ML16336A575

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2016-10 Final Outlines
ML16336A575
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 10/20/2016
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16336A575 (42)
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Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency &

Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

3 3

3 N/A 3

3 N/A 3

18 6

2 1

2 2

1 2

1 9

4 Tier Totals 4

5 5

4 5

4 27 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

2 3

2 2

3 2

3 3

2 3

3 28 5

2 1

1 1

1 0

1 1

1 1

1 1

10 3

Tier Totals 3

4 3

3 3

3 4

4 3

4 4

38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

3 2

2 3

Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G*

Generic K/As

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization -

Recovery / 1 X

EK1.05 Knowledge of the operational implications of decay power as a function of time as they apply to the reactor trip. (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.3 39 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

AA1.02 Ability to operate and / or HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident. (CFR 41.7 /

45.5 / 45.6) 4.1 40 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X

EA2.38 Ability to determine or interpret the Existence of head bubble as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 3.9 41 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X

EA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret the difference between overcooling and LOCA indications as they apply to a Large Break LOCA.

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 3.7*

42 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reason for the potential damage from high winding and/or bearing temperatures as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow).

(CFR 41.5, 41.10/45.6/45.13) 2.5*

43 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X

AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational implications of the relationship between charging flow and PZR level as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup. (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.0 44 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X

AA1.23 Ability to operate and / or monitor RHR heat exchangers as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5

/ 45.6) 2.8 45 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X

G2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

G2.4.11 - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (IR 4.0) 4.0 46 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 X

EK2.06 Knowledge of the interrelations between breakers, relays, and disconnects following an ATWS. (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.9*

47 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X

EK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of leak rate vs. pressure drop as they apply to the SGTR. (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.2 48 000040 (W/E12) Steam Line Rupture -

Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X

G2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

G2.4.2 - Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

4.6 4.5 49

000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X

AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for manual control of AFW flow control valves as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW). (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 3.8 50 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X

AA2.09 Ability to determine and interpret the operational status of reactor building cooling unit as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

Replaced with AA2.21 - Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: EDG voltage and frequency indicators 2.7 3.6 51 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X

G2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation. (CFR: 41.6 / 45.4) 3.7 52 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X

AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the effect on Nuclear Service water discharge flow header of a loss of CCW as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water. (CFR 41.4, 41.8 / 45.7 )

AK3.03 - Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of nuclear service water (ASW) 3.5 4.0 53 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X

AA1.05 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air. (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) RPS 3.3*

54 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X

EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 3.7 55 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

AK2.05 Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and Pumps. (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8) 3.1 56 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

3 3

3 3

Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X

AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the relationship between PZR pressure increase and reactor makeup/letdown imbalance as they apply to the Pressurizer level Control Malfunctions. (CFR 41.5, 41.10/45.6/45.13) 2.9 57 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X

AA2.01 AK2.01Knowledge of the interrelations between the Fuel Handling Incidents and fuel handling equipment.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system indications 2.9 3.2 58 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 X

AA1.02 Ability to operate and / or monitor the ARM system as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release.

NOTE: ARM should be PRM as rad monitor for liquid radwaste is a process, not area monitor at DCPP (CFR 41.7 /

45.5 / 45.6) 3.3 59 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X

G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5

/ 45.12 / 45.13) 4.4 60 000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X

EK3.08 Knowledge of the reasons for the Securing RCPs as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling. (CFR 41.5 /

41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 4.1 61 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X

EK1.2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).as they apply to the (SI Termination) (CFR: 41.8 /

41.10, 45.3) 3.4 62

W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 X

EK2.1 EK2.2 - Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility..

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) (KA statement/importance for EK2.2 not EK2.1) 3.7 63 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X

EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 2.9 64 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X

EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (High Containment Radiation) and the Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 3.0 65 K/A Category Point Totals:

1 2

2 1

2 1

Group Point Total:

9/4

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

A1.08 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including Seal water temperature.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 2.5 1

003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

G2.2.4 Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room l layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 /

45.1 / 45.13)

G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 /

45.13) 3.6 3.1 2

004 Chemical and Volume Control X

A1.09 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including RCS pressure and temperature. (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 3.6 3

005 Residual Heat Removal X

K5.05 Knowledge of the operational implications of the plant response during "solid plant": pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water as they apply the RHRS. (CFR:

41.5 / 45.7) 2.7*

4 006 Emergency Core Cooling X

K4.14 Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for Cross-Connection of HPI/LPI/SIP. (CFR: 41.7) 3.9 5

007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR as they apply to PRTS. (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 3.1 6

008 Component Cooling Water X

G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2)

G2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 3.2 4.1 7

008 Component Cooling Water X

K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the RCP. (CFR 41.7) 4.1 8

010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X

A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor PORV and block valves in the control room. (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.5 to 45.8) 4.0 9

012 Reactor Protection X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the RPS channels, components, and interconnections.

