ML20106E463

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2020-02-DRAFT Operating Test
ML20106E463
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/2020
From: Greg Werner
Operations Branch IV
To:
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
Download: ML20106E463 (494)


Text

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181A1

Title:

Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OM14.ID1, Fatigue Management Rule Program, rev 30 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: Per answer key Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: Revised from L061 (NRCADM061COORO2) 2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as Gen KA # / Rating: minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. 2.9 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials: OM14.ID1, Fatigue Management Rule Program rev 30 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • It is 0600 on Monday morning, 2/17
  • Both Units are operating at 100% power
  • You have just been contacted by the SM and requested to come in as the relief BOP
  • Below is a summary of your hours for the previous week:

Day Start Time End Time Position 14 Day vacation Saturday, 2/8 0700 1900 Control Operator Sunday, 2/9 1200 2200 WC Extra Monday, 2/10 Day off Tuesday, 2/11 0700 1900 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0700 1900 WC Extra Thursday, 2/13 1900 0700 Balance of Plant Operator Friday, 2/14 1900 0700 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1900 0700 Control Operator Sunday 2/16 Day off Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator

  • The WorkForce scheduling program is out of service Initiating Cue: Review your hours and determine if you can accept the watch, including details to support your evaluation.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Page 2 of 6 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard The candidate determines:

  • Cannot accept the watch
  • (Per procedure step 5.1.7) Less than a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any 9 day period. (no more than 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />)

Start Time: __________ Stop Time:_____________

Page 3 of 6 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Examinee Response - Key

  • The candidate determined they are not available to take the watch. - Critical
  • Basis: Covered Workers allowable work hours during Non-Outage Conditions o Can not exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 24 period: Satisfactory (max was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) - not critical o Can not exceed 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 48 period: Satisfactory (max was 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) - not critical o Can not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any continuous 168 period: Satisfactory (max was 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) - not critical o 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break required in any 9 day period: Unsatisfactory (taking the relief watch at 0700 on Monday would result in a continuous break of 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> in the past 9 day period) - Critical o 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> continuous break minimum break required between shifts: Satisfactory (minimum was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)

- not critical Page 4 of 6 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A1 Initial Conditions:

GIVEN:

  • It is 0600 on Monday morning.
  • Both Units are operating at 100% power.
  • You have just been contacted by the SM and requested to come in as the relief BOP.
  • Below is a summary of your hours for the previous week:

Day Start End Time Position Time 14 Day vacation Saturday, 2/8 0700 1900 Control Operator Sunday, 2/9 1200 2200 WC Extra Monday, 2/10 Day off Tuesday, 2/11 0700 1900 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0700 1900 WC Extra Thursday, 2/13 1900 0700 Balance of Plant Operator Friday, 2/14 1900 0700 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1900 0700 Control Operator Sunday 2/16 Day off Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator

  • The WorkForce scheduling program is out of service Initiating Cue: Review your hours and determine if you can accept the watch, including details to support your evaluation.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Page 5 of 6 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A1 Evaluation Results and Basis

___ Available Basis:

___ Unavailable Page 6 of 6 Rev. 0

D IABLO C ANYON POWER P LANT OM14.ID1 INTERDEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Rev. 30 Page 1 of 44 Fatigue Management Rule Program 05/09/19 Effective Date QUALITY RELATED Table of Contents

1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 1
2. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 2
3. DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................. 2
4. RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 6
5. INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................. 8 5.1 Covered Work ................................................................................................. 8 5.2 Non-Covered Workers .................................................................................. 38 5.3 Contractor/Vendor Work Hour Management Programs ................................. 39
6. RECORDS.................................................................................................... 40
7. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 41
8. Turnover Time .............................................................................................. 42 ATTACHMENTS:
1. Maintenance Rule Risk Significant Systems ................................................. 43
2. Conditions Adverse to Safety or Site Security ............................................... 44
3. Form 69-21349, Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form, 07/09/13
4. Form 69-21350, Fatigue Assessment Form, 05/07/18
1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure applies to all PG&E employees, contractors, vendors, TAs, and on-loan personnel who:

1.1.1 Hold unescorted access or unescorted access authorization to the station's protected areas.

1.1.2 Perform radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the onsite emergency response organization minimum shift complement.

1.2 This procedure implements requirements for fatigue management and related work hour controls per 10 CFR 26, Subpart I, "Managing Fatigue."

1.3 This procedure establishes the following:

1.3.1 Requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 26, Subpart I.

1.3.2 Process for implementing work hour limits for workers performing work subject to 10 CFR 26, subsection 26.205, "Work Hours."

1.3.3 Process used to schedule, track, and calculate work hours.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 2 of 44 1.3.4 Conditions and process applicable to covered work hour limit waivers.

1.3.5 Conditions and process applicable to non-covered work hour limit authorizations.

1.3.6 Conditions and process applicable to performing "Fatigue Assessments."

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 DCPP began using the maximum average work hours (AVG 54) method effective Monday, July 29, 2013.

2.2 The requirements of this procedure are intended to provide reasonable assurance that worker fatigue is avoided and all workers will be able to safely perform their duties and maintain the health and safety of the public.

3. DEFINITIONS 3.1 Behavior Observation Program (BOP) Supervisor: Individual trained/qualified as a fitness for duty supervisor (FFDSUP) responsible for ensuring individuals have the correct fatigue management rule (FMR) classification in the site computer system and are responsible to implement BOP for assigned personnel.

3.2 Break

The number of hours between the time an individual leaves work and starts their next work period; excludes turnover on one end of the work period.

3.3 Circadian Factors: Human physiological processes, such as body temperature and hormone releases, that may affect alertness and cognitive or motor functioning.

3.4 Covered Work: Work that includes:

3.4.1 Operating or on-site directing of the operation of systems and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

3.4.2 Performing on-site maintenance or on-site directing of the maintenance on Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

3.4.3 Performing radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the on-site emergency response organization minimum shift complement.

3.4.4 Performing operations responder duties that includes oversight of the effect of fires and fire suppression on safe shutdown systems.

3.4.5 Performing security duties including but not limited to an armed responder, Zebra, Nora, Alarm Station Officer, Watch Commander, Response Team Leader, or Nuclear Security Sergeant.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 3 of 44 3.5 Covered Worker: An individual who is:

3.5.1 Subject to work hour controls under the FMR.

3.5.2 Granted unescorted access to the station's protected area and performs covered work.

3.6 Day Off: A day when a work period does not begin.

3.7 Directing

The exercise of control over a work activity by a worker who is directly involved in the execution of the work activity, and either:

3.7.1 Makes technical decisions for that activity without subsequent technical review.

3.7.2 Is ultimately responsible for the correct performance of that work activity.

3.8 Electronic Tracking System: A software application used to schedule, develop, and track work hours and evaluation periods.

3.9 Evaluation Period: A rolling six week period that includes the current week and the five previous weeks.

3.10 Fatigue: The degradation of an individual's cognitive and motor functions as a result of inadequate rest.

3.11 Fatigue Assessment: An assessment performed by the Shift Manager, security watch commander, or a qualified BOP supervisor for the following reasons:

3.11.1 For Cause 3.11.2 Post Event if required per OM14.ID5, "Fitness For Duty Program For-Cause and Post Event Chemical Testing" 3.11.3 Self-Declaration 3.11.4 Follow-Up 3.12 Fatigue Management Rule (FMR) Representative: Individual selected by director, manager, or supervisor to become knowledgeable in FMR program to assist with FMR implementation in the department, section or work group. FMR representatives from operations, maintenance, site services contractor, radiation protection, chemistry, and security assist with FMR implementation.

3.13 Incidental Duties: Unscheduled work activities performed off-site, including telephone calls and work required by the supervisor to complete off-site, that are required by the station but do not exceed a nominal 30 minutes in a single break period.

3.14 Nominal: Quantity of time spent on work activities to not exceed 30 minutes plus 25%

(37.5 minutes total) in a single break period.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 4 of 44 3.15 Non-Incidental Duties: Work activities performed off-site that are required by the station and exceed a nominal 30 minutes in a single break period.

3.16 Operations Responder: A designated operations person on shift who provides fire brigade oversight for the effect of fires and fire suppression on safe shutdown equipment.

3.17 Outage: The time when the output breakers are open and the unit is not connected to the grid.

3.18 Overtime Limits: Controls that limit the number of overtime hours and/or consecutive days personnel may work.

3.19 Restorative Sleep: A brief opportunity with accommodations for restorative, uninterrupted sleep of at least one half hour in a designated area.

3.20 Risk Informed SSCs: Those systems that fall under the Maintenance Rule and designated as "risk significant" (refer to Attachment 1). At DCPP, work on all Maintenance Rule SSCs is treated as covered work to prevent minor errors and to take a conservative approach.

3.21 Site Senior-Level Manager: An individual in the position of vice president nuclear generation, Station Director, senior director, or director.

3.22 Turnover Time: Time at the beginning or end of a work period that allows personnel to become familiar with their job duties and responsibilities or to transfer pertinent information to personnel assuming their job duties or responsibilities.T35087 3.23 Waiver Assessment: An assessment authorized by the security watch commander or Shift Manager, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, because the need exists to waiver FMR requirements to protect the health and safety of the public or plant security. This assessment is performed by a qualified BOP supervisor knowledgeable of the work to be performed.

3.24 Work Day: A work day is those consecutive hours from the start of a shift. All hours continuously worked after midnight on a shift that started before midnight count for the previous day.

3.25 Work Hours: The amount of time an individual performs duties for the station. This includes all work hours, with the following exceptions:

3.25.1 Shift turnover time.

3.25.2 Within-shift breaks and rest periods in which there is reasonable opportunity and accommodations for restorative sleep, such as a nap, greater than 30 minutes.

3.25.3 Unscheduled work hours for the purpose of participating in unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills are excluded.

3.25.4 Periods defined in writing by the NRC.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 5 of 44 3.26 Work Period: All work hours where restorative sleep does not occur.

3.27 Work Week: A work week is defined as follows:

3.27.1 Operations use a seven day work week that starts at 0001hrs on Monday morning and continues through 2400hrs on Sunday night.

3.27.2 All other departments use a seven day work week that starts at 0001hrs on Sunday morning and continues through 2400hrs on Saturday night.

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4. RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Site senior-level managers are responsible for:

4.1.1 Authorizing work as meeting the requirements to protect the health and safety of the public.

4.1.2 Ensuring at least once per calendar year a review is performed to monitor hours worked for compliance with the FMR.

4.1.3 Concurring with waivers authorized by the Shift Manager and security watch commander.

4.2 Shift Managers and watch commanders (for security issues), are responsible for:

4.2.1 Determining work is required to protect the health and safety of the public and, with concurrence from site senior-level management, authorizing FMR waivers.

4.2.2 Providing clarifications on applicability of overtime limits.

4.2.3 Ensuring individual work hours are managed with the objective to prevent impairment from fatigue due to the duration, frequency, sequencing of successive shifts or call-in, or incidental duties.

4.2.4 Performing reviews as requested by the vice president nuclear generation or Station Director.

4.3 Supervisors, or managers when evaluating supervisors, are responsible for:T34188 4.3.1 Ensuring no personnel exceed 10 CFR 26 Subpart I work hour limits without appropriate prior authorization and waiver.

4.3.2 Ensuring personnel transitioning from non-covered work to covered work include all hours worked in their work hour calculations.

4.3.3 Assessing personnel fitness to perform assigned work within four (4) hours of covered work performance.

4.3.4 Ensuring assigned personnel have the correct FMR classification code indicated in the site computer system.

4.4 Section managers are responsible for conducting:

4.4.1 A quarterly review of section personnel work hour reports for violations and waivers to evaluate FMR compliance.

4.4.2 The section FMR representative may assist the manager with the review.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 7 of 44 4.5 Department directors are responsible for conducting:

4.5.1 Annual review of department personnel work hour reports for violations and waivers to evaluate FMR compliance.

4.5.2 The department FMR representative may assist the director with the review.

4.6 Station personnel are responsible for:T34188 4.6.1 Being capable of performing assigned work.

4.6.2 Reporting fatigue.

4.6.3 Being aware of hours worked in previous 14 days.

4.6.4 Knowing applicable overtime limits.

4.6.5 Obtaining approval to work overtime.

4.6.6 Timely entry of work schedule changes in tracking software so potential violations are identified and addressed before a violation occurs.

4.7 Quality verification director is responsible for:

4.7.1 Ensuring FFD audits are performed at the appropriate frequency, scope, and depth.

4.7.2 Reviewing and approving FFD audit reports and related audit documents.

4.8 Quality verification personnel are responsible for:

4.8.1 Coordinating and conducting FFD audits at the appropriate frequency, scope, and depth 4.8.2 Preparing and submitting FFD audit reports and related audit documentation 4.9 Payroll supervisor is responsible for retaining records of hours worked and FMR waivers for three (3) years.

4.10 Access/FFD manager is responsible for:

4.10.1 Gathering and reporting data to NRC per 10 CFR 26.203(e).

4.10.2 Coordinating annual effectiveness review of work hour control per 10 CFR 26.205(e).

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5. INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 Covered Work 5.1.1 General Provisions
a. Managers and directors should complete periodic reviews of program violations and waivers to evaluate program health.
1. Managers should review FMR reports on a quarterly basis and directors on an annual basis.

a) FMR representatives may assist the manager or director with the review. SAPN will be used to track the reviews for covered work.

2. The access/FFD manager should assign tasks from a SAPN to track reviews completed by managers and/or directors.
b. Audits NOTE: FMR Program audits are conducted during the FFD Program audit performed by quality.
1. Quality shall audit the management of worker fatigue by reviewing all electronic and hard copy information retained to track work performed under the fatigue management program. Such information may include:

a) FMR waiver forms b) Electronic time reporting records c) Payroll summary reports

2. Audits shall focus on the effectiveness of the fatigue management program.
3. The individuals performing the audit of the program shall be independent from both the subject FFD program's management and from personnel who are directly responsible for implementing the FFD program.
4. The result of the audits, along with any recommendations, shall be documented and reported to site senior-level management.

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5. Each audit report shall identify:

a) Conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of the FFD program b) Cause of the condition(s) c) Recommended corrective actions, when appropriate

6. Review of audit findings shall require corrective actions, including re-auditing of the deficient areas where indicated, to preclude, within reason, repetition of the condition.
7. The resolution of the audit findings and corrective actions shall be documented in the corrective action program.
8. Audits shall be performed on 24 month cycle.
c. Reports
1. Payroll shall provide a summary for of all instances during the previous calendar year in which work hour controls were waived.

a) The summary shall include only those waivers under which work was performed.

2. If it was necessary to waive more than one work hour control during any single extended work period, the summary of instances shall include each of the work hour controls that were waived during the period.

a) When creating the report, each work hour control waived on a single waiver counts as a separate waiver.

3. For each category of workers specified, the station shall:

a) Report the number of instances in which each work hour control specified was waived for workers not working on outage activities.

b) Report the number of instances in which each work hour control was waived for workers working on outage activities.

c) Provide a summary that shows the distribution of waiver use among the workers within each category of workers identified (e.g., a table that shows the number of workers that received only one waiver during the reporting period, the number of workers that received a total of two waivers during the reporting period, etc.).

d) Provide a summary of corrective actions, if any, resulting from the analyses of data, including fatigue assessments.

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4. Reports for only waivers actually used shall be provided to the NRC when requested. The reports shall include:

a) The name of the worker performing the work.

b) The name of the worker's supervisor.

c) A description of the work performed.

d) The outcome of the work performed.

e) The need for the waiver.

f) The name of the person authorizing the waiver.

g) The name of the supervisor approving the waiver.

5. Reports covering all instances where FMR violations occurred and waivers were not issued shall be provided to site senior-level management. The reports shall include the information requested in step 5.1.1c.4.
6. Reports related to fatigue management can be integrated into the overall FFD report and may be submitted electronically using EIE system and the NRC provided format.
7. Reports shall be generated every 12 months.

a) The initial reports generated under this procedure shall cover the period October 1, 2009, through December 31, 2009.

b) Subsequent reports shall cover the period January 1 through December 31.

c) Reports for data collected shall be submitted to the NRC before March 1 of the following year.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 11 of 44 5.1.2 Affected Personnel NOTE: For the purposes of compliance with the FMR, directing only applies to operations and maintenance activities.

a. Any workers on-site with unescorted access who perform work within any of the following job categories are considered covered workers subject to work hour controls.
1. Operations a) Workers operating or on-site directing of work activities for SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

b) Workers performing the duties of operations responders who are specifically designated due to their understanding of the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.

2. Maintenance a) Workers performing on-site maintenance or on-site directing of work activities for SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
3. Radiation Protection and Chemistry a) Workers performing duties which are part of the on-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) minimum shift complement.

b) Support staff is not covered by the FMR.

4. Security a) Workers performing duties including but not limited to an armed responder, Zebra, Nora, Alarm Station Officer, Watch Commander, Response Team Leader, or Nuclear Security Sergeant.
5. Other Personnel a) Any other workers normally considered non-covered workers performing operations or maintenance activities addressed in steps 5.1.2a.1, 5.1.2a.2, 5.1.2a.3, and 5.1.2a.4.
1) The FMR may apply to other personnel who, without further oversight, provide direction to operations and maintenance covered workers.

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2) If non-covered workers perform covered work, the covered work restrictions since the beginning of the cycle (evaluation period) apply until the covered work is complete.
3) If the normally non-covered worker performs covered work intermittently throughout the cycle, he or she should be left as "covered" throughout the cycle.

(a) The fatigue rule covered indicator is tracked in the site computer system on the personnel screen using the Nuclear Fatigue Rule (NFR) Covered Worker field.

(1) Supervisors and managers may review the personnel screen in the site computer system to determine covered status for their staff.

(2) Whenever an individual is processed for unescorted access the NFR Covered Worker field defaults to covered status.

(3) When an individual in a non-covered status changes organizations, the status will be evaluated by the fatigue owner to determine if they need to return to covered status.

5.1.3 All site personnel should make timely entry of work schedule changes in tracking software so potential violations are identified and addressed before a violation occurs.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 13 of 44 5.1.4 Fatigue Assessments

a. Requirements for Fatigue and Waiver Assessments
1. Assessments shall be conducted face to face with the worker whose alertness may be impaired.
2. At a minimum, the assessments shall address the worker's work history for the past 14 days while considering the following factors:

a) Acute fatigue b) Cumulative fatigue c) Circadian factors

3. The assessor shall not conclude that fatigue has not or will not degrade the worker's ability to safely and competently perform his or her duties solely on the basis that the worker's work hours have not exceeded any of the limits specified or that the worker has had the minimum breaks required or minimum days off required, as applicable.
4. The results of any assessment conducted shall be documented including a description of the circumstances that necessitated the fatigue assessment and any controls and conditions that were implemented.

a) If a worker disagrees with the results of an assessment, the worker may request a second assessment by a trained assessor.

5. The Fatigue Management Rule Program owner shall prepare an annual summary of instances of assessments that were conducted during the previous calendar year for any worker for which a fatigue assessment was performed.

a) The summary shall include:

1) The conditions under which each assessment was conducted (i.e., self-declaration, for cause, post-event, or follow up).
2) A statement of whether or not the worker was working on outage activities at the time of the self-declaration or condition resulting in the assessment.
3) The category of duties the worker was performing at the time of the self-declaration or condition resulting in the assessment.
4) Management actions, if any, resulting from each assessment.

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6. If a worker was determined to be fit for duty and he or she disagrees with the finding, the work supervisor shall consider the impact of the worker working under distress.

a) The work supervisor should contact his or her management to discuss options and trending.

7. Workers shall provide complete and accurate information that may be required to address the factors listed in step 5.1.4b.6.

a) Inquiries shall be limited to only the personal information necessary to assess the factors.

b. Fatigue Assessments
1. Fatigue assessments shall be documented on the Fatigue Assessment Form, Form 69-21350.

a) The completed form shall be

1) Documented in a SAPN notification
2) Forwarded to the access/FFD manager.
2. Fatigue assessments shall be conducted under the following conditions:

a) For cause

1) In addition to any other test or determination of fitness that may be required, a fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to an observed condition of impaired individual alertness creating a reasonable suspicion that a worker is not fit to safely and competently perform his or her duties, except if the condition is observed during a worker's break period.
2) If the observed condition is impaired alertness with no other behaviors or physical conditions creating a reasonable suspicion of possible substance abuse, DCPP need only conduct a fatigue assessment.

(a) If there is reason to believe that the observed condition is not due to fatigue, a fatigue assessment is not required.

(b) The access/FFD manager shall be consulted to determine if a for-cause FFD test will be conducted per OM14.ID5.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 15 of 44 b) Self-declaration

1) A fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to a worker's self-declaration to his or her supervisor that he or she is not fit to safely and competently perform his or her duties for any part of a working tour because of fatigue, except if, following the self-declaration, the station permits or requires the worker to take a rest break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> before the worker returns to duty.

c) Post-event

1) A fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to events requiring post-event drug and alcohol testing as specified in OM14.ID5.

(a) Necessary medical treatment shall not be delayed in order to conduct a fatigue assessment.

d) Follow up

1) If a fatigue assessment was conducted for cause or in response to a self-declaration, and the worker returns to duty following a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in duration, the worker shall be reassessed for fatigue as well as the need to implement controls and conditions before permitting the worker to resume performing any duties.
3. In the case of a fatigue assessment conducted for cause, the individual who observed the condition of impaired alertness may not conduct the fatigue assessment.
4. The supervisor performing the fatigue assessment should be a qualified BOP supervisor and qualified to direct the work performed by the worker.

a) If the BOP supervisor is not available, another qualified BOP supervisor may be used (i.e., security or operations supervisor).

5. In the case of a post-event fatigue assessment, the individual who conducts the fatigue assessment may not have:

a) Performed or directed (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.

b) Performed, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the event occurred, a fatigue assessment of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 16 of 44 c) Evaluated or approved a waiver of the limits specified for any of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred, if the event occurred while such workers were performing work under that waiver.

6. A fatigue assessment shall provide the information necessary for management decisions and actions in response to the circumstance that initiated the assessment.
7. Upon notification of a self-declaration of fatigue or stress by security personnel, the security watch commander shall:

a) Perform a fatigue assessment to ensure the symptoms, contributing factors, and effects of fatigue or stress do not adversely affect the employee's performance, except if following the self-declaration, the station permits or requires the worker to take a rest break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> before the worker returns to duty.

b) Document the basis of the recommendation and forward it to the security manager for review and approval and generate a notification documenting the review and approval.

c. Waiver Assessments
1. If there is no supervisor on site who is qualified to direct the work, the assessment may be performed by a supervisor who is qualified to provide oversight of the work to be performed. This may be a second level supervisor or manager.
2. Following a fatigue assessment, the assessor shall determine and implement the controls and conditions, if any, necessary to permit the worker to resume performing duties, including the need for a break.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 17 of 44 5.1.5 Directing Work

a. For the purposes of compliance with the FMR, "directing" applies only to the following operations and maintenance activities:
  • On-site directing of the operation of systems and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
  • On-site directing of maintenance on SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
b. Directing may apply to personnel who, without further oversight, provide direction, to covered workers from operations and maintenance.
1. If non-covered workers direct covered work, the covered work restrictions since the beginning of the cycle (evaluation period) apply until the covered work is complete.

a) If the normally non-covered worker directs covered work intermittently throughout the cycle, he or she should be left as "covered" throughout the cycle.

c. Consideration should include all of the following when determining if an individual is directing an operations or maintenance activity:
1. Is the individual on site?
2. Is the individual the first line supervisor or foreman?
3. Is the individual directly involved in the execution of the work activity?
4. Is the individual making technical decisions for that activity without subsequent technical reviews?
5. Is the individual ultimately responsible for the correct performance of that work activity?
d. The following tasks are examples of activities generally considered NOT directing:
1. Engineering tasks
2. Supervising maintenance on a non-covered SSC
3. Supervising at second level supervision
4. Conducting work control center documentation activities
5. Writing a work procedure
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7. Training personnel during which time the trainee is not operating or performing maintenance activities
8. Reviewing and approving documents
9. Performing any work that is not operations or maintenance on risk significant SSCs (refer to Attachment 1)
10. Technical staff providing recommendations to control room staff
11. Senior management reviewing work plans
12. Contractors, vendors, or engineers providing recommendations on test performance, component and system operation, or other similar technical inputs
e. Position alone should not be the deciding factor when determining personnel covered by the FMR. For example, a Shift Manager is a second level supervisor, but, in practice and as provided in 10 CFR 26, has the authority to direct covered activities.
1. Analyze and evaluate all criteria prior to determining applicability or exclusions.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 19 of 44 5.1.6 Minimum Days Off (MDO)

a. The requirements outlined in this section only apply during the first 60 days of an outage.

Table 1: Required Minimum Days Off for Various Shift Schedules (Outage)

Group 8-Hour Shift 10-Hour Shift 12-Hour Shift Maintenance 1 day off/in any 1 day off/in any 1 day off/in any 7-day period 7-day period 7-day period Operations, Radiation 3 days 3 days 3 days Protection, Chemistry, Ops off/successive off/successive off/successive responder (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period 15-day period 15-day period Security 4 days 4 days 4 days off/successive off/successive off/successive (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period 15-day period 15-day period

1. The option of keeping workers on normal operations work hour restrictions is still available during outages.
2. The table above applies to the first 60 days of a unit outage; after this 60-day period expires, normal online work hour limits shall apply.

a) The 60-day period may be extended seven days for a worker for each 7-day block during which they work 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or less.

b) Multiple 7-day extensions may be given to a worker as long as the 7-day blocks are not overlapping.

3. Minimum days off may be scheduled any day of the week.

a) Maintenance shall meet at least one day off in a 7-day rolling period.

b) For all other covered workers, there is no restraint as to when required days off occur during the 15-day fixed period.

b. For purposes of work hour calculations, average hours worked, and minimum days off calculations, work hours in response to the following situations are excluded from meeting 10 CFR 26, Subpart I requirements:
1. Plant emergencies as defined in the Emergency Plan.

a) After a declared emergency drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

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2. Unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills (unscheduled work hours ONLY).

a) After an unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

3. Security response.

a) Force-on-force tactical exercises: Exclude hours worked by security personnel during the actual conduct of NRC evaluated force-on-force tactical exercises when calculating the worker's average work hours.

b) Common defense and security: When informed in writing by the NRC that the requirements of the FMR are waived for security personnel to ensure the common defense and security, workers exclude FMR requirements for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.

c. If one or both units are in an outage, those licensed operators composing the minimum shift complement of operators required under 10 CFR 50.54(m) for the operating unit, including the operator at the controls specified in 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the senior operator in the control room required under 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii), are not eligible for the MDO requirements permitted by 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4).
1. 10 CFR 26 Subpart I does not prohibit these individuals from performing outage activities.

a) An operator who has been working outage work hours and has had 2 days off in the previous 7-day period may provide relief to the operator at the controls or the senior operator in the control room, if an appropriately qualified operator who has been working nonoutage work hours is not immediately available to provide relief.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 21 of 44 b) If an operator who has been working outage work hours and has had 2 days off in the previous 7-day period is not immediately available, an operator who has been working outage hours may provide either:

1) Short-term relief (up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) for the operator at the controls or the senior operator in the control room without a waiver.
2) Longer term relief (more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) under a waiver of the MDO requirement that is applicable to the shift schedule (i.e., 8-, 10-, or 12-hour shifts) for personnel assigned to the operating unit.
2. When one unit is in an outage and there is one unit operating, the FMR requires 2 reactor operator (RO) licenses and 2 senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses assigned to the shift to be working under nonoutage work restrictions.

a) At least one RO shall be at the controls of the reactor and one SRO shall be in the control room.

d. Workers performing or directing work who are normally non-covered assume the covered work requirements for their assigned department to perform or direct covered work for the length of their assignment and for the work history in the cycle, prior to performing or directing the covered work.
e. Workers temporarily performing or directing covered work who do not leave their normal work department and are normally non-covered, shall follow maintenance work requirements. For example, an engineer giving direction to maintenance workers for a specific job without further oversight is required to meet maintenance covered work requirements for the length of the job and for his or her work history in the cycle.

5.1.7 Work Hour Limits

a. The following limits apply to covered workers regardless of unit status:
1. No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period.
2. No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period.
3. No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day period.
4. At least a 10-hour break between successive work periods, or an 8-hour break when a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts.
5. A 34-hour break in any 9 day period.

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b. Workers performing covered work while the station is on-line are limited to 54 work hours per week when averaged over the rolling 6-week cycle.
c. The following limits apply for workers performing covered work during outages:
1. Minimum days off:

a) 1 day off per week for maintenance personnel.

b) 3 days off for operations, radiation protection, chemistry, and operations (fire) responder personnel every 15 days.

c) 4 days off for security personnel every 15 days.

5.1.8 Breaks

a. Workers shall have, at minimum, the rest breaks specified in step 5.1.7.
b. For the purposes of this section, a break shall be an interval of time that falls between successive work periods, during which the worker does not perform any duties other than one period of shift turnover either at the beginning or at the end of a shift, but not both, for purposes of break calculation. Refer to step 5.1.12a for turnover exceptions related to minimum break between shifts and a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break in 9 days.

5.1.9 Sanctions and Disciplinary Actions

a. Workers shall report to work fit for duty and on schedule.
b. Workers exhibiting chronic self-declaration that they are not fit for duty as a result of fatigue should be considered for referral to the employee assistance program.
c. Workers exhibiting chronic self-declaration that they are not fit for duty as a result of fatigue, absent a sound medical reason, may be subject to disciplinary action.
1. Personnel are required to be fit for duty and get sufficient rest to ensure they are not subject to fatigue.

a) Persons who make choices that result in less than the sleep necessary for that person to remain alert and avoid fatigue are not meeting their obligation per this rule.

d. The refusal on the part of a worker to submit to a fatigue assessment shall subject the worker to disciplinary action and possible removal from unescorted access.
1. Facts to be considered in assessing disciplinary action shall include the employee's job assignment and past work record.

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e. Personnel subject to the fatigue assessments who refuse to be assessed shall be considered fatigued and unable to perform their duties.
1. Time away from work for fatigue management recovery shall be classified as personal time off, if available, or non-paid time.

5.1.10 Schedule Transitions

a. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> break shall only be allowed before the first shift of the new schedule.
b. A worker shall have a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any rolling 9 day period.
c. The MDO requirements shall be met for outage schedules.
d. Outage schedules.
e. Schedule transitions, when output breakers change state, may present problems and should be addressed on a case by case basis for covered workers entering an outage.
1. Follow outage rules if the plant experiences an unplanned trip.

a) If the schedule before the trip would have provided for work hours and breaks within the FMR, no violation of the FMR occurs.

2. When the outage is planned, ensure the schedule meets all work hour and minimum break requirements prior to breaker opening in order to assume outage requirements.
3. A short cycle (less than 6 weeks) occurs in order to have plant personnel resume their normal 6 week cycle. Refer to step 5.1.10h.3.
4. Consider AVG 54 requirements and hours worked.
f. Workers may work 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7 day period the week before or after outages as long as the following conditions are met for the non-outage schedule:
1. The average hours worked
2. MDO requirements during the outage.
g. Transition from covered work to non-covered work presents no problem for the FMR.
1. While performing non-covered work, FMR restrictions do not apply for the worker; however, exceeding overtime limits prescribed the FMR requires notification to the worker's management.

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h. If transitioning into or out of an outage, normal operations work hour rules apply.
1. Outage hours start the shift following breaker opening.
2. Non-outage hours start the shift following breaker closing.
3. A new evaluation period may be used at the completion of an outage.
4. Post-outage transitions are in compliance if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided for the required average days off and the average non-hours worked.
5. If the interval between outages for a worker is less than nine (9) days, then the worker shall have a 34-hour break period and shall not exceed the following limits:

a) 16 work hours in any 24-hour period b) 26 work hours in any 48-hour period c) 72 work hours in any 7-day period

6. A minimum of 2 days off in the preceding 7-day period may be acceptable for operators who have been working outage hours on 10- or 12-hour shifts before they transition to the non-outage unit as one of the two required operators working non-outage minimum days off.

a) This applies only during outages when transitioning a specific SRO or RO from the outage unit to the non-outage unit.

b) This does NOT apply when a nuclear operating unit transitions from an outage to on-line operations.

7. When entering an unplanned outage, the station shall be considered in compliance with the FMR if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided for the required days off.
8. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum days off requirement, shifts worked by security personnel during the actual conduct of NRC-evaluated force-on-force tactical exercises when calculating the worker number of days off may be excluded.

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9. When entering an outage or any evaluation period less than one week in duration, the evaluation period MDO is calculated using the ratio of the number of days off per week required for a 7 day period to the number of days worked in the partial week for the covered classification.

a) If x is <0.5, drop the value.

b) If x is 0.5, make a whole day off required.

x z where x = Required days off for partial week

= y = Number of days worked in partial week y 7 z = Number of required days off in seven (7) days 5.1.11 Self-Declaration

a. All workers shall have the right to self-declare.
b. If called to come into work, the worker should inform the supervisor placing the call that he or she is unfit for duty due to fatigue or stress.
1. Security personnel shall immediately report to their immediate supervisor, or the security watch commander, if any instances arise while performing work that may cause them to be unfit for duty due to fatigue or stress.
c. If a worker is working under a waiver and declares he or she is too fatigued to safely perform their duties, they shall be removed immediately from risk significant duty, unless the worker is required to continue performing that duty under other requirements.
1. If the worker shall continue performing the risk significant duty, the station shall take immediate action to relieve the worker.
d. If a worker declares he or she is too fatigued to safely perform their duties during any part of the assigned work schedule, a fatigue assessment shall be performed.
1. The worker may forego the fatigue assessment if a 10-hour rest break is given before the worker returns to work.
2. The worker may return to non-risk significant duties if fatigue assessment is satisfactory.

5.1.12 Shift Turnover

a. When calculating breaks, either on-coming or off-going shift turnover may be excluded from the calculation of a worker's work hours, but not both.
1. Turnover on both ends of a shift is excluded except for a Minimum Break Between Shift (MBBS), 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break, and a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break in 9 days break calculations.

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b. Shift turnover includes only those activities that are necessary to safely transfer information and responsibilities between two or more workers between shifts.
c. Shift turnover activities may include, but are not limited to, discussions of the status of plant equipment, and the status of ongoing activities, such as extended tests of safety systems and components.
1. Shift turnover may include the time required for security personnel to arm and disarm.
d. Work hours worked during turnovers between workers within a shift period due to rotations or relief within a shift shall not be excluded.
1. Other activities that shall not be excluded from work hours calculations include, but are not limited to:

a) Shift holdovers to cover for late arrivals of incoming shift members b) Early arrivals of workers for meetings, training, or pre-shift briefings for special evolutions c) Holdovers for interviews needed for event investigations.

e. Time should be accounted for in 15 minute increments.

5.1.13 Training

a. All site personnel shall receive FMR CBT training as part of the badging and access process.
1. All directors, managers, and supervisors shall receive training on their specific areas of the FMR procedure.
2. All Shift Managers, security watch commanders, and site senior-level managers shall receive training to delineate and define conditions adverse to public health and safety and plant security. Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance on such conditions.

5.1.14 Transition to Covered Work

a. A worker transitioning from non-covered work to covered work shall meet all requirements for the covered worker:
1. The worker shall meet the MDO requirements for the work group he or she is entering.
2. The worker shall have had a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.
3. The worker shall have a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before starting covered work.

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4. A look-back shall be performed to ensure the worker has not exceeded maximum working hours in the past 7 days and the 54 hour6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> average has or will not be exceeded for the cycle.

a) This may also include AVG 54 requirements for the cycle.

5. A look ahead shall be performed to ensure MDO requirements are met for the covered work group entered.
b. Contractors or vendors performing covered work shall:
1. Follow work hour rules in this procedure.
2. Not count their work hours and days off prior to arriving on site.

5.1.15 Waivers

a. Waivers are only applicable to covered workers performing covered work.

Examples of instances that would most likely meet the threshold for a waiver include:

1. A safety-related SSC fails placing the unit in a shutdown LCO.
2. A worker, who is part of the minimum shift complement, must be held over due to relief not available.
b. A list of authorized waiver issues is provided in Attachment 2.
c. Staffing levels should be sufficient so that schedules for covered workers may be maintained based on vacation and training demand without relying on waivers.Ref 7.5
1. While it is expected and allowed that normal variation in vacation and training demand may occasionally require additional work hours to be used, management shall consider the total vacation, training, and workload demands in order to maintain sufficient staff to execute work.Ref 7.5
d. When informed in writing by the NRC that the FMR requirements are waived for security personnel to ensure common defense and security, the requirements specified in the FMR do not apply for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.
e. Waiver Requirements
1. Waivers shall be granted on an individual basis and only to address circumstances that could not have been reasonably controlled.

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2. Waivers may be granted if either:

a) A Shift Manager, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, determines that the waiver is necessary to mitigate or prevent a condition adverse to safety.

b) The security watch commander, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, determines that the waiver is necessary to maintain site security.

c) A site senior-level manager determines if a waiver is necessary to mitigate or prevent a condition adverse to safety or to maintain site security.

3. The cognizant supervisor shall perform a face-to-face waiver assessment on the worker to determine if there is reasonable assurance that the worker will be able to safely and competently perform assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

a) The supervisor performing the waiver assessment shall be FFD qualified.

b) The supervisor performing the waiver assessment shall be qualified to direct the work (or related work) to be performed by the worker.

1) If there is no supervisor on-site who is qualified to direct the work, the assessment may be performed by a trained supervisor who is qualified to provide direction of the work to be performed by the worker.

c) Waiver assessments prior to the worker performing any work under the waiver shall be performed no more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the work activity.

d) At a minimum, the waiver assessment shall address:

1) The potential for acute and accumulative fatigue considering the worker's work history for at least the past 14 days.
2) The potential for circadian degradations in alertness and performance considering the time of day for which the waiver shall be granted.
3) The potential for fatigue-related degradations in alertness and performance to affect risk-significant functions.
4) Whether any controls and conditions are required under which the worker shall be permitted to perform work.

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4. The documented basis for a waiver shall include:

a) The circumstances that necessitate the waiver.

b) A statement of the scope of work.

c) A time period for which the waiver is approved.

d) The bases for the approval of the waiver.

5. Waivers shall be tracked in the corrective action program.T34188
6. The station does NOT need to meet the waiver requirements during declared emergencies as defined in the Emergency Plan or unannounced ERO drills.

a) After a declared emergency or unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

7. Waivers are not required for changing to and from daylight savings time.
f. Waiver Process
1. Only one work period shall be waivered per FMR Waiver Form, Form 69-21349.
2. Immediate supervisor shall complete a FMR Waiver Form.

a) List the condition adverse to safety or site security requiring resolution.

3. Shift Manager or security watch commander, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, shall authorize a FMR waiver on the FMR waiver form.
4. If condition is determined to NOT be a condition adverse to safety or site security, the waiver is not valid and FMR work hour limits shall not be exceeded.

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5. Once the Shift Manager, security watch commander, and designated site senior-level manager authorizes the waiver, the immediate supervisor shall:

a) Perform a face-to-face supervisory assessment on the worker no more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to exceeding FMR work hour limits using the following guidance:

1) Potential for acute fatiguetime since last 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break.
2) Potential for cumulative fatiguereview 14-day work history.
3) Consider if the worker had adequate opportunity to obtain sufficient rest considering the length and sequencing of break periods, available sleep periods, and transitions that may have interfered with quality sleep.
4) Circadian factorstime of day and recent work cycle.
5) Consider the time of day/night the work will be performed relative to the worker's recent shift schedules.
6) Observation and statements of the worker.
7) How fatigue could affect the work quality, if at all.
8) Nature of work to be performed.

b) Document the supervisory assessment.

c) Determine if there is reasonable assurance that the worker will be able to safely and competently perform assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

d) Determine if there should be any restrictions on the worker that will be assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

e) Document the reasonable assurance determination and any restrictions.

f) Initiate a tracking notification. One notification per waiver is created with work type of "PROG FMR."

6. Worker shall sign the FMR waiver form agreeing they are fit for duty to conduct the planned work under waiver.
7. The immediate supervisor shall perform closeout review promptly after the waiver period and complete the close out section of the FMR waiver form.

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a. Work hour controls apply only to unescorted employees, contractors, or vendors performing or on-site directing covered work. Refer to step 5.1.16e for work hour control exemptions.
b. All hours worked at any nuclear station shall be counted as hours accumulated toward the work hour limitations specified for covered workers.
c. Work activities on both risk-significant and non-risk-significant SSCs contribute towards fatigue; therefore, all work hours shall be considered in the accumulated time related to work hour limitations.
d. Reviews shall be performed annually to evaluate effectiveness of work control hours.
1. If any plant or security system outages or increased threat conditions occurred since the most recently completed review, include in the review an evaluation of the work control hours during outages or increased threat conditions.
2. The review shall be completed within 30 days of the end of the review period.
3. The review shall include:

a) Actual work hours and performance of workers subject to this requirement.

b) Information from the corrective action program.

c) At a minimum, provide:

1) Workers whose actual hours worked during the review period exceeded an average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week in any evaluation period while the worker's work hours are subject to the FMR.
2) Workers who were granted more than one waiver during the review period.
3) Workers who were assessed for fatigue during the review period.

d) Worker's hours worked and the waivers under which work was performed to evaluate staffing adequacy for all jobs subject to the work control hours.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 32 of 44

4. Document the methods used to conduct the review and the results of the review in a SAPN.
5. Document in the corrective action program any problems identified in maintaining control of work hours consistent with the specific requirements and performance objectives.
e. Work hour controls do not apply to the following individuals and activities:Ref 7.5
1. Maintenance activities on Maintenance Rule SSCs located off site.
2. Quality control and quality assurance activities.
3. Predictive maintenance activities that do not result in a change of condition or state of an SSC that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety may be excluded from covered work.

NOTE: At times an activity requires starting or stopping a piece of equipment. The worker starting or stopping the equipment would be performing covered work under the operating category; however, the data collection would not be considered covered work.

a) Examples of activities that may be excluded if they do not change the state or condition of these SSCs include, but are not limited to:

1) Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
2) Thermography
3) Vibration analysis
4) Data collection and analysis
5) Reactor engineering analysis
4. Contractors or vendors, who are not granted unescorted access, conducting work on a risk-significant SSC on site.
5. Contractors or vendors making recommendations to plant personnel.
6. Emergency response personnel who do not perform radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the on-site emergency response organization minimum shift complement.
7. Technical staff making recommendations to other plant personnel.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 33 of 44 5.1.17 Work Hour Calculations

a. Work hour limits and the associated calculation and tracking of work hours apply to the workers performing covered work.T34188
1. This calculation includes both covered and non-covered work since the latter also contributes to fatigue.
b. Work hour accounting practices may be different from record keeping for payroll purposes or gate times.
c. Work hour records should show the number of hours worked each calendar day.
1. Work period start and stop times should be recorded and documented in a consistent manner.
d. Covered workers performing work while off-site shall report hours worked to the cognizant supervisor upon returning on-site.
1. The cognizant supervisor shall ensure any hours worked in excess of the schedule are included into the electronic tracking software.
2. The worker shall be aware of work hour restrictions and not exceed the restrictions without an approved waiver.
e. The calculated work hours shall include all time performing duties for work, including all within-shift break times and rest periods during which there are no reasonable opportunities or accommodations appropriate for restorative sleep.

Work hours include but are not limited to:

1. Shift holdovers to cover for late arrivals of incoming shift members.
2. Early arrivals of workers for required meetings, training, or pre-shift briefings for special evolutions (these activities are not considered shift turnover activities).
3. Holdovers or early arrivals for interviews needed for event investigations.
4. Call-in work periods. The time between leaving the station and the call-in work period are also included if that time is less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in duration.
f. That portion of a break or rest period during which there is a reasonable opportunity and accommodations for restorative sleep (e.g., a nap) may be excluded when calculating a worker's work hours.
g. Personal time in which an individual is on-site but is off duty (i.e., before or after his or her normally scheduled work period in which work activities are performed) may be excluded.

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h. If a worker begins or resumes performing covered work during the calculation period, include in the calculation all hours worked, including hours worked performing non-covered work.
1. Control the worker's work hours per the requirements of this procedure.
i. Incidental unscheduled duties performed off-site (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home), provided the total duration of the work does not exceed a nominal 30 minutes during any single break period, may be excluded.
1. The term "unscheduled" is an integral part of the definition of "Incidental Duties". Once an activity is scheduled it no longer can be called an incidental duty and therefore the 30 minute time limit no longer applies and every minute a worker is performing the activity must be tracked in Workforce as time worked.
2. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum break requirements and the minimum day off requirements, such duties do not constitute work periods or work shifts if the nominal 30 minutes is not exceeded.
3. Time spent on incidental duties is cumulative.

a) The cumulative 30 minutes impacts the break period where the nominal 30 minute limit is exceeded.

j. Contractors or vendors shall track and report their hours to their supervisors between outages.

5.1.18 Work Hour Scheduling

a. Unscheduled work hours for the purpose of participating in unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills may be excluded when calculating actual hours worked.
1. After a declared emergency or unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.
2. Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.
b. Work hours for covered workers shall be scheduled with the objective of preventing impairment from fatigue due to duration, frequency, or sequencing of successive shifts.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 35 of 44

c. Supervisors should consider the following factors when establishing schedules:
1. Work hour limits
2. Consistent start and stop times for work periods
3. Impact of shift rotations
4. Training requirements
5. Vacation scheduling
d. To determine if a worker may be called in to work, use the following guidelines to determine if the work hour limit will be exceeded.
1. Hours worked should be evaluated to determine if any limit will be exceeded based on the work schedule by a backward look at the number of hours that have or will have been worked based on a time in the future (i.e., if the worker works at time T, how many hours will he or she have worked in the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/48 hours/7 days preceding time T relative to work hour limits as well as minimum days off and break requirements).
2. When entering an unplanned outage, compliance with work hour limits is met if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided the required average minimum days off.
3. Deviations from overtime limits may occur as the result of administrative errors or unforeseen circumstances. A notification shall be initiated for each worker if this occurs.

a) If an employee is actively engaged in covered work, remove the employee from covered activities at the earliest possible safe time to do so.

b) If a waiver is warranted and no other work hour compliant individual is available to perform the work, process a waiver per step 5.1.15 prior to continuing.

c) If the employee is not able to work under a waiver, safe transport home should be considered.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 36 of 44 NOTE: A worker is considered "reset" from deviation, whether under a waiver or otherwise, when they meet the hours worked and break requirements in step 5.1.7.

5.1.19 For the purposes of compliance with the maximum average hours worked requirements, supervisors may exclude shifts worked by security personnel during actual conduct of force-on-force tactical exercises evaluated by the NRC when calculating worker's number of days off.

a. Work hour requirements do not apply when informed in writing by the NRC that these requirements, or any subset thereof, are waived for security personnel in order to assure the common defense and security, for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.

5.1.20 Work Performed Off-Site

a. Work hours for unscheduled work performed off-site may be excluded from the calculation of a worker's work hours unscheduled work performed off-site (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home) provided the total duration of the work, which is required by the leader, does not exceed a cumulative 30 minutes during any single break period.
b. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum break requirements and the minimum day off requirements, such duties do not constitute work periods or work shifts.
c. After hours study time that is not required by the company may be excluded from work hour calculations.Ref 7.5
1. As with any academic setting and curriculum, after hours study time varies from worker to worker.
2. Appropriate after hours study time compliments the utility provided training to ensure the learning process occurs and optimal information retention is achieved.
d. When considering work hour extensions for workers performing covered work, all hours worked by the worker shall be included. For example:
1. If a worker has performed 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of non-covered work, and the worker is needed to perform additional covered work that extends beyond 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, then a waiver to exceed the work hour limits shall be approved prior to the worker exceeding the 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> limit.
2. On the other hand, if the worker has performed 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of covered work, and is needed to perform additional non-covered work, then the programmatic approvals of this document do not apply. However, the additional work hours are included in consideration of any other limits if the worker subsequently performs covered work.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 37 of 44 5.1.21 Work Week Schedule

a. Supervisors shall review the actual hours worked and the performance of the workers subject to the FMR.
1. At a minimum, the review shall address:

a) Workers whose actual hours worked during the review period exceeded an average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week in any evaluation period while the workers' work hours are subject to the requirements of the FMR.

2. Use the Corrective Action Program to identify and evaluate the conditions which lead workers to work an average of more than 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week within an evaluation period.
b. An evaluation period shall not exceed six weeks for the purposes of calculating maximum average hours worked.
1. Each department should follow evaluation periods as defined in their respective labor agreements.
c. An eight (8) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall not average more than nine (9) hours per workday over the entire evaluation period.
d. A ten (10) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall not average less than nine (9) hours, but not more than eleven (11) hours, per workday over the entire evaluation period.
e. A twelve (12) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall average more than eleven (11) hours, but not more than twelve (12) hours, per workday over the entire evaluation period.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 38 of 44 5.2 Non-Covered Workers 5.2.1 Non-Covered Worker Requirements

a. Non-covered workers should arrive for work fit for duty and avoid fatigue in order to safely perform their duties.
b. Non-covered workers with unescorted access to the plant shall be subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 26.
c. Non-covered workers performing or directing non-covered work are normally expected to follow the FMR guidelines for minimum days off, overtime limits, and breaks associated with the maintenance organization.
d. Non-covered workers performing or directing non-covered work who enter time in the electronic time keeping system will receive warnings when the FMR is at risk of being exceeded; however, such warnings will not be identified or recorded as violations of the FMR.
e. Manager or higher level should approve non-covered workers exceeding FMR guidelines.
1. Non-covered workers should obtain such approval prior to exceeding the guidelines.
2. Managers who are non-covered workers should receive approval from a site senior-level manager prior to exceeding FMR guidelines.
3. Site senior-level managers who are non-covered workers do not require approval to exceed FMR guidelines.
f. Manager or higher level shall review and approve changing any covered worker to a non-covered worker status.

5.2.2 Non-Covered Worker Limits

a. Workers performing non-covered work shall obtain written approval from a vice president nuclear generation prior to working more than 20 consecutive work days.
1. Workers shall take two consecutive days off prior to returning to work.
b. Supervisors performing non-covered work shall obtain written approval from a vice president nuclear generation, the Station Director, prior to exceeding 13 consecutive work days.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 39 of 44 5.3 Contractor/Vendor Work Hour Management Programs 5.3.1 PG&E may accept a contractor/vendor work hour management program in place of the DCPP program.

a. Contractor/vendor shall submit fatigue management procedure(s) and a description of software tool to PG&E for review and approval.
b. Contractor/vendor representative shall provide work hour monitoring reports on a weekly basis to the PG&E contract technical coordinator.
c. Contractor/vendor representative shall notify the PG&E contract technical coordinator of any potential work hour violations before the violation actually occurs.
d. The PG&E director responsible for implementation of the Fatigue Management Program shall approve the Contractor/Vendor Program before it is used.
e. The contractor/vendor shall notify the PG&E contract technical coordinator of any contractor/vendor fatigue management procedure or fatigue management software changes before they are implemented for use for work completed at DCPP.
f. Contractor/Vendor Program changes reported to the PG&E contract technical coordinator shall be approved for use by the PG&E director responsible for implementation of the Fatigue Management Program before implemented at DCPP.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 40 of 44

6. RECORDS 6.1 Records generated by the use of this procedure include non-training records associated with work hour and related activity tracking, and training records.

