ML20106E470

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2020-02-FINAL Outlines
ML20106E470
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/2020
From: Greg Werner
Operations Branch IV
To:
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
Download: ML20106E470 (44)
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Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: March 6, 2020 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

2 2

4 N/A 4

3 N/A 3

18 6

2 2

1 1

1 2

2 9

4 Tier Totals 4

4 4

5 5

5 27 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

3 2

3 3

2 2

3 3

3 2

2 28 5

2 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

10 3

Tier Totals 4

2 4

4 3

3 4

4 4

3 3

38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 X

Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.03 RCS pressure and temperature 4.2 40 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 4.5 42 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.01 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling 4.1 55 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 /

45.6)

AA1.03 Reactor trip alarms, switches, and indicators 3.7*

52 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.5, 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.06 RCP thermal barrier cooling 3.2 45 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.01 RHR heat exchangers 2.9 44 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.01 PZR heaters, sprays, and PORVs 4.0 46 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 X

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.12 Status of MSIV activating system 3.9*

53 000040 (APE 40) Steam Line Rupture Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR: 43.5 /

45.13)

AA2.01 Occurrence and location of a steam line rupture from pressure and flow indications 4.2 41 000054 (APE 54) Loss of Main Feedwater

/4 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout:

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power 4.3 39 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 X

2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.12) 4.2 54

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.01 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 4.1 51 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.01 Battery charger equipment and instrumentation 2.8 43 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR 41.4, 41.8 / 45.7)

AK3.03 Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of nuclear service water 4.0 49 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR 41.7 /

45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.03 Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained 2.9 56 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following: (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.7)

EK2.2 Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

3.8 50 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 X

2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 /

45.2) 4.0 48 (W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments 3.7 47 K/A Category Totals:

2 2

4 4

3 3

Group Point Total:

18

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.05 Uncontrolled rod withdrawal, from available indications 4.4 62 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.01 Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation 3.2 59 000036 (APE 36) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X

G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

3.8 63 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 X

2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 4.1 57 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.02 Auxiliary building ventilation system 2.7 65 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/ 7 X

AA2.01 - Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms:

- ARM panel displays 3.5 60 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 000068 (APE 68) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74) Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.03 - Processes for removing decay heat from the core 4.5 64

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility 3.0 61 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (High Containment Radiation) 3.0 58 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding / 8 (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 1

2 1

1 2

Group Point Total:

9

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCPS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 S/G 3.5 1

004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.29 Methods of pressure control of solid plant (PZR relief and water inventory) 3.8 15 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.03 Closed cooling water flow rate and temperature 2.5 16 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.04 ESFAS-operated valves 3.6 22 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRTS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.06 Bubble formation in PZR 2.6 28 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.02 Operation of the CCW pumps, including interlocks and the CCW booster pump 3.2 7

010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.01 Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables 3.5 25 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the RPS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.02 Power density 3.3*

24 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.03 Containment 4.3 23 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9

/ 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.01 SWS/cooling system 3.5 21 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X

Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.04 Reduction of temperature and pressure in containment after a LOCA by condensing steam, to reduce radiological hazard, and protect equipment from corrosion damage (spray) 3.7 3

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MRSS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.03 AFW pumps 3.2*

12 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.07 Tripping of MFW pump turbine 3.0*

4 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.02 Pumps 2.6 6

062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: (CFR:

41.5 / 45.5)

A1.01 Significance of D/G load limits 3.4 27 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.02 AC electrical system 2.7 10 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Automatic start of compressor and ED/G 4.1 14 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X

2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1

/ 45.13) 3.6 19 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9

/ 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.15 FPS 2.5 26 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 Pressure gauges 3.1 20 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.3 / 45.13)

A2 03 Phase A and B isolation 3.5*

17 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X

2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 3.9 9

008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 CCW temperature 2.9 18

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PZR PCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.02 PZR Pressure (3.6) 3.6 5

026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Containment spray pumps 3.4*

11 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.04 Emergency heat loads 3.5*

8 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X

Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.03 Securing of SAS upon loss of cooling water 3.1*

2 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X

Knowledge of containment system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K4.06 Containment isolation system 3.1 13 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

3 3

2 2

3 3

3 3

2 Group Point Total:

28

ES-401 9

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.01 Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter 2.7 37 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation K

K4.03 Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) provide for the following:

Reading of source range/intermediate range/power range outside control room 3.9 29 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ITM system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 Natural circulation indications 3.5*

38 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.03 CIRS fans 3.3*

34 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control X

2.1.27 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.12):

Knowledge of system purpose and/or function 3.9 35 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Spent Fuel A1.02 Pool Cooling System operating the controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) A1.02 Radiation monitoring systems 2.8 31 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.02 Steam valve stuck open 3.6 32 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MT/G system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.18 RPS 3.6 36 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Liquid Radwaste System including: (CFR: 41.7 A3.02 Automatic isolation 3.6 33

ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Rev,4 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the Fire Protection System following will have on the: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.04 Fire, smoke, and heat detectors 2.6 30 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals:

1 0

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

10

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Rev. 11 Rev,4 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.

G2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen)..

3.4 73 2.1.

2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. (CFR: 41.1 / 43.6

/ 45.6) 4.3 74 2.1.

2.1.44 Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communication with the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12) 3.9 66 Subtotal 3

2. Equipment Control 2.2.

2.2.2 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 45.2) 4.6 68 2.2.

2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) 3.4 67 2.2.

2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 70 Subtotal 3

3. Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR: 41.11 /

43.4 / 45.10) 3.8 75 2.3.

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) 3.2 71 Subtotal 2

4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.

2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.13) 3.9 69 2.4.

2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.8 72 Subtotal 2

Tier 3 Point Total 10

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Rev. 11 Rev,4 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection T1/G2 APE 061 G2.4.8

(#63)

Oversampled and unable to write a question to KA and not have overlap with other similar (rad montor KAs). Also no instances of EOP /AOP usage for Area Rad monitor alarms.

