX in service PER OP E-5:II, Section 6.1, "Preferred Method".

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: The following Cues apply to the Prerequisite section of OP E5:II.

4. OP E-5:II, Step 4.1 - Ensure the ASW ***********************************

System is aligned for normal plant CUE: ASW System is aligned for normal operations PER OP E-5:I, "Auxiliary operation per procedure.

Saltwater System - Make Available" . ***********************************

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 4 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. OP E-5:II, Step 4.2 - Ensure the CCW ***********************************

System is aligned for normal plant CUE: CCW System is aligned for normal operations PER OP F-2:I, "Component operation per procedure.

Cooling Water System - Make ***********************************

Available" Note: The following Cues apply to the Precautions and Limitations Section of OP E5:II.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. OP E-5:II, Step 5.1 -Review Technical ***********************************

Specifications 3.7.7 and 3.7.8. CUE: The Shift Foreman has reviewed Tech Specs.

6.1 Read P&L 5.2 regarding limits on ASW Pump motor start frequency.

6.2 Read P&L 5.3 regarding requirement for shell side of Hx to be at higher pressure than tube side.

6.3 Read P&L 5.4 regarding potential for Unit 1 ASW pump start to cause autostart of Unit 2 ASW standby pump.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 5 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. OP E-5:II, Step 5.5 (Reactivity Brief ***********************************

if required, ASW operability, ECGs) CUE: The Shift Foreman will address any remaining P&Ls as required.

7.1 Continued to Section 6.1, Preferred Method - Two ASW Pumps and Two Heat Exchangers.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.1 -6.1.4 (place 8.1 Read NOTE regarding two column format standby ASW pump in service) corresponding to a specific train.

8.2 Placed ASW Pp 1-2 Standby Select Switch in "MAN" (VB-1)**

Note: When Examinee directs Unit 2 CO to place the Unit 2 standby ASW pump Standby Select Switch in "MAN" to prevent a possible auto start, provide the following Cue:

CUE: UNIT 2 ASW pump 2-2 Standby Select Switch has been taken to MANUAL.

Note: AR PK01-01 will re-flash due to high pressure when the second ASW pump is started (input 1131), but will clear once the second CCW Hx is placed in service.

(continued, next page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 8** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.1 -6.1.4 (place 8.3 Turned ASW Pp 1-2 control switch to the (cont) standby ASW pump in service, cont.) START position.**

8.4 Checked ASW pump motor current between 42.5 - 60 amps and stable.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

9.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.5 & 6 - Open the 9.1 Opened FCV-603, ASW supply to CCW Hx second heat exchanger ASW supply 1-2 (VB-1).**

to CCW HX valve.

9.2 Checked the differential pressure across the CCW HX in expected range 80-130 psig (PI-46, VB-1)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.7 - Open the CCW 10.1 Opened FCV-431, CCW Hx 1-2 outlet valve outlet valve on the second HX to cut (VB-1).**

in CCW flow 10.2 Noted CCW Hx 1-1 outlet temperature on TI-181 starting to lower slightly.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

11. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.8 - Check AR PK01- 11.1 Checked the AR PK01-02 did NOT come in, 02 Inputs 148 or 227 not IN by indicating ASW Room fan DID start with ensuring ASW Room Fan starts when fan start.

the pump is started Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

12. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.9 - Notify the Unit Note: When Examinee directs Unit 2 CO 2 CO to place the Unit 2 standby ASW to return the Unit 2 standby ASW pump pump Standby Select Switch in Standby Select Switch to AUTO, provide "AUTO". the following Cue:

CUE: UNIT 2 ASW pump 2-2 Standby Select Switch has been returned to AUTO.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

13. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.10 - (Step 13.1 ***********************************

addressing alignment for > 7 days) CUE: Other Operators will address the remainder of OP E-5:II".

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 9 OF 11 REV. 2

JPM

Title:

Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-10.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS5.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 10 OF 11 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Initiating Cue: PK01-01 has just alarmed. The SFM directs you to respond to the alarm.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS6

Title:

Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup Power Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

OP J-6A:II, Transferring 4160 Volt Banks, Rev 18B Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 6.1, 12.1, 17.1, 21.1, 21.3 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 062.A4.07 - Synchronizing and paralleling of different AC supplies 3.1 / 3.1 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: OP J-6A:II, Transferring 4160 Volt Banks, Rev 18B (place-keeping marked-up to step 6.2.4)

Initial Conditions Given:

• Unit 1 is at 2% power and performing alignments per OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup.

• 12 kV bus E was transferred from Auxiliary power to Startup earlier in the shift.

• Grid Control Center (GCC) has been notified that transfer of 4kV house loads to the 230kV system is about to commence.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to transfer all Vital 4kV buses from Auxiliary to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Rev 18B, beginning with step 6.2.4.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

• 4kV bus F is aligned to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Section 6.2.

• Examinee manually opened either Startup Breaker 52-HG-14 or Aux Breaker 52-HG-13 when bus failed to transfer to Startup as expected, prior to overcurrent relay actuating as indicated by blue light illuminated on either breaker.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 2 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 OP J-6A:II, Section 6.2.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 6.2.4 - Direct the Operator 2.1 Read NOTE regarding Startup power performing the transfers as follows: inoperability due to Load Tap Changer (LTC) in manual.

2.2 Read step regarding Operator to remain at the transfer switches while the LTC is in manual.

2.3 Read note regarding Operator being prepared to return LTC to automatic any time during the transfer if startup power operability is required.

CUE: Another operator will return the LTC to automatic if startup power operability is required.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Step 6.2.5 - Pull S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low 3.1 Pulled LTC to manual (VB-5).**

Side Vltg Adjust, to place it in "MAN" 3.2 Observed MAN ADJ ENABLED light above LTC control handle illuminate.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 3 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Next step directs Examinee to go to step corresponding with desired bus to transfer. If asked, provide the following cue:

CUE: Perform bus transfers in the order they appear alphabetically, starting with Bus F.

4. Step 6.2.6 - GO TO the step 4.1 Determined first bus to transfer is vital 4kV corresponding to the first bus to be Bus F and moved to step 6.2.29.

transferred:

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Reset of Auto Transfer Relays is not required (not active). Examinee may elect to perform reset steps if desired.

5. Step 6.2.29 - IF necessary, reset the 5.1 Pressed 4 kV BUS F AUTO XFR RESET Auto Transfer to Startup relay. button (VB-4).

5.2 Checked 4kV Bus F Auto Transfer reset indications:

• PK18-19 (4 kV BUS F AUTO TRANSFER) is OFF

• 4 kV BUS F AUTO XFR RESET blue light is OFF (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 4 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** Step 6.2.30 - Insert the Synchroscope 6.1 Inserted sync key for 4kV bus F Startup key in 4kV Bus F S/U Feeder Sync feeder breaker 52-HF-14 and turned Switch and place the key in "ON". clockwise to ON (VB-4). **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Acceptable range for synchroscope is 11-1 oclock.

7. Step 6.2.31 & 32 - Check 7.1 Determined synchroscope indication to be Synchroscope indication. within range; proceeded to step 6.2.33 (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. Step 6.2.33 - Check for normal 8.1 Checked auxiliary bus voltage on 4 kV BUS auxiliary bus voltage of 114-126 volts F or SYNC BUS VOLTS meter and indicated. determined voltage was within specified range (120 V indicated, VB-4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 5 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. Step 6.2.34 - While minimizing tap 9.1 Checked SYNC INCOMING VOLTS (Startup changes, adjust S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low Side voltage) matched SYNC BUS VOLTS Voltage Adjust to match voltages (Auxiliary voltage) within 3 volts indicated.

between auxiliary and startup power to within 100 V (3V indicated).

9.2 May adjust voltages using LTC.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10. Step 6.2.35 - IF in step 6.2.37, the 10.1 Read NOTE regarding expected behavior transfer does NOT occur within two of transfer circuit and breaker response.

seconds, THEN place the Synchroscope key in "OFF" AND release the bus transfer switch.

10.2 Read step describing action to take if transfer from Auxiliary to Startup power does NOT occur within 2 seconds.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

11. Step 6.2.36 - IF after the transfer in 11.1 Read step describing action to take if both step 6.2.37, both breakers remain Auxiliary and Startup breakers remain closed, THEN immediately trip one of closed after the transfer.

the breakers.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 6 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 12.** Step 6.2.37 - Perform the transfer as 12.1 Turned 4kV BUS F XFR SW clockwise (VB-follows: 4, just right of 52-HF-10).**

a. Place 4kV Bus F Pwr Xfr Sw in the "XFER TO S/U" position and hold.

b. Check that auxiliary and startup 12.2 Checked for proper breaker response:

power feeder breakers operate as

• 52-HF CLOSED (RED LIGHT on expected. S/U 4kV Fdr to Bus F) (VB-4)

• 52-HF OPEN (GREEN LIGHT on Aux 4kV Fdr to Bus F) (VB-4) 12.3 Determined 4kV Bus F transferred

c. After checking the transfer successfully and released power transfer complete, release 4kV Bus F Pwr switch.

Xfr Sw.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

13. Step 6.2.38 - Place the Synchroscope 13.1 Turned sync switch counter-clockwise to key in "OFF" and remove the key. OFF and removed key.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 7 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 6.2.39 - Position the breaker 14.1 Flagged breaker control switches to match control switches to match actual actual breaker positions:

breaker positions:

• 52-HF-14: CLOSED (red)

• 52-HF-13: OPEN (green)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

15. Step 6.2.40,41 - GO TO the step 15.1 Determined next bus to transfer was Vital corresponding to the next bus to be 4kV Bus G and proceeded to step 6.2.42.

transferred:

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Reset of Auto Transfer Relays is not required (not active). Examinee may elect to perform reset steps if desired.

16. Step 6.2.42 - IF necessary, reset the 16.1 Pressed 4 kV BUS G AUTO XFR RESET Auto Transfer to Startup relay. button (VB-4).

16.2 Checked 4kV Bus G Auto Transfer reset indications:

• PK17-19 (4 kV BUS G AUTO TRANSFER) is OFF

• 4 kV BUS G AUTO XFR RESET blue light is OFF (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 8 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 17.** Step 6.2.43 - Insert the Synchroscope 17.1 Inserted sync key for 4kV bus G Startup key in 4kV Bus G S/U Feeder Sync feeder breaker 52-HG-14 and turned Switch and place the key in "ON". clockwise to ON (VB-4). **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

18. Step 6.2.44 & 45 - Check 18.1 Read NOTE regarding allowable range for Synchroscope indication. synchroscope (between 11 o'clock and 1 o'clock) 18.2 Observed synchroscope indication to be within range; proceeded to step 6.2.46 (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 9 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

19. Step 6.2.46 - Check for normal 19.1 Checked auxiliary bus voltage on 4 kV BUS auxiliary bus voltage of 114-126 volts G or SYNC BUS VOLTS meter and indicated. determined voltage was within specified range (120 V indicated, VB-4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

20. Step 6.2.47 - While minimizing tap 20.1 Observed SYNC INCOMING VOLTS (Startup changes, adjust S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low Side voltage) matched SYNC BUS VOLTS Voltage Adjust to match voltages (Auxiliary voltage) within 3 volts indicated.

between auxiliary and startup power to within 100 V (3V indicated).

20.2 May adjust voltages using LTC.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 10 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Procedure steps 6.2.48 & 6.2.49 describe indications and actions the Examinee should take if the buses DO NOT transfer as expected (identical to 6.2.35 and 6.2.36).

21.** Step 6.2.50 - Perform the transfer as 21.1 Turned 4kV BUS G XFR SW clockwise (VB-follows: 4, just right of 52-HG-10).**

a. Place 4kV Bus G Pwr Xfr Sw in the "XFER TO S/U" position and hold.

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

b. Check that auxiliary and startup 21.2 Identified improper breaker response:

power feeder breakers operate as

• 52-HG CLOSED (RED LIGHT on expected. S/U 4kV Fdr to Bus G) (VB-4)

• 52-HG CLOSED (RED LIGHT on Aux 4kV Fdr to Bus G) (VB-4) 21.3 Manually opened one of the following breakers: **

• 52-HG-14

• 52-HG-13

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

CUE: Other operators will complete any necessary actions associated with the buses.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 11 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 12 OF 14 REV. 2

JPM

Title:

Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS6 Startup Power Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-160. The simulator is setup at 2% power, ready to transfer from Auxiliary to Startup power.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS6.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 13 OF 14 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 2% power and performing alignments per OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup.

• 12 kV bus E was transferred from Auxiliary power to Startup earlier in the shift.

• Grid Control Center (GCC) has been notified that transfer of 4kV house loads to the 230kV system is about to commence.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to transfer all Vital 4kV buses from Auxiliary to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Rev 18B, beginning with step 6.2.4.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 14 OF 14 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS7

Title:

Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-5, Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel, Rev. 43 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank JPM - LJC-051 Gen KA # / Rating: 015.A2.02: - Faulty or erratic operator of detector or 3.1 / 3.5 compensating components.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed),

if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 75% power.

• A malfunction caused power range channel N42 to slowly fail high.

• Rod control was placed in MANUAL after rods stepped in several steps.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to remove power range channel N42 from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and tripping of bistables, in accordance with OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1. The Shift Foreman has requested Maintenance to trip bistables and remove control power fuses.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Power range channel N42 has been removed from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and bistable tripping, in accordance with OP AP 5, attachment 4.1.

NRCL141-LJCS7.docx PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1, Actions to be performed for NI failure.

Note: Operator may review STP I N42.B Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Place rod stop bypass switch the **********************************

failed channel position. Cue: (If the operator refers to the requirement to use concurrent verification), "the requirement is waived for this JPM."

2.1 Placed the ROD STOP BYBASS switch in the BYPASS PR N42 position. **

Note: May verify PK07-07, PWR RNG 42 ROD STOP BYPASSED -- ON.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 2 rev2.docx

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Place power mismatch bypass switch 3.1 Placed the POWER MISMATCH BYPASS to the failed channel position. switch in the BYPASS PR N42 position. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Place quadrant power tilt alarm 4.1 Placed the QUADRANT POWER TILT upper section switch to the failed ALARM UPPER SECTION switch in the channel position. PRN42 position. **

4.2 Verified that the CHANNEL DEFEAT light lit.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

5.** Place quadrant power tilt alarm lower 5.1 Placed the QUADRANT POWER TILT section switch to the failed channel ALARM LOWER SECTION switch in the position. PRN42 position. **

5.2 Verified that the CHANNEL DEFEAT light lit.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 2 rev2.docx

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** Place the comparator defeat switch to 6.1 Placed the COMPARATOR CHANNEL the failed channel position. DEFEAT switch in the N42 position. **

6.2 Verified that the COMPARATOR DEFEAT light has lit.

Note: If Examinee moves on to next step to trip bistables, provide the following cue:

Cue: Maintenance Services will remove the control power and instrument power fuses and trip associated bistables.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

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JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Service SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson file NRCL141-LJCS7 Perform the following:

Place rod control in MANUAL as soon as the Rods step in several steps. (Done manually vice in drill file to prevent rod motion after returning to Run)

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

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EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 75% power.

• A malfunction caused power range channel N42 to slowly fail high.

• Rod control was placed in MANUAL after rods stepped in several steps.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to remove power range channel N42 from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and tripping of bistables, in accordance with OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1. The Shift Foreman has requested Maintenance to trip bistables and remove control power fuses.

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NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS8

Title:

Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

OP A-4B:IV, Pressurizer Relief Tank - Normal Operations, Rev 9 AR PK05-25, PRT PRESS/LVL TEMP, Rev. 15 Alternate Path: Yes ______ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 4.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.3, 7.7, 7.9 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 007.A1.01 - Ability to (a) predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including maintaining 2.9 / 3.1 quench tank water level within limits.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: OP A-4B:IV, Pressurizer Relief Tank - Normal Operations, Rev 9 AR PK05-25, PRT PRESS/LVL TEMP, Rev. 15 Initial Conditions Given:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• PRT Temperature is elevated due to leakby encountered during PCS Pressure control calibration on PCV-474.

• Pressure control calibration work is complete. All systems have been fully restored and are operating properly in automatic.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restore PRT Temperature to normal range per OP A-4B:IV, Pressurizer Relief Tank - Normal Operation, Section 6.3.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

• PRT Temperature is in the green band on TI-471 (VB2) and less than or equal to 120oF.

• PRT Level is in the green band on LI-470 and less than or equal to 84%.

• RCS-1-8031, PRT Drain to RCDT (VB2) closed such that RCDT discharge piping rupture disk remains intact.*

• Monitored by booth Operator using RCDT Maximum Pressure Limit NRCL141-LJCS8.DOCX PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Step 6.3 - High Temp in the PRT 1.1 Referenced OP A-4B:IV, Pressurizer Relief Tank - Normal Operations, Section 6.3 1.2 Opened 1-RCS-8030, Pri Wtr Sply (VB2)**

1.3 Note: Temperature may be monitoring using TI-471(VB2) or the Plant Process Computer (PPC) 1.4 Monitored temperature lowering to less than or equal to 120oF Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: AR PK05-25 will alarm on high PRT Level (89%), just before the target temperature is reached. Step sequence to close 1-RCS-8030 is duplicated in OP A-4B:IV; either reference may be used. JPM steps modelled on AR PK05-25. If OP A-4B:IV is used, JPM steps 2 & 3 are N/A.

Closure of 1-RCS-8030 begins on step 4.

2. AR PK05-25, PRT PRESS/LVL TEMP (if 2.1 Responds to AR PK05-25, PRT PRESS/LVL used) TEMP 2.2 Determined cause of alarm is input 367, Pzr Relief Tk Lvl Hi > 89 %

2.3 Checked PRT indications on VB2 to determine cause of alarm 2.4 Identified high level on LI-470 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. PK05-25, Step 2.1.2 - 1.4 3.1 Noted PRT level was high, NOT low, step 2.1.2 is N/A.

3.2 Note: When asked about implementing OP AP-1, provide the following cue:

3.3 ***********************************

CUE: Another Operator will implement OP AP-1 for Excess RCS Leakage.

3.4 Note: When asked about source of leakage, provide the following cue:

3.5 ***********************************

CUE: Shift Foreman will address Tech Specs as needed. Continue on in procedure.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: The following step sequence appears in both OP A-4B:IV and AR PK05-

25. Either procedure may be used.

4.** PK05-25, Step 2.1.5.a - If high PRT 4.1 Ensured closed RCS-1-8030, PRT PRI Wtr level exists, perform the following: Sply (VB2)**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. PK05-25, Step 2.1.5.b -Lower PRT 5.1 Read CAUTION regarding slow closure of level to approximately 84% by RCS-1-8031 and need to close valve at 60%

draining to the RCDT as follows: RCDT level.

Note: Booth Operator will role play Aux Senior. Examinee should maintain open communications via phone line with Aux Senior until draining is complete.

5.2 Established communications with the Aux Senior watch.

5.3 Provided Aux Senior watch with direction regarding RCDT Level

• Contact CR IMMEDIATELY If RCDT Level reached 60% on PY-99 (level indication at Aux Board)

• Start both RCDT pumps in manual ON to keep up with draining.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6.** IF at any time RCDT level reaches 6.1 Note: The following steps serve as a 60%, THEN perform Immediately preview for the operator and should be CLOSE RCS-1-8031, PRT Drain to RCDT read prior to opening RCS-1-8031, PRT (VB2). the following: Drain to the RCDT.

6.2 Immediately CLOSE RCS-1-8031, PRT Drain to RCDT (VB2).**

6.3 Allow the RCDT level to lower to approximately to 34% as read on PY-99, RCDT level (Aux Control Board) 6.4 IF desired to continue to lower PRT Level, THEN OPEN RCS-1-8031.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 7.** PK05-25, Step 2.1.5.b.4 - OPEN RCS- 7.1 Opened RCS-1-8031.**

1-8031 to begin draining 7.2 Monitored level PRT level for 84% target level using PPC or PI-472 (VB2)

Note: RCDT will reach 60% when the PRT reaches approximately 87.5%, lowering.

Aux Watch will advise Control Room that level in RCDT has risen to 60%

7.3 Closed RCS-1-8031.**

7.4 Directed Aux Watch to monitor RDCT level and report when PY-99 lowered to 34%

(Aux Control Board Level) 7.5 Note: The following Booth cue will be given to the Examinee when RCDT level has lowered to 34%.

7.6 ***********************************

CUE: RCDT level has reached 34%

7.7 Re-opened RCS-1-8031 to continue drain down.**

7.8 Monitored level PRT level for 84% target level using PPC or PI-472 (VB2) 7.9 Closed RCS-1-8031 at or below target level of 84%.**

7.10 Directed Aux Senior to return RCDT pumps to Auto Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 2

JPM

Title:

Return PRT Parameters to Normal Operating Limits JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS8 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-162.

Load L141NRC-LJCS8.cts to monitor PRT parameters Display Active Schematic for Containment (Control to start/stop RCDT Pumps)

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS8.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• PRT Temperature is elevated due to leakby encountered during PCS Pressure control calibration on PCV-474.

• Pressure control calibration work is complete. All systems have been fully restored and are operating properly in automatic Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restore PRT Temperature to normal range per OP A-4B:IV, Pressurizer Relief Tank - Normal Operation, Section 6.3 NRCL141-LJCS8.DOCX PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJP1

Title:

Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 12 to Backup Power Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _____ min TCOA Time: _____ min Comments:

This is a UNIT 1 JPM

References:

OP A-4A:I, Pressurizer - Make Available, Rev. 32 OP1.ID2, TCOAs, Rev 8A (& TCOA database); TCOA item 36 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 60 minutes (Validated Time: 16 minutes)

Critical Steps: 4.2, 8.2, 10.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-029 Gen KA # / Rating: 010.A2.02 3.3 / 3.6 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: A copy of OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1.

• An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 13D.

• Offsite power is available.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 12 to its backup power supply in accordance with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Pressurizer heater group 12 is powered from its backup supply.

Time Critical This JPM was evaluated against TCOA # 36, "After a LOOP, manually Operator Action transfer PZR heater power supplies to vital within 60 minutes".

(TCOA): This TCOA:

• is applicable to this JPM. The initiating event is different but the task is the same. TCOA start time is when the operator is directed to perform the task. TCOA stop time is when alignment is complete in Step 11.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time: (also TCOA start time)

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 6.4.1- Reference procedure step. 1.1 Read Cautions and Note.

Cue: Another Operator has been assigned to monitor the loading of Bus G 480V transformer.

1.2 Recognized that off-site power is available and goes to Section 6.4.1b.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. Step 6.4.1.b.1,2 - Place control switch 2.1 Went to or called the control room to verify for heater group 12 in the OFF the position of the control switch for heater position on CC1. group 12 is in OFF.

Cue: The control switch for heater group 12 is in the OFF position and the green light is ON.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Step 6.4.1.b.3.a - Ensure that heater 3.1 Located the normal breaker for heater group 12 normal breaker 52-13D-6 is group 12 on load center 13.

OPEN.

Note: As-found breaker position is OPEN 3.2 Ensured that the breaker is OPEN.

Cue: The breaker is as you see it.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4. ** Step 6.4.1.b.3.b - Place the DC 4.1 Located the DC control power switch for control power cutout toggle switch the heater group 12 normal breaker, 72-52-13D-06 for pzr heater group located on load center 13.

12 normal breaker in OFF position.

Note: As-found toggle switch position is ON 4.2 ** Placed the control power toggle switch in the OFF position.

Cue: The toggle switch is in the DOWN (OFF) position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Step 6.4.1.b.4.a - Check heater group 5.1 Located the heater group 12 backup breaker.

12 backup breaker 52-1G-72 open.

Note: As-found breaker position is OPEN 5.2 Checked that the breaker is open.

Cue: The breaker is as you see it.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

6. Step 6.4.1.b.4.b Check open the DC 6.1 Located the DC control power knife switch for control power knife switch 72-52-1G- heater group 12 (located above the vital 72 for the heater group 12 backup breaker).

breaker.

Note: The knife switch is in the OPEN position.

Show the Examinee Attachment 1 Image of the switch box interior.

Cue: The knife switch is as you see it 6.2 Verified that the knife switch is open.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. 6.4.1.b.5.a Ensure that both white 7.1 Located the pressurizer heater 1-2 transfer potential lights on the manual switch EPPH12 on the wall next to the 52-transfer switch EPPH12 are not lit. 1G-72 breaker.

Note: Since the normal breaker may be available, a white light may be ON.

7.2 Observed that neither white light is ON.

Cue: Both white lights are OFF.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

8. ** 6.4.1.b.5.b,c Move the transfer switch **********************************

EPPH12 down to the backup (vital bus) Cue: The Shift Foreman has assigned position. another operator to complete all required sealed component change forms and resealing.

Note: As-found switch position is NORMAL 8.1 Removed seal. (Simulates.)

8.2 ** Positioned switch EPPH12 to the backup supply.

Cue: The transfer switch is in the DOWN (backup) position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. 6.4.1.b.6.a Rack in or check racked in 9.1 Racked in or checks racked in 52-1G-72. 52-1G-72.

Cue: Breaker is flush with the breaker cabinet (RACKED IN).

Note: This breaker is normally racked in.

This step would become critical if the breaker were initially racked out. OP J-7A:II would only be needed in this "unusual" case.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

10. ** 6.4.1.b.6.b Close the DC control Note: Show the Examinee Attachment 1 power knife switch for the heater Image of the switch box interior.

group 12 backup breaker.

10.1 ** Closed the DC control power knife switch for 52-1G-72.

Cue: The handle moved up.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

11. 6.4.1.b.6.c,d Ensure the D.C. 11.1 Located the D.C. charging power switch on Charging Power Switch for heater the lower front of 52 1G 72.

group 12 backup breaker (52-1G-

72) is on and springs charged.

11.2 Ensured the following:

• CHARGING POWER switch in the ON position

• SPRINGS CHARGED flag displayed Cue: The indications are as you see.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

TCOA Stop Time: __________________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 12 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

12. Notify the control room of the 12.1 Notifies the control room that heater status of heater group 12. group 12 has been transferred to the backup power supply.

Cue: The Control Operator will complete the procedure and energize heater group 12.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time: (For entire task)

Total Time: (For entire task; enter total time on the cover page)

TCOA Start Time:

TCOA Stop Time:

TCOA Total Time: (Enter TCOA time on front page)

TCOA: SAT UNSAT (TCOA time must be < 60 minutes)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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EVALUATOR WORKSHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

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ATTACHMENT 1 - DC CONTROL POWER JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 nrcl141-ljp1-u1 PAGE 13 OF 14 REV. 2 rev2.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1.

• An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 13D.