6.2 Non-Training Records 6.2.1 Records generated through the implementation of this procedure include the following:

a. Records of work hours for workers who are subject to the work hour controls.
b. Records of shift schedules and evaluation periods of workers who are subject to the work hour controls.
c. The documentation of waivers including the bases for granting the waivers.
d. The documentation of annual work hour reviews including:
1. Documentation of the methods used to conduct the reviews.
2. Results of the reviews.
3. Documentation of any problems found during the reviews.
4. Actions taken under the corrective action program.
e. The documentation of fatigue assessments including assessments related to self-declarations.

6.2.2 The non-training records noted above shall be retained for three (3) years.

a. If there are legal proceedings related to fatigue management in progress at the end of the three year retention period, records shall be retained until the completion of all related legal proceedings.
b. These records do not meet the definition of quality records and therefore do not need to be retained in the records management system.
c. Non-training records may be retained by the department generating the documentation or the payroll group.
d. Non-training records may be generated in hardcopy format or retained electronically using a computer program.

6.2.3 Non-training records are not considered quality-related records.

6.3 Training records associated with fatigue management are considered quality related records and therefore shall be retained in the records management system.

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7. REFERENCES 7.1 AD3.ID6, "Designation and Protection of Security Information" 7.2 NEI 06-11, "Managing Personnel Fatigue at Nuclear Power Reactor Sites" 7.3 NEI 06-11, Addendum, "Implementation Guidance for Maximum Average Work Hours Alternative" 7.4 NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2011-08, "Fatigue Management During Hurricane Conditions" 7.5 Regulatory Guide 5.73, "Fatigue Management for Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" 7.6 10 CFR 26 Subpart I, "Managing Fatigue" 7.7 SAPN 50890593 "No Annual fatigue assessment summary created" OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 42 of 44

8. Turnover Time 8.1 The following table provides examples of acceptable and unacceptable turnover time activities.

Table 2: Turnover Time ACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE

  • Exchanging information with your
  • Authorizing or directing work supervisor, peer, or crew assignments
  • Exchanging information with
  • Performing repairs personnel assuming job duties or
  • Performing a test responsibilities (During watch or job turnover requiring two people, both
  • Reviewing test data are considered on turnover time.)
  • Monitoring work activities
  • Familiarizing yourself with your areas
  • Standing a watch of responsibilities
  • Attending training
  • Crew briefing
  • Attending section meetings
  • Discussing safety issues (safety
  • Reviewing an order for closure meeting, safety concern, etc.)
  • Taking a welder qualification test
  • Obtaining and carrying materials and tools to the work area
  • Investigative interviews 8.2 A director, manager, Shift Manager, or security watch commander shall preauthorize other activities that may fall within the definition of turnover time but are not listed above.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

OM14.ID1 R30 Page 43 of 44 Maintenance Rule Risk Significant Systems Attachment 1: Page 1 of 1 SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM NAME 01 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 03B 02 03 01 TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY-UPSTREAM MSIV 02 05 04B 07 08 09 04C 04 TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY-S/G BLOWDOWN 01 RCS 07A 02 04 01 CVCS 02 08A 04 05 07 01 SI 02 09 03 05 01 RHR 02 10 04 05 01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 12 02 14 01 CCW 16A 01 SAFETY RELATED MU WATER 01 AUX SALTWATER 17B 02 21A 01 D/G 01 D/G FUEL TRANSFER 21B 02 23B 01 MAIN AUX BLDG HVAC 23C1 01 MISC AUX BLDG HVAC 23F1&2 01 CONTROL ROOM HVAC 24 01 GASEOUS RADWASTE 25B 01 BACKUP AIR & N2 36 01 EAGLE 21 37 01 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 38 01 SSPS 01 CONTROL ROD-MECHANICAL 41A 02 41B 01 CONTROL ROD-ELECTRICAL 45B 01 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 62 04 12KV 63A 01 4KV VITAL BUSSES 63B 02 4KV NON-VITAL 64A 01 480V VITAL 65A 01 120V VITAL AC 01 125VDC VITAL 67A 03 69 01 230KV 01 CIVIL STRUCTURES 80 02 95 01 NUCLEAR FUEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROCESS CONTROL 99 FLOCS SYSTEM (PCS)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

OM14.ID1 R30 Page 44 of 44 Conditions Adverse to Safety or Site Security Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1

1. Conditions adverse to safety or site security are unforeseen conditions which, in the informed opinion of the duty Shift Manager or security watch commander, could jeopardize the safety or security of the public, station, personnel, or environment.
2. Waivers are considered appropriate if required to mitigate conditions adverse to safety or site security. If rule compliance could result in the following, but not limited to, type conditions, it would be appropriate to consider using the waiver process:
a. Violate other NRC requirements such as minimum on-site staffing.
b. Jeopardize the industrial or radiological safety of the public or plant personnel.
c. Delay recovery from a challenge to a safety system function, if the compliance with the FMR would cause a forced reactor shutdown, power reduction, or other similar action as a result of exceeding a time limit for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.
d. Delay in recovering from actual or potential loss of reactor core cooling capability during outages.
e. Cause a forced reactor shutdown, power reduction, or similar action as a result of exceeding a time limit for a Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation.
f. Result in an increase in Core Damage Frequency of greater than 1.0E-6, or similar program risk profile.
g. Cause or prevent mitigation of an environmental permit violation.
h. Compromise the ability to maintain the site secure from the actions of malicious groups or persons
i. Force undue risk to on-site or off-site station personnel as a consequence of an external event (e.g., security, fire, or severe weather).

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21349 (07/09/13) OM14.ID1 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form Authorization to Waive Worker Work Hour Limits This attachment should only be used if database is not available.

Date: Notification No. Unit Status (check one)

[ ] Outage [ ] Non-Outage Time:

Waiver Period: Waiver Start: / Waiver End: /

Date / Time Date / Time NOTE: Only one work period shall be waivered per waiver form.

The following person is authorized to exceed the limits of 10 CFR 26 Print Name: Limits Additional Time Work Activity (last, first) (see below) Authorized or Actual Break (see below) OPS HP/CHEM MNT SEC LAN ID:

Enter the letter code(s) for each of the applicable limits being exceeded under "Limits."

A. More than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24-hour period (MWH16/24)

B. More than 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any 48-hour period (MWH26/48)

C. More than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7 day period (MWH72)

D. Fewer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> between work periods (MBBS10)

E. Less than 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the last 9 days (MBBS34/9)

F. More than 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> in a rolling 6 week period (AVG 54)

G. Minimum days off for outage requirements not met (MDO-OUT)

Enter the hours/day in excess of the appropriate limit in the "Additional Time Authorized/Actual Break" column.

Justification for exceeding work hour limits:

Description of work to be performed:

Circumstances that caused work hour extensions:

[ ] ERO Minimum Shift Staffing

[ ] Condition Adverse to Safety SAPN/Order Number: Order Priority:

[ ] Security Threat or Security Outage:

[ ] Necessary to maintain site security (explain):

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21349 (07/09/13) OM14.ID1 Attachment 3 Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form Page 2 of 2 Authorization to Waive Worker Work Hour Limits If the worker will not be in compliance with the work hour limits when they return to work on their next scheduled day of work, then a new authorization to waive the worker work hours, including a new fatigue assessment, must be completed prior to allowing the worker to return to work.

Worker's work schedule has been checked and worker has been notified when he or she can return to work:

[ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Waiver requested by: (Work supervisor or supervisor familiar with work to be performed)

/ /

Print Name Signature Date Waiver authorized by: (Shift Manager, security watch commander, or director or above with requisite signature authority)

/ /

Print Name Signature Date Concurrence by director or above:

/ /

Print Name Signature Date NOTE: Director concurrence may be verbal and/or by telephone, name shall be listed above. If a director authorizes the waiver then no additional concurrence is necessary.

The worker's supervisor will complete Fatigue Assessment per Attachment 4 prior to work beginning.

Fatigue assessment completed: [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

If this waiver was not used, then this attachment should be voided. The voided attachment will not be a QA record and the WorkForce schedule should be updated with actual hours worked.

CLOSE-OUT Print Name: Hours Worked Was work Database (last, first) under this performed Updated?

waiver satisfactorily?

LAN ID: [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Closed by:

/ /

Job Supervisor Signature Date Retention Instructions:

Department - Attach this form to electronic waiver.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Page 1 of 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Fatigue Assessment Name: Badge Number: Fatigue Assessment or Waiver ID Number:

This assessment is intended to determine whether a degradation in a worker's cognitive and motor functioning have occurred due to the lack of rest and where fatigue is identified, establish appropriate controls and conditions ensuring the worker can safely and competently perform assigned duties. Completed assessment shall be maintained as confidential. As request, workers shall provide complete and accurate information necessary to address acute and cumulative fatigue and circadian variations in alertness and performance.

PART A Assessment of Fatigue and Work Hours To be completed by worker being assessed.

Assessment Type (check one)

[ ] WORK HOUR [ ] FOR CAUSE [ ] POST-EVENT [ ] FOLLOW-UP [ ] SELF-WAIVER DECLARATION Assessment cannot Include description Include description Required when a Checking this box, be conducted more of observed notification number worker is returned to completing this than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before behavior and name of event and work after a break of section and signing the worker begins of worker who worker's less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> below indicates a performing any observed condition involvement in following a for cause or formal self-declaration work under the in comments. comments. self-declaration fatigue of fatigue.

waiver. assessment.

Work history of the last 14 days to assess acute and cumulative fatigue and circadian variation in alertness and performance. This information is available from WorkForce on the waiver tab.

Past 14 day work history 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Shift Record D for days, N for nights or Schedule S for swing Hours Only include one shift turnover for Worked time period 34-hour Check the boxes of those days break you've had a break of at least 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> before shift.

Have you had a break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> between successive work periods in the last 14 days (or at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if you were transitioning between shifts)? [ ] YES [ ] NO Have all duties you've performed off-site, if applicable, met the definition of incidental (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home)? [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] N/A How many hours of sleep have you had in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />?

How many hours have you been awake?

How many hours of sleep have you averaged each day in the last 9 days?

Describe the work activity you are performing.

Do you feel you can perform this work activity without additional oversight? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

(Continued on page 2)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 2 of 4 Fatigue Assessment PART A (continued)

Are you mentally alert? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Did factors outside of work keep you from obtaining adequate and regular rest (e.g., illness, family personal obligations)? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Completed by: ______________________________/_______________________________________/_____________

Print Name Signature Date PART B Supervisor Face-to Face Fatigue Assessment BOP supervisor directing or overseeing assessed worker: /

(Print Name) LAN ID As applicable, worker observing the condition of impaired alertness: / [ ] N/A (Print Name) LAN ID BOP supervisor performing fatigue assessment: /

(Print Name) LAN ID Assessment Guidelines:

  • Only BOP supervisors with current plant access authorization may conduct fatigue assessments.
  • If this assessment is for a waiver, it shall not be performed more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the start of the extended work period.
  • When a fatigue assessment is conducted "For Cause," the person who observed the condition of impaired alertness shall not conduct the fatigue assessment.
  • In the case of a post-event fatigue assessment, the worker who conducts the fatigue assessment may not have:
  • Performed or directed (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.
  • Performed, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the event occurred, a fatigue assessment of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.
  • Evaluated or approved a waiver for any of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred, if the event occurred while such workers were performing work under that waiver.
  • For items below as appropriate, interview/observe worker and review worker's assessment/documents to determine whether additional controls and conditions are necessary to address fatigue.

Fatigue Assessment Basis: Describe observed behavior or self-declared conditions leading to assessment. Minimally state the category of duties (Ops, Maintenance, HP, Chemistry, Security, or other) the worker was performing and whether the worker was performing outage activities.

Comments:

(Continued on page 3)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 3 of 4 Fatigue Assessment PART B (continued)

Acute Fatigue Indicators: (Fatigue cause occurring within last 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/since last 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break)

1. Was sleep restricted within last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
2. Has worker been awake > 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
3. Did tasks at or away from work require physical exertion? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
4. Does worker appear intoxicated? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
5. Sleepiness-yawning, tired eyes, legs? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
6. Rubs face with hands often? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
7. Poor communication/decisions? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
8. Bad mood, apathetic, fixated? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Observe worker and review Section A completed by the worker:

Comments:

Cumulative Fatigue Indicators (Increases in fatigue over consecutive sleep-wake periods resulting from inadequate rest)

9. Was sleep restricted between any changes in shift schedules within the last 14 days? [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. Did worker experience sustained wakefulness within last 14 days (were length of sleep [ ] YES [ ] NO periods reduced as work week progressed)?
11. If worker has sleep debt, has worker been unable to catch-up depleted sleep between [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] N/A shifts or on off-periods?
12. Has worker experienced any personal issues or other factors that may impact his or her [ ] YES [ ] NO ability to obtain adequate sleep within last month? If so, when? Describe impact.
13. Has worker lacked initiative or creativity? [ ] YES [ ] NO
14. Has worker's work schedule during past 14 days prevented opportunity to obtain [ ] YES [ ] NO sufficient rest?

Comments:

(Continued on page 4)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 4 of 4 Fatigue Assessment Circadian Rhythm Considerations (changes in alertness and cognitive/motor functioning related to approximate 24-hour cycle)

Is worker on day, afternoon or evening shifts? [ ] Day Shift [ ] Afternoon Shift [ ] Evening Shift

15. Is worker experiencing or exhibiting fatigue symptoms during possible physiological [ ] YES [ ] NO alertness low points (01:00 - 04:30 or 13:30 - 15:30)?
16. Is worker's rest/sleep being interrupted by external time cues such as light and social [ ] YES [ ] NO activity?

Potential Effect of Fatigue on Work Quality (What risk significant function could be impacted during this activity, i.e., reactivity management, radioactive release, pressure boundary, containment isolation/integrity, off site power, core cooling, decay heat removal? Consider quality barriers such as post maintenance testing, independent verifications, hold points, or surveillance testing.)

Nature of Work to be Performed (What environmental conditions exist that could increase fatigue? Is task repetitive?

Does task have high mental focus or attention demands? Will there be social interaction?)

Assessment Results Based on your review and the fatigue assessment, you will need to determine if the individual can work without restriction (PASS), work with restrictions (PASS RESTRICTED) or not be able to continue to work (FAIL). The decision takes into consideration answers to questions B1 through B16, the answers to these questions are counted and assist with determining the assessment result. The score guidelines listed with the outcomes are to be utilized unless the individual performing the assessment determines a more restrictive outcome is indicated.

[ ] PASS Worker does not exhibit signs of impairment due to fatigue and may continue to work with no additional controls or conditions. Select this outcome if there are zero or one "YES" answer on questions B1 through B16 or all answers to questions B1 through B16 are "NO" or "N/A".

[ ] PASS RESTRICTED Worker may continue working under controls and conditions identified in the next block.

Select this response if there are 2 or more "YES" responses on questions B1 through B16.

[ ] FAIL Worker is exhibiting impairment due to fatigue and must be provided a break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Select this response if there are five or more "YES" answers on questions B1 through B16.

Fatigue Controls and Conditions (to address fatigue concerns identified above)

[ ] Additional Breaks Required:

[ ] Additional Oversight/Verifications/Peer Checks required:

[ ] Additional Environmental Controls required:

Results of the fatigue assessment have been provided to the assessed worker: Worker's initials____________

If worker advises assessor they do not feel they can continue working, the assessor should notify their supervisor and enter the self-declared fatigue process outline in OM14.ID1.

Initiate a notification: [ ] Notification Number:

Supervisor Performing Assessment:

Waived work period begins: /

Date Time*

/ /

Print Name Signature Date/Time*

  • If this assessment is for a waiver, it shall not be performed more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the start of the waived work period.

Retention Instructions:

Department - Document creation of this form in a notification and forward original or a copy to the access/FFD manager OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A2

Title:

Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP SD-5, Loss of Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 10 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: See task standard Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: Revised from Bank LJC-014 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials such as graphs, Gen KA # / Rating: curves, tables, etc. 3.9 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

  • Calculator
  • OP AP SD-5, Loss of Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 10, Appendix B - Estimation of Decay Heat and Heatup Rate Initial Conditions: GIVEN:
  • Unit 1 was shut down six days ago for a refueling outage
  • RCS has been drained to 108' and is being maintained at that level in accordance with OP A-2:III, Reactor Vessel - Draining to Half Loop/Half Loop Operations With Fuel in Vessel
  • Core is still loaded
  • RHR pump 1-2 just tripped on overcurrent o RHR pump 1-1 can NOT be started o RCS temperature is 106 oF o NR RVRLIS level is 108'
  • The Excel Spreadsheet to calculate heatup rate is unavailable Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman has directed you to determine the time to reach 200oF per OP AP SD-5, Appendix B.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard:

  • Determined decay heat load is 12.0 MWn(+/-0.5 MW)
  • Determined heatup rate was 5.4 oF (+/- 0.3)
  • Determined the time to reach 200oF is 17.4 (+/-1.0)minutes Start End Time: Time:

Page 2 of 6 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Page 3 of 6 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET APPENDIX B Estimation of Decay Heat and Heatup RateT31417 NOTE: This appendix is normally performed using an Excel spreadsheet. The Excel spreadsheet is more accurate than using this appendix, and also contains time to core uncovery calculations. Use of either this appendix (hard copy) or the Excel spreadsheet is acceptable for determining heatup rates and time to 200°F.

1. PREDICTED HEAT LOAD
2.
  • REDUCTION FACTOR FOR REFUELED CORES 12.0 (+/-0.5) MW X 1.0 = 12.0 (+/-0.5) - *Critical MW Predicted Fraction of Previously Estimated Heat Load Used assemblies Decay Heat Load Installed in Core *
  • Use 1.0 if unknown Page 4 of 6 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Estimate Decay Heat and Heat Removal Rate JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A2 ANSWER KEY APPENDIX B (Continued)

3. HEAT UP RATE PREDICTION 12.0 (+/-0.5) MW X 0.45 = 5.4 (+/-0.3) Degrees per
  • Critical-Estimated Inventory Predicted Minute Decay Heat Factor Heat Up Load Rate
a. INVENTORY FACTOR - Degrees/MW Min 107-ft 0.52 108-ft 0.45 Nozzle Dams Installed OR NO Nozzle Dams Installed AND SG Tubes Voided SG Tubes Not Voided 110-ft 0.40 112-ft 0.36 0.29 114-ft 0.33 0.27 116-ft 0.31 0.26 118-ft 0.31 0.054 Upper Internals Removed (Use 118-ft if Upper Internals Installed) 120-ft 0.06 130-ft 0.03 138-ft 0.02
4.
  • ESTIMATED TIME TO REACH 200 DEGREES 200 ____94_______ Delta Temp Existing

-_106__ Temperature ÷ Actual or = _17.4 (+/-1.0)_-

  • Critical Predicted Minutes to

_94____ Delta Temp _5.4 (5.1 - 5.7)__ Heat Up Rate reach 200 Page 5 of 6 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • Unit 1 was shut down six days ago for a refueling outage
  • RCS has been drained to 108' and is being maintained at that level in accordance with OP A-2:III, Reactor Vessel - Draining to Half Loop/Half Loop Operations With Fuel in Vessel
  • Core is still loaded
  • RHR pump 1-2 just tripped on overcurrent o RHR pump 1-1 can NOT be started o RCS temperature is 106 oF o NR RVRLIS level is 108'
  • The Excel Spreadsheet to calculate heatup rate is unavailable Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman has directed you to determine the time to reach 200oF per OP AP SD-5, Appendix B.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Page 6 of 6 Rev. 0

Loss of Residual Heat Removal OP AP SD-5 R10 Page 5 of 7 UNITS 1&2 APPENDIX B Estimation of Decay Heat and Heatup RateT31417/T31098

1. PREDICTED HEAT LOAD



2. REDUCTION FACTOR FOR REFUELED CORES MW X = MW Predicted Fraction of Previously Estimated Heat Load Used Assemblies Decay Heat Installed in Core
  • Load
  • Use 1.0 if unknown OP_AP_SD-5u3r10.DOC 0130.1657

Loss of Residual Heat Removal OP AP SD-5 R10 Page 6 of 7 UNITS 1&2 APPENDIX B (Continued)

3. HEAT UP RATE PREDICTION MW X = Degrees per Minute Estimated Inventory Predicted Decay Heat Factor Heat Up Load Rate
a. INVENTORY FACTOR - Degrees/MW Min 107' 0.52 108' 0.45 Nozzle Dams Installed NO Nozzle Dams Installed OR SG Tubes Voided AND SG Tubes NOT Voided 110' 0.40 -----

112' 0.36 0.29 114' 0.33 0.27 116' 0.31 0.26 118' 0.31 0.054 Upper Internals Removed (Use 118' if Upper Internals Installed) 120' 0.06 130' 0.03 138' 0.02

4. ESTIMATED TIME TO REACH 200 DEGREES 200° Delta Temp Existing

- Temperature ÷ Actual or =

Predicted Minutes to Delta Temp Heat Up Rate reach 200 OP_AP_SD-5u3r10.DOC 0130.1657

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A3

Title:

Perform STP I-1A Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Perform __X Simulate Method:

Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: ________ minutes Comments: Designed for RO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

STP I-1A, Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses, rev 141 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: See task standard Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: New G2.2.37 - Ability to determine operability and/or availability of Gen KA # / Rating:

safety related equipment 3.6 RON FORTIER DATE: 11/20/2019 AUTHOR CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 11/26/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform STP I-1A JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly documented. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure (as applicable) and told the steps with which to begin.

Required STP I-1A, Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses, Steps 12.5 and 12.6, rev 141 Materials:

Initial Unit 1 is at 100% power Conditions:

Initiating Cue: You are instructed to perform STP I-1A, Shift Checks Required by Licenses:

  • Inform the SFM of the results NOTE:
  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard :

  • Step 12.5.3 not met o RCS Accumulator 1-2 level change is greater than 3% (5%)

Task Standard:

  • Step 12.6.2 not met o RCS Accumulator 1-2 pressure greater than 640 psig (650 psig) o RCS Accumulator 1-3 pressure less than 600 psig (590/585 psig).

Start Time: ____________

Stop Time: _____________

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 4 Rev. 0

Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R141 Page 15 of 118 U1 Section 12: Page 6 of 28 12.5 RCS Accumulator Volume -

a. Select indicators used. _glh1__
b. Record levels for indicators selected. _glh1_
c. Record C-2 level from latest STP C-2 volume. _glh1_

RCS Current STP C-2 % Level Accum. VB-1 Ind or PPC Point Level (%) Level Change LI-950 [X] LI950R [ ] 70 - 68 = 2 1-1 LI-951 [X] LI951R [ ] 70 - 68 = 2 LI-952 [X] LI952R [ ] 73 - 68 = 5*

1-2 73 LI-953 [X] LI953R [ ] - 68 = 5*

LI-954 [X] LI954R [ ] 68 - 67 = 1 1-3 68 - 67 LI-955 [X] LI955R [ ] = 1 69 - 69 = 0 LI-956 [X] LI956R [ ]

1-4 69 - 68 LI-957 [X] LI957R [ ] = 1

d. Calculate level changes in table above. _glh1_

12.5.2 Check all current RCS accumulator levels are 59% [52%] AND 75% [82%]. _glh1_

12.5.3 Check all RCS accumulator level changes are +3% [+5.6%]. _____

12.5.4 IF draining or filling of accumulator(s) has occurred OR level increase is unacceptable, THEN request chemistry to perform STP C-2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for affected accumulator(s). [ ]N/A _glh1_

ANSWER KEY STP_I-1Au1r41.DOC 0806.1531

Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R141 Page 16 of 118 U1 Section 12: Page 7 of 28 12.6 RCS Accumulator Nitrogen Pressure * - out of specification Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 SR 3.5.1.3 RCS Accumulator Nitrogen Pressure 12.6.1 In table below, record the following:

a. Select indicators used. _glh1_
b. Record pressure readings for indicators selected. _glh1_

RCS Pressure Accumulator VB-1 Ind or PPC Point (psig)

PI-960 [ X] PI960R [ ] 610 1-1 PI-961 [ X] PI961R [ ] 610 PI-962 [ X] PI962R [ ] 650

  • 1-2 650
  • PI-963 [ X] PI963R [ ]

PI-964 [ X] PI964R [ ] 590

  • 1-3 585
  • PI-965 [ X] PI965R [ ]

PI-966 [ X] PI966R [ ] 615 1-4 615 PI-967 [ X] PI967R [ ]

12.6.2 Check RCS accumulator nitrogen pressures are 600 psig [579 psig]

AND 640 psig [664 psig]. _____

12.7 Pressurizer Level Channels Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 Admin PPC Pressurizer Level Channels 12.7.1 Check the following PPC Pressurizer Level Channels have a quality code of good (green): _____

  • L0480A
  • L0481A ANSWER KEY
  • L0482A 12.7.2 IF a quality code is NOT good, THEN document in a notification. [ ]N/A _____

STP_I-1Au1r41.DOC 0806.1531

JPM TITLE: Perform STP I-1A JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Response: _____________________________________________________________________________

Examinee Response - Key See attached marked up procedure

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 4 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A3 Initial Unit 1 is at 100% power Conditions:

Initiating Cue: You are instructed to perform STP I-1A, Shift Checks Required by Licenses:

  • Inform the SFM of the results NOTE:
  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Page 4 of 4 Rev. 0

Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R141 Page 15 of 118 U1 Section 12: Page 6 of 28 12.5 RCS Accumulator Volume Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 SR 3.5.1.2 RCS Accumulator Volume SR 3.5.1.4 12.5.1 In table below, record the following:

a. Select indicators used. _____
b. Record levels for indicators selected. _____
c. Record C-2 level from latest STP C-2 volume. _____

RCS Current STP C-2  % Level Accum. VB-1 Ind or PPC Point Level (%) Level Change LI-950 [ ] LI950R [ ] - =

1-1 LI-951 [ ] LI951R [ ] - =

LI-952 [ ] LI952R [ ] - =

1-2 LI-953 [ ] LI953R [ ] - =

LI-954 [ ] LI954R [ ] - =

1-3 LI-955 [ ] LI955R [ ] - =

LI-956 [ ] LI956R [ ] - =

1-4 LI-957 [ ] LI957R [ ] - =

d. Calculate level changes in table above. _____

12.5.2 Check all current RCS accumulator levels are 59% [52%] AND 75% [82%]. _____

12.5.3 Check all RCS accumulator level changes are +3% [+5.6%]. _____

12.5.4 IF draining or filling of accumulator(s) has occurred OR level increase is unacceptable, THEN request chemistry to perform STP C-2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for affected accumulator(s). [ ]N/A _____

STP_I-1Au1r41.DOC 0806.1531

Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses STP I-1A R141 Page 16 of 118 U1 Section 12: Page 7 of 28 12.6 RCS Accumulator Nitrogen Pressure Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 SR 3.5.1.3 RCS Accumulator Nitrogen Pressure 12.6.1 In table below, record the following:

a. Select indicators used. _____
b. Record pressure readings for indicators selected. _____

RCS Pressure Accumulator VB-1 Ind or PPC Point (psig)

PI-960 [ ] PI960R [ ]

1-1 PI-961 [ ] PI961R [ ]

PI-962 [ ] PI962R [ ]

1-2 PI-963 [ ] PI963R [ ]

PI-964 [ ] PI964R [ ]

1-3 PI-965 [ ] PI965R [ ]

PI-966 [ ] PI966R [ ]

1-4 PI-967 [ ] PI967R [ ]

12.6.2 Check RCS accumulator nitrogen pressures are 600 psig [579 psig]

AND 640 psig [664 psig]. _____

12.7 Pressurizer Level Channels Applicability Requirement Parameter MODE 1 Admin PPC Pressurizer Level Channels 12.7.1 Check the following PPC Pressurizer Level Channels have a quality code of good (green): _____

  • L0480A
  • L0481A
  • L0482A 12.7.2 IF a quality code is NOT good, THEN document in a notification. [ ]N/A _____

STP_I-1Au1r41.DOC 0806.1531

69-13523 02/12/09 Page 1 of 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE:

STP C-2 ATTACHMENT 9.1 Accumulator Chemical Concentration Data Sheet 1 2 AND A. Unit: ___1___ Operating MODE: ___1___ Date/Time: _02/23/20_/_0230_

B. Reason for Analysis:

[ X ] Monthly (31 Day) Analysis [ ] Other _______________________________________

[ ] 3% level increase or any operational draining or filling. (REFER TO OM12.DC1, "Relieving the Watch,"

Form 69-09377, for date and time of level change as determined by operations.)

Accumulator Level (%)

C. Accumulator Boron in Limits?

Boron Concentration Vertical Board PPC LI950 _68_ LI950R __68.2_

Accumulator #1: _2340_ ppm [X]Yes [ ]No [ ]N/A LI951 _68___ LI951R __68.1_

LI952 _68___ LI952R __67.8_

Accumulator #2: _2298_ ppm [ X ]Yes [ ]No [ ]N/A LI953 _68___ LI953R __67.5_

LI954 _67___ LI954R __67.2_

Accumulator #3: _2318_ ppm [ X ]Yes [ ]No [ ]N/A LI955 _67___ LI955R __67.0_

LI956 _69___ LI956R __68.4_

Accumulator #4: __2322_ ppm [ X ]Yes [ ]No [ ]N/A LI957 _68___ LI957R __68.1_

Acceptance Criteria Accumulator level values have no acceptance criteria in STP C-2.

IF accumulator boron concentration is 2200 ppm and 2500 ppm, THEN the accumulator results are acceptable.

OTHERWISE the results are NOT acceptable.

Accumulator boron concentrations are: [ X] Acceptable [ ] NOT Acceptable IF NOT acceptable, THEN perform the following:

Immediately notify SFM and chemistry foreman.

Create a notification. # _______________

The chemistry foreman shall notify the chemistry engineer of any out-of-limit parameter.

Comments:

STP_C-2u3r10.doc 06 1024.1412

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A4

Title:

Perform RM-19 Channel Check Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Perform __X Simulate Method:

Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: ________ minutes Comments: Designed for RO candidates in a classroom setting.

Operations Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria, rev 6

References:

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: Per Examinee Response - Key Job Designation: RO Rev Comments: New G2.3.5 -Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as Gen KA # / Rating: fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. 2.9 RON FORTIER DATE: 11/08/19 AUTHOR CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 11/26/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform RM-19 Channel Check JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A4 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly documented. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure (as applicable) and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Operations Policy B-5, Materials:

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • Both Unit 1 and 2 are at 100% power
  • STP I-1B, Attachment 12.1, MODES 1, 2, and 3 Daily Checklist is being performed
  • The operator has reached step 15, CHANNEL CHECK the steam generator blowdown liquid monitor, RM-19 Initiating Cue: You are instructed to use Operations Section Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria to perform the CHANNEL CHECK for steam generator blowdown liquid monitor, RM-19 and document all your results to support your determination.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard :

Channel Check is UNSAT due to:

Task Standard:

  • Range selector switch is set to NARROW
  • Setpoint toggle switch selected to HASP #2 (MAINT ONLY)

Start Time: ____________

Stop Time: _____________

Follow up Question Documentation:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 5 Rev. 0

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 3 of 6

2. WESTINGHOUSE RAD MONITORS (includes RM-3, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22)
a. POWER light is ON.
b. Operation Selector switch set to OPERATE.
c. Range Selector switch set to WIDE.
d. Normal analog channel levels and response.
e. Red LOW ALARM lamp is OFF.

There are additional checks for RM-11, Containment Air Particulate detector:

f. Sample Selector set to MAIN sample.
g. PUMP ON light is lit.
h. FILTER NOT IN MOTION light is OUT.

There is an additional check for RM-3, OWS effluent monitor:

Y

i. Flow verified through the monitor while the OWS is running.

NOTE: RM-19 setpoint toggle switch selected to the HASP #1 (S/G TO B/D) position.

3. VICTOREEN RAD MONITORS KE ANALOG RAD MONITORS (includes RM-71, 72, 73, 74, 30, 31, U-1 RM-29)
a. Switch selector to OPERATE or ALL.
b. Green SAFE/FAIL/RESET light is ON.
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

ER DIGITAL RMs (includes RM-14/R, 15/R, 24/R, 28/R, 44A/B, U-2 RM-29)

a. White NORMAL panel light is ON.
b. Red SKID PMP light ON.
c. The Remote Display Units (RDU) on the back panels have digital readouts which must update periodically, generally from 15 to 120 seconds.

NOTES:

SW

1. RM-30, 31 detectors measure in R/hr and should generally be less than 1 R/hr on a normal channel check. An auto check of these detectors to 1E3 will occur every 17 minutes to ensure these monitors are not failed low. This auto check is NOT a required channel check.
2. RM-29 (Unit 2) detector has a RANGE light which will illuminate when the detector reading drops below its under-range of less than 0.01 mR/hr. When it AN registers activity greater than 0.01mR/hr, the red RANGE light will go OUT.
4. MISCELLANEOUS RADIATION MONITORS RM-58, 59
a. Switch selected to OPERATE.
b. Green OPERATE light is ON.
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

NOTE 1: RM-59 will generally read very low, whereas RM-58 may read significantly higher especially following a refueling on that unit.

NOTE 2: RM if no pulses occur within approximately 150 seconds, the failure alarm comes in, otherwise the OPERATE light stays illuminated.

RM-23, RADECO monitor (located in PM-205, 115, Aux Bldg)

a. HIGH and LOW alarm lamps should be ON (these lamps go OUT on an alarm condition).
b. Normal analog channel levels and response.

RM-25, 26, 51, 52, 53, 54

a. White NORMAL light is ON (RM-51 through 54).
b. Yellow FAILURE light is OFF (RM-25, 26).
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

JPM TITLE: Perform RM-19 Channel Check JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A4 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Question: _____________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________

Examinee Response - Key RM-19 Channel Check SAT: _____

UNSAT: __X___

Basis for SAT/UNSAT:

  • Range selector switch is set to NARROW
  • Setpoint toggle switch selected to HASP #2 (MAINT ONLY)
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 5 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A4 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • Both Unit 1 and 2 are at 100% power
  • STP I-1B, Attachment 12.1, MODES 1, 2, and 3 Daily Checklist is being performed
  • The operator has reached step 15, CHANNEL CHECK the steam generator blowdown liquid monitor, RM-19 Initiating Cue: You are instructed to use Operations Section Policy B-5, Channel Check Criteria to perform the CHANNEL CHECK for steam generator blowdown liquid monitor, RM-19 and document all your results to support your determination.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Examinee Response - Key RM-19 Channel Check SAT: _____

UNSAT: _____

Basis for SAT/UNSAT:

Page 4 of 5 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A4 Page 5 of 5 Rev. 0

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Number: B-5 OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 1 of 6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TITLE: CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA APPROVED:

Operations Manager As defined in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), a CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

The first sentence of the CHANNEL CHECK definition implies that single instrument channel checks are entirely permissible. The second part of the definition goes on to say where possible, a CHANNEL CHECK of independent, redundant channels measuring the same parameter shall be performed. It is also clear from the definition, that quantitative limits are not applicable to CHANNEL CHECKS.

In the past, several different classes of instruments have presented problems to operators in their CHANNEL CHECKS. These include flow instruments, which utilize square root extractors, radiation monitors, and process analysis instruments (ANI/ANRs). This policy was written to standardize the procedure for performing CHANNEL CHECKS. It is very important that the channel check criteria listed below be used as GUIDELINES for determining channel operability. Remember that not all checks need to be satisfied when determining that a particular instrument is OPERABLE. For example, a channel check criterion for the Radiation Monitors is to check the POWER light is ON.

If the POWER light is found OFF, the monitor may still be OPERABLE. Operators need to look at other indications as well. If the RM were indicating normal background radiation, the analog meter needle was oscillating slightly, all switches were in their normal position, and power fuses were installed, the shift operators should consider the Radiation Monitor OPERABLE. In this case, it is probable the POWER ON light bulb is burned out. The guideline status of these CHANNEL CHECK steps must always be recognized.

A. GENERAL CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA The criteria listed below are applicable to most channel checks and may be applied to single and/or redundant instrument channels. Whenever an instrument channel is declared inoperable, the SFM needs to consider the effect on protection bistables associated with that indication. Certain criterion listed below will apply to instrument classes listed in the following sections of this policy.

1. Most instrument loops at DCPP utilize a 4-20 mA current scheme. Thus, most zero (0) readings occur at 4 mA. This is termed a live zero, since the instrument should generate a current output even for the zero reading (0). However with various accuracy limits among instruments, it is very possible to have a below zero reading which is normal for that channel. However, if the meter needle is hard against its low limit peg and motionless, the channel may have failed low and should be considered inoperable. Contact I&C for evaluation of the instrument and the SFM for status of channel operability.

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 2 of 6

2. For redundant instruments measuring the same parameter, one indicator reading GREATER THAN 5% (of scale) higher or lower than other channels should be declared inoperable. An exception to this rule is with the Pressurizer Level Channels, where one indicator reading GREATER THAN 8.5% (of scale) higher or lower than other channels should be declared inoperable. (Reference A0437900/07).
3. Some parameters are measured by both WIDE RANGE and NARROW RANGE instruments, e.g., accumulator levels. Because the instrument loops are calibrated to different ranges, these channels should NOT be considered redundant channels for the purpose of CHANNEL CHECKS.
4. Most analog meters indicate they are updating properly by showing a slight meter needle movement (oscillation). Most digital meters will refresh their indications periodically, e.g.,

every 20 seconds. If an analog meter needle is rock steady or oscillating excessively or if a digital indication is not updating periodically, then notify the SFM since the instrument may be inoperable. I&C should be contacted for evaluation of the channel response.

5. Many chart recorders provide the plant with permanent logs. In this case, I&C will calibrate the recorder pen trace more accurately than the meter scale pointer. Most meters and recorders exhibit a small amount of needle or pen oscillation. If this oscillation is excessive, e.g., +/-5% of channel scale, the instrument should be considered inoperable. Contact I&C for evaluation of meters or recorders exhibiting this behavior.
6. When comparing NI-31 or 32 with a Gamma-Metrics channel, the channel check is acceptable if the readings are within one decade of each other. (Reference A0603406/03)
7. Section E lists appropriate reference procedures for all instrument checks described within this Policy. Exercise caution when using quantitative test documents for performing CHANNEL CHECKS.

B. RADIATION MONITOR CHECKS Due to the wide variety of radiation monitors currently in use at DCPP, not all the checks listed below can be performed for each class of monitor. Operators should use ONLY those checks which are applicable for the RM they are channel checking. If the validity of an indication on a RMS channel is questioned, the SFM and I&C shall be notified for an evaluation of the problem and a determination of channel operability.

1. Many of the RMS channels below have an analog meter indication. A normal channel check of these meters should indicate background or normal, historical radiation levels. Analog meters are updating properly when they show a slight meter needle movement (oscillation).

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 3 of 6

2. WESTINGHOUSE RAD MONITORS (includes RM-3, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22)
a. POWER light is ON.
b. Operation Selector switch set to OPERATE.
c. Range Selector switch set to WIDE.
d. Normal analog channel levels and response.
e. Red LOW ALARM lamp is OFF.

There are additional checks for RM-11, Containment Air Particulate detector:

f. Sample Selector set to MAIN sample.
g. PUMP ON light is lit.
h. FILTER NOT IN MOTION light is OUT.

There is an additional check for RM-3, OWS effluent monitor:

i. Flow verified through the monitor while the OWS is running.

NOTE: RM-19 setpoint toggle switch selected to the HASP #1 (S/G TO B/D) position.

3. VICTOREEN RAD MONITORS ANALOG RAD MONITORS (includes RM-71, 72, 73, 74, 30, 31, U-1 RM-29)
a. Switch selector to OPERATE or ALL.
b. Green SAFE/FAIL/RESET light is ON.
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

DIGITAL RMs (includes RM-14/R, 15/R, 24/R, 28/R, 44A/B, U-2 RM-29)

a. White NORMAL panel light is ON.
b. Red SKID PMP light ON.
c. The Remote Display Units (RDU) on the back panels have digital readouts which must update periodically, generally from 15 to 120 seconds.

NOTES:

1. RM-30, 31 detectors measure in R/hr and should generally be less than 1 R/hr on a normal channel check. An auto check of these detectors to 1E3 will occur every 17 minutes to ensure these monitors are not failed low. This auto check is NOT a required channel check.
2. RM-29 (Unit 2) detector has a RANGE light which will illuminate when the detector reading drops below its under-range of less than 0.01 mR/hr. When it registers activity greater than 0.01mR/hr, the red RANGE light will go OUT.
4. MISCELLANEOUS RADIATION MONITORS RM-58, 59
a. Switch selected to OPERATE.
b. Green OPERATE light is ON.
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

NOTE 1: RM-59 will generally read very low, whereas RM-58 may read significantly higher especially following a refueling on that unit.

NOTE 2: RM if no pulses occur within approximately 150 seconds, the failure alarm comes in, otherwise the OPERATE light stays illuminated.

RM-23, RADECO monitor (located in PM-205, 115, Aux Bldg)

a. HIGH and LOW alarm lamps should be ON (these lamps go OUT on an alarm condition).
b. Normal analog channel levels and response.

RM-25, 26, 51, 52, 53, 54

a. White NORMAL light is ON (RM-51 through 54).
b. Yellow FAILURE light is OFF (RM-25, 26).
c. Normal analog channel levels and response.

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 4 of 6 C. FLOW INSTRUMENT (SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR) CHECKS When the plant is operated in a low power condition or following maintenance outages, the accuracy of square root extractor indications is frequently questioned by Operations personnel. In some cases the instrument may be inoperable or it may simply need to be backfilled. It is also possible that low flow conditions will place the square root extractor outside its calibrated range. Any time the validity of an indication is in question, I&C should be notified for an evaluation of the channel.

1. All flow instruments utilizing square root extractors are inherently inaccurate when reading less than 10% of channel scale. No accuracy requirements apply in this range and no operator action is necessary. For example, the AFW flow channels on VB3 are 0-300 gpm scales. No accuracy limits are applicable when reading less than 30 gpm.
2. The following table should aid Operations personnel in performing channel checks on these flow instruments which have no redundant indications:

INSTRUMENT CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA AFW Flow FI-157,158, >30 gpm, + 5 gpm.

159,160 (Refer. General Channel Check A 1.)

Plant Vent Flow FR-12 Reasonable comparison with fan con-figuration of Aux/Fuel Handling Bldg vent modes, e.g., Bldgs Only - Approx.

13E4 cfm.

Radwaste Discharge FR-20 Verify flow is recording during a Flow release period. If possible, channel check with FR-20A (RWS filter 0-3 discharge).

S/G Blowdown Flow FR-53 Verify flow is recording during a release period. PM-205, multipoint recorder point # 6 in service with a corresponding digital readout (double or 2X digital readout).

NOTE: The Test switch located in 100, GW area of the Aux Bldg should not be used by Operations personnel. That switch is reserved for maintenance activities performed by I&C personnel.

OWS Influent Flow FR-251 If an automatic discharge is not (7 digit totalizer observed, start the turbine building nonresettable) waste pumps manually. Once overboard discharge commences, verify totalizer <100gal/min (which corresponds to 66.7% on FI-251) when the OWS is in service and discharging.

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 5 of 6 D. PROCESS ANALYSIS INSTRUMENT CHECKS The following table should aid Operators in performing channel checks on various process analysis instruments.

INSTRUMENT CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA Waste Gas O2 ANI/ANR 75,76 Verify FI-905,906 have approx. 1 scfh, Analyzers otherwise run WGC for several minutes. Max. difference between channels is +/- 0.20% O2.

DFO transfer piping ANI-501 Display cycles through cables 1-6 and leak detection all cables indicate OK. If remapping is required, refer to OP J-6C:VI.

E. PROCEDURAL REFERENCES Due to the qualitative nature of a CHANNEL CHECK assessment, the procedures listed below should only be used in a reference capacity. Quantitative limits are not applicable to CHANNEL CHECKS.

Moreover, the guideline nature of this Operations Policy should be recognized and applied appropriately. Remember if these references are consulted; use the correct Unit and most recent revision of the procedure.

RADIATION MONITOR CHECKS

1. STP I-18P1, Functional Test of Oily Water Separator Influent Monitor, RM-3
2. STP I-100A, Containment Air Particulate/Gas Radiation Monitor RM-11/RM-12 Functional Test
3. STP I-102A, Functional Test of Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor, RM-18
4. STP I-111A, Functional Test of Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Effluent Liquid Monitor, RM-19
5. STP I-103A, Functional Test of Gas Decay Tank Gas Discharge Monitor, RM-22
6. STP I-39-R71.A, Functional Test of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, RM-71, 72, 73, 74
7. STP I-18N1, Functional Test of Containment High Range Radiation Monitors, RM-30, RM-31
8. STP I-39-R29.A, High Range Plant Vent Gross Gamma Monitor RM-29 Functional Test
9. STP I-39-R14.A, Plant Vent Noble Gas Radiation Monitor RM-14 Functional Test
10. STP I-39-R14R.A, Plant Vent Noble Gas Radiation Monitor RM-14R Functional Test
11. STP I-39-R24.A, Plant Vent Iodine Radiation Monitor RM-24 Functional Test
12. STP I-39-R24R.A, Plant Vent Iodine Radiation Monitor RM-24R.A Functional Test
13. STP I-39-R28.A, Plant Vent Particulate Radiation Monitor RM-28 Functional Test
14. STP I-39-R28R.A, Plant Vent Particulate Radiation Monitor RM-28R Functional Test
15. STP I-39-R44A.A, Containment Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor RM-44A Functional Test
16. STP I-39-R44B.A, Containment Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor RM-44B Functional Test
17. STP I-119A, Functional Test: Fuel Handling Building Area Radiation Monitors, RM-58 / RM-59
18. STP I-18F1, Functional Test of S/G Blowdown Tank Radiation Monitor RM-23
19. STP I-18M1, Control Room Air Intake Monitor Functional Test (RM-25 & RM-26)
20. STP I-118A, Functional Test of Control Room Pressurization Radiation Monitors, RM-51, 52, 53, 54

OPERATIONS SECTION POLICY Number: B-5 Channel Check Criteria Revision: 6 Date: 6/06/16 Page: 6 of 6 FLOW INSTRUMENTS

1. STP I-3-F50, Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator 1-1 (2-1) Flow Channel FT-50 Calibration
2. STP I-3-F77, Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator 1-2 (2-2) Flow Channel FT-77 Calibration
3. STP I-3-F78, Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator 1-3 (2-3) Flow Channel FT-78 Calibration
4. STP I-3-F79, Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator 1-4 (2-4) Flow Channel FT-79 Calibration
5. STP I-39-F12.B, Plant Vent Flow Measurements System Calibration
6. STP I-19-F243.A, Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Flow Channel FIT-243 Functional Test
7. STP I-4-F53.A, Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line Flow Channel FT-53 Functional Test
8. STP I-27-F251.A, Oily Water Separator System Flow Channel FT-251 Functional PROCESS ANALYSIS INSTRUMENTS
1. STP I-24-A75.A, Functional Test of Waste Gas System Oxygen Analyzer Channels 75 and 76
2. STP M-121, Diesel Fuel Oil Leak Detection System ANI-501 Functional Test

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A5

Title:

Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OM14.ID1, Fatigue Management Rule Program, rev 30 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: See Examinee Response - Key Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: Revised from L061 (NRCADM061-COO-SRO1)

G2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as Gen KA # / Rating: minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. 3.9 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/20/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 11/26/19 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials: OM14.ID1, Fatigue Management Rule Program, rev 30 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • It is 0600 on Monday, 2/17
  • Both Units are operating at 100% power
  • The oncoming Control Operator has just called in sick
  • WorkForce scheduling program is out of service
  • The following licensed Operators are currently available:

Operator #1 Day Start Time End Time Position Sunday, 2/9 0700 1900 Control Operator Monday, 2/10 0700 1900 Control Operator Tuesday, 2/11 0700 1900 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0900 2200 WC Extra Thursday 2/13 Day Off Friday 2/14 0700 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1400 1500 TeleCon personnel statement Sunday 2/16 0700 1900 Control Operator Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Control Operator Page 2 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Initial Conditions (continued): Operator #2 Day Start Time End Time Position Sunday, 2/9 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Monday, 2/10 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Tuesday, 2/11 Day Off Wednesday, 2/12 1900 0700 Control Operator Thursday, 2/13 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Friday, 2/14 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Saturday, 2/15 1900 0700 Control Operator Sunday 2/16 Day Off Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Control Operator Operator #3 Day Start Time End Time Position Sunday, 2/9 1000 1700 Fire Watch Monday, 2/10 Day Off Tuesday, 2/11 0700 2100 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator Thursday, 2/13 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator Friday, 2/14 0700 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1000 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Sunday 2/16 Day Off Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Control Operator Page 3 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Initiating Cue: Review the hours worked by the available Operators and determine their ability to fill the watch bill. Document reason(s) each operator is available or unavailable.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: See Examinee Response Key.

Start End Time: Time:

Page 4 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Examinee Response - Key Only Operator #2 can accept the watch without a waiver based on the allowable work hours during Non-Outage Conditions. NOTE: Only reason for unavailability is critical, hours not required with answer.