Kept G2.4.8 and selected new system, APE 037 T1/G2 EPE 074 EK1.07

(#64)

Covered with question 25 - 010 K5.01. Selected EK1.03 (IR 4.3)

T2/G1 010 A3.02 (#05)

Unable to write satisfactory question to meet KA. Selected only other available A3. A3.02 (IR 3.6)

T2/G1 076 K1.05 (#26)

The relationship of SWS to D/G does not exist at the station.

Selected K1.15 (IR 2.5).

T2/G2 029 K4.02 (#29)

No testable tie between negative pressure and containment - no interlocks/design features. DCPP is not a negative containment pressure plant. Selected the only other available KA, K4.03 (IR 3.2)

T2/G2 034 A1.02 (#31)

No testable RO tie to Refueling Canal. Because there is no other A1 with IR greater than 2.5, shifted to SF8 system 033 A1.02 (IR2.8)

T2/G2 028 G2.1.19 (#35)

No tie between computer and HRPS. Selected G2.1.27 (IR 3.9)

T3/G1 2.1.28 (#73)

Unable to write a Tier 3 question to this KA. Selected G2.1.26 (IR 3.4)

T2/G2 045 K1.06 (#36)

Unable to write satisfactory question. KA is very specific and trivial knowledge of a seldomly performed surveillance. From the remaining K1, randomly selected K1.18,RPS, (IR 3.6)

T1G2 APE 024 AK3.02

(#31)

Replaced due to overlap with SRO question 93. Replaced with APE 061 AA2.01 (IR 3.5)

T2/G2 029 K4.02 (#29)

Replaced due to overlap with SRO question. Replaced with 015 K4.03 (IR 3.9)

T2G1 004 K6.29 Replaced due to overlap with Operating test. Replaced with 004 K6.26 (IR 3.8)

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: March 6, 2020 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

N/A N/A 18 3

3 6

2 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 27 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

28 3

2 5

2 10 1

2 3

Tier Totals 38 4

4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

2 2

1 2

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.34 Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI 4.2 88 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 4.0 89 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 X

2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.2 87 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.08 Steam flow-feed trend recorder 3.3*

86 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

2.4.30 - Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

4.1 85

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

4.2 84 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

Group Point Total:

6

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 X

2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10

/ 43.5 / 45.13) 4.7 93 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 X

2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7 / 45.8) 4.6 91 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/ 7 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /

4 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding / 8 (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 (W E10) Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS/4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

3.9 90 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 (W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

4.2 92 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

Group Point Total:

4

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/ 43/5 / 45/3 / 45/5)

A2.27 Improper RWST boron concentration 4.2 76 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 LOCA 4.8 80 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.12 / 45.13) 4.7 77 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.07 Air or MOV failure 3.5 78 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X

2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7

/ 43.2) 4.2 79 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals:

3 2 Group Point Total:

5

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant X

2.4.4. Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.6 / 45.4) 34.7 83 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge X 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 4.0 81 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the S/GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

A2.03 Pressure/level transmitter failure 3.6 82 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals:

1 2 Group Point Total:

3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Rev. 11 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.

2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 3.5 94 2.1.

2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process.

3.7 97 Subtotal 2

2. Equipment Control 2.2.

2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 98 2.2.

2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.3 95 Subtotal 2

3. Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR:

41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) 3.8 99 Subtotal 2

4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.

2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.11) 4.4 96 2.4.

2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.5 100 Subtotal 2

Tier 3 Point Total 7

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-4 Rev. 11 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection T2/G2 079 G2.1.32 (#81)

Station Air - cannot write SRO level question to KA. Selected System 029 - Containment Purge, KA unchanged.

T1/G1 APE 077 G2.4.21

(#85)

Unable to tie APE to generic KA dealing with critical safety functions.

Shifted to 2.4.30 (IR 4.1)

T3/G1 G2.1.43 (#97)

Unable to write a suitable SRO level question. Replaced with 2.1.41 (IR 3.7)

T2/G2 002 G2.4.3 (83)

Unable to write a suitable SRO level question. Replaced with 002 2.4.4 (IR 4.7

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Diablo Canyon Date of Examination:

02/24/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

L181 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (NRCL181-A1)

M, R Determine H2 Recombiner Settings 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(4.3)

(STP Exam 09-2017)

Conduct of Operations (NRCL181-A2)

M, R Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(3.9)

(Bank: LJC-014)

Equipment Control (NRCL181-A3)

N, R Perform STP I-1A 2.2.37 Ability to determine Operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(3.6)

Radiation Control (NRCL181-A4)

N, R Perform RM-19 Channel Check 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (2.9)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

  • Type Codes and Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)

Rev 2

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Diablo Canyon Date of Examination:

02/24/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

L181 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (NRCL181-A5)

M, R Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc (3.9)

(NRCADM061-COO-SRO1)

Conduct of Operations (NRCL181-A6)

M, R Evaluate Fire Zone Operability 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(4.2)

(Bank: LJC-014)

Equipment Control (NRCL181-A7)

N, R Determine 230 kV Operability 2.2.37 Ability to determine Operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(4.6)

Radiation Control (NRCL181-A8)

M, R Authorize Emergency Exposure 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (3.7)

(NRCL161-A8)

Emergency Plan (NRCL181-A9)

N, R Review Emergency Notification for Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

(4.5)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

  • Type Codes and Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)

Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

Diablo Canyon Date of Examination:

02/24/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:

L181 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function

a. (S1) (001.A2.11) Dropped Rods During Rod Misalignment Verification (Modified LJC-066)

A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Resp to Changing Plant Params During Rx Trip Resp A,N,EN,L,S 2
c. (S3) (E04.EA1.1) Isolate LOCA Outside Containment (Bank LJC-118)

D,L,S 3

d. (S4P) (011.EA1.11) Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc (Bank LJC-27A)

A,D,L,S 4P

e. (S4S) (059.A2.07) Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for MFP Trip (Bank LJC-247)

A,D,S 4S

f. (S5) (E14.E1.2) Manually Initiate Containment Spray (Bank LJC-010)

D,L,S 5

g. (S6) (064.A4.06) Crosstie Vital Bus G to H (LJC-032)

D,L,S 6

h. (S8) (067.AA2.17) Fire in 480V Bus G Switchgear Room A,N,S 8

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U

i. (P1) (010.A2.02) Transfer Pzr Heater Grp 23 to Backup Pwr (LJP-029A)