• Offsite power is available.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 12 to its backup power supply in accordance with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

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Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R32 Page 14 of 29 UNIT 1 6.4 Pressurizer Heaters - Transfer to Backup Power Supply CAUTION: The load on 480V Vital Bus/Transformer shall be monitored when transferring Pressurizer heaters to the backup power supply. Pressurizer heaters ON and CFCUs in FAST speed could result in exceeding transformer normal rated load.T03665/Ref 7.2.4 NOTE: Red tick marks on transformer MW meter face indicate normal continuous rating value.

6.4.1 IF Press Heater Group 1-2 is to be transferred to the backup power supply, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: Any safety injection signal must be reset before loads can be stripped and before the heaters can be energized. Safety injection signal may be reset only if applicable reset criteria is met in the specific Emergency Operating Procedures.T03665

a. IF 4kV Vital Bus G is being supplied by its diesel generator AND bus load is greater than or equal to 2.6 MW, THEN at SFM discretion, strip loads from the bus as follows:T03665

1. IF all containment fan coolers are running AND average containment air temperature is less than 120°F, THEN shut down ONE of the following:

• CFCU 1-3 OR

• CFCU 1-5.

2. IF ALL component cooling water pumps are running, THEN shut down CCW Pump 1-2.

3. IF the ECCS pump shutdown criteria in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedure is met, THEN shut down RHR Pump 1-1.

OP_A-4A~Iu1r32.DOC 0222.2004

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R32 Page 15 of 29 UNIT 1

b. Energize Pzr Heater Group 12 from backup supply as follows:T03665

1. Place Backup Htr Grp 1-2 control switch in "OFF" (CC1).

2. Check Backup Htr Grp 1-2 control switch green light ON.

3. Ensure the following for 52-13D-6, Pzr Htr Group 12:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-13D-06, DC Control Power Cut Out Switch, in "OFF"

4. Ensure the following for 52-1G-72, Pzr Htr Group 12:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-1G-72, DC Control Power knife switch OPEN (above breaker inside SPGA)

5. Transfer EPPH12, Press Heater 1-2 Transfer Switch, as follows:

a) Check BOTH of the following white potential indicating lights OFF:

• Normal supply 52-13D-6

• Backup supply 52-1G-72 b) Place EPPH12 in "BACKUP".

c) Seal EPPH12 in "BACKUP" PER OP1.DC20, "Sealed Components."

6. Ensure the following for 52-1G-72, Pzr Htr Group 12:

a) Breaker RACKED IN and OPEN PER OP J-7A:II, "480V Non-Vital System - Switching Operation."Ref 7.2.5 b) 72-52-1G-72, DC Control Power knife switch, CLOSED c) DC Charging Power switch in "ON" (lower front of breaker) d) Closing springs charged OP_A-4A~Iu1r32.DOC 0222.2004

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R32 Page 16 of 29 UNIT 1 CAUTION: The Pressurizer heater group breaker auto trip on low Pressurizer level is defeated when heaters are on backup power supply. Heaters must be manually turned OFF if Pressurizer level drops below 17%.

7. Place Backup Htr Grp 1-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON" (CC1).

NOTE: The indicating lights for this group will NOT illuminate since they are associated with the normal power supply breaker position.

8. Check Htr Grp 1-2 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1).

9. IF Pzr Htr Group 1-2 is NOT energized, THEN manually close breaker 52-1G-72 as follows:Ref 7.2.3 a) Ensure Backup Htr Grp 1-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON".

NOTE: Charging the closing springs electrically requires the local DC Control Power knife switch (72-52-1G-72) above the breaker to be closed and the DC Charging Power toggle switch on the front of the breaker in "ON".

b) Ensure breaker 52-1G-72 closing springs charged.

c) Press the CLOSE pushbutton.

10. Ensure that Diesel Generator 1-2 is NOT overloaded by referencing the capability curve in OP J-6B:V, "Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-2."

11. Check Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are less than or equal to the red tick mark on meter face.

12. IF Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are greater than the red tick mark, THEN REFER TO AR PK17-22, "480V Bus 1G," for guidance on reducing loads.

OP_A-4A~Iu1r32.DOC 0222.2004

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJP1-U2

Title:

Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 22 to Backup Power Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _____ min TCOA Time: _____ min Comments:

This is a UNIT 2 JPM

References:

OP A-4A:I, Pressurizer - Make Available, Rev. 25 OP1.ID2, TCOAs, Rev 8A (& TCOA database); TCOA item 36 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 60 minutes (Validated Time: 16 minutes)

Critical Steps: 4.2, 8.2, 10.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-029 Gen KA # / Rating: 010.A2.02 3.3 / 3.6 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: A copy of OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is in MODE 1.

• An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 23D.

• Offsite power is available.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 22 to its backup power supply in accordance with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Pressurizer heater group 22 is powered from its backup supply.

Time Critical This JPM was evaluated against TCOA # 36, "After a LOOP, manually Operator Action transfer PZR heater power supplies to vital within 60 minutes".

(TCOA): This TCOA:

• is applicable to this JPM. The initiating event is different but the task is the same. TCOA start time is when the operator is directed to perform the task. TCOA stop time is when alignment is complete in Step 11.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time: (also TCOA start time)

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 6.4.1- Reference procedure step. 1.1 Read Cautions and Note.

Cue: Another Operator has been assigned to monitor the loading of Bus G 480V transformer.

1.2 Recognized that off-site power is available and goes to Section 6.4.1b.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. Step 6.4.1.b.1,2 - Place control switch 2.1 Went to or called the control room to verify for heater group 22 in the OFF the position of the control switch for heater position on CC1. group 22 is in OFF.

Cue: The control switch for heater group 22 is in the OFF position and the green light is ON.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Step 6.4.1.b.3.a - Ensure that heater 3.1 Located the normal breaker for heater group 22 normal breaker 52-23D-6 is group 22 on load center 23.

OPEN.

Note: As-found breaker position is OPEN 3.2 Ensured that the breaker is OPEN.

Cue: The breaker is as you see it.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4. ** Step 6.4.1.b.3.b - Place the DC 4.1 Located the DC control power switch for control power cutout toggle switch the heater group 22 normal breaker, 72-52-23D-06 for pzr heater group located on load center 23.

22 normal breaker in OFF position.

Note: As-found toggle switch position is ON 4.2 ** Placed the control power toggle switch in the OFF position.

Cue: The toggle switch is in the DOWN (OFF) position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Step 6.4.1.b.4.a - Check heater group 5.1 Located the heater group 22 backup breaker.

22 backup breaker 52-2G-72 open.

Note: As-found breaker position is OPEN 5.2 Checked that the breaker is open.

Cue: The breaker is as you see it.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

6. Step 6.4.1.b.4.b Check open the DC 6.1 Located the DC control power knife switch for control power knife switch 72-52-2G- heater group 22 (located above the vital 72 for the heater group 22 backup breaker).

breaker.

Note: The knife switch is in the OPEN position.

Show the Examinee Attachment 1 Image of the switch box interior.

Cue: The knife switch is as you see it 6.2 Verified that the knife switch is open.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. 6.4.1.b.5.a Ensure that both white 7.1 Located the pressurizer heater 2-2 transfer potential lights on the manual switch EPPH12 on the wall next to the 52-transfer switch EPPH22 are not lit. 2G-72 breaker.

Note: Since the normal breaker may be available, a white light may be ON.

7.2 Observed that neither white light is ON.

Cue: Both white lights are OFF.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

8. ** 6.4.1.b.5.b,c Move the transfer switch **********************************

EPPH22 down to the backup (vital bus) Cue: The Shift Foreman has assigned position. another operator to complete all required sealed component change forms and resealing.

Note: As-found switch position is NORMAL 8.1 Removed seal. (Simulates.)

8.2 ** Positioned switch EPPH22 to the backup supply.

Cue: The transfer switch is in the DOWN (backup) position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. 6.4.1.b.6.a Rack in or check racked in 9.1 Racked in or checks racked in 52-2G-72. 52-2G-72.

Cue: Breaker is flush with the breaker cabinet (RACKED IN).

Note: This breaker is normally racked in.

This step would become critical if the breaker were initially racked out. OP J-7A:II would only be needed in this "unusual" case.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

10. ** 6.4.1.b.6.b Close the DC control Note: Show the Examinee Attachment 1 power knife switch for the heater Image of the switch box interior.

group 22 backup breaker.

10.1 ** Closed the DC control power knife switch for 52-2G-72.

Cue: The handle moved up.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

11. 6.4.1.b.6.c,d Ensure the D.C. 11.1 Located the D.C. charging power switch on Charging Power Switch for heater the lower front of 52-2G-72.

group 22 backup breaker (52-2G-

72) is on and springs charged.

11.2 Ensured the following:

• CHARGING POWER switch in the ON position

• SPRINGS CHARGED flag displayed Cue: The indications are as you see.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

TCOA Stop Time: __________________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: TRANSFER PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP 22 TO BACKUP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 POWER EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

12. Notify the control room of the 12.1 Notifies the control room that heater status of heater group 22. group 22 has been transferred to the backup power supply.

Cue: The Control Operator will complete the procedure and energize heater group 22.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time: (For entire task)

Total Time: (For entire task; enter total time on the cover page)

TCOA Start Time:

TCOA Stop Time:

TCOA Total Time: (Enter TCOA time on front page)

TCOA: SAT UNSAT (TCOA time must be < 60 minutes)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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EVALUATOR WORKSHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

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ATTACHMENT 1 - DC CONTROL POWER JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 nrcl141-ljp1-u2 PAGE 12 OF 13 REV. 2 rev2.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJP1-U2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is in MODE 1.

• An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 23D.

• Offsite power is available.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 22 to its backup power supply in accordance with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

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Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 15 of 29 UNIT 2 6.4 Pressurizer Heaters - Transfer to Backup Power Supply CAUTION: The load on 480V Vital Bus/Transformer shall be monitored when transferring Pressurizer heaters to the backup power supply. Pressurizer heaters ON and CFCUs in FAST speed could result in exceeding transformer normal rated load.T03665/Ref 7.2.4 NOTE: Red tick marks on transformer MW meter face indicate normal continuous rating value.

6.4.1 IF Press Heater Group 2-2 is to be transferred to the backup power supply, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: Any safety injection signal must be reset before loads can be stripped and before the heaters can be energized. Safety injection signal may be reset only if applicable reset criteria is met in the specific Emergency Operating Procedures.T03665

a. IF 4kV Vital Bus G is being supplied by its diesel generator AND bus load is greater than or equal to 2.6 MW, THEN at SFM discretion, strip loads from the bus as follows:T03665

1. IF all containment fan coolers are running AND average containment air temperature is less than 120°F, THEN shut down ONE of the following:

• CFCU 2-3 OR

• CFCU 2-5.

2. IF ALL component cooling water pumps are running, THEN shut down CCW Pump 2-2.

3. IF the ECCS pump shutdown criteria in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedure is met, THEN shut down RHR Pump 2-2.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 16 of 29 UNIT 2

b. Energize Press Heater Group #22 from backup supply as follows:T03665

1. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "OFF".

2. Check Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch green light ON.

3. Ensure the following for 52-23D-6, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-23D-06, DC Control Power Cut Out Switch, in "OFF"

4. Ensure the following for 52-2G-72, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-2G-72, DC Control Power knife switch, OPEN (above breaker inside SPGA)

5. Transfer EPPH22, Press Heater 2-2 Transfer Switch, as follows:

a) Ensure that BOTH white potential indicating lights OFF.

• Normal supply 52-23D-6

• Backup supply 52-2G-72 b) Place EPPH22 in "BACKUP".

c) Seal EPPH22 in "BACKUP" PER OP1.DC20, "Sealed Components."

6. Ensure the following for 52-2G-72, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker RACKED IN and OPEN PER OP J-7A:II, "480V Non-Vital System - Switching Operation"Ref 7.2.5 b) 72-52-2G-72, DC Control Power knife switch, CLOSED (above breaker inside SPGA) c) DC Charging Power switch in "ON" (lower front of breaker) d) Closing springs charged OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 17 of 29 UNIT 2 CAUTION: The Pressurizer heater group breaker auto trip on low Pressurizer level is defeated when heaters are on backup power supply. Heaters must be manually turned OFF if Pressurizer level drops below 17%.

7. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON" (CC1).

NOTE: The indicating lights for this group will NOT illuminate since they are associated with the normal power supply breaker position.

8. Check Htr Grp 2-2 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1).

9. IF Press Heater Group #22 is NOT energized THEN manually close breaker 52-2G-72 as follows:Ref. 7.2.3 a) Ensure Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON".

NOTE: Charging the closing springs electrically requires the local DC Control Power knife switch (72-52-2G-72) above the breaker to be closed and the DC Charging Power toggle switch on the front of the breaker in "ON".

b) Ensure breaker 52-2G-72 closing springs are charged.

c) Press the CLOSE pushbutton.

10. Ensure that Diesel Generator 2-1 is NOT overloaded by referencing the capability curve in OP J-6B:IV, "Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-1."

11. Check Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are less than or equal to the red tick mark on meter face.

12. IF Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are greater than red tick mark, THEN REFER TO AR PK17-22, "480V Bus 2G," for guidance on reducing loads.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 18 of 29 UNIT 2 6.4.2 IF Pzr Heater Group 2-3 is to be transferred to the backup power supply, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: Any safety injection signal must be reset before loads can be stripped and before the heaters can be energized. Safety injection signal may be reset only if applicable reset criteria are met in the specific Emergency Operating Procedures.T03665

a. IF 4kV Vital Bus H is being supplied by its diesel generator AND bus load is greater than or equal to 2.6 mW, THEN at SFM discretion, strip loads from the bus as follows:T03665

1. IF all containment fan coolers are running AND average containment air temperature is less than 120°F, THEN shut down CFCU 2-4.

2. IF ALL component cooling water pumps are running, THEN shut down CCW Pump 2-3.

3. IF the ECCS pump shutdown criteria in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedure are met, THEN

• Shut down RHR Pump 2-2

• Shut down SI Pump 2-2

b. Energize Pzr Heater Group 2-3 from backup supply as follows:T03665

1. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "OFF" (CC1).

2. Check Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch green light ON.

3. Ensure the following for 52-23E-2, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-23E-02, DC Control Power Cut Out Switch, in "OFF"

4. Ensure the following for 52-2H-74, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-2H-74, DC Control Power knife switch, OPEN (above breaker inside SPHA)

OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 19 of 29 UNIT 2

5. Transfer EPPH23, Press Heater 2-3 Transfer Switch, as follows:

a) Check BOTH of the following white potential indicating lights OFF:

• Normal supply 52-23E-2

• Backup supply 52-2H-74 b) Place EPPH23 in "BACKUP".

c) Seal EPPH23 in "BACKUP" per OP1.DC20, "Sealed Components."

6. Ensure the following for 52-2H-74, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker RACKED IN and OPEN PER OP J-7A:II, "480V Non-Vital System - Switching Operation"Ref 7.2.5 b) 72-52-2H-74, DC Control Power knife switch, CLOSED (above breaker in SPHA) c) DC Charging Power switch in "ON" (lower front of breaker) d) Closing springs charged CAUTION: The Pressurizer heater group breaker auto trip on low Pressurizer level is defeated when heaters are on backup power supply. Heaters must be manually turned OFF if Pressurizer level drops below 17%.

7. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON" (CC1).

NOTE: The indicating lights for this group will NOT illuminate since they are associated with the normal power supply breaker position.

8. Check Htr Grp 2-3 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1).

9. IF Press Heater Group 2-3 is NOT energized, THEN manually close breaker 52-2H-74 as follows:Ref 7.2.3 a) Ensure Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON".

NOTE: Charging the closing springs electrically requires the local DC Control Power knife switch (72-52-2H-74) above the breaker to be closed and the DC Charging Power toggle switch on the front of the breaker in "ON".

b) Ensure 52-2H-74 closing springs are charged.

c) Press the CLOSE pushbutton.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R25 Page 20 of 29 UNIT 2

10. Ensure Diesel Generator 2-2 is NOT overloaded by referencing the capability curve in OP J-6B:V, "Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-2."

11. Check Bus H 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are less than or equal to the red tick mark on meter face.

12. IF Bus H 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are greater than red tick mark, THEN REFER TO AR PK16-22, "480V Bus 2H," for guidance on reducing loads.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r25.DOC 0222.2001

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P2-U1

Title:

Reset the Turbine Driven AUX Feedwater Pump Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

Unit 1 OP D-1:IV, Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump - Restart or Make Available After Overspeed Trip, Rev. 18.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 3, 5 Job Designation: NO/RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank LJP-012A Gen KA # / Rating: E05.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor the 4.1 / 4.0 following as they apply to the Loss of Heat Sink:

Components, and functions of control and safety systems including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, anutomatic and manual features.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Note: Instructions for resetting the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump are provided in OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2, and duplicated on a lamicoid in the Auxiliary Building by the pump. For the purposes of this JPM, a paper copy of Attachment 2 should be provided and used by the student.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure, U1 OP D-1:IV, Attach 2.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power.

• All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

• AFW pump 1-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 1-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: The TDAFW pump has been reset and started in accordance with the guidance of OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2 .

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Ensure that the speed setting knob 1.1 Ensured the speed setting knob on MS on the turbine governor is FCV-15 is positioned to the maximum positioned to the maximum speed setting (fully clockwise.)

setting.

Cue: Knob is fully clockwise.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: Spring may not be readily visible in its fully compressed position.

2. ** Turn the turbine throttle trip valve 2.1 Turned MS-1-FCV-152 in the clockwise MS-1-FCV-152 handwheel in the direction until the spring is fully clockwise direction until the spring is compressed.**

fully compressed.

Cue: Spring is fully compressed.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

• Comments:

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. ** Latch up the latching lever using the 3.1 Pulled the connecting rod slightly towards trip hook. MS-1-FCV-152 AND pushes down on the trip tappet and nut. **

Cue: Tappet nut is seated 3.2 Released tension applied to connecting rod.

Cue: Trip hook is latched Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. On top of the outboard Note: Image below illustrates tappet nut seating and turbine bearing, check the manual trip handle in the reset position.

latch plate fully depressed Student should describe position of tappet nut into the latching mechanism (flat against housing), trip handle (handle is to ensure the trip mechanism horizontal), and interface (leading edge of trip properly reset. handle body pressed flush against tappet nut) that ensures trip mechanism is properly reset).

4.1 Checked latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism.

Cue: Latch plate is fully depressed into latching mechanism.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. ** Fully open turbine trip throttle valve Note: Procedure advises Operator that MS-1-FCV-152 by turning the turbine will roll up to speed as MS handwheel in the counter clockwise FCV-152 is opened and governor will direction. maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 rpm. Turbine speed should be monitored by the Operator on a column-mounted tachometer located in the vicinity of FCV-152.

5.1 Turned the handwheel in the counter clockwise direction until MS-1-FCV-152 is fully open.**

Cue: Normal turbine rollup noise is heard as FCV-152 rotates CCW.

Cue: (when MS-1-FCV-152 is fully open)

Turbine noise levels are normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Check if turbine trips on overspeed. Note: Operator may elect to contact control room and/or use local indications to verify pump flow and speed indications. Cues are provided below for both cases.

Note: Use following cue if local Tach used for overspeed trip check:

Cue: (Point to approximately 4200 RPM on tachometer) - Meter is reading here and stable. Turbine noise levels are normal.

Note: Use following cue if Control Room contacted for overspeed trip check:

Cue: AFW Turbine speed indicates approximately 4200 RPM on VB3.

Pump discharge pressure is in the normal band.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U1 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power.

• All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

• AFW pump 2-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 1-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

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OP D-1:IV R15 Page 8 of 8 Restarting Turbine Driven AFW Pump After Overspeed Trip - Lamicoid Instructions U2 Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1 The following instructions are for emergency use only in restarting the turbine driven AFW pump after an overspeed trip. Similar instructions are posted on a lamicoid in the auxiliary building at the turbine driven AFW pump.

Restarting the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump after an Overspeed Trip:

1. Ensure the speed setting on turbine governor MS-2-FCV-15 is set to maximum (fully clockwise).

2. Turn the turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 handwheel in the clockwise direction until the spring is fully compressed.

3. Latch up the latching lever using the trip hook as follows:

a. Pull the connecting rod slightly towards MS-2-FCV-152 AND push down on the trip tappet and nut.

b. WHEN the tappet nut is properly seated, THEN gently release tension applied to the connecting rod.

4. On top of the outboard turbine bearing, check the latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism to ensure the trip mechanism properly reset.

5. Fully open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction. (The turbine will roll up to speed as MS-2-FCV-152 is opened. The governor will maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 RPM.)

6. IF the turbine trips on overspeed, THEN perform the following:

a. Perform steps 1 through 4

b. Slowly open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction until full speed is attained.

7. Leave turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 in the latched position.

OP_D-1~IVu2r15.DOC 0209.0951

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P2-U2

Title:

Reset the Turbine Driven AUX Feedwater Pump Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

Unit 2 OP D-1:IV, Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump - Restart or Make Available After Overspeed Trip, Rev. 15.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 3, 5 Job Designation: NO/RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank LJP-012A Gen KA # / Rating: E05.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor the 4.1 / 4.0 following as they apply to the Loss of Heat Sink:

Components, and functions of control and safety systems including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, anutomatic and manual features.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Note: Instructions for resetting the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump are provided in OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2, and duplicated on a lamicoid in the Auxiliary Building by the pump. For the purposes of this JPM, a paper copy of Attachment 2 should be provided and used by the student.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure, U2 OP D-1:IV, Attach 2.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

• All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

• AFW pump 2-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 2-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: The TDAFW pump has been reset and started in accordance with the guidance of OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2 .

NRCL141-P2-U2 PAGE 2 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Ensure that the speed setting knob 1.1 Ensured the speed setting knob on MS on the turbine governor is FCV-15 is positioned to the maximum positioned to the maximum speed setting (fully clockwise.)

setting.

Cue: Knob is fully clockwise.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: Spring may not be readily visible in its fully compressed position.

2. ** Turn the turbine throttle trip valve 2.1 Turned MS-2-FCV-152 in the clockwise MS-2-FCV-152 handwheel in the direction until the spring is fully clockwise direction until the spring is compressed.**

fully compressed.

Cue: Spring is fully compressed.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

• Comments:

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 3 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 4 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. ** Latch up the latching lever using the 3.1 Pulled the connecting rod slightly towards trip hook. MS-2-FCV-152 AND pushes down on the trip tappet and nut. **

Cue: Tappet nut is seated 3.2 Released tension applied to connecting rod.

Cue: Trip hook is latched Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 5 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 6 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. On top of the outboard turbine Note: Image below illustrates tappet nut bearing, check the latch plate fully seating and manual trip handle in depressed into the latching the reset position. Student should mechanism to ensure the trip describe position of tappet nut (flat mechanism properly reset. against housing), trip handle (handle is horizontal), and interface (leading edge of trip handle body pressed flush against tappet nut) that ensures trip mechanism is properly reset).

4.1 Checked latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism.

Cue: Latch plate is fully depressed into latching mechanism.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 7 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 8 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. ** Fully open turbine trip throttle valve Note: Procedure advises Operator that MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the turbine will roll up to speed as MS handwheel in the counter clockwise FCV-152 is opened and governor will direction. maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 rpm. Turbine speed should be monitored by the Operator on a column-mounted tachometer located in the vicinity of FCV-152.

5.1 Turned the handwheel in the counter clockwise direction until MS-2-FCV-152 is fully open.**

Cue: Normal turbine rollup noise is heard as FCV-152 rotates CCW.

Cue: (when MS-2-FCV-152 is fully open)

Turbine noise levels are normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 9 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Check if turbine trips on overspeed. Note: Operator may elect to contact control room and/or use local indications to verify pump flow and speed indications. Cues are provided below for both cases.

Note: Use following cue if local Tach used for overspeed trip check:

Cue: (Point to approximately 4200 RPM on tachometer) - Meter is reading here and stable. Turbine noise levels are normal.

Note: Use following cue if Control Room contacted for overspeed trip check:

Cue: AFW Turbine speed indicates approximately 4200 RPM on VB3.

Pump discharge pressure is in the normal band.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 10 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P2-U2 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

• All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

• AFW pump 2-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 2-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

nrcl141-p2-u2 PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 1 rev1.docx

OP D-1:IV R15 Page 8 of 8 Restarting Turbine Driven AFW Pump After Overspeed Trip - Lamicoid Instructions U2 Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1 The following instructions are for emergency use only in restarting the turbine driven AFW pump after an overspeed trip. Similar instructions are posted on a lamicoid in the auxiliary building at the turbine driven AFW pump.

Restarting the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump after an Overspeed Trip:

1. Ensure the speed setting on turbine governor MS-2-FCV-15 is set to maximum (fully clockwise).

2. Turn the turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 handwheel in the clockwise direction until the spring is fully compressed.

3. Latch up the latching lever using the trip hook as follows:

a. Pull the connecting rod slightly towards MS-2-FCV-152 AND push down on the trip tappet and nut.

b. WHEN the tappet nut is properly seated, THEN gently release tension applied to the connecting rod.

4. On top of the outboard turbine bearing, check the latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism to ensure the trip mechanism properly reset.

5. Fully open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction. (The turbine will roll up to speed as MS-2-FCV-152 is opened. The governor will maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 RPM.)

6. IF the turbine trips on overspeed, THEN perform the following:

a. Perform steps 1 through 4

b. Slowly open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction until full speed is attained.

7. Leave turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 in the latched position.

OP_D-1~IVu2r15.DOC 0209.0951

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P3-U1

Title:

Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following Control Room Evacuation Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

Note: This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, Establishing Hot Standby, Rev. 40 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 30 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1, 8.3, 9.2, 10.1, 10.5, 10.6 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-003A Gen KA # / Rating: 068.AA1.31 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 3.9 / 4.0 as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: ED/G AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/31/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/31/2016 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of OP AP-8A (Unit 1), Attachment 3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

• U-1 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to energize bus F per step 2 of Attachment 3 in OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Diesel Generator 1-3 has been started and Bus F energized in accordance with OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

Site Safety Standard: All personnel entering the Diesel Generator room shall have double hearing protection in their possession and in place prior to simulating the manual start of Diesel Generator 1-3. Per TQ2.ID8, rev. 16, the same safety standard shall be used for simulated tasks.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 2 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: If asked, the diesel is not running 1.** Step 2b - Place the 125 V DC Control 1.1 Read and observed procedure CAUTIONs Power Transfer (EQD-13) in OFF. prior to Step 2.

1.2 Located the 125 V DC Control Power Transfer Switch on the right side of the DG 1-3 DC Cont Pwr Transfer Switch Panel.