  • Operator #1 - Not Available o Can not exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 24 period: Satisfactory (max was 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 48 period: Satisfactory (max was 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any continuous 168 period: Satisfactory (max was 63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br />) o 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break required in any 9 day period: Unsatisfactory (taking the relief watch at 0700 on Monday would result in a continuous break of 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> in the past 9 day period) o 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> continuous break minimum break required between shifts: Satisfactory (min was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)
  • Operator #2 - Available o Can not exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 24 period: Satisfactory (max was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 48 period: Satisfactory (max was 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any continuous 168 period: Satisfactory (max was 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) o 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break required in any 9 day period: Satisfactory (min was 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) o 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> continuous break minimum break required between shifts: Satisfactory (min was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)
  • Operator #3 - Not Available o Can not exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 24 period: Satisfactory (max was 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any continuous 48 period: Satisfactory (max was 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) o Can not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any continuous 168 period: Unsatisfactory (max was 73.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />) o 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break required in any 9 day period: Satisfactory(max was 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br />) o 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> continuous break minimum break required between shifts: Satisfactory (min was 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)

Page 5 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Page 4 of 8 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • It is 0600 on Monday, 2/17
  • Both Units are operating at 100% power
  • The oncoming Control Operator has just called in sick
  • WorkForce scheduling program is out of service
  • The following licensed Operators are currently available:

Operator #1 Day Start End Time Position Time Sunday, 2/9 0700 1900 Control Operator Monday, 2/10 0700 1900 Control Operator Tuesday, 2/11 0700 1900 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0900 2200 WC Extra Thursday 2/13 Day Off Friday 2/14 0700 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1400 1500 TeleCon personnel statement Sunday 2/16 0700 1900 Control Operator Monday 2/17 (proposed) 0700 1900 Control Operator Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 Operator #2 Day Start End Time Position Time Sunday, 2/9 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Monday, 2/10 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Tuesday, 2/11 Day Off Wednesday, 2/12 1900 0700 Control Operator Thursday, 2/13 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Friday, 2/14 1900 0700 Work Control Lead Saturday, 2/15 1900 0700 Control Operator Sunday 2/16 Day Off Monday 2/17 0700 1900 Control Operator (proposed)

Initial Conditions (continued): Operator #3 Day Start End Time Position Time Sunday, 2/9 1000 1700 Fire Watch Monday, 2/10 Day Off Tuesday, 2/11 0700 2100 Control Operator Wednesday, 2/12 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator Thursday, 2/13 0700 1900 Balance of Plant Operator Friday, 2/14 0700 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Saturday, 2/15 1000 2000 Balance of Plant Operator Sunday 2/16 Day Off Monday 2/17 0700 1900 Control Operator (proposed)

Page 8 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A5 Initiating Cue: Review the hours worked by the available Operators and determine their ability to fill the watch bill. Document reason(s) each operator is available or unavailable.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Evaluation Results and Basis Operator #1 Basis:

___ Available

___ Unavailable Operator #2 Basis:

___ Available

___ Unavailable Operator #3 Basis:

___ Available

___ Unavailable Page 9 of 9 Rev. 0

D IABLO C ANYON POWER P LANT OM14.ID1 INTERDEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Rev. 30 Page 1 of 44 Fatigue Management Rule Program 05/09/19 Effective Date QUALITY RELATED Table of Contents

1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 1
2. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 2
3. DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................. 2
4. RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 6
5. INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................. 8 5.1 Covered Work ................................................................................................. 8 5.2 Non-Covered Workers .................................................................................. 38 5.3 Contractor/Vendor Work Hour Management Programs ................................. 39
6. RECORDS.................................................................................................... 40
7. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 41
8. Turnover Time .............................................................................................. 42 ATTACHMENTS:
1. Maintenance Rule Risk Significant Systems ................................................. 43
2. Conditions Adverse to Safety or Site Security ............................................... 44
3. Form 69-21349, Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form, 07/09/13
4. Form 69-21350, Fatigue Assessment Form, 05/07/18
1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure applies to all PG&E employees, contractors, vendors, TAs, and on-loan personnel who:

1.1.1 Hold unescorted access or unescorted access authorization to the station's protected areas.

1.1.2 Perform radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the onsite emergency response organization minimum shift complement.

1.2 This procedure implements requirements for fatigue management and related work hour controls per 10 CFR 26, Subpart I, "Managing Fatigue."

1.3 This procedure establishes the following:

1.3.1 Requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 26, Subpart I.

1.3.2 Process for implementing work hour limits for workers performing work subject to 10 CFR 26, subsection 26.205, "Work Hours."

1.3.3 Process used to schedule, track, and calculate work hours.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 2 of 44 1.3.4 Conditions and process applicable to covered work hour limit waivers.

1.3.5 Conditions and process applicable to non-covered work hour limit authorizations.

1.3.6 Conditions and process applicable to performing "Fatigue Assessments."

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 DCPP began using the maximum average work hours (AVG 54) method effective Monday, July 29, 2013.

2.2 The requirements of this procedure are intended to provide reasonable assurance that worker fatigue is avoided and all workers will be able to safely perform their duties and maintain the health and safety of the public.

3. DEFINITIONS 3.1 Behavior Observation Program (BOP) Supervisor: Individual trained/qualified as a fitness for duty supervisor (FFDSUP) responsible for ensuring individuals have the correct fatigue management rule (FMR) classification in the site computer system and are responsible to implement BOP for assigned personnel.

3.2 Break

The number of hours between the time an individual leaves work and starts their next work period; excludes turnover on one end of the work period.

3.3 Circadian Factors: Human physiological processes, such as body temperature and hormone releases, that may affect alertness and cognitive or motor functioning.

3.4 Covered Work: Work that includes:

3.4.1 Operating or on-site directing of the operation of systems and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

3.4.2 Performing on-site maintenance or on-site directing of the maintenance on Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

3.4.3 Performing radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the on-site emergency response organization minimum shift complement.

3.4.4 Performing operations responder duties that includes oversight of the effect of fires and fire suppression on safe shutdown systems.

3.4.5 Performing security duties including but not limited to an armed responder, Zebra, Nora, Alarm Station Officer, Watch Commander, Response Team Leader, or Nuclear Security Sergeant.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 3 of 44 3.5 Covered Worker: An individual who is:

3.5.1 Subject to work hour controls under the FMR.

3.5.2 Granted unescorted access to the station's protected area and performs covered work.

3.6 Day Off: A day when a work period does not begin.

3.7 Directing

The exercise of control over a work activity by a worker who is directly involved in the execution of the work activity, and either:

3.7.1 Makes technical decisions for that activity without subsequent technical review.

3.7.2 Is ultimately responsible for the correct performance of that work activity.

3.8 Electronic Tracking System: A software application used to schedule, develop, and track work hours and evaluation periods.

3.9 Evaluation Period: A rolling six week period that includes the current week and the five previous weeks.

3.10 Fatigue: The degradation of an individual's cognitive and motor functions as a result of inadequate rest.

3.11 Fatigue Assessment: An assessment performed by the Shift Manager, security watch commander, or a qualified BOP supervisor for the following reasons:

3.11.1 For Cause 3.11.2 Post Event if required per OM14.ID5, "Fitness For Duty Program For-Cause and Post Event Chemical Testing" 3.11.3 Self-Declaration 3.11.4 Follow-Up 3.12 Fatigue Management Rule (FMR) Representative: Individual selected by director, manager, or supervisor to become knowledgeable in FMR program to assist with FMR implementation in the department, section or work group. FMR representatives from operations, maintenance, site services contractor, radiation protection, chemistry, and security assist with FMR implementation.

3.13 Incidental Duties: Unscheduled work activities performed off-site, including telephone calls and work required by the supervisor to complete off-site, that are required by the station but do not exceed a nominal 30 minutes in a single break period.

3.14 Nominal: Quantity of time spent on work activities to not exceed 30 minutes plus 25%

(37.5 minutes total) in a single break period.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 4 of 44 3.15 Non-Incidental Duties: Work activities performed off-site that are required by the station and exceed a nominal 30 minutes in a single break period.

3.16 Operations Responder: A designated operations person on shift who provides fire brigade oversight for the effect of fires and fire suppression on safe shutdown equipment.

3.17 Outage: The time when the output breakers are open and the unit is not connected to the grid.

3.18 Overtime Limits: Controls that limit the number of overtime hours and/or consecutive days personnel may work.

3.19 Restorative Sleep: A brief opportunity with accommodations for restorative, uninterrupted sleep of at least one half hour in a designated area.

3.20 Risk Informed SSCs: Those systems that fall under the Maintenance Rule and designated as "risk significant" (refer to Attachment 1). At DCPP, work on all Maintenance Rule SSCs is treated as covered work to prevent minor errors and to take a conservative approach.

3.21 Site Senior-Level Manager: An individual in the position of vice president nuclear generation, Station Director, senior director, or director.

3.22 Turnover Time: Time at the beginning or end of a work period that allows personnel to become familiar with their job duties and responsibilities or to transfer pertinent information to personnel assuming their job duties or responsibilities.T35087 3.23 Waiver Assessment: An assessment authorized by the security watch commander or Shift Manager, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, because the need exists to waiver FMR requirements to protect the health and safety of the public or plant security. This assessment is performed by a qualified BOP supervisor knowledgeable of the work to be performed.

3.24 Work Day: A work day is those consecutive hours from the start of a shift. All hours continuously worked after midnight on a shift that started before midnight count for the previous day.

3.25 Work Hours: The amount of time an individual performs duties for the station. This includes all work hours, with the following exceptions:

3.25.1 Shift turnover time.

3.25.2 Within-shift breaks and rest periods in which there is reasonable opportunity and accommodations for restorative sleep, such as a nap, greater than 30 minutes.

3.25.3 Unscheduled work hours for the purpose of participating in unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills are excluded.

3.25.4 Periods defined in writing by the NRC.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 5 of 44 3.26 Work Period: All work hours where restorative sleep does not occur.

3.27 Work Week: A work week is defined as follows:

3.27.1 Operations use a seven day work week that starts at 0001hrs on Monday morning and continues through 2400hrs on Sunday night.

3.27.2 All other departments use a seven day work week that starts at 0001hrs on Sunday morning and continues through 2400hrs on Saturday night.

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4. RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Site senior-level managers are responsible for:

4.1.1 Authorizing work as meeting the requirements to protect the health and safety of the public.

4.1.2 Ensuring at least once per calendar year a review is performed to monitor hours worked for compliance with the FMR.

4.1.3 Concurring with waivers authorized by the Shift Manager and security watch commander.

4.2 Shift Managers and watch commanders (for security issues), are responsible for:

4.2.1 Determining work is required to protect the health and safety of the public and, with concurrence from site senior-level management, authorizing FMR waivers.

4.2.2 Providing clarifications on applicability of overtime limits.

4.2.3 Ensuring individual work hours are managed with the objective to prevent impairment from fatigue due to the duration, frequency, sequencing of successive shifts or call-in, or incidental duties.

4.2.4 Performing reviews as requested by the vice president nuclear generation or Station Director.

4.3 Supervisors, or managers when evaluating supervisors, are responsible for:T34188 4.3.1 Ensuring no personnel exceed 10 CFR 26 Subpart I work hour limits without appropriate prior authorization and waiver.

4.3.2 Ensuring personnel transitioning from non-covered work to covered work include all hours worked in their work hour calculations.

4.3.3 Assessing personnel fitness to perform assigned work within four (4) hours of covered work performance.

4.3.4 Ensuring assigned personnel have the correct FMR classification code indicated in the site computer system.

4.4 Section managers are responsible for conducting:

4.4.1 A quarterly review of section personnel work hour reports for violations and waivers to evaluate FMR compliance.

4.4.2 The section FMR representative may assist the manager with the review.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 7 of 44 4.5 Department directors are responsible for conducting:

4.5.1 Annual review of department personnel work hour reports for violations and waivers to evaluate FMR compliance.

4.5.2 The department FMR representative may assist the director with the review.

4.6 Station personnel are responsible for:T34188 4.6.1 Being capable of performing assigned work.

4.6.2 Reporting fatigue.

4.6.3 Being aware of hours worked in previous 14 days.

4.6.4 Knowing applicable overtime limits.

4.6.5 Obtaining approval to work overtime.

4.6.6 Timely entry of work schedule changes in tracking software so potential violations are identified and addressed before a violation occurs.

4.7 Quality verification director is responsible for:

4.7.1 Ensuring FFD audits are performed at the appropriate frequency, scope, and depth.

4.7.2 Reviewing and approving FFD audit reports and related audit documents.

4.8 Quality verification personnel are responsible for:

4.8.1 Coordinating and conducting FFD audits at the appropriate frequency, scope, and depth 4.8.2 Preparing and submitting FFD audit reports and related audit documentation 4.9 Payroll supervisor is responsible for retaining records of hours worked and FMR waivers for three (3) years.

4.10 Access/FFD manager is responsible for:

4.10.1 Gathering and reporting data to NRC per 10 CFR 26.203(e).

4.10.2 Coordinating annual effectiveness review of work hour control per 10 CFR 26.205(e).

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5. INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 Covered Work 5.1.1 General Provisions
a. Managers and directors should complete periodic reviews of program violations and waivers to evaluate program health.
1. Managers should review FMR reports on a quarterly basis and directors on an annual basis.

a) FMR representatives may assist the manager or director with the review. SAPN will be used to track the reviews for covered work.

2. The access/FFD manager should assign tasks from a SAPN to track reviews completed by managers and/or directors.
b. Audits NOTE: FMR Program audits are conducted during the FFD Program audit performed by quality.
1. Quality shall audit the management of worker fatigue by reviewing all electronic and hard copy information retained to track work performed under the fatigue management program. Such information may include:

a) FMR waiver forms b) Electronic time reporting records c) Payroll summary reports

2. Audits shall focus on the effectiveness of the fatigue management program.
3. The individuals performing the audit of the program shall be independent from both the subject FFD program's management and from personnel who are directly responsible for implementing the FFD program.
4. The result of the audits, along with any recommendations, shall be documented and reported to site senior-level management.

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5. Each audit report shall identify:

a) Conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of the FFD program b) Cause of the condition(s) c) Recommended corrective actions, when appropriate

6. Review of audit findings shall require corrective actions, including re-auditing of the deficient areas where indicated, to preclude, within reason, repetition of the condition.
7. The resolution of the audit findings and corrective actions shall be documented in the corrective action program.
8. Audits shall be performed on 24 month cycle.
c. Reports
1. Payroll shall provide a summary for of all instances during the previous calendar year in which work hour controls were waived.

a) The summary shall include only those waivers under which work was performed.

2. If it was necessary to waive more than one work hour control during any single extended work period, the summary of instances shall include each of the work hour controls that were waived during the period.

a) When creating the report, each work hour control waived on a single waiver counts as a separate waiver.

3. For each category of workers specified, the station shall:

a) Report the number of instances in which each work hour control specified was waived for workers not working on outage activities.

b) Report the number of instances in which each work hour control was waived for workers working on outage activities.

c) Provide a summary that shows the distribution of waiver use among the workers within each category of workers identified (e.g., a table that shows the number of workers that received only one waiver during the reporting period, the number of workers that received a total of two waivers during the reporting period, etc.).

d) Provide a summary of corrective actions, if any, resulting from the analyses of data, including fatigue assessments.

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4. Reports for only waivers actually used shall be provided to the NRC when requested. The reports shall include:

a) The name of the worker performing the work.

b) The name of the worker's supervisor.

c) A description of the work performed.

d) The outcome of the work performed.

e) The need for the waiver.

f) The name of the person authorizing the waiver.

g) The name of the supervisor approving the waiver.

5. Reports covering all instances where FMR violations occurred and waivers were not issued shall be provided to site senior-level management. The reports shall include the information requested in step 5.1.1c.4.
6. Reports related to fatigue management can be integrated into the overall FFD report and may be submitted electronically using EIE system and the NRC provided format.
7. Reports shall be generated every 12 months.

a) The initial reports generated under this procedure shall cover the period October 1, 2009, through December 31, 2009.

b) Subsequent reports shall cover the period January 1 through December 31.

c) Reports for data collected shall be submitted to the NRC before March 1 of the following year.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 11 of 44 5.1.2 Affected Personnel NOTE: For the purposes of compliance with the FMR, directing only applies to operations and maintenance activities.

a. Any workers on-site with unescorted access who perform work within any of the following job categories are considered covered workers subject to work hour controls.
1. Operations a) Workers operating or on-site directing of work activities for SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

b) Workers performing the duties of operations responders who are specifically designated due to their understanding of the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.

2. Maintenance a) Workers performing on-site maintenance or on-site directing of work activities for SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
3. Radiation Protection and Chemistry a) Workers performing duties which are part of the on-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) minimum shift complement.

b) Support staff is not covered by the FMR.

4. Security a) Workers performing duties including but not limited to an armed responder, Zebra, Nora, Alarm Station Officer, Watch Commander, Response Team Leader, or Nuclear Security Sergeant.
5. Other Personnel a) Any other workers normally considered non-covered workers performing operations or maintenance activities addressed in steps 5.1.2a.1, 5.1.2a.2, 5.1.2a.3, and 5.1.2a.4.
1) The FMR may apply to other personnel who, without further oversight, provide direction to operations and maintenance covered workers.

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2) If non-covered workers perform covered work, the covered work restrictions since the beginning of the cycle (evaluation period) apply until the covered work is complete.
3) If the normally non-covered worker performs covered work intermittently throughout the cycle, he or she should be left as "covered" throughout the cycle.

(a) The fatigue rule covered indicator is tracked in the site computer system on the personnel screen using the Nuclear Fatigue Rule (NFR) Covered Worker field.

(1) Supervisors and managers may review the personnel screen in the site computer system to determine covered status for their staff.

(2) Whenever an individual is processed for unescorted access the NFR Covered Worker field defaults to covered status.

(3) When an individual in a non-covered status changes organizations, the status will be evaluated by the fatigue owner to determine if they need to return to covered status.

5.1.3 All site personnel should make timely entry of work schedule changes in tracking software so potential violations are identified and addressed before a violation occurs.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 13 of 44 5.1.4 Fatigue Assessments

a. Requirements for Fatigue and Waiver Assessments
1. Assessments shall be conducted face to face with the worker whose alertness may be impaired.
2. At a minimum, the assessments shall address the worker's work history for the past 14 days while considering the following factors:

a) Acute fatigue b) Cumulative fatigue c) Circadian factors

3. The assessor shall not conclude that fatigue has not or will not degrade the worker's ability to safely and competently perform his or her duties solely on the basis that the worker's work hours have not exceeded any of the limits specified or that the worker has had the minimum breaks required or minimum days off required, as applicable.
4. The results of any assessment conducted shall be documented including a description of the circumstances that necessitated the fatigue assessment and any controls and conditions that were implemented.

a) If a worker disagrees with the results of an assessment, the worker may request a second assessment by a trained assessor.

5. The Fatigue Management Rule Program owner shall prepare an annual summary of instances of assessments that were conducted during the previous calendar year for any worker for which a fatigue assessment was performed.

a) The summary shall include:

1) The conditions under which each assessment was conducted (i.e., self-declaration, for cause, post-event, or follow up).
2) A statement of whether or not the worker was working on outage activities at the time of the self-declaration or condition resulting in the assessment.
3) The category of duties the worker was performing at the time of the self-declaration or condition resulting in the assessment.
4) Management actions, if any, resulting from each assessment.

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6. If a worker was determined to be fit for duty and he or she disagrees with the finding, the work supervisor shall consider the impact of the worker working under distress.

a) The work supervisor should contact his or her management to discuss options and trending.

7. Workers shall provide complete and accurate information that may be required to address the factors listed in step 5.1.4b.6.

a) Inquiries shall be limited to only the personal information necessary to assess the factors.

b. Fatigue Assessments
1. Fatigue assessments shall be documented on the Fatigue Assessment Form, Form 69-21350.

a) The completed form shall be

1) Documented in a SAPN notification
2) Forwarded to the access/FFD manager.
2. Fatigue assessments shall be conducted under the following conditions:

a) For cause

1) In addition to any other test or determination of fitness that may be required, a fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to an observed condition of impaired individual alertness creating a reasonable suspicion that a worker is not fit to safely and competently perform his or her duties, except if the condition is observed during a worker's break period.
2) If the observed condition is impaired alertness with no other behaviors or physical conditions creating a reasonable suspicion of possible substance abuse, DCPP need only conduct a fatigue assessment.

(a) If there is reason to believe that the observed condition is not due to fatigue, a fatigue assessment is not required.

(b) The access/FFD manager shall be consulted to determine if a for-cause FFD test will be conducted per OM14.ID5.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 15 of 44 b) Self-declaration

1) A fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to a worker's self-declaration to his or her supervisor that he or she is not fit to safely and competently perform his or her duties for any part of a working tour because of fatigue, except if, following the self-declaration, the station permits or requires the worker to take a rest break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> before the worker returns to duty.

c) Post-event

1) A fatigue assessment shall be conducted in response to events requiring post-event drug and alcohol testing as specified in OM14.ID5.

(a) Necessary medical treatment shall not be delayed in order to conduct a fatigue assessment.

d) Follow up

1) If a fatigue assessment was conducted for cause or in response to a self-declaration, and the worker returns to duty following a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in duration, the worker shall be reassessed for fatigue as well as the need to implement controls and conditions before permitting the worker to resume performing any duties.
3. In the case of a fatigue assessment conducted for cause, the individual who observed the condition of impaired alertness may not conduct the fatigue assessment.
4. The supervisor performing the fatigue assessment should be a qualified BOP supervisor and qualified to direct the work performed by the worker.

a) If the BOP supervisor is not available, another qualified BOP supervisor may be used (i.e., security or operations supervisor).

5. In the case of a post-event fatigue assessment, the individual who conducts the fatigue assessment may not have:

a) Performed or directed (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.

b) Performed, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the event occurred, a fatigue assessment of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 16 of 44 c) Evaluated or approved a waiver of the limits specified for any of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred, if the event occurred while such workers were performing work under that waiver.

6. A fatigue assessment shall provide the information necessary for management decisions and actions in response to the circumstance that initiated the assessment.
7. Upon notification of a self-declaration of fatigue or stress by security personnel, the security watch commander shall:

a) Perform a fatigue assessment to ensure the symptoms, contributing factors, and effects of fatigue or stress do not adversely affect the employee's performance, except if following the self-declaration, the station permits or requires the worker to take a rest break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> before the worker returns to duty.

b) Document the basis of the recommendation and forward it to the security manager for review and approval and generate a notification documenting the review and approval.

c. Waiver Assessments
1. If there is no supervisor on site who is qualified to direct the work, the assessment may be performed by a supervisor who is qualified to provide oversight of the work to be performed. This may be a second level supervisor or manager.
2. Following a fatigue assessment, the assessor shall determine and implement the controls and conditions, if any, necessary to permit the worker to resume performing duties, including the need for a break.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 17 of 44 5.1.5 Directing Work

a. For the purposes of compliance with the FMR, "directing" applies only to the following operations and maintenance activities:
  • On-site directing of the operation of systems and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
  • On-site directing of maintenance on SSCs that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
b. Directing may apply to personnel who, without further oversight, provide direction, to covered workers from operations and maintenance.
1. If non-covered workers direct covered work, the covered work restrictions since the beginning of the cycle (evaluation period) apply until the covered work is complete.

a) If the normally non-covered worker directs covered work intermittently throughout the cycle, he or she should be left as "covered" throughout the cycle.

c. Consideration should include all of the following when determining if an individual is directing an operations or maintenance activity:
1. Is the individual on site?
2. Is the individual the first line supervisor or foreman?
3. Is the individual directly involved in the execution of the work activity?
4. Is the individual making technical decisions for that activity without subsequent technical reviews?
5. Is the individual ultimately responsible for the correct performance of that work activity?
d. The following tasks are examples of activities generally considered NOT directing:
1. Engineering tasks
2. Supervising maintenance on a non-covered SSC
3. Supervising at second level supervision
4. Conducting work control center documentation activities
5. Writing a work procedure
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7. Training personnel during which time the trainee is not operating or performing maintenance activities
8. Reviewing and approving documents
9. Performing any work that is not operations or maintenance on risk significant SSCs (refer to Attachment 1)
10. Technical staff providing recommendations to control room staff
11. Senior management reviewing work plans
12. Contractors, vendors, or engineers providing recommendations on test performance, component and system operation, or other similar technical inputs
e. Position alone should not be the deciding factor when determining personnel covered by the FMR. For example, a Shift Manager is a second level supervisor, but, in practice and as provided in 10 CFR 26, has the authority to direct covered activities.
1. Analyze and evaluate all criteria prior to determining applicability or exclusions.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 19 of 44 5.1.6 Minimum Days Off (MDO)

a. The requirements outlined in this section only apply during the first 60 days of an outage.

Table 1: Required Minimum Days Off for Various Shift Schedules (Outage)

Group 8-Hour Shift 10-Hour Shift 12-Hour Shift Maintenance 1 day off/in any 1 day off/in any 1 day off/in any 7-day period 7-day period 7-day period Operations, Radiation 3 days 3 days 3 days Protection, Chemistry, Ops off/successive off/successive off/successive responder (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period 15-day period 15-day period Security 4 days 4 days 4 days off/successive off/successive off/successive (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) (i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period 15-day period 15-day period

1. The option of keeping workers on normal operations work hour restrictions is still available during outages.
2. The table above applies to the first 60 days of a unit outage; after this 60-day period expires, normal online work hour limits shall apply.

a) The 60-day period may be extended seven days for a worker for each 7-day block during which they work 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or less.

b) Multiple 7-day extensions may be given to a worker as long as the 7-day blocks are not overlapping.

3. Minimum days off may be scheduled any day of the week.

a) Maintenance shall meet at least one day off in a 7-day rolling period.

b) For all other covered workers, there is no restraint as to when required days off occur during the 15-day fixed period.

b. For purposes of work hour calculations, average hours worked, and minimum days off calculations, work hours in response to the following situations are excluded from meeting 10 CFR 26, Subpart I requirements:
1. Plant emergencies as defined in the Emergency Plan.

a) After a declared emergency drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

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2. Unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills (unscheduled work hours ONLY).

a) After an unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

3. Security response.

a) Force-on-force tactical exercises: Exclude hours worked by security personnel during the actual conduct of NRC evaluated force-on-force tactical exercises when calculating the worker's average work hours.

b) Common defense and security: When informed in writing by the NRC that the requirements of the FMR are waived for security personnel to ensure the common defense and security, workers exclude FMR requirements for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.

c. If one or both units are in an outage, those licensed operators composing the minimum shift complement of operators required under 10 CFR 50.54(m) for the operating unit, including the operator at the controls specified in 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the senior operator in the control room required under 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii), are not eligible for the MDO requirements permitted by 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4).
1. 10 CFR 26 Subpart I does not prohibit these individuals from performing outage activities.

a) An operator who has been working outage work hours and has had 2 days off in the previous 7-day period may provide relief to the operator at the controls or the senior operator in the control room, if an appropriately qualified operator who has been working nonoutage work hours is not immediately available to provide relief.

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Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 21 of 44 b) If an operator who has been working outage work hours and has had 2 days off in the previous 7-day period is not immediately available, an operator who has been working outage hours may provide either:

1) Short-term relief (up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) for the operator at the controls or the senior operator in the control room without a waiver.
2) Longer term relief (more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) under a waiver of the MDO requirement that is applicable to the shift schedule (i.e., 8-, 10-, or 12-hour shifts) for personnel assigned to the operating unit.
2. When one unit is in an outage and there is one unit operating, the FMR requires 2 reactor operator (RO) licenses and 2 senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses assigned to the shift to be working under nonoutage work restrictions.

a) At least one RO shall be at the controls of the reactor and one SRO shall be in the control room.

d. Workers performing or directing work who are normally non-covered assume the covered work requirements for their assigned department to perform or direct covered work for the length of their assignment and for the work history in the cycle, prior to performing or directing the covered work.
e. Workers temporarily performing or directing covered work who do not leave their normal work department and are normally non-covered, shall follow maintenance work requirements. For example, an engineer giving direction to maintenance workers for a specific job without further oversight is required to meet maintenance covered work requirements for the length of the job and for his or her work history in the cycle.

5.1.7 Work Hour Limits

a. The following limits apply to covered workers regardless of unit status:
1. No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period.
2. No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period.
3. No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day period.
4. At least a 10-hour break between successive work periods, or an 8-hour break when a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts.
5. A 34-hour break in any 9 day period.

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b. Workers performing covered work while the station is on-line are limited to 54 work hours per week when averaged over the rolling 6-week cycle.
c. The following limits apply for workers performing covered work during outages:
1. Minimum days off:

a) 1 day off per week for maintenance personnel.

b) 3 days off for operations, radiation protection, chemistry, and operations (fire) responder personnel every 15 days.

c) 4 days off for security personnel every 15 days.

5.1.8 Breaks

a. Workers shall have, at minimum, the rest breaks specified in step 5.1.7.
b. For the purposes of this section, a break shall be an interval of time that falls between successive work periods, during which the worker does not perform any duties other than one period of shift turnover either at the beginning or at the end of a shift, but not both, for purposes of break calculation. Refer to step 5.1.12a for turnover exceptions related to minimum break between shifts and a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break in 9 days.

5.1.9 Sanctions and Disciplinary Actions

a. Workers shall report to work fit for duty and on schedule.
b. Workers exhibiting chronic self-declaration that they are not fit for duty as a result of fatigue should be considered for referral to the employee assistance program.
c. Workers exhibiting chronic self-declaration that they are not fit for duty as a result of fatigue, absent a sound medical reason, may be subject to disciplinary action.
1. Personnel are required to be fit for duty and get sufficient rest to ensure they are not subject to fatigue.

a) Persons who make choices that result in less than the sleep necessary for that person to remain alert and avoid fatigue are not meeting their obligation per this rule.

d. The refusal on the part of a worker to submit to a fatigue assessment shall subject the worker to disciplinary action and possible removal from unescorted access.
1. Facts to be considered in assessing disciplinary action shall include the employee's job assignment and past work record.

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e. Personnel subject to the fatigue assessments who refuse to be assessed shall be considered fatigued and unable to perform their duties.
1. Time away from work for fatigue management recovery shall be classified as personal time off, if available, or non-paid time.

5.1.10 Schedule Transitions

a. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> break shall only be allowed before the first shift of the new schedule.
b. A worker shall have a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any rolling 9 day period.
c. The MDO requirements shall be met for outage schedules.
d. Outage schedules.
e. Schedule transitions, when output breakers change state, may present problems and should be addressed on a case by case basis for covered workers entering an outage.
1. Follow outage rules if the plant experiences an unplanned trip.

a) If the schedule before the trip would have provided for work hours and breaks within the FMR, no violation of the FMR occurs.

2. When the outage is planned, ensure the schedule meets all work hour and minimum break requirements prior to breaker opening in order to assume outage requirements.
3. A short cycle (less than 6 weeks) occurs in order to have plant personnel resume their normal 6 week cycle. Refer to step 5.1.10h.3.
4. Consider AVG 54 requirements and hours worked.
f. Workers may work 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7 day period the week before or after outages as long as the following conditions are met for the non-outage schedule:
1. The average hours worked
2. MDO requirements during the outage.
g. Transition from covered work to non-covered work presents no problem for the FMR.
1. While performing non-covered work, FMR restrictions do not apply for the worker; however, exceeding overtime limits prescribed the FMR requires notification to the worker's management.

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h. If transitioning into or out of an outage, normal operations work hour rules apply.
1. Outage hours start the shift following breaker opening.
2. Non-outage hours start the shift following breaker closing.
3. A new evaluation period may be used at the completion of an outage.
4. Post-outage transitions are in compliance if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided for the required average days off and the average non-hours worked.
5. If the interval between outages for a worker is less than nine (9) days, then the worker shall have a 34-hour break period and shall not exceed the following limits:

a) 16 work hours in any 24-hour period b) 26 work hours in any 48-hour period c) 72 work hours in any 7-day period

6. A minimum of 2 days off in the preceding 7-day period may be acceptable for operators who have been working outage hours on 10- or 12-hour shifts before they transition to the non-outage unit as one of the two required operators working non-outage minimum days off.

a) This applies only during outages when transitioning a specific SRO or RO from the outage unit to the non-outage unit.

b) This does NOT apply when a nuclear operating unit transitions from an outage to on-line operations.

7. When entering an unplanned outage, the station shall be considered in compliance with the FMR if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided for the required days off.
8. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum days off requirement, shifts worked by security personnel during the actual conduct of NRC-evaluated force-on-force tactical exercises when calculating the worker number of days off may be excluded.

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9. When entering an outage or any evaluation period less than one week in duration, the evaluation period MDO is calculated using the ratio of the number of days off per week required for a 7 day period to the number of days worked in the partial week for the covered classification.

a) If x is <0.5, drop the value.

b) If x is 0.5, make a whole day off required.

x z where x = Required days off for partial week

= y = Number of days worked in partial week y 7 z = Number of required days off in seven (7) days 5.1.11 Self-Declaration

a. All workers shall have the right to self-declare.
b. If called to come into work, the worker should inform the supervisor placing the call that he or she is unfit for duty due to fatigue or stress.
1. Security personnel shall immediately report to their immediate supervisor, or the security watch commander, if any instances arise while performing work that may cause them to be unfit for duty due to fatigue or stress.
c. If a worker is working under a waiver and declares he or she is too fatigued to safely perform their duties, they shall be removed immediately from risk significant duty, unless the worker is required to continue performing that duty under other requirements.
1. If the worker shall continue performing the risk significant duty, the station shall take immediate action to relieve the worker.
d. If a worker declares he or she is too fatigued to safely perform their duties during any part of the assigned work schedule, a fatigue assessment shall be performed.
1. The worker may forego the fatigue assessment if a 10-hour rest break is given before the worker returns to work.
2. The worker may return to non-risk significant duties if fatigue assessment is satisfactory.

5.1.12 Shift Turnover

a. When calculating breaks, either on-coming or off-going shift turnover may be excluded from the calculation of a worker's work hours, but not both.
1. Turnover on both ends of a shift is excluded except for a Minimum Break Between Shift (MBBS), 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break, and a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> continuous break in 9 days break calculations.

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b. Shift turnover includes only those activities that are necessary to safely transfer information and responsibilities between two or more workers between shifts.
c. Shift turnover activities may include, but are not limited to, discussions of the status of plant equipment, and the status of ongoing activities, such as extended tests of safety systems and components.
1. Shift turnover may include the time required for security personnel to arm and disarm.
d. Work hours worked during turnovers between workers within a shift period due to rotations or relief within a shift shall not be excluded.
1. Other activities that shall not be excluded from work hours calculations include, but are not limited to:

a) Shift holdovers to cover for late arrivals of incoming shift members b) Early arrivals of workers for meetings, training, or pre-shift briefings for special evolutions c) Holdovers for interviews needed for event investigations.

e. Time should be accounted for in 15 minute increments.

5.1.13 Training

a. All site personnel shall receive FMR CBT training as part of the badging and access process.
1. All directors, managers, and supervisors shall receive training on their specific areas of the FMR procedure.
2. All Shift Managers, security watch commanders, and site senior-level managers shall receive training to delineate and define conditions adverse to public health and safety and plant security. Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance on such conditions.

5.1.14 Transition to Covered Work

a. A worker transitioning from non-covered work to covered work shall meet all requirements for the covered worker:
1. The worker shall meet the MDO requirements for the work group he or she is entering.
2. The worker shall have had a continuous 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.
3. The worker shall have a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before starting covered work.

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4. A look-back shall be performed to ensure the worker has not exceeded maximum working hours in the past 7 days and the 54 hour6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> average has or will not be exceeded for the cycle.

a) This may also include AVG 54 requirements for the cycle.

5. A look ahead shall be performed to ensure MDO requirements are met for the covered work group entered.
b. Contractors or vendors performing covered work shall:
1. Follow work hour rules in this procedure.
2. Not count their work hours and days off prior to arriving on site.

5.1.15 Waivers

a. Waivers are only applicable to covered workers performing covered work.

Examples of instances that would most likely meet the threshold for a waiver include:

1. A safety-related SSC fails placing the unit in a shutdown LCO.
2. A worker, who is part of the minimum shift complement, must be held over due to relief not available.
b. A list of authorized waiver issues is provided in Attachment 2.
c. Staffing levels should be sufficient so that schedules for covered workers may be maintained based on vacation and training demand without relying on waivers.Ref 7.5
1. While it is expected and allowed that normal variation in vacation and training demand may occasionally require additional work hours to be used, management shall consider the total vacation, training, and workload demands in order to maintain sufficient staff to execute work.Ref 7.5
d. When informed in writing by the NRC that the FMR requirements are waived for security personnel to ensure common defense and security, the requirements specified in the FMR do not apply for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.
e. Waiver Requirements
1. Waivers shall be granted on an individual basis and only to address circumstances that could not have been reasonably controlled.

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2. Waivers may be granted if either:

a) A Shift Manager, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, determines that the waiver is necessary to mitigate or prevent a condition adverse to safety.

b) The security watch commander, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, determines that the waiver is necessary to maintain site security.

c) A site senior-level manager determines if a waiver is necessary to mitigate or prevent a condition adverse to safety or to maintain site security.

3. The cognizant supervisor shall perform a face-to-face waiver assessment on the worker to determine if there is reasonable assurance that the worker will be able to safely and competently perform assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

a) The supervisor performing the waiver assessment shall be FFD qualified.

b) The supervisor performing the waiver assessment shall be qualified to direct the work (or related work) to be performed by the worker.

1) If there is no supervisor on-site who is qualified to direct the work, the assessment may be performed by a trained supervisor who is qualified to provide direction of the work to be performed by the worker.

c) Waiver assessments prior to the worker performing any work under the waiver shall be performed no more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the work activity.

d) At a minimum, the waiver assessment shall address:

1) The potential for acute and accumulative fatigue considering the worker's work history for at least the past 14 days.
2) The potential for circadian degradations in alertness and performance considering the time of day for which the waiver shall be granted.
3) The potential for fatigue-related degradations in alertness and performance to affect risk-significant functions.
4) Whether any controls and conditions are required under which the worker shall be permitted to perform work.

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4. The documented basis for a waiver shall include:

a) The circumstances that necessitate the waiver.

b) A statement of the scope of work.

c) A time period for which the waiver is approved.

d) The bases for the approval of the waiver.

5. Waivers shall be tracked in the corrective action program.T34188
6. The station does NOT need to meet the waiver requirements during declared emergencies as defined in the Emergency Plan or unannounced ERO drills.

a) After a declared emergency or unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.

b) Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.

7. Waivers are not required for changing to and from daylight savings time.
f. Waiver Process
1. Only one work period shall be waivered per FMR Waiver Form, Form 69-21349.
2. Immediate supervisor shall complete a FMR Waiver Form.

a) List the condition adverse to safety or site security requiring resolution.

3. Shift Manager or security watch commander, with concurrence from a site senior-level manager, shall authorize a FMR waiver on the FMR waiver form.
4. If condition is determined to NOT be a condition adverse to safety or site security, the waiver is not valid and FMR work hour limits shall not be exceeded.

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5. Once the Shift Manager, security watch commander, and designated site senior-level manager authorizes the waiver, the immediate supervisor shall:

a) Perform a face-to-face supervisory assessment on the worker no more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to exceeding FMR work hour limits using the following guidance:

1) Potential for acute fatiguetime since last 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break.
2) Potential for cumulative fatiguereview 14-day work history.
3) Consider if the worker had adequate opportunity to obtain sufficient rest considering the length and sequencing of break periods, available sleep periods, and transitions that may have interfered with quality sleep.
4) Circadian factorstime of day and recent work cycle.
5) Consider the time of day/night the work will be performed relative to the worker's recent shift schedules.
6) Observation and statements of the worker.
7) How fatigue could affect the work quality, if at all.
8) Nature of work to be performed.

b) Document the supervisory assessment.

c) Determine if there is reasonable assurance that the worker will be able to safely and competently perform assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

d) Determine if there should be any restrictions on the worker that will be assigned duties during the additional work period for which the waiver will be granted.

e) Document the reasonable assurance determination and any restrictions.

f) Initiate a tracking notification. One notification per waiver is created with work type of "PROG FMR."

6. Worker shall sign the FMR waiver form agreeing they are fit for duty to conduct the planned work under waiver.
7. The immediate supervisor shall perform closeout review promptly after the waiver period and complete the close out section of the FMR waiver form.

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a. Work hour controls apply only to unescorted employees, contractors, or vendors performing or on-site directing covered work. Refer to step 5.1.16e for work hour control exemptions.
b. All hours worked at any nuclear station shall be counted as hours accumulated toward the work hour limitations specified for covered workers.
c. Work activities on both risk-significant and non-risk-significant SSCs contribute towards fatigue; therefore, all work hours shall be considered in the accumulated time related to work hour limitations.
d. Reviews shall be performed annually to evaluate effectiveness of work control hours.
1. If any plant or security system outages or increased threat conditions occurred since the most recently completed review, include in the review an evaluation of the work control hours during outages or increased threat conditions.
2. The review shall be completed within 30 days of the end of the review period.
3. The review shall include:

a) Actual work hours and performance of workers subject to this requirement.

b) Information from the corrective action program.

c) At a minimum, provide:

1) Workers whose actual hours worked during the review period exceeded an average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week in any evaluation period while the worker's work hours are subject to the FMR.
2) Workers who were granted more than one waiver during the review period.
3) Workers who were assessed for fatigue during the review period.

d) Worker's hours worked and the waivers under which work was performed to evaluate staffing adequacy for all jobs subject to the work control hours.

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4. Document the methods used to conduct the review and the results of the review in a SAPN.
5. Document in the corrective action program any problems identified in maintaining control of work hours consistent with the specific requirements and performance objectives.
e. Work hour controls do not apply to the following individuals and activities:Ref 7.5
1. Maintenance activities on Maintenance Rule SSCs located off site.
2. Quality control and quality assurance activities.
3. Predictive maintenance activities that do not result in a change of condition or state of an SSC that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety may be excluded from covered work.

NOTE: At times an activity requires starting or stopping a piece of equipment. The worker starting or stopping the equipment would be performing covered work under the operating category; however, the data collection would not be considered covered work.

a) Examples of activities that may be excluded if they do not change the state or condition of these SSCs include, but are not limited to:

1) Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
2) Thermography
3) Vibration analysis
4) Data collection and analysis
5) Reactor engineering analysis
4. Contractors or vendors, who are not granted unescorted access, conducting work on a risk-significant SSC on site.
5. Contractors or vendors making recommendations to plant personnel.
6. Emergency response personnel who do not perform radiation protection or chemistry duties required as a member of the on-site emergency response organization minimum shift complement.
7. Technical staff making recommendations to other plant personnel.

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a. Work hour limits and the associated calculation and tracking of work hours apply to the workers performing covered work.T34188
1. This calculation includes both covered and non-covered work since the latter also contributes to fatigue.
b. Work hour accounting practices may be different from record keeping for payroll purposes or gate times.
c. Work hour records should show the number of hours worked each calendar day.
1. Work period start and stop times should be recorded and documented in a consistent manner.
d. Covered workers performing work while off-site shall report hours worked to the cognizant supervisor upon returning on-site.
1. The cognizant supervisor shall ensure any hours worked in excess of the schedule are included into the electronic tracking software.
2. The worker shall be aware of work hour restrictions and not exceed the restrictions without an approved waiver.
e. The calculated work hours shall include all time performing duties for work, including all within-shift break times and rest periods during which there are no reasonable opportunities or accommodations appropriate for restorative sleep.

Work hours include but are not limited to:

1. Shift holdovers to cover for late arrivals of incoming shift members.
2. Early arrivals of workers for required meetings, training, or pre-shift briefings for special evolutions (these activities are not considered shift turnover activities).
3. Holdovers or early arrivals for interviews needed for event investigations.
4. Call-in work periods. The time between leaving the station and the call-in work period are also included if that time is less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in duration.
f. That portion of a break or rest period during which there is a reasonable opportunity and accommodations for restorative sleep (e.g., a nap) may be excluded when calculating a worker's work hours.
g. Personal time in which an individual is on-site but is off duty (i.e., before or after his or her normally scheduled work period in which work activities are performed) may be excluded.

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h. If a worker begins or resumes performing covered work during the calculation period, include in the calculation all hours worked, including hours worked performing non-covered work.
1. Control the worker's work hours per the requirements of this procedure.
i. Incidental unscheduled duties performed off-site (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home), provided the total duration of the work does not exceed a nominal 30 minutes during any single break period, may be excluded.
1. The term "unscheduled" is an integral part of the definition of "Incidental Duties". Once an activity is scheduled it no longer can be called an incidental duty and therefore the 30 minute time limit no longer applies and every minute a worker is performing the activity must be tracked in Workforce as time worked.
2. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum break requirements and the minimum day off requirements, such duties do not constitute work periods or work shifts if the nominal 30 minutes is not exceeded.
3. Time spent on incidental duties is cumulative.

a) The cumulative 30 minutes impacts the break period where the nominal 30 minute limit is exceeded.

j. Contractors or vendors shall track and report their hours to their supervisors between outages.

5.1.18 Work Hour Scheduling

a. Unscheduled work hours for the purpose of participating in unannounced emergency preparedness exercises and drills may be excluded when calculating actual hours worked.
1. After a declared emergency or unannounced drill is terminated, employees require a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift to reset their FMR hours.
2. Employees require a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break before the start of the next shift if they have not had a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the previous 9 days.
b. Work hours for covered workers shall be scheduled with the objective of preventing impairment from fatigue due to duration, frequency, or sequencing of successive shifts.

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c. Supervisors should consider the following factors when establishing schedules:
1. Work hour limits
2. Consistent start and stop times for work periods
3. Impact of shift rotations
4. Training requirements
5. Vacation scheduling
d. To determine if a worker may be called in to work, use the following guidelines to determine if the work hour limit will be exceeded.
1. Hours worked should be evaluated to determine if any limit will be exceeded based on the work schedule by a backward look at the number of hours that have or will have been worked based on a time in the future (i.e., if the worker works at time T, how many hours will he or she have worked in the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/48 hours/7 days preceding time T relative to work hour limits as well as minimum days off and break requirements).
2. When entering an unplanned outage, compliance with work hour limits is met if the schedule for the evaluation period would have provided the required average minimum days off.
3. Deviations from overtime limits may occur as the result of administrative errors or unforeseen circumstances. A notification shall be initiated for each worker if this occurs.

a) If an employee is actively engaged in covered work, remove the employee from covered activities at the earliest possible safe time to do so.

b) If a waiver is warranted and no other work hour compliant individual is available to perform the work, process a waiver per step 5.1.15 prior to continuing.

c) If the employee is not able to work under a waiver, safe transport home should be considered.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 36 of 44 NOTE: A worker is considered "reset" from deviation, whether under a waiver or otherwise, when they meet the hours worked and break requirements in step 5.1.7.

5.1.19 For the purposes of compliance with the maximum average hours worked requirements, supervisors may exclude shifts worked by security personnel during actual conduct of force-on-force tactical exercises evaluated by the NRC when calculating worker's number of days off.

a. Work hour requirements do not apply when informed in writing by the NRC that these requirements, or any subset thereof, are waived for security personnel in order to assure the common defense and security, for the duration of the period defined by the NRC.

5.1.20 Work Performed Off-Site

a. Work hours for unscheduled work performed off-site may be excluded from the calculation of a worker's work hours unscheduled work performed off-site (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home) provided the total duration of the work, which is required by the leader, does not exceed a cumulative 30 minutes during any single break period.
b. For the purposes of compliance with the minimum break requirements and the minimum day off requirements, such duties do not constitute work periods or work shifts.
c. After hours study time that is not required by the company may be excluded from work hour calculations.Ref 7.5
1. As with any academic setting and curriculum, after hours study time varies from worker to worker.
2. Appropriate after hours study time compliments the utility provided training to ensure the learning process occurs and optimal information retention is achieved.
d. When considering work hour extensions for workers performing covered work, all hours worked by the worker shall be included. For example:
1. If a worker has performed 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of non-covered work, and the worker is needed to perform additional covered work that extends beyond 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, then a waiver to exceed the work hour limits shall be approved prior to the worker exceeding the 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> limit.
2. On the other hand, if the worker has performed 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of covered work, and is needed to perform additional non-covered work, then the programmatic approvals of this document do not apply. However, the additional work hours are included in consideration of any other limits if the worker subsequently performs covered work.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 37 of 44 5.1.21 Work Week Schedule

a. Supervisors shall review the actual hours worked and the performance of the workers subject to the FMR.
1. At a minimum, the review shall address:

a) Workers whose actual hours worked during the review period exceeded an average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week in any evaluation period while the workers' work hours are subject to the requirements of the FMR.

2. Use the Corrective Action Program to identify and evaluate the conditions which lead workers to work an average of more than 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> per week within an evaluation period.
b. An evaluation period shall not exceed six weeks for the purposes of calculating maximum average hours worked.
1. Each department should follow evaluation periods as defined in their respective labor agreements.
c. An eight (8) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall not average more than nine (9) hours per workday over the entire evaluation period.
d. A ten (10) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall not average less than nine (9) hours, but not more than eleven (11) hours, per workday over the entire evaluation period.
e. A twelve (12) hour shift schedule is a schedule that shall average more than eleven (11) hours, but not more than twelve (12) hours, per workday over the entire evaluation period.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 38 of 44 5.2 Non-Covered Workers 5.2.1 Non-Covered Worker Requirements

a. Non-covered workers should arrive for work fit for duty and avoid fatigue in order to safely perform their duties.
b. Non-covered workers with unescorted access to the plant shall be subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 26.
c. Non-covered workers performing or directing non-covered work are normally expected to follow the FMR guidelines for minimum days off, overtime limits, and breaks associated with the maintenance organization.
d. Non-covered workers performing or directing non-covered work who enter time in the electronic time keeping system will receive warnings when the FMR is at risk of being exceeded; however, such warnings will not be identified or recorded as violations of the FMR.
e. Manager or higher level should approve non-covered workers exceeding FMR guidelines.
1. Non-covered workers should obtain such approval prior to exceeding the guidelines.
2. Managers who are non-covered workers should receive approval from a site senior-level manager prior to exceeding FMR guidelines.
3. Site senior-level managers who are non-covered workers do not require approval to exceed FMR guidelines.
f. Manager or higher level shall review and approve changing any covered worker to a non-covered worker status.

5.2.2 Non-Covered Worker Limits

a. Workers performing non-covered work shall obtain written approval from a vice president nuclear generation prior to working more than 20 consecutive work days.
1. Workers shall take two consecutive days off prior to returning to work.
b. Supervisors performing non-covered work shall obtain written approval from a vice president nuclear generation, the Station Director, prior to exceeding 13 consecutive work days.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 39 of 44 5.3 Contractor/Vendor Work Hour Management Programs 5.3.1 PG&E may accept a contractor/vendor work hour management program in place of the DCPP program.

a. Contractor/vendor shall submit fatigue management procedure(s) and a description of software tool to PG&E for review and approval.
b. Contractor/vendor representative shall provide work hour monitoring reports on a weekly basis to the PG&E contract technical coordinator.
c. Contractor/vendor representative shall notify the PG&E contract technical coordinator of any potential work hour violations before the violation actually occurs.
d. The PG&E director responsible for implementation of the Fatigue Management Program shall approve the Contractor/Vendor Program before it is used.
e. The contractor/vendor shall notify the PG&E contract technical coordinator of any contractor/vendor fatigue management procedure or fatigue management software changes before they are implemented for use for work completed at DCPP.
f. Contractor/Vendor Program changes reported to the PG&E contract technical coordinator shall be approved for use by the PG&E director responsible for implementation of the Fatigue Management Program before implemented at DCPP.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 40 of 44

6. RECORDS 6.1 Records generated by the use of this procedure include non-training records associated with work hour and related activity tracking, and training records.

6.2 Non-Training Records 6.2.1 Records generated through the implementation of this procedure include the following:

a. Records of work hours for workers who are subject to the work hour controls.
b. Records of shift schedules and evaluation periods of workers who are subject to the work hour controls.
c. The documentation of waivers including the bases for granting the waivers.
d. The documentation of annual work hour reviews including:
1. Documentation of the methods used to conduct the reviews.
2. Results of the reviews.
3. Documentation of any problems found during the reviews.
4. Actions taken under the corrective action program.
e. The documentation of fatigue assessments including assessments related to self-declarations.

6.2.2 The non-training records noted above shall be retained for three (3) years.

a. If there are legal proceedings related to fatigue management in progress at the end of the three year retention period, records shall be retained until the completion of all related legal proceedings.
b. These records do not meet the definition of quality records and therefore do not need to be retained in the records management system.
c. Non-training records may be retained by the department generating the documentation or the payroll group.
d. Non-training records may be generated in hardcopy format or retained electronically using a computer program.