(CFR: 41.7) 3.3 10 012 Reactor Protection X

K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the trip logic circuits will have on the RPS. (CFR:

41.7 / 45/7) 3.1 11 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to ESFAS/safeguards equipment control. (CFR 41.7) 3.6*

12 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of safety system logic and reliability as they apply to the ESFAS.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2.9 13 022 Containment Cooling X

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including initiation of safeguards mode of operation. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 4.1 14 026 Containment Spray X

K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the CSS and ECCS. (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 4.2 15 039 Main and Reheat Steam X

A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including isolation of the MRSS. (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5) 3.1 16 039 Main and Reheat Steam X

K4.06 Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which prevent reverse steam flow on steam line break. (CFR: 41.7) 3.3 17 059 Main Feedwater X

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the AFW system. (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.6) 3.6 18 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of Pumps will have on the AFW components. (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7) 2.6 19 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including the significance of D/G load limits. (CFR:

41.5 / 45.5) 3.4 20 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor synchro scope, including an understanding of running and incoming voltages in the control room. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / to 45.8) 2.8 21

063 DC Electrical Distribution X

G2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

G2.4.6Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13) 4.6 3.7 22 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X

K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ED/G system and the D/G cooling water system. (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 3.1 23 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:Erratic or failed power supply. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5

/ 45.3 / 45.13) 2.5 24 076 Service Water X

K2.08 Knowledge of bus power supplies to ESF-actuated MOVs.

(CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to Service Water.

3.1*

2.7 25 078 Instrument Air X

A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor pressure guages in the control room. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 3.1 26 103 Containment X

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Phase A and B isolation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.3 / 45.13) 3.5*

27 103 Containment X

A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Emergency Containment entry. (CFR:

41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 2.9 28 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 3

2 2

3 2

3 3

2 3

3 Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant X

K6.06 Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on Sensors and Detectors.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 2.5 29 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to NIS channels, components, and interconnections. (CFR: 41.7) 3.3 30 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation X

K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implication of separation of control and protection circuits as they apply to the NNIS. (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K3.01 -Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: RCS 2.7 3.4*

31 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X

A1.02Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and RHRS. (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System operating the controls including: Spent fuel pool water level 2.5 2.7 32 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X

A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor neutron levels in the control room. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 3.5 33 035 Steam Generator X

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including S/G water level control. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 4.0 34 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste

071 Waste Gas Disposal X

G2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 4.4 35 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X

K4.01 Knowledge of ARM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for containment ventilation isolation. (CFR: 41.7) 3.3*

36 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air X

K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the SAS and IAS.

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 3.0 37 086 Fire Protection X

A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 3.3 38 K/A Category Point Totals:

1 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

10/3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 2.7 66 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 3.8 67 2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication. (CFR: 41.7 /

43.5 / 45.4) 4.3 68 Subtotal

2.

Equipment Control 2.2.42 2.2.43 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications. (CFR: 41.7 /

41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3)

Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

3.9 3.0 69 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 70 Subtotal

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 /

45.10) 3.8 71 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR:

41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 2.9 72 Subtotal

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 4.5 73 2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.6 74 2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 3.0 75 Subtotal

Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency &

Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

N/A N/A 18 3

3 6

2 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 27 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

28 3

2 5

2 10 0

2 1

3 Tier Totals 38 5

3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

2 2

2 1

Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G*

Generic K/As

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization -

Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X

AA2.10 Ability to determine and interpret when to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow). (CFR 43.5 /

45.13)

AA2.11 -when to jog RCPs during ICC 3.7 3.8 76 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X

AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret whether charging line leak exists as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup. (CFR 43.5/ 45.13) 3.8 77 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 X

G2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5

/ 45.11) 4.6 78 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X

EA2.03 Ability to determine or interpret which S/G is ruptured as they apply to a SGTR. (CFR 43.5 /

45.13) 4.6 79 000040 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X

G2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 4.6 80 W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

G2.4.30Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.1 81 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

Group Point Total:

18/6

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X

G2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.l (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.12) 4.2 82 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X

AA2.04Ability to determine and interpret the availability of BWST as they apply to the Emergency Boration. (CFR: 43.5 /

45.13) 4.2 83 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X

AA2.12 Ability to determine and interpret the maximum allowable channel disagreement as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear instrumentation. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 3.1*

84 000036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X

G2.4.31Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.3) 4.1 85 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

Group Point Total:

9/4

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control X

G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10

/ 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 86 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling X

(Replacement for 078 A2.01)

A2.13,Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Inadvertent SIS actuation 4.2 90 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Loss of instrument bus (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.3 / 45.13) 4.2 87 022 Containment Cooling 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater X

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Overfeeding event (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.3 / 45.13) 3.1*

88 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

G2.1.25Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 89 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals:

3 2

Group Point Total:

28/5

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge X

G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.13)

G2.2.25 - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

4.5 4.2 91 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control A2.02 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Steam valve stuck open 3.9 045 Main Turbine Generator X

A2.13Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the MT/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Opening of the steam dumps at low pressure (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) 2.5*

92 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 075 Circulating Water X

A2.02Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of circulating water pumps (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 2.7 93 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals:

2 1

Group Point Total:

10/3

DCPP Rev 0A, 07/28/2016 ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process. (CFR: 41.2 / 41.10 /

43.6 / 45.13) 3.7 95 2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

3.9 94

2.

Equipment Control 2.2.23 Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 4.6 96 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 97

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR:

41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) 3.7 98 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 3.8 99

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan 2.4.43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 3.8 100 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

DCPPRev0A-07/28/2016

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Diablo Canyon Exam 10/2016 SRO KA's REJECTED Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection SRO T1G1 015/017 AA2.10 This KA is very similar to questions in the RO section.

Of the available KA's in this APE, selected AA2.11, When to jog RCPs during ICC (IR 3.8)

SRO T2G1 078A2.01 Unable to write to SRO level. Randomly replaced with:

006 A2.13, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadvertent SIS actuation (IR 4.2)

SRO T3G1 G2.1.25 Not able to write SRO "generic" question for KA Randomly replaced with G2.1.40, Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements. (IR 3.9)

SRO T2G2 029 G2.4.8 No abnormal procedures for containment purge.