1.3 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in OFF. **

Cue: The EQD-13 is in the OFF [middle]

position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Step 2c - Place the droop switch on 2.1 Located the diesel generator 1-3 droop the excitation cubicle to the ISOC switch on the excitation cubicle.

mode.

2.2 Placed the droop switch to the ISOC position.**

Cue: The Droop Switch is in the ISOC position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 3 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 2d - Place the Mode Control 3.1 Located the Mode Control selector switch switch on the local control panel in on the diesel generator 1-3 local control the TEST position. panel.

3.2 Placed the Mode Control selector switch to the TEST position.**

Cue: The Mode Control Switch is in the TEST position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Step 2e - Place the diesel generator 4.1 Located the diesel generator 1-3 control control selection switch on the selection switch on the excitation cubicle.

excitation cubicle to the LOCAL position.

4.2 Placed the diesel generator 1-3 control selection switch to the LOCAL position.**

Cue: The Control Selector Switch is in the LOCAL position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 4 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Step 2f - Place DSL GEN 1-3 BACKUP 5.1 Located the 43DC-13/SS switch on the FUSE TRANSFER SWITCH 43DC-13/SS diesel generator 1-3 local control panel.

to the BACKUP position.

5.2 Placed the Appendix R fuse selector switch to the BACKUP position.**

Cue: The Appendix R Switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: Examinee will push tab to unlock mechanism.

6.** Step 2g - Place the 125V DC Control 6.1 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in Transfer Switch to NORMAL. **

NORMAL.

Cue: The EQD-13 switch is in the NORMAL [top] position. Amber light is ON.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 5 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 2h - Depress the alarm relay reset 7.1 Located the alarm relay reset push push button. button on diesel generator 1-3 local control panel.

7.2 Depressed the alarm relay reset push button.

Cue: The Alarm Reset push button has been depressed and returned to normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 6 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 8.** Step 2i - Place the Engine control switch Note: Per DCPP Site Safety Standards, (DE-13) on the control panel in START. the individual performer shall have double hearing protection available (with them upon entry to the DG room) and in place prior to simulating start of Diesel Generator 1-3. Failure to don appropriate hearing protection constitutes failure of the TPE.

8.1 Read NOTE 8.2 Located the START/STOP switch at the diesel generator 1-3 local control panel.

8.3 Placed the START/STOP switch to the START position.**

Cue: Normal DG startup noise level is heard. If asked, other DG parameters are moving up to (or are at) their normal values.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 7 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Step 2k - Notifies the HSDP of DG 9.1 Notified the SFM at the U-1 HSDP of DG status. status, and asked if 4KV bus voltage is satisfactory.

Cue: When asked, provide Examinee with Attachment 1, HSDP Interior Image 9.2 Determined voltage is NOT satisfactory, continued on to to step 2l.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV Note: Sync keys are stored at the Hot switchgear. Shut Down Panel Procedure Cabinet and the 4kV switchgear lockers.

10.1 Obtained a sync key (may do this any time before breaker operation; this action may be simulated) **

10.2 Read Caution.

Note: Blue lights for OC Aux Relay Alarm are on the feeder breakers for SU, DG and 480V 1F.

Amber light for DG 13 differential relay is on Safeguards Relay Panel.

White lights are used as phase or DC potential indication only (Continued on next page) nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 8 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 10.3 Checked bus not faulted by checking for kV switchgear, overcurrent and/or differential trips on DG or bus, and for dropped relay target; may Continued also check for visible damage and/or smells.

Cue: The OC and Differential lights are out for the bus and DG, there are no dropped relay flags, and there are no visible signs of damage in the room (or unusual odors).

10.4 Ensured bus feeder breakers open:

• Aux Feeder 52-HF13

• SU Feeder 52HF14 Cue: Breakers 52-HF-13 and 52-HF-14 are both red light OFF, green light ON.

10.5 Turned on the DG 1-3 FEED SYNC switch**

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the SYNC position. If checked, DG voltage is now indicated on the "big" sync scope.

(Continued on next page) nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 9 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV 10.6 Closed DG 1-3 output breaker, 52-HF-switchgear, Continued 7**

Cue: Breaker 52-HF-7 shows a red light ON and green light OFF.

Approximately 4KV is indicated on the "big" sync scope voltmeter for the bus.

10.7 Turned off the DG 1-3 FEEDER SYNC switch.

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the OFF position. (if checked) The "big" sync scope indicates no voltage.

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

10.8 Reported 4KV Bus F status to SFM (optional).

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page) nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 10 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 11 OF 13 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U1 ATTACHMENT 1 - HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL INTERIOR IMAGE nrcl141-p3-u1 rev1.docx PAGE 12 OF 13 REV. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

• U-2 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to establish local control and start diesel generator 2-3 by completing OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 13 OF 13 REV. 1

OP AP-8A R40 Page 50 of 61 Turbine Bldg Actions U1 Attachment 3: Page 1 of 5 PERFORM the following:

1. IF offsite power is still available, THEN ensure OPEN the RCP breakers:

• 52VD6

• 52VD7

• 52VE3

• 52VE4 NOTE 1: This Attachment requires a Sync Key which is stored with the procedure folder next to the 12-kV Room flashgear locker.

NOTE 2: Bus F is the preferred bus to establish AFW and other support conditions.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

2. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 1-3. (Bus F)

a. IF D/G 1-3 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 2.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle to ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

e. PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

f. PLACE the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (43DC-13/SS) on control panel in BACKUP.

g. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in NORMAL.

h. DEPRESS the Alarm Relay Reset push button on control panel.

NOTE: Depending upon number and types of faults, the D/G breaker may automatically close and loads sequence on following D/G start.

i. PLACE Engine control switch (DE-13) on the control panel in START.

OP_AP-8Au1r40.DOC 1104.2112 Phone Nos. HSDP x3107, x3781; DSDP x1355, x3179 D/G 1-1 x1249; D/G 1-2 x1251; D/G 1-3 x1438 12kV Rms x1247; 4kV Rms x1747; 480 V Rms x1372

OP AP-8A R40 Page 51 of 61 Turbine Bldg Actions U1 Attachment 3: Page 2 of 5

j. IF the D/G did not start, THEN perform the following:

1) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in OFF.

2) Wait for 10 seconds.

3) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-13) in BACKUP position.

4) PLACE Engine control switch (DE-13) on the control panel in START.

k. Contact the HSDP:

1) Report status of D/G 1-3.

2) Ask if 4kV Bus F voltage is satisfactory.

CAUTION: Use CAUTION when reenergizing dead buses, a bus fault may have caused it to de-energize. faulted bus would be indicated by a AC Feeder breaker overcurrent (OC) or a Bus Differential flag drop.

l. IF voltage is not satisfactory, THEN perform the following at the 4kV Switchgear:

1) CHECK the bus NOT Faulted.

2) Ensure Aux Trans Fdr Bkr 52HF13 open.

3) Ensure S/U Trans Fdr BKr 52HF14 open.

4) Turn ON the D/G 1-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5) CLOSE D/G Output Bkr 52HF7.

6) Turn OFF the D/G 1-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-12) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

3. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 1-2. (Bus G)

a. IF D/G 1-2 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 3.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-12) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle in ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

OP_AP-8Au1r40.DOC 1104.2112 Phone Nos. HSDP x3107, x3781; DSDP x1355, x3179 D/G 1-1 x1249; D/G 1-2 x1251; D/G 1-3 x1438 12kV Rms x1247; 4kV Rms x1747; 480 V Rms x1372

OP AP-8A R40 Page 52 of 61 Turbine Bldg Actions U1 Attachment 3: Page 3 of 5

e. PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

f. PLACE the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (43DC-12/SS) on control panel in BACKUP.

g. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-12) in NORMAL.

h. DEPRESS the Alarm Relay Reset push button on control panel.

NOTE: Depending upon number and types of faults, the D/G breaker may automatically close and loads sequence on following D/G start.

i. PLACE Engine control switch (DE-12) on the control panel in START.

j. IF the D/G did not start, THEN perform the following:

1) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-12) in OFF.

2) Wait for 10 seconds.

3) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-12) in BACKUP position.

4) PLACE Engine control switch (DE-12) on the control panel in START.

k. Contact the HSDP:

1) Report status of D/G 1-2.

2) Ask if 4-kV Bus G voltage is satisfactory.

CAUTION: Use CAUTION when reenergizing dead buses, a bus fault may have caused it to de-energize. faulted bus would be indicated by a AC Feeder breaker overcurrent (OC) or a Bus Differential flag drop.

l. IF voltage is not satisfactory, THEN PERFORM the following at the 4-kV Switchgear:

1) CHECK the bus NOT Faulted.

2) Ensure Aux Trans Fdr Bkr 52HG13 open.

3) Ensure S/U Trans Fdr BKr 52HG14 open.

4) Turn ON the D/G 1-2 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5) CLOSE D/G Output Bkr 52HG5.

6) Turn OFF the D/G 1-2 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

OP_AP-8Au1r40.DOC 1104.2112 Phone Nos. HSDP x3107, x3781; DSDP x1355, x3179 D/G 1-1 x1249; D/G 1-2 x1251; D/G 1-3 x1438 12kV Rms x1247; 4kV Rms x1747; 480 V Rms x1372

OP AP-8A R40 Page 53 of 61 Turbine Bldg Actions U1 Attachment 3: Page 4 of 5 CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-11) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

4. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 1-1. (Bus H)

a. IF D/G 1-1 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 4.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-11) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle in ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

e. PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

f. PLACE the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (43DC-11/SS) on control panel in BACKUP.

g. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-11) in NORMAL.

h. DEPRESS the Alarm Relay Reset push button on control panel.

NOTE: Depending upon number and types of faults, the D/G breaker may automatically close and loads sequence on following D/G start.

i. PLACE Engine control switch (DE-11) on the control panel in START.

j. IF the D/G did not start, THEN perform the following:

1) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-11) in OFF.

2) Wait for 10 seconds.

3) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-11) in BACKUP position.

4) PLACE Engine control switch (DE-11) on the control panel in START.

k. Contact the HSDP:

1) Report status of D/G 1-1.

2) Ask if 4kV Bus H voltage is satisfactory.

OP_AP-8Au1r40.DOC 1104.2112 Phone Nos. HSDP x3107, x3781; DSDP x1355, x3179 D/G 1-1 x1249; D/G 1-2 x1251; D/G 1-3 x1438 12kV Rms x1247; 4kV Rms x1747; 480 V Rms x1372

OP AP-8A R40 Page 54 of 61 Turbine Bldg Actions U1 Attachment 3: Page 5 of 5 CAUTION: Use CAUTION when reenergizing dead buses, a bus fault may have caused it to de-energize. faulted bus would be indicated by a AC Feeder breaker overcurrent (OC) or a Bus Differential flag drop.

l. IF voltage is not satisfactory, THEN perform the following at the 4kV Switchgear:

1) CHECK the bus NOT Faulted.

2) Ensure Aux Trans Fdr Bkr 52HH13 open.

3) Ensure S/U Trans Fdr BKr 52HH14 open.

4) Turn ON the D/G 1-1 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5) CLOSE D/G Output Bkr 52HH7.

6) Turn OFF the D/G 1-1 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5. IF D/Gs are running, THEN CHECK D/G status periodically.

OP_AP-8Au1r40.DOC 1104.2112 Phone Nos. HSDP x3107, x3781; DSDP x1355, x3179 D/G 1-1 x1249; D/G 1-2 x1251; D/G 1-3 x1438 12kV Rms x1247; 4kV Rms x1747; 480 V Rms x1372

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P3-U2

Title:

Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following Control Room Evacuation Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

Note: This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, Establishing Hot Standby, Rev. 30 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 30 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1, 8.3, 9.2, 10.1, 10.5, 10.6 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-003A Gen KA # / Rating: 068.AA1.31 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 3.9 / 4.0 as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: ED/G AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 03/15/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 03/16/2016 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of OP AP-8A (Unit 2), Attachment 3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

• U-2 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to energize bus F per step 2 of Attachment 3 in OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Diesel Generator 2-3 has been started and Bus F energized in accordance with OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

Site Safety Standard: All personnel entering the Diesel Generator room shall have double hearing protection in place prior to simulating the manual start of Diesel Generator 2-3. Per TQ2.ID8, rev. 16, the same safety standard shall be used for simulated tasks.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 2 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: If asked, the diesel is not running 1.** Step 2b - Place the 125 V DC Control 1.1 Read and observed procedure CAUTIONs Power Transfer (EQD-23) in OFF. prior to Step 2.

1.2 Located the 125 V DC Control Power Transfer Switch on the right side of the DG 2-3 DC Cont Pwr Transfer Switch Panel.

1.3 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF. **

Cue: The EQD-23 is in the OFF [middle]

position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Step 2c - Place the droop switch on 2.1 Located the diesel generator 2-3 droop the excitation cubicle to the ISOC switch on the excitation cubicle.

mode.

2.2 Placed the droop switch to the ISOC position.**

Cue: The Droop Switch is in the ISOC position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 3 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 2d - Place the Mode Control 3.1 Located the Mode Control selector switch switch on the local control panel in on the diesel generator 2-3 local control the TEST position. panel.

3.2 Placed the Mode Control selector switch to the TEST position.**

Cue: The Mode Control Switch is in the TEST position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Step 2e - Place the diesel generator 4.1 Located the diesel generator 2-3 control control selection switch on the selection switch on the excitation cubicle.

excitation cubicle to the LOCAL position.

4.2 Placed the diesel generator 2-3 control selection switch to the LOCAL position.**

Cue: The Control Selector Switch is in the LOCAL position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 4 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Step 2f - Place DSL GEN 5-3 BACKUP 5.1 Located the 43DC-23/SS switch on the FUSE TRANSFER SWITCH 43DC-23/SS diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

to the BACKUP position.

5.2 Placed the Appendix R fuse selector switch to the BACKUP position.**

Cue: The Appendix R Switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: Examinee will push tab to unlock mechanism.

6.** Step 2g - Place the 125V DC Control 6.1 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in Transfer Switch to NORMAL. **

NORMAL.

Cue: The EQD-23 switch is in the NORMAL [top] position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 5 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 2h - Depress the alarm relay reset 7.1 Located the alarm relay reset push push button. button on diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

7.2 Depressed the alarm relay reset push button.

Cue: The Alarm Reset push button has been depressed and returned to normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 6 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 8.** Step 2i - Place the Engine control switch Note: Per DCPP Site Safety Standards, (DE-23) on the control panel in START. the individual performer shall have double hearing protection available (with them upon entry to the DG room) and in place prior to simulating start of Diesel Generator 2-3. Failure to don appropriate hearing protection constitutes failure of the TPE.

8.1 Read NOTE 8.2 Located the START/STOP switch at the diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

8.3 Placed the START/STOP switch to the START position.**

Cue: Normal DG startup noise level is heard. If asked, other DG parameters are moving up to (or are at) their normal values.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 7 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Step 2k - Notifies the HSDP of DG 9.1 Notified the SFM at the U-2 HSDP of DG status. status, and asked if 4KV bus voltage is satisfactory.

Cue: When asked, provide Examinee with Attachment 1, HSDP Interior Image 9.2 Determined voltage is NOT satisfactory, continued on to to step 2l.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV Note: Sync keys are stored at the Hot switchgear. Shut Down Panel Procedure Cabinet and the 4kV switchgear lockers.

10.1 Obtained a sync key (may do this any time before breaker operation; this action may be simulated) **

10.2 Read Caution.

Note: Blue lights for OC Aux Relay Alarm are on the feeder breakers for SU, DG and 480V 2F.

Amber light for DG 23 differential relay is on Safeguards Relay Panel.

White lights are used as phase or DC potential indication only (Continued on next page) nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 8 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV 10.3 Checked bus not faulted by checking for switchgear, overcurrent and/or differential trips on DG or bus, and for dropped relay target; Continued may also check for visible damage and/or smells.

Cue: The OC and Differential lights are out for the bus and DG, there are no dropped relay flags, and there are no visible signs of damage in the room (or unusual odors).

10.4 Ensured bus feeder breakers open:

• Aux Feeder 52-HF13

• SU Feeder 52HF14 Cue: Breakers 52-HF-13 and 52-HF-14 are both red light OFF, green light ON.

10.5 Turned on the DG 2-3 FEED SYNC switch**

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the SYNC position. If checked, DG voltage is now indicated on the "big" sync scope.

(Continued on next page) nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 9 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV 10.6 Closed DG 2-3 output breaker, 52-HF-switchgear, Continued 7**

Cue: Breaker 52-HF-7 shows a red light ON and green light OFF.

Approximately 4KV is indicated on the "big" sync scope voltmeter for the bus.

10.7 Turned off the DG 2-3 FEEDER SYNC switch.

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the OFF position. (if checked) The "big" sync scope indicates no voltage.

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

10.8 Reported 4KV Bus F status to SFM (optional).

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page) nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 10 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 11 OF 13 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3-U2 ATTACHMENT 1 - HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL INTERIOR IMAGE nrcl141-p3-u2 rev2.docx PAGE 12 OF 13 REV. 2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

• U-2 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to establish local control and start diesel generator 2-3 by completing OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 13 OF 13 REV. 2

OP AP-8A R30 Page 47 of 58 Turbine Bldg Actions U2 Attachment 3: Page 1 of 5 PERFORM the following:

1. IF offsite power is still available, THEN ensure OPEN the RCP breakers:

• 52VD3

• 52VD4

• 52VE6

• 52VE7 NOTE 1: This Attachment requires a Sync Key which is stored with the procedure folder next to the 12kV Room flashgear locker.

NOTE 2: Bus F is the preferred bus to establish AFW and other support conditions.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

2. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 2-3. (Bus F)

a. IF D/G 2-3 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 2.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle to ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

e. PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

f. PLACE the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (43DC-23/SS) on control panel in BACKUP.

g. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in NORMAL.

h. DEPRESS the Alarm Relay Reset push button on control panel.

NOTE: Depending upon number and types of faults, the D/G breaker may automatically close and loads sequence on following D/G start.

i. PLACE Engine control switch (DE-23) on the control panel in START.

OP_AP-8Au2r30.DOC 0613.1010 Phone Nos. HSDP x2497, x3108; DSDP x2246 D/G 2-1 x2276; D/G 2-2 x2252; D/G 2-3 x2275 12kV Rms x2274; 4kV Rms Fx2404, Gx2778, Hx2706; 480 V Rms x2497

OP AP-8A R30 Page 48 of 58 Turbine Bldg Actions U2 Attachment 3: Page 2 of 5

j. IF the D/G did not start, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF, wait for 10 seconds, then PLACE in BACKUP position.

2) PLACE Engine control switch (DE-23) on the control panel in START.

k. Contact the HSDP:

1) Report status of D/G 2-3.

2) Ask if 4kV Bus F voltage is satisfactory.

CAUTION: Use CAUTION when reenergizing dead buses, a bus fault may have caused it to de-energize. faulted bus would be indicated by a AC Feeder breaker overcurrent (OC) or a Bus Differential flag drop.

l. IF voltage is not satisfactory, THEN PERFORM the following at the 4kV Switchgear:

1) CHECK the bus NOT Faulted.

2) Ensure Aux Trans Fdr Bkr 52HF13 open.

3) Ensure S/U Trans Fdr Bkr 52HF14 open.

4) Turn ON the D/G 2-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5) CLOSE D/G Output Bkr 52HF7.

6) Turn OFF the D/G 2-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-21) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

3. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 2-1. (Bus G)

a. IF D/G 2-1 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 3.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-21) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle in ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

OP_AP-8Au2r30.DOC 0613.1010 Phone Nos. HSDP x2497, x3108; DSDP x2246 D/G 2-1 x2276; D/G 2-2 x2252; D/G 2-3 x2275 12kV Rms x2274; 4kV Rms Fx2404, Gx2778, Hx2706; 480 V Rms x2497

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, aligned to Start-Up Power, MOL, 1431 ppm boron Turnover: In OP L-3, performing step 6.28, raising power to 8%.

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 N/A R(ATC, Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, sec 6.28.

SRO) 2 MAL_NIS3B SRO Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%. (AP-5, TS 3.3.1.F) (Used for SRO TS Only).

3 CNV_MFW9_3 I (BOP, Feed Reg Bypass Valve FCV-1510 oscillation; manual control SRO) required (PK09-15).

4 MAL_EPS4D_2 C (ALL) 4kV Vital Bus G differential trip results in loss of charging and letdown isolation (AP-17, AP-27, TS 3.4.11.C, 3.8.1.B, 3.8.4.A).

5 MAL_RCP1A, XMT_RCP17_3, M (ALL) RCP 1-1 #1 seal leak requiring Rx Trip and tripping of RCP 1-1.

XMT_RCP18_3 (AP-28) 6 MAL_RCS4C M (ALL) 400 gpm Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (CT-18, 19, 20, 21) 7 CNV_MSS24_2 C (BOP) PORV on ruptured S/G fails open, requires backup air to close

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 1 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7) 6

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Event 7) 1

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-3) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) (CT-18, 19, 20) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (CT-18) Isolate the ruptured steam SG inventory increase leads to water release

• W Margin to Overfill (CN-generator from the intact steam generators through the S/G PORV or safety valve(s) or to SG CRA-05-53 Rev1) prior to commencing cooldown of the RCS overfill, which would seriously compromise the SG

• W Offsite Doses (CN-CRA-in step 9.c (40% stem dumps) or 10.b (10% as a fission-product barrier and complicate 05-54) steam dump) by completing the following: mitigation.

• SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 Isolate feedwater by ensuring closed:

• WCAP-17711-NP

• LCV-108 (MDAFW Level Control Valve)

• LCV-115 (TDAFW Level Control Valve)

Isolate steamflow by ensuring closed:

• FCV-43 and FCV-23 (S/G 1-3 MSIV and bypass) (VB3)

• S/G 1-3 supply to TD AFW Pp (FCV-38)

• FCV-157 and FCV-246 (Blowdown and Sample Isolation Outside Containment)

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 2 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Task Justification Reference (CT-19) Perform RCS cooldown at Transition to contingency procedures to address

• W Margin to Overfill (CN-maximum rate* to CETC target inadequate subcooling or Pressurized Thermal CRA-05-53 Rev1) temperature specified in E-3, step 6, using Shock conditions results in delaying RCS

• SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 steam dumps such that: depressurization and SI termination. This delay

• WCAP-17711-NP allows excess inventory in the ruptured S/G to

• MAGENTA PATH on RCS INTEGRITY is continue to increase, with the potential of avoided challenging SG overpressure components or

• RCS subcooled margin still exists causing an overfill condition to occur.

following the cooldown.

• Target temperature is reached within 20 minutes of initiation of cooldown (based on 2x NRC scenario validation time)

• For 40% steam dumps, maximum rate limit is 100 psi/min (PPC value). Above this, main steam line isolation will occur.

Operator should attempt highest rate possible without getting main steam line isolation (not critical). If 40% dumps are not available or if steam line isolation occurs, maximum rate cooldown requires 10%

steam dumps on intact S/Gs to be fully opened.

(CT-20) Depressurize the RCS to meet Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a

• W Margin to Overfill (CN-depressurization criteria specified in E-3, ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS complicates CRA-05-53 Rev1)

App GG prior to stopping Safety Injection mitigation of the event and constitutes a

• SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 pumps. significant reduction of safety margin beyond that

• WCAP-17711-NP irreparably introduced by the scenario.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 3 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Control rods are used to raise power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup, step 6.28. ATC operator complies with 1 step pull and wait procedural requirement while monitoring relevant controls and diverse indicators. Shift Foreman provides reactivity oversight.

2. Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%. The ATC operator identifies single intermediate range detector lowering with no other indications corroborate a power decrease. SFM directs power ascension placed on hold. OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel may be referenced. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.3.1.F, One Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.

3. Feed Reg Bypass valve FCV-1510 begins to oscillate causing an unexpected rise in S/G 1-1 feedwater flow and level. Crew responds to AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System, taking manual control of the failed valve. Shift Foreman establishes level control band for manual operation. May refer to TS 3.7.3 for MFRV bypass valves, but LCO is not applicable.

4. 4 kV bus G trips on differential causing a loss of charging and letdown isolation. The crew responds by entering OP AP-17, Loss of Charging, and OP AP-27, Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus. Shift Foreman establishes priorities and maintains oversight while the board operators implement abnormal procedures as assigned. Normal charging and letdown are restored and redundant/backup equipment is placed in service. Shift Foreman addresses applicable short action Tech Specs: TS 3.4.11.C-Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves; 3.8.1.B-AC Sources Operating for D/G 1-2; 3.8.4.A-DC Sources.

5. RCP 1-1 seal leak ramps in over 2 minutes resulting in high seal return flow. Crew responds to AR PK05-01, RCP NO 11 for seal leakoff flow greater than 5.0 gpm and transitions to OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure. When seal leakoff and radial out bearing temperatures begin to rise, SFM directs Rx Trip and subsequent tripping of RCP 1-1 and closure of associated pressurizer spray valve.

6. Crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions into EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. A 400 gpm SGTR*** on S/G 1-3 ramps in approximately two minutes post-trip. The crew identifies the need to safety inject when pressurizer pressure and level begin to lower rapidly. The Shift Foreman re-enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, based on RM-73 and rising S/G 1-3 level, where the crew will address the following three critical tasks:

CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to commencing a cooldown of the RCS.

CT-19: Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate such that MAGENTA PATH on RCS INTEGRITY is avoided and RCS subcooled margin still exists following the cooldown (accomplished by reaching the target temperature specified in E-3, step 6).

CT-20: Depressurize the RCS to meet depressurization criteria specified in E-3, App GG prior to stopping Safety Injection pumps.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 4 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

7. The 10% Pressure Operated Relief Valve on the ruptured steam generator inadvertently actuates (steam generator pressure is still over 100# below setpoint). The Control Operator identifies the open valve by the audible sound of steam and a red position indicator. The valve is successfully closed by cutting in backup air and taking the backup control switch to close. Isolation of the valve is part of CT-18.

The scenario is terminated once RCS depressurization is complete (E-3, ready to perform step 24).

• • • CT / TCOA note: SGTR was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) # 2,3, and 4 (SGTR); initial power level and supporting equipment conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario. For these reasons, the S/G TCOAs will remain critical (a critical task, per WOG), but TCOA time limits will not be applied to this scenario.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 5 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 2 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 50% MOL 1085 ppm boron; Bus F week: CFCU 1-1 and D/G 1-3 OOS Turnover: Maintenance has requested Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 energized on vital backup power.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 PZ01PRZ_PRH12_1RTAPWRRT, LOA_PZR31 C (ATC, Pressurizer Heater Grp 1-2 ground and power failure SRO) during routine maintenance (PK17-24, TS 3.4.9) 2 H_V1_034M_1, XMT_VEN6_3, C(BOP, CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to XMT_VEN7_3, XMT_VEN8_3 SRO) low CCW flow (PK01-21, TS 3.6.6) 3 XMT_CVC2_3 I(BOP, PT-135 Fails High causing letdown pressure control SRO) valve to go full open (PK04-21).