D 3

j. (P2) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power(LJP-058A)

A,D,E,L 6

k. (P3) (G2.1.30) Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" E,L,N,R 8

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

Diablo Canyon Date of Examination:

02/24/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:

L181 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function

a. (S1) (001.A2.11) Dropped Rods During Rod Misalignment Verification (Modified LJC-066)

A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Resp to Changing Plant Params During Rx Trip Resp A,N,EN,L,S 2
c. (S3) (E04.EA1.1) Isolate LOCA Outside Containment (Bank LJC-118)

D,L,S 3

d. (S4P) (011.EA1.11) Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc (Bank LJC-27A)

A,D,L,S 4P

e. (S4S) (059.A2.07) Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for MFP Trip (Bank LJC-247)

A,D,S 4S

f. (S5) (E14.E1.2) Manually Initiate Containment Spray (Bank LJC-010)

D,L,S 5

g.
h. (S8) (067.AA2.17) Fire in 480V Bus G Switchgear Room A,N,S 8

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U

i. (P1) (010.A2.02) Transfer Pzr Heater Grp 23 to Backup Pwr (LJP-029A)

D 3

j. (P2) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power(LJP-058A)

A,D,E,L 6

k. (P3) (G2.1.30) Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" E,L,N,R 8

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

Diablo Canyon Date of Examination:

02/24/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:

L181 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function

a. (S1) (001.A2.11) Dropped Rods During Rod Misalignment Verification (Modified LJC-066)

A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Resp to Changing Plant Params During Rx Trip Resp A,N,EN,L,S 2
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U

i. (P1) (010.A2.02) Transfer Pzr Heater Grp 23 to Backup Pwr (LJP-029A)

D 3

j. (P2) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power(LJP-058A)

A,D,E,L 6

k. (P3) (G2.1.30) Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" E,L,N,R 8

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 Rev 1

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD101r2.docx Page1of3 Rev2

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

1

OpTestNo:

L181NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

2%withMFWinservice,alignedtoStartUpPower.MOLwithCFCU11OOS.

Turnover:

InOPL3,performingstep6.28,raisingpowerto8%.

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 N/A R(ATC, SRO)

Raisereactorpowerfrom2%to8%OPL3,sec6.28.

2 VLV_CVC22_2.5delay=0ramp=15 I(ALL)

RegenHxIsolationValve,LCV459,failstomidposition(OP AP18).

3 H_V1_034M_1,XMT_VEN6_3, XMT_VEN7_3,XMT_VEN8_3 TS,C (BOP, SRO)

CFCU12highstator/bearingtemperatureduetolowCCW flow(ARPK0121,TS3.6.6.C).

4 RLY_PPL63_2OPEN RLY_PPL59_2OPEN TS,I (ALL)

SSPSrelayactuationcausesinadvertentstartofTDAFWpump andblowdownsampleisolationvalvestoclose(ARPK0403, OPD1:III,OP1.DC10;TS3.7.5.B).

5 MAL_MSS41.57E+07ramp=30 M(ALL)

MSLBoutsidecontainment.

6 VLV_MSS7_2,VLV_MSS8_2, VLV_MSS9_2,VLV_MSS10_21 C(ALL)

AllMSIVsfailopen;NomanualcloseforFCV42.

7 MAL_PPL3BBOTH C(BOP)

SafetyInjection,TrainBfailstoactuate.

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD101r2.docx Page2of3 Rev2 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7) 6
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events6,7) 2
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events2,3,4) 3
4. Majortransients(12)(Event5) 1
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E2,E1.1) 2
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 3

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S1CT1)ShutdownTDAFWpumppriortoany SteamGeneratorOverfill(S/Gwiderangegreater than100%)byeither:

ClosingLCV106,107,108,109tothe individualS/Gs OR ClosingsteamsupplyvalvesFCV37and FCV38toleads2and3respectively OR DirectingFCV95closedinthefield Carryoverintothesteamlinescanresultindamage todownstreampipingandvalves,placingthe secondaryheatsinkatrisk.Highsteamgenerator levelcanalsoresultinreactivityexcursionsdueto excessivecooldownoftheprimarysystem.

TechSpec3.3.2 Basis Documentation (S1CT2)StopuncontrolledRCScooldownbeforea severechallengetoIntegritySafetyFunction develops(magentapathonF0.4RCSIntegrity)as follows:

CloseMainSteamIsolationValvesFCV41, FCV43,FCV44.

DispatchOperatortocloseFCV42(S/G12 steamlineisolation).

IsolatefeedflowtoS/G12by closing/verifyingclosedLCV107andLCV111.

(Note:LCV107iscriticalonlywhenTDAFW pumpisrunningorcapableofanautostart).

IsolatesteamflowfromS/G12by closing/verifyingclosedFCV37.

Maintainstheminimumheatsink requirements(435gpmuntilS/GNRlevelis greaterthan15%inonenonfaultedS/G)by controllingflowtoS/Gs11,13,and14.

Aneventorseriesofeventswhichleadstoa relativelyrapidandseverereactorvessel downcomercooldowncanresultinathermal shocktothevesselwallthatmayleadtoasmall flaw,whichmayalreadyexistinthevesselwall, growingintoalargercrack.Thegrowthor extensionofsuchaflawmaylead,insomecases (wherepropagationisnotstoppedwithinthewall),

toalossofvesselintegrity

Background

Informationfor WOGEmergency

Response

Guideline (S1CT3)TerminateSIpriortoruptureofPRTby closing8801A/BOR8803A/B.

FailuretoterminateECCSflowwhenSItermination criteriaaremetresultsinoverfillofthePressurizer andtheeventualruptureofthePRT.This constitutestheavoidabledegradationoftheRCSas afissionproductbarrier.

Westinghouse OwnersGroup WCAP17711NP PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L181NRCESD101r2.docx Page3of3 Rev2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#1 1.

Controlrodsareusedtoraisepowerfrom2%to8%OPL3,SecondaryPlantStartup,step6.28.ATC operatorcomplieswith1steppullandwaitproceduralrequirementwhilemonitoringrelevantcontrols anddiverseindicators.ShiftForemanprovidesreactivityoversight.