Randomly replaced with G2.2.25, Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (IR 4.2)

DCPPRev0A-07/28/2016

SRO T2G2 045 A2.13 Unable to write to proper level, low operational validity for SRO.

Shifted KA to 041, Steam Dumps, not tested on either examination and randomly selected A2.02 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Steam valve stuck open (IR 3.9)

DCPPRev0A-07/28/2016

RO KA's REJECTED RO T1G1 APE 026 G2.2.39 No less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCO for selected system.

G2.4.11 - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures (4.0)

RO T1G1 APE040 G2.4.49 There are no immediate actions for a steam line rupture.

Randomly replaced with G.2.4.2-Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. (IR 4.5)

RO T1G1 APE 056 AA2.09 Rejected due to already sampled with KA 022 A3.01. Both require knowledge of CFCU operation.

Randomly replaced with AA2.21 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: EDG voltage and frequency indicators (IR 3.6)

RO T1G1 APE 062 AK3.04 Unable to write question to address KA. Replaced with AK3.03 Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of nuclear service water (ASW) (IR 4.0)

RO T1G2 E03 EK2.1 Apparent typo - write up and importance align with EK2.2.

Question written to EK2.2 RO T1G2 APE036 AA2.01 Apparent typo - write up and importance align with AK2.01.

To maintain outline balance, wrote question to AA2.01.

Updated ES-401-2 to reflect wording and importance for AA2.01.

DCPPRev0A-07/28/2016

RO T2G1 003 G2.2.4 There are no unit differences for RCP control board instrumentation, etc.

Randomly replaced with 003 G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

(IR 3.1)

RO T2G1 008 G2.2.25 Tech Spec Bases is not RO Knowledge.

Randomly replaced with 008 G2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (IR 4.1)

RO T2G1 063 G2.4.1 No immediate action steps for DC electrical distribution.

Randomly replaced with 063 G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (IR 3.7)

RO T2G1 076 K2.08 No ESF actuated MOVs.

Randomly replaced with 076 K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to Service Water. (IR 2.7)

RO T2G2 033 A1.02 No tie between SFP and RHR Randomly replaced with 033 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System operating the controls including: Spent fuel pool water level (IR 2.7)

DCPPRev0A-07/28/2016

RO T2G2 016 K5.01 KA is too similar to T2G1 KA013 K5.02. As this is the only K5 for 016, therefore, randomly selected K3.01 as replacement. This results in a more balanced distribution of the RO Systems Tiers. The original distribution was 3/4/2/3/3/4 (2 K3's and 4 K5's). Now there is 3 K3's and 3 K5's and an overall distribution of 3/4/3/3/3/3.

016 K3.01 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: RCS (IR 3.4)

RO T3G2 2.2.42 KA, Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications is not a "generic" KA for tier 3.

Randomly replaced with 2.2.43,Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms. (IR 3.0)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L161 Administrative Topic (See Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (NRCL161-A5)

M, R Evaluate Shift Staffing Assignments 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

(3.9)

(modified from NRCL081LJA_SROA1)

Conduct of Operations (NRCL161-A6)

N, R Evaluate Fire Zone Operability 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(4.2)

Equipment Control (NRCL161-A7)

N, R Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(4.1)

Radiation Control (NRCL161-A8)

N, R Authorize Emergency Exposure 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(3.7)

Emergency Procedures/Plan (NRCL161-A9)

N, R Classify Hostile Action 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

(4.6)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L161 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function

a. (LJC-S1) (001.A2.11) Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine Dilution A,E,M,S 1
b. (LJC-S2) (013.A4.01) SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure A,E,EN,L,N,S 2
c. (LJC-S3) (010.A2.03) Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a SGTR A,E,L,N,S 3
d. (LJC-S4) (E05.EA1.1) Initiate Feed and Bleed for a Loss of Heat Sink (LJC-116)

D,E,L,S 4S

e. (LJC-S5) (E14.EA1.1) Initiate Containment Spray Manually (LJC-010)

D,E,L,S 5

f.

(LJC-S6) (064.A4.06) Crosstie of Vital Bus G to H (LJC-032)

A,D,E,L,S 6

g.
h. (LJC-S7) (068.AA1.23) Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation (LJC-21)

D,E,S 8

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i.

(P1) (040.AA1.03) Close MSIV and Bypass Locally - LJP-212 D,E,EN,L 4S j.

(P2) (E14.EA1.1) Isolate the Spray Additive Tank - LJP-224 A,E,L,R 5

k. (P3) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power - modified LJP-058A A,M,E,L 6

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

< 9 / < 8 / < 4

> 1 / > 1 / > 1

> 1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system)

> 1 / > 1 / > 1

> 2 / > 2 / > 1

< 3 /

< 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

> 1 / > 1 / > 1 ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L161 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function

a. (LJC-S1) (001.A2.11) Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine Dilution A,E,M,S 1
b. (LJC-S2) (013.A4.01) SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure A,E,EN,L,N,S 2
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (040.AA1.03) Close MSIV and Bypass Locally - LJP-212 D,E,EN,L 4S
j. (P2) (E14.EA1.1) Isolate the Spray Additive Tank - LJP-224 A,E,L,R 5
k. (P3) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power - modified LJP-058A A,M,E,L 6

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

< 9 / < 8 / < 4

> 1 / > 1 / > 1

> 1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system)

> 1 / > 1 / > 1

> 2 / > 2 / > 1

< 3 /

< 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

> 1 / > 1 / > 1 ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10)

Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 3 Facility:

Diablo Canyon (PWR)

Scenario No:

1 Op-Test No:

L161 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

2% with AFW in service, backfeeding from 500 kV, BOL, 1609 ppm boron Turnover:

At start of OP L-3, preparing MFPs to place in service.