6.2.3 Non-training records are not considered quality-related records.

6.3 Training records associated with fatigue management are considered quality related records and therefore shall be retained in the records management system.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 41 of 44

7. REFERENCES 7.1 AD3.ID6, "Designation and Protection of Security Information" 7.2 NEI 06-11, "Managing Personnel Fatigue at Nuclear Power Reactor Sites" 7.3 NEI 06-11, Addendum, "Implementation Guidance for Maximum Average Work Hours Alternative" 7.4 NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2011-08, "Fatigue Management During Hurricane Conditions" 7.5 Regulatory Guide 5.73, "Fatigue Management for Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" 7.6 10 CFR 26 Subpart I, "Managing Fatigue" 7.7 SAPN 50890593 "No Annual fatigue assessment summary created" OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Fatigue Management Rule Program OM14.ID1 R30 Page 42 of 44

8. Turnover Time 8.1 The following table provides examples of acceptable and unacceptable turnover time activities.

Table 2: Turnover Time ACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE

  • Exchanging information with your
  • Authorizing or directing work supervisor, peer, or crew assignments
  • Exchanging information with
  • Performing repairs personnel assuming job duties or
  • Performing a test responsibilities (During watch or job turnover requiring two people, both
  • Reviewing test data are considered on turnover time.)
  • Monitoring work activities
  • Familiarizing yourself with your areas
  • Standing a watch of responsibilities
  • Attending training
  • Crew briefing
  • Attending section meetings
  • Discussing safety issues (safety
  • Reviewing an order for closure meeting, safety concern, etc.)
  • Taking a welder qualification test
  • Obtaining and carrying materials and tools to the work area
  • Investigative interviews 8.2 A director, manager, Shift Manager, or security watch commander shall preauthorize other activities that may fall within the definition of turnover time but are not listed above.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

OM14.ID1 R30 Page 43 of 44 Maintenance Rule Risk Significant Systems Attachment 1: Page 1 of 1 SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM NAME 01 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 03B 02 03 01 TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY-UPSTREAM MSIV 02 05 04B 07 08 09 04C 04 TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY-S/G BLOWDOWN 01 RCS 07A 02 04 01 CVCS 02 08A 04 05 07 01 SI 02 09 03 05 01 RHR 02 10 04 05 01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 12 02 14 01 CCW 16A 01 SAFETY RELATED MU WATER 01 AUX SALTWATER 17B 02 21A 01 D/G 01 D/G FUEL TRANSFER 21B 02 23B 01 MAIN AUX BLDG HVAC 23C1 01 MISC AUX BLDG HVAC 23F1&2 01 CONTROL ROOM HVAC 24 01 GASEOUS RADWASTE 25B 01 BACKUP AIR & N2 36 01 EAGLE 21 37 01 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 38 01 SSPS 01 CONTROL ROD-MECHANICAL 41A 02 41B 01 CONTROL ROD-ELECTRICAL 45B 01 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 62 04 12KV 63A 01 4KV VITAL BUSSES 63B 02 4KV NON-VITAL 64A 01 480V VITAL 65A 01 120V VITAL AC 01 125VDC VITAL 67A 03 69 01 230KV 01 CIVIL STRUCTURES 80 02 95 01 NUCLEAR FUEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROCESS CONTROL 99 FLOCS SYSTEM (PCS)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

OM14.ID1 R30 Page 44 of 44 Conditions Adverse to Safety or Site Security Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1

1. Conditions adverse to safety or site security are unforeseen conditions which, in the informed opinion of the duty Shift Manager or security watch commander, could jeopardize the safety or security of the public, station, personnel, or environment.
2. Waivers are considered appropriate if required to mitigate conditions adverse to safety or site security. If rule compliance could result in the following, but not limited to, type conditions, it would be appropriate to consider using the waiver process:
a. Violate other NRC requirements such as minimum on-site staffing.
b. Jeopardize the industrial or radiological safety of the public or plant personnel.
c. Delay recovery from a challenge to a safety system function, if the compliance with the FMR would cause a forced reactor shutdown, power reduction, or other similar action as a result of exceeding a time limit for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.
d. Delay in recovering from actual or potential loss of reactor core cooling capability during outages.
e. Cause a forced reactor shutdown, power reduction, or similar action as a result of exceeding a time limit for a Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation.
f. Result in an increase in Core Damage Frequency of greater than 1.0E-6, or similar program risk profile.
g. Cause or prevent mitigation of an environmental permit violation.
h. Compromise the ability to maintain the site secure from the actions of malicious groups or persons
i. Force undue risk to on-site or off-site station personnel as a consequence of an external event (e.g., security, fire, or severe weather).

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21349 (07/09/13) OM14.ID1 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form Authorization to Waive Worker Work Hour Limits This attachment should only be used if database is not available.

Date: Notification No. Unit Status (check one)

[ ] Outage [ ] Non-Outage Time:

Waiver Period: Waiver Start: / Waiver End: /

Date / Time Date / Time NOTE: Only one work period shall be waivered per waiver form.

The following person is authorized to exceed the limits of 10 CFR 26 Print Name: Limits Additional Time Work Activity (last, first) (see below) Authorized or Actual Break (see below) OPS HP/CHEM MNT SEC LAN ID:

Enter the letter code(s) for each of the applicable limits being exceeded under "Limits."

A. More than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24-hour period (MWH16/24)

B. More than 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in any 48-hour period (MWH26/48)

C. More than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7 day period (MWH72)

D. Fewer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> between work periods (MBBS10)

E. Less than 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in the last 9 days (MBBS34/9)

F. More than 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> in a rolling 6 week period (AVG 54)

G. Minimum days off for outage requirements not met (MDO-OUT)

Enter the hours/day in excess of the appropriate limit in the "Additional Time Authorized/Actual Break" column.

Justification for exceeding work hour limits:

Description of work to be performed:

Circumstances that caused work hour extensions:

[ ] ERO Minimum Shift Staffing

[ ] Condition Adverse to Safety SAPN/Order Number: Order Priority:

[ ] Security Threat or Security Outage:

[ ] Necessary to maintain site security (explain):

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21349 (07/09/13) OM14.ID1 Attachment 3 Fatigue Management Rule Waiver Form Page 2 of 2 Authorization to Waive Worker Work Hour Limits If the worker will not be in compliance with the work hour limits when they return to work on their next scheduled day of work, then a new authorization to waive the worker work hours, including a new fatigue assessment, must be completed prior to allowing the worker to return to work.

Worker's work schedule has been checked and worker has been notified when he or she can return to work:

[ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Waiver requested by: (Work supervisor or supervisor familiar with work to be performed)

/ /

Print Name Signature Date Waiver authorized by: (Shift Manager, security watch commander, or director or above with requisite signature authority)

/ /

Print Name Signature Date Concurrence by director or above:

/ /

Print Name Signature Date NOTE: Director concurrence may be verbal and/or by telephone, name shall be listed above. If a director authorizes the waiver then no additional concurrence is necessary.

The worker's supervisor will complete Fatigue Assessment per Attachment 4 prior to work beginning.

Fatigue assessment completed: [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

If this waiver was not used, then this attachment should be voided. The voided attachment will not be a QA record and the WorkForce schedule should be updated with actual hours worked.

CLOSE-OUT Print Name: Hours Worked Was work Database (last, first) under this performed Updated?

waiver satisfactorily?

LAN ID: [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Closed by:

/ /

Job Supervisor Signature Date Retention Instructions:

Department - Attach this form to electronic waiver.

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Page 1 of 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Fatigue Assessment Name: Badge Number: Fatigue Assessment or Waiver ID Number:

This assessment is intended to determine whether a degradation in a worker's cognitive and motor functioning have occurred due to the lack of rest and where fatigue is identified, establish appropriate controls and conditions ensuring the worker can safely and competently perform assigned duties. Completed assessment shall be maintained as confidential. As request, workers shall provide complete and accurate information necessary to address acute and cumulative fatigue and circadian variations in alertness and performance.

PART A Assessment of Fatigue and Work Hours To be completed by worker being assessed.

Assessment Type (check one)

[ ] WORK HOUR [ ] FOR CAUSE [ ] POST-EVENT [ ] FOLLOW-UP [ ] SELF-WAIVER DECLARATION Assessment cannot Include description Include description Required when a Checking this box, be conducted more of observed notification number worker is returned to completing this than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before behavior and name of event and work after a break of section and signing the worker begins of worker who worker's less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> below indicates a performing any observed condition involvement in following a for cause or formal self-declaration work under the in comments. comments. self-declaration fatigue of fatigue.

waiver. assessment.

Work history of the last 14 days to assess acute and cumulative fatigue and circadian variation in alertness and performance. This information is available from WorkForce on the waiver tab.

Past 14 day work history 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Shift Record D for days, N for nights or Schedule S for swing Hours Only include one shift turnover for Worked time period 34-hour Check the boxes of those days break you've had a break of at least 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> before shift.

Have you had a break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> between successive work periods in the last 14 days (or at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if you were transitioning between shifts)? [ ] YES [ ] NO Have all duties you've performed off-site, if applicable, met the definition of incidental (e.g., technical assistance provided by telephone from a worker's home)? [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] N/A How many hours of sleep have you had in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />?

How many hours have you been awake?

How many hours of sleep have you averaged each day in the last 9 days?

Describe the work activity you are performing.

Do you feel you can perform this work activity without additional oversight? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

(Continued on page 2)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 2 of 4 Fatigue Assessment PART A (continued)

Are you mentally alert? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Did factors outside of work keep you from obtaining adequate and regular rest (e.g., illness, family personal obligations)? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Completed by: ______________________________/_______________________________________/_____________

Print Name Signature Date PART B Supervisor Face-to Face Fatigue Assessment BOP supervisor directing or overseeing assessed worker: /

(Print Name) LAN ID As applicable, worker observing the condition of impaired alertness: / [ ] N/A (Print Name) LAN ID BOP supervisor performing fatigue assessment: /

(Print Name) LAN ID Assessment Guidelines:

  • Only BOP supervisors with current plant access authorization may conduct fatigue assessments.
  • If this assessment is for a waiver, it shall not be performed more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the start of the extended work period.
  • When a fatigue assessment is conducted "For Cause," the person who observed the condition of impaired alertness shall not conduct the fatigue assessment.
  • In the case of a post-event fatigue assessment, the worker who conducts the fatigue assessment may not have:
  • Performed or directed (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.
  • Performed, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the event occurred, a fatigue assessment of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred.
  • Evaluated or approved a waiver for any of the workers who were performing or directing (on site) the work activities during which the event occurred, if the event occurred while such workers were performing work under that waiver.
  • For items below as appropriate, interview/observe worker and review worker's assessment/documents to determine whether additional controls and conditions are necessary to address fatigue.

Fatigue Assessment Basis: Describe observed behavior or self-declared conditions leading to assessment. Minimally state the category of duties (Ops, Maintenance, HP, Chemistry, Security, or other) the worker was performing and whether the worker was performing outage activities.

Comments:

(Continued on page 3)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 3 of 4 Fatigue Assessment PART B (continued)

Acute Fatigue Indicators: (Fatigue cause occurring within last 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/since last 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> break)

1. Was sleep restricted within last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
2. Has worker been awake > 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
3. Did tasks at or away from work require physical exertion? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
4. Does worker appear intoxicated? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
5. Sleepiness-yawning, tired eyes, legs? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
6. Rubs face with hands often? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
7. Poor communication/decisions? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:
8. Bad mood, apathetic, fixated? [ ] YES [ ] NO Comments:

Observe worker and review Section A completed by the worker:

Comments:

Cumulative Fatigue Indicators (Increases in fatigue over consecutive sleep-wake periods resulting from inadequate rest)

9. Was sleep restricted between any changes in shift schedules within the last 14 days? [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. Did worker experience sustained wakefulness within last 14 days (were length of sleep [ ] YES [ ] NO periods reduced as work week progressed)?
11. If worker has sleep debt, has worker been unable to catch-up depleted sleep between [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] N/A shifts or on off-periods?
12. Has worker experienced any personal issues or other factors that may impact his or her [ ] YES [ ] NO ability to obtain adequate sleep within last month? If so, when? Describe impact.
13. Has worker lacked initiative or creativity? [ ] YES [ ] NO
14. Has worker's work schedule during past 14 days prevented opportunity to obtain [ ] YES [ ] NO sufficient rest?

Comments:

(Continued on page 4)

OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

DCPP Form 69-21350 (05/07/18) OM14.ID1 Attachment 4 Fatigue Assessment Form Page 4 of 4 Fatigue Assessment Circadian Rhythm Considerations (changes in alertness and cognitive/motor functioning related to approximate 24-hour cycle)

Is worker on day, afternoon or evening shifts? [ ] Day Shift [ ] Afternoon Shift [ ] Evening Shift

15. Is worker experiencing or exhibiting fatigue symptoms during possible physiological [ ] YES [ ] NO alertness low points (01:00 - 04:30 or 13:30 - 15:30)?
16. Is worker's rest/sleep being interrupted by external time cues such as light and social [ ] YES [ ] NO activity?

Potential Effect of Fatigue on Work Quality (What risk significant function could be impacted during this activity, i.e., reactivity management, radioactive release, pressure boundary, containment isolation/integrity, off site power, core cooling, decay heat removal? Consider quality barriers such as post maintenance testing, independent verifications, hold points, or surveillance testing.)

Nature of Work to be Performed (What environmental conditions exist that could increase fatigue? Is task repetitive?

Does task have high mental focus or attention demands? Will there be social interaction?)

Assessment Results Based on your review and the fatigue assessment, you will need to determine if the individual can work without restriction (PASS), work with restrictions (PASS RESTRICTED) or not be able to continue to work (FAIL). The decision takes into consideration answers to questions B1 through B16, the answers to these questions are counted and assist with determining the assessment result. The score guidelines listed with the outcomes are to be utilized unless the individual performing the assessment determines a more restrictive outcome is indicated.

[ ] PASS Worker does not exhibit signs of impairment due to fatigue and may continue to work with no additional controls or conditions. Select this outcome if there are zero or one "YES" answer on questions B1 through B16 or all answers to questions B1 through B16 are "NO" or "N/A".

[ ] PASS RESTRICTED Worker may continue working under controls and conditions identified in the next block.

Select this response if there are 2 or more "YES" responses on questions B1 through B16.

[ ] FAIL Worker is exhibiting impairment due to fatigue and must be provided a break of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Select this response if there are five or more "YES" answers on questions B1 through B16.

Fatigue Controls and Conditions (to address fatigue concerns identified above)

[ ] Additional Breaks Required:

[ ] Additional Oversight/Verifications/Peer Checks required:

[ ] Additional Environmental Controls required:

Results of the fatigue assessment have been provided to the assessed worker: Worker's initials____________

If worker advises assessor they do not feel they can continue working, the assessor should notify their supervisor and enter the self-declared fatigue process outline in OM14.ID1.

Initiate a notification: [ ] Notification Number:

Supervisor Performing Assessment:

Waived work period begins: /

Date Time*

/ /

Print Name Signature Date/Time*

  • If this assessment is for a waiver, it shall not be performed more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the start of the waived work period.

Retention Instructions:

Department - Document creation of this form in a notification and forward original or a copy to the access/FFD manager OM14!ID1u3r30.DOC 0424.1047

Number: NRCL181A6

Title:

Evaluate Fire Zone Operability Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies Fire Protection Drawings 11190621 DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 5152212 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: See Examinee Response Key Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments Bank NRCL161 A6 Gen KA # G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as 4.2 graphs, curves, tables, etc.

RON FORTIER DATE: 12/02/19 AUTHOR CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly documented. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure (as applicable) and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies eSOMS printout Fire Protection Drawings 11190621 DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 5152212 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) on Unit 1 has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results and the basis of your decision in the space below before reporting out.

NOTE:

You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).

Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Determined ECG 18.7, Condition A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is the only applicable TS/ECG action.

Basis - with inoperable detectors in the area, only action is a continuous fire watch.

o NOTE: Use of an hourly fire watch patrol is not permitted due to the nonfunctional fire detection equipment within the same fire zone as the nonfunctional door.

NRCL181A6 REV 0 .docx PAGE 1 OF 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL181A6 REV 0 .docx PAGE 2 OF 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Followup Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL181A6 REV 0 .docx PAGE 3 OF 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A6 ANSWER KEY EXAMINEE RESPONSE Key Required Action: Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Basis: Use of an hourly fire watch patrol is not permitted due to the nonfunctional fire detection equipment within the same fire zone as the nonfunctional door.

NRCL181A6 REV 0 .docx PAGE 4 OF 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A6 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) on Unit 1 has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results and the basis of your decision in the space below before reporting out.

NOTE:

You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).

Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE ACTION:

BASIS:

NRCL181A6 REV 0 .docx PAGE 5 OF 5 Rev. 0

SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS EXTINGUISHANTS ELECTRICAL C3 WET PIPE SPRINKLER -. FIRE HOSE STATION g ELECTRICAL SHUTOFF WATER SPRAY ( DELUGE) ISFHSI SEISMIC FIRE HOSE STATION

$ 110 VAC ELECTRICAL OUTLET v;?{j SEMI-AUTO WATER SPRAY PRE-ACTION SPRINKLERS i HA=HALON DC=DRY CHEMICAL H 2O=WATER 125 VAC ELECTRICAL OUTLET MANUAL WATER SPRAY CO2 =CARBON DIOXIDE CO2 WDC=WHEELED DRY CHEMICAL CTEJ ELECTRICAL PANEL v

WCO 2 =CARBON DIOXIDE Q  :::) EMBEDDED CONDUIT HALON 1301 FIRE HYDRANT

_ffi EMERGENCY LIGHTING FIRE DETECTOR ZOf\ES SEISMIC STANDPIPE

( COLOR & DIRECTION FOR REFE REl'JCE ON...Yl

@ NON-SEISMIC STANDPIPE SMOKE REMOVAL NSPC EQUIPMENT SPECIAL HAZARDS


P --- PRESSURIZATION AIR FLOW PATH IFLSCI FLAMMABLE LIQUID STORAGE CABINET COMMUNICATION

- R---- SMOKE REMOVAL AIR FLOW PATH HYDROGEN PIPING

-I 8 TELEPHONE PORTABLE FAN GAS CYLINDER SOUND POWERED PHONE HVAC CONTROLS RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD RESTRICTED RADIO TRANSMISSION HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OTHER DETECTOR HATCH DELUGE ISOLATION VALVE © CARDOX PULL STATION D EXHAUST FAN Zl POST INDICATOR VALVE [£] PULL STATION UNDERGROUND ISO VALVE 0 SUPPLY FAN DJ ISOLATION VALVE STOKES BASKET IEW/SI EYE WASH AND SHOWER M DOMESTIC WATER SHUTOFF RADIATION LEVEL> 100 MREM/HR AT

@ FIRE DEPARTMENT CONNECTION [EJ MSA SCBA PACK IEwl EYE WASH CB@ 30 CM FROM THE RADIATION SOURCE.

M RADIATION LEVEL> 1000 MREM/HR AT IHHRAI 30 CM FROM THE RADIATION SOURCE.

FIRE ALARM PANEL [g]J AUTCl'v1ATED EXTERNAL DEFIBlLATOR IHRKI HAZMAT RESPONSE KIT DOSE> 500 RADS IN ONE HOUR AT IVHRAI co ONE METER FROM THE RADIATION SOURCE.

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SURFACE CONTAMINATION AREA I

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o::::ou 6 11-08-2018 ZNS4 FXC2 NOT REQUIRED PER CF3. 1D5 Revised Pe, DDN-2*1788 INPGZND I Size DATE OWN RE IV PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER PE DISC. PE EXP.

FH 1 FH 2 AUX 7 8 4 6 2 6 3 7 6 9 7

10 7

12 9

15 15 16 17 18 18 19 19 20 15 15 BLD CONT CONT 1 AREA 2 U1 H U1 B6 U2 B7 B16 1390 1 TURBINE 2 VHRA 363 V

361 355 354 B16-03 RESINS DC CO2 H20 DC 1755 FP-1-24 H20 B16-04 366 371 FP-1-25 353 FP-1-27 2208 367 S-9 B6-01 1492 372 368 U AB-243 U 373 3-R (F/-) S I FP-2-27 3-P-3 DC 3-P-4 362 321-2 FP-2-24 FP-2-1044 AB-154A SEE NOTE F FP-2-25 369 1293 124 I EW 374 357 GRATING GRATING 350-2 357-2 409 EW/S 3-R H20 H20 U1 B8 375 1304 2208 ALSO A.B. 85' (DWG. 111906-17)

S-8 3-AA 279 S-3 SEE NOTE C E S-4 S-3 B8-14 T EW/S EW/S T 358 DC E 377 B16-06 B16-05 B16-02 B16-01 DC PLAN AT EL. 125'-8" 378 349 3-P-2 H20 398A 398A-2 5

S 1398 FIRE HOSE STATION 3-P-5 FP-1-29 391 SULFURIC ACID S

390 DC SEE NOTE B (TYP.)

398 1205 1271 348-2 R B7-06 B7-02 B7-01 2473 E B7-07 B7-03 B7-08 B7-05 B7-09 B7-04 (F/-) (F/-)

1271 DC B7-12 B7-11 B7-10 B7-13 B7-14 FP-1-591 FP-2-596 H20 3-BB DC H20 S

347 H20 EYE WASH N B8-01 B8-02 B8-03 UP E EYEWASH AND SHOWER 1437 S-2 B8-07 B8-04 B8-05 B8-08 B8-06 B8-09 ELEVATOR UP DN 1711 345 B8-10 B8-11 B8-12 B8-13 E

A8-01 UP A9-08 CA-66 A8-05 (F/-) A9-06 A9-11 A9-12 (F/-)

SEE NOTE J 6-A-4 UP 6-B-4 S-5 L (F/C) 343 (F/C)

A9-07 342 A9-10 A9-14 A9-05 A9-13 1207 A9-09 A8-02 CO2 CO2 CO2 SEE NOTE A 340-2 3HR (TYP) 1209 A8-06 341 E SPECIFIC NOTES 6-A-3 A9-10 6-B-3 A9-21 3HR A9-04 336 337 338-2 A9-15 3HR CO2 E EW EW A. 1 HR RATED FIRE PROOFED DUCTS AND SUPPORTS (F/C) (F/C) CO2 IN ZONES 6-A-1 THRU 6-A-5 AND ZONES 6-B-1 THRU Date:05-22-2018 6-B-5 ARE TO BE INSPECTED.

K 335 CO2 SEE NOTE G 339-2 DC A8-07 A9-11 CO2 B. INSPECT FIRE BARRIER(S) ENCASING SAFE 6-A-2 334 333 6-B-2 A9-20332-2 A9-16 SHUTDOWN CIRCUITRY.

A9-03 2493 A8-03 EW EW (F/C) (F/C) 331-2 (SULFURIC ACID & HYDROGEN)

C. FLOOR AND CEILING NON-RATED EXCEPT AS NOTED.

SEE NOTE G D. UNSEALED MAIN STEAM LINE PENETRATIONS A9-02 6-A-1 A9-12 6-B-1 A9-19 A9-17 ARE PROTECTED BY WATER SPRAY.

327 EW 328 329-2 CO2 (F/C) (F/C) CO2 1209 E. 2 HR FIRE RATED BLOCKOUT PANEL ABOVE DOOR.

325 330-2 J

RASTER= 111906-21-0.dgn SEEE NOTE E 324 E 323-2 F. PARTIAL DETECTION IN ZONE 3-R ABOVE FIRE 364 SEE NOTE D 2 1 PUMPS ONLY.

H A9-18 SEE NOTE H 14-A 6-A-5 EQUIP.

6-B-5 EQUIP.

G. DAMPER IS PERMANENTLY CLOSED.

E DGN= 111906-21-0.dgn CO2 A9-01 S-1 UP (F/C) 2

(-/C) (F/C)

HATCH HATCH H. BLOWOUT PANELS PROTECTED BY WATER SPRAY.

UP DN H I. DELETED 322 LEGEND DC J. DETECTOR LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE AND DO NOT SPECIFY THE EXACT LOCATION IN THE PLANT.

INSPECTED FIRE BARRIERS PER STP M-70D CAD User: ZNS4 U1 CA-70B U1 U2 UNINSPECTED FIRE BARRIERS PER STP M-70D A8 A9 A9 F/C INDICATES INSPECTED FLOOR AND CEILING INDICATES LIMITS OF INSPECTION FOR FLOOR/CEILING OR PARTIAL SUPPRESSION UNIT 1 & 2 INDICATES AN ACCEPTABLE DEGRADATION IN BARRIER NONRATED BARRIERS DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - PG&E CO.

INSPECTED HELB BARRIER PER STP M-70D Preliminary FIRE PROTECTION DRAWING SHEET PAGE REV 111906 21 0 13 1NPG2ND 1 Size 05-22-2018 ZNS4 FXC2 NOT REQUIRED PER CF3.ID5 - - - Revised Per DDN-2*1788 DATE DWN RE IV PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER PE DISC. PE# PE EXP.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE DUE DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

None ACTIVE RISK SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE TLS NO.

None ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 0-TS-19-0104 Fire Damper: 1-FD-36 failed STP M-39B. STP M-39B 18.5.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire Jul 18, 2019 13:50 Jul 18, 2019 14:50 A1 Cable Spreading NONE suppression equipment in the affected areas. Room 18.5.1 B.1 Establish a fire watch patrol in the affected areas. Jun 03, 2019 10:51 Jun 03, 2019 11:51 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 18.5.1 D.1 Verify backup fire suppression equipment is Jun 03, 2019 10:51 Jun 03, 2019 11:51 A1 Cable Spreading NONE available in the affected area. Room 18.7 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one Jul 18, 2019 13:50 Jul 18, 2019 14:50 A1 Cable Spreading NONE side of the inoperable assembly. Room 18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Jun 03, 2019 04:55 Jun 03, 2019 05:55 A1 Cable Spreading NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of Room 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Jun 03, 2019 04:55 Jun 03, 2019 05:55 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 23.6 C.1.1 Restore both trains to service. Jun 03, 2019 15:10 Jun 03, 2019 23:10 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 23.6 C.1.2 Verify the area ambient temperature = 101 °F. Jun 03, 2019 15:10 Jun 03, 2019 16:10 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 1-TS-19-0550 Fire Damper FD-43, 44, 45 4kV switchgear area 18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Jul 25, 2019 14:20 Jul 25, 2019 15:20 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Jul 25, 2019 14:20 Jul 25, 2019 15:20 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE TODAY Page: 3

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 2-TS-19-0629 2R21 480V switchgear ventilation maintenance (HELB/fire barriers) 18.7 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one Sep 30, 2019 03:00 Sep 30, 2019 04:00 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 side of the inoperable assembly. zone 18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Nov 05, 2019 10:30 Nov 05, 2019 11:30 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of zone 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Nov 05, 2019 10:30 Nov 05, 2019 11:30 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 zone 1-TS-19-0688 Unit 1 Risk Tracking for Unit 2 Outage (2R21 Impacts)

PRA A.1 Check Safety Monitor/Phoenix Sep 22, 2019 04:24 Sep 22, 2019 04:24 NA 1O2R21 INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

TECH SPEC 1-TS-08-0038 INCORE THERMOCOUPLES - TRAIN A: TT-17 (III), TT-21 (II), TT-49 (IV), TT-61 (III) / TRAIN B: TT-16 (IV), TT-25 (II), TT-28 (III) 3.3.3 A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. Sep 27, 2008 10:07 NA None 1-TS-19-0821 Intermediate Range Channnel, NI-35 loss of voltage 3.3.1 A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1 1 for the Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE channel(s) or trains.

3.3.1 F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE 3.3.1 F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10. Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE 3.3.1 G.1 -----------NOTE------------- Limited boron concentration Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited 3.3.1 G.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE 3.3.1 S.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE conditions.

3.3.1 S.2 Be in MODE 3. Nov 25, 2019 07:46 NA NONE ECG Action TODAY Page: 4

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 0-TS-19-0104 Fire Damper: 1-FD-36 failed STP M-39B. STP M-39B 18.5.1 A-2 Implement alternate compensatory measure(s). Jun 03, 2019 17:22 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 18.7 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of Jun 03, 2019 17:22 A1 Cable Spreading NONE the inoperable assembly. Room 18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Jun 03, 2019 17:22 A1 Cable Spreading NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of Room 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Jun 03, 2019 17:22 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 18.7 A.3 Implement alternate compensatory measure(s). Jun 03, 2019 17:22 A1 Cable Spreading NONE Room 1-TS-19-0549 Smoke Detectors EFD09-02 and EFD09-03 Inop (Fire Zone A-9) 18.3 C.1 Establish hourly fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) Jul 09, 2019 08:20 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE with the inoperable instruments 1-TS-19-0550 Fire Damper FD-43, 44, 45 4kV switchgear area 18.7 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of Jul 25, 2019 10:45 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE the inoperable assembly.

18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Jul 25, 2019 10:45 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Jul 25, 2019 10:45 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE 18.7 A.3 Implement alternate compensatory measure(s). Jul 25, 2019 10:45 A3 4kV Switchgear NONE TODAY Page: 5

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 2-TS-19-0629 2R21 480V switchgear ventilation maintenance (HELB/fire barriers) 18.7 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of Sep 30, 2019 03:00 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 the inoperable assembly. zone 18.7 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an Sep 30, 2019 03:00 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of zone 18.7 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Sep 30, 2019 03:00 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 zone 18.7 A.3 Implement alternate compensatory measure(s). Sep 30, 2019 03:00 See Instructions for multi 2FANS45 zone TODAY Page: 6

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 18.0 Fire Protection 18.7 Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES: All fire rated assemblies required to protect Safe Shutdown (SSD) Equipment required to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever SSD equipment protected by the fire rated assembly is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS


NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each fire rated assembly.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more fire rated A.1 Establish a continuous fire 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> assemblies inoperable. watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly.

OR A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> detection or an automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of the inoperable fire rated assembly.

AND A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol. AND Once per hour OR thereafter A.3 Implement alternate 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> compensatory measures(s).

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 11/09/17 Effective Date:____________________ Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 1 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 18.7.1 Visually inspect each of the fire rated assemblies, 18 months or 24 months except penetration seals, to verify functionality. for assemblies inside containment or inaccessible during power operation*

SR 18.7.2 Fire rated penetration seals shall be verified to be 18 months operable by performing a visual inspection of at least 10 percent of each type of penetration seal, on average.

SR 18.7.3 Verify fire rated assemblies to be functional following Prior to returning to repairs or maintenance by the performance of a functional status.

visual inspection of the affected fire rated assemblies.

  • Inacessible assemblies at power include dampers 1-FD-4, 1-FD-5, 1-FD-6, 1-SD-26, 1-SD-27, 1-FD-26, 1-FD-27, 2-SD-26, 2-SD-27, 2-FD-26 and 2-FD-27.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 2 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES BACKGROUND Fire rated assemblies include all walls, floor/ceilings, fire rated enclosures, fire doors, fire dampers, hatches and penetration seals (outside containment) which are used to protect Safe Shutdown equipment required to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.

The following GENERAL BASES applies to all types of fire rated assemblies:

Implementation of the DCPP Fire Protection Program (FPP) is a condition in the Operating Licenses, paragraph 2.C.(5).a. for Unit 1 and 2.C.(4).a.

for Unit 2, which reads "PG&E shall implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in PG&E amendment request dated June 26, 2013 as supplemented by letters dated October 3, 2013, September 29, 2014, October 27, 2014, October 29, 2014, November 26, 2014, and December 31, 2014; February 25, 2015 (two letters), May 7, 2015, October 15, 2015, and December 31, 2015; and January 28, 2016, and as approved in the safety evaluation dated April 14, 2016.

The FPP is designed to provide assurance through a defense-in-depth approach that those structures, systems and components important to maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition are protected against the effects of a fire. The defense-in-depth philosophy involves preventing fires from starting, rapidly detecting fires that do occur, extinguishing fires effectively before significant damage occurs, and maintaining features, which minimize the consequences of a fire.

Safe shutdown systems have been evaluated to determine the effects of a postulated design basis fire to provide assurance that a fire will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition for each fire area. The Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment credits fire rated assemblies for adequate separation of safe shutdown systems to mitigate potential consequences of a fire as required by the NFPA 805 fire protection program (Reference 3).

Therefore, in the event that a fire rated assembly required for adequate separation of redundant safe shutdown systems becomes INOPERABLE, appropriate compensatory measures must be taken while the assembly is being restored to operability. Typically, compensatory measures, such as fire watches, fire detection or automatic fire suppression are used.

OPERABILITY for Fire Rated Assemblies is as defined in the DCPP Technical Specifications (TS).

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 3 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES BACKGROUND Surveillance Requirements provide assurance that the minimum (continued) operability requirements for DCPP fire rated assemblies are maintained.

The NRC, in the original fire protection technical specifications, established the frequency of system surveillance's when the plant was licensed.

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES The bases for maintaining Fire Rated Assemblies in an OPERABLE condition is provided in the above GENERAL BASES, along with the following:

The functional integrity of the fire rated assemblies, including penetration seals, ensures that a fire will be confined to its area of origin. This will ensure flames and hot gasses are prevented from spreading to adjacent fire areas/zones or from affecting redundant safe shutdown circuits.

These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several fire areas/zones of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment.

The fire rated assemblies, including walls, floors/ceilings, fire rated enclosures, penetration seals, fire doors, fire dampers, and hatches are considered functional when the observed condition is the same as the as-designed configuration. For those fire rated assemblies that are not in the as-designed configuration, either the appropriate ECG action shall be performed, until the fire rated assembly is returned to the as-designed configuration, or an evaluation should be performed. The evaluation should demonstrate that the as-found configuration has not degraded the capability of the fire rated assembly to prevent the spread of fire from the area of origin and, therefore; does not impact the ability to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.

The controls provided by ECG 18.7 are based upon maintaining the passive design features as evaluated and accepted by the NRC. The action statements are based upon temporary compensatory measures for degraded barrier features. Removal of a barrier or excessive degradations of a barrier must be evaluated for additional compensatory measures.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 4 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES BACKGROUND The Unit 1 and 2 credited Fire Rated Assemblies are shown on the (continued) 111906 series Fire Protection Drawings. Additional Fire Rated Assembly information (describing the system and its functionality) is available in Design Criteria Memorandum S-18, "Fire Protection System", S-98, "Penetration Seals", STP M-70A, "Inspection of Fire Barrier and HELB Penetration Seals", and STP M-70D, "Inspection of Rated Fire Assemblies, Except Penetration Seals, Dampers, & Doors." Fire Rated Assemblies are also categorized as ECG 18.7 in the associated FLOC.

Additionally, fire doors are listed by ECG applicability in Table 18.7-1.

SYSTEM/SAFETY FUNCTION The safety function of fire rated assemblies is to provide a passive means to ensure that a fire is confined to the area of origin.

System

Description:

FIRE RATED WALLS, FLOORS, CEILINGS The plant design and layout plays a significant role in the fire protection program by providing physical separation between redundant safe shutdown systems. Generally, when physical separation (via distance) cannot be achieved, fire barriers (i.e., walls, floors, ceilings, 3M wrap, enclosures, etc.) are provided to ensure protection of a single safety division from fire hazards, and to separate redundant divisions or trains from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire.

Fire Barriers are generally comprised of heat resistant and noncombustible materials such as; concrete, concrete blocks, plaster, pyrocrete, and gypsum wallboard.

FIRE RATED ENCLOSURES Fire rated enclosures are used in conjunction with other defense-in-depth aspects to provide protection to PG&E Design Class I equipment from fire hazards and to prevent the propagation of fire. Fire Rated enclosures are generally constructed of heat resistant and non-combustible materials such as; 3M wrap, pyrocrete, and plaster.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 5 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES BACKGROUND FIRE DOORS Fire doors are provided to ensure a fire is confined to its area of origin.

This is accomplished by having the fire rating of the fire door at least equal to the fire hazard present on either side of the barrier or equal to the fire rating of the barrier. Fire doors are equipped with automatic door closing mechanisms and have signs on them to inform plant personnel that they are fire doors and that these doors must be kept closed at all times (except for normal entry or exit). In addition, firewater suppression sprinklers are credited to protect certain fire doors. As such, the associated sprinklers must be in-service for the door to be OPERABLE.

Directional closed head automatic sprinkler protection is provided on one or both sides of fifteen (15) fire doors.

Door # Location Associated sprinkler Isolation Valve DOORB17 RHR pump room FP-1-1294 DOORB18 RHR pump room FP-1-1294 DOORB21 Charging pump room FP-1-1294 DOORB23 Charging pump room FP-1-1294 DOORB24 Charging pump room FP-1-1294 DOORB42-2 RHR pump room FP-2-1294 DOORB43-2 RHR pump room FP-2-1294 DOORB37-2 Charging pump room FP-2-1294 DOORB38-2 Charging pump room FP-2-1294 DOORB39-2 Charging pump room FP-2-1294 DOOR503 Main control room FP-1-341 DOOR508 Main control room FP-1-1042 DOOR560 Main control room FP-1-1042 DOOR364 115' penetration area FP-1-335 DOOR364-2 115' penetration area FP-2-30 Approved fire doors, like fire barriers, are usually rated by U.L. or other recognized testing agencies. PG&E Architectural Door Schedule, Sheet 2 of drawings 515220 through 515226 and the functional location (FLOC) lists the doors at DCPP and provides information concerning door location, type, size, fire rating, hardware, and ECG applicability.

Fire doors controlled by this ECG are listed in Table 18.7-1.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 6 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-1 Fire Doors Controlled by ECG 18.7 Unit Door Building Elevation Unit Door Building Elevation 1 A1 INTAKE -2'-1" 2 A4 INTAKE -2'-1" 1 A2 INTAKE -2'-1" 2 A5 INTAKE -2'-1" CNT 1 B17 AUX 64' 2 B19-2 PNTN 64' CNT 1 B18 AUX 64' 2 B20-2 PNTN 64' CNT 1 B19 PNTN 64' 2 B28-2 AUX 73' CNT 1 B20 PNTN 64' 2 B35-2 AUX 73' 1 B21 AUX 73' 2 B36-2 AUX 73' 1 B22 AUX 73' 2 B37-2 AUX 73' 1 B23 AUX 73' 2 B38-2 AUX 73' 1 B24 AUX 73' 2 B39-2 AUX 73' 1 B25 AUX 73' 2 B40-2 AUX 73' 1 B26 AUX 73' 2 B42-2 AUX 64' 1 B28 AUX 73' 2 B43-2 AUX 64' 1 101 TB 85' 2 101-2 TB 85' 1 102 TB 85' 2 102-2 TB 85' 1 103 TB 85' 2 103-2 TB 85' 1 104 TB 85' 2 104-2 TB 85' 1 104A TB 85' 2 107-2 TB 85' 1 107 TB 85' 2 109-2 TB 85' 1 109 TB 85' 2 109A-2 TB 85' 1 109A TB 85' 2 111-2 TB 85' 1 111 TB 85' 2 115A-2 TB 85' 1 113 TB 85' 2 116-2 TB 85' 1 113A TB 85' 2 117-2 TB 85' 1 115 TB 85' 2 118-2 TB 85' 1 115A TB 85' 2 119-2 TB 85' CNT 1 116 PNTN 85' 2 119A-2 TB 85' 1 117 TB 85' 2 126A-2 TB 85' 1 118 TB 85' 2 127A-2 TB 85' 1 119 TB 85' 2 128-2 TB 85' 1 119A TB 85' 2 142-2 AUX 85' 1 124 TB 85' 2 159-2 AUX 85' 1 143 TB 85' 2 171-2 AUX 85' 1 144 AUX 85' 2 174A-2 AUX 85' CNT 1 145 AUX 85' 2 189A-2 PNTN 85' CNT 1 146 AUX 85' 2 197-2 PNTN 85' 1 155 AUX 85' 2 199F-2 TB 85' 1 163 AUX 85' 2 199G-2 TB 85' 1 174A AUX 85' 2 203-2 TB 107' 1 189A AUX 85' 2 205-2 TB 107' 1 193 TB 85' 2 207-2 TB 107' DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 7 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-1 (continued)

Fire Doors Controlled by ECG 18.7 Unit Door Building Elevation Unit Door Building Elevation 1 199B TB 85' 2 208-2 TB 107' 1 199C TB 85' 2 209-2 TB 107' 1 199D AUX 85' 2 210-2 TB 107' 1 203 TB 107' 2 211-2 TB 107' 1 205 TB 107' 2 214-2 TB 107' 1 207 TB 107' 2 215-2 TB 107' 1 208 TB 107' 2 217-2 TB 107' 1 209 TB 107' 2 217A-2 TB 107' 1 209A TB 107' 2 222-2 AUX 100' 1 209B TB 107' 2 233-2 AUX 100' 1 210 TB 107' 2 234-2 AUX 100' 1 211 TB 107' 2 234A-2 AUX 100' 1 211A TB 107' 2 235-2 AUX 100' 1 212 TB 107' 2 236-2 AUX 100' 1 214 TB 107' 2 237-2 AUX 100' 1 215 TB 107' 2 238-2 AUX 100' 1 221 AUX 104' 2 239-2 AUX 100' CNT 1 223 AUX 100' 2 245-2 PNTN 100' 1 224 AUX 100' 2 258-2 AUX 100' 1 225 AUX 100' 2 259-2 FHB 100' 1 226 AUX 100' 2 262-2 FHB 100' 1 227 AUX 100' 2 263-2 FHB 100' 1 228 AUX 100' 2 265-2 FHB 100' CNT 1 229 AUX 100' 2 269-2 PNTN 100' 1 230 AUX 100' 2 279-2 FHB 100' 1 231 AUX 100' 2 284-2 TB 107' 1 232 AUX 100' 2 285-2 FHB 100' 1 245 AUX 100' 2 297-2 TB 107' 1 258 AUX 100' 2 297A-2 TB 107' 1 259 FHB 100' 2 297B-2 TB 107' 1 262 FHB 100' 2 297C-2 TB 107' 1 263 FHB 100' 2 297D-2 TB 107' 1 265 FHB 100' 2 298-2 FHB 100' CNT 1 269 PNTN 100' 2 302-2 TB 119' 1 279 FHB 100' 2 303-2 TB 119' 1 285 FHB 100' 2 304-2 TB 119' 1 297 FHB 100' 2 305-2 TB 119' 1 297A FHB 100' 2 306-2 TB 119' 1 298 TB 107' 2 307-2 TB 119' 1 298A TB 107' 2 308-2 TB 119' 1 298B TB 107' 2 309-2 TB 119' DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 8 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-1 (continued)

Fire Doors Controlled by ECG 18.7 Unit Door Building Elevation Unit Door Building Elevation 1 298C TB 107' 2 310-2 TB 119' 1 301 TB 119' 2 311-2 TB 119' 1 302 TB 119' 2 323-2 AUX 115' 1 303 TB 119' 2 330-2 AUX 115' 1 304 TB 119' 2 331-2 AUX 115' 1 305 TB 119' 2 339-2 AUX 115' 1 306 TB 119' 2 340-2 AUX 115' 1 307 TB 119' 2 348-2 AUX 115' 1 308 TB 119' 2 358-2 FHB 115' CNT 1 309 TB 119' 2 364-2 PNTN 115' 1 310 TB 119' 2 392-2 TB 119' 1 311 TB 119' 2 401-2 AUX 128' 1 322 TB 119' 2 407-2 AUX 128' 1 324 AUX 115' 2 408-2 AUX 128' 1 325 AUX 115' 2 412-2 TB 128' 1 326 AUX 115' 2 511-2 AUX 140' 1 328 AUX 115' 2 605-2 AUX 154' 1 333 AUX 115' 1 335 AUX 115' 1 337 AUX 115' 1 341 AUX 115' 1 342 AUX 115' 1 343 AUX 115' 1 348 AUX 115' 1 358 AUX 115' CNT 1 364 PNTN 115'-6" 1 402 AUX 128' 1 403 AUX 128' 1 404 AUX 128' 1 405 AUX 128' 1 406 AUX 128' 1 503 AUX 140' 1 508 AUX 140' 1 509 AUX 140' 1 560 AUX 140' 1 567 AUX 140' 1 603 AUX 154' DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 9 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES BACKGROUND FIRE DAMPERS (continued)

Fire dampers are provided to prevent fire propagation across the associated fire rated barrier. Ventilation ducts penetrating established fire barriers are provided with fire rated dampers, or have a Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE) to justify their acceptability. Automatically closing dampers on ventilation ducts penetrating areas protected by gas flooding systems provide isolation of the area to maintain gas concentration [Ref. NFPA 12 and NFPA 805] in addition to acting as a fire barrier. Smoke dampers may be required to minimize air leakage and to ensure fire damper operation in some ducts.

HATCHES Hatches are installed to enable passage of equipment and materials through fire rated barriers. Hatches are comprised of noncombustible materials such as concrete and steel. Hatches in fire rated barriers are provided with U.L. fire rated hatches, or have an FPEE to justify their acceptability. Hatches must be maintained closed to be Operable.

PENETRATION SEALS Penetration seals are essentially a sub-system of barriers. Penetration seals are typically comprised of heat resistant, materials such as; silicone foam, silicone elastomer, cementitious grout, plaster, ceramic fiber, caulk, rubber boots, steel caps or plugs, radflex, etc. Penetration seals are devices which seal openings in DCPP walls, floors, and ceilings and are credited for preventing the propagation of fire, products of combustion (smoke and hot gasses), HELB, flood and radiation. The specific function of a particular seal is therefore defined by the function of the barrier in which it is installed. In addition to maintaining the function of the barrier, penetration seals are designed so as not to interfere with the function of the item penetrating the barrier. The penetration seals addressed in this ECG are located outside containment in power block walls, floors, and ceilings and include penetration seals around pipe, conduit, cable tray, cable, HVAC ducts, instrument tubing and structural steel penetrates through barriers. Also addressed in this ECG are internal conduit seals, bus duct seals, seismic gap seals and expansion gap seals. Electrical cabling, cable trays or conduit, mechanical piping, and HVAC ducts penetrating fire barriers are typically provided with approved, fire resistant, penetration seal assemblies commensurate with the barrier's fire rating.

APPLICABLE Safety analysis that apply to the operability of fire Rated Assemblies at SAFETY DCPP include: the Nuclear Safety Capablity Assessment (NSCA) and ANALYSIS FPEEs.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 10 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES LCO The operability of Fire Rated Assemblies is necessary to protect plant equipment required to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition and to ensure that fire hazards do not result in the release of radioactivity, which could impact the health and safety of the public. Therefore, this equipment control guideline exists to ensure that the fire rated assemblies at DCPP will perform their safety function whenever the SSD equipment they protect is required to be OPERABLE.

The FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES are OPERABLE when the as found condition meets the as-designed condition. Abnormalities must be evaluated against the Acceptance criteria for the fire barrier per the appropriate STP.

  • STP M-70.SWG APPLICABILITY As discussed above, the FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES must be OPERABLE whenever the equipment they protect are required to be OPERABLE. This includes equipment, cables, instrumentation, controls, and support systems on either side of the barrier. This equipment includes the analyzed equipment necessary to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition. This requirement is necessary since these systems are credited for protecting SSD equipment from fire hazards.

ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to provide clarification that separate condition entry is allowed for each ECG 18.7 fire barrier impairment. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable fire rated assembly.

A.1 In the event a fire rated assembly is inoperable, a method to prevent the spread of a fire must be provided. Action A.1 prevents the spread of a fire by requiring a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly. A continuous fire watch in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the INOPERABLE fire rated assembly is restored. If a fire is detected, the fire watch will immediately notify the control room and the appropriate response will be initiated.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 11 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

(continued)

For specific fire detection zones listed in Table 18.7-2 (next page), it is acceptable to dispatch a single fire watch person to provide continuous fire watch coverage for all inoperable fire barriers in the entire fire detection zone. Fire watch personnel must stay within the assigned fire detection zone and must continuously transition between each room or fire area with inoperable fire barriers spending approximately the same amount of time in each room or area (i.e., the fire watch shall not remain in a room or fire area for a prolonged period of time). Each room or fire area with inoperable fire barriers within the assigned detection zone shall be surveyed for fire every 15 minutes or less.

The 15 minute continuous fire watch is a specific exception to the normal continuous fire watch. The 15 minute continuous fire watch has been approved for use via Licensing Basis Impact Evaluation (LBIE) 98-119A with some very specific restrictions. The 15 minute continuous fire watch allowance shall only be used in the areas authorized by this ECG.

If access between rooms or fire areas becomes restricted, such as by radiological barriers for surface contamination areas requiring use of step-off pads, continuous fire watches must be posted for each fire area.

All other ECG 18.7 areas not covered by Table 18.7-2 shall have continuous fire watch personnel dispatched to provide coverage for each affected room or fire area within the detection zone. The fire watch shall be continuously dedicated to the room or fire area.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 12 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-2 Fire Detections Zones where "15 Minute Continuous" Fire Watch is Allowed Unit 1 Fire Detector Zone Unit 1 FSAR Fire Area or Zones Description A-31 13-A, 13-B, 13-C, 13-D Turbine Building 119' Excluding Fire Area 13-E North A-4 12-A, 12-B, 12-C Turbine Building 104; North A-9 6-A-1, 6-A-2, 6-A-3, 6-A-4, 6-A-5 Battery and Inverters 115' A-10 5-A-1, 5-A-2, 5-A-3, 5-A-4 480V Bus Rooms 100' B-1 3-B-1, 3-B-2,3-C corridor 64' Aux Building B-3 3-M, 3-L (BA Evap Rm only) 85' SI Pump Rooms B-5 3-O, 3-Q-1, 3-Q-2, 3-X (BA transfer Fuel Handling Building pumps only) 100' B-7 3-P-4 115' Vent Area Filter Rooms B-11 3-P-7 140' Vent E-5 Fan Rooms B-12 3-P-8 140' Vent E-6 Fan Rooms B-14 8-A, 8-G, 8-E CR Computer Rm, SSPS Rm, SFM Office Unit 2 Fire Detector Zone Unit 2 FSAR Fire Areas or Zones Description A-31 24-A, 24-B, 24-C, 24-D Turbine Building 119' Excluding Fire Area 24-E South A-4 23-A, 23-B, 23-C Turbine Building 104; South A-9 6-B-1, 6-B-2, 6-B-3, 6-B-4, 6-B-5 Battery and Inverters 115' A-10 5-B-1, 5-B-2, 5-B-3, 5-B-4 480V Bus Rooms 100' B-1 3-D-1, 3-D-2,3-C corridor 64' Aux Building B-3 3-N, 3-L (BA Evap Rm only) 85' SI Pump Rooms B-5 3-U, 3-T-1, 3-T-2, 3-X (BA transfer Fuel Handling Building pumps only) 100' B-7 3-V-4 115' Vent Area Filter Rooms B-11 3-V-7 140' Vent E-5 Fan Rooms B-12 3-V-8 140' Vent E-6 Fan Rooms B-14 8-D, 8-F, 8-H CR Computer Rm, SSPS Rm, SFM Office (1)

For Fire Detector Zone A-3, Fire Areas 13-E (Unit 1) and 24-E (Unit 2) are not included because they are separated by security doors from the other fire areas in Fire Detector Zone A-3.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 13 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES ACTIONS A.2 (continued)

Instead of stationing a continuous fire watch, the fire detectors or detection capability of the automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of the affected barrier may be verified OPERABLE and an hourly fire watch patrol established, until the barrier is restored to functional status. The fire detection or automatic fire suppression system must be contiguous to the affected barrier in order to credit its operability, i.e. it must provide coverage up to and including the degraded fire rated assembly. Fire Zones or Fire Areas with area-wide detection or suppression or partial detection or suppression up to and including the degraded fire rated assembly, as shown in the Fire Protection 111906 DWGs, would be considered creditable.