2.

RegenHxIsolationValve,LCV459,driftstomidpositioncausingletdownorificevalve8149Ctoclose.

ShiftForemanentersOPAP18,LetdownLineFailure.ExcessLetdownisestablishedperOPB1A:IV CVCSExcessLetdownPlaceInServiceandRemoveFromService.

3.

CFCU12hasalossofCCWflowduetodebrismigrationcausingstatorandmotorbearingtemperatures toriserapidlyandbringinannunciatoralarmPK0121,ContmtFanClr.Reactoroperatorsidentifylow flowindicationsonverticalboardsandrapidlyrisingstator/bearingtemperaturesusingplantprocess computertrends.ThecrewsecurestheCFCUtopreventmotordamageandcontacts maintenance/engineeringforassistance.ShiftForemanentersTS3.6.6ConditionC,onerequiredCFCU systeminoperablesuchthataminimumoftwoCFCUsremainOPERABLE(7day).

4.

SSPSrelayactuationresultsinTurbineDrivenAFW(TDAFW)PumpSteamSupplyIsolationValve,FCV95, failingopenandisolationofhalfoftheblowdownsamplevalvesinsideandoutsidecontainment.S/G levelsriseandRCStemperaturelowers.FCV95cannotbeclosedandthecrewmustisolatetheTDAFW PumpbyclosingtheLCVstotheindividualS/GsorbyclosingsteamsupplyvalvesFCV37andFCV38 fromleads2and3respectively,orbydirectingFCV95manuallyclosedinthefield(S1CT1)Shutdown TDAFWpumppriortoSteamGeneratorOverfill.ShiftForemanimplementsTS3.7.5.B,AFWSystem foroneAFWtraininoperable(72hrs).

5.

AmainsteamlinebreakdevelopsdownstreamoftheMainSteamIsolationValves,outsidecontainment.

S/GpressuredropsrapidlyresultinginanautomaticReactorTripandSafetyInjection.Thecrewenters EOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.

6.

TrainBofSafetyInjectionfailstoactuate,requiringthecrewtoperformnumerousmanualalignments andpumpstartsaspartofAppendixE,ESFAutoActions,SecondaryandAuxiliariesStatus.

7.

Allfourmainsteamisolationvalvesfailopen.Steamleads1,3,and4maybeclosedfromthecontrol room,butlead2(FCV42)requiresfieldaction.ThecrewtransitionstoEOPE2,FaultedSteam GeneratorIsolationtoisolateS/G12anddispatchesanoperatortolocallycloseFCV42aspartofthe criticaltasktostoptheuncontrolledcooldown(S1CT2)Stopuncontrolledcooldownbeforeasevere challenge(magentapath)developsonF0.4RCSIntegrity.

8.

ThecrewtransitionstoEOPE1.1,SITerminationwheretheycompletethefinalcriticaltaskofthe scenario(S1CT3)TerminateSIpriortoruptureofPRT.

Thescenarioisterminatedoncethefinalcriticaltaskiscomplete.

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD102r2.docx Page1of4 Rev2

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

2

OpTestNo:

L181NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

75%Power,MOLwithAFW12clearedforabearingoilleak

Turnover:

At75%powerforSCCWHXClearance

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 H5ESP_INIT_455G0ramp=20 RCCIPCSDI_H5DHC455GSPUPTFFREEZE TRUE I(ATC, SRO)

PressurizerSprayValvePCV455Asetpointfailurecausing RCSpressuretoslowlylower(ARPK0516,OPAP13).

2 XMT_PZR24_3ramp=1 TS,I (BOP, SRO)

PT474,PressurizerPressureTransmitter,FailsLow(OP AP5,TS3.3.1.E,M,3.3.2.D,3.4.11.B).

3 XMT_CVC2_3ramp=75 I(BOP, SRO)

PT135FailsHighcausingletdownpressurecontrolvalve togofullopen(ARPK0421).

4 MAL_RCS4H30.0 TS,C (ALL) 30gpmSGTLonloop4;plantshutdownrequired(OPAP 3,OPAP25,TS3.4.13.B).

5 MAL_RCS4H400.0ramp=60 M(ALL) Tubeleakgrowsto400gpmruptureduringrampoffline.

6 MAL_EPS5A_2DIFFERENTIALcd='H_V5

_194B_1'delay=10 C(BOP, SRO) 12kVBusDfeederbreakertripsondifferentialontransfer tostartuppower.

7 MAL_EPS4D_2DIFFERENTIAL cd='h_v4_221r_1' C(ALL) 4kVBusGdifferentialtripontransfertostartuppower.

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD102r2.docx Page2of4 Rev2 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events6,7) 2
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events1,2,3,4) 4
4. Majortransients(12)(Event5) 1
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E3) 1
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 3

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S2CT1)Isolatetherupturedsteam generatorfromtheintactsteamgenerators priortocommencingcooldownoftheRCS instep10.b(10%steamdump)by completingthefollowing:

Isolatefeedwaterbyensuringclosed:

LCV109(TDAFWLevelControlValve)

LCV113(MDAFWLevelControlValve)

IsolatesteamflowbyclosingFCV44(MSIV)

SGinventoryincreaseleadstowaterrelease throughtheS/GPORVorsafetyvalve(s)ortoSG overfill,whichwouldseriouslycompromisetheSG asafissionproductbarrierandcomplicate mitigation.

WMargintoOverfill (CNCRA0553Rev1)

WOffsiteDoses(CN CRA0554)

SGTRUFSAR15.4.3 WCAP17711NP (S2CT2)PerformRCScooldownat maximumratetoCETCtargettemperature specifiedinE3,step6,usingsteamdumps suchthatRCSsubcooledmarginstillexists followingthecooldown.

Maximumratecooldownrequires10%steamdumps onintactS/Gstobeatleast90%open.

Transitiontocontingencyprocedurestoaddress inadequatesubcoolingorPressurizedThermal ShockconditionsresultsindelayingRCS depressurizationandSItermination.Thisdelay allowsexcessinventoryintherupturedS/Gto continuetoincrease,withthepotentialof challengingSGoverpressurecomponentsor causinganoverfillconditiontooccur.