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 XMT_CVC19_3 0.0 delay=0 ramp=120 I (ATC, SRO)

LT-112 Fails Low (auto make-up) (AP-19, AP-5) 2 DSC_VEN12 BREAKER_OPEN TS only (SRO)

Loss of Power to S-31 (PK15-17; T.S. 3.7.12.B) 3 AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 1 AS02E03V00_52HG6TF_SF6 2 TS, C (BOP, SRO)

ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault (AP-10, T.S. 3.0.3) 4 XMT_MSS1_3 1215 delay=0 ramp=300 I (ATC, SRO)

PT-507 Fails High (AP-5) 5 MAL_RCS3G.75 delay=0 ramp=300 M (ALL) 750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to earthquake 6

MAL_PPL3B BOTH C (BOP)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate 7

VLV_SIS1_1 1 C (ATC) 8803 A Fails closed on SI (S1CT-1) 8 MAL_SEI1 0.1500000 ramp=10 ASISRWST 1.53e6 delay=10 ramp=300 C (ALL)

RWST drains to less than 4% due to seismic damage (S1CT-2)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D (rev 10)

Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 3 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4)

Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7,8) 3
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,3,4) 3
4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1.3) 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA-1.1) 1
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S1CT-1) Manually align at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

FSAR analysis predicates acceptable results on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards has actuated and is providing flow to the core. Failure to manually align the minimum required safeguards equipment results in the persistence of degraded emergency core cooling system capacity.

  • WOG Background HE0BG_R2 (S1CT-2) Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation as indicated by rapid swings in pump amperage.

Damage to the RWST in this scenario results in a continuous loss of level and eventual inability to meet the minimum NPSH requirements for the running ECCS pumps. Failure to stop the pumps before cavitation occurs can lead to pump damage sufficient to render the pumps unavailable for use once an alternate make-up supply is aligned to the RCS.

  • WOG Background HECA11BG_R2 Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r3.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1.

Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT-112 fails low, causing a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured, and makeup is accomplished (if needed) using manual mode (or enabling the auto mode for short periods).

May elect to use OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel to take manual control of Makeup Control System.

2.

Auxiliary Building Supply Fan S-31 loses power and crew responds per AR PK15-17, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, ABVS, which was operating in Buildings and Safeguards, swaps to Safeguards only. Crew verifies automatic shutdown of Supply E-1 as well as auto-swap to Safeguards only alignment for the ABVS. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.7.12.B, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) for one ABVS train inoperable.

3.

ASW Pump 1-1 trips due to a seized shaft. Standby ASW Pump 1-2 fails to start as the result of a fault at the breaker (SF6 pressure fault). The Shift Foreman implements OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water and cross-ties to the Unit 2 ASW system via the ASW cross-tie valve FCV-601. Shift Foreman enters T.S.

3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable on Unit 1.

4.

Steam Generator Header Pressure Transmitter, PT-507, fails high over 5 minutes causing actual temperature to lower. Crew identifies malfunction noting increase in steam flow and lowering Tcold, and takes manual control of HC-507. OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel is used to address the failure and return primary and secondary plant parameters to normal bands.

5.

An earthquake occurs, causing a 750 gpm leak to ramp in on loop 4 hot leg. The crew determines the leak is substantial in size based on a rapid drop in pressurizer level. The Shift Foreman directs a reactor trip and safety injection.

6.

The crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Train B of Safety Injection fails to actuate, requiring the crew to perform numerous manual alignments and pump starts as part of Appendix E.

7.

Charging Injection Supply Valve, CVCS-1-8803A fails to open on SI as well. The crew must open 8803A or its parallel equivalent, CVCS-1-8803B in order to meet the requirements of S1CT-1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E-0.***

8.

The seismic event damages the RWST, resulting in a large fissure that terminates close to the bottom of the tank. The crew briefly enters E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant prior to transitioning to E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST level reaches 33%, which happens quickly due to the leaking RWST. With the Containment Recirc Sump Level less than 92%, the crew is forced into EOP ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. The fissure location causes the RWST to continue to drain, requiring the crew to perform the second critical task S1CT2 - Stop ECCS pumps aligned to the RWST before insufficient level results in ECCS pump cavitation.***

The scenario is terminated once the crew has implemented Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT.

CT / TCOA note:

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD102r3.docx Page1of3 Rev3

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

2

OpTestNo:

L161NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

100%MOL,878ppmboron

Turnover:

TDAFWOOSforrepair;EmergentissueonCCP11(OOS)

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 VLV_SIS7_20cd='h_v1_144g_1 ANDV1_144S_2' C(BOP, SRO)

SI8923AfailsclosedduringSTPV3L10A 2

XMT_CVC4_30.0delay=0ramp=30 TS,I (ATC, SRO)

FT128Failslowcausinghighchargingflow(OPAP5;OPAP 17, T.S.3.3.4.A) 3 MAL_SIS1C100delay=0ramp=180 TSonly (SRO)

Accumulator13100gpmleak(PK0210;T.S.3.5.1.B) 4 MAL_RCS3C.10delay=0ramp=180 TS,C (ALL) 100gpmRCSleakonLoop3(OPAP1,T.S.3.4.13.A) 5 PMP_CVC2_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL M(ALL)