4 MAL_CVC8A C (ATC, Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs causing reduction in SRO) charging flow to RCP seals (PK04-22).

5 MAL_GEN4_2 R (ATC) Main Generator underfrequency at 50% causes load C (BOP, rejection (AP-2).

SRO) 6 MAL_MSS3A, MAL_SYD2 M (ALL) Steamline break outside containment upstream of flow restrictor (S/G 1-1); requires Rx trip and SI.

MDAFW Pump LCV-110 fails open and must be closed locally. RCPs trip due to a loss of 12kV power, driving conditions for entry into FR-P.1 (CT-48, CT-CD).

7 MAL_PPL5A, MAL_PPL5B C (BOP) ATWS condition; requires manual opening of 13D/E CNV_AFW1_2 1 breakers from C/R (CT-1).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r3.docx Page 1 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7) 1

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 1,2,3,4,5) 5

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 6) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-2) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-P.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (CT-1) Reactor tripped by The safeguards systems that protect the plant during

• Westinghouse Owners completion of E-0, step 1. accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and Group WCAP-17711-NP pump heat are being added to the RCS. Failure to

• Calc G.2 Rev 5 (08151-manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the 2169) subcriticality critical safety function beyond that

• OP1.ID2, Time Critical irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Operator Actions Rev 8A,

1. 34.

(CT-48) Terminate ECCS flow by Failure to terminate ECCS flow when SI termination

• Westinghouse Owners the completion of FR-P.1, step 11. criteria are met causes the PRZR to fill and RCS pressure Group WCAP-17711-NP to increase. Additionally, the unnecessary continuation of ECCS flow needlessly aggravates the thermal stress on the reactor vessel. This constitutes an incorrect performance that causes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

(CT-CD) Stop RCS Cooldown by: An event or series of events which leads to a relatively

• Background Information

• Isolating feedflow to S/G 1-1 rapid and severe reactor vessel downcomer cooldown can for WOG Emergency by closing/verifying closed result in a thermal shock to the vessel wall that may lead Response Guideline LCV-106 and LCV-110. to a small flaw, which may already exist in the vessel wall,

• Verifying FCV-25 and FCV-41 growing into a larger crack. The growth or extension of are closed (S/G 1-1 steamline such a flaw may lead, in some cases (where propagation isolation) is not stopped within the wall), to a loss of vessel integrity

• Verifying all steam dumps closed.

• Throttling Feedflow to S/Gs 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 while maintaining the minimum heatsink requirements (435 gpm until S/G level is greater than 15% in one non-faulted S/G).

prior to performing step 15.d, isolation of Accumulators, in FR-P.1 L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r3.docx Page 2 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

1. Reactor Operator places Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 (aligned to vital backup power supply) in service to support routine maintenance. Associated control board power meter spikes to high end of scale followed by annunciator alarm PK17-24, 480V Bus 1G Ground on the associated bus. Operator recognizes the abnormal condition and secures heater. If breaker is not opened manually, break trips open in 15 seconds. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.4.9 Condition B, for one required group of pressurizer heaters inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown tech spec).

2. CFCU 1-2 has loss of CCW flow due to debris migration causing stator and motor bearing temperatures to rise rapidly and bring in annunciator alarm PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr. Reactor operators identify low flow indications on vertical boards and rapidly rising stator/bearing temperatures using plant process computer trends. Crew secures the CFCU to prevent motor damage and contact maintenance/engineering for assistance. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.6.6 Condition C, one required CFCU system inoperable such that a minimum of two CFCUs remain OPERABLE (7 day shutdown tech spec).

(Note: Malfunction is designed to trip the CFCU if crew has not shut the fan down within 5 minutes of stator temperature reaching 380oF).

3. PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, Fails High causing letdown pressure control valve to go full open and letdown flow to rise. AR PK04-21, LETDOWN PRESS / FLOW TEMP comes into alarm for Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Pressure High as a result of the failed transmitter, while actual letdown pressure lowers to approximately 90 psig as a result of full open control valve response. Letdown flow increases approximately 8 gpm above normal, resulting in a charging/letdown mismatch. Procedural guidance in AR PK04-21 directs crew to take manual control of PCV-135. Crew performs diagnostic brief to determine nature of the malfunction as well as actions required to restore letdown pressure back to normal band.

4. In-service Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs, reducing flow to RCP seals and bringing in AR PK04-22, RCP Seal Inj Fltr Delta-P Hi. Reactor Operators verify CCP seal cooling is still being maintained by CCW and ATC operator throttles RCP seal injection hand control valve, HCV-142, as needed to maintain pressurizer level. Shift Foreman establishes bands for pressurizer level and confirms field operators have been dispatched to swap seal injection filters.

5. An underfrequency condition on the grid results in a full load rejection on Unit 1 from 50% power. Crew recognizes condition based on numerous power level alarms and the ensuing secondary side transient. The crew monitors primary and secondary systems response, most notably rod control, steam dumps, and digital feedwater to ensure all systems respond appropriately in automatic. Shift Foreman implements OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection to stabilize the plant. The ATC operator places rods in manual to maintain reactor power between 20%-30% reactor power and determines required boration to stabilize the plant. BOP operator performs secondary realignments.

6. A main steamline break develops gradually (4 minute ramp) upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, outside containment. The crew identifies the need to safety inject and enter Emergency Operating Procedures based on pressurizer pressure and level lowering rapidly. Initial diagnosis may also note the absence of parameters indicative of a primary side break. Shift Foreman directs Safety Injection (SI) and entry into EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

(continued on next page)

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L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r3.docx Page 4 of 5 Rev 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

7. On the SI, the reactor fails to automatically actuate (ATWS). Manual Rx Trip switches are ineffective as well.

Control board operators will perform their respective immediate actions: ATC drives control rods inward and BOP manually opens control rod breakers 13D/E on VB5 (CT-1, Reactor tripped by completion of E-0, step 1)**. The Shift Foreman maintains his oversight position to ensure immediate actions are performed properly and in a timely manner, prior to formally entering EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

8. A reactor operator is assigned the task of isolating S/G 1-1 per EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Appendix HH, while the Shift Foreman and remaining crew member continue on through the main procedure body in parallel.

The loss of power to the RCPs (Startup power lost shortly after Rx trip), combined with the blowdown of S/G 1-1 eventually leads to a MAGENTA and subsequent RED path on RCS INTEGRITY. The Shift Foreman transitions to EOP FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, where the crew completes the critical task of SI termination (CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step 11)** and stopping the RCS cooldown (CT-CD, Stop the RCS cooldown prior to performing step 15, isolation of Accumulators, in FR-P.1)**.

The scenario is terminated once Safety Injection is terminated in FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition (completion of step 11), provided all Critical Tasks are complete. If steps to stop the cooldown have not been completed, the scenario should be continued to the bounding step 15, in FR-P.1.

• • • TCOA note: Steam break was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) # 18 & 19 (MSLB IC & OC); the break sizes, ramp times, initial power levels, and other conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario.

• • • TCOA note: The ATWS was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOA) # 34 and is similar to the TCOA basis event. TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario. Operators must trip the reactor from the control room within 90 seconds.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r3.docx Page 5 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; AFW 1-3 and CFCU 1-5 OOS Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail)

Grid Control Center backdown order (200 MW within 30 1 N/A R(ALL) minutes) (AP-25).

2 XMT_PZR24_3 I (BOP, PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low ( AP-5, SRO) TS 3.3.1.E, M, 3.3.2.D, 3.4.11) 3 XMT_ASW2, XMT_ASW1, C (BOP, ASW Pp 1-1 high bearing temperature / trip due to loss of PMP_ASW2, SRO) motor oil (PK01-03, AP-10, TS 3.7.8.A).

AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 4 DSC_ROD1 C (ATC, DRPI power supply failure during ramp. (PK03-21, TS SRO) 3.1.7.B).

5 MAL_CVC1 C (ALL) 35 gpm letdown leak inside containment (AP-18).

6 ZMLSEI1, MAL_SEI1, MAL_RCS2A M (ALL) Seismically induced 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and Safety Injection auto-initiate. Crew transitions to E-1.3 Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST reaches 33% (CT-36).

7 PMP_ASW2_1 C (BOP) ASW Pp 1-2 trip during initial bus transfer; manual restart required) (CT-9).

8 RLY_PPL73, RLY_PPL74, RLY_PPL75, C (BOP) Containment spray fails to actuate (manually alignment RLY_PPL76 required) (CT-3).

9 AF01AFW_AFP12_MTFSHEAR C (ATC) AFW Pp 1-2 shaft shears and TDAFW auto-start fails.

10 PMP_RHR2_1, PMP_RHR1_1 C (ATC) RHR pumps fail to trip @ 33% RWST level; manual stop required.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r3.docx Page 1 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) 9

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7,8,9,10) 4

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 3,4,5) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 6) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1, E-1.3) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (CT-9) Manually start ASW Pump 1-2 by ASW train is required to remove accident generated

• FSAR, Section 6.2. & 9.2.7.

completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step and core decay heat following a design basis LOCA.

• Westinghouse Owners

5. Without ASW, CFCUs cannot remove heat from the Group WCAP-17711-NP containment atmosphere. Additionally, ASW serves

• Technical Specification Basis as the ultimate heat sink during the recirculation B.3.7.8 mode of ECCS cooling. Failure to start the minimum number of required ASW pumps places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

(CT-3) Manually align at least 1 train of Failure to initiate the minimum required

• EOP FR-Z.1 Background Containment Spray (1 pump and Containment Spray equipment as a means of Document associated valves) by completion of EOP pressure suppression represents a severe challenge

• Westinghouse Owners E-0, Appendix E, step 7. to Containment Safety Function. Group WCAP-17711-NP (CT-36) Establish one train of cold leg Transfer to cold leg recirculation within the TCOA

• STA-061 (07938-3-21, W recirculation within 10 minutes of the time frame is license commitment. Failing to Letter PGE-99-546 (07711-RWST reaching low level set point of 33% perform RHR suction realignment within the specified 1153) as verified by: time constraint can lead to inadequate RHR NPSH

• OP1.ID2, Time Critical and degraded the emergency core cooling system Operator Actions Rev 8A, performance. #8.

Train A (RHR HX 1-1 in Service)

• Westinghouse Owners

• 8700A CLOSED Group WCAP-17711-NP

• 8982A OPEN

• 8804A OPEN

• Flow Indicated on FI-970A/B OR Train B (RHR HX 1-2 in Service)

• 8700B CLOSED

• 8982B OPEN

• 8804B OPEN

• 8807A OR 8807B OPEN

• Flow Indicated on FI-971A/B L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r3.docx Page 2 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. Shift Manager reports a confirmed Grid Control Center backdown order due to 500 kV line fire risk. Unit 1 is directed to shed 200 MW within 30 minutes. The Shift Foreman determines an appropriate ramp rate to meet the backdown order requirement (may assign this task to reactor operator) and implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown. The ATC determines an initial boration based on the Reactivity Handbook and advises the Shift Foreman of his recommendation. The BOP enters the programmed ramp into the turbine control system. The reactivity evolutions are implemented sequentially, with the Shift Foreman providing oversight.

2. PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails low bringing in multiple Annunciator Alarms. There is no transient associated with this failure, but the failure has significant Operational implications due to its input function as part of various Reactor Protection logic schemes. When failed low, PT-474s interlock function prevents Pressurizer PORVs PCV-455C and PCV-474 from opening on a valid high pressure signal; only PCV-456 will still function. The Shift Foreman may elect to enter any of the associated Annunciator Response alarms, but in all cases, will be directed to OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel, which provides information regarding indications, controls, and a listing of the associated Tech Specs:

• TS 3.3.1.E, PC-474C High Press Trip & TC 441C OT Delta T Trip (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.1.M, PC 474A Low Press Trip (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.2.D, PC 474D Low Press S.I. (72 hrs)

• TS 3.4.11, PC 474B PORV Press Interlock o PCV-474 (non-class I), 3.4.11.B1 & B2 to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) o PCV-455C (class I), 3.4.11.B1 & B2 to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr);

3.4.11.B3 to return to OPERABLE status (72 hrs)

3. A loss of motor oil to ASW Pp 1-1 causes high motor bearing temperatures, bringing in annunciator AR PK01-03, Aux Salt Water Pumps. Reactor operators follow procedural guidance and identify rapidly rising upper and lower motor bearing temperatures on ASW Pp 1-1 using the plant process computer (PPC). The local field operator is dispatched to determine the cause of the alarm and the Shift Foreman directs a swap to the standby ASW pump. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.7.8.A, for one ASW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown tech spec).

(Note: ASW Pp 1-1 will experience a seized shaft malfunction if it is stilling running 8 minutes after the high temperature alarm actuates ~ 350oF).

4. The normal power supply to DRPI trips opens at 1000 MW (close to end of target ramp). Crew responds per AR PK03-21, DRPI FAILURE/ROD BOTTOM, placing rods in manual. The Shift Foreman directs the ramp to be placed on hold and field operators are contacted to place DRPI on backup power. Shift Foreman provides crew with procedural guidance regarding rod motion (minor adjustments as well as actions required should a major transient occur) with DRPI unavailable and before entering TS 3.1.7.B for more than one DRPI per group inoperable (immediate TS action is to place rods in manual).

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r3.docx Page 3 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

5. A 35 gpm letdown line leak inside containment, downstream RO 27/28/29 ramps in over 3 minutes. The ATC identifies lowering letdown flow, VCT level, and rising charging. The BOP operator checks containment parameters to aid diagnostic efforts. Diagnostic brief by the crew identifies letdown line inside containment as likely leak source (pressurizer pressure stable, structure sumps rising, RM-12 in alarm). Crew enters OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure to address the leak. Normal letdown is isolated and excess letdown is placed in service.

(Note: If leak is not identified as being on the letdown line during initial diagnosis, crew will enter OP AP-1, and be directed to OP AP-18).

6. Large seismic results in 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occur immediately and the crew enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew performs their immediate actions and checks for actuation of emergency safeguards equipment, diagnosing conditions consistent with a large break LOCA (high containment pressure, loss of pressurizer pressure and level, loss of subcooling, high containment sump levels). The crew identifies RCP trip criteria have been met, with Shift Foreman concurrence, trip all four RCPs (TCOA).*** Shift Foreman directs the BOP Operator to complete Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS, and continues on in E-0.

7. Reactor Operator notes that ASW Pp 1-2 is not running (tripped off during bus transfer) and manually restart the pump (CT-9, Manually start ASW Pump 1-2 to provide at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train by the completion of E-0, Appendix E, step 5).

(Note: This action may be performed after individuals have verified immediate actions or as part of Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS) .

8. Reactor Operator identifies Containment Spray has failed to actuate as required based on high high containment pressure and an active Safety Injection signal. Action is taken to manually start containment spray pumps and align spray valves. (CT-3, Manually align at least 1 train of Containment Spray (1 pump and associated valves) by completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 7).**

(Note: This action may be performed after individuals have verified immediate actions or as part of Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS).

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r3.docx Page 4 of 5 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

9. Reactor Operator identifies low S/G level and no flow condition from running AFW pump (sheared shaft) along with TDAFW failed auto start. TDAFW pump is manually started to restore S/G level.

Crew continues through E-0 diagnostic steps, and transitions to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Functional restoration status trees are checked and crew identifies transition criteria for FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock. Conditions will be met for exiting the procedure at the first step.

The Shift Foreman performs a procedure transition brief to review plant conditions, priorities, and review the expected procedural flow path prior to continuing on into E-1. The task of monitoring for E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation transition criteria is assigned to one of the Reactor Operators as a Fold Out Page (FOP) item during the brief.

10. When RWST level will reach 33%, both RHR pumps fail to trip, but can be manually stopped in the Control Room. The crew to transition immediately to E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, performing the TCOA/CT*** of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment (CT-36, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation and establish at least 1 train of ECCS flow within 10 minutes of the RWST level reaching 33%). The Shift Foreman will assign one operator (usually the BOP) Appendix EE to perform RHR Hx alignment, while he and the remaining operator complete the TCOA alignment steps of E-1.3. The loss of one train of ASW early in the scenario will limit the crew to a single RHR Hx, requiring the crew to clearly communicate and choreograph the final valve alignment process.

The scenario is terminated once a single train of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment is complete per EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

• • • TCOA note: This DBA LBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #8, and is similar to the TCOA bases event, so TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario (operators have 10 min to align to cold leg recirculation, as timed from the RWST reaching 33% [alarm comes in] and finishing the alignment). Phase B, RCP Trip Criteria in this scenario was evaluated against TCOA #67 and determined to apply. Operators have 5 minutes to trip all four RCPs from the initial Phase B actuation signal.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r3.docx Page 5 of 5 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; AFW 1-3 and D/G 1-3 OOS Turnover: Perform remainder of STP P-CCP-11, continuing from step 12.9.11 Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 H_V2_164M_1 C (ALL) STP P-CCP-11 surveillance test unsat due to high amp reading; pump swap required. TS 3.5.2.A 2 VLV_PZR6_2 C (BOP, Pressurizer PORV PCV-474 seat leak-by to PRT. (PK05-23, SRO) TS 3.4.11.A).

3 MAL_RCS4H C (ALL) 10 gpm SGTL ramped in over 1 minute; plant shutdown required (OP O-4, AP-3, AP-25, TS 3.4.13.B).

4 VLV_SGB1_1, VLV_SGB2_1, C(BOP, SG Blowdown High Rad auto actuations fail (PK11-17).

VLV_SGB3_1, VLV_SGB4_1, SRO)

VLV_SGB1_9, VLV_SGB10_1, VLV_SGB11_1, VLV_SGB12_1, VLV_SGB13_1, VLV_SGB14_1, 5 LOA_CND1 M (ALL) Condenser vacuum requiring turbine trip/Rx trip (AP-7).

6 VLV_PZR4_2 C (BOP) Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C fails slightly open on trip requiring manual isolation by associated block valve (CT-10).

7 MAL_AFW1 C (BOP) Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump trips on overspeed.

PMP_AFW1 Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 1-2 fails to autostart, manual start available.

8 PMP_AFW_2 M (ALL) AFW Pp 1-2 overcurrent trip at less than the minimum required S/G level causing Loss of Heat Sink extreme challenge and entry into FR-H.1 (CT-43).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r3.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

• Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8

• Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7,8) 3

• Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

• Major transients (1-2) (Events 5 and 8) 2

• EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1) 1

• EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-H.1) 1

• Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (CT-10) Close the block MOV upstream of The open PORV and block valve constitute the

• Westinghouse Owners the stuck open PORV such that the PRT degradation of a fission product barrier. Closing the Group WCAP-17711-NP remains intact for the duration of the block valve is essential to safety since failure to do scenario. so results in the unnecessary continuation of the degraded condition.

(CT-43) Establish feedwater flow from Primary to secondary heat transfer deteriorates If

• Westinghouse Owners the Condensate System to at least one S/G dryout is allowed to occur. The resultant rise in Group WCAP-17711-NP S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 RCS temperature and pressure can lead to RCS trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of barrier loss when pressure rises above the 25 minutes) as indicated by WR S/G level Pressurizer PORV setpoint, causing a loss of rising and/or Core Exit Thermocouple inventory and eventual fuel over-heating and temperatures lowering. damage.

Associated Performance Indicators are as follows:

• Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation Valves OPEN

• Throttles open MFRVs (feed reg valves) or MFRV bypasses

• Depressurizes one S/G using the 10%

steam dumps, at maximum rate (100% open), down to condensate injection pressure (< 490 psig)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r3.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. Crew takes the watch with STP P-CCP-11, Routine Surveillance Test of Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-1 already in progress. Pump amps are found to be slightly above the normal operating range, and the crew follows the STP procedural guidance to shut down the pump. The crew notes CCP 1-3 was in-service just prior to the test, and performs a pump swap following the guidance of OP B-1A:V. The field operator assigned to check for bearing oil flow reports no oil was visible in the sight glass while the pump was running. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.5.2.A, for one ECCS train inoperable (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to determine no common cause failure and 14 days to restore the train to OPERABLE status).

2. Pressurizer Pressure Operated Relief Valve PCV-474 begins leaking by, bringing in annunciator AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP. The crew performs diagnostics, confirming the existence of seat leakage based on PZR PORV tailpipe temperature and rising Pressurizer Relief Tank pressure and temperature. Annunciator guidance is followed to identify and isolate PCV-474 by closing its associated block valve, 8000A. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.4.11.A, for one or more PORVs inoperable solely due to excessive seat leakage. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to close the associated block valve).

3. Steam Generator 1-4 develops a 10 gpm tube leak over a one minute period. Rising counts on various radiation monitors alert the crew to both the nature and location of the leak. The Crew estimates the leak rate and enters OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure. The leak is also evaluated per OP O-4, Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection, which directs the crew to reduce power by 50% in the next hour and be in Mode 3 within two hours. Shift Foreman determines TS 3.4.13.B, RCS Operational Leakage applies and enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or ShutdowN for the ramp off-line.

4. AR PK11-17, SG BLOWDOWN HI RAD comes into alarm during the ramp as a result of high radiation on RM- 23. Isolation relays fail to actuate and the crew takes manual action to close the affected valves on the steam generator blowdown sample header and swap steam generator blow down discharge over to the Equipment Drain Receiver.

5. The vacuum breaker at the main condenser develops a leak at approximately 1150 MW, causing condenser vacuum to steadily degrade. The crew enters OP AP-7, Degraded Condenser, and may attempt to adjust the ramp rate, but will be unsuccessful in avoiding an automatic turbine trip/Rx trip.

The Shift Foreman will monitor the turbine automatic trip set point and the may elect to manually actuate once it is clear that a trip is unavoidable.

6. The crew enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions. Board operators also identify PCV-455C in mid-position. The valve will not close and must be isolated using the associated block valve 8000B (Critical Task CT-10, close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV such that the PRT remains intact for the duration of the scenario).**

7. Operators identify low S/G level with no AFW pumps running while preparing to transition out of E-0.

The turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump is tripped on overspeed and cannot be restarted. The remaining Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (MDAFW 1-2) failed to auto start and is started manually.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r3.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

8. Crew transitions from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. When S/G 1 & 2 reach approximately 13.5%, Motor Driven Aux Feedwater 1-2 trips on overcurrent, leading to Loss Of Heat Sink condition. EOP FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink is used to establish secondary feedwater from the condensate system. (Critical Task CT-43:

Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of 25 minutes)).**

The scenario is terminated in FR-H.1, once condensate flow to the steam generators has been established.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r3.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 25 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power from 2% to 8%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

(OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup, starting at step 6.28)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 6.28 ATC * (6.28) Slowly raises power to 8% by pulling control rods one step at a time.

SRO Provides reactivity oversight while raising power BOP * (6.29) Monitors feed/steam P (PI-509, VB3 or CC2, DFWCS HMI on CC3)

• (6.30) Verifies that DFWCS maintains constant P during rise in power (it's in auto, and will maintain P)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 6.31 Insert next event per lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 25 Event

Description:

Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses failed NI channel using one or more of the following:

• Redundant channel NI-35 does not channel check (CC1)

• Power range NIs not changing (CC1)

SRO May Implement OP AP-5, Malf of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems are controlling properly in AUTO.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

SRO * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not open as result of instrument failure or spurious actuation. (Dumps SHOULD be open to maintain temperature for current 2% power conditions. Shift Foreman SHOULD NOT enter RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column)

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of the NI-36 failure, as time permits SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 6 SRO * (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 25 Event

Description:

Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0% (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC * (7) Uses Attachments 4.1 and 4.2 to determine affected indicator o (a) Places Out-of-Service (OOS) sticker on NI-36 Indicators (CC1).

SRO/BOP * (8) Uses Attachment 4.1, pg 19 to determine required TS/ECG actions for the inoperable channel o TS 3.3.1.F (24 hrs to go < P-6 or > P-10) o (Shift Foreman discretion) may have IR trip bypassed from NI-35 (not TS action)

Note: Shift Manager to provide the following cue if the Shift Foreman ask for guidance with regard to lowering power to less than P-6 as a result of TS 3.3.1.F evaluation.

Cue: (from Shift Manager) What do you recommend."

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed (per lead examiner)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 25 Event

Description:

Feed Reg Bypass valve FCV-1510 oscillations in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis is made by using one or more of the following:

• PK09-15, Digital Feedwater System alarm

• Erratic feed flow on 1-1 S/G (PPC, VB3 meters, DFWCS console (CC3))

• FCV-1510 demand/actual mismatch; rising level on S/G 1-1 (DFWCS HMI on CC3)

BOP Takes manual control of FCV-1510 and restores flow SRO Implements AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System (AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System)

SRO * (1.0) Reads input 875 and associated note regarding multiple possible input alarms (220 possible, all with reflash capability) o Goes to section 2.1 for General Actions SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks DFWCS status o (a, b) Restores S/G 1-1 level to previous band o (c) Reviews DFWCS alarm screen; notes level deviation alarms o (d, e) Checks for additional related annunciators o (f) Checks for indications of level, pressure, or flow control channel failures May reference OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel for additional guidance SRO May refer to TS 3.7.3, but valve is capable of closing (on FWI) - LCO is not applicable Proceed to the next event once S/G 1-1 level is being controlled in MANUAL, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 5 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of loss of 4KV Bus G is made from one or more of the following:

• Numerous equipment alarms associated with the loss of 4KV Bus G equipment

• PK17-16 and PK17-17 4KV Bus G alarms (both related to loss of bus)

• Blue light on 4KV Bus G (diff) (VB4)

• White lights out on 4KV and 480 vac Bus G (VB4)

BOP Diagnoses differential trip on Bus G due to alarms (above), blue light on Bus G, and loss of power available white light on Bus G (VB4, middle skirt)

SRO Implements OP AP-27, Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus")

SRO/BOP * (1) Checks vital 4KV busses energized (only Bus G OFF; other white bus lights checked ON) (VB4, skirt)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks DRPI energized (aligned to normal power supply, Bus F, no impact) (VB2, upper left)

BOP * (3) Confirms 4KV Bus G is tripped on differential (VB4, blue light on bus)

SRO * (4) Notifies maintenance of bus fault BOP * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV busses o (5.b) Starts CCW 1-3 (VB1)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus", continued)

ATC * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV busses (cont) o (5.b) Reports no charging pumps running; letdown has isolated (VB2)

Note: Shift Foreman may elect to postpone implementation of OP AP-17 until after field operators are dispatched to restore backup power supplies as part of OP AP-27, Attachment 4.2 SRO * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV buses (cont) o (5.b RNO) Directs Reactor Operators to Implement OP AP-17, Section A to restore charging and letdown (see page 9 for implementation)

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks 480 vac vital busses - only bus 1G de-energized (VB4 - white power light for each 480 vac bus)

Shift Manager Cue (if asked for next step) There are currently no loads on their backup source (from the OP O-13)

BOP * (Att 4.2) Implements Attachment 4.2 for bus 1G:

o (1.a) Verifies DRPI was not on backup power (it was not) o (1.b) Places PCV-455C Pzr PORV in CLOSE position (due to 8000B loss of power)

(VB2, upper panel, far right), and refers the Shift Foreman to TS 3.4.11 (TS 3.4.11.C (1 hr) o ( 1c) Assigns field actions to Nuclear Operators (2.a) Initiate performance of D/G margin assessment for additional bus loading per OP O-13 (2.c) Transfer of following equipment to backup power (as required):

• Battery 1-2 to charger 1-21 per OP J-9:II

• Instrument AC PY-16 per OP J-10:VII

• Control Room Vent Power Panel B2 switch no. EPCB2 per OP O-13 (2.d) Check Diesel Fuel Transfer Pp 02 NOT on backup power (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus", continued)

BOP * (Att 4.2) Implements Attachment 4.2 for bus 1G: (continued) o (1.d) Verifies Pressurizer heater group 12 NOT on backup power supplies (they are not) o (1.e) Verifies redundant equipment on the other 480V buses is running Contacts Aux Watch to align BATP 1-1 to the blender.