WMargintoOverfill (CNCRA0553Rev1)

SGTRUFSAR15.4.3 WCAP17711NP (S2CT3)DepressurizetheRCStomeet depressurizationcriteriaspecifiedinE3, AppGGpriortostoppinganySafety Injectionpump.

Failuretostopreactorcoolantleakageintoa rupturedSGbydepressurizingtheRCScomplicates mitigationoftheeventandconstitutesa significantreductionofsafetymarginbeyondthat irreparablyintroducedbythescenario.

WMargintoOverfill(CN CRA0553Rev1)

SGTRUFSAR15.4.3 WCAP17711NP PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L181NRCESD102r2.docx Page3of4 Rev2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#2 1.

PressurizerSprayValvecontrollerfailurecausesPCV455AtorampopenandRCSpressurebeginsto lowerslowly.PK0516,PZRPRESSUREHI/LOalarmswhenRCSpressurereaches2210psig.Thecrew followsARPK0516guidancetotakemanualcontrolandclosethesprayvalve.Thecrewmayfollowup withtheactionsofOPAP13,MalfunctionofReactorPressureControlSystemorOPAP5,Malfunction ofEagle21ProtectionorControlChannel,torestorepressuretonormalusingmanualcontrol.

Alternately,thecrewmaydiagnosethefailurepriortotheannunciatorresponseactivatingandenterOP AP13directlywhichalsodirectstakingmanualcontrolandclosingthesprayvalve.

2.

PT474,PressurizerPressureTransmitter,failslowbringinginmultipleAnnunciatorAlarms.Thereisno transientassociatedwiththisfailure,butthefailurehassignificantOperationalimplicationsduetoits inputfunctionaspartofvariousReactorProtectionlogicschemes.Whenfailedlow,PT474sinterlock functionpreventsPressurizerPORVsPCV455CandPCV474fromopeningonavalidhighpressure signal;onlyPCV456willstillfunction.TheShiftForemanmayelecttoenteranyoftheassociated AnnunciatorResponsealarms,butinallcases,willbedirectedtoOPAP5,MalfunctionofEagle21 ProtectionorControlChannel,whichprovidesinformationregardingindications,controls,andalisting oftheassociatedTechSpecs:

TS3.3.1.E,PC474CHighPressTrip&TC441COTDeltaTTrip(72hrs).

TS3.3.1.M,PC474ALowPressTrip(72hrs).

TS3.3.2.D,PC474DLowPressS.I.(72hrs).

TS3.4.11,PC474BPORVPressInterlock o PCV474(nonclassI),3.4.11.B1&B2toclose&removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve(1hr) o PCV455C(classI),3.4.11.B1&B2toclose&removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve(1hr);

3.4.11.B3toreturntoOPERABLEstatus(72hrs).

3.

PT135,TransmitterforLetdownPressureControlValve,failsHighcausingletdownpressurecontrol valvetogofullopenandletdownflowtorise.ARPK0421,LETDOWNPRESS/FLOWTEMPcomesinto alarmforLetdownHeatExchangerOutletPressureHighasaresultofthefailedtransmitter,whileactual letdownpressurelowerstoapproximately90psigasaresultoffullopencontrolvalveresponse.

Letdownflowincreasesapproximately8gpmabovenormal,resultinginacharging/letdownmismatch.

ProceduralguidanceinARPK0421directscrewtotakemanualcontrolofPCV135.Crewperforms diagnosticbrieftodeterminenatureofthemalfunctionaswellasactionsrequiredtorestoreletdown pressurebacktonormalband.

4.

SteamGenerator14developsa30gpmtubeleakasindicatedbyrisingcountsonvariousradiation monitors.ThecrewentersOPAP3,SteamGeneratorTubeFailure.ShiftForemandeterminesTS 3.4.13.B,RCSOperationalLeakageappliesandentersOPAP25,RapidLoadReductionorShutdowfor therampoffline.

5.

Duringtherampthetubeleakdevelopsintoa400gpmrupture.Thecrewdeterminestheleakis substantialinsizebasedonarapiddropinpressurizerlevel.TheShiftForemandirectsareactortripand safetyinjectionandthecrewentersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.

(continued)

L181NRCESD102r2.docx Page4of4 Rev2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#2 6.

Onthetransfertostartuppower,4kVbusGexperiencesadifferentialfault.12kVbusDalsotripson differentialcausingalossofvacuumaswellastrippingofRCPs12and14.

7.

ThecrewtransitionstoEOPE3,SteamGeneratorTubeRupture,basedonRM74andrisingS/G14 level,wheretheyaddressthefollowingcriticaltasks:

(S2CT1)Isolatetherupturedsteamgeneratorfromtheintactsteamgeneratorspriorto commencingcooldown.

(S2CT2)PerformRCScooldownatmaximumratetoCETCtargettemperature.

(S2CT3)DepressurizetheRCStomeetdepressurizationcriteriaspecifiedinAppendixGG.

ThescenarioisterminatedoncethecrewhascompletedcriticaltaskS2CT3.

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD103r1.docx Page1of3 Rev1

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

3

OpTestNo:

L181NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

100%Power,MOLwithAFW12cleared

Turnover:

At100%powerwithAFW12cleared

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 PMP_CVC3_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL TS,C (ALL)

CCP13OCTrip(OPAP17,ECG8.1.A).

2 AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR1

TS,C (BOP, SRO)

ASWPp11Seizes;Pp12cannotbestarted(OPAP10,TS 3.0.3).

3 MAL_CWS3A80 MAL_CWS3B75 MAL_CWS1A0.15ramp=120 MAL_CWS1B0.15ramp=150 C(ALL)

HighDPonIntakeScreens;ramprequired(ARPK1301,OP AP7,OPAP25).

4 PMP_CWS1_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAILcd='smsslt 1140' PMP_CWS2_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAILcd='smsslt 1080' M

(ALL)

BothCircWaterpumpstripoffduringramp,requiring ReactorTrip(OPAP7).

5 MAL_EPS4C_2DIFFERENTIAL cd='fnisprlt5'delay=30 C(ALL)

Vital4kVBusFdifferentialtrip.