CCP12OCTriprequiringcrewtotrip/SIplant 6

MAL_RCS3C11cd='jpplsia'delay=0 ramp=120 M(ALL) 4.5sqinSBLOCAonLoop3 7

pmp_afw2_1opendelay=0 cd='fnisprlt5' C(ATC)

MDAFWPp13AutostartFailure(Requiresmanualstart; (S2CT1)

(Occursw/LossofMDAFWPp12onBusHDifferential) 8 MAL_EPS4E_2DIFFERENTIALcd='h_

v4_218r_1' CV09CVC_932TASTEM0 PMP_CVC3_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd='jpplsiaandH_V2_266R_1' delay=120 C(ALL)

SIP12LostonBusHDifferential CCP13cavitatesandtrips.

Lossofallhighandintermediateheadinjection;CTto depressurizetoinjectaccumulators(S2CT2).

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD102r3.docx Page2of3 Rev3

TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,4,5,6,7,8) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8) 2
3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events1,2,4) 3
4. Majortransients(12)(Event5,6) 2
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E1) 1
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(FRC.2) 1
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 2

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S2CT1)Establishatleast435gpmAFW flowtothesteamgeneratorspriorto exitingEOPE0.

Failuretomanuallyestablishtheminimum requiredAFWflowrate(whenitispossibletodo so)resultsinachallengetotheHeatSinkcritical safetyfunction.Inthisscenario,adequateS/Glevel isalsorequiredtoeffectivelydepressurizetheRCS toinjectaccumulatorsintheabsenceofbothhigh andintermediateheadinjectionpumps.

WCAP17711NP,CT4 WOGBackground HFRH1BG_R2 (S2CT2)DepressurizeSteamGeneratorsto injectSIAccumulatorstorefloodthecore asindicatedbyRVLISlevelreturningabove theminimalrequiredlevelshownbelow beforeaREDpathdevelopsonCore CoolingCriticalSafetyFunction.

RVLISDynamicRange IndicationGREATERTHAN:

RCPs Running RVLIS Level RVLIS Range 1

14%

Dyn 2

20%

Dyn 3

30%

Dyn 4

44%

Dyn

FailuretodepressurizetheSGsresultsinthe avoidablecontinuationofthedegradedofcore coolingcondition.DepressurizingtheS/Gsprovides immediatebenefitbycondensingsteamonthe primarysideoftheUtubes.OncepressureRCS fallsbelowapproximately625psig,Accumulators willinject,floodingthecoreandclearingthe magentapathonCoreCooling.Continuingthe 100oF/hrcooldownafterAccumulatorshave injectedultimatelyresultsinRCSpressurelowering belowRHRshutoffheadandthecorecoolingCSF statusreturningtonormal.

WCAP17711NP,CT42 WOGBackground HFRC2BG_R2 PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L161NRCESD102r3.docx Page3of3 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#2 1.

CrewperformstimedstroketestofSIPump11suctionvalve8923AperSTPV3L10A, ExercisingValve SI8923A,SafetyInjectionPump1SuctionValve.Thevalvestrokesclosed,butdoesnotrespondwhen thecrewattemptstoreopenitperthetestprocedure.TheShiftForemannotesalreadyinTechSpec forCCP11outofservice.MaycontactMaintenanceforassistance.

2.

FT128(chargingflow)failslow,causingactualchargingflowtorise.ThecrewrespondsperOPAP5, MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControlChannel.FCV128andHC459Daretakentomanual,and chargingflowismonitoredusingalternateindications(RCPseals,Pzrlevel,VCTlevel,etc)forthe remainderofthescenario.OPAP17,LossofCharging,SectionB(ChargingSystemEquipment Malfunctions),mayalsobeusedtorespondtothefailure.TS3.3.4.A,RemoteShutdownSystems,is implemented.

3.

Accumulator13developsa100gpmleak,bringinginARPK0210,ACUMLEVELHILOforlevelbelow 60.8%.ShiftForemanentersTS3.5.1.B,Accumulators,whenlevelfallsbelow52%.

4.

A100gpmRCSleakonloop3rampsinoverthenext3minutes,requiringentryinOPAP1,Excessive ReactorCoolantSystemLeakage.PressureandlevelarestabilizedonceCCP12isstartedandletdown isolated.VCTlevelcannotbemaintainedatthecurrentleakrate,however,andthecrewdeterminesa plantshutdownisrequired.ShiftForemanentersTS3.4.13.A,RCSOperationalLeakage.

5.

CCP12tripsandchargingisnolongerabletokeepupwiththeleak.ShiftForemandirectsaReactor TripandSafetyInjection.ThecrewentersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionandperformstheir immediateactions.

6.

Loop3rupturesontheSafetyInjection,witha4.5inchSBLOCArampinginoverthenext2minutes.

7.

BusHislostonadifferentialtripduringthetransfertoStartupandMDAFWPp13failstoAutostart, leadingtothecriticaltaskofstartingMDAFWPp13(S2CT1)Establishatleast435gpmAFWflowto thesteamgeneratorspriortoexitingEOPE0.***

8.