The fire detection system is used as the primary means for detecting fires, however; the spray and/or sprinkler system flow switches as identified in Table 18.7-3 may be used as an alternate form of fire detection. The fire suppression system flow switches can be credited for detection by reviewing the results of the most recently performed fire water flow switch testing (Ref. STP M-63A). For instance, when a fusible link melts, water starts flowing in the system, which in turn causes a flow switch to activate. This action is indicated in the Control Room on the fire computer. Using the fire computer, Operators can determine the location of the flow switch and alert the fire brigade to respond to the incident.

Table 18.7-3, cross-references flow switch and fire areas. Both the fire detectors and automatic fire suppression system provide detection and alarm capability in the control room for early warning of a fire, so that the operators can muster the fire brigade. Crediting both fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems for detection is consistent with the NRC's evaluation granting a D.C. Cook Technical Specification change (Ref. 9).

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 14 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-3 Flow Switches Credited as Detection BARRIER DWG MONITORING SSD SPR SPR SYS 111906 FLOW AREA FIRE FIRE REDUNDANT ECG CONTROL SHEET SWITCH UNIT BLDG ELEV DESCRIPTION AREA ZONE EQUIP. Y/N Y/N VALVE NO.

AUX BOILER 0-FS-9 1 FHB 085' 2 - N N 0-20 17 0-1 DIRTY LUBE 0-FS-18 1 TURB 085' TB7 14B N N 1-50 6 OIL RM ABVS FAN &

1 AUX 140' AB1 8B1 23 EQUIP. RM CR VENT 1 AUX 154' FANS S35/S36 CR1 8B3 25 RM 0-FS-50 N N 1-341 ABVS FAN &

2 AUX 140' AB1 8B2 23 EQUIP. RM CR VENT 2 AUX 154' FANS S37/S38 CR1 8B4 25 RM ACCESS 0 AUX 085' 4B 1-FS-10 CONTROL - Y Y 1-37 17 0 AUX 085' CHEM LAB 4A MAIN TURB 1-FP-11 1 TURB 085' TB7 14A N N 6 BLDG 1-42 DIESEL GEN 1-355 1 TURB 085' 11D - Y Y 6 HALLWAY 1-42 1-FS-11 MAIN TURB 1 TURB 104' TB7 14A N N 1-42 7 BLDG NORTH SWGR VENT 1-355 1 TURB 119' 13E - Y Y 8 FAN RM 1-42 MAIN TURB 1-FS-12 1 TURB 104' TB7 14A N N 1-42 7 BLDG NORTH MAIN TURB 1-FS-13 1 TURB 104' TB7 14A N N 1-42 7 BLDG NORTH OPS WORK 0 TURB 119' 17 - N N 8, 13 CONTROL DIRTY LUBE 1 TURB 085' TB7 14B N N 6 OIL RM AREA 1 TURB 085' AROUND CCW TB7 14A Y Y 6 HX RM 1-FS-17 1-50 1 TURB 085' CCW HX RM TB7 14E Y Y 6 COLUMN 1 TURB 104' LINE G FROM TB7 14A Y Y 7 11 - 15.7 COLUMN 1 TURB 119' LINE G FROM TB7 14A Y Y 8 11 - 15.7 COLUMN 1 TURB 104' LINE G FROM 7 11 - 15.7 1-FS-20 TB7 14A Y Y 1-50 COLUMN 1 TURB 119' LINE G FROM 8 11 - 15.7 OPS WORK 1-FS-31 0 TURB 119' 17 - N N 1-50 8, 13 CONTROL DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 15 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-3 (continued)

BARRIER DWG MONITORING SSD SPR SPR SYS 111906 FLOW AREA FIRE FIRE REDUNDANT ECG CONTROL SHEET SWITCH UNIT BLDG ELEV DESCRIPTION AREA ZONE EQUIP. Y/N Y/N VALVE NO.

RHR PP 1 AUX 064' CORRIDOR AB1 3B3 15 DOOR CCP 1-1/1-2 1 AUX 073' 3H1 - 16 RM CCW 1-1 PP 1-346 1-FS-36 1 AUX 073' AB1 3J1 Y Y 16 RM 1-1294 CCW 1-2 PP 1 AUX 073' AB1 3J2 16 RM CCW 1-3 PP 1 AUX 073' AB1 3J3 16 RM 1 AUX 073' CCP 1-3 RM 3H2 - 16 PEN 100' PEN 1-FS-38 1 100' 3BB - Y Y 1-338 19 AREA AREA PEN 115' PEN 1-FS-39 1 115' 3BB - Y Y 1-335 21 AREA AREA 100' 1 FHB 100' FB1 31 N N CORRIDOR MOTOR 1-FS-42 1 FHB 100' DRIVEN AFW AB1 3Q2 Y Y 1-332 19 PP RM TURB DRIVEN 1 FHB 100' 3Q1 - Y Y AFW PP RM DIESEL GEN 1 TURB 085' 11D - 6 HALLWAY 1-355 1-FS-48 Y Y SWGR VENT 1-42 1 TURB 119' 13E - 8 FAN RM MAIN TURB 2-FP-20 2 TURB 085' TB7 19A N N 11 BLDG 2-66 DIESEL GEN 2-980 2 TURB 085' 22C - Y Y 11 HALLWAY 2-66 MAIN TURB 2-FS-11 2 TURB 104' TB7 19A N N 2-66 12 BLDG SOUTH SWGR VENT 2-980 2 TURB 119' TB13 24E Y Y 13 FAN RM 2-66 OPS READY 2 TURB 119' TB13 25 N N 2-66 13 RM AREA MAIN TURB 2-FS-12 2 TURB 104' TB7 19A N N 2-66 12 BLDG SOUTH MAIN TURB 2-FS-13 2 TURB 104' TB7 19A N N 2-66 12 BLDG SOUTH DIESEL GEN 2-980 2 TURB 085' 22C - Y Y 11 HALLWAY 2-66 OPS READY 2-FS-16 2 TURB 119' TB13 25 N N 2-66 13 RM AREA SWGR VENT 2-980 2 TURB 119' TB13 24E Y Y 13 FAN RM 2-66 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 16 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 Table 18.7-3 (continued)

BARRIER DWG MONITORING SSD SPR SPR SYS 111906 FLOW AREA FIRE FIRE REDUNDANT ECG CONTROL SHEET SWITCH UNIT BLDG ELEV DESCRIPTION AREA ZONE EQUIP. Y/N Y/N VALVE NO.

2 TURB 085' CCW HX RM 19E 11 AREA 2 TURB 085' AROUND CCW 19A 11 HX RM 2-FS-17 COLUMN TB7 Y Y 2-59 2 TURB 104' LINE G FROM 19A 12 20.3 - 25 COLUMN 2 TURB 119' LINE G FROM 19A 13 20.3 - 25 COLUMN 2 TURB 104' LINE G FROM 12 20.3 - 25 2-FS-20 TB7 19A Y Y 2-59 COLUMN 2 TURB 119' LINE G FROM 13 20.3 - 25 RHR PP 2 AUX 064' CORRIDOR AB1 3D3 15 DOOR CCP 2-1/2-2 2 AUX 073' 3I1 - 16 RM CCW 2-1 PP 2-349 2-FS-36 2 AUX 073' AB1 3K1 Y Y 16 RM 2-1294 CCW 2-2 PP 2 AUX 073' AB1 3K2 16 RM CCW 2-3 PP 2 AUX 073' AB1 3K3 16 RM 2 AUX 073' CCP 2-3 RM 3I2 - 16 PEN 100' PEN 2-FS-38 2 100' 3CC - Y Y 2-861 20 AREA AREA PEN 115' PEN 2-FS-39 2 115' 3CC - Y Y 2-30 22 AREA AREA 100' 2 FHB 100' FB2 32 N N CORRIDOR MOTOR 2-FS-47 2 FHB 100' DRIVEN AFW AB1 3T2 Y Y 2-352 20 PP RM TURB DRIVEN 2 FHB 100' 3T1 - Y Y AFW PP RM DIESEL GEN 2 TURB 085' 22C - 11 HALLWAY 2-980 2-FS-49 Y Y SWGR VENT 2-66 2 TURB 119' TB13 24E 13 FAN RM OPS READY 2-FS-51 2 TURB 119' TB13 25 N N 2-66 13 RM AREA SOUTH &

2-FS-384 2 FHB 115' EAST AB1 3W N N 2-1048 22 CORRIDOR DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 17 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES ACTIONS A.3 A different compensatory measure or combination of measures (e.g., additional administrative controls, operator briefings, temporary procedures, interim shutdown strategies, operator manual actions, temporary fire barriers, temporary detection or suppression systems) may be implemented in lieu of Required Actions A.1, or A.2.1 and A.2.2, or A.3. A documented evaluation of the impact of the proposed alternate compensatory measure and its adequacy compared to the compensatory measure required by the ECG must be completed. The evaluation must demonstrate that the alternate compensatory measure would not adversely affect the ability to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition in the event of a fire. Any alternate compensatory measure must maintain compliance with the General Design Criteria and 10 CFR 50.48(a), and must be retained as a record pursuant to 10 CFR 50.48(a). The evaluation of the alternate compensatory measure should incorporate risk insights regarding the location, quantity, and type of combustible material in the fire area; the presence of ignition sources and their likelihood of occurrence; the automatic fire suppression and fire detection capability in the fire area; the manual fire suppression capability in the fire area; and the human error probability where applicable.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 18 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE Surveillance Requirements were originally established in the fire REQUIREMENTS protection Technical Specifications (TSs) when the plant was licensed.

Since that time, the fire protection TSs have been converted to Equipment Control Guidelines. Few changes have been made to the surveillance requirements in the fire protection ECGs; the changes have been approved under the 50.59 Safety Evaluation Process.

SR 18.7.1 Visually inspect each of the fire rated assemblies, except penetration seals, to verify functionality.

Fire Rated Assemblies consists of fire barriers (concrete, plaster, gypsum, etc.), fire rated enclosures (3-M, pyrocrete, plaster, etc.), fire doors, fire dampers, and hatches. Penetration seal surveillance requirements are discussed in SR 18.7.2. The fire rated assemblies are inspected on an 18 month frequency. The 18 month surveillance frequency was established by the NRC in the original TS, and is sufficient to ensure that the fire rated assemblies are available whenever the equipment it protects must be OPERABLE.

Fire rated assemblies that are inaccessible during normal power operation will be inspected every 24 months. Examples include fire rated assemblies located inside containment and PRA high risk activities involving the clearing of ventilation to perform inspection of fire dampers.

The 24 month surveillance frequency is consistent with 24 month refueling cycles. The basis for this frequency is that past surveillance, maintenance, and operational history have demonstrated that the fire rated assemblies remain intact and can be expected to perform their required safety function when inspected on a 24 month interval.

Additionally, the fire rated assemblies inside containment are not inspected since damage is unlikely to occur when the plant is at power and ALARA concerns are avoided since radiological doses significantly decrease during refueling outage periods.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 19 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 18.7.2 REQUIREMENTS "Fire rated penetration seals shall be verified to be OPERABLE by (continued) performing a visual inspection of at least 10 percent of each type of penetration seal, on average. 10 percent, on average, is equivalent to an inspection population comprised of 10 percent of the total penetration seal population, with the percentage inspected for each individual seal type potentially being less than 10 percent. If an unacceptable degradation is identified, an engineering evaluation of the degradation shall be performed. The results of the analysis will be used to determine if the degraded penetration seal is still capable of performing its safety function. If the seal is deemed to be nonfunctional, an engineering evaluation will be performed to determine whether a new sample population of penetration seals shall be inspected. The population size and type will be determined based on the results of the engineering evaluation. If a new sample population is inspected, the inspection process shall continue until no additional non-functional seals are found in the sample population(s)."

This surveillance activity will verify the operability of 10 percent of each seal type, on average. 100 percent of all types of penetration seals will be inspected over a 15 year period. An 18 month surveillance frequency is sufficient to ensure these components will function properly whenever the SSD equipment they are protecting is required to be OPERABLE.

The DCPP fire protection program requirements were originally established in the DCPP TS. The surveillance inspection scope for penetration seal was a 100 percent visual inspection of all types of penetration seals over an 18 month period. The basis for the surveillance scope change was that as part of the Penetration Seal Re-verification Program a minimum of two, 100 percent enhanced inspections of each identified component was conducted, with only a small percentage of seal failures attributed to seal degradation. Design controls have been enhanced to assure configuration control, Westinghouse standard TS originally allowed for a 10 percent sample program, and several utilities were originally licensed with or have subsequently transitioned to a 10 percent inspection program.

SR 18.7.3 Verify fire rated assemblies to be functional following repairs or maintenance by the performance of a visual inspection of the affected fire rated assemblies. This action is required prior to returning a fire rated assembly to a functional status.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 20 of 21

Fire Rated Assemblies ECG 18.7 BASES REFERENCES 1. The DCPP Operating Licenses for Units 1 & 2.

2. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805: Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 edition).
3. License Amendments 225/227, dated April 14, 2016, Amendment No.

225/227 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80/DPR-82 [Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805)].

4. Design Criteria Memorandum DCM S-18, "Fire Protection Systems."
5. Design Criteria Memorandum DCM S-98, "Penetration Seals."
6. DCPP Fire Protection System Drawings 111906 Series.
7. OM8.ID2, "Fire System Impairment."
8. License Amendment Request 90-11, "Revision of Fire Protection License Conditions, Relocation of Fire Protection Technical Specifications, and Clarification of AFW Water Sources."
9. Letter from NRC to Indiana and Michigan Electric Company dated 7/15/86. Letter from NRC to Indiana and Michigan Electric Company dated 2/8/90.
10. Letter from NRC to Pacific Gas and Electric, dated 1/27/00, Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to the Request for NRC Approval of a Revision to the Licensee's Requirements for Certain Continuous Fire Watches.
11. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-07, "Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire Protection Program Requirements," April 19, 2005.
12. Calculation M-1177, "Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA)."

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Rev. 14 ECG_18!7u3r14.DOC 1030.1318 Page 21 of 21

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A7

Title:

Determine 230 kV OPERABILITY Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Perform __X Simulate Method:

Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: ________ minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

OP J-2:VIII, rev 32

References:

LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, rev 12 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: See Examinee Response - Key Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: New G2.2.37 - Ability to determine operability and/or availability of Gen KA # / Rating:

safety related equipment 4.6 RON FORTIER DATE: 12/02/19 AUTHOR CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Determine 230 kV OPERABILITY JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly documented. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure (as applicable) and told the steps with which to begin.

Required OP J-2:VIII, rev 32 Materials: LCO 3.8.1 Initial GIVEN:

Conditions:

  • Both Unit 1 and 2 are at 100% power
  • Two minutes after Diesel Generator 1-2 is declared inoperable, an earthquake causes a grid disturbance
  • Grid Control reports:

o loss of the Morro Bay-Diablo Canyon 230 kV line o 230 kV voltage is 230 kV o Los Padres Area Load is 350 MW o DCPP has 0 capacitors in service o Mesa has 4 capacitors and 1 transformer in service

  • No operator compensatory actions have been taken or LCO ACTION(s) have been entered
  • 52VU11 is OPEN Initiating Cue: You are instructed to:
  • Using OP J-2:VIII, Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP, Attachment 2, 230kV Offsite Power Operability Evaluation - LTC IN AUTO, determine the OPERABILITY of 230 kV at this time (show your work)
  • Determine the LCO ACTION(s) Unit 1 should enter NOTE:
  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Determine 230 kV OPERABILITY JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard :

Task Standard:

  • 230 kV is inoperable (see key for determination)
  • LCO 3.8.1A, B and D must be entered Start End Time: Time:
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Determine 230 kV OPERABILITY JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________

Examinee Response - Key

1. 230 kV is inoperable Determined OP J-2-VIII, Table 1, Row 2-11 (Morro Bay-Diablo Canyon 230 kV Line) applies Determined NO to 230 kV switchyard voltage greater than Table 1 Normal Transfer Level (230 vs 231)

NOTE: Candidate may not explicitly mark up attachment but will have verified the next two steps as part of reaching the conclusion that 230 kV is inoperable (Determined Electrical Configuration is 3, Power, from attachment 1)

(Determined NO to Comp actions complete)

Determined 230 kV inoperable NOTE: candidate may add comp measures that could be taken to make 230 kV OPERABLE. This is NOT part of the grading criteria. If their answer is based on the comp measures, tell student to refer to their initial cue.

2. LCO 3.8.1 Action(s) in effect (all required):

Action A Action B Action D

    • Denotes Critical Step and SubSteps Page 4 of 6 Rev. 0

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 48 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 36 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 12 of 77 230kV Offsite Power Operability Evaluation - LTC IN AUTO U1&2 Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
b. Three diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s); and
c. Two supply trains of the diesel fuel oil (DFO) transfer system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS


NOTE---------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required OPERABLE AND offsite circuit.

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

AND A.2 Restore required offsite 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135,166,169,215 Rev 12 Page 1 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135,167,170,217 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the required offsite AND circuit(s).

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

AND


NOTE-------------

In MODE 1, 2, and 3, TDAFW pump is considered a required redundant feature.

B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) supported by discovery of Condition the inoperable DG B concurrent with inoperable when its inoperability of required redundant redundant required feature(s) is inoperable. feature(s).

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE DG(s).

AND B.4 Restore DG to 14 days OPERABLE status.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135,166,215 Rev 12 Page 2 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135,167,217 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two required offsite circuits C.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from inoperable. feature(s) inoperable discovery of Condition when its redundant C concurrent with required feature(s) is inoperability of inoperable. redundant required features.

AND C.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

D. One required offsite circuit D.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inoperable. circuit to OPERABLE status.

AND OR One DG inoperable. D.2 Restore DG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

E. Two or more DGs E.1 Ensure at least two DGs 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> inoperable. are OPERABLE.

F. One supply train of the F.1 Restore the DFO 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> DFO transfer system transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

G. Two supply trains of the G.1 Restore one train of the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> DFO transfer system DFO transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion AND Time of Condition A, B, C, D, E, F or G not met. H.2 -----------NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.

Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135, 219 Rev 12 Page 3 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135, 221 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A7 Initial GIVEN:

Conditions:

  • Both Unit 1 and 2 are at 100% power
  • Two minutes after Diesel Generator 1-2 is declared inoperable, an earthquake causes a grid disturbance
  • Grid Control reports:

o loss of the Morro Bay-Diablo Canyon 230 kV line o 230 kV voltage is 230 kV o Los Padres Area Load is 350 MW o DCPP has 0 capacitors in service o Mesa has 4 capacitors and 1 transformer in service

  • No operator compensatory actions have been taken or LCO ACTION(s) have been entered
  • 52VU11 is OPEN Initiating Cue: You are instructed to:
  • Using OP J-2:VIII, Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP, Attachment 2, 230kV Offsite Power Operability Evaluation - LTC IN AUTO, determine the OPERABILITY of 230 kV at this time (show your work)
  • Determine the LCO ACTION(s) Unit 1 should enter NOTE:
  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.
  • If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Examinee Response

1. 230 kV is inoperable or OPERABLE Basis:
2. All LCO Action(s) in effect:

Page 5 of 5 Rev. 0

1&2 D IABLO C ANYON POWER P LANT OP J-2:VIII OPERATING PROCEDURE Rev. 32 UNITS Page 1 of 77 Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP 09/17/18 Effective Date QUALITY RELATED Table of Contents

1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 2
2. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 2
3. RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 3
4. PREREQUISITES........................................................................................... 3
5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .............................................................. 3
6. INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................. 5 6.1 Considerations for 500-kV System Operability ................................................ 5 6.2 Considerations for 230-kV System Operability ................................................ 5 6.3 Radial Feed Conditions................................................................................... 9
7. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 10
8. RECORDS.................................................................................................... 10 ATTACHMENTS:
1. Diablo Canyon Electrical Alignment Configurations....................................... 11
2. 230kV Offsite Power Operability Evaluation - LTC IN AUTO ......................... 12
3. O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" .... 13
4. 230-kV Operability Determination Worksheet................................................ 76
5. 230-kV Lines Normal Alignment Diagram ..................................................... 77 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 2 of 77 UNITS 1&2

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure contains instructions to assist the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP)

Control Room in making operability determinations regarding each of the offsite power system sources. This determination is based upon the following factors:T35523 1.1.1 230-kV Source:

  • Startup transformer LTC mode of operation
  • Los Padres area load (MWe)
  • DCPP electrical configuration and load transfer level
  • 230-kV line configuration
  • DCPP and MESA capacitor banks in service 1.1.2 500-kV Source:
  • 500-kV outlet line availability
  • 500-kV voltage at the switchyard 1.2 Attachment 3 contains Transmission Department Guideline O-23, "Operating Instructions for Reliable Transmission Service to Diablo Canyon Power Plant." This guideline contains instructions for operating the transmission system and dispatching DCPP.

1.3 The operability of 12-kV, 4.16-kV, and 480 VAC buses is not within the scope of this procedure. For determining operability of these buses, REFER TO STP I-1C, "Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses."

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 The following are examples of situations in which evaluation of the 230-kV system as an offsite power source for DCPP may be required:
  • Transmission lines are disabled such that the ability of the system to supply DCPP load and voltage requirements is degraded.
  • Abnormal system voltages exist which limit the ability of DCPP bus transfer equipment to operate as designed.
  • Abnormally heavy system loading in the Los Padres Division.
  • Capacitor bank(s) unavailable.

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 3 of 77 UNITS 1&2

3. RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 The operations SFM is responsible for making Offsite Power Source operability determinations for DCPP based on grid and plant conditions. The SFM is also responsible for Tech Spec entries due to inoperable electrical sources or equipment.

3.2 The Grid Control Center (GCC) South Coast Operator has operating jurisdiction of both Diablo Canyon Switchyards via California Independent System Operator (CAISO). GCC also has operational jurisdiction over all equipment in the yards.

4. PREREQUISITES None
5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Revisions to this procedure shall coincide with revisions to O-23, "Operating Instructions for Reliable Transmission Service to Diablo Canyon Power Plant." O-23 requires the following approvals due to multiple users and system operation needs:
  • Station Director, DCPP
  • Executive Vice President, Electric Operations 5.2 Startup Transformer Load Tap Changers (LTCs) maintain voltage as follows:
  • With both startup feeder breakers open, voltage is maintained at 12.9-kV (107.5%).
  • With either startup feeder breaker closed, voltage is maintained at 12-kV (100%).

5.3 With the LTC voltage at the upper setting, the 4-kV and 480 VAC buses will experience higher voltages.

5.4 Placing the LTC in manual results in an inoperable 230-kV system. This operation during startups and shutdowns should be expedited to reduce the time the 230-kV system is inoperable.

5.5 Portions of the 230 kV offsite power source are licensed as a Unit 1 & 2 shared resource.

The 230 kV system offsite power source is designed to have sufficient capacity and capability to perform BOTH of the following:Ref 7.3.4

  • Operate the ESF system for a design-basis accident on one unit while performing a safe shutdown on the other unit.
  • Operate the ESF system for a dual unit trip as a result of an earthquake or abnormal operational occurrence.

5.6 The following procedures provide instruction for grid restrictions during DG maintenance and/or testing:

  • OP J-6B:IX, "Diesel Generator Extended On-Line Maintenance" if a DG MOW is in progress
  • OP J-6B:X, :XI, :XII, "Diesel Generator Clearing" if a DG is cleared
  • STP M-9G, "DG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Load Test and Hot Restart test" if test is in progress OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 4 of 77 UNITS 1&2 5.7 Regarding the Special Protection Scheme (SPS) and Unit Selector Switch:

5.7.1 The Diablo Canyon SPS has a Unit Selector Switch at the 500-kV Switchyard Control Room that is used to manually select which of the two units is the preferred unit to trip. However, the SPS may trip the unit that is NOT selected by this switch. The SPS contains logic that executes a wide range of combinations between possible events and bus configurations that it will override this selector switch, when necessary. The "trip" in this context means opening the generator 500-kV breakers for a load rejection on that unit.

5.7.2 Selection of the unit NOT preferred to trip by SPS may be influenced by the following, but not limited to:

  • A unit at end of core life.
  • A unit's known or suspected nuclear fuel leak.
  • A unit's SG primary-to-secondary leak.
  • Maintenance on equipment that places the unit on a very high PRA risk.
  • Known equipment problems such as steam dumps, rod control problems or turbine DEH Control that could challenge the survival of a load rejection.
  • Problems with PZR or SG safeties such that placing the unit in hot standby would be complicated.

5.7.3 The manual selection of which unit to trip by SPS should take into consideration that a unit curtailed at 70% load or less will likely survive a load rejection.

5.7.4 Plant curtailment in 2-line schemes of operation (one 500-kV outlet line is out of service) will not be necessary if the SPS is armed (operational).

5.7.5 If SPS is armed, plant management may choose to proactively back down below the MW arming levels in certain situations PER OP C-3:III. The following are examples that could lead to that decision:

  • Hot summer days.
  • Special CAISO events.
  • Line relay protection out of service.
  • Transmission requests for line clearance.
  • Condenser tunnel cleaning.
  • 500-kV line outage scheduling.
  • Fire potentially taking out both 500-kV lines to Midway.
  • Fire approaching the line.
  • DG maintenance.
  • Fire potentially taking out a 230-kV line with no offsite support to preserve the 500-kV lines.
  • Personnel experience with SPS.

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 5 of 77 UNITS 1&2

6. INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Considerations for 500-kV System Operability NOTE: Both 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 are required for the 500-kV System to be OPERABLE.

6.1.1 500-kV switchyard is connected to the grid by at least one of the three 500-kV lines (Gates, Midway #2, Midway #3).

6.1.2 500-kV switchyard voltage is greater than 512-kV.

6.2 Considerations for 230-kV System Operability NOTE: System conditions in Attachment 3 that are blank (shown as "---") represent unanalyzed conditions. Operation under these system conditions requires entry into TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources" - Operating" Condition A.

6.2.1 REFER TO Attachment 3 Section 3, "230-kV Off Site Power."T36915 6.2.2 REFER TO Attachment 5, "230-kV Lines Normal Alignment Diagram."

6.2.3 WHEN notified by GCC South Coast Operator of changes to 230-kV operability OR plant conditions change, THEN obtain the information needed from GCC and from the Control Room to make an operability determination AND record on Attachment 4.

6.2.4 IF LTC is in MANUAL, THEN the 230-kV offsite power is INOPERABLE.Ref 7.1.8 6.2.5 IF 52VU11 is CLOSED, THEN the 230-kV offsite power is INOPERABLE.

6.2.6 IF 52VU11 is OPEN AND the LTC is in AUTO, THEN REFER TO Attachment 2, "LTC in AUTO," for evaluation.

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 6 of 77 UNITS 1&2 NOTE: Compensatory actions as required by the applicable attachment must be in effect before the 230-kV power source can be declared operable or maintained operable for the given or expected conditions.

6.2.7 Complete evaluation PER Attachment 2.

a. IF Compensatory Action 1 of Attachment 2 is required, THEN block ALL standby condensate booster pump sets:
1. Unit 1:

a) Record as-found configuration of Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches (inside rear of VB4):

1) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-1

[ ] Block [ ] Normal

2) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-2

[ ] Block [ ] Normal

3) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-3

[ ] Block [ ] Normal b) Ensure in "BLOCK" all Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches.

  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 1-1, "BLOCK"
  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 1-2, "BLOCK"
  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 1-3, "BLOCK"
2. Unit 2:

a) Record as-found configuration of Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches (inside rear of VB4):

1) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-1

[ ] Block [ ] Normal

2) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-2

[ ] Block [ ] Normal

3) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-3

[ ] Block [ ] Normal OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 7 of 77 UNITS 1&2 b) Ensure in "BLOCK" all Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches.

  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 2-1, "BLOCK"
  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 2-2, "BLOCK"
  • Cnd & Bstr Pump Set 2-3, "BLOCK" CAUTION: The 12-kV bus with the Circulating Water Pump selected for auto-reclose should NOT be blocked in the following step.
b. IF Compensatory Action 2 of Attachment 2 is required, THEN perform the following:
1. On Unit 1, perform ONE of the following to block the automatic transfer of the 12k-kV Bus to Startup power:

NOTE: Blocking 12-kV Bus D will cause the loss of CWP 1-1, RCP 1-2 and RCP 1-4 if an automatic transfer is initiated.

  • Place 12-kV Bus D Auto XFR to S/U switch in CUT OUT.

OR NOTE: Blocking 12-kV Bus E will cause the loss of CWP 1-2, RCP 1-1 and RCP 1-3 if an automatic transfer is initiated.

  • Place 12-kV Bus E Auto XFR to S/U switch in CUT OUT.
2. On Unit 2, perform ONE of the following to block the automatic transfer of the 12k-kV Bus to Startup power:

NOTE: Blocking 12-kV Bus D will cause the loss of CWP 2-1, RCP 2-2 and RCP 2-4 if an automatic transfer is initiated.

  • Place 12-kV Bus D Auto XFR to S/U switch in CUT OUT.

OR NOTE: Blocking 12-kV Bus E will cause the loss of CWP 2-2, RCP 2-1 and RCP 2-3 if an automatic transfer is initiated.

  • Place 12-kV Bus D Auto XFR to S/U switch in CUT OUT.
c. IF Compensatory Action 3 of Attachment 2 is required, THEN ensure BOTH of the following are unloaded:
  • 12-kV Bus D
  • 12-kV Bus E OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 8 of 77 UNITS 1&2 NOTE: The times between 1700 and 2000 and between 0200 and 0400 represent the high and low system load periods respectively; voltage and load will have the greatest tendency to be outside of required limits at these times.

6.2.8 IF one 230-kV line is out of service, THEN monitor 230-kV system voltage and Los Padres load using SCADA once between 1700 and 2000 AND once between 0200 and 0400.

6.2.9 IF two 230-kV lines are out of service, THEN monitor hourly 230-kV system voltage and Los Padres load using SCADA.

NOTE: Some compensatory actions may remain if the SFM deems them required for plant conditions.

6.2.10 WHEN compensatory actions are no longer required AND requested by SFM, THEN ensure compensatory measures removed.

a. IF Compensatory Action 1 of Attachment 2 was implemented, THEN perform the following:
1. Return Unit 1 Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches to step 6.2.7a.1.a) as-found configuration (inside rear of VB4):

a) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-1

[ ] Block [ ] Normal b) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-2

[ ] Block [ ] Normal c) Condensate/Booster Pump 1-3

[ ] Block [ ] Normal

2. Return Unit 2 Condensate/Booster Pump Set block switches to step 6.2.7a.2.a) as-found configuration (inside rear of VB4):

a) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-1

[ ] Block [ ] Normal b) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-2

[ ] Block [ ] Normal c) Condensate/Booster Pump 2-3

[ ] Block [ ] Normal OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 9 of 77 UNITS 1&2

b. IF Compensatory Action 2 of Attachment 2 was implemented, THEN ensure CUT IN the following switches:
  • Auto XFR to S/U on Unit 1 12kV Bus D
  • Auto XFR to S/U on Unit 1 12kV Bus E
  • Auto XFR to S/U on Unit 2 12kV Bus D
  • Auto XFR to S/U on Unit 2 12kV Bus E
c. Ensure the following switches in AUTO (pushed):
  • S/U XFMR 1-1 Low Side Voltage Adjust
  • S/U XFMR 2-1 Low Side Voltage Adjust 6.3 Radial Feed Conditions NOTE: A radial feed condition is one of the following configurations:
  • Utilizing a single 230kV bus Sec "E" at Morro Bay
  • Morro Bay - DCPP 230-kV line out of service
  • Morro Bay - Mesa 230-kV line out of service
  • DCPP - Mesa 230-kV line out of service 6.3.1 WHEN a radial feed condition exists, THEN perform the following:
a. WHEN performing risk evaluations using the configuration risk management software (CRMS),

THEN ensure the appropriate Train Level SSC (TLS) code is entered.

b. IF the Unit is in Modes 1-4, THEN perform the following:
1. Ensure non-emergent work that may render any DG unavailable is NOT performed.Ref 7.1.8
2. Post two diesel generators per unit as protected equipment PER OP O-36, "Protected Equipment Postings," as follows:Ref 7.1.9/7.1.10
  • WHEN in a Bus F, G or H Week, THEN post the diesel generators not associated with the Bus Matrix Week.
  • WHEN in a Bus X Week, THEN post any two diesel generators.

6.3.2 WHEN the radial feed condition no longer exists, THEN remove postings on diesel generators not protected for other reasons PER OP O-36.

6.3.3 Ensure a radial feed on the 230-kV system with only one 500-kV output breaker in service is NOT scheduled.Ref 7.1.8 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for OP J-2:VIII R32 DCPP Page 10 of 77 UNITS 1&2

7. REFERENCES 7.1 ARs/Notifications 7.1.1 A0419055, "STP I-1C Voltage Limits for 4kV and 480V Buses Need Eval" 7.1.2 A0505071, "Inadvertent Transfer of a 4kV Vital Bus to Startup" 7.1.3 A0528007, "Startup Power Inoperable with Tap Changer in Manual," AE 3 7.1.4 50455129, "STP I-1C 480V Maximum Voltage" 7.1.5 50481860, "Startup Xfmr LTC in Manual Evaluation" 7.1.6 50503487, "230 kV Trans Network Line Capacity" 7.1.7 50508293, "Request that PRA information be Put Into OP J-2:VIII" 7.1.8 50572399, "Risk of Morro Bay 230 kV Configuration" 7.1.9 50593182, "OP J-2:VIII, D/G Posting Expectations" 7.1.10 50684607, "Request approval to revise OP J-2:VIII" 7.2 Drawings 7.2.1 437566, "Schematic Diagram - Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps" 7.2.2 414351, "Single Line Diagram - Morro Bay Power Plant" 7.3 Other 7.3.1 Calculation 357A-DC, "Units 1 & 2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Motor Starting" 7.3.2 Calculation 359-DC, "230kV Grid Interface Requirements as a DCPP Offsite Power source" 7.3.3 California Independent System Operator, Transmission Control Agreement, Appendix E, Nuclear Protocols 7.3.4 NRC Letter dated December 14, 2009, "Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos 1 and 2 - Request for Technical Specification Interpretation of 230 Kilovolt System Operability (TAC Nos ME0711 and ME0712)"

7.3.5 STP I-1C, "Routine Weekly Checks Required By License"

8. RECORDS 8.1 There are no retention requirements for this procedure.

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 11 of 77 Diablo Canyon Electrical Alignment Configurations U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 1 of 1 CO NFIG UR AT IO N 1 CO NFIG URA T IO N 2 C O NFIG URA T ION 3 B A CK FE E D T RA NS FE R POW ER 230 KV 5 00KV 23 0KV 500K V 2 30KV 5 00KV (S U) (A UX ) (SU ) (AU X) (SU ) (A UX )

PC B PC B P CB MOD MOD MOD DC PP D CP P G EN D CP P G EN LO A D LO AD LO A D G EN (T ypical O ffline) (Typical O nline)

NO TE : Configuration 2 (T ransfer) applies when at least one 12kV bus is aligned to S tartup; other buses aligned to either S tartup or Aux.

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 12 of 77 230kV Offsite Power Operability Evaluation - LTC IN AUTO U1&2 Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1 Load Transfer Level (Att. 3 Table 1)

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 47 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 35 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 48 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 36 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 49 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 37 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 51 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 39 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 52 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 40 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 53 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 41 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 54 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 42 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 56 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 44 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 57 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 45 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 58 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 46 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 59 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 47 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 60 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 48 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 61 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 49 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 62 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 50 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 63 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 51 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 64 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 52 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 65 of 77 O-23, "Operating Instruction for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP" U1&2 Attachment 3: Page 53 of 63 OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

OP J-2:VIII R32 Page 76 of 77 230-kV Operability Determination Worksheet U1&2 Attachment 4: Page 1 of 1 NOTE: Steady state voltages should be used for this worksheet and should disregard momentary grid transients.

Date/Time ____________/_____________

Unit/Mode ____________/_____________

Switchyard Data (See Attachment 3)

Line Outage(s) ___________________________

Capacitors DCPP ___________ AVAILABLE or IN (number)

MESA ___________ AVAILABLE or IN (number)

MESA Transformers In Service ___________ (1 or 2)

Row Number (X-Y) ____ ____

230-kV Voltage at Switchyard Minimum req'd ___________ kV Actual ___________ kV Los Padres Area Load Maximum Allowed ___________ mW Actual ___________ mW Control Room Data DCPP Electrical Configuration (1 = backfeed, 2 = transfer, (Attachment 1) ___________ 3 = power)

Load Transfer Level ___________ (Normal, C)

LTC Status ___________ (AUTO, MANUAL) 52VU11 Status ___________ (OPEN, CLOSED)

Comp actions, if required ___________________________

SCADA Data Monitoring ___________ (Hourly/ Shiftly)

Radial Feed DGs Protected ___________ (Yes, No)

OP_J-2~VIIIu3r32.DOC 0910.0835

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
b. Three diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s); and
c. Two supply trains of the diesel fuel oil (DFO) transfer system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS


NOTE---------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required OPERABLE AND offsite circuit.

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

AND A.2 Restore required offsite 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135,166,169,215 Rev 12 Page 1 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135,167,170,217 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the required offsite AND circuit(s).

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

AND


NOTE-------------

In MODE 1, 2, and 3, TDAFW pump is considered a required redundant feature.

B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) supported by discovery of Condition the inoperable DG B concurrent with inoperable when its inoperability of required redundant redundant required feature(s) is inoperable. feature(s).

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE DG(s).

AND B.4 Restore DG to 14 days OPERABLE status.

(continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135,166,215 Rev 12 Page 2 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135,167,217 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two required offsite circuits C.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from inoperable. feature(s) inoperable discovery of Condition when its redundant C concurrent with required feature(s) is inoperability of inoperable. redundant required features.

AND C.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

D. One required offsite circuit D.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inoperable. circuit to OPERABLE status.

AND OR One DG inoperable. D.2 Restore DG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

E. Two or more DGs E.1 Ensure at least two DGs 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> inoperable. are OPERABLE.

F. One supply train of the F.1 Restore the DFO 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> DFO transfer system transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

G. Two supply trains of the G.1 Restore one train of the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> DFO transfer system DFO transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion AND Time of Condition A, B, C, D, E, F or G not met. H.2 -----------NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.

Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135, 219 Rev 12 Page 3 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135, 221 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. Two or more DGs I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.

AND One or more required offsite circuits inoperable.

J. One or more DGs J.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.

AND Two required offsite circuits inoperable.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 135, 219 Rev 12 Page 4 of 37 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 135, 221 Tab_3!8u3r12.DOC 1222.1610

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-A8

Title:

Authorize Emergency Exposure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Rev 8.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: See Examinee Response Key Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments Modified Bank Gen KA # G2.3.4 - Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal 3.7 or emergency conditions.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

  • EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Rev 8.
  • Completed Emergency Exposure Permits for volunteers (Handout 1)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.
  • There is evidence of fuel damage.
  • MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and a break downstream of the MSIV is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.
  • The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.
  • Volunteers have been found to undertake two high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

  • The Shift Manager directs you to review each completed permit and determine whether or not it should be approved.
  • Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out NOTE:
  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references. .

NRCL181-A8 .docx PAGE 2 OF 5 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

  • Wayne permit should be authorized - permit request is for 4.5 REM, and maximum for allowable for sampling is 5 REM.
  • Banner permit should NOT be authorized - Voluntary consent signature line is marked N/A. Voluntary consent signature IS required for a NO LIMIT exposure authorization.

Start End Time: Time:

Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL181-A8 .docx PAGE 3 OF 5 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A8 ANSWER KEY Examinee Response - KEY Volunteer Approve? Basis for Approval or Rejection Requested permit limit is within the allowable range of Wayne YES the associated activity type. (Permit request is for 4.5 REM, which is within the limits allowable for sampling).

Requested NO LIMIT exposure is allowable for the associated Banner NO activity type, but the volunteers signature line is incorrectly marked N/A. Volunteer signature is required to acknowledge he/she is fully aware of the risks. (Permit request is for a life-saving activity, but is missing the volunteers signature).

NRCL181-A8 .DOCX PAGE 4 OF 5 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A8 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.
  • There is evidence of fuel damage.
  • MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and a break downstream of the MSIV is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.
  • The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.
  • Volunteers have been found to undertake two high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

  • The Shift Manager directs you to review each completed permit and determine whether or not it should be approved.
  • Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE Volunteer Approve? Basis for Approval or Rejection Wayne Banner NRCL181-A8 .DOCX PAGE 5 OF 5 REV. 0

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 08:36 Permit #: 16-090A Responder(s): Bruce Wayne (Print)

RP Support: S. Witt Description of Activity: Perform sampling of all steam generators per CAP AP-1 as called for by EOP E-3, Appendix FF, step 9.

Special Hazards: Condition of sampling system unknown. Structural damage in area.

Special Instructions: Contact Control Room at x1224 when prepared to commence sampling.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 4.5 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [X] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.0 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 4.5 (rem)

  • Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

N/A Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 09:00 Permit #: 16-090B Responder(s): Bruce Banner (Print)

RP Support: D. Libby Description of Activity: Operator with fractured leg and head contusion trapped within 100' pipe nest SCA. The individual appears to be having significant difficulty breathing. Volunteer has EMT background; will move Operator to low dose area for further evaluation.

Special Hazards: Exposed Electical Special Instructions: SCA Boundaries will be relocated as needed to support rescue efforts. Second volunteer on standby.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 20 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.3 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[X] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 26.0 (rem)

  • Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

N/A Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION 8 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE UNITS TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides 1 2 INFO ONLY AND EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................................. 1 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................... 2 DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 3 RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................................................................ 4 PREREQUISITES ............................................................................................................................................. 4 PRECAUTIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 5 INSTRUCTIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 5 RECORDS ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 ATTACHMENTS ............................................................................................................................................. 6 Emergency Director (SEC or SEC) Checklist ............................................................................................... 6 TSC Radiological Advisor Checklist ............................................................................................................ 6 OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator Checklist .................................................................................. 6 OSC Director Checklist ................................................................................................................................. 6 EOF Radiological Manager Checklist ........................................................................................................... 6 DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines........................................................................................................ 6 Emergency Exposure Permit ......................................................................................................................... 6 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 6

1. SCOPE{TC "SCOPE" \F C \L 1}

1.1 This procedure provides guidance in the process of determining the need for authorizing and controlling emergency radiological exposure to selected individuals that is beyond the 10 CFR 20 annual exposure limits.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 8 PAGE 2 OF 6 TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides UNITS 1 AND 2

2. DISCUSSION{TC "DISCUSSION" \F C \L 1}

2.1 Authorization of emergency exposure is an extraordinary measure, but justifiable under four sets of circumstances.

When the intended action requiring a potential overexposure to an emergency worker, is expected to result in;

  • Saving or preserving the quality of a human life that would otherwise be lost
  • Significant projected dose saving to others
  • Protection of valuable property
  • Sampling results required to redefine or adjust existing Protective Actions for the public or site personnel All of the above situations require that no reasonable method is immediately available (or readily apparent) to avoid exceeding the established annual limits and that every effort will be made to keep the emergency exposure ALARA.

2.2 The emergency exposure guidelines implemented at DCPP are consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance for controlling doses to workers under emergency conditions.Ref 10.11 2.3 Authorized dose limits for workers during emergencies are based on avoiding acute health effects and limiting the risk of delayed health effects.

2.4 Emergency worker exposures are not controlled by Planned Special Exposures.

NOTE: Planned Special Exposures may be implemented during non-emergency situations including Recovery Operations. Refer to RP1.ID8, "Planned Special Exposure."

2.5 An emergency exposure should be authorized only once in an individual's lifetime and is in addition to any prior occupational exposure from normal or planned special exposures.

2.6 The emergency exposure limits specified in this procedure are applicable to both in-plant team response activities and off-site field monitoring by the company's ERO personnel.

2.7 Emergency exposure above 25 rem TEDE shall require the voluntary consent of the authorized individual.

2.8 All references and instructions for the Emergency Director and Site Emergency Coordinator in this procedure also apply to the Shift Manager while he/she has command and control over the emergency event.

2.9 Nothing in this procedure shall be construed as limiting actions that may be necessary to protect health and safety.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 8 PAGE 3 OF 6 TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides UNITS 1 AND 2

3. DEFINITIONS{TC "DEFINITIONS" \F C \L 1}

3.1 Annual Administrative Exposure Guidelines: An administrative dose restriction for individual occupational radiation exposure established by the company to control personnel exposures within non-regulatory recommendations recommended by NCRP and ICRP.

3.2 Annual Administrative Exposure Limits: Dose limits established by the company to ensure that personnel do not exceed regulatory limits.

3.3 Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE): The dose to the organs or tissues that would be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50 years following the intake.

3.4 Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE): The sum of the products of the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the CDE to these organs or tissues.

3.5 Corrective Actions: Those emergency measures taken to mitigate or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem in order to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material or reduce the magnitude of a release.

3.6 Declared Pregnant Woman (DPW): A woman who has voluntarily informed her supervision, in writing, of her pregnancy and the estimated date of conception.

3.7 Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE): Dose associated with external exposure of the whole body at a depth of 1 cm.

3.8 Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE): For external radiation exposure, EDE is the sum of the product of the deep dose equivalent for each whole body compartment time the compartment's weighting factor.

3.9 Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE): External exposure to the lens of the eye at a depth 0.3 cm.

3.10 Lifesaving Action: Any of several activities that are necessary to save human life including search and rescue, first aid, transport and emergency medical care.

3.11 Occupational Dose: Dose received by an individual in the course of employment in which the individual's assigned duties involve exposure to radiation and to radioactive material from licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession of the licensee or other person.

3.12 Personal Electronic Dosimeter (PED): A PED is a specific type of SRD. The PED is the most commonly used SRD at DCPP. This dosimeter has a digital display and is set to alarm at RWP dependent dose and dose rate values.

3.13 Planned Special Exposure: Dose received in addition to and accounted for separately from the doses received under the limits of 10 CFR 20.1201 as a planned and specially authorized exposure in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1206.

3.14 Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE): External exposure of the skin or any extremity (depth 0.007 cm).

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 8 PAGE 4 OF 6 TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides UNITS 1 AND 2 3.15 Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE): TEDE is the sum of EDE (for external exposures) and CEDE (for internal exposures).

3.16 Total Organ Dose Equivalent (TODE): TODE is the sum of EDE (for external exposures) and CDE (for internal exposures).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES{TC "RESPONSIBILITIES" \F C \L 1}

4.1 The PG&E person with command and control of emergency response, (The Emergency Director (ED), Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) prior to turnover or Shift Manager (SM) prior to turnover), has the unilateral authority and non-delegable responsibility for authorizing an individual emergency worker to exceed normal 10 CFR 20 exposure limits.

4.1.1 The ED/SEC is furthermore responsible for ensuring that the NRC is notified of any overexposure that may result.

4.2 The TSC Radiological Advisor (RA) is responsible for evaluating the conditions requiring an emergency exposure authorization and advising the ED (or SEC) on its justification and when all prerequisite requirements have been met.

4.3 The EOF Radiological Manager (RM) is responsible for evaluating radiological conditions and exposures to off-site emergency response personnel and advising the ED when an emergency exposure authorization is justified.

4.4 The Site Radiation Protection Coordinator (SRPC) is responsible for identifying the necessity of obtaining an emergency exposure authorization and in assisting with volunteer selection as needed.

4.5 The OSC Director (OD) is responsible for ensuring that the maximum protection and support is provided to those personnel dispatched from the OSC under the extraordinary conditions of emergency exposure.

4.6 The emergency worker is responsible for knowing the potential health consequences of the emergency exposure and for signing the Emergency Exposure Permit when volunteering for potential emergency exposures of > 25 Rem TEDE.

4.6.1 The emergency worker is responsible for maintaining his/her emergency exposure ALARA consistent with the successful completion of the emergency activity.

5. PREREQUISITES{TC "PREREQUISITES" \F C \L 1}

5.1 Emergency classification of Alert or higher has been declared.

5.2 An essential emergency action is required (refer to Attachment 9.6) and cannot be performed without one or more workers potentially exceeding 10 CFR 20 annual exposure limits.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 8 PAGE 5 OF 6 TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides UNITS 1 AND 2

6. PRECAUTIONS{TC "PRECAUTIONS" \F C \L 1}

6.1 Selection of volunteers shall be based upon established criteria and on the specific skills and knowledge of the workers needed to successfully complete the activity.

6.2 Individuals shall not be authorized to enter any area where exposure rates are unknown or beyond the highest range of portable monitoring instruments.

6.3 Any individual who receives (or is suspected to have received) an actual overexposure shall be removed from further participation in the emergency response.

6.4 Those personnel receiving a dose of 25 rem TEDE or greater shall be promptly transported off-site for evaluation by appropriate medical personnel.

6.5 An Emergency Exposure Authorization considers only the radiological hazards involved.

Other potential hazards to health (i.e., heat stress, hazardous chemicals, biological hazards, confined space entry, etc.) shall be taken into consideration as well and shall be explained to the emergency workers prior to dispatching the team.

7. INSTRUCTIONS{TC "INSTRUCTIONS" \F C \L 1}

NOTE 1: Emergency exposure authorization is specific to each volunteer (individually) for performing the specific activity authorized. Any changes in the specific conditions that established the basis for the authorization are not valid until approved by both the volunteer(s) (for potential emergency exposures > 25 Rem TEDE) and the ED/SEC/SM.

NOTE 2: Individual voluntary emergency exposure should be limited to once in a lifetime.

7.1 The Emergency Director (Shift Manager or Site Emergency Coordinator) shall implement Attachment 9.1 of this procedure.

7.2 The TSC Radiological Advisor (RA) shall implement Attachment 9.2 of this procedure.

7.3 The OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator (SRPC) shall implement Attachment 9.3 of this procedure.

7.4 The OSC Director shall implement Attachment 9.4 of this procedure.

7.5 The EOF Radiological Manager (RM) shall implement Attachment 9.5 of this procedure.

8. RECORDS{TC "RECORDS" \F C \L 1}

8.1 All records generated by the utilization of this procedure for an exercise or emergency shall be forwarded the next working day to the Emergency Planning Manager, for review and retention.

8.1.1 Completed forms and documents generated during drills are non-quality related records and shall be retained a minimum of 3 years in accordance with AD10.ID2.