Starts CFCU 1-2 o (1.f) Verifies other minor equipment status (as time permits)

SRO * (7) Evaluates Tech Specs and ECGs (longer specs as time permits, per lead examiner):

o TS 3.4.11.C - PORV block valve (1 hr) o TS 3.8.1.B - AC Sources - operating (STP I-1C w/I 1 hr) o TS 3.8.4.A - DC Sources - operating (restore batt charger) (2 hrs) o NOTE: may not have time to look up all (longer time limit) Tech Specs prior to next event o TS 3.6.3.A & C - Containment isolation valves (4 hrs, 72 hrs) o TS 3.8.9.A - Distribution system (vital bus) - operating (8 hrs to restore) o TS 3.7.3.A - MFIVs, MFRVs & bypasses, etc (72 hrs) o ECG 8.1 - Charging Pump No. 3.

SRO/BOP * (8) Checks unloaded DGs (VB4) o Places D/G 1-2 Mode Selector Switch in the MANUAL position o Stops D/G 1-2 SRO * (9) Checks OPERABILITY of ESF equipment (pumps, valves lost due to Bus G loss)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging)

BOP * (1.a & c) Ensures suction flowpath for available remaining charging pump CCP 1-1 o VCT level and pressure in normal band (VB2, middle) (it is) o Suction valves LCV-112B and 112C OPEN (VB2, middle right skirt)

Red light for LCV-112B is on LCV-112C is without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

Operator may elect to use Monitor Light Box C (VB1, top) to verify valve position o Charging recirculation valve 8105 and 8106 (VB2, lower skirt just below pump)

Red light for 8105 is on 8106 without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

NOTE: HC-459D in MANUAL will operate FCV-128 while the FCV-128 controller is in AUTO and an acceptable, and sometimes the desired, method of operation ATC * (1.d) Closes FCV-128 by placing FCV 128 (CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2) OR HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MANUAL) o AUTO light out, MAN light lit o Takes output to zero flow on FI-128A (CC2)

BOP * (1.e) Starts CCP 1-1 SRO/ATC * (1.f) Establishes RCP seals only charging o Adjusts FCV 128 or HC-459D to establish approximately 35 gpm charging flow indicated on FI-128A (CC2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging, continued)

SRO/ATC * (1.g&h) Restores pressurizer level o Places FCV-128 in MANUAL (if not done previously) o Adjusts FCV 128 to restore pressurizer level to program (CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2)

• (2) Adjusts HCV-142 to maintain seal injection 8 to 13 gpm (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2)

SRO/BOP * (3.a) Checks pressurizer level greater than 17% (LI-459A, 460A and 461 on VB2)

BOP/ATC * (3.b) Restores Letdown using appendix R o Ensures FCV-355 - OPEN (HDR C ISOL VLV on VB1) (it is) o Opens TCV-130 to 40% demand - (LETDOWN TEMP on VB2) o Ensures 8149A, B AND C - CLOSED. (LTDN ORIFICE STOP on VB2) (they are) o Opens LCV-459 AND LCV 460 (LTDN ISOL on VB2) o Ensures 8152 - OPEN (LTDN ISOL VLV O.C. on VB2) o Opens PCV-135 to 60% demand (LETDOWN PRESS on VB2) o Establishes approximately 87 gpm charging flow o Adjusts FCV 128 to raise charging flow(CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2) o Adjusts HCV-142 to maintain seal injection 8 to 13 gpm (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2) o Opens 8149B OR C (75 GPM LTDN ORIFICE STOP on VB2) o Adjusts PCV 135 for 350 psig AND place in AUTO (PI-135 on VB2) o Adjusts TCV 130 for 90 - 110°F AND place in AUTO (TI-130 on VB2) o Checks RV 8117 - TI 129 NORMAL (LTDN RV on VB2) o Notifies SFM letdown in service (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 25 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging, continued)

SRO/ATC * (3.c) Adjusts charging as needed to restore PZR Level to band specified by Shift Foreman SRO/ATC * (4.a - e.) Checks VCT Makeup Control o Checks VCT level 14% to 87% (LI-112 on VB2) o Reads NOTE prior to step 4.b o Checks VCT pressure 15 to 60 psig (PI-135 on VB2) o VCT makeup control (YIC-100) set for RCS boron concentration AUTO mode selected with boron concentration displayed at current RCS boron (CC2) o Checks Instrument Air available (VB4)

SRO/BOP * (5.a) Checks charging aligned to VCT o Red light for LCV-112B is on o LCV-112C is without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

Operator may elect to use Monitor Light Box C (VB1, top) to verify valve position SRO * (6.a) Evaluate Technical Specifications and ECGs o Covered under OP AP-27 evaluation SRO * (7) Evaluates STP M-55 for applicability; May request the SM to perform the evaluation SRO * (8) Returns to Procedure and Step in Effect Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed and letdown restored (per lead examiner)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 25 Event

Description:

RCP 1-1 #1 Seal Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of RCP 1-1 number seal leakage increase is made using one or more of the following:

• RCP parameters rising (charging flow rising, seal lower bearing temp lower, high seal return flow on VB2, lower center, below DRPI) (PPC picture and various group displays)

• PK05-01 RCP 1-1, input 1393 (AR PK05-01, RCP 11)

SRO Implements AR PK05-01 SRO/ATC * (1.0) Identifies inputs 1393 (RCP 1-1 Seal Leakoff Flo Hi, >5.0 gpm) and goes to section 2.1 for General Actions SRO Reads caution regarding alarms on an RCP indicate a complex RCP malfunction that is unlikely to be resolved before equipment damage or an automatic trip occurs SRO * (2.1) Informs crew of Reactor Trip criteria associated with multiple diverse alarms in close succession on RCP 1-1 and assigns as CONTINUOUS ACTION to monitor. Describes additional requirements following Rx Trip (trip RCP 1-1, close associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A, and implement OP AP-28, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction)

SRO/ATC * (2.2) Determines seal leakoff rate is greater than AR PK upper limit of 6 gpm and transitions to OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure.

(OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure)

SRO Reads notes regarding total seal leakoff flow (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 25 Event

Description:

RCP 1-1 #1 Seal Failure, Manual Reactor Trip (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure, cont.)

ATC * (1.) Checks RCP Seal #1 Return flow for RCP 1-1 and reports approximately 7 gpm.

Note 1: The Shift Foreman may determine that the rapid increase in seal leakoff flow (7 gpm ramped in over 1 minute), constitutes a step rise in # 1 Seal Leakoff > 2 gpm, and direct implementation of the following CONTINUOUS ACTIONS.

Note 2: Foldout page directs reactor trip / performance of Section B, step 1 if RCP bearing temperatures are increasing with RCP #1 seal return flow > 6 gpm.

SRO (1.a) Informs crew of Reactor Trip criteria associated with step rise in # 1 Seal Leakoff > 2 gpm, and assigns as CONTINUOUS ACTION to monitor. Describes additional requirements following Rx Trip o stop RCP 1-1 o close Seal #1 outlet isolation valve 3-5 minutes after pump is secured o monitor CCW temperature and flow to RCP 1-1 o close the associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A SRO (1.b) References Decision Table (Total #1 Seal LeakOff versus RCP Radial Bearing Outlet Temperature and #1 Seal Outlet Temperature).

ATC (1.b) Reports RCP Radial Bearing Outlet Temp and #1 Seal Outlet Temp rising.

SRO (1.b) Directs reactor trip and RCP 1-1 trip after immediate actions and E-0 entered.

ATC (1.b) Initiates reactor trip (CC1, or VB2)

BOP (1.b) Trips RCP 1-1 (may do this following EOP E-0 immediate actions)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 25 Event

Description:

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip breakers open(VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), Nis decreasing (CC1 left))

ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital bus G has a white light on the mimic bus)

ATC/BOP * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 OFF, also checks SSPS ESF status lights on VB1 and PK02-02 to verify SI is NOT required)

ATC/BOP * (4 RNO) Checks AFW status (VB3, AFW Pp 1-2 & 1-3 will be running), and exits E-0 for E-0.1 May throttle AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left to limit RCS cooldown; levels will be relatively high due to low initial power.

ALL

• Implements CSFSTs SRO

• Transitions to EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and performs procedure transition brief (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 14 of 25 Event

Description:

E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Note 1: Follow-up actions from AP-28 (associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A (CC2) and closure of Seal #1 outlet isolation valve (8141A, VB-2) 3-5 minutes after RCP 1-1 is secured) are implemented in parallel with E-0.1.

Note 2: EOP E-0.1 actions will be performed until crew identifies SGTR, which will most likely occur within the first step or two of E-0.1; there is no requirement to perform any particular E-0.1 actions prior to the transition back to E-0.

ATC/BOP * (1) Checks Tavg stable or trending towards Tref (if should be); no actions expected here other than continued throttling of AFW flow may be done (AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left), to control RCS temperature ATC/BOP * (2) Checks Feedwater Isolation (FWI) complete

• Checks Tave < 554°F (expected, given initial power level)

• Checks FWI MLB (monitor light box) (VB1, upper center), RED light ON, WHITE lights OFF (they are, this actuation occurs if < 554°F)

• Checks AFW flow > 435 gpm (the flow will be adequate, and S/G levels will be at or near normal) (VB3)

ATC * (3) Checks all control rods - fully inserted (they are) (VB2 upper left, for DRPI panel)

ATC/BOP * (4) Checks Pzr and level control

• Checks Pzr level > 17% (it is) (VB2 meter, CC2 recorder, PPC)

• Checks charging and letdown in service (they both are) (CC2 and VB2 CVCS mimic)

• Checks Pzr level trending to 22%; operates FCV-128 and HCV-142 (CC2) to control Pzr level 22% - 60% (RNO)

• Operates Pzr heaters as needed (auto/manual) to maintain normal pressure (normal auto operation expected at this point, with pressure returning to normal or normal already)

The next event (major) triggered off shutdown of RCP 1-1, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses of SGTR is made using one or more of the following:

• Pressurizer level and pressure lowering (PPC, CC2, VB2)

• S/G 1-3 level rising (PPC, VB3)

• Main steam line hi-rad rising, loop 3 (RM-73) (PPC, VB2) (not visible for several minutes after initial break)

SRO/BOP

• May attempt to isolate letdown (VB2, upper center skirt)

SRO/ATC

• Initiates manual SI (CC2, far right)

ALL Crew enters EOP E-0 on trip/SI actuation and silently performs immediate actions:

• Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

• Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

• Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

• Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated)

(EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

Note: Immediate action steps are re-verified by Shift Foreman after first being performed independently by each member of crew SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1)

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train light ON and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) o Both trains of SI actuated as indicated by PK08-21, SI red light above Monitor Light Box C (VB1), and both trains of SI/RHR pumps running (VB1 skirt)

SRO * (5) Directs implementation of App E (usually given to BOP); See page 23 SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but with throttling in Auto due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required; will require field operators to manually control valves due to loss of 4kV bus G SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is greater than 1300 PSIG, trip criteria is not met (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized SRO/ATC * (10) Checks for ruptured S/G o Notes RE-73 elevated with and S/G 1-3 level rising o Directs transition to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 25 Event

Description:

PORV on ruptured S/G fails open, requires backup air to close (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: PCV-21 (10% Pressure Operated Relief Valve on the ruptured S/G) 2 minutes after SI is initiated. Response details are described below:

ALL Diagnoses PCV-21 inadvertently open using one or more of the following:

• Audible sound of steam

• Red status light on steam dump valve status indicator panel (VB3)

• Rising steam flow on S/G 1-3 (PPC, VB3)

• Notes S/G 1-3 pressure is less than 10% dump setpoint of 1020 psig (VB3)

ATC

• May attempt taking manual control of PCV-21 using HC-536 (hand-controller), but is will not be successful (VB3)

• Cuts in Back-up Air using back-up air cut-in toggle switch (VB3)

• Closes PCV-21 using back-up air control valve (VB3)**

• Verifies PCV-21 goes closed by position indicator light color fully green and steam flow lowered to zero flow (VB3)

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to commencing a cooldown of the RCS)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 17 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 18 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks if RCPs should be stopped (VB2) (still above RCP trip criteria)

SRO/ATC * (2) Identifies S/G 1-3 as ruptured (RM-73 in alarm; indications of rising level without feed during E-0)

SRO/BOP * (3) Implements Appendix FF to isolate ruptured S/G 1-3 (Contains CT steps; see page 25)

SRO/ATC

• Reads CAUTION regarding maintaining isolation of Faulted/Ruptured S/G (do not feed)

• (4.a) Notes ruptured S/G level is greater than 15%

• (4.b) Isolates Feed flowpaths to S/G 1-3:

o Takes LCV-115 to MANUAL and closes the valve**

o Notes LCV-108 failed OPEN due to loss of bus G. Dispatches operator to locally close LCV-108 **

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to commencing a cooldown of the RCS)

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks ruptured S/G pressure greater than 225 psig (it is)

(continued on page 22)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 18 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 19 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO

• Reads CAUTION regarding false PTS (Integrity Status Tree indication) for ruptured loop

• (6.a) Determines required cool down target Core Exit Temperature from table based on current ruptured S/G pressure.

LOWEST RUPTURED SG PRESS (PSIG) REQ'D CORE EXIT TEMPERATURE (oF) 1050 and above 516 1030 to 1049 513 1000 to 1029 510 900 to 999 497 800 to 899 483 700 to 799 467 600 to 699 450 225 to 599 350 SRO/ATC * (7) Determines Condenser is available o MSIVs - ANY OPEN on INTACT SGs o PK08 ON SRO/ATC

• Reads two CAUTIONS regarding Main Steam Line Isolation

• (8) Blocks Low Steamline Pressure SI o (8.a) Checks RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 1915 PSIG (it is) o (8.b) Checks PK08-06, PZR SI PERMISSIVE P ON (it is) o (8.c) Blocks LO Steamline Pressure SI, Train A and B, verifies PK08-17 ON (it is)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 19 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 20 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO

• Reads CAUTION that RCP Trip Criteria is NOT applicable after operator begins RCS cooldown.

• (9) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 40% Steam Dumps o (9.a) Verifies Appendix FF is complete Note: If AR PK 08-07, Lo Lo Tave Permissive (P-12) is active, Shift Foreman will need to pull step 9.d forward to unblock the 40% steam dump valves. If 40% dump valves not used, following step is N/A.

SRO/ATC * (9) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 40% Steam Dumps (continued) o (9.b) Places Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode Place HC-507 in MANUAL and reduce demand to 0%

Place Steam Dump Mode Select Switch in STEAM PRESSURE o (9.c) Dumps steam at maximum rate possible without achieving a main steam line isolation (less than 120 psi/min).

(Cooldown Start Time or N/A if using 10% steam dumps: _______________)

o (9.d) Places Steam Dump Control in Bypass Intlk (Train A and B) to rearm 40%

dumps if P-12 activates (or is already active) o (9.e) Will continue on in procedure at step 11 while cooldown continues.

o (9.f) Stops the cooldown when ALL Core Exit Thermocouples are less than required target temperature. ** (Time Cooldown Complete or N/A if using 10% steam dumps:________________)

o (9.g) Stabilizes temperature slightly less than required temperature using steam dumps in AUTO

• • (Critical Task)(CT-19: Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate such that MAGENTA PATH on RCS INTEGRITY is avoided and RCS subcooled margin still exists following the cooldown.)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 20 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 21 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

Note: If MSL Isolation occurs while using 40% steam dumps, Shift Foreman may elect to continue cooldown using 10% dump valves (described below) to avoid unnecessary delays. N/A if 10% dump valves not used.

SRO/ATC * (10) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 10% Steam Dumps o (10.a) Verifies Appendix FF is complete o (10.b) Manually opens PCV-19, 20, and 22 (10% Steam Dumps) to 100% to dump steam at maximum possible rate.

(Cooldown Start Time or N/A if using 40% steam dumps: _______________)

o (10.c) Continues on in procedure at step 11 while cooldown continues.

o (10.d) Stops the cooldown when ALL Core Exit Thermocouples are less the required target temperature.** (Time Cooldown Complete or N/A if using 40% steam dumps:________________)

o (10.e) Stabilizes temperature slightly less than required temperature using steam dumps in AUTO

• • (Critical Task)(CT-19: Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate such that MAGENTA PATH on RCS INTEGRITY is avoided and RCS subcooled margin still exists following the cooldown.)

SRO/BOP * (11.a,b) Maintains intact S/G levels while controlling S/G NR levels between 20%-65%

• (11.c) May shut down TDAFW pump SRO/BOP * (12) CHECK PZR PORVs and Block Valves o (12.a,c) Power available to block valves & ALL open (8000B open/de-energized) o (12.b) PZR PORVs - all closed (PCV-455C hand switch to closed)

SRO/BOP * (13) Resets Safety Injection (VB1)

SRO/BOP * (14) Resets both Trains Phase A (Phase B was not in) (VB1)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 21 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 22 of 25 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/BOP * (15) Restores Instrument Air to Containment and checks header pressure greater than 90 psig (VB4)

SRO/BOP * (16) Shuts down RHR pumps SRO/ATC * (17) Checks RCS cooldown stopped before continuing on to depressurization of RCS SRO/BOP * (18) Checks ruptured S/G pressure stable or rising (should be 950-1040 psig, and stable)

SRO/BOP * (19) Checks Subcooling greater than 40oF (it is)

SRO/BOP

• Reads note regarding use of a PORV for depressurization if normal spray is determined to be ineffective.

• (20) Attempts to depressurization of RCS using normal Pressurizer Sprays o Monitors RCS pressure; lowering very slowly (455A isolated earlier in scenario) o Determines sprays are ineffective; moves on to PORVs

• (21) Depressurizes the RCS using one PZR PORV o Depressurizes the RCS to minimize break flow and refill the PZR until one of the criteria of Appendix GG is met:**

RCS Pressure < S/G pressure, and Pzr level at least 12%, OR, Pzr level > 74%, OR, SCM < 20 F o Closes the PORV

• • (Critical Task) CT-20: Depressurize the RCS to meet depressurization criteria specified in E-3, App GG prior to stopping Safety Injection pumps.

The scenario is terminated once RCS depressurization criteria specified in E-3, App GG, has been met.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 22 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs already and exciter field bkr open due to line up to 230 kV start up power, CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, Monitor Light Box B: red lights ON, only one light ON, (seal water return) is associated with Bus G loss)

• (5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete (SI Portion of Monitor Light Box C: red light ON, white lights - several ON, but all associated with Bus G loss);

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light ON for FW Iso Valve 439 (Bus G)

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but throttling due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required; will require field operators to manually control valves due to loss of 4kV bus G o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15%

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel)

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP * (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

• (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

• (17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

• (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2)

• (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

• (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 24 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

EOP E-3, Appendix FF, "Isolate Faulted Steam Generator (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, Appendix FF, "Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP Reads CAUTION regarding TDAFW as only source of feedflow prior to step 1

• (1) Reads step to ensure 10% steam dump controller in AUTO; notes valves was manually isolated earlier using backup air.

• (2) Checks S/G 1-3 10% steam dump valve closed (PCV-21) (VB3)

• (3) Verifies S/G 1-3 MSIV and bypass (FCV-43 and FCV-23) valves closed (VB3)**

• (4) Verifies S/G 1-3 supply to TD AFW Pp (FCV-38) closed (VB3, skirt)**

• (5) Verifies S/G 1-3 SGBD valves (FCV-157 and FCV-246) closed (VB3, lower left

• (6) Verifies S/G 1-3 is isolated from intact S/G (S/G 1-3 MSIV and MSIV Bypass are both closed as are all intact S/G MSIV and MSIV Bypasses)

• (7) Informs Shift Foreman S/G 1-3 isolation is complete

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to commencing a cooldown of the RCS)

BOP * (8) Removes WR Thot input to SCMM for loop 3 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3) o Goes to PAM3 panel o Checks Loop 3 Thot Disabled

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 25 of 27 Rev 2

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 0 Days Operating Mode: 2 Gross Generation: 0 MWe Power Level: 2% Net Generation: 0 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• None ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• Reactor trip occurred 7 days ago.

• The reactor was declared critical and power stabilized at 2% power late last shift.

• MFP 1-1 is in service and supplying feedwater.

• The unit is currently aligned to Startup Power (230 kV).

• OP L-0 has been signed off for Mode 1 Entry.

• No one is in Containment.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Continue with OP L-3, step 6.28, and stabilize power at approximately 8%.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 26 of 27 Rev 2

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: 2% and preparing to raise power to approximately 8%.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Previously at 100% for 17 days. Currently power level is approximately 2% following a reactor trip a week ago (MFP trip during maintenance).

• Boron concentration is _1431 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 140 steps on CBD.

• Rod motion: used to maintain current power level and to raise power to 8%.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r2.docx Page 27 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 24 Event

Description:

PZR Htr Grp 1-2 test run and failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: SRO may choose to read (direct) the procedure himself, or hand off the procedure to the BOP and ATC to perform SRO Shift Foreman implements OP A-4A:I, step 6.4.1.b.7, to energize Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 from backup (vital) power OP A-4A:I, step 6.4.1.b.7 ATC

• Reads procedure CAUTION prior to step 6.4.1.b.7 that Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 must be manually turned off if Pressurizer low level (automatic low level trip not available) condition occurs when aligned to backup (vital) power.

ATC * (6.4.1.b.7) Places Htr Grp 1-2 in AUTO after ON to energize (CC1).

ATC

• Reads NOTE prior to step 6.4.1.b.8 on indicating lights for the PZR Htr Grp not illuminated on backup power.

ATC * (6.4.1.b.8) Checks PZR Htr Grp 1-2 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1 above Htr Grp controls)

ATC

• Observes Htr Grp 1-2 kW meter is pegged high and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC

• Observes PK17-24 (480 V Bus 1G Ground) and informs the Shift Foreman.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 1 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 24 Event

Description:

PZR Htr Grp 1-2 test run and failure (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The ATC/BOP may elect to secure Htr Grp 1-2 prior to informing Shift Foreman direction in accordance with OP1.DC10 and then notify the Shift Foreman after taking the action.

SRO/ATC

• If action not already taken, directs ATC to secure Htr Grp 1-2.

Note: PK17-24, 480 V Bus 1G Ground, alarm will clear when the breaker, 52-1G-72 trips open , therefore, entry into the PK is not documented below.

SRO

• Enters TS 3.4.9.B for Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 inoperable since the Heater Group cannot be powered from its emergency (backup/vital) power supply (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown tech spec).

SRO

• Notifies Maintenance and/or Shift Manager of Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 failure.

Proceed to the next event once seals once Tech Specs addressed, per Lead Examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 2 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 24 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

• Observes PK01-21 (Contmt Fan Clr) and informs the Shift Foreman.

PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr SRO Enters PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr

• (1.0) Identifies input 441 (Contmt Fans Temp PPC) and goes to section 2.1, Fan High Temperature.

ATC * (2.1.1) Checks annunciator and PPC printouts to determine the affected component is CFCU 1-2 Note: The Crew may elect to secure CFCU 1-2 at any point after discovering the lack of CCW flow and rising CFCU bearing alarms.

BOP * (2.1.2) Checks CCW flow on all CFCUs. Observes CFCU 1-2, FI-35 (VB1, vertical section),

is several hundred gpm below normal and trending down.

BOP * (2.1.3) Checks containment ambient air temperature less than 120oF (it is). (VB1, vertical section)

SRO

• Reads note regarding CFCU ability to be run at elevated temperatures (stator/bearings),

without affecting the component lifetime.

• (2.1.4) Notes documentation is required if CFCU is left in service with high temperature alarms.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 3 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 24 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Reactor Operators will be monitoring CFCU 1-2 stator and bearing temperatures using Plant Process Computer (PPC). Actually stator temperature at this point will vary based on crew pace through annunciator response, but is most likely above the limit described below.

Note: CFCU 1-2 will trip on overcurrent if fan is still running 5 minutes after stator temperature reaches 380oF.

SRO * (2.1.5) Notes need to contact engineering for evaluation if fan will be left in service with stator temperature above 293oF.

• (2.1.6) Provides direction to shutdown CFCU 1-2 per OP H-2:II, Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing.

SRO

• May direct crew to shift CFCU 1-5 to fast speed to maintain ambient Containment conditions.

Note: A CFCU System is defined as either four CFCUs or three CFCUs powered from three separate vital buses.

SRO

• Enters TS 3.6.6.C for one required CFCU system inoperable (7 day shutdown tech spec).

o CFCU 1-2 inoperable due to no CCW flow and beginning stages of damage to the motor.

SRO

• Notifies Maintenance and/or Shift Manager of CFCU 1-2 degradation.

• May request CFCU 1-1 return to service expedited.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 4 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 24 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP H-2:II, Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing BOP

• Reviews Precautions and Limitations BOP * (6.1) Stops CFCU 1-2, by pressing associated STOP control on VB1 (center)

ATC

• Acknowledges reflash on AR PK01-21 for CFCU 1-2 high vibration (expected during coast down) after verifying input.