SIP12islostwiththelossofbusH.NonECCSChargingPumpCCP13beginstocavitateandeventually trips,resultinginatotallossofallhighandintermediateheadinjection.ThecrewproceedsthroughE0, notingthatRCPsmustremainingrunningwhenpressurefallsbelow1300psigduetoalackofrunning ECCSCCPsandSIPs.ThecrewdeterminestheRCSisnotintactandtransitionstoE1,LossofReactoror SecondaryCoolant.AlossofsubcoolingandloweringRVLISleveleventuallyresultsinamagentapathon thecorecoolingcriticalsafetyfunction,andthecrewtransitionstoFRC.2,ResponsetoDegradedCore Cooling.FollowingtheguidanceofFRC.2,thecrewwillperformthecriticaltaskoftemporarily recoveringthecore:

(S2CT2)DepressurizeSteamGeneratorstoinjectSIAccumulatorstorefloodthecorebeforeaRED pathdevelopsonCoreCoolingCriticalSafetyFunction.***

ThescenarioisterminatedonceAccumulatorshaveinjectedenoughvolumetocleartheMAGENTApathon CORECOOLING

      • CT/TCOAnote:

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD103r3.docx Page1of4 Rev3

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

3

OpTestNo:

L161NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

100%MOL,878ppmboron

Turnover:

OOSEquipment:PT403

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 CC01CCW_CCP11_MTFSHEAR1 TS,C (BOP, SRO)

CCWPp11ShaftShear(ARPK0111,ARPK0109,ARPK01 08,AP11;TS3.7.7.A) 2 EECIX5213D5_51TF_ACT1 C(ATC, SRO)

PressurizerHeaterGroup#1OverCurrentTrip(ARPK0519, OPA4A:I) 3 MAL_PPL7J1 TS,I (BOP, SRO)

Eagle21DFP1HaltinRack10(AP5;T.S.3.3.1.D,E,M; 3.3.2.D,L;3.4.11) 4 LOA_TUR280 C(ALL)

MainTurbineStopValve#2(Loop1)Closes(PK0406,PK08 12) 5 CNV_MFW6_21delay=0ramp=30 M(ALL)

Loop4FWRegFailsto100%,P14(HighS/GLevelTrip)

Failure(S3CT3) 6 MAL_MFW5D2e+007cd='fnisprlt 5'delay=0ramp=10 M(ALL)

FeedlineHeaderBreakInsideContainmentonS/G14 (S3CT2) 7 MAL_EPS4D_2DIFFERENTIAL cd='fnisprlt5' C(ATC) 4kVBusGBusTransferFailure;IsolatefeedflowfromTDAFW aspartofCriticalTask(S3CT1,partial) 8 VLV_MFW4_21 delIAVLV_MFW4_22 cd=V3_193S_1 C(BOP)

FCV441failsopen;IsolatefeedflowaspartofCriticalTask (S3CT1,partial)

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD103r3.docx Page2of4 Rev3 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8) 2
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events1,2,3,4) 4
4. Majortransients(12)(Event5,6) 2
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E2,E1.1) 2
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 3

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S3CT1)Manuallyisolatefeedlinebreak beforecontainmentwiderangesumplevel reaches94feet(LI940&LI941),resulting inamagentapathontheContainment safetyfunctionstatustree.

Failuretoisolatefeedflowintocontainmentleads toanunnecessaryandavoidableseverechallenge tothecontainmentintegritysafetyfunctionasa resultofflooding.

WOGBackground HFRZ2BG_R2 (S3CT2)TerminateECCSflowbefore overfilloftheRCSresultsinarupturingof thepressurizerrelieftank(PRT)as indicatedbyaPRTpressuredropand subsequentequalizationwithwiderange ContainmentPressure.

Thefeedlineruptureintroducedinthisscenario resultsinaSafetyInjectionduetoshrinkageanda slightlyovercooledconditionintheRCS.Once isolated,RCSpressurerisesquicklyastheresultof ongoinginjectionflow.EventuallytheRCSgoes solid,withtheexcessinventorypassingwater throughthePressureOperatedReliefValvestothe PRT.FailuretoterminateECCSflowwhenitis possibletodosoresultsinaruptureofthePRTand constitutesanavoidabledegradationofafission productbarrier.

DCPPDesignCriteria MemorandumS7:Reactor CoolantSystem FSARChapter15, (S3CT3)Manuallytripsthereactorbefore S/G14reaches92%narrowrange.

SteamGeneratorLevelabovetheHighHigh setpoint(P14)normallygeneratesaturbinetrip signaltoprotectagainsthighfeedwaterflowand carryoverintothesteamlineswhenoneoutof fourS/Ghasreachedanarrowrangelevelgreater than90%.Carryoverintothesteamlinescan resultindamagetodownstreampiping,valves, placingthesecondaryheatsinkatrisk.

GenericLetter8128 WOGBackground HFRH3BG_R2 PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L161NRCESD103r3.docx Page3of4 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#3 1.

ARPK0111,CCWPp11RecirccomesintoalarmforFCV606,CCWPump11RecircValve,open.Crew identifieslowpumpampsonVB1anddispatchesNuclearOperatortoinvestigate.Fieldreportsno audibleflowsoundinspiteofindicationsmotorisrunning.CCWPump13isstartedmanuallyandCCW Pump11shutdown.T.S.3.7.7.A,VitalComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System,isenteredforone loopofCCWinoperable.

2.

PressurizerHeaterGroup#1tripsonovercurrent,bringinginARPK0519,PZRHTRSOCTRIP/FANFLO LO.CrewplacesadditionalbackupheatergroupinserviceperOPA4A:I,Pressurizer-MakeAvailable, Section6.6.

3.