8.1.2 Completed forms and documents generated during real events are quality related records and shall be retained per AD10.ID1.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP RB-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 8 PAGE 6 OF 6 TITLE: Emergency Exposure Guides UNITS 1 AND 2

9. ATTACHMENTS{TC "ATTACHMENTS" \F C \L 1}

9.1 Form 69-20628, "Emergency Director (SEC or SM) Checklist," 07/20/10Form {tc "Emergency Director (SEC or SEC) Checklist" \f C \l 2}

9.2 Form 69-20629, "TSC Radiological Advisor Checklist," 07/20/10{tc "TSC Radiological Advisor Checklist" \f C \l 2}

9.3 Form 69-20630, "OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator Checklist," 07/20/10{tc "OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator Checklist" \f C \l 2}

9.4 Form 69-20631, "OSC Emergency Maintenance Coordinator OSC Director Checklist,"

07/20/10{tc "OSC Director Checklist" \f C \l 2}

9.5 Form 69-20632, "EOF Radiological Manager Checklist," 07/20/10{tc "EOF Radiological Manager Checklist" \f C \l 2}

9.6 "DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines," 07/20/10{tc "DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines" \f C \l 2}

9.7 Form 69-10554, "Emergency Exposure Permit," 05/06/09{tc "Emergency Exposure Permit" \f C \l 2}

10. REFERENCES{TC "REFERENCES" \F C \L 1}

10.1 CP M-13, "Personnel Injury (or Illness) with Radioactive Contamination or Personnel Overexposure" 10.2 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center" 10.3 EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center" 10.4 EP EF-3, "Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility" 10.5 EP G-2, "Activation and Operation of the Interim Site Emergency Organization" 10.6 EP RB-1, "Personnel Dosimetry" 10.7 EP RB-3, "Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking" 10.8 RP1.ID6, "Personnel Dose Limits and Monitoring Requirements" 10.9 NUREG-0737, November 1980 10.10 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20 10.11 "Manual of Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," USEPA, 400-R-92-001, May 1992 EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.1 AND TITLE: Emergency Director (SEC or SM) Checklist Actions Initial NOTE: All RCA Qualified personnel are automatically authorized to receive a dose up to, but not exceeding, the DCPP Administrative Limits for Calendar Year exposure (4.5 rem TEDE) during an Alert or higher emergency classification event, EXCEPT as may be limited by lifetime and current year occupational dose already received or other restrictions such as a declared pregnancy.

1. INITIAL ACTIONS Review the completed Emergency Exposure Permit, form 69-10554, with the RA (or RM) and evaluate the justification for authorization.

1.1 Ensure volunteers (if necessary) have been obtained and thoroughly briefed on the potential health consequences of this exposure. (See Criteria in Attachment 9.3) ______

1.2 Ensure emergency activity is necessary (no reasonable alternatives) and can be successful in outcome. ______

1.3 Ensure special hazards have been identified and protective measures implemented. ______

1.4 Direct the OSC Director to establish a back-up team of volunteers for rotation, relief, or rescue if very high dose rates or other life threatening conditions are applicable. ______

1.5 Implement EP RB-3, "Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking," and direct the RA to administer KI distribution, if needed. ______

1.6 Sign the permit to approve the Authorized Limit. (Refer to Attachment 9.6 for Exposure Limits.) LOG NOTE: Each permit is specific to the individuals or volunteers identified and specified activity. Any changes or additions require a new authorization.

2. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 2.1 Direct the Administrative Advisor in the TSC to callout anticipated replacement personnel for the potentially overexposed volunteers. ______

2.2 Ensure other emergency measures taken concurrently do not increase the accepted risks to the volunteers or jeopardize a successful outcome. ______

2.3 Ensure overexposed personnel are promptly transported to off-site medical facilities for evaluation and treatment. (Refer to CP M-13.) ______

2.4 Ensure that the NRC is notified immediately in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2202(a) for any individual exposure of 25 rem TEDE, 250 rad SDE, or 75 rem LDE. ______

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.2 AND TITLE: TSC Radiological Advisor Checklist Actions Initial NOTE: All RCA Qualified personnel are automatically authorized to receive a dose up to, but not exceeding, the DCPP Administrative Limits for Calendar Year exposure (4.5 rem TEDE) during an ALERT or higher emergency classification event, EXCEPT as may be limited by lifetime and current year occupational dose already received or other restrictions such as a declared pregnancy.

1. INITIAL ACTIONS Obtain a copy of Emergency Exposure Permit, Form 69-10554, from the OSC and confirm it's completeness by contacting the SRPC - a "faxed" copy is acceptable.

1.1 Volunteers (if needed) have been obtained and thoroughly briefed on the potential health consequences of this exposure. (See Criteria in Attachment 9.3.) ______

1.2 Emergency activity is necessary (no reasonable alternatives) and can be successful in outcome. ______

1.3 Ensure special hazards have been identified and protective measures implemented. ______

1.4 Recommend a back-up team to be assembled and standing by if very high dose rates are anticipated. ______

1.5 Obtain authorization from the ED/SEC/SM for Thyroid Blocking Agent per EP RB-3, if necessary. ______

1.6 Evaluate justification for the Authorized Limit and advise the ED/SEC/SM to authorize the permit. (Refer to Attachment 9.6 for Exposure Limits.) ______

NOTE: TEDE exposure is the controlling limit for continuous monitoring of the team. Other exposures (SDE, LDE, and CDE+DDE) require appropriate protective measures (i.e., KI, respirator use, clothing, etc.) and are important for planning purposes only, unless capability of direct monitoring exists.

1.7 Determine any appropriate Dose Correction Factors to adjust the Authorized TEDE Limit if conditions indicate that other doses are more likely to be limiting and notify the SRPC. ______

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

69-20629 07/20/10 Page 2 of 2 EP RB-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: TSC Radiological Advisor Checklist Actions Initial

2. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 2.1 Notify SRPC that ED/SEC/SM authorization has been obtained and provide any special instructions, conditions or revised limits, if needed. ______

2.2 Direct SRPC to prepare a Radiation Work Permit (RWP), if not already done. ______

NOTE: If the situation requires immediate action the RWP may be completed afterward, but verbal authorization is required beforehand.

2.3 Ensure that CP M-13, "Personal Injury (or Illness) with Radioactive Contamination or Personnel Overexposure," is implemented in anticipation of overexposed personnel. ______

2.4 Implement EP RB-3, "Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking," as directed by the ED/SEC/SM. ______

2.5 Implement EP RB-1, "Personnel Dosimetry," to ensure that; ______

  • adequate personnel exposure monitoring is provided for the extraordinary conditions
  • dosimetry devices are collected and dose evaluated promptly after task completion
  • dosimetry incidents (off-scale or erratic readings) are evaluated promptly EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

69-20630 07/20/10 Page 1 of 2 1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.3 AND TITLE: OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator Checklist Actions Initial NOTE: All RCA Qualified personnel are automatically authorized to receive a dose up to, but not exceeding, the DCPP Administrative Limits for Calendar Year exposure (4.5 rem TEDE) during an ALERT or higher emergency classification event, EXCEPT as may be limited by lifetime and current year occupational dose already received or other restrictions such as a declared pregnancy.

1. INITIAL ACTIONS When a pre-departure analysis of radiological conditions, in accordance with EP EF-2, indicates that the planned or anticipated dose to any emergency response team member will exceed 10 CFR 20 annual limits, perform the following; 1.1 Review your dose evaluation with the OSC Director and the affected Unit Shift Foreman as applicable to determine if any alternative actions can achieve the desired results without requiring an emergency exposure. ______

1.2 Obtain qualified volunteers (if needed) from those personnel available.

(Criteria in Section 3.0, next page) ______

1.3 Obtain a working copy of form 69-10554, Emergency Exposure Permit (Attachment 9.7), and fill in the required information. ______

NOTE: Complete a new permit form for each team activity that is analyzed to require emergency exposure. ______

1.4 Calculate and record the anticipated exposure to the most limiting team member and determine the authorized limit appropriate to the activity in accordance with Attachment 9.6, DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines. ______

1.5 Brief the volunteers on the radiological hazards and ensure they are informed about the potential health consequences associated with authorized exposure. ______

1.6 For potential exposures of > 25 Rem TEDE, obtain the signature on the Emergency Exposure Permit of each volunteer, including the C&RP technician assigned to monitor the team. ______

1.7 Obtain authorization from the ED/SEC/SM for Thyroid Blocking Agent per EP RB-3, if necessary. ______

1.8 FAX the completed form to the Emergency Director (or SEC if EOF is not activated) and contact the RA to review the Permit and advise the ED/SEC. ______

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69-20630 07/20/10 Page 2 of 2 EP RB-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.3 TITLE: OSC Site Radiation Protection Coordinator Checklist Actions Initial

2. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS When the emergency exposure authorization is approved by the ED/SEC/SM, then ensure that all conditions and limitations are understood by the response team prior to departure in accordance with EP EF-2 and RWP documentation requirements.

With regard to the extraordinary circumstances of this activity ensure that the following additional actions are taken; 2.1 Ensure that appropriate personnel dosimetry is issued in accordance with EP RB-1, "Personnel Dosimetry." ______

2.2 Ensure that a portable radiation monitoring instrument with adequate range capability is supplied to the C&RP Technician. ______

CAUTION: IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER ANY AREA WHERE THE DOSE RATES ARE UNKNOWN OR BEYOND THE RANGE OF INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE.

2.3 Ensure that the Team Leader understands that whenever practical (without compromising the mission) ALARA principles should be used to minimize team exposure. ______

NOTE: If the situation requires immediate action, the RWP may be completed afterward, but verbal authorization is required beforehand.

3. CRITERIA FOR VOLUNTEER SELECTION 3.1 Professional rescue personnel for lifesaving activities who volunteer by choice of employment should be chosen for search and rescue.

3.2 RCA Qualified personnel should be selected for missions involving very high dose rates and high contamination levels.

3.3 Volunteers shall be fully aware of the risks involved.

3.4 Volunteers should be above the age of 45 years old.

3.5 Declared Pregnant Women (DPW) shall NOT be chosen.

3.6 Individuals who have already received an emergency exposure should NOT be chosen.

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69-20631 07/20/10 Page 1 of 2 1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.4 AND TITLE: OSC Emergency Maintenance Coordinator OSC Director Checklist Actions Initial

1. INITIAL ACTIONS When a pre-departure analysis of radiological conditions, in accordance with EP EF-2, indicates that the planned or anticipated dose to the emergency response team members will exceed 10 CFR 20 annual limits, perform the following; 1.1 Contact the Operations Coordinator and the SEC to determine if any alternative actions can achieve the desired results without requiring an emergency exposure. ______

Consideration may be given to any one or combination of the following possible alternatives and should be pursued in parallel, as time permits to avoid unnecessary risk to individuals;

  • use of robotics or fabrication of special tools
  • use of temporary shielding
  • changing plant system lineups to reduce background exposure rates near operating equipment
  • use of short cut procedures, elimination of double checks and hold points, non-QA parts, tools, etc.
  • installation of jumpers and bypasses to achieve remote operation of equipment from lower dose areas NOTE: Some of the above options may involve intentionally violating Technical Specifications *, written procedures, or Quality Standards, but may be equally justifiable to the ED/SEC/SM as emergency exposure of personnel, depending on circumstances.

1.2 Determine the optimum team composition in terms of skills and experience to ensure the highest degree of confidence in mission success in the least amount of time for exposure of personnel available. ______

NOTE: Emergency exposure is unwarranted in circumstances where alternative actions can achieve equal or better results.

1.3 Review the Permit form prepared by the SRPC and concur with seeking emergency dose authorization. ______

NRC Notification required per EP G-3 EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

69-20631 07/20/10 Page 2 of 2 EP RB-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.4 TITLE: OSC Emergency Maintenance Coordinator OSC Director Checklist Actions Initial

2. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 2.1 Ensure that the Team Leader is briefed on potential hazards that are expected and the limits of authority that he/she may exercise in making ad hoc decisions in the field. ______

2.2 Ensure that a back-up team is chosen and prepared for immediate dispatch to rotate in, relieve, or rescue the primary response team, as needed. ______

NOTE: Back-up team shall be briefed, dressed out, pre-authorized, pre-staged in low dose area, standing by if needed for immediate action.

2.3 Control any other concurrent activities that may hamper, impede, or otherwise increase the risk to the primary emergency response team. ______

2.4 Ensure that the emergency operations coordinator is aware of the team location so that Operations activities from the Control Room do not change radiological conditions adversely without warning. ______

2.5 Maintain an open communication line with the affected Unit Shift Foreman, as needed, to ensure that changes in plant status are immediately recognized and factored into ongoing risk assessment. ______

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69-20632 07/20/10 Page 1 of 2 1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.5 AND TITLE: EOF Radiological Manager Checklist Actions Initial NOTE: All RCA Qualified personnel are automatically authorized to receive a dose up to, but not exceeding, the DCPP Administrative Limits for Calendar Year exposure (4.5 Rem TEDE) during an Alert or higher emergency classification event, EXCEPT as may be limited by lifetime and current year occupational dose already received or other restrictions such as a declared pregnancy.

1. INITIAL ACTIONS When an analysis of radiological conditions, in accordance with EP EF-3, indicates that the planned or anticipated dose to any emergency response off-site field team member will exceed 10 CFR 20 annual limits, perform the following:

1.1 Review the dose evaluation with the Dose Assessment Coordinator and FMT Coordinator to determine if any alternative actions can achieve the desired results without requiring an emergency exposure such as rotation or replacement of team members, shorter sampling times, team movement tactics to avoid higher exposures, etc. ______

1.2 Obtain a working copy of form 69-10554, "Emergency Exposure Permit" (Attachment 9.7), and fill in the required information. ______

NOTE: Complete a new permit form for each off-site field team that is analyzed to require emergency exposure authorization, when needed.

1.3 Calculate and record the anticipated exposure to the most limiting team member and ensure that the authorized limit of 5 rem TEDE (total emergency exposure, not counting occupational dose prior to the emergency) will not be exceeded. ______

1.4 Provide the completed form 69-10554 to the ED for emergency exposure authorization. ______

NOTE: Voluntary consent is not necessary for emergency exposures authorized at less than 25 rem TEDE, but written authorization is required.

1.5 Obtain authorization from the ED for Thyroid Blocking Agent per EP RB-3, if necessary. ______

1.6 Notify the FMT Coordinator to communicate the authorizations to the Field Team Leaders affected when obtained from the ED. ______

NOTE: These authorizations are for PG&E personnel only. Separate authorizations for SLO County team members, if needed, must be obtained through the UDAC from the County Health Officer (CHO).

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69-20632 07/20/10 Page 2 of 2 EP RB-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.5 TITLE: EOF Radiological Manager Checklist Actions Initial

2. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS When the emergency exposure authorization is approved by the ED, then ensure that all conditions and limitations are understood by the field monitoring team prior to directing them to continue with their activities in the plume or plume affected areas.

With regard to the extraordinary circumstances of this activity ensure that the following additional actions are taken:

2.1 Ensure that each Team Member understands that whenever practical (without compromising the mission) ALARA principles should be used to minimize team exposure. ______

2.2 Ensure that Turn-back dose rates are re-analyzed for the present or projected characteristics of the plume and revised as needed. ______

CAUTION: IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER ANY AREA WHERE THE DOSE RATES ARE UNKNOWN OR BEYOND THE RANGE OF INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE.

2.3 Ensure that the FMT Coordinator makes more frequent checks on accumulated dose (PED readings) and is controlling team deployment to minimize unnecessary exposures. ______

2.4 Begin the process of obtaining relief and replacements for the field monitoring team members, if necessary, to ensure continuous monitoring capability. ______

2.5 Consider deployment of additional teams in standby locations in case an active team can no longer function due to any of the following: ______

  • gross contamination of vehicle, equipment, or personnel requires decontamination efforts.
  • respirator use in field conditions creating additional heat stress and fatigue.
  • higher than anticipated dose rates cause authorized exposure limits to be exceeded.
  • vehicle breakdown or accident necessitates assistance to personnel stuck in plume pathway.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

07/20/10 Page 1 of 2 1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.6 AND TITLE: DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines The following table contains guidelines for use in authorizing emergency exposures when lower doses are not practicable:

RADIOLOGICAL PROPERTY DOSE SAVING LIFESAVING ASSESSMENT SAVING (2) TO TO SAMPLING (1) POPULATION (3)* INDIVIDUAL (4)*

Emergency Sampling Under Mitigating Corrective Actions, Lifesaving Actions, Actions----> Emergency Damage to stop/reduce a release 1st Aid, Search and Part of Body Conditions Valuable rescue Irradiated Property Whole Body 5 rem TEDE 10 rem TEDE 25 rem TEDE 25 rem TEDE Skin & any 50 rem SDE 100 rem SDE 250 rem SDE 250 rem SDE Extremity Lens of the Eye 15 rem LDE 30 rem LDE 75 rem LDE 75 rem LDE Any Organ or 50 rem 100 rem 250 rem 250 rem Tissues (CDE+DDE) (CDE+DDE) (CDE+DDE) (CDE+DDE)

NOTES: 1. Radiological Assessment Sampling: Includes collection of atmospheric, liquid, and environmental radiological activity samples as well as chemistry samples involving high activity or high radiation. Emergency exposure limits may be authorized for selected individuals, for emergency assessment functions, in addition to annual occupational dose to date.

2. Property Saving, for example, might be dispatching the Fire Brigade to extinguish a fire in a Very High Radiation Area to protect plant equipment though no immediate threat exists to compromising Plant Safety.
3. Dose Saving to Population: Includes activities that justify a potential overexposure to a few workers in order to save even a small average dose in a large population. (May also include Traffic Control for Evacuees or other Security Plan Functions.)
4. Lifesaving to Individual: Includes the activity of search and rescue in very high dose rates or high airborne activity.
  • Extreme situations may occur in which a dose in excess of 25 rem TEDE would be unavoidable for either Dose Saving to (Large) Population or Lifesaving to (An)

Individual.

An authorization of emergency exposure with NO LIMITS may be made under those conditions, but only to volunteers who are fully aware of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and the numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

07/20/10 Page 2 of 2 EP RB-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.6 TITLE: DCPP Emergency Exposure Guidelines NOTES: (continued)

5. If any of the above emergency exposure limits would prevent successful completion of the activity then the ED/SEC/SM should ensure that back-up teams are standing by to rotate in and relieve the primary responders.
6. Volunteers for any authorized exposures above 25 rem TEDE should be made aware that there is some risk of acute health effects involved, however remote.
  • The dose limit of 75 rem to the whole body previously recommended by the EPA for lifesaving action represents a very high level of risk of both acute and delayed effects.
  • A dose of 100 rem is expected to result in an approximately 15 percent risk of temporary incapacity from non lethal acute effects and an indeterminate, but less than 5 percent, chance of death within 60 days. This is in addition to a risk of about 1 in 30 of incurring fatal cancer.
  • Such high risk levels can only be accepted by a recipient who has been made aware of the risks involved.
  • (Reference, EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, May 1992)

NOTE: Although EPA-400 guidelines say that no limit is applicable under extreme situations it is also true that the ED/SEC/SM must make the authorization and may impose a more restrictive limit if so desired consistent with the availability of personnel resources, alternative actions and the desire to avoid acute health effects of the volunteers.

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 1 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 AND TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit Date: Time: Permit #:

Responder(s):

(Print)

RP Support:

Description of Activity:

Special Hazards:

Special Instructions:

Anticipated TEDE Rate: (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: (rem)

  • Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

EP_RB-2u3r08.doc 03B 1120.1210

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181A9

Title:

Review Emergency Notification for Steam Generator Tube Rupture Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EP G3, Emergency Notification of OffSite Agencies, Rev 61 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: Per Examinee Response Key Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments: New G2.4.40 - Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan Gen KA # / Rating: implementation. 4.5 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/20/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Review Emergency Notification for Steam Generator Tube Rupture JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A9 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly documented. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure (as applicable) and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: EP G-3, Emergency Notification of Off-Site Agencies, Rev 61 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • At 1055, U1 initiated a manual SI due to SGTR
  • RCS temperature is 514°F
  • At 1100, the SM declared FA1.1
  • The ENF program is not working
  • The WCSFM has manually prepared the Emergency Notification Form for FA1.1 NOTE: for the purposes of this JPM, this is a Drill Initiating Cue: You are directed to review the Emergency Notification Form for the SM and determine if it should be approved, explaining your rationale.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard:

  • Box 6 should be "1100" - based on time of declaration given in Initial Conditions (refer to completed ENF form)
  • Box 8 should be "Radiological Release in progress" - based on item 5, SGTR is a condition attributable to the emergency event
  • Box 10 should be "No PAR" based on emergency classification being less than a General Emergency Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Page 2 of 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Review Emergency Notification for Steam Generator Tube Rupture JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A9 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Page 3 of 5 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Review Emergency Notification for Steam Generator Tube Rupture JPM NUMBER: NRCL181A9 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Examinee Response Key See Marked up form - next page Page 4 of 5 Rev. 0

Examinee Response - KEY DCPP Form 69-20596 (11/14/17)

U1&2 EP G-3 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 1 DCPP Emergency Notification Form This is the Diablo Canyon Power Plant making an Emergency Notification. Please prepare to receive the message.

1. This is a: X Drill Emergency
2. This is Message Number: 1
3. I am notifying you of a: X New Classification New PAR
4. X Unit 1 Unit 2
5. The Emergency Classification Level is:

UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) X ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE)

6. This classification was made on: Date: Today at Time: 1055 1100
7. The Emergency Action Level (EAL) number is: FA1.1 Brief event description: Loss or Potential Loss of Either Fuel Clad or RCS
8. Radiological Conditions:

X Radiological Releases remain within normal limits X Radiological Release in progress Radiological Release occurred but is now terminated

9. Wind Conditions: Speed: __2.4_ m/sec x 2.2 = _5.28__ mph Direction from: _288_ degrees
10. Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) due to the Event:

X No PAR X PAR to Shelter PAZs: X 1 X 2 PAR to Evacuate PAZs: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 PAR to Evacuate Ocean: 5 Nautical Miles at Sea 10 Nautical Miles at Sea PAR to Administer KI per the SLO County Plan PAR for all other PAZ(s) to Monitor and Prepare Other:

11. Form Approved by: X Shift Manager Site Emergency Coordinator Emergency Director Name: S. Willson Date: Time:
12. Notification Made Verbally To: Date Start Time Person Contacted County (SLO) Use Tie Line OR Call 1-805-781-4553 State (CA) Use Tie Line OR Call 1-916-845-8911 Record time SLO County and State Notification Completed:____________________

NRC (refer to NRC Form 361) 1-301-816-5100 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared AND the SLO County EOC is NOT activated, notify the USCG at 1-805-772-2167 (Morro Bay) OR 1-310-521-3815 (Long Beach Operations Center).

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-A9 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

  • At 1055, U1 initiated a manual SI due to SGTR
  • RCS temperature is 514°F
  • At 1100, the SM declared FA1.1
  • The ENF program is not working
  • The WCSFM has manually prepared the Emergency Notification Form for FA1.1 NOTE: for the purposes of this JPM, this is a Drill Initiating Cue: You are directed to review the Emergency Notification Form for the SM and determine if it should be approved, explaining your rationale.

NOTE:

  • You may use any source of information normally available (procedures, prints, etc.).
  • Classroom instruction materials (Lesson Plans, System Training Manuals, PowerPoint presentations, classroom notes, etc.) are not permitted to be used.

If there is a question regarding reference material desired to be used, ask evaluator prior to seeking references.

Page 5 of 5 Rev. 0

DCPP Form 69-20596 (11/14/17)

U1&2 EP G-3 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 1 DCPP Emergency Notification Form This is the Diablo Canyon Power Plant making an Emergency Notification. Please prepare to receive the message.

1. This is a: X Drill Emergency
2. This is Message Number: 1
3. I am notifying you of a: X New Classification New PAR
4. X Unit 1 Unit 2
5. The Emergency Classification Level is:

UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) X ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE)

6. This classification was made on: Date: Today at Time: 1055
7. The Emergency Action Level (EAL) number is: FA1.1 Brief event description: Loss or Potential Loss of Either Fuel Clad or RCS
8. Radiological Conditions:

X Radiological Releases remain within normal limits Radiological Release in progress Radiological Release occurred but is now terminated

9. Wind Conditions: Speed: __2.4_ m/sec x 2.2 = _5.28__ mph Direction from: _288_ degrees
10. Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) due to the Event:

No PAR X PAR to Shelter PAZs: X 1 X 2 PAR to Evacuate PAZs: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 PAR to Evacuate Ocean: 5 Nautical Miles at Sea 10 Nautical Miles at Sea PAR to Administer KI per the SLO County Plan PAR for all other PAZ(s) to Monitor and Prepare Other:

11. Form Approved by: X Shift Manager Site Emergency Coordinator Emergency Director Name: S. Willson Date: Time:
12. Notification Made Verbally To: Date Start Time Person Contacted County (SLO) Use Tie Line OR Call 1-805-781-4553 State (CA) Use Tie Line OR Call 1-916-845-8911 Record time SLO County and State Notification Completed:____________________

NRC (refer to NRC Form 361) 1-301-816-5100 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared AND the SLO County EOC is NOT activated, notify the USCG at 1-805-772-2167 (Morro Bay) OR 1-310-521-3815 (Long Beach Operations Center).

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 11 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 1 of 7

1. General Instructions
a. Information on the DCPP Emergency Notification Form (ENF) is provided to SLO County and the State within 15 minutes for any new, or change in, emergency classification level or PARs.
b. In the event that a General Emergency is declared and the SLO County EOC is not yet activated, the USCG will need to be notified by DCPP of the emergency classification level and any applicable PARs.
1) USCG notification should be done after SLO County and State notifications are completed.
2. ENF Creation and Detailed Content InstructionsT30899
a. Generating the form using the ENF computer program should result in some of the blocks automatically populating.
1) The computer program should also select plant-based PARs.
b. The following table provides guidance on completing each block of the DCPP Emergency Notification Form (ENF).

Block Instructions 1 This is a: [ ] Drill [ ] Emergency (PI)

1. If drill, select drill.
2. If real emergency, select emergency.

2 This is Message Number: __________

1. Throughout an event the message number should be entered sequentially regardless of the notification type, i.e., New Classification = 1, Follow-Up = 2, New Classification = 3, New PAR = 4, etc.
2. IF either unit OR both units is already in a declared emergency, THEN review all previously sent ENFs (initial and follow-up) to determine appropriate message number.

3 I am notifying you of a: [ ] New Classification [ ] New PAR

1. Select the reason for this notification.
2. Only one box should be checked.
3. IF a new classification includes a new PAR, THEN the "New Classification" box should be checked.

4 [ ] Unit 1 [ ] Unit 2

1. For unit specific events (EALs based on systems or events within a single unit's boundaries) select the unit in the highest emergency classification level.
2. Select both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for events affecting the entire station (e.g., earthquakes, security events, dry cask storage area, etc.)

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 12 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 2 of 7 Block Instructions 5 The Emergency Classification Level is:

(PI)

[ ] UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) [ ] ALERT

[ ] SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) [ ] GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE)

1. Ensure only one box is checked.
2. IF notification is being made for a New Classification, THEN select emergency classification level declared.
3. IF notification is being made for a New PAR, THEN ensure a General Emergency has been declared AND select General Emergency.

6 This classification was made on: Date: ______ at Time: ________

(PI Time 1. IF notification is for a New Classification, Only) THEN enter the date and time the emergency classification was declared.

2. IF notification is for a New PAR, THEN the date and time shall be the time the General Emergency was declared.
3. The preferred date format is "mm/dd/yyyy" (e.g., 03/31/2012); however, other formats are acceptable if they are accurate.
4. The preferred time format is military time (e.g., 1800); however, other formats are acceptable if they are accurate.

7 The Emergency Action Level (EAL) Number is: ________

Brief event description: ___________________________________

1. IF notification is for a New Classification, THEN enter the EAL number for the new emergency classification level that is in effect.
2. IF notification is for a New PAR, THEN enter the EAL for the General Emergency that was declared.
3. DO NOT use jargon or acronyms when describing the event.
4. IF the description is automatically filled in by the computer, THEN it may be modified to more closely match the actual event.

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 13 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 3 of 7 Block Instructions 8 Radiological Conditions:

(PI) [ ] Radiological Releases remain within normal limits

[ ] Radiological Release in progress

[ ] Radiological Release occurred but is now terminated Any of the following conditions attributable to the emergency event:

1. A valid Alert Level Alarm on any Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitor [NOT Plant Process Computer (PPC)].

RM-14/14R RM-29 RM-24/24R RM-28/28R

2. A valid High Level Alarm on RM-3, RM-18 or RM-23 liquid effluent radiation monitor.
3. An unmonitored release to the atmosphere
4. Elevated Radioactivity detected by survey or grab sampling in:

- A site ventilation system

- An outside area, either on or off site

5. Any Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
6. A Steam Generator Tube Leak resulting in an Unusual Event classification Has the release been terminated per a condition below Any above For SGTR/Leakage: RCS is cooled down below 200F condition YE S (use any available instrument to determine temperature)

True? OR For all other releases: Rad/Chem or TSC personnel declare release is terminated Select Any above "Radiological Release condition YE S occured but is now NO True?

terminated" Select "Radiological Releases Select remain within normal NO "Radiological Release in limits" progress" EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 14 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 4 of 7 Block Instructions 9 Wind Conditions: Speed: ____ m/sec x 2.2 = ____ mph Direction From: ____ degrees

1. Enter "Wind Speed" and "Direction" from available Meteorological Data.
2. IF time shown is outside the current quarter hour, THEN click on the update symbol above the "Met Data at {time}"
3. IF met data feed is not working, THEN obtain met tower data from the following sources in order of preference:
  • Primary Tower 10M Wind Direction and 10M Average Wind Speed
  • Primary Tower 76M Wind Direction and 76M Average Wind Speed
  • Backup Tower 10M Wind Direction and 10M Average Wind Speed
  • Backup Tower 60M Wind Direction and 60M Average Wind Speed
  • Tertiary Tower 10 meter (if deployed) wind direction and average wind speed
4. Met data may be available on:
  • eDNA on the PDN
  • The Met Computer in the TSC
  • The EARS application in the TSC and EOF
5. SLO County requires wind speed to be reported in miles per hour (mph ONLY). The conversion formula is meters/sec x 2.2 = mph.

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 15 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 5 of 7 Block Instructions 10 Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) Due to the Event:

(PI) [ ] No PAR

[ ] PAR to Shelter PAZs [ ]1[ ]2

[ ] PAR to Evacuate PAZs [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] 11 [ ] 12

[ ] PAR to Evacuate Ocean [ ] 5 Nautical Miles at Sea [ ] 10 Nautical Miles at Sea

[ ] PAR to Administer KI per the SLO County Plan

[ ] PAR for all other PAZ(s) to Monitor and Prepare

[ ] Other NOTE 1: Refer to EP RB-10, "Protective Action Recommendations" for detailed PAR instructions.

NOTE 2: PARs remain in effect for the duration of the event, unless conditions change requiring a more restrictive PAR. PARs are NOT downgraded, when the conditions for initial entry into that PAR are no longer present.

NOTE 3: Sheltering PARs are NOT made for the ocean.

1. IF emergency classification level is a UE, ALERT, OR SAE, THEN recommend "No PAR".
2. GENERAL EMERGENCY Plant Based PARs
a. IF a RAPIDLY PROGRESSING SEVERE ACCIDENT is in progress, as indicated by the presence of ALL of the following:
  • A GENERAL EMERGENCY was declared AND
  • Initial PAR AND
  • Any containment loss EAL applicable AND
  • RM 30/31 > 5000 R/hr OR
  • EAL RG1.1 met for any Table R-1 GE value THEN recommend ALL of the following protective actions:
  • Evacuate PAZ 1 and 2.
  • Evacuate all applicable downwind PAZs (3-5) based on the wind direction table in Attachment 4 of EP RB-10.
  • Evacuate the ocean based on the wind direction table in Attachment 4 of EP RB-10.
  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.
  • All other PAZ(s) Monitor and Prepare.

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 16 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 6 of 7 Block Instructions 10 GENERAL EMERGENCY Plant Based PARs (Continued)

(PI) b. IF a CONTROLLED RELEASE is in progress, AND ALL of the following conditions exist:

  • A GENERAL EMERGENCY was declared
  • Expected release duration LESS THAN 60 minutes THEN recommend ALL of the following protective actions:
  • Shelter PAZ 1 and 2.
  • Evacuate ocean to 5 NM.
  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.
  • All other PAZ(s) Monitor and Prepare.
c. IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared, which is NOT either of the following:
  • RAPIDLY PROGRESSING SEVERE ACCIDENT OR
  • CONTROLLED RELEASE (expected release duration LESS THAN 60 minutes)

THEN recommend ALL of the following protective actions:

  • Evacuate PAZ 1 and 2.
  • Evacuate ocean to 5 NM.
  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.
  • All other PAZ(s) Monitor and Prepare.
3. GENERAL EMERGENCY Expanded PARs
a. IF at any time, the projected offsite dose in ANY PAZ not currently recommended for evacuation exceeds either:
  • 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE THEN recommend ALL of the following protective actions:
  • Evacuate all affected PAZs.
  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.
b. IF at any time, the projected offsite dose over the ocean beyond 5 miles exceeds either
  • 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE THEN recommend ALL of the following protective actions:
  • Evacuate the ocean to 10 NM.
  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

EP G-3 R61 Page 17 of 23 Instructions for DCPP Emergency Notification Form U1&2 Attachment 1: Page 7 of 7 Block Instructions 10 NOTE 1: Land areas beyond the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are those land areas beyond PAZs (PI) 8, 9, 11 and 12.

NOTE 2: Ocean areas beyond the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are those ocean areas beyond 10 miles.

4. PARs for area beyond the Emergency Planning Zone IF the SM/SEC/ED declares a PAR for an area beyond the EPZ boundary, THEN:
a. Obtain the affected 22.5 degree wind rose sector(s) and adjacent sectors from the SM/SEC/ED.
b. Obtain distance from SM/SEC/ED for which the PAR needs to be made.
c. Select "Other"
d. Recommend ALL of the following protective actions:
  • Write in the available text field something similar to:

"Evacuate sectors [sectors obtained from SM/SEC/ED] out to [distance obtained from SM/SEC/ED] miles [nautical miles if area is over ocean]."

  • Administer KI per the SLO County Plan.

11 Form Approved by: [ ] Shift Manager [ ] Site Emergency Coordinator [ ] Emergency Director Name: _________________ Date: ___________ Time: _________

1. Check the appropriate box of the approver of the ENF.
2. Enter the approver name.
3. The "Date" and "Time" is when the Emergency Notification Form is approved by the SM, SEC, or ED.

12 Block 12 is completed by the Communicator in the CR/TSC/EOF to document when notification was made and to record the name of the person contacted.

1. Perform phone calls using Attachment 6.

EP_G-3u3r61.DOC 0926.1542

PDNServer Page 3 of 5 Primary Meteorological (MET) Points Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT1_1 10M Wind Direction Today - Now GOOD 288.42 degrees MT1_2 10M Sigma Theta Today - Now GOOD 10.16 degree MT1_3 10M Average Wind Speed Today - Now GOOD 2.4 m/sec MT1_4 10M Temperature Today - Now GOOD 12.01 deg C MT1_5 46M Temperature Today - Now GOOD 11.43 deg C MT1_6 76M Wind Direction Today - Now GOOD 294.42 degree MT1_7 76M Sigma Theta Today - Now GOOD 9.13 degree MT1_8 76M Average Wind Speed Today - Now GOOD 2.31 m/sec MT1_9 76M Temperature Today - Now GOOD 11.17 deg C MT1_10 10M Peak Wnd Speed Today - Now GOOD 3.63 m/sec MT1_11 Precipitation Today - Now GOOD 5.9 cm MT1_12 76M Peak Wnd Speed Today - Now GOOD 3.44 m/sec MT1_13 SB X/Q Dispersion Today - Now GOOD 4.5738 E-5 sec/m^3 MT1_14 SB Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 106.01 meters MT1_15 1.0Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 3.4389 E-5 sec/m^3 MT1_16 1.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 119.56 meters MT1_17 2.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 3.4389 E-5 sec/m^3 MT1_18 2.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 184.78 meters MT1_19 4.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 5.5252 E-6 sec/m^3 MT1_20 4.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 305.29 meters MT1_21 6.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 3.1343 E-6 sec/m^3 MT1_22 6.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 416.75 meters MT1_23 8.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 2.0988 E-6 sec/m^3 MT1_24 8.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 522.97 meters MT1_25 10.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 1.546 E-6 sec/m^3 MT1_26 10.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 625.85 meters MT1_27 25.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 4.4833 E-7 sec/m^3 MT1_28 25.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 2240.86 meters MT1_29 50.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 1.845 E-7 sec/m^3 MT1_30 50.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 2240.86 meters MT1_31 Mixing Height Today - Now GOOD 600 meters MT1_32 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 4 (1-7)

MT1_33 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 4 (1-7)

MT1_34 Dewpoint Today - Now GOOD 11.16 deg C MT1_35 Downwind sector Today - Now GOOD ESE sector MT1_36 Rainfall (EARS) Today - Now GOOD 0 in/15min Backup Meteorological (MET) Points Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT2_1 10M Wind Direction Today - Now GOOD 284.58 degrees MT2_2 10M Sigma Theta Today - Now GOOD 6.93 degree MT2_3 10M Average Wind Speed Today - Now GOOD 3.24 m/sec MT2_4 10M Temperature Today - Now GOOD 11.74 deg C MT2_6 60M Wind Direction Today - Now GOOD 289.46 degree MT2_7 60M Sigma Theta Today - Now GOOD 6.41 degree MT2_8 60M Average Wind Speed Today - Now GOOD 3.03 m/sec MT2_9 60M Temperature Today - Now GOOD 11.24 deg C MT2_10 10M Peak Wind Speed Today - Now GOOD 4.37 m/sec MT2_12 60M Peak Wnd Speed Today - Now GOOD 4.09 m/sec MT2_13 SB X/Q Dispersion Today - Now GOOD 5.801 E-5 sec/m^3 MT2_14 SB Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 61.98 meters MT2_15 1.0 Km X/Q Dispersion Today - Now GOOD 4.2467 E-5 sec/m^3 http://pdnserver/ Today

PDNServer Page 4 of 5 MT2_16 1.0 Km Sigma Y GOOD 71.8 meters MT2_17 2.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 1.598 E-5 sec/m^3 MT2_18 2.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 119.71 meters MT2_19 4.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 6.0253 E-6 sec/m^3 MT2_20 4.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 207.76 meters MT2_21 6.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 3.376 E-6 sec/m^3 MT2_22 6.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 287.12 meters MT2_23 8.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 2.2512 E-6 sec/m^3 MT2_24 8.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 361.82 meters MT2_25 10.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 1.6555 E-6 sec/m^3 MT2_26 10.0 Km Sigma Y Today - Now GOOD 433.84 meters MT2_27 25.0 Km X/Q Today - Now GOOD 4.8253 E-7 sec/m^3 MT2_28 25.0 Km Sigma Y GOOD 905.81 meters MT2_29 50.0 Km X/Q GOOD 1.9471 E-7 sec/m^3 MT2_30 50.0 Km Sigma Y GOOD 1575.54 meters MT2_31 Mixing Height GOOD 600 meters MT2_32 Horizontal Stability GOOD 5 (1-7)

MT2_33 Vertical Stability GOOD 4 (1-7)

MT2_34 Dewpoint GOOD -1 deg C MT2_35 Down wind sector GOOD ESE sector Point Buchon Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT3_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT3_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 2.63 m/sec MT3_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 248.4 degrees MT3_8 Temperature GOOD 12.11 deg C MT3_10 Horizontal Stability GOOD 1 (1-7)

MT3_11 Vertical Stability GOOD 1 (1-7)

Los Osos Memorial Center Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT4_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT4_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 3.26 m/sec MT4_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 351.6 degrees MT4_8 Temperature Today - Now GOOD 15.55 deg C MT4_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 4 (1-7)

MT4_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 4 (1-7)

Foothill Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT5_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT5_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 2.56 m/sec MT5_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 287.1 degrees MT5_8 Temperature Today - Now GOOD 19.63 deg C MT5_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

MT5_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

Service Center Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT6_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT6_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 0.92 m/sec http://pdnserver/ Today

PDNServer Page 5 of 5 MT6_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 348.6 degrees MT6_8 Temperature Today - Now GOOD 20.2 deg C MT6_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

MT6_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

Education Center Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT7_3 Time Today - Now BAD 1045 hhmm MT7_4 Wind speed Today - Now BAD 1.46 m/sec MT7_5 Wind direction Today - Now BAD 244.6 degrees MT7_8 Temperature Today - Now BAD 22.93 deg C MT7_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now BAD 1 (1-7)

MT7_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now BAD 1 (1-7)

Davis Peak Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT8_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT8_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 0.81 m/sec MT8_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 278.2 degrees MT8_8 Temperature Today - Now GOOD 26.49 deg C MT8_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

MT8_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 1 (1-7)

Grover Beach Point ID Description DateTime Quality Value Units MT9_3 Time Today - Now GOOD 1130 hhmm MT9_4 Wind speed Today - Now GOOD 2.31 m/sec MT9_5 Wind direction Today - Now GOOD 236.9 degrees MT9_8 Temperature Today - Now GOOD 13.12 deg C MT9_10 Horizontal Stability Today - Now GOOD 2 (1-7)

MT9_11 Vertical Stability Today - Now GOOD 2 (1-7) http://pdnserver/ Today

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS1

Title:

Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

OP AP-12B, Control Rod Misalignment, Rev. 19 (include Appendix B)

References:

OP AP-12C, Dropped Control Rod, Rev. 17 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Modified from DCPP Bank: LJC-066 DCPP Task # / Rating: 80200 4.0 Gen KA # / Rating: 001.A2.03 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 3.5 / 4.2 malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: effect of stuck or misaligned rod.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/19/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: OP AP-12B, Control Rod Misalignment (Including Appendix B)

OP AP-12C, Dropped Control Rod Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 is at approximately 75% power and was in the process of being returned to 100% following curtailment for condenser cleaning.
  • The power increase was stopped 5 minutes ago when control rod K2 was observed to be greater than 12 steps below the other Control Bank D rods based on DRPI.
  • Procedure OP AP-12B, Control Rod Misalignment, has been implemented.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform Step 14 of OP AP-12B.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard:

  • Determined control rod K2 is NOT stuck by performing the following actions:

o Turned the ROD BANK/MODE SELECT switch to the CBD position o Inserted rods for Control Bank D until a DRPI change on rod K2 is observed

  • Manually tripped reactor before Control Bank D is restored to original demand position recorded on step 2.1 of this JPM.
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. AP-12B, Step 14.a - Check Grp 1 and grp 2 of 1.1 Read CAUTIONS prior to Step 14.a. If asked each bank - at the same step on demand step about RIL, then state the "Another operator will counter. monitor RIL" 1.2 Checked both groups of bank D at the same step as the demand counter.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

NOTE: All positions may be recorded, but are not required.

2. AP-12B, Step 14.b - Record the bank demand 2.1 Recorded Control Bank D demand position.

positions.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 3. AP-12B, Step 14.c - Rotate the Rod Bank ** 3.1 Turned the ROD BANK/MODE SELECT switch to Selector Switch to the - AFFECTED BANK. the CBD position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. AP-12B, Step 14.d - Record the plant process 4.1 Displayed the Control Bank D position from the computer position for the affected bank. plant computer and records the value.

NOTE: Operator may call up the CBD address listed in App. B of AP-12B (U0052), or record the value from an existing group display.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 5. AP-12B, Step 14.e,f - Drive the affected bank ** 5.1 Inserted rods for Control Bank D until a DRPI in several steps (enough to see a DRPI change is observed.

change).

    • 5.2 Identified that rod K2 moves and diagnoses that rod K2 is not stuck.

5.3 Reported status to Shift Foreman.

NOTE: Status of control rod may be reported after rod restored to its recorded position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. AP-12B, Step 14.g - Return the rods in the 6.1 Attempted to move rods back out to original affected bank to the position recorded in Step position.

14.a.

<< Alternate Path - Start Point >>

6.2 Identified multiple dropped rods during restoration of Control Bank D.

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat _________

Comments:

    • 7. Enters OP AP-12C, Dropped Control Rod and ** 7.1 Tripped the Reactor.

performs step 1.

<< Alternate Path - End Point >>

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat _________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Verify Misaligned Rod Is Not Stuck JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-11 (75%, MOL).

Set PPC screen at SRO desk to RBU display (rodconfig).

Verify step counters matched (group 1 and 2) and RBU are updated to current CBD rod position.

Enter Lesson file L181-LJCS1 Description L3 Commands Sets rod k2 15 steps below Bank D insert MAL_ROD3_K02 MOVEABLE delay=0 ramp=0 label ROBERPPCDGRP2NDRF 12 label ROBERPPCDGRP2DRFT(4) 1 label ROBERPPCDGRP2RSPD 1 insert C1_085S_5 1 delay=0 ramp=0 insert C1_086S_1 1 delay=0 ramp=0 delIA MAL_ROD3_K02 2 delay=1 cd='c1_086s_1' delIA C1_086S_1 2 delay=1 cd=

delIA C1_085S_5 2 delay=2 cd=

Freeze Sim after 60 seconds to unfreeze allow for temperature transient freeze delay=60 Drop two rods on Rod Cntl Out insert MAL_ROD3_K02 STATIONARY delay=2 cd='c1_086s_3' insert MAL_ROD3_P10 STATIONARY delay=2 cd='c1_086s_3' Verify Sim has run long enough for Tave to settle.

Place Rod Control Switch to Manual after simulator goes to freeze.

Place pink tag for RODS IN MANUAL on CC1.

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 7 of 8 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS1 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 is at approximately 75% power and was in the process of being returned to 100%

following curtailment for condenser cleaning.

  • The power increase was stopped 5 minutes ago when control rod K2 was observed to be greater than 12 steps below the other Control Bank D rods based on DRPI.
  • Procedure OP AP-12B, Control Rod Misalignment, has been implemented.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform Step 14 of OP AP-12B.

Page 8 of 8 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS2

Title:

Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev 43 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 5 minutes Critical Steps: 2.4, 6.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: New DCPP Task # / Rating: 47080 Gen KA # / Rating: 013.A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 4.6 / 4.8 malfunction or operations on the ESFAS system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: LOCA.

Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 10/11/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev 43 (with Fold Out Pages)

Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced an inadvertent Reactor Trip. The cause is presently unknown.
  • The Crew has completed EOP E-0 and has now transitioned to EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response..

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to begin implementation of EOP E-0.1, beginning with Step 1.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard:

  • Provided greater than 435 gpm Aux Feedwater Flow by starting any of the following:

MDAFW Pump 1-2 and/or MDAFW Pump 1-3 and/or TDAFW Pump 1-1 before S/G level drops below 15% NR in all four Steam Generators

  • Manually actuated Safety Injection before subcooling falls below 0oF
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. E-0.1, Step 1 - Check RCS Temperature 1.1 Checked RCPs running.

Response - Stable or trending to 547 oF.

1.2 Determined RCS temperature was NORMAL.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 2. E-0.1, Step 2 - Check Fdwtr Status. 2.1 Checked RCS temperature less than 554oF.

2.2 Checked Feedwater Isolation complete:

  • Red Activated Light - ON
  • White Status Light - OFF NOTE: AFW pump autostarts have been disabled.

2.3 Determined total AFW flow was NOT greater than 435 gpm.

    • 2.4 Started one or more AFW pumps:
  • TDAFW Pump 1-1 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions NOTE: Candidate may respond to indications of a LOCA based on Fold Out Page and not complete checks for Control Rod Insertion and Pressurizer Level Control

3. E-0.1, Step 3 - Check all Control Rods fully 3.1 Determined all control rods fully inserted.

inserted.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

4. E-0.1, Step 4 - Check PZR Level Controls 4.1 Determined pressurizer level NOT greater than 17%.

4.2 Determined auto isolation of letdown had already occurred.

4.3 Determined pressurizer heaters already off due to low pressurizer level.

4.4 Increased charging flow to maximum by throttling FCV-128 full open.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< Alternate Path - Start Point >>

NOTE: Any of the following may be used to identify SBLOCA.

5. Identifies multiple indications of a small break 5.1 Identified indications of Small Break LOCA:

LOCA.

  • RCS Pressure lowering
  • Pressurizer level lowering
  • Subcooling lowering
  • Containment sump levels rising Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 6. Implements Fold Out Page Item #2 NOTE: Auto Safety Injection signal for low RCS pressure (1850 psig) has been disabled 6.1 Determined either Safety Injection Criteria for Fold Out Page Item #2 met:
  • RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit Thermocouples - Less than 20oF
  • PZR Level - Cannot be maintained greater than 6%

OR

  • RCS Pressure below auto SI setpoint of 1850 psig.
    • 6.2 Manually actuated Safety Injection 6.3 Informed Shift Foreman transition to EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection is required.

<< Alternate Path - End Point >>

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Changing Plant Parameters During Reactor Trip Response JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-12 (50%, MOL).

Enter Lesson file L181-LJCS2 Description L3 Commands Fails Auto SI insert MAL_PPL3A AUTO insert MAL_PPL3B AUTO Trip Rx and reset rods insert C1_072S_3 1 delIA C1_072S_3 2 delay=2 cd=

insert C1_064S_1 1 delIA C1_064S_1 2 delay=2 cd=

Freeze Sim after 60 seconds to unfreeze allow for temperature transient freeze delay=60 RCS leak (triggered on AFW pump insert MAL_RCS3B 2.5 cd='h_v3_221r_1 or h_v3_222r_1' start) delay=0 ramp=30 Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 8 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS2 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced an inadvertent Reactor Trip. The cause is presently unknown.
  • The Crew has completed EOP E-0 and has now transitioned to EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response..

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to begin implementation of EOP E-0.1, beginning with Step 1.

Page 9 of 9 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-S3

Title:

Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, Rev. 6C Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank: LJC-118 DCPP Task # / Rating: 111200, 886600 3.8 / 3.5 Gen KA # / Rating: E04.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor components and 4.0 / 4.0 functions of control and safety systems including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features as they apply to a LOCA Outside Containment.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/19/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/03/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 has experienced a Safety Injection
  • Automatic actuation of safeguards equipment was verified
  • It was determined that SI cannot be terminated and abnormal radiation has been observed in the Auxiliary Building Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions for a LOCA outside containment, in accordance with ECA-1.2, starting on step 1.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Completed actions to isolate LOCA outside containment and identify the correct procedure for recovery as follows:

  • Cut in series contactor toggle switch for 8809B
  • Closed 8809B, RHR to cold legs 3 and 4
  • Identified EOP E-1 as correct procedure for recovery
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. EOP ECA-1.2, Step 1 - Verify Proper Valve 1.1 Determined following valves are in the correct Alignment. position:
  • 8702, RCS RHR Suct LP4 HL - CLOSED
  • 8701, RCS RHR Suct LP4 HL - CLOSED
  • 8703, RHR to hot legs 1 and 2 - CLOSED
  • 8802A, SI to hot legs 1 and 2 - CLOSED
  • 8802B, SI to hot legs 3 and 4 - CLOSED Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. EOP ECA-1.2, Step 2.a.1 - Try To Identify And 2.1 Cut in series contactor toggle switch for 8809A.

Isolate Break (RHR cold legs 1 and 2) 2.2 Closed 8809A, RHR to cold legs 1 and 2.

2.3 Diagnosed RCS pressure still lowering.

2.4 Re-opened 8809A.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 3. EOP ECA-1.2, Step 2.a.2 - Try To Identify And ** 3.1 Cut in series contactor toggle switch for 8809B.