BOP

• Resets CFCU Vibration alarm to clear annunciator panel (VB1, lower)

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per Lead Examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 5 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 24 Event

Description:

PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

• Observes PK04-21 (Letdown Press/Flow Temp) and informs the Shift Foreman.

PK04-21, LETDOWN PRESS / FLO TEMP SRO Enters PK04-21, LETDOWN PRESS / FLO TEMP

• (1.0) Identifies input 393 (Letdn HX Outlet Press Hi) and goes to section 2.1, General Actions

• Reads two CAUTIONS (potential reactivity impact of letdown temperature excursions and elevated dose rate concerns if argon injection continues with letdown isolated.

• (2.1.1) Notes if letdown is isolated, argon injection must be isolated as well.

Note: Crew may call for diagnostic brief during annunciator response implementation ALL * (2.1.2) Checks for indications of a letdown line break:

o Letdown flow decrease - NO, flow has risen approximately 8 gpm o Letdown pressure decrease - PI-135 reads high while letdown flow rise indicates pressure has fallen.

o Containment sump level increasing - NO, sumps remain stable o VCT level decreasing - NO, VCT level begins to rise very slowly

• Determines indications are not consistent with a letdown leak.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Checks if letdown HX outlet pressure is high.

o Notes PI-135 reads high, but letdown flow behavior indications the opposite o Takes manual control of PCV-135 (VB2) o Adjusts PCV-135 using alternate indications (Letdown flow rate, net charging, etc. ) or from knowledge of normal demand setting for PCV-135 Hand Controller (VB2)

SRO

• Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions o (2.1.4) Step is N/A - High letdown flowrate is not indicative of letdown orifice valve alignment (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 6 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 24 Event

Description:

PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, Fails High (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO

• Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions o (2.1.5) Step is N/A - Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature is NOT high (normal band)

SRO/ATC

• Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions o (2.1.6) Step is N/A - Charging flow was slightly low; may adjust as needed to maintain Pressurizer level within established bands.

o (2.1.7) Step is N/A - Charging appears norm (not lost)

SRO/BOP

• Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions o (2.1.8) Step is N/A - There are no indications that RV-8117 has lifted (PRT temperature, level, and pressure are all normal) o (2.1.9, 10) Step is N/A - Letdown is not at risk; normal Letdown alignment should be maintained SRO

• May review probable causes for the alarm and identify PT-135 failed high.

• May reference OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel to aid in diagnostics.

Proceed to the next event once PCV-135 is being controlled properly in MANUAL, per Lead Examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 7 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 24 Event

Description:

Seal Injection Filter 1-1 Plugged Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses plugged seal injection filter using one or more of the following indications:

• Lowering seal injection flow to all RCPs (VB2, middle right)

• PKs 05-01, 05-02, 05-03, 05-04 in alarm due to RCP seal low flow alarms

• PKs 04-22 in alarm for High RCP Seal injection Filter DP BOP/ATC

• May check CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers (VB1, left)

• May check RCP parameters to verify cooling (PPC picture, VB2 meters)

ATC

• Attempts to raise seal injection flow using HCV-142 (seal backpressure) and/or FCV-128 (charging flow controller). (CC2)

• Identifies potential impact on Pressurizer level (charging flow lowering as more flow is directed toward seals); re-adjusts to maintain pressurizer level.

ATC

• Identifies input 498 for PK04-22, RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta-P Hi PK04-22, RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta-P Hi SRO * (1) Determines input is for RCP Seal Injection Filter 1-1 and goes to General Actions section.

SRO Reads CAUTION regarding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit for operating RCPs without injection flow Note: If seal flow adjustment was previously attempted, it is not necessary to repeat action SRO/ATC * (2.1.1) Attempts to throttle HCV-142 while adjusting FCV-128 to establish 8-13 gpm seal injection flow to each RCP.

o Recognizes charging flow lowering with no change in seal flow o Readjusts seal flow to maintain pressurizer level (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 24 Event

Description:

Seal Injection Filter 1-1 Plugged (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (PK04-22, "RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta P Hi"- continued)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 2.1.2 regarding potential impact on seal and bearing temperatures.

SRO/ANY * (2.1.2) Directs board operator to monitor RCP radial bearing temperatures on the PPC SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Directs Nuclear Operator to swap seal injection filter 1-1 to filter 1-2 per OP B-IA:I, Section 6.3 SRO * (2.1.4) Contacts Maintenance to replace seal injection filter 1-1.

SRO/ATC Directs ATC to reestablish RCP seal flow, once filter is swapped.

Proceed to the next event once seals injection has been returned to normal, per Lead Examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 9 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 24 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis made of load rejection by use of various alarms, generator load dropping, and/or generator output breakers open.

SRO Implements OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection Note: Once the generator output breakers open, the rod control system will drive rods in, lowering power (via steam dump demand). Rods are placed in manual, and power stabilized on steam dumps between 20-30% power (ideally, but not required, is to stabilize at a point where group 1 steam dumps are throttled, and group 2 steam dumps are closed).

(OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection)

SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 1 ATC * (1) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (VB2, intermittent green IN light)

ATC/BOP * (2) Verifies proper operation of steam dumps, Tave trending to Tref (VB3, red/green indicator lights; Tave/Tref from CC1 recorder/PPC)

BOP * (3) Checks MFP suction adequate

• (3a) Verifies 3rd Condensate/booster Pp set running (VB3, lower, center, will auto-start)

• (3b) MFP suction is verified adequate (PPC, VB3 meter; will remain > 260 psig)

BOP * (4) Verifies DFWCS in AUTO and controlling S/G levels (CC3 MFW HMI, VB3, PPC)

• Checks MFW control and bypass valves in AUTO

• Checks both MFPs and their controller in AUTO

• May check level trends, as well as steam flow/feed flow trends (CC3, PPC, and/or big VB3 DFWCS electronic recorders)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 24 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection, con't)

ATC * (5) Rod Control is placed in manual, and power is controlled (via Tave and steam dumps) between 20-30%

ATC * (6) Verifies Pressurizer Pressure is controlling in automatic (2210-2260 psig) (may be outside this for short periods, but is controlling in automatic)

ATC * (7) Verifies Pzr Level is controlling at program, and charging flow adequate to prevent letdown flashing: may take manual control of Pzr level (now, or any time during ramp) to prevent flashing of letdown.

• Places HC-459D (master level controller) or FCV-128 (charging flow controller) in manual (CC2, right side, for both)

• Keeps charging high enough to prevent letdown from flashing (VB2, upper panel, letdown temperature, is monitored)

• Uses HCV-142 (seal backpressure) to maintain RCP seal flows 8-13 gpm SRO/ATC * (8) Refers to reactivity handbook for approx. 20% - 30% load reduction (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook)

• Presses STOP on M/U Ctrlr HMI (CC2)

• Presses BORATE on HMI

• Sets target gallons for boration (as decided above, and per the Shift Foreman);

verifies batch is reset

• Sets boric acid flowrate

• Presses START, and monitors boration

• Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman SRO Reads NOTE on stabilizing the plant prior to step 9 (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 11 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 24 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection, con't)

BOP * (9) Stabilizes secondary:

• Places hotwell reject valve HC-3 controller in manual and closed (VB3, lower, right)

• Places FCV-31 (part of cold gas temp control scheme) in manual and full open (VB3, lower right; note that this valve/controller is reverse acting, in that 0% on controller is full open demand)

• Adjusts TCV-23 and FCV-31 to attain acceptable steam jet air ejector (SJAE) flows and cold gas temps, and then returns controllers to auto, and monitors (all VB3, lower right)

• Secures one condensate booster pp set, and places it back in AUTO Cue: (from Shift Manager) If 500kV Offsite power asked or discussed by SRO, GCC reports 230kV and 500kV power is available.

Proceed to the next event once step 9 (above) is completed, and at least the 1st boration is completed by the ATC, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 12 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6,7 Page 13 of 24 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs ATWS (13D/E Work) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Crew identifies RCS temperature lowering, pressurizer level and pressure lowering based on the following:

Annunciator Response Alarms:

• AR PK09-01, S/G 1-1 PRESS, LVL FLOW (due to lowering S/G 1-1 pressure and level)

• AR PK09-15, DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONT SYSTEM (due to feedflow/steam flow mismatch)

• AR PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO (pressure low due to cooldown)

• AR PK04-06, PROTECT CHANNEL ACTIVATED (for Tave less than 554 oF on loop 1 due to cooldown)

RCS Cooldown Indications: PPC, VB2, and CC1 trends Increased Steam Flow: PPC, VB3, CC3 steam flow meters, record, and trends Lowering S/G 1-1 pressure and level: VB3 and PPC SFM/ATC

• Directs/performs manual Safety Injection ALL

• Perform immediate actions

• Identify ATWS condition ATC

• Verifies rods are inserting at maximum rate BOP

• Manually opens Reactor Trip Breakers 13D/E (VB5)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-1, Manually trip the reactor from the control room by the end of E-0 step 1) **

SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left)) (CT, see previous page) **

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

Note: Offsite power (230 kV Startup) will be lost shortly after the reactor trip breakers are open, causing a loss of all non-vital power, and a transfer of busses G & H to their respective Diesel Generators. Bus F will be without power based on the initial scenario setup (D/G 1-3 OOS).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated)

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 22)

ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature - stable (temps will initially be dropping due to faulted S/G; AFW will be throttled back (VB2, upper panel lower area)

ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr safeties (closed) / PORV block valves (all open, but 8000A is without power due to loss of bus F), and no elevated tailpipe temps or sonic flows on safeties/PORVs (VB2 - upper panel, far right); checks Pzr sprays closed (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria (RCS pressure [VB2, PPC] < 1300 psig and SI or ECCS CCPs running (VB1 and VB2))

o RCPs already tripped due to loss of Startup Power (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 14 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

ATC/BOP * (9) Checks for faulted S/Gs o Faulted - Notes 1-1 S/G pressure continuing to lower (all S/G pressures on VB3)

SRO Transitions to EOP E-2 (next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation)

SRO Reads CAUTIONS prior to step 1 SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies ALL MSIVs and bypasses are closed (VB3, upper panel, left side)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks for any intact S/G (1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 S/Gs have lower, but stable pressures, consistent with the RCS cooldown from the 1-1 S/G); continues in E-2 SRO/ATC * (3) Identifies 1-1 S/G as faulted (VB3, pressure is still dropping in uncontrolled manner, or completely depressurized at this point)

SRO * (4) Directs Reactor Operator to Implement Appendix HH to isolate the Faulted S/G (see page 24)

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks CST level > 10% (VB3, upper panel, center area meter and recorders)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks for ruptured S/Gs

• NOT Ruptured - notes NO valid alarm on PK11-06, PK11-17, or PK11-18; no upward trends on RE-19/15/15R/71-74

• Concludes that no SGTR exists (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 16 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 17 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation, cont)

Note: Red Path on Critical Status Function - Integrity will have developed by this point in the scenario, therefore, details for transition procedures have not been included in this outline.

ALL * (7) Evaluate ECCS Termination criteria

• Determines that adequate subcooled margin exits (VB2/SPDS) (ATC)

• Determines that adequate heat sink exists (VB3/PPC/SPDS) (BOP)

• Checks RCS pressure (could be rising, stable, or falling at this point; no impact on the scenario) o Determines that Pzr level is adequate (VB2/CC2/PPC) (ATC) o Determines that criteria met or NOT (based on RCS pressure trend), and exits to either E-1 or E-1.1, based on which decision was made (SRO)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 17 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 18 of 24 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition")

PTS conditions in loop 1, requiring a transition to EOP FR-P.1. Entry will be triggered based on Loop Tcold less than 280oF with RCS Pressure greater than 300 PSIG.

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION before step 1 regarding loss of AFW suction

• (1) Checks RCS pressure greater than 300 psig (VB2, lower center) (it is)

• (2) Determines RCS cold leg tems are not all stable or rising and enters RNO column

• (2 RNO) Attempts to stop RCS cooldown:

(a) Verifies 10% steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)

(b) Verifies Condenser steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)

(c) Notes RHR system is in service, but is not contributing to the cooldown (RCS pressure is above shutoff head of RHR pumps) (VB1, upper right)

(d) Throttles feedflow to non-faulted S/Gs while maintaining a secondary heat sink (min total feedflow greater than 435 gpm until narrow range S/G level is greater than 15% in at least one non-faulted S/G (e) Minimizes cooldown from faulted S/G:

Verifies MSIV and bypass valve closed on S/G 1-1 (faulted)

Verifies feedwater to S/G 1-1 has been isolated (no flow from LCV-106, LCV-110)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-CD, Stop RCS Cooldown)

SRO/ATC * (3) ChecksPZR PORV block valves (a) Power is available for valves (VB2, far right, lower)

(b) At least one block valve is open (VB2, far right lower)

SRO/ATC * (4) Determines PORVs should be closed based on current conditions (a) Lo Temp/Over pressure Setpt Protection C/O switch is not cut-in (VB2, far right lower); goes to step 4.d (d) Notes PZR pressure is less than 2335 psig (VB2, far right upper OR PPC)

(e) Verifies all three PORVs are closed (VB2, far right, middle)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 18 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 19 of 24 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition", continued)

SRO/ATC * (5) Determines ECCS is in service o SIP 1-2 is running (VB1, lower skirt) o Charging injection valves 8803A/B and 8801A/B are open (VB2, skirt, lower middle)

Note: Entry into the RNO column of step 6 directs crew to implement procedure and step in effect, but to perform only those actions which do not cause additional cooldown or increase RCS pressure until the temperature soak directed in step 24 is complete.

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks if ECCS can be terminated o Checks RCS subcooling greater than 70oF (VB2,middle) (It is) o ChecksRVLIS Full Range greater than 60% (PAMs3 or 4, in back, or SPDS) (It is)

SRO/ATC * (7) Resets SI (VB1, middle)

SRO/ATC * (8) Resets Phase A (Phase B not actuated)

SRO/BOP * (9) Establishes Instrument Air to Containment (a) Opens FCV-584 (VB4, skirt, lower left)

(b) Checks instrument air header pressure greater than 90 PSIG (PI-380, VB4, upper left)

SRO/ALL * (10) Stops ECCS Pump (a) Resets vital 4kV auto transfer relays for all vital buses (VB4 skirt)

(b) Stops all but one ECCS charging pump**

(c) Stops SI Pump**

(d) Stops RHR Pumps**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step 11)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 20 of 24 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition", continued)

SRO/BOP * (11) Isolates charging injection (a) Verifies 8105 and 8106 open (VB2, center skirt)

(b) Closes 8803A/B**

(c) Closes 8801A/B**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step 11)

SRO/ATC * (12) Establishes charging flow (a) Throttles HCV 142 to 20% demand (CC2)

SRO/BOP * (12) Establishes charging flow (b) Verifies 8107 and 8108 OPEN (VB2, center skirt)

(c) Verifies 8146 OPEN (VB2, center skirt)

(d) Verifies 8145 and 8148 CLOSED (VB2, center skirt)

SRO/ATC * (12.e) Throttle open FCV 128 and adjust HCV 142 to maintain (CC2) o PZR Level o Seal injection to each RCP between 8 GPM and 13 GPM SRO * (13) Verifies ECCS Flow NOT Required:

o RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F (Subcooled Margin Monitor, YI 31, VB2) o RVLIS Indication greater than 60% Full Range (SPDS) or (PAMS 3/4, behind VB5)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 20 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 21 of 24 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition", continued)

SRO/BOP * (14) Checks RCS HOT LEG Temperature - Stable o If INCREASING, controls feedflow and steam dumps as needed to establish stable RCH Hot Leg temperatures.

o If DECREASING, verifies actions of Step 2 RNO (Try to stop RCS Cooldown) have been completed:

(a) Verifies 10% steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)**

(b) Verifies Condenser steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)**

(c) Notes RHR system is in service, but is not contributing to the cooldown (RCS pressure is above shutoff head of RHR pumps) (VB1, upper right)

(d) Throttles feedflow to non-faulted S/Gs while maintaining a secondary heat sink (min total feedflow greater than 435 gpm until narrow range S/G level is greater than 15% in at least one non-faulted S/G ) (VB3, middle)**

(e) Minimizes cooldown from faulted S/G:

• Verifies MSIV and bypass valve closed on S/G 1-1 (faulted)**

• Verifies feedwater to S/G 1-1 has been isolated (no flow from LCV-106, LCV-110)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-CD, Stop RCS Cooldown)

Note: Following step is the bounding condition for CT-CD, Stop the RCS cooldown. Verifiable Operator Critical Task actions associated with attempting to stop cooldown must be complete prior to performing step 15.d, Isolation of Accumulators, in FR-P.1.

SRO/BOP * (15) Isolates ALL Accumulators:

(d) Closes 8808 A, B, C, and D The scenario is terminated once actions associated with CT-CD Bounding Criteria are satisfied

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 21 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 22 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announce trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs open, and exciter field bkr open, CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Checks Phase A and containment vent isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red light ON, white lights OFF)

• (5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete (ESF/SI red light ON, white lights - some ON);

takes RNO actions to verify all unavailable pumps are associated with the loss of Bus F.

• (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (red lights ON and white lights OFF)

• (7) Checks containment spray, Phase B- NOT required (red lights are OFF for ESF for this on VB1, and white lights are OFF)

• (8) Main Steam Isolation - Most likely in by this point and isolation complete (red lights are ON and white lights are OFF)

• (9) Checks AFW status (All AFW pump running, VB3 center area); verifies either min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15% (VB3 center)

• (10) Verifies ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel); expected is that only CCPs will be delivering flow at this RCS pressure. Leaves CCP 1-3 running due to CCP 1-1 loss with Bus F.

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 23 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E) (cont)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown - not in service (8166/8167 closed); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side)

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), only one CB Pp set running, condenser status (not avail))

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel)

• (15 - 20) Verifies DGs 1-1 and 1-2 running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900)); verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area); verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI); throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2); checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm); notifies Shift Foreman of completion

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 23 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP E-2, Appendix HH, Isolate Faulted Steam Generator (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Isolation of feedflow to S/G 1-1 is part of CT-CD, Stop RCS Cooldown. Attempts to isolate LCV-110 (feedwater from MDAFW Pp 1-2) will be unsuccessful due from the Control Room. Critical Task element to stop feeding faulted S/G 1-1 requires dispatching an operator to locally close LCV-110 and verifying action was completed successfully. Guidance for closing valve locally is found in OP D-1:III, Section 6.3.

EOP E-2, APP HH, Isolate Faulted S/G BOP * (1) Isolates 1-1 faulted S/G:

o (a) Ensures MFIV FCV-438 closed (closed on SI signal prior to loss of power to bus F) o (b) Ensures SGBD valves FCV-760, 151, and 250 closed (IC, OC, and sample)

(already closed) o (c) Ensures S/G 1-1 10% steam dump closed (PCV-19) (already closed) o (d) Ensures AFW control valves isolated Closes TDAFP AFW LCV-106**

Attempts to close MDAFP AFW LCV-110 for 1-1 S/G to isolate AFW but is unsuccessful. Dispatches operator to locally close LCV-110.**

o (e) Notes S/G-2 and 3 are intact, leaves FCV-37 and FCV-38 open o (f) Ensures AFW flow still available to S/Gs 1-2, 1-3 & 1-4 o (g) Informs Shift Foreman S/G 1-1 isolation complete with exception of LCV-110.

• • (Critical Task) (CT-CD, Stop RCS Cooldown)

BOP (2) Removes WR Thot input to SCMM for loop 1 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3)(does these steps for each loop) o Goes to PAM4 panel o Presses Configuration Summary o Presses Failed S/G o Presses the PB for the Thot to be disabled (1) o Presses Disable Loop 1

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 24 of 26 Rev 2

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 593 MWe Power Level: 47% Net Generation: 543 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.8.1.B DG 1-3 OOS for corrective maintenance on lube oil heater (discovered during rounds); RTS estimate is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; last partial STP I-1C completed 30 minutes ago (due in 7.5 hrs); action 3.8.1.B.3.1 has been completed.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• Unit was ramped to 50% 8 days ago for high vibrations on the MFP 1-1. Bearings have been replaced, and the pump has been returned to service; due to some minor/intermittent pump vibrations, engineering will be doing data-taking for another shift or two; management will then decide if the plant will ramp back to 100%.

• Maintenance has requested PZR Heater Group 1-2 to be energized by the control room. As part of the planned maintenance, the Heater Group has been aligned to backup (vital) power by field operators who are standing by, waiting for the control room to energize.

• CFCU 1-1 OOS for backdraft damper linkage adjustments.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Energize PZR Heater Group 1-2 from control room per OP A-4A:I.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 25 of 26 Rev 2

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• Alarms in are consistent with current power level (PK14-16 & 14-19)

• Alarms in also consistent with DEG 1-3 and CFCU 1-1 OOS (PK18-03, 18-04, 18-09 and 18-18)

TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 50% - no one in containment

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State @ 50% for 8 days, previously at 100% for 103 days.

• Boron concentration is _1085 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 175 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

• Rod motion: none planned, as needed to maintain I on target.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• Partial STP I-1C due in 7.5 hrs OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r2.docx Page 26 of 26 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 31 Event

Description:

Grid Control Center Backdown Order to Shed 200 MW over 30 minutes Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Cue: (from Shift Manager) I have just received a valid backdown order from the Grid Control Center (GCC) due to downed 500 kV lines. Per Ops Policy B-1, Unit 1 is directed to shed 200 MW total in the next 30 minutes. I will address OP J-2:VIII and OP AP-35.

SRO Implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction)

SRO Enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction

• (1.a) Notes runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP

• Commences ramp (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3 or Shift Foreman will hand off Step 1 sheet to BOP):

o (1.b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3) o (1.c) 990 MWe (1190-200, approximate) load target is entered into Triconex HMI o (1.d) Sets ramp rate to 7 mw/min (approximate rate; actual rate dictated by Shift Foreman) o (1.e) Pushes GO SRO o (1.f) Determines downpower is greater than 15%. May contact chemistry in advance or wait until 15% power change is complete.

ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1)

• (3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

• (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 1 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 31 Event

Description:

Grid Control Center Backdown Order to Shed 200 MW over 30 minutes (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction", continued)

SRO/BOP * (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

• (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

Next event triggered as soon as ramp commenced, per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 2 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: PT-474 Failing low does not cause a pressure transient, but does have significant Operational implications as an input into various Reactor Protection logic scheme. When failed low, PT-474s interlock function prevents PCV-455C and PCV-474 from opening on a valid high pressure signal; only PCV-456 will still function.

ATC Identifies numerous Annunciator Response alarms associated with PT-474 failing low:

• AR PK02-04, SAFEGUARD CHANNEL ACTIVATED o Input 1316 - Pzr Press Lo Ch IV, < 1850 psig

• AR PK0404 - OT DELTA-T C-3 CHANNEL ACTIVATED o Input 482 - OT Delta T Rod Stop/Turb Runback C-3, 1/4

• AR PK04-06, PROTECT CHANNEL ACTIVATED o Input 40 - Pzr Press Lo 1/4, < 1950 psig o Input 131 - Over Temp Delta T 1/4, variable

• AR PK02-04, SAFEGUARD CHANNEL ACTIVATED o Input 1316 - Pzr Press Lo Ch IV, < 1850 psig

• AR PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO o Input 534 - Pzr Press Lo Chan 474

• AR PK06-21, PROCESS CONTROL SYS TROUBLE o Input 1399 - Cont Set 1-PLC 1, 2 Trouble Note: Shift Foreman may choose to enter any one of the Annunciator Responses or go directly to OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel, to determine the extent of the failure.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 3 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AR PK0204 (SAFEGUARD CHANNEL ACTIVATED) - If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

ALL * (2.1.1) Evaluates plant conditions by checking Control Room status lights, main annunciators and instrumentation.

SRO * (2.1.2,3) Notes Annunciator Response contains reactor trip or safety injection criteria and advises Crew.

• (2.1.4) Notes alarm is NOT due to a transient.

• (2.1.5) Determines alarm is due to a channel failure.

o Refers to TS 3.3.2 for required restrictions on plant operation o Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see pg 7)

AR PK0404 (OT DELTA-T C-3 CHANNEL ACTIVATED) - If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

SRO * (2.1.1) Notes Annunciator Response contains reactor trip or safety injection criteria and advises Crew.

• (2.1.2) Checks PK08-09, OT DELTA T ROD STOP & TURB RUNBCK C-3 is NOT lite.

o Checks C-3 runback bistable lights to determine which loop is bringing in the alarm.

o Checks associated plant conditions (RCS pressure, temperature, and AFD) o Identifies failed pressure channel and goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see pg 7)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 4 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AR PK0406 (PROTECT CHANNEL ACTIVATED) - If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

SRO * (2.1.1,2) Notes Annunciator Response contains reactor trip or safety injection criteria and advises Crew.

• (2.1.3) Notes there are no surveillances tests in progress to cause the alarm.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.4) Checks PPC for ALL protection channel bistables "OFF".

• (2.1.5) Identifies failed channel.

o Refers to TS 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation".

o Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see pg 7)

AR PK0516 (PZR PRESSURE HI/LO) - If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

SRO * (2.1.1) Notes Annunciator Response contains reactor trip or safety injection criteria and advises Crew.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.2,3) Notes actual pressurizer pressure is less NOT less than 2210 psig (PORV/spray actuation) or 2175 psig (RCS departure from nucleate boiling limits).

• (2.1.4) Verifies HC-455K, Pzr Pressure Controller, set at 78.8% Setpoint (2235 psig).

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5) Performs a channel check of all Pzr pressure channels; identifies PI-474 reading bottom of scale (VB2).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 5 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AR PK0516 (PZR PRESSURE HI/LO) (continued)

SRO/BOP

• Reads NOTE regarding PCS Control Set input selection scheme (Median Select, based on 2nd highest out of channels) and possible failure scheme (3 of 4 inputs detected bad)

• (2.1.6) Checks for Pressurizer pressure channel abnormal reading. Identifies PI-474 reading bottom of scale (VB2).

o Check HC-455K in AUTO and controlling Pzr pressure with PACT and PREF nearly matched (CC2).

o Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see pg 7)

AR PK0621 (PROCESS CONTROL SYS TROUBLE) - If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, PCS Rack Channel Trouble.

SRO * (2.1.1) Check PCS HMI on CC4 to determine alarming channel.

• (2.1.2) May check PY-17N (behind hot shutdown panel) for no breakers tripped

• (2.1.3) REFERs to Attachment for individual alarm input.

o Identifies mPzrPres_Dev, PT-455/PT-456/PT-457/PT-474 Pzr Press Channel Deviation (NON SAFETY RELATED CONTROL SET 1) o Notes input has no associated automatic or Operator actions.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 6 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems are controlling properly in AUTO.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

SRO * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not open as result of instrument failure or spurious actuation.