6 VLV_PZR4_20.3cd='jpplp4'del ay=60 C(BOP)

PressurizerPORVPCV455Cfailsslightlyopenontrip requiringmanualisolationbyassociatedblockvalve 7

MAL_AFW11cd='fnisprlt5' C(ALL)

TurbinedrivenAFWpumpoverspeedtrip.

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD103r1.docx Page2of3 Rev1 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events5,6,7) 3
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events1,2,3) 3
4. Majortransients(12)(Event4) 1
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E0.1,FRH.1) 2
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(FRH.1) 1
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 2

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S3CT1)Closethemotoroperatedblock valveupstreamofthestuckopenPORV priortoruptureofthePRT.

TheopenPORVandblockvalveconstitutethe degradationofafissionproductbarrier.Closingthe blockvalveisessentialtosafetysincefailuretodo soresultsintheunnecessarycontinuationofthe degradedcondition.

WestinghouseOwners GroupWCAP17711NP (S3CT2)Establishasecondaryheatsinkas indicatedby:

WRlevelrising CoreExitThermocouple temperatureslowering Priortoreachingbleedandfeedcriteria whichisdefinedaswiderangeS/Glevelin anythreeS/Gslessthan18%[26%]AND narrowrangeS/GlevelinallfourS/Gsless than15%[25%]narrowrange.

Alossofallfeedwatertransientischaracterizedby adepletionofsecondaryinventoryandeventual degradationofsecondaryheattransfercapability.

Assecondaryheattransfercapabilitydegrades, coredecayheatgenerationwillincreaseRCS temperatureandpressurecausinglossofRCS inventorysimilarinnaturetoasmallbreaklossof coolantaccident.Failuretorestoreasecondary heatsinkwhenitispossibletodosoconstitutesa significantreductionofsafetymarginbeyondthat irreparablyintroducedbythescenario.

FRH.1Background Document(HFRH1BG),

Rev.3.

PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L181NRCESD103r1.docx Page3of3 Rev1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#3 1.

ChargingPumpCCP13tripsonovercurrent.ThecrewrespondsbyenteringOPAP17,LossofCharging torestorenormalchargingandletdown.ShiftForemanentersECG8.1.A-ChargingPumpNo.3 Inoperable(establishfirewatch;restoretooperablestatuswithin7days).

2.

ASWPump11tripsduetoaseizedshaft.StandbyASWPump12failstoautostartandcannotbe startedmanually.TheShiftForemanimplementsOPAP10,LossofAuxiliarySaltWaterandcrosstiesto theUnit2ASWsystemviatheASWcrosstievalveFCV601.ShiftForemanentersT.S.3.0.3fortwo trainsofASWinoperableonUnit1.

3.

Screendifferentialpressurebeginstorisequickly,bringinginARPK1301,BarRacks/Screens.Following annunciatorguidance,thecrewentersOPAP7,DegradedCondenser,SectionC:TravelingScreen Problemandbeginstoreduceloadto50%orlessperOPAP25,RapidLoadReduction.

4.

BothCircWaterpumpstripoffduringramp,requiringthecrewtomanuallytriptheReactorperOPAP 7.ThecrewentersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionandperformstheirimmediateactions.

5.

Onthetrip,vital4kVbusFtripsondifferential.DRPIlosespower,butcrewisabletodeterminethe reactorhastrippedbasedondiverseindications(loweringreactorpowerandreactortripbreakers open).MDAFWPump13isalsolostduetothebusfailure.

6.

BoardoperatorsalsoidentifyPCV455Cinmidposition.Thevalvewillnotcloseandmustbeisolated usingtheassociatedblockvalve8000B(S3CT1)Closethemotoroperatedblockvalveupstreamofthe stuckopenPORVpriortoruptureofthePRT.

7.

TheTDAFWpumptripsonoverspeed.SteamGeneratorlevelsareinitiallyhighenoughtoprovidean adequatesecondarysideheatsinkandthecrewtransitionstoEOPE0.1,ReactorTripResponseto stabilizetheplant.SteamGeneratorlevelsslowlylowerbelowtheminimumrequiredlevelof15%

narrowrangeandthecrewtransitionstoEOPFRH.1,ResponsetoLossofSecondaryHeatSink.With thecondenserunavailable,Condensateisusedtorestoreasecondarysideheatsink(S3CT2)Establisha secondaryheatsink.

ThescenarioisterminatedonceCriticalTaskS3CT2iscomplete

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD104r2.docx Page1of3 Rev2

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

4

OpTestNo:

L181NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

75%Power,MOLwithD/G12OOS

Turnover:

At75%powerforSCCWHXClearance

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 AB01ABV_E2_MTVIGAIN65cd='H_V4_176R_1 andH_V4_180L_1'delay=5 TS,C (BOP, SRO)

OvercurrenttriponE2duringAuxBuildingfan swaps(OPH1:II,ARPK1517,TS3.7.12.B).

2 XMT_CVC19_30.0ramp=120 I(ATC, SRO)

LT112FailsLow(automakeup)(OPAP19,AP 5).

3 MAL_RCS3B.07 TS,C (ALL) 70gpmRCSleakonLoop2(OPAP1,TS 3.4.13.A).

4 MAL_SEI10.21ramp=10 MAL_GEN4_3TRIPdelay=10cd='jmlsei1' LOA_SYD6(SYD7,SYD8,SYD16)OPEN delay=15cd='jmlsei1' LOA_SYD16Energizedcd='jmlsei1'delay=15 C(BOP, SRO)

SeismiceventcausingFullLoadRejection(OPAP 2,AP25).

5 DR04CND_HDP11_MTFSHEAR1 PMP_CND1_1AS_IS delIAPMP_CND1_12delay=0cd='V3_223S_3' C(ATC, SRO)

DigitalFeedwatercontrollerfailurerequiring reactortrip(OPAP2).

6 MAL_SYD20cd='fnisprlt5'delay=2 MAL_EPS4E_2DIFFERENTIAL cd='h_v4_217r_1' MAL_DEG1C_2NO_RESETcd='H_V4_224R_1' M(ALL)

LossofallA/Cpower.