Isolate Break (RHR cold legs 3 and 4)

    • 3.2 Closed 8809B, RHR to cold legs 3 and 4.

3.3 Determined RCS pressure stable or rising.

    • 3.4 Identified EOP E-1 as correct procedure for recovery.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Isolate a LOCA Outside Containment JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-10.

Run Lesson file drl_1118 or manually enter the following:

Command Description Insert v2_225r_1 0, insert v2_225g_1 1 8701 Green ON, Red OFF Insert v2_226r_1 0, insert v2_226g_1 1 8702 Green ON, Red OFF Insert vlv_rhr1_2 1, label rrhh8701 0.5 8702 OPEN, 8701 to 50%

(closes when 8809B is Insert vlv_rhr1_2 0 cd=rrhh8809_2 lt 0.1 ramp=1 CLOSED)

Insert mal_rhr1 400 ramp=5 RHR system leak delIA mal_rhr1 2 delay=100 Insert c2_030s_2 1, delIA c2_032s_2 2 delay=5 Actuates SI Insert v2_266s_1 1 delay=15 Stops CCP 1-3 Insert v2_266s_1 2 delay=20 Insert v4_388s_3 1 delay=15 ABV Char Htr ON Insert v4_388s_1 0 Insert v3_179s_2 0 Stops all but one CB PP set Insert v3_224s_1 1, Insert v3_225s_1 1 delIA v3_224s_1 2 delay=60 delIA v3_225s_1 2 delay=60 Insert v3_257s_1 1 delay=150, delIA v3_257s_1 2 delay=180 Closes ALL TDAFP LCVs Insert v3_258s_1 1 delay=150, delIA v3_258s_1 2 delay=180 Insert v3_259s_1 1 delay=150, delIA v3_259s_1 2 delay=180 Insert v3_260s_1 1 delay=150, delIA v3_260s_1 2 delay=180 (only if lesson file NOT RUN) throttle AFW to 150 gpm/SG Throttle AFW (manually)

RUN, then FRZ after 4 minutes RUN for 4 minutes Reset SI, Reset Phase A Isolation, Open FCV-584 during 4 minute run.

Scroll chart PR-403 forward so operator has a reference point for RCS pressure trends.

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 6 of 7 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-S3 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 has experienced a Safety Injection
  • Automatic actuation of safeguards equipment was verified
  • It was determined that SI cannot be terminated and abnormal radiation has been observed in the Auxiliary Building Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions for a LOCA outside containment, in accordance with ECA-1.2, starting on step 1.

Page 7 of 7 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS4P

Title:

TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ____________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform _______X________ Simulate _______________

Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ TCOA Time: ___________

Comments: (Note: Any Unsat step requires a numbered comment; use back as needed.)

EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 34

References:

OP1.ID2, Time Critical/Sensitive Operator Actions, Rev. 12 Alternate Path: Yes ______X _ No Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 10 minutes 2.4, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.3, 6.2, 6.4, 7.2, 7.4, 10.1, 10.3, 11.3, 11.6, Critical Steps:

11.7 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-027A 3.5 / 4.5 / 4.0 / 4.0 /

DCPP Task # / Rating: 331200, 43200, 324800, 323600, 324600 4.0 (all RO) 011.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor components and functions of the control and safety systems including Gen KA # / Rating: 4.2 / 4.2 instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/04/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 experienced a LBLOCA and RWST level has decreased to 33%.

Initiating Cue: Given:

  • The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-1.3 to align RHR for cold leg recirculation starting at step 1.
  • App EE of EOP E-1.3 will be completed by another operator at your direction (using time compression).
  • This is a time critical JPM.
  • You may take a couple of minutes to preview the procedure before the task begins.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: RHR has been aligned to the suction of the SI pumps and CCPs for cold leg recirculation by performing the following:

  • Stopped RHR Pump 1-1
  • Closed 8700A
  • Closed 8716A and B
  • Closed 8974A and B
  • Closed 8105 and 8106 (only 1 of 2 required; series valves)
  • Opened 8807A and B (only 1 of 2 required; parallel valves)
  • Opened 8982A
  • Re-started RHR Pump 1-1
  • Opened 8804A Within the 10 minutes of JPM start time.

Time Critical This JPM was evaluated against TCOA #8 - Operator must transfer to cold leg recirculation Operator Action within 10 minutes of the RWST reaching the low level setpoint which corresponds to the start (TCOA): time of this JPM. Case 2 - one RHR pump (1-2) does not trip and cannot be stopped from the control room for up to 5 minutes after the RWST reaches 33%.

This TCOA is applicable to this JPM; the appropriate steps will be designated as critical and the TCOA will be designated time critical.

Page 2 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. E-1.3, Step 1 - Implement Appendix EE. 1.1 Read note regarding FR procedures.

1.2 Assigned operator to complete Appendix EE.

Note: Actions for Appendix EE have already been completed in the setup for this JPM.

Cue: Appendix EE has is complete".

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 2. E-1.3, Step 2 - Ensure RHR PP 1-2 stopped. 2.1 Observed that RHR PP 1-2 was running (red light ON and/or amps indicated).

2.2 Attempted to secure RHR PP 1-2.

<< Alternate Path - Start Point >>

2.3 Dispatched a Nuclear Operator to locally open the breaker for RHR PP 1-2.

    • 2.4 Skipped to E-1.3, step 4 (Did NOT close 8700B).

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 3. E-1.3, step 4 - Ensure RHR PP 1-1 stopped. 3.1 Observed that RHR PP 1-1 was running (red light ON and/or amps indicated).
    • 3.2 Secured RHR PP 1-1 with control switch (green light ON, and/or no amps indicated).

<< Alternate Path - End Point >>

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Page 3 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 4. E-1.3, step 5 - Close 8700A, RHR pump 1 ** 4.1 Closed 8700A.

normal suction valve.

4.2 Observed green light (only) ON for 8700A.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 5. E-1.3, step 6 - Close 8716A and B, RHR ** 5.1 Closed 8716A.

pump discharge crosstie valves.

5.2 Observed green light (only) ON for 8716A.

    • 5.3 Closed 8716B.

5.4 Observed green light (only) ON for 8716B.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 6. E-1.3, step 7 - Isolate ECCS PPs Recirc Paths. 6.1 Observed RCS Pressure is < 1500 psig (VB-2, any PPC).
    • 6.2 Closed 8974A.

6.3 Observed green light (only) ON for 8974A.

    • 6.4 Closed 8974B.

6.5 Observed green light (only) ON for 8974B.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Page 4 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 7. E-1.3, step 7 - Isolate ECCS PPs Recirc Paths 7.1 Note: Valves are in series. Only one is required (cont) closed to meet the critical step criteria.
    • 7.2 Closed 8105.

7.3 Observed green light (only) ON for 8105.

    • 7.4 Closed 8106.

7.5 Observed green light (only) ON for 8106.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

8. E-1.3, step 8 - Check Containment Recirc 8.1 Observed Containment Recirc Sump Level > 92' Sump Level. on LI-940 & 941.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

9. E-1.3, step 9 - Verify RHR PP 1-2 Alignment. 9.1 Observed that RHR PP 1-2 was running (red light ON and/or amps indicated).

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

9.2 Skipped to E-1.3, step 10.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Page 5 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 10. E-1.3, step 10 - Crosstie SI PP suction to 10.1 Note: Valves are in parallel. Only one is required CCPs. open to meet the critical step criteria.
    • 10.2 Opened 8807A.

10.3 Observed red light (only) ON for 8807A.

    • 10.4 Opened 8807B.

10.5 Observed red lights (only) ON for 8807B.

10.6 Observed both ECCS CCPs are running (red lights ON).

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

Step was: Sat _______ Unsat __________

Comments:

11. E-1.3, step 11 - Verify RHR PP 1-1 11.1 Observed that RHR PP 1-1 is not running (green Alignment. light ON and/or no amps).

11.2 Observed green light (only) ON for 8700A.

    • 11.3 Opened 8982A.

11.4 Observed red light (only) ON for 8982A.

11.5 Verified RHR HX 1-1 in service per App EE.

Cue: App EE has been completed. Both RHR HXs are in service per the appendix.

Continued on next page Page 6 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 11 E-1.3, step 11 - Verify RHR PP 1-1 11.6
    • Started RHR pump 1-1.

Alignment (continued)

    • 11.7 Opened 8804A.

Note the time 8804A indicated full OPEN (TCOA stop time):

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments: See page 1 for start_____ finish____ description

12. E-1.3, step 13 - Check at least one RHR PP **********************************

running in Cold Leg Recirc Lineup. Cue: The SFM has assigned other operators to complete this procedure.

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

TCOA Start Time:

TCOA Stop Time:

TCOA Total (Enter TCOA time on the cover page)

Time:

TCOA: SAT UNSAT (TCOA time must be < 10 minutes)

Page 7 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

Page 8 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP

  • Initialize to JPM IC 203.
  • Execute lesson LJC-027A.lsn.
  • This SNAP allows entry into EOP E-1.3 at Step 1. RWST level is 33%.

Both RHR pumps are running.

Step 1 (App EE has been completed by other operators, using time compression).

  • Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

NOTE: This JPM is time critical. Do NOT go to run until the examiner or examinee indicates that they are ready to begin. RWST low level will occur shortly after going to RUN.

Go to RUN when the examinee states they are ready to perform the task.

Page 9 of 10 Rev. XXX

JPM TITLE: TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4P EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Unit 1 experienced a LBLOCA and RWST level has decreased to 33%.

Initiating Cue: Given:

  • The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-1.3 to align RHR for cold leg recirculation starting at step 1.
  • App EE of EOP E-1.3 will be completed by another operator at your direction (using time compression).
  • This is a time critical JPM.
  • You may take a couple of minutes to preview the procedure before the task begins.

Page 10 of 10 Rev. XXX

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS4S

Title:

PERFORM OP AP-15 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR MAIN FEED PUMP TRIP Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-15, Loss of Feedwater Flow, Rev 26.

Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 5 minutes Critical Steps: 2.3, 5.3, 5.4 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-247 DCPP Task # / Rating: 47220 4.0 059.A2.07 - Ability to predict the impact of tripping of the MFW pump turbine on MFW and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Gen KA # / Rating: those malfunctions or operations. 3.0 / 3.3 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/01/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Hard Card for Unit 1 OP AP-15, Loss of Feedwater Flow Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power
  • PK09-12, Main Feedwater Pump Trip, and PK09-13, Main Feedwater Pump No. 11, have just alarmed
  • The Shift Foreman has announced he is entering OP AP-15, Loss of Feedwater Flow Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform immediate actions in response to plant conditions. OP AP-15 Immediate Action Hard Card may be used.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard:

  • AFW Pumps 1-2 and 1-3 are running
  • Rod Control is in MANUAL
  • Rods inserted at maximum available rate (48 steps/min)
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct Hard Card. 1.1 Hard Card for OP AP-15 Immediate Actions.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 2. Step 1 - CHECK Reactor Power Less Than 80%. 2.1 Read CAUTION regarding attempts to stabilize plant online.

2.2 Determined power was greater than 80%.

    • 2.3 Performed Step 1 RNO
  • Started AFW Pp 1-2
  • Started AFW Pp 1-3 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Step 2 - REDUCE Turbine Load. 3.1 Determined turbine load was greater than 650 MW.

3.2 Determined programmed ramp executing appropriately:

  • DEH MW feedback in service
  • TARGET set for 550 MW
  • RAMP RATE at 225 MW/min Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

4. Step 3 - CHECK MFW Pp Suction Pressure 4.1 Determined MFW Pp Suction Pressure was GREATER THAN 260 PSIG greater than 260 PSIG.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 5. Step 4 - ENSURE Rods Controlling Properly in 5.1 Checked Tave/Tref mismatch greater than 1.5 oF.

AUTO.

5.2 Determined rods were NOT controlling properly in Auto.

<<Alternate Path - Start Point>>

    • 5.3 Placed Rod Control in MANUAL,
    • 5.4 Inserted rods at maximum available rate of 48 steps/min.

<<Alternate Path - End Point>>

Cue: Another Operator will continue with the performance of OP AP-15.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Perform OP AP-15 Immediate Actions for Main Feed Pump TRIP JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-10. .

Run Lesson drl_1247.lsn or manually insert the following:

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when instructed by examiner.

Page 7 of 8 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS4S Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power
  • PK09-12, Main Feedwater Pump Trip, and PK09-13, Main Feedwater Pump No. 11, have just alarmed
  • The Shift Foreman has announced he is entering OP AP-15, Loss of Feedwater Flow Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform immediate actions in response to plant conditions. OP AP-15 Immediate Action Hard Card may be used.

Page 8 of 8 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS5

Title:

Initiate Containment Spray Manually Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev. 12 Alternate Path: Yes ______ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-010 DCPP Task # / Rating: 849200, 835600 3.7 / 3.6 Gen KA # / Rating: E14.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor components and the 3.7 / 3.7 functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features as they apply to high containment pressure.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 10/16/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced a LOCA
  • EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset
  • Containment pressure is > 25 psig
  • A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed
  • All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1, starting at step 3.c DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Containment spray is manually initiated and aligned for injection phase in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1, Step 3 such that:
  • Containment Spray Pump 1-2 running with discharge valve 9001B OPEN Prior to the completion of FR-Z.1.
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP FR Z.1.

Cue (if required): Start with Step 3.c Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. 2.1 Determines Containment Spray IS required -

FR-Z.1, Step 3.c - Containment pressure containment pressure is greater than 22 psig greater than 22 psig.

(PI-934, PI-935, PI-936, PI-937 on VB1)

If asked about ECA-1.1, provide the following:

Cue: Refer to Initial Conditions.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 3. FR-Z.1, Step 3.d - RNO Start the containment ** 3.1 Turns control switches to the START position for spray pumps. containment spray pumps 1-1 and 1-2 (VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 4. FR-Z.1, Step 3.d - RNO Start the containment ** 4.1 Turns control switches to the START position for spray pumps. containment spray pumps 1-1 and 1-2 (VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 5. SFR-Z.1, step 3.e - Checks containment spray 5.1 Determines that Containment Spray System is system for proper valve alignment. NOT in proper emergency alignment based on Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves 9001A and 9001B position indication lights (VB1):
  • Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON
    • 5.2 Takes control switch for 9001A and B to OPEN position and verifies valve position lights indicate OPEN (VB1):
  • Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF 5.3 Verifies 8992 open.

5.4 Verifies 8994A&B open.

Cue: Another operator will continue with the procedure".

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson File drl_1010.lsn.

Perform the following:

1. Place FCV-53 and 54 in RECIRC.
2. Shut down condensate booster pump set 13, if running.
3. Select CSF-5 on SPDS.

After the simulator goes to FREEZE, Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet and has verified containment pressure greater than 22 psig (containment pressure lowers quickly from CFCU cooling once the simulator is taken to RUN).

Page 6 of 7 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS5 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced a LOCA
  • EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset
  • Containment pressure is > 25 psig
  • A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed
  • All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1, starting at step 3.c Page 7 of 7 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS6

Title:

Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ______________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP ECA-0.3, Restore 4kV Buses, Appendix X and Appendix Q, Rev. 21 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 9.2, 10.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 17.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-032 DCPP Task # / Rating: 573800 3.5 Gen KA # / Rating: 062.A4.07 - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor 3.1 / 3.1 synchronizing and paralleling of different ac supplies in the control room.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 REV.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

  • U-1 was operating at 100%.
  • A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.
  • Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.
  • Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.
  • CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.
  • Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: 4KV and 480 V bus H are energized from DG 1-2 in accordance with ECA-0.3, appendix X as by performing the following sequence:

  • Step 4.c - Opens 52-HH-10.
  • Step 4.d - Calls the operator in the field to open all 480V Bus H breakers.
  • Step 4.f - Manually depresses both SI reset pushbuttons (Train A and Train B).
  • Step 4.g - Places all Xfer to S/U PWR C/O toggle switches to CUT-OUT for Vital 4kV buses F, G, and H.
  • Step 4.h - Depress all auto transfer reset pushbuttons for Vital 4kV buses F, G, and H.
  • Step 4.j - Opens Startup Feeder Breakers 52-HF-14 and 52-HH-14.
  • Step 4.k - Opens Startup Feeder 52-HG-15.
  • Step 4.m - Inserts sync key for 4kV bus H start up feeder breaker and turns switch to on. Closes 4kV bus H start up feeder breaker 52-HH-14.
  • Step 4.n - Inserts sync key for 4kV bus G start up feeder breaker and turns switch to on. Closes 4kV bus G start up feeder breaker 52-HG-14.
  • Step 4.r - 4kV to 480V bus feeder breaker for bus H, 52-HH-10.
    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References ECA-0.3, Appendix X, step 4.c.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 2. Step 4.c - Verify OPEN the 4kV to 480 VAC bus ** 2.1 Opens 52-HH-10 (VB4).

feeder breaker for the de-energized bus to be reenergized 2.2 Verifies that 52-HH-10 has opened (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 3. Step 4.d - On the de-energized 480V bus to be ** 3.1 Calls the operator in the field to open all 480V reenergized, open all 480V breakers. Bus H breakers.

Note: 480V Bus H breakers are in the correct OPEN position for this JPM. Inform the Examinee that Time Compression is being used.

Cue: (using time compression) An Operator has opened all the 480V breakers on bus 1H.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 4.e - Cut in the DIR PWR, LOSS OF FIELD, & 4.1 Places D/G DIR PWR, LOSS OF FLD & BKR OC BKR OC PROT RLYS for diesel generator 12. PROT RLYS C/O SW to CUT-IN (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 5. Step 4.f - Reset SI. 5.1 Checks PK08-21 Safety Injection Actuation status (VB3).
    • 5.2 Manually depresses both pushbuttons.

5.3 Checks at least one of the following:

Monitor Light Box B Safety Injection red light OFF (VB1).

OR PK08-21, Safety Injection Actuation not ON (VB3).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 6. Step 4.g - Cutout the auto transfer FCOs for ** 6.1 Places all Xfer to S/U PWR C/O toggle switch to 4kV and 12kV buses. CUT-OUT (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 7. Step 4.h - Depress all auto transfer reset ** 7.1 Depresses all AUTO XFER RESET pushbuttons, if pushbuttons. required (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

7.2 Verifies that all Auto Xfer indicating blue lights are off. (VB4, VB5).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

8. Step 4.i - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus 8.1 Observes that all vital 4kV bus aux feeder auxiliary feeder breakers. breakers are OPEN (VB4):
  • 52-HH-13 OPEN
  • 52-HG-13 OPEN
  • 52-HF-13 OPEN Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 9. Step 4.j - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus startup 9.1 Observes 52-HG-14 is OPEN (VB4).

feeder breakers.

    • 9.2 Opens Startup Feeder Breakers (VB4)
  • 52-HF-14
  • 52-HH-14 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 10. Step 4.k - Verify OPEN the 4kV startup feeder ** 10.1 Opens 52-HG-15 (VB4).

breaker 52-HG-15.

10.2 Verifies that 52-HG-15 has opened Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

11. Step 4.l - Verify that Steps 4.b and 4.c of this 11.1 Reads CAUTION and NOTE.

appendix are complete.

Cue: Another operator will monitor the stability of the DG, and open the S/U feeder breaker if needed.

If requests status of steps 4.b and 4.c, provide the following cue:

Cue: Refer to your initial conditions Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 12. Step 4.m - Close 4kV startup feeder breaker ** 12.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus H startup feeder for the de-energized bus being reenergized. breaker 52-HH-14 (VB4).
    • 12.2 Turns sync switch to ON.
    • 12.3 Closes 52-HH-14.

12.4 Verifies that 52-HH-14 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 13. Step 4.n - Close the 4kV startup feeder ** 13.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus G startup feeder breaker for the bus that will be supplying breaker 52-HG-14 (VB4).

power to the de-energized bus

    • 13.2 Turns sync switch to ON.
    • 13.3 Closes 52-HG-14.

13.4 Verifies that 52-HG-14 has closed.

13.5 Verifies running diesel generator remains stable.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 4.o - Monitors for an SI 14.1 **********************************

Cue: Another operator will monitor for an SI, and open the bus G S/U feeder if required.

15. Step 4.p - IMPLEMENT Appendix Q to start 15.1 **************************************

4kV loads as needed on the reenergized bus Cue: An operator has been stationed at VB4 with Appendix Q and is monitoring the diesel generator.

Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting of any 4KV loads that are required.

Please continue with Appendix X.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

16. Step 4.q - Verify that Step 4.d of this 16.1 Verifies that Step 4.d of this Appendix is Appendix is complete PRIOR to performing complete.

the next step.

Cue: Steps 4.d of this appendix is complete.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 17. Step 4.r - Close the 4kV to 480V bus feeder ** 17.1 Closes 52-HH-10.

breaker for the reenergized bus.

Verifies that 52-HH-10 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

18. Step 4.s - Implement Appendix Q for starting 18.1 Implements Appendix Q for starting 480V bus 480V loads as needed. loads as needed.

Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting of 480 vac loads that are required.

Another operator will monitor and implement App Q.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 10 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to the IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter lesson file drl_1032 or manually insert the following:

Command Description Insert loa_sis3 OPEN delay=60 Strips vital 4KV Bus H Insert loa_rhr10 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_css8 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_ccw31 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_afw14 OPEN delay=60 Insert dsc_ven14 OPEN delay=60 Insert mal_deg1a 2 Fails DGs 1-1 and 1-3 Insert mal_deg1c 2 Insert mal_syd1 1 Loss of Offsite Power Insert mal_syd1_btw 1 Insert mal_ppl2a 1 Inadvertant SI delIA mal_ppl2a 2 delay=2 insert mal_ppl2b 1 delIA mal_ppl2b 2 delay=2 Insert pmp_ccw2 4 delay=4 OC trip on CCW PP 1-2 RUN Runs simulator Run lesson drl_0063 (Strips 480v bus H). Manual insert is not practical due to large number of actions.

Freeze simulator Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 11 of 12 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS6 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • U-1 was operating at 100%.
  • A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.
  • Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.
  • Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.
  • CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.
  • Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

Page 12 of 12 Rev.0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-LJCS8

Title:

Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ ________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-34.3.11, Fire Response - 480 V Bus G Switchgear Room, Rev 0 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.9, 4.10 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: New DCPP Task # / Rating: 89481 3.0 / 3.0 Gen KA # / Rating: 067.AA2.17 - Ability to determine and interpret the following as 3.5 / 4.3 they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: systems that may be affected by the fire.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 10/10/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/04/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator.

The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: OP AP-34.3.11, Fire Response - 480 V Bus G Switchgear Room, Rev 0 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • A fire has been reported and verified as valid in the 480 V Bus G switchgear room.
  • The crew has entered AP-34 and determined Fire Response procedure AP-34.3.11 applies..

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to implement OP AP-34.3.11, Fire Response - 480 V Bus G Switchgear Room.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: Realign charging as follows:

  • Letdown isolated by one or more of the following:

o Letdown isolation valve, LCV-459 - CLOSED o Letdown isolation valve LCV-460 - CLOSED o Letdown orifice stop valve 8149C - CLOSED

  • Charging pump suction from the RWST, 8805A - OPENED
  • VCT outlet to charging pumps, LCV-112B - CLOSED
  • CCP 1 RUNNING Prior to exiting OP AP-34.3.11, Fire Response - 480 V Bus G Switchgear Room
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. AP-34.3.11, Step 1 - Check reactor does NOT 1.1 Noted reactor was NOT tripped and Safety trip and Safety Injection does NOT actuate. Injection had NOT actuated.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

NOTE: This is a continuous action step. The running charging pump will begin cavitating shortly after the original check, requiring the candidate to return to step 2 to implement RNO actions.

2. AP-34.3.11, Step 2 - Check suction to running 2.1 Determined VCT level and pressure in normal charging pumps. band.

2.2 Identified charging pump suction flow path available through LCV-112B and LCV-112C.

2.3 Checked charging pump 1-3 amps stable.

2.4 Checked charging header flow FI-128A stable.

2.5 Checked charging header pressure PI-142A stable.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. AP-34.3.11, Step 3 - Check RWST drain path 3.1 Checked PK08-21 OFF.

isolated.

NOTE: AR PK05-01, 02, 03, 04 alarm shortly after CCP 1-3 cavitation begins.

3.2 Noted reduced flow to RCP seals.

3.3 Identified CCP 1-3 amps - NOT stable.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

<< Alternate Path - Start Point >>

    • 4. AP-34.3.11, Step 2 RNO - Align charging pump ** 4.1 Stopped CCP 1-3.

suction to RWST.

NOTE: Closing any combination of the following valves will isolate letdown.

    • 4.2 Isolated letdown by closing isolation and/or orifice valves:
  • LCV-459 and/or
  • LCV-460 and/or
  • 8149 C
    • 4.3 Opened charging pump suction from the RWST:
  • 8805A
    • 4.4 Closed VCT outlet to the charging pumps:
  • LCV-112B 4.5 Informs Shift Foreman CCP 1-3 must be vented prior to restart.

4.6 ***************************************

Cue: CCP 1-3 will be vented prior to restarting the pump (Step continued on next page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. AP-34.3.11, Step 2 RNO - Align charging 4.7 Checked charging pump recirc isolation lines (cont) pump suction to RWST. 8105 and 8106 are open.

4.8 Closed charging flow control valve FCV-128

    • 4.9 Started CCP 1-1
    • 4.10 Opened FCV-128 to establish minimum charging flow to seals only (approx 32 gpm; 8gpm/seal) 4.11 Noted requirement to establish letdown per OP AP-17, Loss of Charging

<< Alternate Path - End Point >>

4.12 ***************************************

Cue: Other Operators will continue with system restoration.

Step was: Sat _________ Unsat _________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 8 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Fire in the 480V Bus G Switchgear Room JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson file L181-LJCS8 Description L3 Commands Activate PK10-10 Fire Detected Insert PK1010_0674 FAIL_TO_TRUE Cavitate CCP 1-3 insert CVC_932TASTEM 0.1 ramp=4 Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 7 of 8 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-LJCS8 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • A fire has been reported and verified as valid in the 480 V Bus G switchgear room.
  • The crew has entered AP-34 and determined Fire Response procedure AP-34.3.11 applies..

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to implement OP AP-34.3.11, Fire Response - 480 V Bus G Switchgear Room.

Page 8 of 8 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-P1

Title:

Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ______________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments: (Note: Any Unsat step requires a numbered comment; use back as needed.)

This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

U2 OP A-4A:I, Pressurizer - Make Available, Rev. 26 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 4.2, 8.2, 10.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank: LJP-029A DCPP Task # / Rating: 109800 3.6 010.A2.01 - Ability to predict the impact of heater failures on the PZR PCS and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those Gen KA # / Rating: malfunctions or operations. 3.3 / 3.6 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/05/19 APPROVED BY: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 12/05/19 LINE MANAGER REV.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: A copy of U2 OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 2 is in MODE 1.
  • An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 23E.
  • Offsite power is available Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 23 to its backup power supply in accordance with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: Pressurizer heater group 2-3 is powered from its backup supply as follows:

  • Control power toggle switch in OFF position
  • Transfer switch EPPH23 in DOWN (backup) position
  • DC control power knife switch 72-52-2H CLOSED
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Reference procedure section 6.4 1.1 Read caution and note.

Cue: Another Operator has been assigned to monitor the loading of Bus H 480V transformer.

1.2 Went to step 6.4.2 for Pzr Heater Group 2-3.

1.3 Read caution.

1.4 Recognized that off-site power is available and went to Section 6.4.2b.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.1,2 - Place control 2.1 Went to or called the control room to ensure switch for heater group 23 in the OFF position. the position of the control switch for heater group 23 is in OFF.

Cue: The control switch for heater group 23 is in the OFF position and the green light is ON.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.3.a - Ensure that 3.1 Located the normal breaker for heater group 23 heater group 23 normal breaker 52-23E-2 is on load center 23E.

OPEN.

3.2 Ensured that the breaker is OPEN.

Cue: The OPEN (green) indicator is showing on the breaker.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 4. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.3.b - Place the DC 4.1 Located the DC control power switch for the control power switch 72-52-23E-02 for pzr heater group 23 normal breaker on load center heater group 23 normal breaker in OFF 23E.

position.

    • 4.2 Placed the control power toggle switch in the OFF position.

Cue: The toggle switch is in the DOWN (OFF) position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.4.a-Check heater 5.1 Located the heater group 23 backup breaker.

group 23 backup breaker 52-2H-74 open.

5.2 Checked that the breaker is open.

Cue: The OPEN (green) indicator is showing on the breaker.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

6. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.4.b - Check open the 6.1 Located the DC control power knife switch for DC control power knife switch 72-52-2H-74 heater group 23 (located above the vital for the heater group 23 backup breaker. breaker).

Cue: You may open the cabinet.

6.2 Ensured the knife switch is open.

Cue: The knife switch is open.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.5.a - Ensure both 7.1 Located the manual transfer switch on the wall white potential lights on manual transfer next to the 52-2H-74 breaker.

switch EPPH23, Press Heater 2-3 Transfer Switch are OFF.

Note: Normal breaker may be available, white light may be ON.

7.2 Checked BOTH white lights OFF

  • Backup supply 52-2H-74 Cue: Both white lights are OFF.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 8. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.5.b,c - Move the ***************************************

transfer switch down to the backup (vital bus) Cue: Another Operator will complete all position. required sealed component change forms and re-sealing.

8.1 Simulated removing seal.

    • 8.2 Positioned switch EPPH23 to the backup supply.

Cue: The transfer switch is in the DOWN (backup) position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.6.a - Rack in or check Note: This breaker is normally racked in. This racked in 52-2H-74. step would become critical if the breaker were initially racked out. OP J-7A:II would only be needed in this unusual case.

9.1 Racked in or checked racked in 52-2H-74.

Cue: Breaker is flush with the breaker cabinet (RACKED IN).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • 10. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.6.b - Close the DC ** 10.1 Closed the DC control power knife switch control power knife switch for the heater 72-52-2H-74.

group 23 backup breaker.

Cue: The knife switch is closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

11. OP A-4A:I, Step 6.4.2.b.6.c,d - Ensure the DC 11.1 Located the DC Charging Power Switch on the Charging Power Switch for heater group 23 lower front of 52-2H-74.

backup breaker (52-2H-74) is on and springs charged.

11.2 Ensured the following:

  • CHARGING POWER switch is in the ON position
  • SPRINGS CHARGED flag displayed Cue: The switch is in the ON position, and the Springs Charged flag is showing on the breaker.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

12. Notify the control room of the status of 12.1 Notified the control room that heater group 23 heater group 23. has been transferred to the backup power supply.

Cue: The Control Operator will complete the procedure and energize heater group 23.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Pressurizer Heater Group 23 to Backup Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 10 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P1 Init Given:

ial

  • Unit 2 is in MODE 1.

Co ndi

  • An electrical fault has deenergized 480VAC bus 23E.

tio

  • Offsite power is available ns:

Init The Shift Foreman directs you to transfer pressurizer heater group 23 to its backup power supply in accordance iati with OP A-4A:I, Section 6.4.

ng Cu e:

Page 10 of 10 Rev.0

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 13 of 28 UNIT 2 6.4 Pressurizer Heaters - Transfer to Backup Power Supply CAUTION: The load on 480V Vital Bus/Transformer shall be monitored when transferring Pressurizer heaters to the backup power supply. Pressurizer heaters ON and CFCUs in FAST speed could result in exceeding transformer normal rated load.T03665/Ref 7.2.4 NOTE: Red tick marks on transformer MW meter face indicate normal continuous rating value.

6.4.1 IF Press Heater Group 2-2 is to be transferred to the backup power supply, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: Any safety injection signal must be reset before loads can be stripped and before the heaters can be energized. Safety injection signal may be reset only if applicable reset criteria is met in the specific Emergency Operating Procedures.T03665

a. IF 4kV Vital Bus G is being supplied by its diesel generator AND bus load is greater than or equal to 2.6 MW, THEN at SFM discretion, strip loads from the bus as follows:T03665
1. IF all containment fan coolers are running AND average containment air temperature is less than 120°F, THEN shut down ONE of the following:
  • CFCU 2-3 OR
  • CFCU 2-5.
2. IF ALL component cooling water pumps are running THEN shut down CCW Pump 2-2.
3. IF the ECCS pump shutdown criteria in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedure is met, THEN shut down RHR Pump 2-2.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 14 of 28 UNIT 2

b. Energize Press Heater Group #22 from backup supply as follows:T03665
1. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "OFF".
2. Check Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch green light ON.
3. Ensure the following for 52-23D-6, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-23D-06, DC Control Power Cut Out Switch, in "OFF"

4. Ensure the following for 52-2G-72, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-2G-72, DC Control Power knife switch, OPEN (above breaker inside SPGA)

5. Transfer EPPH22, Press Heater 2-2 Transfer Switch, as follows:

a) Ensure that BOTH white potential indicating lights OFF.

  • Backup supply 52-2G-72 b) Place EPPH22 in "BACKUP".

c) Seal EPPH22 in "BACKUP" PER OP1.DC20, "Sealed Components."

6. Ensure the following for 52-2G-72, Press Heater Group #22:

a) Breaker RACKED IN and OPEN PER OP J-7A:II, "480V Non-Vital System - Switching Operation"Ref 7.2.5 b) 72-52-2G-72, DC Control Power knife switch, CLOSED (above breaker inside SPGA) c) DC Charging Power switch in "ON" (lower front of breaker) d) Closing springs charged OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 15 of 28 UNIT 2 CAUTION: The Pressurizer heater group breaker auto trip on low Pressurizer level is defeated when heaters are on backup power supply. Heaters must be manually turned OFF if Pressurizer level drops below 17%.

7. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON" (CC1).

NOTE: The indicating lights for this group will NOT illuminate since they are associated with the normal power supply breaker position.

8. Check Htr Grp 2-2 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1).
9. IF Press Heater Group #22 is NOT energized THEN manually close breaker 52-2G-72 as follows:Ref. 7.2.3 a) Ensure Backup Htr Grp 2-2 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON".

NOTE: Charging the closing springs electrically requires the local DC Control Power knife switch (72-52-2G-72) above the breaker to be closed and the DC Charging Power toggle switch on the front of the breaker in "ON".

b) Ensure breaker 52-2G-72 closing springs are charged.

c) Press the CLOSE pushbutton.

10. Ensure that Diesel Generator 2-1 is NOT overloaded by referencing the capability curve in OP J-6B:IV, "Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-1."
11. Check Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are less than or equal to the red tick mark on meter face.
12. IF Bus G 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are greater than red tick mark, THEN REFER TO AR PK17-22, "480V Bus 2G," for guidance on reducing loads.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 16 of 28 UNIT 2 6.4.2 IF Pzr Heater Group 2-3 is to be transferred to the backup power supply, THEN perform the following:

CAUTION: Any safety injection signal must be reset before loads can be stripped and before the heaters can be energized. Safety injection signal may be reset only if applicable reset criteria are met in the specific Emergency Operating Procedures.T03665

a. IF 4kV Vital Bus H is being supplied by its diesel generator AND bus load is greater than or equal to 2.6 mW, THEN at SFM discretion, strip loads from the bus as follows:T03665
1. IF all containment fan coolers are running AND average containment air temperature is less than 120°F, THEN shut down CFCU 2-4.
2. IF ALL component cooling water pumps are running, THEN shut down CCW Pump 2-3.
3. IF the ECCS pump shutdown criteria in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedure are met, THEN
  • Shut down RHR Pump 2-2
  • Shut down SI Pump 2-2
b. Energize Pzr Heater Group 2-3 from backup supply as follows:T03665
1. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "OFF" (CC1).
2. Check Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch green light ON.
3. Ensure the following for 52-23E-2, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-23E-02, DC Control Power Cut Out Switch, in "OFF"

4. Ensure the following for 52-2H-74, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker OPEN b) 72-52-2H-74, DC Control Power knife switch, OPEN (above breaker inside SPHA)

OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 17 of 28 UNIT 2

5. Transfer EPPH23, Press Heater 2-3 Transfer Switch, as follows:

a) Check BOTH of the following white potential indicating lights OFF:

  • Backup supply 52-2H-74 b) Place EPPH23 in "BACKUP".

c) Seal EPPH23 in "BACKUP" per OP1.DC20, "Sealed Components."

6. Ensure the following for 52-2H-74, Press Heater Group #23:

a) Breaker RACKED IN and OPEN PER OP J-7A:II, "480V Non-Vital System - Switching Operation"Ref 7.2.5 b) 72-52-2H-74, DC Control Power knife switch, CLOSED (above breaker in SPHA) c) DC Charging Power switch in "ON" (lower front of breaker) d) Closing springs charged CAUTION: The Pressurizer heater group breaker auto trip on low Pressurizer level is defeated when heaters are on backup power supply. Heaters must be manually turned OFF if Pressurizer level drops below 17%.

7. Place Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON" (CC1).

NOTE: The indicating lights for this group will NOT illuminate since they are associated with the normal power supply breaker position.

8. Check Htr Grp 2-3 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1).
9. IF Press Heater Group 2-3 is NOT energized, THEN manually close breaker 52-2H-74 as follows:Ref 7.2.3 a) Ensure Backup Htr Grp 2-3 control switch in "AUTO" after "ON".

NOTE: Charging the closing springs electrically requires the local DC Control Power knife switch (72-52-2H-74) above the breaker to be closed and the DC Charging Power toggle switch on the front of the breaker in "ON".

b) Ensure 52-2H-74 closing springs are charged.

c) Press the CLOSE pushbutton.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

Pressurizer - Make Available OP A-4A:I R26 Page 18 of 28 UNIT 2

10. Ensure Diesel Generator 2-2 is NOT overloaded by referencing the capability curve in OP J-6B:V, "Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-2."
11. Check Bus H 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are less than or equal to the red tick mark on meter face.
12. IF Bus H 4kV / 480V XFMR High Side mW are greater than red tick mark, THEN REFER TO AR PK16-22, "480V Bus 2H," for guidance on reducing loads.

OP_A-4A~Iu2r26.DOC 0131.1127

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: LNRCL181-P2

Title:

Transfer the TSC to Vital Power Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ______________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

EOP ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, Appendix J, Rev.

27A OP J-6B:VI, Manual Operation of DG 1-3, Unit 1 - Rev. 37 OP J-6B:VI, Manual Operation of DG 2-3, Unit 2 - Rev. 33 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.1, 7.1, 7.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Converted to new format, updated references. Rev 2A for reference procedure number Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: revision only - no impact to JPM. LOF supervisor approves.

DCPP Task # / Rating: 896600 3.0 / 3.0 062.A2.11 - Ability to predict the impact of aligning standby equipment with correct emergency power source on the ac distribution system and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Gen KA # / Rating: those malfunctions or operations. 3.7 / 4.1 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/03/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/05/19 LINE MANAGER REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of ECA-2.1, Appendix J.

Copy of OP J-6B:VI for D/G 1-3 and 2-3. (only once asked for)

Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.
  • Offsite power was lost to both units.
  • The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power.
  • The TSC is manned and requires vital power.
  • Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying Unit 1 4 kV Bus F and is carrying 2.12 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.
  • Diesel generator 2-3 is supplying Unit 2 4 kV Bus F and is carrying 2.26 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with Step 3.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: TSC Transfer Switch Normal Power:

TSC is being provided power from Unit 2 D/G 2-3 via:

  • Switch EPTSN to BACKUP power.
  • Switch EPTSC to the NORMAL (U-2) position.
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 3 - Check D/G 1-3 1.1 Referenced D/G 1-3 load in initial conditions.

loaded and able to support additional loading.

1.2 Referenced OP J-6B:VI, Precautions and Limitations Step 5.10 for D/G 1-3 load limits.

Note: Supply copy of procedure OP J-6B:VI P&Ls to student when they indicate they will refer to a procedure for D/G load limits.

1.3 Determined that D/G 1-3 can support additional 106.2 KW loading. (2.6 Mw - 2.12 MW = .48 MW or 480 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Note: Examinee may elect to evaluate support capability of D/G 2-3 at this time, but is expected to align the TSC to D/G 1-3 per Shift Foreman directions given in cue.

Mark Step N/A if evaluation of D/G 2-3 not performed at this time.

2. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 3 - Check D/G 2-3 2.1 Referenced OP J-6B:VI, Precautions and loaded and able to support additional loading Limitations Step 5.10 for D/G 2-3 load limits.

(Optional step since D/G 1-3 is capable of carrying load).

2.2 Determined DG 2-3 has room for an additional 106.2 KW of load (2.6 Mw - 2.26 MW = .34 MW or 340 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: JPM steps 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 may be done in any order (bulleted steps in the procedure).

    • 3. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 5 - Open the ** 3.1 Placed breaker 52-22J-40 (EPTSN TSC PWR following breakers: TRANSF SW NORMAL SOURCE) in the OFF

Cue: An audible "clunk" is heard, and the breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

  • Open breaker 52-1F-67 (TSC 3.3 Noted that breaker 52-1F-67 (TSC TRANSFER TRANSFER SWITCH) SWITCH) is in the OFF position.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Switch is on west wall of 2F 480 VAC switchgear room.

    • 4. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 6 - Switch EPTSN to ** 4.1 Placed switch EPTSN in the BACKUP position.

BACKUP power.

Cue: The sealed component change form needs will be addressed by another Operator.

Cue: The switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 7 - Supply Power 5.1 Placed EPTSC switch (TSC Power Transfer Unit from Unit 1: Selector Switch) to the BACKUP position.

a) Switch EPTSC, Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch to BACKUP.

Cue: The sealed component change form needs will be addressed by another Operator.

Cue: The switch is in the BACKUP position.

Note: When the Examinee attempts to close the breaker to align power from Unit 1, the breaker WILL NOT CLOSE. The Examinee should recognize aligning TSC to Unit 2 as a viable alternative.

5.2 Attempted to place breaker 52-1F-67 in the ON position.

Cue: The breaker REMAINS AS IS with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

5.3 Determined Unit 1 is not capable of supplying power to TSC.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

<< Alternate Path - Start Point >>

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: If Examinee requests direction from Control Room due to original field alignment becoming unavailable, provide the following cue:

Cue: Take the appropriate action Note: Mark step N/A if evaluation of D/G 2-3 load support was performed earlier.

6. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 4 - Check D/G 2-3 6.1 Referenced OP J-6B:VI, Precautions and loaded AND able to support an additional Limitations Step 5.10 for D/G 2-3 load limits.

106.2 KW loading.

6.2 Determined that DG 2-3 has room for an additional 106.2 KW of load (2.6 MW - 2.26 MW = .34 MW or 340 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Switch is also on west wall of 2F 480VAC switchgear room, next to EPTSN switch.

Unit 2 is the NORMAL position

    • 7. ECA-2.1, Appendix J, Step 8 - Supply Power ** 7.1 Places EPTSC switch (TSC Power Transfer Unit from Unit 2: Selector Switch) to the NORMAL position.

a) Switch EPTSC, Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch to NORMAL.

Cue: The switch is in the NORMAL position.

b) Close 52-2F-47, TSC 480V Power to ** 7.2 Places breaker 52-2F-47 in the ON position.

EPTSC.

Cue: An audible clunk is heard, and the breaker is in the up position with the word ON showing on the upper breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

<< Alternate Path - End Point >>

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 10 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 10 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: LNRCL181-P2 Initial Conditions: Given:

  • Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.
  • Offsite power was lost to both units.
  • The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power.
  • The TSC is manned and requires vital power.
  • Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying Unit 1 4 kV Bus F and is carrying 2.12 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.
  • Diesel generator 2-3 is supplying Unit 2 4 kV Bus F and is carrying 2.26 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with Step 3.

Page 10 of 10 Rev. 0

Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam EOP ECA-2.1 R27A Generators page 34 of 38 UNIT 1 APPENDIX J TSC ELECTRICAL POWER

1. Check that the TSC is being manned and that vital power is required.

NOTE: Aligning TSC power supply to a vital bus renders the D/G associated with that bus inoperable due to the addition of 106.2 KW of load to the bus.

2. Obtain the SEC's permission prior to placing the TSC on vital power.
3. Check D/G 1-3 OR 2-3 loaded AND able to support an additional 106.2 KW loading.
4. IF one of the D/Gs is unable to support the additional loading, THEN supply power from the other unit.
5. Open the following breakers:
6. In the 2F MCC Room, switch EPTSN, TSC Power Transfer Switch, to BACKUP.
7. To supply power from Unit 1:
a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to BACKUP.
b. Close 52-1F-67
8. To supply power from Unit 2:
a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to NORMAL.
b. Close 52-2F-47.

Appendix J, Page 1 of 1 EOP_ECA-2!1u1r27.DOC 0912.1300

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-3 OP J-6B:VI R37 Page 4 of 22 UNIT 1 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

  • Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes
  • Maximum stator temperature: 240°F
  • Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig
  • Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F
  • Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F
  • Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag
  • Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 1-3 to the bus, the DG 1-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

  • In MODES 1-4: DG 1-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 1-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 1-3 or 1-1 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 1-3 INOPERABLE.
  • In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 1-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 1-3 DC source), DG 1-3 and Battery 1-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 1-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 1-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.16 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 1-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.17 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

  • Starting air: 140-160 psig
  • Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu1r37.DOC 0808.0708

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-3 OP J-6B:VI R33 Page 4 of 22 UNIT 2 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

  • Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes
  • Maximum stator temperature: 240°F
  • Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig
  • Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F
  • Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F
  • Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag
  • Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 2-3 to the bus, the DG 2-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

  • In MODES 1-4: DG 2-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 2-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 2-3 or 2-2 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 2-3 INOPERABLE.
  • In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 2-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 2-3 DC source), DG 2-3 and Battery 2-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 2-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 2-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.16 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 2-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.17 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

  • Starting air: 140-160 psig
  • Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu2r33.DOC 0808.0725

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL181-P3

Title:

Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments: (Note: Any Unsat step requires a numbered comment; use back as needed.)

OP AP SD-4, Loss of Component Cooling Water, Rev 23, Appendix A

References:

OVID 106714-02 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 1.4, 2.3, 3.3 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: New DCPP Task # / Rating: - -

Gen KA # / Rating: G2.1.30 - Ability to locate and operate components, including local 4.4 / 4.0 controls.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 10/01/19 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 12/06/19 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab;

  • OP AP SD-4, Appendix A
  • OVID 106714-02 Initial Conditions: Given:
  • Unit 1 is in Mode 5.
  • The Control Room is currently implementing OP AP SD-4, Loss of Component Cooling Water, due to CCW system outleakage.
  • Local inspection of CCW indicates the leak is between CCW Pump 1-1 discharge and CCW HX 1-1 outlet valve FCV-430.
  • CCW HX 1-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to isolate a portion of CCW Header "A" by performing OP AP SD-4, Appendix A, Step 1.a.1.

NOTE: Do NOT provide examinee with Task Standard Task Standard: CCW Header "A" loads isolated as follows:

  • 1-CCW-18, CCW Pump 1-1 Discharge to Header A - CLOSED
  • 1-CCW-19, CCW Pump 1-2 Discharge to Header A - CLOSED
  • 1-CCW-20, CCW Pump 1-3 Discharge to Header A - CLOSED
    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 1. OP AP SD-4, Appendix A, Step 1.a.1 - Close all 1.1 1-CCW-18 at the discharge of CCW Pump 1-1 three CCW pump discharge valves to CCW HX (73' elevation aux building)
  1. 1:
  • CCW-18 1.2 Noted valve is sealed in the open position and will require seal component change forms.

Cue: The Shift Foreman has assigned another operator to complete all required sealed component change forms and resealing.

1.3 Removed seal (simulated).

    • 1.4 Rotated the handle until the arrow points to 0 degrees (simulated).

Cue (if required): The valve is now positioned as you described.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 2. OP AP SD-4, Appendix A, Step 1.a.1 - Close all 2.1 1-CCW-19 at the discharge of CCW Pump 1-2 three CCW pump discharge valves to CCW HX (73' elevation aux building)
  1. 1 (cont):
  • CCW-19 2.2 Removed seal (simulated).

2.3 Rotated the handle until the arrow points to 0 degrees (simulated).

Cue (if required): The valve is now positioned as you described.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

    • 3. OP AP SD-4, Appendix A, Step 1.a.1 - Close all 3.1 1-CCW-20 at the discharge of CCW Pump 1-3 three CCW pump discharge valves to CCW HX (73' elevation aux building)
  1. 1 (cont):
  • CCW-20 3.2 Removed seal (simulated).

3.3 Rotated the handle until the arrow points to 0 degrees (simulated).

Cue (if required): The valve is now positioned as you described.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

If Candidate continues on in Appendix A ***************************************

Cue: Another operator will complete isolation of CCW Header "A".

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Clear Component Cooling Water Header "A" JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

    • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 7 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL181-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

The Control Room is currently implementing OP AP SD-4, Loss of Component Cooling Water, due to CCW system outleakage.

Local inspection of CCW indicates the leak is between CCW Pump 1-1 discharge and CCW HX 1-1 outlet valve FCV-430.

CCW HX 1-2 is currently in service.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to isolate a portion of CCW Header "A" by performing OP AP SD-4, Appendix A, Step 1.a.1.

Page 7 of 7 Rev. 0

Loss of Component Cooling Water OP AP SD-4 R23 Page 10 of 26 UNITS 1&2 APPENDIX A Clearing a Component Cooling Water Header This appendix provides guidance for clearing a CCW header due to a gross leak that CANNOT otherwise be ISOLATED. The operators must determine the leaking header and follow the steps below to clear it:

1. CLEARING HEADER "A"
a. IF the leak is determined to be between the pump discharge and CCW HX #1 Outlet valve FCV-430, check or place in service CCW HX #2, THEN:
1) Close all three CCW pump discharge valves to CCW HX #1:
  • CCW-18
  • CCW-19
  • CCW-20
2) Close FCV-430.
3) Close the inlet valve to RE-17A, CCW-7.
b. IF the leak is determined to be downstream of FCV-430, check or place HX #2 in service, THEN:
1) Close FCV-430.
2) Close CCW HX #1 outlet header A-C crosstie valve CCW-23.
3) Start #1 and #2 CCW pumps if available. Shutdown #3 CCW pump.
4) Close header A-C suction crosstie valve CCW-5.
5) Isolate makeup water supply to the "A" header from the Surge Tank, CCW-52 (100 foot Pen area GW, 909 key).
6) Close the return valve from RE-17A, CCW-6.

OP_AP_SD-4u3r23.doc 0404.0946

P:\1-My Work\1-Exam Group\1-Initial License Exams\DCPP-L181\2-Development\1 - JPMs\3-In-Plant\P3 - SF8\671402.tif 1 of 1

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 Op-Test No: L181 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, aligned to Start-Up Power. MOL with CFCU 1-1 OOS.

Turnover: In OP L-3, performing step 6.28, raising power to 8%.

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 N/A R (ATC, Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, sec 6.28.

SRO) 2 VLV_CVC22_2 .5 delay=0 ramp=15 I (ALL) Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, fails to mid-position (OP AP-18).

3 H_V1_034M_1, XMT_VEN6_3, TS, C CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW XMT_VEN7_3, XMT_VEN8_3 (BOP, flow (AR PK01-21, TS 3.6.6.C).

SRO) 4 RLY_PPL63_2 OPEN TS, I SSPS relay actuation causes inadvertent start of TDAFW pump (ALL) and blowdown sample isolation valves to close (AR PK04-03, RLY_PPL59_2 OPEN OP D-1:III, OP1.DC10; TS 3.7.5.B).