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of the PT-474 failure, as time permits SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 6 SRO * (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance SRO/ATC * (7) Uses Attachments 4.1 and 4.2 to determine affected indicator o (a) Places Out-of-Service (OOS) sticker on the following:

PI 474, Pressurizer Pressure Indicator (VB2)

PR 455, Pressurizer Pressure Recorder (CC2) from PCS (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 7 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 8 of 31 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)(continued)

SRO/BOP

• Reads NOTE regarding inoperable PZR PORV(s) requiring TS actions to be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of inoperability

• (8) Uses Attachment 4.1, pg 1, and Attachment 4.2, pg 16, to determine required TS/ECG actions for the inoperable channel:

o TS 3.3.1.E, PC-474C High Press Trip & (TC 441C OT Delta T Trip) (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 474A Low Press Trip (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs) o TS 3.3.2.D, PC 474D Low Press S.I. (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs) o PC 474B PORV Press Interlock ()

PCV-455C & PCV-474: TS 3.4.11.B.1 & B.2 (Close associated block valve and remove power within 1 hr)

PCV-455C: also requires TS 3.4.11.B.3 (Since this is a Class I PORV, must restore to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />).

o Identifies affected controls:

PCS (PM 474A) Pzr Press Control PORV 455C & 474 Low Press Interlock Enter next event once TS addressed, per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 8 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 31 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: ASW Pp 1-1 will experience a seized shaft malfunction if stilling running approximately 8 minutes after the high temperature alarm actuates (~ 350oF). ASW Pp 1-2 will fail to autostart, but manual start capability remains available.

ATC Responds to PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS) alarm and identifies input 426 for Aux Salt Water Pump Temperature Plant Process Computer (PPC) temperature.

• Uses PPC to evaluate bearing temperatures for ASW Pp 1-1

• Reports both top and bottom motor bearings temperatures greater than 219oF and trending up.

SRO Implements AR PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS)

AR PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS)

SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.2 for Motor Temperature Alarm SRO/BOP * (2.2.1) Contacts the Intake Watch to evaluate ASW Pp 1-1 for cause of high temperature alarm (at a minimum checks ventilation, motor oil levels)

SRO/BOP * (2.2.2) Directs BOP to swap to the standby ASW pump per OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System - Changing Over Pump and Heat Exchanger Trains.

Note: Shift Foreman may choose to review remainder of Annunciator Response silently if direction to perform pump swap has already been given.

SRO

• Reads note regarding running the pump with bearing temperature up to 210oF; temperatures are above the limit

• (2.2.3) Notes that leaving the pump in service with high temperature alarms requires documentation.

• (2.2.4) Checks/determines stator temperatures are normal

• (2.2.5) Refers to Tech Spec TS 3.7.8.A, for one ASW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action).

(May elect not to enter the spec until Intake Watch reports in with additional information regarding pump. Call from field will report major motor oil leak).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 9 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 31 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature (swap to standby ASW Pp 1-2) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation)

Note: Shift Foreman direct BOP to swap ASW pumps without swapping CCW heat exchangers based on time considerations. Both options are described below.

(OP E-5:IV, Step 6.1 Swapping an ASW Pump and CCW Heat Exchanger Train - If used, Otherwise N/A)

BOP Reads NOTE regarding two column format, determines left-hand column should be followed.(ASW Pump 1-1 running and CCW HX 1-1 in service)

• (6.1.1) Determines current configuration: ASW Pump 1-1 running and CCW HX 1-1 in service .

• (6.1.2) Contacts Intake Watch to secure Continuous Chlorination to ASW Bay 1-1.

• (6.1.3) Contacts Aux Watch to ensure no liquid radwaste discharge is in progress.

• (6.1.4) Directs U2 to place U2 standby ASW pump in Manual.

• (6.1.5) Places Mode Selector Switch for ASW Pump 1-2 in MANUAL (VB1, far left, label reads Standby Select Switch)

Note: Starting ASW Pp 1-2 will cause AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX P/HDR PRESS to alarm; alarm is expected and will clear when the second HX is placed in service.

Note: All control manipulations described below are located on the far left side of VB1 BOP * (6.1.6) Takes ASW Pump 1-2 control switch to START position (VB1, far left).

• (6.1.7) Ensures pump amps are stable ((VB1, far left, just above pump controls)

• (6.1.8) Opens FCV-603, CCW HX 1-2 saltwater inlet valve.

• (6.1.9) Ensures differential pressures across both CCW HXs are in the green band (they are).

• (6.1.10) Opens FCV-431, CCW HX 1-2 shell-side outlet valve.

• (6.1.11) Closes FCV-430, CCW HX 1-1 shell-side outlet valve.

• (6.1.12) Closes FCV-602, CCW HX 1-1 saltwater inlet valve.

• (6.1.13) Checks P across CCW HX 1-2 less than 50 psig. (it is).

• (6.1.14) Secures ASW Pp 1-1.

• (6.1.15) Verifies P across CCW HX 1-2 stable, in the green band and ASW Pp 1-2 amps stable.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 10 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 11 of 31 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature (swap to standby ASW Pp 1-2) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation) (cont)

BOP * (6.1.16) Advises U2 to they may return U2 standby ASW pump to AUTO.

• (6.1.17) Informs Shift Foreman ASW train swap is complete.

• (6.1.18) Contacts Intake Watch to align ASW Bay 1-2 for Continuous Chlorination.

(OP E-5:IV, Step 6.2 Swapping ASW Pumps Without Swapping CCW Heat Exchangers - If used, Otherwise N/A)

BOP Reads NOTE regarding two column format, determines left-hand column should be followed.(ASW Pump 1-1 running , swapping to ASW Pump 1-2)

• (6.2.1) Contacts Intake Watch to secure Continuous Chlorination to ASW Bay 1-1.

• (6.2.2) Directs U2 to place U2 standby ASW pump in Manual.

• (6.2.3) Places Mode Selector Switch for ASW Pump 1-2 in MANUAL (VB1, far left, label reads Standby Select Switch)

• (6.2.4) Takes ASW Pump 1-2 control switch to START position (VB1, far left).

• (6.2.5) Ensures pump amps are stable ((VB1, far left, just above pump controls)

• (6.2.6) Secures ASW Pp 1-1.

• (6.2.7) Verifies P across CCW HX 1-1 remains stable, in the green band and ASW Pp 1-2 amps stable.

• (6.2.8) Advises U2 to they may return U2 standby ASW pump to AUTO.

• (6.2.9) Informs Shift Foreman ASW train swap is complete.

• (6.2.10) Contacts Intake Watch to align ASW Bay 1-2 for Continuous Chlorination.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 11 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 12 of 31 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1, Seized Shaft/OC Trip; 1-2 ASW Pump does not auto start (swap to standby ASW Pp 1-2) - N/A if crew completes swap prior to time delayed trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation) (cont)

SRO

• Goes to section 2.1, due to OC trip inputs SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Determines that the standby ASW pump is NOT running with normal current (did not start); takes 1-2 ASW pp to MAN, and starts it SRO * (2.1.2) Determines that ASW flow has been restored, and continues to next step.

SRO

• Reads NOTE prior to step 2.1.3 SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Checks that ASW/CCW HX P is normal (normal range: 100 -140"), P may be low, so BOP calls intake watch BOP * (2.1.4) Directs intake watch to secure continuous chlorination to the 1-1 ASW bay SRO * (2.1.5a) Dispatches operator to pump breaker (1-1 ASW)

SRO * (2.1.5b, 2.1.5c, 2.1.5d) Determines if breaker reclose is allowed, using Ops Policy B-2 (if desired; will not do this, as the 1-2 ASW pp is running normally); directs maintenance to investigate (including clearance and notification).

Note: "Normalizing" the ASW/CCW trains is not needed for this event SRO * (2.1.6) Established normal ASW/CCW alignment (will not start/complete)

SRO * (2.1.7) Refers to Tech Spec 3.7.8.A (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action) for ASW Pp 1-1 (if not completed earlier).

Next event triggered on power level (1000 MW), per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 12 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 13 of 31 Event

Description:

DRPI Power Failure During Ramp Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL DRPI power loss is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

• DRPI Panel is "dark", with no rod position lights (VB2, left, black DRPI panel)

• PK03-21 alarms on two inputs SRO Implements AR PK03-21, "DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom" (AR PK03-21, DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom)

SRO * (1) Selects section 2.1 from "DRPI urgent failure" input ATC * (2.1.1) Takes manual control of rods by placing bank selector switch in MAN, and verifying normal manual speed on meter (45-51 gpm) (CC1 right)

Note: If SFM asks SM for guidance regarding tripping the Reactor vice stopping the ramp, SM should provide the following cue:

Shift Manager Cue What do you recommend (if recommendation is to trip, respond Dont trip; stop the ramp)

SRO * (2.1.2) Places ramp on hold (ramp is close to completion)

SRO/ATC * (2.1.3) May review diverse indicators to be used (step counters, bank overlap, NIs, and RCS temperature) if moving rods is required prior to DRPI restoration.

SRO * (2.1.4) Implements Tech Spec 3.1.7.B (immediate action to place rod control in manual)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 14 of 31 Event

Description:

DRPI Power Failure During Ramp (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK03-21, DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom)(cont)

Shift Manager Cue (if asked for next step) There are currently no loads on their backup source (from the OP O-13)

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5.a) Directs transfer of DRPI to backup power per OP A-3:I (all field actions; may send Nuclear Operator to normal breaker first to investigate)

ATC * (2.1.5.b) Once DRPI is restored, Rod Control is returned to auto by placing the back selector in AUTO, and verifying 8 spm on the speed indicator (CC1, right)

Proceed to the next event once control rods are back in AUTO, and Tech Specs have been discussed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 14 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 15 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of loss of Letdown Leak is made from one or more of the following:

• VCT level lowering, Increased charging with abnormally low letdown flow

• Structure sumps rising, RM-12 (Containment High Rad; Gas)

• Pressurizer level stable Note: The Shift Foreman (SFM) may enter OP AP-18 (Letdown Line Failure) directly, or be directed there after first evaluating the leak as part of OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage). Both procedural flowpaths are described below.

If OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure, if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures no load changes are in progress (they arent)

SRO/BOP * (2) Isolates letdown o Closes Letdown Orfice Stop Valve, 8149C (VB2) o Closes Regen Heat Exchanger Inlet Valves, LCV-459/460 (VB2) o Verifies RHR to Letdown Flow Control Valve, HCV-133 (RHR Ltdn) closed (it is)

(VB2)

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks for RCS Leakage - verifies that Pzr level and RCS press are both stable/rising ATC * (4) Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed) (CC2)

SRO/BOP * (5) Establish Excess Letdown (see next page), per OP B-1A:IV SRO * (6) Initiates Recovery Actions o Contacts RP and Chemistry regarding letdown line failure system status (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 15 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak inside Containment (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP B-1A:IV, Place Excess Letdown in Service BOP * (6.1.1) Verifies charging at minimum (seals only) (done, per above step, or do now) o Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed)

BOP * (6.1.2) Contacts RP for rad conditions/posting Note: If Shift Manager asked in regard to flushing, provide the following cue:

CUE: Excess letdown line flushing is NOT needed.

BOP * (6.1.3) Skips line flush, moves on to next step BOP * (6.1.4) Opens FCV-361, CCW to Excess Ltdn HX (VB1)

BOP * (6.1.5) Verifies pot for HCV-123, Excess Letdown Pressure Control, is CLOSED (at 0)

(VB2)

• (6.1.6) Opens 8166/8167, Excess Letdown isolation valves (VB2)

• (6.1.7) is N/A

• (6.1.8) Slowly opens HCV-123 to establish excess letdown (VB2)

• (6.1.9) Adjusts HCV-123 to provide 40 gpm letdown at NOP ATC/BOP * (to end of scenario) HCV-123 and FCV-128 are now used to control Pzr Level

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 17 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines charging flow and/or pressurizer level NOT normal o Charging flow is elevated and pressurizer level is slowly lowering (CC2)

• (1) Adjusts charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level o Adjusts seal flows using HCV-142 (CC2) to maintain 8-13 gpm o May raise charging in manual using master level controller (HC-459D)(CC2) or flow controller (FCV-128)(CC2)

Note: Monitoring Pressurizer level and charging flow - NORMAL is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e. unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines pressurizer level is still lowering (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/BOP * (1 RNO) Starts second charging pump (VB2, Lower middle skirt)

• (1 RNO) May isolate letdown as pressurizer level continues to drop o Closes 8149C, and closes LCV-459/460 (VB2, upper middle skirt)

ATC * (1 RNO) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level o Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC1) o Determines pressurizer level is stable (PPC, VB2, CC2) (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks RCS pressure greater than 2210 psig and stable or rising (VB2)

( 2220-2250 psig)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 18 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines CVCS Makeup can keep up with leak o Makeup Control is in AUTO (CC2) o VCT Level is being maintained within the control band (PPC, VB2 RCDR-4 just below DRPI) o Continuous Action to Monitor VCT Level Note: Step (4) actions are directed at identifying and isolating the leak.

SRO/BOP * (4.a) Rules out Seal Table leak o RE-7 not in alarm(PPC) o No audible alarm from MIDS panel (back of VBs)

SRO/BOP * (4.b) Rules out S/G Tube Leak o Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RM-71/72/73/74 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o SJAE Rad Monitor RM-15/15R not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o S/G Blowdown Rad Monitor RM-23 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o S/G sample activity RM-19 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o PK11-06/17/18 are all out SRO/BOP * (4.c) Rules out RCS in-leakage to CCW o CCW Surge Tank Pressure is not in alarm (PK01-14) o CCW Surge Tank Level is stable (VB1, upper left just below Monitor Light Box B) o CCW Rad Monitors RM-17A/B not in alarm (PPC) (PK11-21) o CCW surge tank vent, RCV-16, remains open (VB1, lower left)

SRO/BOP * (4.d) Rules out pressurizer steam space leak through safeties and PORVs o Pressurizer safety valves and PORVs closed (VB2, upper right panel) o PORV tailpipe temperature is less than 200oF (TI-463: VB2, upper right panel)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 19 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/BOP * (4.e) Notes no indications (indicator or alarm) of reactor vessel flange leakage (VB2 indicator and PK11-02 alarm)

SRO/BOP * (4.f) Observes that RCP seal leakage is normal (VB2, PPC)

SRO/BOP * (4.g) Notes no indication of RCS valve packing leakage (PK05-08 alarm)

ALL * (4.h) Observes several containment environmental indicators - NOT normal o Containment sump and reactor cavity sump levels rising (PAM1) o Containment radiation monitor RM-12 trending upward (PPC) o Containment air temperature/pressure may be slightly elevated (VB1, upper left)

SRO/BOP * (4.h.1 RNO) Contacts Chemistry to sample Reactor cavity samples for increased activity SRO * (4.h.1 RNO) Considers making Containment entry to pinpoint sources of RCS leak Note 1: Following step performed if crew diagnostics has not ruled out CVCS leak inside Containment.

Note 2: Letdown isolation may have been completed earlier as part of step 1 RNO, continuous action.

SRO/BOP * (4.h.3.a-b RNO) Isolates letdown (VB2, upper skirt) o Closes 8149A, B, and C o Closes LCV-459 and 460

• (4.h.3.c RNO) Isolates charging (VB2, lower skirt) o Closes 8107 and 8108 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 20 of 31 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

Note: Performed if letdown/charging isolated in previous step, else, N/A.

SRO/ATC * (4.h.3.c RNO, cont) o Throttles back charging to stabilize Pressurizer level (CC2) o Re-estimates leakrate by throttling FCV-128 for flow and maintaining RCP seals 8-13 gpm using HCV-142 (CC2)

• 4.h.4 RNO Determines leak is now isolated o Transitions to OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure (see page 15 for details)

Enter next event once Excess Letdown placed in service (8167 OPEN), per lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7,8 Page 21 of 31 Event

Description:

Seismically Induced Large Break LOCA ASW Pump Autostart Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The DBA LBLOCA will occur rapidly, causing an immediate Safety Injection.

(EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

• (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, white lights on mimic all on; 4kV vital powered from 230 kV Startup)

Note: Critical task to manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps must be completed before transition out of E-0. Action is addressed as part of App E, step 5 alignment verification, but may be addressed as soon as failure is identified.

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train light ON and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) o Both trains of SI actuated as indicated by PK, SI red light o May report ASW pump status (ASW Pp 1-2 tripped off during bus transfer, may have been started manually**; ASW Pp 1-1 was inoperable earlier in scenario)

• • (Critical Task) (CT-9: Manually start ASW Pump 1-2 to provide at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train before exiting E-0.)

SRO * (5) Directs implementation of App E (usually given to BOP); See page 23 Note: Crew priorities should remain focused on overall mitigation strategy for LBLOCA, noting that AFW malfunction is inconsequential for this accident.

SRO/ATC o (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o Notes temperature has dropped significantly due to LBLOCA,(VB2, upper panel lower area) o Notes AFW Pp 1-2 running, but with no flow and low pump amps.

o Notes TDAFW pump available, but not running Starts TDAFW pump and throttles flow (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 22 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o Ensures all RCPs are tripped (VB2). (TCOA) o Action to trip RCPs may have already been completed as part of Appendix E or Foldout Page 3.0 SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o May note S/Gs are depressurizing, but as consequence of LBLOCA cooldown o None are completely depressurized SRO/ATC * (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured

• Checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders onVB2 (and PPC); (all normal)

• PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF)

• May request samples SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0)

• (11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC)

• (11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS)

• (11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM-11, 02, 07 are all in alarm)

• (11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service (opens FCV-603 and FCV-431, VB1 far left), and transitions to EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 23 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO Performs procedure transition brief for E-1, and implements CSFST (if required)

Note: A CSFST RED or MAGENTA path may occur prior to EOP E-1 entry or before the end of the scenario (FR-P.1 on PTS); If it occurs, it will be a short entry (perform a single step and exit)

SRO Implements FR-P.1, Imminent PTS (if RED or MAGENTA path occurs)

(ONLY IF FR-P.1, Imminent PTS, is entered; otherwise, this section is N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCS pressure (low), and RHR flow (normal); exits to procedure in effect SRO Implements EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCPs tripped (already done, VB2)

ALL * (2 & 3) Checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized; all are dropping slowly, as the primary is now the heat sink for the secondary) o Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes, unless containment shine is noted), and PK11-06/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

• Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1)

• Opens FCV-584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left)

• Opens blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV-760, 761, 762, 763) if requested for sampling (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 24 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/BOP * (4) Maintains S/G levels 25-65%

• (5) Re-verifies PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far SRO/BOP right)

SRO/ATC * (6) Determines Containment Spray should remain in service o (a) PK01-18 is ON o (b) Checks if Spray Additive Tank Level is less than 16% (VB1, to right of Cont Press/Temp display) o Assigns continuous action to monitor level, and isolate tank when level falls below 16% by performing the following (step 6c):

Reset both trains of Containment Spray (VB1, middle)

Close 8994A and 8994B Dispatch operator to open breakers for 8994A/B (VB1, middle skirt)

• (7)Containment radiation levels are above normal (PK11-21 is ON, RE-2/RE-7 in alarm)

(b RNO) Verifies spray system still in service (VB1, middle skirt)

SRO * (8) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI-31, lower center VB2)

SRO/ATC

• Reads CAUTION regarding running RHR pump with cooling to associated heat exchanger

• (9) Determines RHR pump should NOT be stopped o (a.1) Notes pressure is less than 300 psig (a.1 RNO) Checks all available RHR pumps running, continues to step 11 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,10 Page 25 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/ATC * (11) Checks if Diesel Generators should be stopped o Checks Vital 4kV buses powered from Off-Site (they are) o Resets SI o Stops all D/Gs and places respective control switch in AUTO SRO/ALL * (12) Evaluates Plant Status o (a) Verifies cold leg recirculation capability - notes power available to both RHR pumps o (b) Checks Aux building radiation monitor - all are Normal o (c) Checks if RHR pumps are on recir - they are not o (d) Directs RO to Implement Appendix P, Monitor Light Box Verification (checks ECCS valve lineup) o (e) Contacts Chemistry to sample the RCS and place H2 analyzers in service o (f) Checks Turbine status (oil pumps, coast down, etc) o (g) Checks for alarms on Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature SRO/ATC * (13) Determines that post LOCA cooldown procedure (EOP 1.2) is not appropriate o (RCS pressure is < 300 psig (VB2, PPC, CC2) o RHR flow > 100 gpm (VB2)

ALL * (Note) (If step 13 is reached prior to 33% in the RWST) The crew will preview EOP E-1.3 ATC * (14) When RWST level of 33% is reached, RHR Pps are verified STOPPED; o Both RHR pumps fail to stop and must be stopped manually o will need to manually stop RHR Pp 1-2 (VB1 lower right) (if this occurs due to FOP kickout to E-1.3, RHR Pps may be stopped as late as E-1.3 step 2)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 26 of 31 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (TCOA)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

At 33% in RWST is time 0 for TCOA to complete transition to cold leg recirc in 10 minutes (PK03-01 will also alarm).

Record Start Time: _______________

Note: all BOLD substeps part of Critical Task CT-36, Transfer to cold leg recirc within 10 minutes of RWST level reaching 33%.**

The TCOA is more limiting than this criteria. (Critical Task and TCOA; end point on next pages) **

Note: Only a single train of RHR Cold Leg Recirc will be placed in service due to the loss of ASW Pp 1-1 earlier in the scenario. The SFM may direct either RHR HX to be placed in service and perform corresponding cold leg alignment accordingly BOP * (1) App EE assigned/performed:

• (App EE, 1) All (6) series contactor switches are cut in (VB2, upper panel)**

• (App EE, 2, 3) Verifies reset of SI and both trains of CI Phase A and Phase B (VB1, upper panel)

• (App EE, 4) Determines ASW/CCW is aligned to only 1 ASW Pump (2 CCW HXs are in service, VB1, far left)

• Notifies SFM that only one RHR pump and HX should be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity.

• Places one RHR HX in service per SFM direction(VB1, far left)**

If RHR HX 1-1 specified, opens outlet valve, FCV-365 (VB1, far right)

If RHR HX 1-2 is specified, operator will open FCV-364 (VB1, far right)

• Continues to step 7

• (App EE, 7 & 8) Verifies CCP 1-3 stopped (VB2); makes PA announcement concerning Cold Leg Recirc

• (App EE, 9) Dispatches operators to rack in breakers for 8980 and 8976.

SRO/ATC * (2, 3) Verifies RHR Pp 1-2 stopped and closes 8700B (VB1, lower right)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-36, Establish one train of cold leg recirculation within 10 minutes of the RWST reaching low level set point of 33%)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 27 of 31 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

SRO/ATC * (4, 5) Verifies RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and closes 8700A (VB1, lower right)**

ATC * (6) Closes RHR crosstie valves 8716 A/B (VB1, lower center)**

ATC * (7) Isolates ECCS Pp recirc paths by closing 8974 A/B, and closing 8105 / 8106 (VB2)**

SRO/ATC * (8) Verifies recirc sump level > 92 ft (will be close to 94 or more, VB1 upper right side)

Note: Only 1 RHR Pump and RHR Hx will be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity. Procedure flow path and the related Critical Task steps identified below correspond with the specific RHR HX placed in service and its associated cold leg recirc train alignment.

For RHR HX 1-2 as the only in service HX, else N/A SRO/ATC

• 9.a Checks RHR Pp 1-2 stopped and 8700B closed

• 9.b Opens recirc suction valve 8982B (VB1, lower right)**

• 9.c Ensures RHR Hx 1-2 in service per Appendix EE (VB1, lower right)

• 9.d Starts RHR Pp 1-2 (verifies flows, amps) (both on VB1, lower right)**

• 9.e Opens crosstie 8804B (VB1, lower center)**

• 9.f-h Verifies SI Pps running and RHR Pp amps w/i limits

• 10.a Opens crossties 8807A and/or 8807B (VB1, lower center)**,

• (TCOA/CT completion time ___________)

• 10.b Verifies CCP 1-2 running

• • (Critical Task)(CT-36, Establish one train of cold leg recirculation within 10 minutes of the RWST reaching low level set point of 33%)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 28 of 31 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior For RHR HX 1-1 as the only in service HX, else N/A SRO/ATC

• 11a,b Checks RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and 8700A Closed.

• 11.c Ensures RHR Hx 1-1 is in service per Appendix EE (VB1, lower right)

• 11.d Starts RHR Pp 1-1 (verifies flows, amps) (both on VB1, lower right)**

• 11.e Opens crosstie 8804A (VB1, lower center)**

• (TCOA/CT completion time ___________),

• 11.f-h Verifies SI Pps running and RHR Pp amps w/i limits

• Continues to step 12

• • (Critical Task)(CT-36, Establish one train of cold leg recirculation within 10 minutes of the RWST reaching low level set point of 33%)

SRO/ATC * (12) Observes one train of RHR train is now in cold leg recirc lineup ATC * (13) Closes normal ECCS pump suction valves: 8805 A/B, 8976, and 8980 Terminate the scenario any time after a single train of cold leg recirculation has been aligned (completion of CT and TCOA to be on CL Recirc)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7 Page 29 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA ASW Pump Autostart Failure (CT) Containment Spray Actuation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

Note: Critical task to manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps must be completed before transition out of E-0; may have been addressed during performance of immediate actions BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs open, and exciter field bkr open, CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, Monitor Light Box B: red lights ON, white lights OFF)

• (5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete (SI Portion of Monitor Light Box C: red light ON, white lights - some ON);

(5.a RNO) Determines ASW 1-2 is NOT running o Determines ASW 1-2 is NOT running; manually starts pump** (if not previously identified)

• • (Critical Task)(CT-9, Manually start ASW Pump 1-2 to provide at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train by the completion of E-0, Appendix E, step 5)

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white lights OFF)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8,9 Page 30 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Containment Spray Actuation Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E, continued)

Note: TCOA to trip RCPs within 5 minutes of Phase B may have already been completed.

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are ON)

(7.a.1 RNO) May attempt to manually initiate Containment Isolation Phase B/Spray (VB1, directly below containment environment indications, but without success)

(7.a.2 RNO) Notes white lights on for Containment Spray Pumps and valves and performs manual alignments (VB1, middle) **

(7.a.3 RNO) Maintains RCP seal injection between 8-13 gpm (may need to start CCP 1-3)

(7.a.4 RNO) Ensures all RCPs are tripped. (TCOA)

• • (Critical Task) (CT-3, Manually align at least 1 train of Containment Spray (1 pump and associated valves) by completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 7)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light ON, white light are OFF)

Note: Step to control AFW and identification of AFW 1-2 shaft shear may have already been completed (E-0, step 6 RNO) by other crew members. Crew priorities should remain focused on overall mitigation strategy for LBLOCA, noting that AFW malfunction is inconsequential for this accident.