7 VLV_AFW7_11 DelIAVLV_AFW7_12cd='V3_219S_3' C(BOP, SRO)

TDAFWPumpfailstoautostart-manualstart required.

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD104r2.docx Page2of3 Rev2 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Event7) 1
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events1,2,3,4,5) 5
4. Majortransients(12)(Event6) 1
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(ECA0.0,ECA0.2) 2
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(ECA0.0,ECA0.2) 2
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 2

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S4CT1)EnergizeatleastonevitalACbus priortoimplementationofFLEXstrategies (ECA0.0,step10RNO)associatedwith entryintoExtendedLossofACPowerEvent (ELAP)conditions FailuretorestorevitalACpowerfromanavailable sourcewhenavailablerepresentsanunnecessary continuationofadegradedelectricalconditionand unnecessarilycomplicatesthemitigationstrategy WCAP17711NP,CT24 ECA0.0Background Document(HECA00BG),

Rev.3.

(S4CT2)Establishflowfromatleastone safetyinjectionpumppriortotransition outofECA0.2.

Failuretomanuallystartatleastone high/intermediateheadinjectionpumpunderthe postulatedconditionsconstitutesmisoperationor incorrectcrewperformanceinwhichthecrewdoes notpreventdegradedcorecoolingcapacity.

WCAP17711NP,CT7

PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L181NRCESD104r2.docx Page3of3 Rev2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#4 1.

ThecrewperformsanormalweeklyfanswapfortheAuxBuildingVentilationSystemperOPH1:II, AuxiliaryBuildingSafeguardsVentilation(ABVS)-NormalOperation,Section6.1.ExhaustFanE2 tripsshortlyaftertheswapbringinginARPK1517,Aux&FHBVentPwrFailure.ExhaustFanE1 restartsautomaticallyandafieldoperatorisdispatchedtoinvestigate.ShiftForemanentersTS 3.7.12.B,AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)foroneABVStraininoperable(7days).

2.

VolumeControlTank(VCT)levelchannelLT112failslow,causingacontinuous(anderroneous)makeup signal.ThecrewdiagnosesthelevelchannelfailurebycomparingotherVCTparameters,andbyusing OPAP19,MalfunctionoftheReactorMakeupControlSystem.Themakeupsystemissecured,and makeupisaccomplished(ifneeded)usingmanualmode(orenablingtheautomodeforshortperiods).

CrewmayelecttouseOPAP5,MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControlChanneltotakemanual controlofMakeupControlSystem.

3.

A70gpmRCSleakdevelops,requiringentryinOPAP1,ExcessiveReactorCoolantSystemLeakage.

Thecrewadjustschargingflowandeventuallystartsasecondchargingpumptostabilizedpressurizer pressure.VCTlevelcanbemaintainedatthecurrentleakrate,however,andthecrewdeterminesa plantshutdownisrequired.ShiftForemanentersTS3.4.13.A,RCSOperationalLeakage(4hrs).

4.

AsignificantseismiceventresultsinafullloadrejectiononUnit1.Thecrewrecognizesthecondition basedonnumerouspowerlevelalarmsandtheensuingsecondarysidetransient.Thecrewmonitors primaryandsecondarysystemresponses,mostnotablyrodcontrol,steamdumps,anddigital feedwater,toensureallsystemsrespondappropriatelyinautomatic.ShiftForemanimplementsOPAP 2,FullLoadRejectiontostabilizetheplant.

5.

Duringtherampdown,DigitalFeedwaterfailstomanualandtheShiftForemandirectsaReactortrip.

6.

Startuppowerislostonthetripfollowedbyabusdifferentialfaultonvital4kVbusH.DieselGenerator 13tripsandcannotbereset.ThecrewtransitionstoEOPECA0.0,LossofAllVitalACPower.

7.

TheturbinedrivenAFWpumpfailstoautostartrequiringthecrewtomanuallystartthepumpand dispatchfieldoperatorstothrottleflow.

8.

GridControlCenterinformsthecrewthat230kVstartuppowerisnotavailable,but500kVisavailable.

ThecrewperformsactionstoisolateRCPsealcooling.

9.

Powerisrestoredtovital4kVbusesFandGfollowingtheguidanceofECA0.0,AppendixDD(Backfeed from500kVPower)(S4CT1)EnergizeatleastonevitalACbusfrompriortoimplementationofFLEX strategies.

10. ThecrewtransitionstoEOPECA0.2,LossofAllACPowerwithSIRequiredwheretheymanuallystart safeguardsequipment.Thecrewperformsthefinalscenariocriticaltask(S4CT2)Establishflowfromat leastonesafetyinjectionpump.

Thescenarioisterminatedonceinjectionflowisestablished.

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD105r3.docx Page1of4 Rev3

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

5 OpTestNo:

L181NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

100%Power,MOLwithPT403OOS

Turnover:

At100%powerwithPT403OOS

Event No Malf No.

EventType*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 None N(ATC,BOP)

SwaptoCCP11fromCCP13perOPB1A:V,section 6.1 2

CC01CCW_CCP11_MTFSHEAR1 TS,C(BOP, SRO)

CCWPp11ShaftShear(ARPK0111;TS3.7.7.A).

3 MAL_PPL7J1 TS,I(ALL)

Eagle21DFP1HaltinRack10(OPAP5;TS 3.3.1.E,M;3.3.2.D,L;3.4.11).

4 PK1421_08291 C(ALL)

LossofMainTransformerCooling(ARPK1421,AP 25) 5 MAL_SEI10.31delay=0ramp=15 MAL_PPL5A;PPL5BBOTH M(ALL)

Largeseismicwithnoautomaticormanualreactor trip(ATWS).

6 MAL_RCS3C10.0cd='jmlsei1' delay=10ramp=60 M(ALL)

SBLOCAfollowingseismic;rampsinover60seconds.

7 MAL_PPL1AFAILURE_TO_INIT MAL_PPL1BFAILURE_TO_INIT C(BOP)

PhaseA-TrainAandBfailtoactuaterequiring manualalignment.