Eagle21experiencesaDigitalFilterProcessor(DFP)haltonrack10.AssociatedindicatorsPI456,LI 460A,FI415,FI425,FI435,FI445(VB2),andPR445,LR459(CC2)failasisaswellascontrol channelsforPORV456(PT456)andPressurizerLevelControl(LT460).CrewrespondsperOPAP5, MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControlChannel.ShiftForemanreviewsTechSpecs,entering:

TS3.3.2.D,PC456DLowPressSI(72hrs)

TS3.3.1.E,PC456AHighPressTrip(72hrs)

TS3.3.1.M,PC456CLowPressTrip(72hrs)

TS3.3.1.M,LC460AHighLevelTrip(72hrs)

TS3.3.1.M,FC415(425,435,445)RCSLoop1(2,3,4)Flow(72hrs)

TS3.3.2.L,PC456B,P11(1hr)

TS3.4.11.B1,B2,&B3PC456E,toclose&removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve(1hr)and restoretooperable(72hrs) 4.

MainTurbineStopValve#2(Loop1)closes,causingasecondarytransient,bringingPK0812,TURBLOAD REJECTIONC7Aintoalarm.Powerlowersapproximately10%.Crewmayperformadiagnosticbriefto identifythecauseoftheexcursion.Thecrewidentifiesvariousindicationsthatthestopvalveisfully closedsuchasdeviationsinsteamflow,temperature,Triconexdisplay,aswellasactivationofPK0406, PROTECTIONCHANNELACTIVATEDfor1outof4TurbStmStopVlvsClsd.PowerisstabilizedperShift Foremansdirection.

5.

Loop4FeedwaterRegValve,FCV540,failsfullopen.Thecrewidentifiesthemalfunctionandattempts totakemanualcontrol,butisunsuccessful.ShiftForemandirectsmanualreactortripbeforeS/G14 levelreachestheautotrippointof90%.(S3CT3)ManuallytripsthereactorbeforeS/G14reaches 92%narrowrange.

6.

Onthetrip,thefeedlineheadertoS/G14failscatastrophically,causingS/G14todepressurizeinto containment.

7.

BusGfailstotransfertostartupresultinginalossofpowertotheTDAFWLCVsandaninabilityto throttleflow.FeedflowfromthepumpisisolatedduringrecoveryactionsaspartofcriticaltaskS3CT1 (seepage4,below).

8.

FeedwaterIsolationValveFCV441failsopen,requiringmanualisolationatVB3.(Partofcriticaltask S3CT1,seepage4,below).

L161NRCESD103r3.docx Page4of4 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#3

CrewentersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionandperformstheirimmediateactions.E0 diagnosticstepsdirectthecrewtoE2,FaultedSteamGeneratorIsolationtoperformthecriticaltaskof isolatingthefeedlinebreak.(S3CT1)ManuallyisolatefeedlinebreakbeforeContainmentwiderange levelreaches94feet,resultinginamagentapathontheContainmentsafetyfunctionstatustree.***

Onceisolated,theShiftForemanverifiesSIterminationcriteriahasbeenmetandtransitionstoE1.1,SI Termination,performingthecriticaltaskofsequentiallyreducingECCSflowandrealigningtheplanttoa preSIconfiguration.(S3CT2)TerminateECCSflowbeforeoverfilloftheRCSresultsinaruptureofthe pressurizerrelieftank(PRT).***

Thescenarioisterminatedoncenormalcharging/letdownisalignedinE1.1,readytoperformstep15.

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD104r3.docx Page1of3 Rev3

Facility:

DiabloCanyon(PWR)

ScenarioNo:

4

OpTestNo:

L161NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

InitialConditions:

71%MOL,919ppmboron

Turnover:

OOSEquipment:CCP12

Event No Malf No.

Event Type*

EventDescription (SeeSummaryforNarrativeDetail) 1 MAL_DEG2BFAULT cd='h_v4_101m_1gt680' TS,C (BOP, SRO)

FailonD/G12ManualStart(ARPK1701;TS3.8.1.B) 2 VLV_CVC22_20.2delay=0ramp=15 I(ALL)

RegenHxIsolationValve,LCV459,Failstomidposition(AP 18) 3 RLY_PPL63CLOSED(TRUE)

TS,I (ALL)

SSPSrelayactuationcausesinadvertentstartofTDAFW pumpandblowdownsampleisolationvalvestoclose(AR PK0403,OP1.DC10;TS3.7.5.B) 4 PK1421_08291 C(ALL)

LossofMainTransformerCooling(PK1421) 5 MAL_GEN1_3TRUE M(ALL)

MainTransformerUnitTripscausingaTurbinetrip;Buses transfertoStartUpPower(PK1401,PK1211,AP25) 6 MAL_PPL5A3,MAL_PPL5B3 V5_245S_10,V5_239S_10 M(ALL)

ATWS;rodcontrolmalfunction;CTtoaddnegativereactivity (S4CT1).

7 BKR_EPS20OPENcd='h_v5_230r_1' MAL_DEG1C_2NO_RESET cd='H_V4_224R_1' C(ALL) 12kVStartUpFeederBreakertoStartUpTrip,SDRFailure onD/G11and13;CriticalTasktostartD/G13torestore 4kVvitalbus(S4CT2).