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o Notes AFW Pp 1-2 running, but with no flow and low pump amps.

o Notes TDAFW pump available, but not running Starts TDAFW pump and throttles flow o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 25% (adverse containment) (VB3 center)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 31 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E, continued)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel); shuts down CCP 1-3.

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown in service prior to trip o Manually closes 8166 & 8167

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater; verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel)

• (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

• (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

• (17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

• (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2)

• (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

• (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 31 of 33 Rev 2

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1147 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• CFCU 1-5 OOS for backdraft damper replacement.

SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.7.5.B MDAFW 1-3, OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test, estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; pump has been OOS for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• Shift Manager was notified by Grid Control Center (GCC) that several 500 kV lines have been taken out of service due to a fire in the central valley. OP AP-35 and OP J-2:VIII have been referenced and no actions are required at present.

• Missing blade bolting identified during routine inspection of CFCU 1-5.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Maintain 100% power L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 32 of 33 Rev 2

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

• Boron concentration is _960 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _30_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r2.docx Page 33 of 33 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

Perform STP P-CCP-11 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (STP P-CCP-11, Routine Surveillance Test of Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-1 starting at step 12.9.11)

BOP (12.11 &12) Verifies normal charging (CC2) and seal injection (VB3) , then calls Aux Watch to verify oil flow is visible through bearing sight glass BOP (12.13 & 12.14) Records CCP 1-1 motor amps

• Notes the amps are higher than 87.5 amps (VB2) (reading 95 amps)

• Informs Shift Foreman the amps are high and the pump must be shutdown ATC/BOP Refer to OP B-1A:V, step 6.1 to swap from CCP 1-1 to CCP 1-3.

OP B-1A:V, step 6.1 to swap from CCP 1-1 to CCP 1-3 ATC (6.1.1) Notify RP of pump swap to CCP 1-3 on VB2 (6.1.2) HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MANUAL) o AUTO light out o MAN light lit BOP (6.1.3 & 4) Start CCP 1-3

• Red light ON (at pump control switch)

• Green light OFF (at pump control switch)

• 1-3 Amps (CHARGING PPS MOTOR AMPS on vertical section above control switch) between the RED arrows (normal band)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

Perform STP P-CCP-11 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SFM When Aux Watch reports there was no oil visible in the CCP 1-1 sight glass;

• Declares CCP 1-1 inoperable

• Enters Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2.A (1 ECCS train inoperable, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to determine no common cause and 14 days to restore OPERABILITY).

BOP (6.1.5) Stops CCP 1-1 (on VB2)

• Red light OFF (at pump control switch)

• Green light ON (at pump control switch)

• 1-1 Amps (CHARGING PPS MOTOR AMPS on vertical section above control switch) 0 (zero ATC (6.1.6 - 6.1.9) Adjusts controls (as necessary) for Pressurizer level and RCP seal flow

• Adjusts HCV-142 (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2)

• Adjusts HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL on CC2)

• When pressurizer level approximately at reference level, returns FCV-128 & HC-459 to AUTO (note, FCV-128 may have remained in AUTO and may not require adjustment) o MAN light out o AUTO light lit BOP (6.1.10) Place Auxiliary Building ventilation in BLDG ONLY mode (VB4, right side, above CR VENT MODE lights)

• Places SPLY & EXH MODE SELECT switch in BLDG ONLY position

• White BLDG light it BOP (6.1.11) Updates status board as required

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

PCV 474 Seat Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP, starting at step 2.1)

ALL Diagnosis that a PORV is leaking by is made using one or more of the following:

• AR PK05-23, input 360 (Pzr PORV Valves Disch Temp Hi)

• PORV tailpipe temperature elevated (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP - PORVS (TI-463 on VB2)

• Safety tailpipe temperature slightly elevated/unchanged (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP

- 8010A/B/C (TI-469, 467, 465 on VB2)

• PRT pressure, level, temperature rising (PI-472, LI-470, TI-471 on VB2)

SRO Enters AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP, starting at step 2.1.2 SRO/BOP (2.1.2) Monitor for indications of relief valve lift (VB2)

• Sonic flow (PZR SAFETIES FLOW POI-116A, 117A and 118A)

• Pressurizer Pressure meters (PI-455A, 456, 457 & 474)

• Pressurizer Pressure digital display (PI-403A)

• PRT pressure, level, temperature rising (PI-472, LI-470, TI-471 on VB2)

SRO Reads note prior to step 2.1.3 SRO (2.1.3) - N/A (2.1.4) reads step, no actions to be taken by crew (2.1.5) - N/A (2.1.6) - N/A SRO Reads note prior to 2.1.7 (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 3 of 22 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

PCV 474 Seat Leakage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (2.1.7) Performs PORV leak isolation Close PCV-474 block valve MOV-8000A (VB2)

• Green light LIT/Red light OUT Monitor TI-463 - lowering (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP - PORVS)

Determines PCV-474 is the leaking PORV SRO (2.1.8) Evaluate Technical Specifications and ECGs

• LCO 3.4.11 Condition A (for seat leakage; 1 hr to close block valve; indefinite time limit to restore with block valve closed)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses Steam Generator Tube Leak from one or more of the following:

• Increased charging flow (PPC, CC2)

• Air ejector off-gas hi-rad in alarm (PPC, RM-15/15R) (PK11-06)

• Steam generator blowdown hi-rad and/or isolation (PPC, RM-19,23) (PK11-17)

• Main steam line hi-rad (RM-74) (PPC, PK11-18)

ATC Observes PK11-06 input 423 (SJAE Hi-Rad) alarming and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP May check PPC and/or VB2 Recorders (lower left) for upscale readings/ trends on rad monitors (If AR PK11-06 is entered, starting at step 2.1; otherwise this section is N/A SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks for upscale readings on both RM-15 and 15R (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left) (both are in alarm; may be over ranged) o (2.1.1.a) Implements OP O-4, "Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection" o (2.1.1.b) Notifies Chemistry of abnormal condition o (2.1.1.c) Transitions to OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure Note: Review of OP O-4 shutdown criteria is also covered as part of OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure" (if not addressed during AR PK11-06 response)

BOP

• Reviews OP O-4 for action levels and shutdown criteria

• Evaluates OP O-4 action level using PPC Group Display

• Determines current OP O-4 action level as 3 (leak >= 100 gpd) and updates Shift Foreman (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure, starting at step 1)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 1 regarding requirement to complete procedure actions unless superseded by EOP E-3 , Steam Generator Tube Rupture Note: Maintaining Pressurizer level stable is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO (1) Checks pressurizer level and charging flow

• May take charging to MANUAL control and attempt to adjust charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level (CC2)

• (step 1.a) Determines pressurizer level stable (CC2, PPC)

SRO/BOP (1.a RNO) Starts additional charging pump IF requested by ATC (VB2)

SRO/ATC (1.b) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level

• Determines leak rate is approximately 10 gpm

• Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC2)

• Determines pressurizer level is stable (CC2, PPC) (Continuous Action to Monitor)

• Depending on transient response, may isolate Letdown by closing LCV-459 and LCV-460 (VB2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (2) Identify affected steam generator

• (2.a) Determines that no S/G levels are rising unexpectedly (VB3 meters, PPC)

• (2.b) Identifies main steamline rad monitor 74 rising (VB2 recorders, upper left; PPC)

• (2.c) Verifies S/G blowdown isolation/sample valves open (VB3 lower left)

(Depending on pace of crew, blowdown may have isolated due to high rad on RM-23; RNO step is performed to allow sampling by chemistry)

(2.c RNO) Checks blowdown isolation due to RM-23 in alarm (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left); Places RE-19, 23 Hi Rad S/G Blowdown and Sample Valve iso defeat cutout switch to "cut-in" and opens blowdown sample valves (FCV-244, 24, 248, 250) (VB3, lower left)

• (2.d) Contacts Chemistry to perform S/G sampling SRO/ATC (3-Continuous Action to Monitor) Determines VCT level can be maintained by RCS makeup (CC2,VB2, PPC)

SRO (4) Determines plant shutdown requirement

• (4.a) determines leakrate greater than O-4 shutdown criteria

• (4.b) due to O-4 criteria, implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown, starting at step 1)

SRO (1.a) Determines runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP Starts load reduction (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3):

(1.b) Places MW and IMP feedbacks in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3)

(1.c,d) Sets load target and ramp rate (greater or equal to 10 MW/min)

(1.e) Pushes GO (1.f) Contacts Chemistry to advise 15%/hr shutdown rate will be exceeded SRO/ATC (2) Ensures control rods are inserting in AUTO (CC1)

(3) Turns Pressurizer heaters on (CC1)

(4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

SRO/BOP (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook)

• Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2)

• Presses BORATE on HMI

• Sets target gallons for boration; verifies batch is reset

• Sets boric acid flowrate

• Presses START, and monitors boration

• Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

NOTE: During the ramp, AR PK11-17, SG BLOWDOWN HI RAD comes into alarm. See writeup in EVENT 4 SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

• (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

SRO If not already completed, reviews T.S. 3.4.13, Action B - greater than 150 gpd primary to secondary leakage. Required actions: be in MODE 3 in 6hrs, and MODE 4 in 12 hrs.

SRO Reads caution prior to step 8 SRO/ATC (8) Check steam dump operation (TR-412, RCS TAVG/TREF recorder on CC1 or PPC trend)

(no action should be required)

• If Tavg NOT trending to Tref o Places HC-507 in MANUAL (40% STM DUMP VLVS PRESS CONT, CC3) o With 0 demand, places Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch in STEAM PRESS mode (CC2) o Adjusts HC-507 demand to match TAVG and TREF avoiding opening Group II steam dumps (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC (9) Check pressurizer pressure and level trending to program (VB2 or PPC trend) (no action should be required)

• If NOT o Manually control heaters/spray or charging as necessary (CC2)

SRO/BOP (10) Shutdown number 2 Heater Drip Pump per OP C-7B:II, Heater 2 Drain Pump -

Shutdown and Clearing

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

SG Blowdown High Rad auto actuation failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Blowdown High Radiation, starting at step 2.11 of AR PK11-17)

ALL Diagnosis that a Blowdown High Radiation has occurred:

• AR PK11-17, input 1242 (Steam Gen Blowdown to Disch Tunnel Hi Rad RE-23)

• RM- 19, Steam Generators Blowdown Liquid Radiation Monitor Detector Assy, in HIGH alarm (PPC)

• RM- 23, Steam Generator Blowdown to Discharge Tunnel, in HIGH alarm (PPC)

BOP (2.1.1) Determines blowdown isolated and SG Blowdown Tank shift to Equipment Drain Receiver did not occur

• Closes OC SG blowdown isolation valves (red light out, green light lit)

• FCV-151, SG 1-1

• FCV-154, SG 1-2

• FCV-157, SG 1-3

• FCV-160, SG 1-4

• Closes SG blowdown sample valves (red light out, green light lit)

• FCV-250, SG 1-1

• FCV-248, SG 1-2

• FCV-246, SG 1-3

• FCV-244, SG 1-4

• Closes FCV-498, Disch Tunnel (red light out)

• Opens FCV-499, Equip Drn Rcvr (red light lit)

SFM (2.1.2 - 2.1.9) Performs several evaluate steps SFM/BOP (2.1.10) Places the RE 19 & 23 Hi Rad SG BD & Smpl Vlvs (O.C.) Iso Defeat C/O SW in "CUT IN" (up) position (VB3)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum/Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-7, "Degraded Condenser, Section A", starting at step 1)

ALL Diagnoses loss of condenser vacuum from one or more of the following:

• Condenser pressure rising (PI-44 (PRESSURE digital) on VB3, PPC) and PR-11A/B (PRESS/AFTER COND FLOW on VB3)

• MW lowering (CC3, PPC)

• PK10-11, CONDENSER PRESS/LEVEL SRO Implements OP AP-7, Degraded Condenser, Section A: Loss of Condenser Vacuum SRO Reads CAUTIONS regarding Attachments to be performed if both CWPs are lost, and guidance to trip reactor if actions to stabilize the plant appear unlikely to succeed Note: ATC and/or BOP will be directed to monitor the turbine for how close they are getting to the turbine trip setpoint. They can see both vacuum and the setpoint on the turbine controller screens (CC3), and can also compare condenser vacuum with the Attachment 2 "curve" in OP AP-7, showing power level vs allowable turbine operation area.

SRO/BOP (1) Checks condenser pressure less than turbine trip setpoint (Attachment 2) (It is)

SRO/BOP (2) Directs load reduction to maintain Condenser pressure below turbine trip setpoint (Attachment 2 limits)

• Crew may increase ramp rate

• Performs RNO (initiate Turbine Trip) due to inability to stabilize condenser vacuum (may occur before crew can take action)

SRO Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" starting at step 1)

ALL Crew enters EOP E-0 on Rx Trip and silently performs immediate actions:

• Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

• Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

• Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

SRO/ATC (1) Verifies reactor trip

• trip bkrs open

• rods on bottom

• NIs decreasing SRO/ATC (2) Verifies turbine trip

• All four stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, white lights on mimic)

• Determines all vital bus is energized from startup SRO/ATC (4) Checks for SI actuated (PK08-21: ON)

• (4.a RNO) Determines SI is neither actuated nor required o PK02-02 is OFF o Safeguards bistable status lights are out (logic for SI is not made up) (VB1, left upper area, just below PK01 and PK02)

• (4.a.2. RNO) Announces Reactor Trip on PA (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (4.a.3 RNO) Controls AFW flow to reduce cooldown while maintaining a secondary heat sink

• Checks for adequate secondary heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right) it will be zero gpm o Starts AFW pump 1-2

• Monitors RCS Loop Tcolds for indications of cooldown (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC); throttles feedflow if cooldown continues (VB3, lower left)

SRO

• Transitions to E-0.1 ("Reactor Trip Response")

NOTE: PCV-455C failed partially open on the reactor trip, the operator may close the block valve any time after immediate actions are complete (CT-10)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-10, close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV such that the PRT remains intact for the duration of the scenario).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, starting at step 1)

Note: During the performance of E-0.1, the only running AFW pump (1-2) trips when narrow range level in one steam generator reaches approximately 13.5%. At the point, there will be a valid RED path on Secondary Heat Sink, the crew will cease E-0.1 actions and go to FR-H.1.

SRO/ATC (1) Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 547oF based on RCS Loop Tavg (RCPs running) (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC)

• If RCS temp < 547oF and decreasing : (Note: expected) o checks steam dumps (VB3, indicator lights middle) and S/G blowdown isolation valves outside containment (VB3, lower left skirt) all closed. Also checks MSRs reset on on Turbine Control HMI (CC3) o throttles AFW feedflow as needed to stop cooldown while maintaining heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right)

• RCS temp > 547oF and increasing o If required, sets 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left) o verifies dumps modulate open to control temperature at 547oF

• Monitoring of RCS temperature stable assigned as Continuous Action SRO/BOP (2) Checks Feedwater Status (a) RCS temperature < 554oF (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC) (NOTE: expected)

(b) Checks Feedwater Isolation has occurred Feedwater Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box C (VB1)

(Red lights ON / White lights OFF )

(c) Checks total AFW flow greater than 435 GPM (VB3, upper middle)

SRO/ATC (3) Checks Rods fully inserted (VB2-DRPI)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC (4) Checks Pressurizer level controls (a) Level greater than 17% (VB2, middle right)

(b) Charging in service with adequate flow (VB2)(CC2)

(c) Letdown in service (VB2, upper middle skirt)

(d) Pressurizer level trending to 22% (VB2, middle right)

(may adjust charging to maintain level 22% to 60%)

(e) May energize pressurizer heaters (CC1, lower left)

SRO/ATC

• Reads CAUTION regarding Aux Spray and notes as N/A (Aux Spray not in service)

(5) Checks Pressurizer pressure control (a) Pressure greater than 1850 psig (VB2, far right)

(b) Pressure stable or trending to 2235 psig (VB2)(CC2)

• (b) RNO will direct closing of PCV=455C block valve, MOV-8000B (VB2 lower right)**

• • (Critical Task) (CT-10, close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV such that the PRT remains intact for the duration of the scenario).

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks S/G NR levels greater than 15%

o (a) Reports all S/G NR levels less than 15%, but total AFW flow is greater than 435 gpm (VB3, upper middle) o (b) Will control AFW flow to maintain S/G NR levels between 20% and 65%

o (c, d) Checks TD AFW Pump required for heat removal Reports TD AFW pump is tripped on overspeed (VB3, center skirt)

• Monitoring of S/G levels assigned as Continuous Action When the 1-2 AFW pump trips, the crew will go to FR-H.1.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, starting at step 1)

ALL Observes one or more of the following:

• AFW Pp 1-2 tripped on overcurrent (Record Time of Trip:______________________)

o Blue and Green lights lit (VB3, lower skirt)

• AFW flows and discharge pressures fall to zero (VB3 center)

• S/G level less than 15% NR o Trend recorder below PK11 (VB3) o Steam Generator LEVEL narrow range meters (VB3 left side)

• RED PATH for Heat Sink on CSFSTs SRO Enters EOP FR-H.1 (LOSHS) due to loss of AFW (complete) and low S/G levels SRO (1) Determines total feedflow less than 435 gpm is NOT the result of operator actions SRO/ATC (2) Determines Secondary Heat Sink is required (a) RCS Pressure is GREATER than any intact S/G ; (RCS pressure (VB2); S/G pressure (VB3))

(b) RCS Hot Leg Temp is GREATER than 350oF; (VB2, lower (chart recorder))

SRO/ATC (3) Checks at least one ECCS CCP available

• NOTE: 1-3 may have been started when CCP 1-1 secured due to high amps. If not running, 1-2 CCP is "available" (green and white lights lit) (VB2)

• Red light lit

• Amps in the normal band (CCP 1-3; VB2, lower left)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (4.a) Verifies Blowdown and Sample isolation valves outside containment are closed (VB3, lower left skirt)

SRO/BOP (4.b.1) Verifies CST level is GREATER than 10% (VB3, middle)

SRO/BOP (4.b.2) Verifies none of the AFW pumps are running (VB3, middle)

(4.b-c RNOs) Dispatches operators to locally check lineups and investigate pump trips; May check on status on getting AFW 1-3 returned to service.

SRO/ATC (5) Stops all four RCPs (VB2, right)

Note: Step may have already been completed during performance of EOP E-0.1.

SRO/BOP (6) Adjusts 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left)

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION regarding monitoring of Hotwell level (7.a) Checks at least one Condensate Booster Pump Set running in recirc (VB3, center skirt)

SRO/ATC (7.b) Takes manual control of all Main Feedwater Reg Valves and Main Feedwater Reg Valves Bypasses and sets demand to zero (DFWCS HMI on CC3)

SRO/BOP (7.c) Checks Feedwater Isolation Valves open (VB3, lower left)

SRO/BOP (7.d) Determines Main Feedwater is NOT available (Condenser NOT available) (PK08-14 NOT lit) and goes to step 9 (Establish Feed from Condensate System)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 18 of 22 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC Reads CAUTIONS before step 9.a regarding blocking/unblocking of automatic SI actuation Reads NOTE regarding parallel performance of S/G and RCS depressurization (steps 9.c in parallel with steps 9.a-b) and the need to stop S/G depressurization if PK06-06 comes in before SI signal are blocked (needed to prevent unwanted SI)

• (9.a.1) Depressurizes RCS to less than 1915 PSIG (P-11) using one Pressurizer PORV (VB2, lower right vertical)

• (9.a.2) After P-11 actuates (PK08-06), blocks RCS low pressure SI ((2) train switches) and low steamline pressure SI signals ((2) train switches)(CC2)

• (9.a.3) Maintains RCS pressure below P-11 (1500 and 1865 PSIG) using PORV (VB2)

SRO/BOP (9.b.1) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation Valves OPEN (VB3, lower left)**

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-43, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of 25 minutes))

SRO/BOP (9.b.2) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation signal OFF (PK09-11); resets as needed (VB3, center)

SRO/ATC (9.b.3) Throttles open Main Feedwater Reg Valves OR Main Feedwater Bypass Valves**

(CC3 DFWCS HMI)

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-43, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of 25 minutes))

SRO/BOP (9.b.4) Bypasses feedwater heaters and condensate demineralizers (FCV-55 and FCV-230)

(VB3, skirt, lower right)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 19 of 22 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION before step 9.c regarding potential for low Tave Feedwater Isolation (9.c) Depressurizes ONE intact S/G to LESS THAN 490 PSIG at MAXIMUM RATE**

(9.c.1) Verifies all MSIV and MSIV bypass valves closed (VB3, lower left)

(9.c.2) Places one 10% dump valve in manual and opens to 100%; Red indicator light ON, green indicator light OFF (VB3, middle)**

• • (Critical Task) (Part of CT-43, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of 25 minutes)).

SRO/ATC (9.c.3) Checks charging in service; may maximize during depressurization to prevent losing Pressurizer level during the cooldown SRO/BOP (9.c.4) Establishes feedflow to at least one S/G (VB3)**

(Record Time Feedwater Flow Established:______________________)

(9.c.5) Stabilizes depressurized S/G pressure at 480 PSIG (VB3)

• Sets depressurized S/G 10% dump valve setpoint to current S/G pressure, approx. 40%

(or below) on controller

• Returns controller to AUTO

• • (Critical Task) (CT-43, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G within 50 minutes of AFW Pump 1-2 trip (2x NRC scenario validation time of 25 minutes)).

Terminate the scenario once feedwater flow from the Condensate System is established, per the Lead Examiner

• • Critical TasK L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 20 of 22 Rev 2

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1147 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• D/G 1-3 Corrective Maintenance SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.8.1.B DG 1-3 OOS for corrective maintenance on lube oil heater (discovered during rounds); RTS estimate is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; last partial STP I-1C completed 30 minutes ago (due in 7.5 hrs); action 3.8.1.B.3.1 has been completed.

• TS 3.7.5.B MDAFW 1-3, OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test, estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; pump has been OOS for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• STP P-CCP 1-1 in progress.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Complete Control Room Portion of STP P-CCP 1-1 Surveillance Testing continuing from step 12.9.11.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 21 of 22 Rev 2

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• Alarms in are consistent with the DG 1-3 OOS (PK18-03, 04, 09, 18)

TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

• Boron concentration is _960 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• Partial STP I-1C due every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r2.docx Page 22 of 22 Rev 2

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 1 (U1, R1, R2)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1-Wed 2-Spare 3-Tues 4-Thur P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4 2,*,4,5 5 4 4 2 SRO-U1 MAJ 5,6 6 3 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2,3,4 5 0 2 2 RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO-1 NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 2,*,5,7,8 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO-2 NOR 4* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,*,7 4,5,9,10 6 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 3

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 3 (I2, I3, R5)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1-Wed 2-Spare 3-Tues 4-Thur P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I2 I/C 4 2,3,4,5 *,2,3,4 8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 2,3,4 1,2,3 6 0 2 2 RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I3 *,2,3,4,6, I/C 3,4 4,5,9,10 7 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO-R5 NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,7 2,3,5,7,8 *,3 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 3

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 4 (I4, I5, R6)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1-Wed 2-Spare 3-Tues 4-Thur P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I4 I/C 4 2,3,4,5 *,2,3,4 8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 2,3,4 1,2,3 6 0 2 2 RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I5 *,2,3,4,6, I/C 3,4 4,5,9,10 7 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO-R6 NOR 1* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,7 2,3,5,7,8 *,3 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5,6 6 5,8 5 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 3

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: April 18, 2016 Operating Test No.: L141 GROUP 1 APPLICANTS RO RO1 RO2 RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U1 SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 2,3,4,5, 6,7 2,3,4,5, 6,8,9, 3,4,5,6, 7

3,4,5,9, 10 2,4,5,6 2,3,5,6, 7,8 10 Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 4,5,6 4,5,6, 10 4,6 2,4,5,6, 7,8 9,10 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 3,4,5,6, 7

1,4,5,6, 10 1,4,5,6 1,2,3,5, 6,7,8 Boards (2)

Communicate 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 3,4,5,6, 7

1,2,3,4, 5,6,9, 1,2,4,5, 6

1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8 9,10 10 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 9,10 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 2,4 2,3,4 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: April 18, 2016 Operating Test No.: L141 GROUP 2 APPLICANTS RO RO RO3 RO4 SRO-I SRO-I1 SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U2 SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 2,3,4,5, 6,8,9, 2,3,4,5, 6,8,9, 3,4,5,9, 2,3,4,5, 2,4,5,6 10 6,7,8 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 5,6,7,8 7 2,3,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 10 10 Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 4,5,6, 10 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8 4,6 1,2,3,4, 5,8 4,5,6 2,4,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 9,10 9,10 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,6, 10 1,4,5,6 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,5, 6,7,8 1,3,8 Boards (2)

Communicate 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,4,5, 5,6,9, 5,6,7,8 6 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,5, 5,6,7,8 6,8 9,10 9,10 10 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8 9,10 9,10 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 2,3,4 2,3,4 1,2,3 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: April 18, 2016 Operating Test No.: L141 GROUP 3 APPLICANTS RO RO RO5 RO SRO-I2 SRO-I3 SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 2,4,5,6 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, 6,8,9, 6,7,8 6,7 3,4,5,9, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 10 5,6,7,8 7 2,3,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 10 Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 4,6 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 4,5,6, 10 1,2,3,4, 5,8 4,5,6 2,4,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 9,10 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,6 1,4,5,6, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 10 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,5, 6,7,8 1,3,8 Boards (2)

Communicate 1,2,4,5, 6

1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 5,6,9, 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,5, 5,6,7,8 6,8 9,10 10 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 9,10 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 2,3,4 1,2,3 2,4 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: April 18, 2016 Operating Test No.: L141 GROUP 4 APPLICANTS RO RO RO6 RO SRO-I4 SRO-I5 SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 2,4,5,6 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, 6,8,9, 6,7,8 6,7 3,4,5,9, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 10 5,6,7,8 7 2,3,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 10 Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 4,6 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 4,5,6, 10 1,2,3,4, 5,8 4,5,6 2,4,5,6, 1,3,5,8 7,8 9,10 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,6 1,4,5,6, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 10 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,5, 6,7,8 1,3,8 Boards (2)

Communicate 1,2,4,5, 6

1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 3,4,5,6, 5,6,9, 5,6,7,8 7 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,5, 5,6,7,8 6,8 9,10 10 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8 5,6,7 9,10 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 2,3,4 1,2,3 2,4 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27