8 MAL_SYD20cd='jpplsia'delay=15 PMP_SIS2_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd='h_v4_218r_1'delay=3 PMP_CVC2_1AS_IS BKR_EPS15AS_IS BKR_EPS9_1OVERCURRENT cd='H_V4_225R_1' MAL_AFW1TRIPcd='h_v3_109m_1gt 3000' C(ALL)

Combinationofelectricalandmechanicalfailures resultinnohighorintermediateinjectionalongwith degradedsecondarysideheatremovalcapabilities requiringmanualstartsofavailablechargingpump safetyinjectionpump.

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev11)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L181NRCESD105r3.docx Page2of4 Rev3 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8) 2
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events2,3,4) 3
4. Majortransients(12)(Event5,6) 2
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E1) 1
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 3

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S5CT1)TriptheReactorbymanuallyde energizing480VBuses13Dand13Ewithin 90secondsofARPK0411,ReactorTrip Initiatecomingintoalarm.

Thesafeguardssystemsthatprotecttheplant duringaccidentsaredesignedassumingthatonly decayheatandpumpheatarebeingaddedtothe RCS.Failuretomanuallytripthereactorcausesa challengetothesubcriticalitycriticalsafety functionbeyondthatirreparablyintroducedbythe postulatedconditions.

WestinghouseOwners GroupWCAP17711NP CalcG.2Rev5(08151 2169)

OP1.ID2,TimeCritical OperatorActionsRev12,

  1. 34.

(S5CT2)Manuallyclosecontainment isolationvalvessuchthatatleastonevalve isclosedoneachPhaseAcontainment penetrationbeforetransitioningoutofEOP E0.

Failuretoperformthecriticaltaskleadstoan unnecessaryreleaseoffissionproductstothe auxiliarybuilding,increasingthepotentialfor releasetotheenvironmentandreducing accessibilitytovitalequipmentwithintheauxiliary building WCAP17711NP,CT11 (S5CT3)StartCCP12andSIP12,soasto avoidasevere(Magenta)challengetothe CoreCoolingcriticalstatusfunction.

FailuretomanuallystartavailableECCSpumps underpostulatedconditionsconstitutes misoperationorincorrectcrewperformancein whichthecrewdoesnotprevent"degraded emergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)capacity.

WCAP17711NP,CT39 HFRC1BGRev3 PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L181NRCESD105r3.docx Page3of4 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#5 1.

CrewperformsnormalchargingpumpswapperOPB1A:V,CVCS-TransferChargingPumps,Section 6.1.

2.

ARPK0111,CCWPp11RecirccomesintoalarmforFCV606,CCWPump11RecircValve,open.Crew identifieslowpumpampsonVB1anddispatchesNuclearOperatortoinvestigate.Fieldreportsno audibleflowsoundinspiteofindicationsmotorisrunning.CCWPump13isstartedmanuallyandCCW Pump11shutdown.TS3.7.7.A,VitalComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System,isenteredforoneloop ofCCWinoperable(72hrs).

3.

Eagle21experiencesaDigitalFilterProcessor(DFP)haltonrack10.AssociatedindicatorsPI456,LI 460A,FI415,FI425,FI435,FI445(VB2),andPR445,LR459(CC2)failasisaswellascontrol channelsforPORV456(PT456)andPressurizerLevelControl(LT460).CrewrespondsperOPAP5, MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControlChannel.ShiftForemanreviewsTechSpecs,entering:

TS3.3.2.D,PC456DLowPressSI(72hrs).

TS3.3.1.E,PC456AHighPressTrip(72hrs).

TS3.3.1.M,PC456CLowPressTrip(72hrs).

TS3.3.1.M,LC460AHighLevelTrip(72hrs).

TS3.3.1.M,FC415(425,435,445)RCSLoop1(2,3,4)Flow(72hrs).

TS3.3.2.L,PC456B,P11(1hr).

TS3.4.11.B1,B2,&B3PC456E,toclose&removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve(1hr)and restoretooperable(72hrs).

4.

CrewrespondstoARPK1421,MAINTRANSF.Anuclearoperatorisdispatchedtoinvestigatelocal alarmsandreportsbackthatNOcoolingfansoroilpumpsarerunningontheMainBankCTransformer.

ShiftForemanentersOPAP25,RapidLoadReductionorShutdownanddirectsa50MW/minpower reductionwhileMaintenanceandfieldOperatorsattempttorestoretransformercooling.

5.

Alargeearthquake(0.31g)occursduringtheramp,butthereactorfailstotripautomatically.Thecrew performstheimmediateactionsofEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionandsuccessfullytripsthe reactorbyopeningthebreakersfor480Vbuses13Dand13Etodeenergizethecontrolroddrive mechanism(CRDM)allowingcontrolrodstofullydropintothecore(S5CT1)TriptheReactorby manuallydeenergizing480VBuses13Dand13E.

6.

ASBLOCAoccursasaresultoftheearthquake,butbothtrainsofPhaseAfailtoactuate.Thecrew performsmanualalignmentofPhaseAcontainmentisolationvalvesperAppendixE,ESFAutoActions, SecondaryandAuxiliariesStatus(S5CT2)Manuallyclosecontainmentisolationvalvessuchthatat leastonevalveisclosedoneachPhaseAcontainmentpenetration.

7.

StartuppowerislostshortlyafterSafetyInjectioninitiatesandacombinationofelectricaland mechanicalfailuresresultinthelossofbothECCSchargingpumpsandsafetyinjectionpumps,withCCP 12andSIP12capableofbeingstartedmanually.Secondaryheatremovalisaffectedaswell.The turbinedrivenAFWpumptripsonoverspeedandAFWpump13hasnopowerduetoalossof4kVbus F.ThecrewperformsthecriticaltaskofstartingtheavailableECCSpumps(S5CT3)StartCCP12and SIP12soastoavoidasevere(Magenta)challengetotheCoreCoolingcriticalstatusfunction.

(continued)

L181NRCESD105r3.docx Page4of4 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#5 8.

ThecrewproceedsthroughE0,transitioningtoE1,LossofReactororSecondaryCoolant,wherethey checkforsubsequentfailuresanddeterminetheoptimalprocedureflowpathforlongtermrecovery.

ThescenarioisterminatedoncethecrewbeginsevaluationofPlantStatusinE1.

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