  • (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor

AppendixD(rev10)

ScenarioOutline FormESD1

L161NRCESD104r3.docx Page2of3 Rev3 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)

ActualAttributes

1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Event7) 1
3. Abnormalevents(1-4)(Events1,2,3,4) 4
4. Majortransients(12)(Events5,6) 2
5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E0.1) 1
6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(FRS.1,ECA0.0) 2
7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(Seedescriptionbelow) 2

CriticalTask Justification Reference (S4CT1)Insertnegativereactivityintothe corefollowingperEOPFRS.1guidanceso thatpowerisreducedtolessthan5%by thecompletionofstep19.

Failuretoinsertnegativereactivityasprocedurally directedconstitutesafailuretoprovide appropriatereactivitycontrolandrepresentsan unnecessaryandavoidablechallengetothe criticalitysafetyfunction.

WCAP17711NP,CT52 FRS.1Background Document,Rev.3.

(S4CT2)EnergizeatleastonevitalACbus andrestoreRCPsealcoolingpriorRCPshut downsealactivationwhichisidentifiable bysealno.1returnflowdroppingfroma normalvalueofgreaterthan2gpmtoless than1gpm.(occurswhensealoutlet temperaturesexceed260oF)

FailuretorestorevitalACpowerwhenitis availablerepresentsanunnecessarycontinuation ofadegradedemergencypowerconditionand presentsapotentialchallengetotheRCSfission productbarrierduetoalossofcoolingtotheRCP seals.

WCAP17711NP,CT24 ECA0.0Background Document,Rev.3.

DCMNo.S7,Rev29

PerNUREG1021,AppendixD,ifanoperatororcrewsignificantlydeviatesfromorfailstofollowproceduresthataffectthe maintenanceofbasicsafetyfunctions,thoseactionsmayformthebasisofaCTidentifiedinthepostscenarioreview.

L161NRCESD104r3.docx Page3of3 Rev3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

-NRC#4 1.

MaintenancerequestsmanualstartandloadingofD/G12perOPJ6B:V,DieselGeneratorsManual OperationofDG12,totakethermographyreadingsinsidetheSEDpanelduetolooseterminations discoveredduringmostrecentroutineMOW.Thedieselfailstostart(overcrankcondition)bringingin ARPK1701,DEISEL12FAILTOSTART.ShiftForemanentersTS3.8.1.B,ACSources-Operating,for oneD/Ginoperable.

2.

RegenHxIsolationValve,LCV459,driftstomidpositioncausingletdownorificevalve8149Ctoclose.

ShiftForemanentersOPAP18,LetdownLineFailure.ExcessLetdownisestablishedperOPB1A:IV CVCSExcessLetdownPlaceInServiceandRemoveFromService.

3.

SSPSrelayactuationresultsinTurbineDrivenAFW(TDAFW)PumpSteamSupplyIsolationValve,FCV95, failingopenandisolationofblowdownsamplevalvesinsideandoutsidecontainment.S/Glevels riseandRCStemperaturelowers,causingcontrolrodstostepoutinresponse.FCV95cannotbeclosed andthecrewmustisolatetheTDAFWPumpbyeitherclosingtheLCVstotheindividualS/Gsorby closingsteamsupplyvalvesFCV37andFCV38toleads1and2respectively.ShiftForemanimplements TS3.7.5.B,AFWSystemforoneAFWtraininoperable.

4.

CrewrespondstoARPK1421,MAINTRANSF.Anuclearoperatorisdispatchedtoinvestigatelocal alarmsandreportsbackthatNOcoolingfansoroilpumpsarerunningonMainBankCTransformer.

ShiftForemanentersOPAP25,RapidLoadReductionorShutdownanddirectsa50MW/minpower reductionwhileMaintenanceandfieldOperatorsattempttorestoretransformercooling.

5.

Atapproximately60%power,theplantexperiencesaMainTransformerUnitTripduetoafaultinthe maintransformerandallbusessuccessfullytransfertoStartuppower.TheTurbinetripsasexpected, butthereactortripbreakersremainclosed.(ARPK1401,UNITTRIP;ARPK1211TURBINETRIP,AR PK0411REACTORTRIPINITIATE) 6.

Reactorpowerisstillgreaterthan50%andthecrewidentifiestheATWScondition.EOPFRS.1, ResponsetoNuclearPowerGeneration/ATWS,isentered,eitherdirectlyorfromthestep1,response notobtainedcolumnofEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.Attemptstotripthereactorfromthe ControlRoomareunsuccessfulandAutorodmotionhasfailed.Thecrewperformsthecriticaltaskof addingnegativereactivitybymanuallydrivingrods(S4CT1)Insertnegativereactivityintothecoreso thatpowerislessthan5%.***ThecrewcontinuesworkingthroughFRS.1untilfieldoperatorsareable tolocallyopenthereactortripbreakers.

7.

ThereactorisverifiedsubcriticalandthecrewtransitionstoEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.

EOPE0.1ReactorTripResponseisenteredoncetheneedforaSafetyInjectionhasbeenruledout.

Shortlyafterverifyingprimaryandsecondaryparametersarestable,StartupFeederBreaker52VU12 tripsopenandcannotbeclosed.D/G11(noreset)and13(resettablefromControlRoom)failasa resultoftheirassociatedshutdownrelaysactivating.ThecrewtransitionstoEOPECA0.0,LossofAll VitalACPowerandperformsthecriticaltaskofstartingD/G13(S4CT2)EnergizeatleastonevitalAC busandrestoreRCPsealcoolingbeforeRCPshutdownsealsactivate.***

ThescenarioisterminatedonceRCPsealcoolinghasbeenreestablished.

CT/TCOAnote:

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