5 MAL_MSS4 1.57E+07 ramp=30 M (ALL) MSLB outside containment.

6 VLV_MSS7_2, VLV_MSS8_2, C (ALL) All MSIVs fail open; No manual close for FCV-42.

VLV_MSS9_2, VLV_MSS10_2 1 7 MAL_PPL3B BOTH C (BOP) Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L181 NRC ES-D-1-01 r0.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7) 6
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7) 2
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3
4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-2, E-1.1) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (S1CT-1) Shutdown TD AFW pump prior to Steam Carryover into the steam lines can result in damage
  • Tech Spec 3.3.2 Generator Overfill (S/G wide range greater than to downstream piping and valves, placing the Basis 100%) by either: secondary heat sink at risk. High steam generator Documentation
  • Closing the LCVs to the individual S/Gs level can also result in reactivity excursions due to excessive cooldown of the primary system.

OR

  • Closing steam supply valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 to leads 1 and 2 respectively OR
  • Directing FCV-95 closed in the field (S1CT-2) Stop uncontrolled RCS cooldown before a An event or series of events which leads to a
  • Background severe challenge to Integrity Safety Function relatively rapid and severe reactor vessel Information for develops (magenta path on F-0.4 RCS Integrity) as downcomer cooldown can result in a thermal WOG Emergency follows: shock to the vessel wall that may lead to a small Response
  • Verify FCV-42 closed (S/G 1-2 steamline flaw, which may already exist in the vessel wall, Guideline isolation). growing into a larger crack. The growth or
  • Close/verify closed S/G Blowdown isolation extension of such a flaw may lead, in some cases valves FCV-761, FCV-154, and FCV-248. (where propagation is not stopped within the wall),
  • Verify all steam dumps closed. to a loss of vessel integrity
  • Isolate feed flow to S/G 1-2 by closing/verifying closed LCV-107 and LCV-111.

(Note: LCV-107 is critical only when TDAFW pump is running or capable of an autostart).

  • Isolate steam flow from S/G 1-2 by closing/verifying closed FCV-37.
  • Throttling Feed flow to S/Gs 1-1, 1-3, and 1-4 while maintaining the minimum heatsink requirements (435 gpm until S/G NR level is greater than 15% in one non-faulted S/G).

(S1CT-3) Terminate SI prior to rupture of PRT by Failure to terminate ECCS flow when SI termination

  • Westinghouse closing 8801A/B and/or 8803A/B. criteria are met results in overfill of the Pressurizer Owners Group and the eventual rupture of the PRT. This WCAP-17711-NP (Note: CT is met by closing either 8801A/B OR 8803A/B.) constitutes the avoidable degradation of the RCS as a fission product barrier.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-01 r0.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 0

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Control rods are used to raise power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup, step 6.28. ATC operator complies with 1 step pull and wait procedural requirement while monitoring relevant controls and diverse indicators. Shift Foreman provides reactivity oversight.
2. Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, drifts to mid-position causing letdown orifice valve 8149C to close.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure. Excess Letdown is established per OP B-1A:IV CVCS - Excess Letdown - Place In Service and Remove From Service.

3. CFCU 1-2 has a loss of CCW flow due to debris migration causing stator and motor bearing temperatures to rise rapidly and bring in annunciator alarm PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr. Reactor operators identify low flow indications on vertical boards and rapidly rising stator/bearing temperatures using plant process computer trends. The crew secures the CFCU to prevent motor damage and contacts maintenance/engineering for assistance. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.6.6 Condition C, one required CFCU system inoperable such that a minimum of two CFCUs remain OPERABLE (7 day).
4. SSPS relay actuation results in Turbine Driven AFW (TDAFW) Pump Steam Supply Isolation Valve, FCV-95, failing open and isolation of half of the blowdown sample valves inside and outside containment. S/G levels rise and RCS temperature lowers. FCV-95 cannot be closed and the crew must isolate the TDAFW Pump by closing the LCVs to the individual S/Gs or by closing steam supply valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 from leads 2 and 3 respectively, or by directing FCV-95 manually closed in the field (S1CT-1) Shutdown TD AFW pump prior to Steam Generator Overfill. Shift Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable (72 hrs).
5. A main steamline break develops downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, outside containment.

The crew identifies the need to isolate the Main Steam Isolation Valves and perform a safety injection (SI) based on pressurizer pressure and level lowering rapidly. Shift Foreman directs a reactor trip and SI and enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

6. Train B of Safety Injection fails to actuate, requiring the crew to perform numerous manual alignments and pump starts as part of Appendix E. Appendix E. ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status.
7. All four main steam isolation valves fail open. Steam leads 1, 3, and 4 may be closed from the control room, but lead 2 (FCV-42) requires field action. The crew transitions to EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate S/G 1-2 and dispatches an operator to locally close FCV-42 as part of the critical task to stop the uncontrolled cooldown (S1CT-2) Stop uncontrolled cooldown before a severe challenge (magenta path ) develops on F-0.4 RCS Integrity.
8. The crew transitions to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination where they complete the final critical task of the scenario (S1CT-3) Terminate SI prior to rupture of PRT.

The scenario is terminated once the final critical task is complete.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-01 r0.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 15 Event

Description:

Raise Power to 8%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP L-3, "Secondary Plant Startup", starting at step 6.28)

SRO

  • Reads NOTES prior to step 6.28.

ATC * (6.28) Slowly raises power to 8% by pulling control rods one step at a time.

SRO Provides reactivity oversight while raising power.

BOP * (6.29) Monitors feed/steam delta P (PI-509, VB3 or CC2, DFWCS HMI on CC3).

  • (6.30) Verifies that DFWCS maintains constant delta P during rise in power.

SRO

  • Reads NOTE prior to step 6.31.

Proceed to the next event once reactivity manipulation adequately observed and power raised 0.5%, per the lead examiner.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 1 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 15 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses charging flow problem from:

  • RCP seal flows lowering (due to controller throttling back) (VB2 meters, PPC).
  • Pzr level rising slowly (due to charging/letdown mismatch) (VB2 meters, PPC, CC2 recorder).
  • VCT level dropping slowly (VB2 recorder, PPC).
  • Dual position indication lights illuminated on mimic board for LCV-459 (VB2).

SRO

  • Implements OP AP-18, "Letdown Line Failure".

(OP AP-18, "Letdown Line Failure")

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures no load changes, heatups, or draindowns are in progress.

SRO/BOP * (2) Isolates letdown o Ensures Letdown Orifice Stop Valve, 8149C is closed (VB2).

o Closes other Regen Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve, LCV-460 (VB2).

o Verifies RHR to Letdown Flow Control Valve, HCV-133 (RHR Letdown) is closed (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks for RCS Leakage - verifies that Pzr level and RCS press are both stable/rising (VB2, CC2, PPC).

ATC * (4) Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 (or HC-459D) and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed or near closed) (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (5) Establish Excess Letdown (see next page), per OP B-1A:IV, "CVCS - Excess Letdown -

Place In Service and Remove From Service", Section 6.1 "Place Excess Letdown in Service".

BOP * (6) Contacts RP and Chemistry regarding Excess Letdown being placed in service.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 2 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 15 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP B-1A:IV, "Place Excess Letdown in Service")

ALL * (6.1.1) Verifies charging at minimum (seals only) (done, per previous step, or do now).

o Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed).

BOP * (6.1.2) Contacts RP for rad conditions/posting.

Note: If Shift Manager asked about flushing or crew attempts to omit flush, provide the following cue:

CUE: Excess letdown line flushing is necessary.

BOP

  • Reads NOTE regarding excess letdown line flushing.
  • (6.1.3) Performs letdown line flush:

o (6.1.3.a) Contacts Aux Watch to check sufficient level in RCDT 1-1 to receive a 13% rise in level.

o (6.1.3.b) Directs Aux Watch to monitor RCDT 1-1 level.

o (6.1.3.c) Places CVCS-1-8143, Excess Letdown Flow Divert Valve, in "DIVERT" (VB2).

  • (6.1.4) Opens FCV-361, CCW to Excess Letdown HX (VB1).
  • (6.1.5) Verifies pot for HCV-123, Excess Letdown Pressure Control, is closed (at 0)

(VB2).

  • (6.1.6) Opens 8166/8167, Excess Letdown isolation valves (VB2).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 15 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP B-1A:IV, "Place Excess Letdown in Service", continued)

BOP * (6.1.7) Monitors RCDT 1-1 level via Aux Watch communication as flush is initiated.

  • Reads CAUTIONS regarding risk of thermal shock to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger and the need to operate HCV-123, slowly.
  • Read NOTES regarding monitoring and adjusting excess letdown once in service.
  • (6.1.8) Slowly opens HCV-123 to establish excess letdown (VB2).
  • (6.1.9) Adjusts HCV-123 to provide 40 gpm letdown at normal operating pressure (VB2).
  • Reads NOTE regarding indications of a leak at the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger.
  • (6.1.10) Monitors containment sump level recorders for increased leakage into the sump.
  • (6.1.11) Places CVCS-1-8143, Excess Letdown Flow Divert Valve, in "NORMAL" when RCDT 1-1 level has risen 13% (VB-2).
  • (6.1.12) Notes Normal Letdown already isolated. May cross reference OP B-1A:XII, CVCS - Letdown System Establish Normal Letdown or Change Flow, Section 6.7 -

Remove Normal Letdown from Service.

ATC/BOP * (6.1.13-15 HCV-123 and FCV-128 (or HC-459D) are now used to control Pzr Level (to end of scenario).

Proceed to the next event once Excess Letdown established, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 15 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Observes PK01-21 (Contmt Fan Clr) and informs the Shift Foreman.

(AR PK01-21," Contmt Fan Clr")

SRO Enters AR PK01-21, "Contmt Fan Clr"

  • (1.0) Identifies input 441 (Contmt Fans Temp PPC) goes to section 2.1, Fan High Temp.

ATC * (2.1.1) Checks annunciator and PPC; determines the affected component is CFCU 1-2.

Note: The Crew may elect to secure CFCU 1-2 at any point after discovering the lack of CCW flow and rising CFCU bearing alarms.

BOP * (2.1.2) Checks CCW flow on all CFCUs. Observes CFCU 1-2, FI-35 (VB1, vertical section),

is several hundred gpm below normal and trending down.

  • (2.1.3) Checks containment ambient air temperature less than 120oF. (VB1, vertical section).

SRO Reads note regarding CFCU ability to be run at elevated temperatures (stator/bearings),

without affecting the component lifetime.

  • (2.1.4) Notes documentation is required if CFCU is left in service with high temperature alarms.

Note 1: Reactor Operators will be monitoring CFCU 1-2 stator and bearing temperatures using Plant Process Computer (PPC). Actual stator temperature at this point will vary based on crew pace through annunciator response, but is most likely above the limit described below.

Note 2: CFCU 1-2 will trip on overcurrent if fan is still running 7 min after stator temp reaches 380oF.

SRO * (2.1.5) Notes need to contact engineering for evaluation if fan will be left in service with stator temperature above 293oF.

  • (2.1.6) Provides direction to shutdown CFCU 1-2 per OP H-2:II, "Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing" or OP H-2:I, "Containment Fan Cooler Units - Make Available and System Operation".
  • Enters TS 3.6.6.C for one required CFCU system inoperable (7 day shutdown tech spec).

o CFCU 1-2 inoperable due to no CCW flow and beginning stages of damage to the motor.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 15 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP H-2:II, "Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing") if used, else N/A BOP

  • Reviews Precautions and Limitations.
  • (6.1) Stops CFCU 1-2, by pressing associated STOP control on VB1 (center).

ATC

  • Acknowledges reflash on PK01-21 for CFCU 1-2 high vibration (expected during coast down) after verifying input.

BOP

  • Resets CFCU Vibration alarm to clear annunciator panel (VB1, lower).

(OP H-2:I, "Containment Fan Cooler Units - Make Available and System Operation") if used, else N/A BOP

  • Reviews Precautions and Limitations.
  • Reads three notes regarding delay time on start and expected alarms.
  • (6.4.1.a) Starts CFCU 1-5 by setting the associated speed select switch to LOW and depressing the switch to start the CFCU VB1 (center).
  • (6.4.1.b) Checks amps stable VB1 (center).
  • (6.4.1.c) Switches CFCU to high speed operation:

o Presses "STOP" pushbutton for the CFCU 1-5.

o Immediately places SPEED SELECT switch to "HIGH" AND depresses switch to restart the CFCU.

o Checks current stabilizes.

o Returns speed select switch to "LOW".

  • (6.4.1.d) When PK01-21, "Contmt Fan Clrs" alarm comes in for high vibration:

o Confirms alarm input is for high vibration on CFCU 1-5.

o Presses VIB ALARM RESET pushbutton to reset the alarm (VB1).

  • (6.4.2) Stops CFCU 1-2, by pressing associated STOP control on VB1 (center).

ATC

  • Acknowledges reflash on PK01-21 for CFCU 1-2 high vibration (expected during coast down) after verifying input.

BOP

  • Resets CFCU Vibration alarm to clear annunciator panel (VB1, lower).

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 15 Event

Description:

SSPS relay actuation causes Inadvertent TDAFW Pump Start and Blowdown Sample Line Isolation (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses TDAFW Pump Start from one or more of the following:

  • RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC)
  • Feedflow / Steamflow rates diverging (CC3, VB3)
  • RED light on FCV-95 illuminated indicating OPEN w/Tach reading ~ 4500 RPM (VB3)
  • TDAFW Discharge Pressure ~ 1200 psig, AFW Flow to S/Gs all reading top of scale (VB3)
  • Diagnoses Blowdown Sample Line Isolation from blowdown valve position indicator lights for FCV-151, 154, 157, 160, 244, 246, 248, and 250 (VB-3)

ALL

  • Reviews primary and secondary side parameters and determines plant is not stable(i.e.

in a transient) based on the following indications:

o RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC)

  • Reviews secondary side for changed conditions affecting secondary load/efficiency o Review of secondary side indications identifies Feedflow / Steamflow mismatch due to excess supply from the TDAFW pump. Numerous pressure, flow, and level gauges confirm the pump is actively feeding forward.

SRO/BOP

  • Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable. Restore to operable status (72 hr).
  • Directs isolation of the TDAFW Pump. May reference OP D-1:III, "Auxiliary Feedwater System - Shutdown and Clearing" or direct isolation by any of the following methods:
  • Closing the LCVs -106, 107, 108, and 109 to the individual S/Gs **

OR

  • Closing steam supply valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 to leads 2 and 3 respectively **

OR

  • Directing FCV-95 closed in the field **

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 8 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Crew identifies RCS temperature lowering, pressurizer level and pressure lowering based on the following:

Annunciator Response Alarms:

  • PK09-01, 09-02, 09-03, 09-04 due to lowering S/G pressure and level
  • PK09-15, DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONT SYSTEM (due to feedflow/steam flow mismatch)
  • PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO (pressure low due to cooldown)
  • PK04-06, PROTECT CHANNEL ACTIVATED (for Tave less than 554oF on loop 1 due to cooldown)
  • PK08-21, SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION (if not manually actuated w/reactor trip).
  • RCS Cooldown Indications: PPC, VB2, and CC1 trends
  • Increased Steam Flow: PPC, VB3, CC3 steam flow meters, record, and trends SRO

ALL

  • Perform immediate actions.

(EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1).

  • (2) Ensures turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Ensures all vital 4kv buses energized (VB4, all vital buses white lights on mimic buses with power supplied by Startup).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 9 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open (continued)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON) and reports Train B of SI failed to actuate.

SRO/BOP

  • Closes MSIVs FCV-41, 43, and 44.**
  • Reports FCV-42 will not close. May dispatch field operator to manually isolate FCV-42 following the guidance of EOP E-0 or E-2, Appendix L.
    • (Critical Task) (S1CT-2, Stop RCS Cooldown)- Partial SRO/BOP * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 13).

o Board manipulations are as follows:

Manually initiates Main Unit Trip (CC3)

Manually actuates Phase A (VB1) o Manually start the following pumps and CFCUs:

  • ASW 1-2
  • CFCUs 1-3, and 1-5 o Manually positions the following valves:
  • 8803B OPEN
  • LCV-112C CLOSED
  • 8801B OPEN
  • 8108 CLOSED
  • 8805B OPEN Stops CCP 1-3 Closes Excess Letdown Isolation Valves 8166 and 8167 (VB2).

Switch LCV-12 to CONT ONLY (VB3).

Main Feedwater Recirc Valves FCV-53 & 54: OPEN (VB3).

Stops all but one CB Pp set.

Turn on Aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4).

Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open (continued)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature NOT stable o Throttles AFW flow while maintaining minimum of 435 gpm flow**

o Dispatches field operator to close FCV-42 per Appendix L (if not done earlier)**

  • (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr safeties (closed) / PORV block valves (all open and power available), and no elevated tailpipe temps or sonic flows on safeties/PORVs (VB2 -

upper panel, far right); checks Pzr sprays closed (CC2).

  • (8) Checks RCP trip criteria (RCS pressure [VB2, PPC] < 1300 psig and SI or ECCS CCPs running; determines RCPs should be secured (VB2).
  • (9) Checks for faulted S/Gs o Notes MSIV FCV-42 could NOT be closed from the control room.

o S/G pressure continuing to lower on S/G 1-2 (VB3).

  • Transitions to EOP E-2 (next page).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open (continued)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, "Faulted S/G Isolation")

SRO Reads three CAUTIONS prior to step 1.

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks if MSIV FCV-42 is still open.

o Dispatches field operator to close FCV-42 per Appendix L (if not done earlier)**

o Notes bypasses are closed (VB3, upper panel, left side).

  • (2) Checks for any intact S/G - notes S/G 1-1, 1-3, and 1-4 are intact.
    • (Critical Task) (S1CT-2, Stop RCS Cooldown)- Partial SRO/ATC * (3) Identifies 1-2 S/G as faulted (VB3, pressure is still dropping in uncontrolled manner, or completely depressurized at this point).

SRO Reads caution regarding steam supply for TDAFW; determines it does not apply.

  • (4) Directs Reactor Operator to Implement Appendix HH to isolate the Faulted S/G (see page 15).

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks CST level > 10% (VB3, upper panel, center area meter and recorders).

  • (6) Checks S/Gs not ruptured:

o (6.a) Notes NO valid alarm on PK11-06, PK11-17, or PK11-18.

o (6.b) No upward trends on RE-19/15/15R/71-74.

o (6.c) Directs Chemistry to sample S/Gs per CAP AP-1.

  • (7) Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

o (7.a) RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 20°F (SCMM or Appendix C).

o (7.b) Secondary heat sink satisfied by either 435 gpm AFW flow or NR level in at least one S/G greater than 15%.

o (7.c) RCS Pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

o (7.d) PZR Level - GREATER THAN 12%.

o (7.e) Transitions to EOP E-1.1, "SI TERMINATION".

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 15 Event

Description:

SI Termination (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.1, "Terminate SI")

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks SI Reset (VB1).

  • (2) Aligns Charging:

o (a) Checks ECCS CCPs running (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (2) Aligns Charging:

o (b) Resets vital 4kV auto transfer relays for all vital buses (VB4).

SRO/ATC * (2) Aligns Charging:

o (c) Stops one ECCS CCP (VB2).

o (d) Notes CCP 1-3 already shutdown (VB2).

  • (3) Checks RCS Pressure STABLE or RISING (VB2 or PPC).
  • (4) Isolates charging injection (a) Closes 8803A/B (VB1)(S1CT-3)**

(b) Closes 8801A/B (VB1)(S1CT-3)**

    • (Critical Task) (S1CT-3) Terminate SI prior to rupture of PRT by closing 8801A/B or 8803A/B.

(Note: CT is met by closing either 8801A/B OR 8803A/B.)

The scenario is terminated once Critical Task S1CT-3, Terminate SI, is complete per Lead Examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Appendix E - ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status")

BOP Implements "App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status)":

  • (1) Notifies Plant Personnel.

o Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice); Announces trip/SI on PA system.

  • (2) Checks main generator - tripped.

o PK14-01 OFF, output breakers OPEN, Exciter Field Breaker - OPEN (CC3 right side) o Manually initiates Main Unit Trip (CC3).

  • (3 & 4) Ensures Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights- Trn A ON, Trn B OFF, various white lights ON).

o Manually actuates Phase A (VB1).

  • (5) Ensures ESF (SI) actuation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red light ON, various white lights ON).

o Manually start the following pumps and CFCUs:

  • ASW 1-2
  • CFCUs 1-3, and 1-5 o Manually positions the following valves:
  • 8803B OPEN
  • LCV-112C CLOSED
  • 8801B OPEN
  • 8108 CLOSED
  • 8805B OPEN
  • (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white lights OFF (VB1).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 15 Event

Description:

MSLB Outside Containment, downstream of MSIVs; MSIVs Fail Open (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E - ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status)

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF (VB1)).

  • (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light ON, white light ON for FCV-42 (VB1)).

o Dispatches field operator to close FCV-42 per Appendix L if not previously directed.

  • (9) Checks AFW status o Both MDAFW pumps running with flow throttled to maintain greater than 435 gpm min flow (VB3).
  • (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2), SI, RHR (VB1) o Shuts down CCP 1-3 (VB2).
  • (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks).
  • (12) Isolates excess letdown - 8166 and 8167 (VB2).
  • (13) Checks secondary systems MFPs tripped (VB3, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY, takes FCV-53 and FCV-54 to RECIRC.
  • (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel).
  • (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4).
  • (16) Verifies vital batteries indicate normal voltage and positive charging amps VB5).
  • (17) Verifies MSRs reset (Triconex HMI)(CC3).
  • (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2).
  • (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm).
  • (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

EOP E-2, "Appendix HH, Isolate Faulted Steam Generator" (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP E-2, "APP HH, Isolate Faulted S/G" BOP * (1) Isolates faulted S/G 1-2:

o (1.a) Ensures MFIVs FCV-439 closed.

o (1.b) Ensures SGBD valves FCV-761, 154, and 248 (IC, OC, and sample).

o (1.c) Ensures (PCV-20) 10% steam dump closed.

o (1.d) Ensures AFW control valves isolated o Ensures closed TDAFW AFW LCV-107** (unless closed earlier) o Closes MDAFW AFW LCV-111.**

o (1.e) Ensures Steam Supply Valves from S/G 1-2 is isolated.

o Ensures closed FCV-37** (unless closed earlier)

(1.f) Ensures AFW flow still available to S/Gs 1-1, 1-3, & 1-4.

o (1.g) Informs Shift Foreman S/G isolation complete for S/G 1-2.

    • (Critical Task) (S2CT-2, Stop RCS Cooldown)- Partial BOP (2) Removes WR Thot input to SCMM for loop2 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3).

o Goes to PAM4 panel.

o Presses Configuration Summary, Presses Failed S/G.

o Presses the PB for the Thot to be disabled (2), Presses Disable Loop 2.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 15 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE IC-47 2%; MOL, CB - See Turnover Sheet X Setup N/A CFCU 1-1 OOS; CFCU 1-2, 1-3, 1-4 running in HIGH; CFCU 1-5 is OFF.

The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements NONE Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; Foldout Pages; OP B-1A:IV, D-1:III, H-2:II, PK01-21, AP-18, EOP E-0, E-2, E-1.1 Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up X 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, min 960 iterations (30 sec).

Critical Task Specific Data Capture:

  • S1CT1: TDAFW flow and S/G levels
  • S1CT2: FCV-42 position, AFW flow
  • S1CT3: ECCS Injection Flow X 0 min Lesson L181 NRC-S1.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc.

by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X Evt-1: Raise Power Placeholder only (approx. 3 min after taking watch per lead examiner)

X Evt-2: LCV-459, Fails LCV-459, Fails to mid-position to mid-position (Once power raised 0.5%, per lead examiner)

X Evt-3: CFCU 1-2 High Stator and bearing temperatures ramp up over 2-3 minutes. CFCU will trip on Stator Temp overcurrent if it has not been shut down within 7 minutes of reaching 380oF.

(once Excess Ltdn established, per Lead If crew does not request removing CFCU 1-2 from service, enter command to Examiner) have CFCU 1-2 trip on OC when it restarts due to SI signal.

X Evt-4: Inadvertent Inadvertent start of TDAFW pump and partial blowdown isolation start of TDAFW pump (Once Evt-2 TS have been addressed, per lead examiner)

X Evt-5: MSLB on S/G 1- MSLB downstream of MSIVs.

2 (Once Evt-4 TS have been addressed, per lead examiner)

(cont on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 16 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A = activate from EVENT file TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION Evt-6: MSIVs Fail All four MSIVs fail open. FCV-41, 43, and 44 can be closed in the Open (post trip) ) control room. Crew will need to call to have FCV-42 closed.

DO NOT CLOSE FCV-42 UNTIL CREW HAS ENTERED E-2.

Evt-7: SI, Train B fails Crew will manually initiate Safety Injection in response to MSLB.

to actuate (post trip) Failure will require manual starting of Train B ECCS pumps and manual alignment of valves.

L181 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 17 of 20 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 0 Days Operating Mode: 2 Gross Generation: 0 MWe Power Level: 2% Net Generation: 0 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.7 SW 5.7 NE 5.7 SE 5.8 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW EMERGENT WORK:

  • CFCU 1-1 OOS for Bearing Replacement SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:
  • None ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:
  • None TURNOVER ITEMS:
  • The reactor was declared critical and power stabilized at 2% power late last shift.
  • The unit is currently aligned to Startup Power (230 kV).
  • OP L-0 has been signed off for Mode 1 Entry.
  • No one is in Containment.
  • CFCU 1-1 OOS for Bearing Replacement.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

  • Continue with OP L-3, step 6.28, and stabilize power at approximately 8%.

ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

  • There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

Shift Foreman Turnover 0B TURNOVER ITEMS:

  • U-1: 2% and preparing to raise power to approximately 8%.
  • U-2: maintain 100%.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

  • Time in core life: _MOL_.
  • Power History: Previously at 100% for 17 days. Currently power level is approximately 2% following a reactor trip a week ago (MFP trip during maintenance).
  • Boron concentration is _1259 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
  • Rod motion: used to maintain current power level and to raise power to 8%.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

  • None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS
  • None

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 2 Op-Test No: L181 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 75% Power, MOL with AFW 1-2 cleared for a bearing oil leak Turnover: At 75% power for SCCW HX Clearance Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 PZ04PRZ_PRH11_.. I (ATC, Pressurizer heater control problem causes RCS pressure to RCARRL_IPC455JXTVSP 0 SRO) slowly lower (AR PK05-16, OP AP-13).

2 XMT_PZR24_3 ramp=1 TS, I PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low ( OP AP-5, (BOP, TS 3.3.1.E, M, 3.3.2.D, 3.4.11,.B).

SRO) 3 XMT_CVC2_3 ramp=75 I(BOP, PT-135 Fails High causing letdown pressure control valve to SRO) go full open (AR PK04-21).

4 MAL_RCS4H 30.0 TS, C 30 gpm SGTL on loop 4; plant shutdown required (OP AP-3, (ALL) AP-25, TS 3.4.13.B).

5 MAL_RCS4H 300.0 ramp=60 M (ALL) Tube leak grows to 300 gpm rupture during ramp offline.

6 RC41SW_52VE3_CSTA_SWIT 1 C (BOP, RCPs trip off shortly after transferring to startup power.

cd='H_V5_195B_1'... SRO) 7 MAL_EPS4D_2 DIFFERENTIAL C (ALL) 4kV Bus G differential trip on transfer to startup power.

cd='h_v4_221r_1' 8 VLV_PZR5_1 1 cd='H_V2_014M_1 C (ALL) PORV PCV-456 fails closed.

LT 1915' delay=8 Aux spray valves 8145 and 8148 fail closed.

VLV_CVC17_1 1 VLV_CVC27_1 1

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L181 NRC ES-D-1-02 r0.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7,8) 3
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4
4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-3, ECA-3.3) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA-3.3) 1
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (S2CT-1) Isolate the ruptured steam SG inventory increase leads to water release
  • W Margin to Overfill generator from the intact steam generators through the S/G PORV or safety valve(s) or to SG (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1) prior to commencing cooldown of the RCS overfill, which would seriously compromise the SG
  • W Offsite Doses (CN-in step 9.c (40% steam dumps) or 10.b (10% as a fission-product barrier and complicate CRA-05-54) steam dump) by completing the following: mitigation.

LCV-109 (TDAFW Level Control Valve)

LCV-113 (MDAFW Level Control Valve)

(S2CT-2) Perform RCS cooldown at Transition to contingency procedures to address

  • W Margin to Overfill maximum rate to CETC target temperature inadequate subcooling or Pressurized Thermal (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1) specified in E-3, step 6, using steam dumps Shock conditions results in delaying RCS
  • SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 such that RCS subcooled margin still exists depressurization and SI termination. This delay
  • WCAP-17711-NP following the cooldown. allows excess inventory in the ruptured S/G to continue to increase, with the potential of For 40% steam dumps, maximum rate limit is 120 challenging SG overpressure components or psi/min (PPC value). Above this, main steam line causing an overfill condition to occur.

isolation will occur. Operator should attempt highest rate possible without getting main steam line isolation (not critical). If steam line isolation occurs, maximum rate cooldown requires 10% steam dumps on intact S/Gs to be at least 90% open.

(S2CT-3) Restore RCS pressure control by Failure to establish RCS pressure control results in

  • W Margin to Overfill (CN-restarting RCP 1-2 and returning from EOP safety injection termination occurring at a CRA-05-53 Rev1) contingency procedure (ECA-3.3) to normal significantly higher RCS pressure. Avoidable
  • SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 EOP flow path (E-3) primary to secondary leakage into a ruptured
  • WCAP-17711-NP steam generator complicates results in the unnecessary continuation of a degraded condition beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

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SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

1. The firing rate for Pressurizer Proportional Heaters fail to minimum and RCS pressure begins to lower slowly. Backup heater relay pc455jx fails to actuate when RCS pressure reaches 2210 psig which also results in a failure of annunciator AR PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO activation. Pressurizer pressure control HC-455K output signal indicates that backup heaters should be on and proportional heaters should be operating at the maximum firing rate. When RCS pressure reaches 2185 psig, AR PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO alarms based on Pressurizer pressure going below the PORV interlock setpoint. The crew follows AR PK05-16 guidance to manually turn on all backup pressurizer heaters and follow up with the actions of OP AP-13, Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System, to restore pressure to normal using manual control. The crew may diagnose the failure prior to the annunciator response activating and enter OP AP-13 directly which also directs turning on all backup heaters. If RCS pressure falls below 2175 psig, the Shift Foreman will enter Tech Spec 3.4.1 for RCS departure from nucleate boiling limits (2 hr).
2. PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails low bringing in multiple Annunciator Alarms. There is no transient associated with this failure, but the failure has significant Operational implications due to its input function as part of various Reactor Protection logic schemes. When failed low, PT-474s interlock function prevents Pressurizer PORVs PCV-455C and PCV-474 from opening on a valid high pressure signal; only PCV-456 will still function. The Shift Foreman may elect to enter any of the associated Annunciator Response alarms, but in all cases, will be directed to OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel, which provides information regarding indications, controls, and a listing of the associated Tech Specs:
  • TS 3.3.1.E, PC-474C High Press Trip & TC 441C OT Delta T Trip (72 hrs).
  • TS 3.4.11, PC 474B PORV Press Interlock o PCV-474 (non-class I), 3.4.11.B1 & B2 to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) o PCV-455C (class I), 3.4.11.B1 & B2 to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr);

3.4.11.B3 to return to OPERABLE status (72 hrs).

3. PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, fails High causing letdown pressure control valve to go full open and letdown flow to rise. AR PK04-21, LETDOWN PRESS / FLOW TEMP comes into alarm for Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Pressure High as a result of the failed transmitter, while actual letdown pressure lowers to approximately 90 psig as a result of full open control valve response.

Letdown flow increases approximately 8 gpm above normal, resulting in a charging/letdown mismatch.

Procedural guidance in AR PK04-21 directs crew to take manual control of PCV-135. Crew performs diagnostic brief to determine nature of the malfunction as well as actions required to restore letdown pressure back to normal band.

Steam Generator 1-4 develops a 30 gpm tube leak as indicated by rising counts on various radiation 4.

monitors. The crew enters OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure. Shift Foreman determines TS 3.4.13.B, RCS Operational Leakage applies and enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdow for the ramp off-line.

5. During the ramp the tube leak develops into a 300 gpm rupture. The crew determines the leak is substantial in size based on a rapid drop in pressurizer level. The Shift Foreman directs a reactor trip and safety injection and the crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-02 r0.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 0

6. On the transfer to start up power, 4 kV bus G experiences a differential fault. The crew also notes all four RCPs trip off on the transfer, but power to the pumps remains available.
7. The crew transitions to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, based on RM-74 and rising S/G 1-4 level, where they address the following critical tasks:
  • (S2CT-2) Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate to CETC target temperature.
8. The crew discovers they are unable to depressurize the RCS based on a combination of equipment failures:
  • With no running RCPs, normal pressurizer spray is ineffective.
  • PCV-456 has failed closed and will not opened.
  • Block valve 8000B, associated with PCV-455C was closed during an earlier event and cannot be opened due loss of bus G.
  • Block valve 8000A, associated with PCV-474 was also closed during the earlier event and will not open.
  • Aux Spray valves 8145 and 8148 are failed closed as well.
9. The crew transitions to EOP ECA-3.3, SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control, where they complete critical task (S2CT-3) Restore RCS pressure control by restarting RCP 1-2. Following procedural guidance, the crew determines normal spray is available and returns to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

The scenario is terminated once the crew has started RCP 1-2 and transitioned back into E-3.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray PCV-455A setpoint fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses spray problem from:

  • RCS Pressure lowering (VB2, PPC).
  • PK05-16 actuation when RCS pressure reaches 2210 psig.
  • Spray valve indicating open (CC2).

(AR PK05-16, "PZR PRESSURE HI/LO") if entered, else N/A SRO * (2.1.1) Advises crew that entry into EOP E-0 is required in the event of a reactor trip.

Note: Crew may refer to AR PK05-16 prior to annunciator actuating at 2210 psig, in which case the following step would not apply.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.2) Notes RCS pressure is less than 2210 psig.

o Checks PORVs closed (VB2).

o Checks both spray valves closed Notes Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-455A is NOT closed (CC2).

Takes manual control and closes PCV-455A.

Note: Turning on pressurizer backup heaters will allow crew to restore RCS pressure to the normal bank. Manual control, however, will be required for the duration of the scenario.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.2) Notes RCS pressure is less than 2210 psig.

o Turns on PZR backup heaters (CC1).

SRO * (2.1.3) Checks if RCS pressure is less than 2175 psig.

o If yes, references TS 3.4.1 for RCS departure from nucleate boiling limits.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.4) Verifies HC-455K, Pzr Pressure Controller, set at 78.8% Setpoint (2235 psig).

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5) Performs a channel check of all Pzr pressure channels (VB2).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray PCV-455A setpoint fails low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC

  • Reads note regarding PCS automatic control channel selection.
  • (2.1.6) Checks pressurizer pressure channel readings for channel check.

SRO o Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel."

(OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel") if used, else N/A SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems are NOT controlling properly in AUTO.

o Takes manual control of PCV-455A and closes (if not done previously).

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF).

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is associated with Pressurizer Pressure, but failure does not affect the currently selected T channel (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not open.

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of apparent pressurizer spray control failure.

  • Reads CAUTION regarding Eagle 21 design failure impact to outputs prior to step 6.
  • (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance.

SRO/ATC * (7-8) Determines remaining steps of procedure do not apply and exits OP AP-5.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray PCV-455A setpoint fails low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-13, "Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System") if entered, else N/A SRO * (1) Notes there are no load changes in progress.

SRO/BOP * (2) Checks PZR PORVs - CLOSED (VB2).

o (3.a) Sonic flow indicators - approx. ZERO.

o (3.b) Tail pipe temp - LESS THAN 185°F.

SRO

  • Reads Caution regarding RCPs and normal spray supply.

SRO/ATC * (4.a) Checks normal PRZ spray valves - CLOSED (CC2):

o PCV-455A o PCV-455B Notes 455A is NOT closed.

Takes manual control and closes valve.

SRO/BOP * (4.b) Checks auxiliary PRZ spray valves - CLOSED (VB2):

o 8145 and 8148 SRO/ATC * (5) Checks Pressurizer Heaters (CC1):

o (5.a) Notes normal power is available.

o (5.b) Notes PZR pressure is LESS THAN 2250 psig.

o (5.c RNO) If PZR pressure is NOT GREATER THAN 2210 psig; turns on all available backup PZR heaters.

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks all pressure control channels operable (VB2, PCS).

SRO/ATC * (7.a) Restores RCS Pressure to normal band (2210-2260 psig) using manual control.

Proceed to the next event once Pressurizer Pressure under control, per Lead Examiner)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK04-06, "PROTECT CHANNEL ACTIVATED") if entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

  • (2.1.3) Notes there are no surveillance tests in progress to cause the alarm.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.4) Checks PPC for ALL protection channel bistables "OFF".

  • (2.1.5) Identifies failed channel.

o Refers to TS 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation".

o Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see pg 5)

(AR PK05-16, "PZR PRESSURE HI/LO") If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.2,3) Notes actual pressurizer pressure is less NOT less than 2210 psig (PORV/spray actuation) or 2175 psig (RCS departure from nucleate boiling limits).

  • (2.1.4) Verifies HC-455K, Pzr Pressure Controller, set at 78.8% Setpoint (2235 psig).

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5) Performs a channel check of all Pzr pressure channels; identifies PI-474 reading bottom of scale (VB2).

  • Reads NOTE regarding PCS Control Set input selection scheme (Median Select, based on 2nd highest out of channels) and possible failure scheme (3 of 4 inputs detected bad).
  • (2.1.6) Checks for Pressurizer pressure channel abnormal reading. Identifies PI-474 reading bottom of scale (VB2).

o Check HC-455K in AUTO and controlling Pzr pressure with PACT and PREF nearly matched (CC2).

  • Goes to OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel" (see next page)

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK06-21, "PROCESS CONTROL SYS TROUBLE") If entered, else mark N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to Section 2.1, PCS Rack Channel Trouble.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks PCS HMI on CC4 to determine alarming channel.

  • (2.1.2) May check PY-17N (behind hot shutdown panel) for no breakers tripped.
  • (2.1.3) REFERs to Attachment for individual alarm input.

o Identifies mPzrPres_Dev, PT-455/PT-456/PT-457/PT-474 Pzr Press Channel Deviation (NON SAFETY RELATED CONTROL SET 1) o Notes input has no associated automatic or Operator actions.

(OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel")

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems are controlling properly in AUTO.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF).

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with the selected T channel (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not open as result of instrument failure or spurious actuation.

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of apparent pressurizer controller failure.

  • Reads CAUTION regarding Eagle 21 design failure impact to outputs prior to step 6.
  • (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel", continued)

SRO/ATC * (7) Uses Attachments 5.1 and 5.2 to determine affected indicator o (a) Places Out-of-Service (OOS) sticker on the following:

PI 474, Pressurizer Pressure Indicator (VB2).

PR 455, Pressurizer Pressure Recorder (CC2) from PCS.

SRO/BOP

  • Reads NOTE regarding inoperable PZR PORV(s) requiring TS actions to be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of inoperability.
  • (8) Uses Attachment 5.1, pg 16, and Attachment 5.2, pg 7, to determine required TS/ECG actions for the inoperable channel:

o TS 3.3.1.E, PC-474C High Press Trip & (TC 441C OT Delta T Trip) (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs).

o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 474A Low Press Trip (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs).

o TS 3.3.2.D, PC 474D Low Press S.I. (Place channel in trip within 72 hrs).

o PC 474B PORV Press Interlock:

PCV-455C & PCV-474: TS 3.4.11.B.1 & B.2 (Close associated block valves and remove power within 1 hr).

PCV-455C: also requires TS 3.4.11.B.3 (Since this is a Class I PORV, must restore to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />).

o Identifies affected controls:

PCS (PM 474A) Pzr Press Control.

PORV 455C & 474 Low Press Interlock.

SRO

  • Directs board operator to implement OP A-4A:III, "Pressurizer - Shutdown and Clearing" to close and remove power from block valves associated with PCV-455C (Section 6.4) and 474 (Section 6.6).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-474, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP A-4A:III, "Pressurizer - Shutdown and Clearing")

BOP Section 6.4 - "RCS-1-PCV-455C - Removing from Service at Power", step 6.4

  • (6.4.3) Places PCV-455C control switch to CLOSE (VB2)
  • (6.4.4.a) Closes 8000B, Block Valve B.
  • (6.4.4.b) Contacts field operator to open associated breaker 52-1G-46.

BOP Section 6.6 - "RCS-1-PCV-474 - Removing from Service at Power", step 6.6.

  • (6.6.3) Places PCV-474 control switch to CLOSE (VB2)
  • (6.6.4.a) Closes 8000A, Block Valve A.
  • (6.6.4.b) Contacts field operator to open associated breaker 52-1F-40.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs are addressed, per Lead Examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Observes PK04-21 (Letdown Press/Flo Temp) and informs the Shift Foreman.

(AR PK04-21, "LETDOWN PRESS / FLO TEMP")

SRO

  • Enters AR PK04-21, "LETDOWN PRESS / FLO TEMP" o (1.0) Identifies input 393 (Letdn HX Outlet Press Hi) and goes to section 2.1, General Actions.

o Reads two CAUTIONS (potential reactivity impact of letdown temperature excursions and elevated dose rate concerns if argon injection continues with letdown isolated.

o (2.1.1) Notes if letdown is isolated, argon injection must be isolated as well.

o (2.1.2) Notes requirement to go to seals only charging if letdown gets isolated.

Note: Crew may call for diagnostic brief during annunciator response implementation ALL * (2.1.3) Checks for indications of a letdown line break:

o Letdown flow decrease - NO, flow has risen approximately 8 gpm.

o Letdown pressure decrease - PI-135 reads high while letdown flow rise indicates pressure has fallen.

o Containment sump level increasing - NO, sumps remain stable.

o VCT level decreasing - NO, VCT level begins to rise very slowly.

  • Determines indications are not consistent with a letdown leak.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.4) Checks if letdown HX outlet pressure is high.

o Notes PI-135 reads high, but letdown flow behavior indications the opposite o Takes manual control of PCV-135 (VB2).

o Adjusts PCV-135 using alternate indications (Letdown flow rate, net charging, etc. ) or from knowledge of normal demand setting for PCV-135 Hand Controller (VB2).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-135, Transmitter for Letdown Pressure Control Valve, Fails High (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK04-21, "LETDOWN PRESS / FLO TEMP", continued)

SRO

  • Notes letdown flow can be controlled with PPCV-135 in manual from previous step.

o (2.1.5) Step is N/A - letdown flow is controlling properly in manual; it is not necessary to isolate letdown.

SRO/ATC

  • Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions o (2.1.6) Step is N/A - Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature is NOT high (normal band).

o (2.1.7) Step is N/A - Charging flow was slightly low; may adjust as needed to maintain Pressurizer level within established bands.

o (2.1.8) Step is N/A - Charging appears norm (not lost).

SRO/BOP

  • Determines remainder of PK steps do not match plant conditions:

o (2.1.9) Step is N/A - There are no indications that RV-8117 has lifted (PRT temperature, level, and pressure are all normal).

o (2.1.10, 11, 12, 13) Step is N/A - Letdown is not at risk; normal Letdown alignment should be maintained.

SRO

  • May review probable causes for the alarm and identify PT-135 failed high.
  • May reference OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel to aid in diagnostics.

(OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel") if used, else mark N/A Note: Only step 1 is applicable to the malfunction; remaining steps have not been listed.

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems was NOT controlling properly in AUTO, performs RNO actions:

o Takes manual control of PCV-135 (VB2).

o Adjusts PCV-135 using alternate indications (Letdown flow rate, net charging, etc. ) or from knowledge of normal demand setting for PCV-135 Hand Controller (VB2).

Proceed to the next event once PCV-135 is being controlled properly in MANUAL, per Lead Examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

30 gpm SGTL on loop 4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses Steam Generator Tube Leak from one or more of the following:

  • Increased charging flow (PPC, CC2).
  • Air ejector off-gas hi-rad in alarm (PPC, RM-15/15R) (PK11-06).

ATC

  • Observes PK11-06 input 423 (SJAE Hi-Rad) alarming and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP

  • May check PPC and/or VB2 Recorders (lower left) for upscale readings/ trends on rad monitors.

(AR PK11-06, "SJAE HI-RAD", starting at step 2.1) if entered, otherwise this section is N/A SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks for upscale readings on both RM-15 and 15R (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left) (both are in alarm; may be over ranged).

o (2.1.1.a) Implements OP O-4, "Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection".

o (2.1.1.b) Notifies Chemistry of abnormal condition.

o (2.1.1.c) Transitions to OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure".

Note: Review of OP O-4 shutdown criteria is also covered as part of OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure" (if not addressed during AR PK11-06 response)

BOP

  • Reviews OP O-4, "Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection" for action levels and shutdown criteria.
  • Evaluates OP O-4 action level using PPC Group Display.
  • Determines current OP O-4 action level as 3 (leak >= 100 gpd) and updates Shift Foreman.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

30 gpm SGTL on loop 4 (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure")

SRO

  • Reads NOTE prior to step 1 regarding requirement to complete procedure actions unless superseded by EOP E-3 , "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".

Note: Maintaining Pressurizer level stable is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks pressurizer level and charging flow.

o (1.a) May take charging to MANUAL control and attempt to adjust charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level (CC2).

SRO/BOP o (1.a RNO) May start additional charging pump IF requested by ATC (VB2)

SRO/ATC o (1.b) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level.

Determines leak rate is approximately 30 gpm.

Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC2).

Determines pressurizer level is stable (CC2, PPC) (Continuous Action to Monitor).

May isolate Letdown by closing 8149C and LCV-459/460 (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (2) Identify affected steam generator.

o (2.a) Determines that no S/G levels are rising unexpectedly (VB3 meters, PPC).

o (2.b) Identifies main steamline rad monitor 74 rising (VB2 recorders, upper left; PPC).

o (2.c) Verifies S/G blowdown isolation/sample valves open (VB3 lower left).

(Depending on pace of crew, blowdown may have isolated due to high rad on RM-23; RNO step is performed to allow sampling by chemistry).

(2.c RNO) Checks blowdown isolation due to RM-23 in alarm (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left); Places RE-19, 23 Hi Rad S/G Blowdown and Sample Valve iso defeat cutout switch to "cut-in" and opens blowdown sample valves (FCV-244, 246, 248, 250) (VB3, lower left).

o (2.d) Contacts Chemistry to perform S/G sampling per CAP AP-1.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

30 gpm SGTL on loop 4 (continued); Ramp Offline Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure")

SRO/ATC * (3-Continuous Action to Monitor) Determines VCT level can be maintained by RCS makeup (CC2,VB2, PPC).

SRO * (4) Determines plant shutdown requirement.

o (4.a) Determines leak rate greater than O-4 shutdown criteria.

o (4.b) Due to O-4 criteria, implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown.

o Reviews T.S. 3.4.13.B, RCS Operational Leakage, - Primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

Required actions: Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown")

SRO * (1.a) Determines runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew).

SRO/BOP

  • Starts load reduction (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3):

o (1.b) Places MW and IMP feedbacks in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3).

o (1.c,d) Sets load target and ramp rate (greater than or equal to 5 MW/min) o (1.e) Pushes GO.

o (1.f) Contacts Chemistry to advise 15%/hr shutdown rate will be exceeded.

SRO/ATC * (2) Ensures control rods are inserting in AUTO (CC1).

  • (3) Turns on Pressurizer heaters if not on from earlier event (CC1).
  • (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

Tube Rupture during ramp offline Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Boration values described below may vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook).

o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2).

o Presses BORATE on HMI.

o Sets target gallons for boration; verifies batch is reset.

o Sets boric acid flowrate.

o Presses START, and monitors boration.

o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2).

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3).

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1).

  • (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2).
  • Reports rapid decrease in Pressurizer pressure and level.
  • Returns to OP AP-3, step 1.a RNO.

(OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure", starting at step 1.a RNO)

SRO/BOP * (1.a RNO) Starts additional CCP (if not done earlier).

  • (1.b RNO) Isolates letdown (if not done earlier).

ATC

  • Reports PZR level cannot be maintained.

SRO

  • Directs Rx trip/SI and transition to E-0.

ATC

  • Performs Rx trip and SI.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip / Safety Injection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1).

  • (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, vital buses F/H white lights on mimic buses).

o Reports differential on bus G following transfer to startup power.

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train light ON and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated).

o Both trains of SI actuated as indicated by PK08-21, SI red light above Monitor Light Box C (VB1), and both trains of SI/RHR pumps running (VB1 skirt).

SRO * (5) Directs implementation of App E (usually given to BOP); See page 19.

o All failures are related to loss of 4kV Bus G. Field Operators should be assigned to manually close associated valves.

o Board manipulations are as follows:

Switch LCV-12 to CONT ONLY (VB3).

Main Feedwater Recirc Valves FCV-53 & 54: OPEN (VB3).

Turn on Aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4).

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF.

o AFW Pp 1-2 OOS; 1-3 is running (VB3).

o TDAFW is running and required (VB3).

  • (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves.

o Safeties closed; no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature normal (VB2).

o PCV-456 is closed with 8000C open; PCV-474 is closed - may restore power to 8000A (VB2).

o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2).

  • (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is greater than 1300 PSIG, trip criteria, however RCP 1-2 and 1-4 tripped off on loss of 12kV Bus D (VB2).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip / Safety Injection (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection") (continued)

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted.

o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

SRO/ATC * (10) Checks for ruptured S/G.

o Notes RE-74 elevated with and S/G 1-4 level rising.

o Directs transition to EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".

(EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture")

SRO/ATC * (1) Notes RCPs are not running (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (2) Identifies S/G 1-4 as ruptured (RM-74 in alarm; indications of rising level without feed during E-0).

SRO/BOP * (3) Implements Appendix FF to isolate ruptured S/G 1-4 (see pg 21 - contains CT step)

SRO/ATC

  • Reads CAUTION regarding maintaining isolation of Faulted/Ruptured S/G (do not feed).
  • (4.a) Notes ruptured S/G level is greater than 15%.
  • (4.b) Isolates Feed flowpaths to S/G 1-4:

o Takes LCV-113 to MANUAL and closes the valve (S2CT-1)(partial) **

o Directs field action to close of LCV-109 (S2CT-1)**

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks ruptured S/G pressure greater than 225 psig.

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip / Safety Injection (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture", continued)

SRO

  • Reads CAUTION regarding false PTS (Integrity Status Tree indication) for ruptured loop.
  • (6.a) Determines required cool down target Core Exit Temperature from table based on current ruptured S/G pressure.

LOWEST RUPTURED SG PRESS (PSIG) REQ'D CORE EXIT TEMPERATURE (oF) 1050 and above 516 1030 to 1049 513 1000 to 1029 510 900 to 999 497 800 to 899 483 700 to 799 467 600 to 699 450 225 to 599 350 SRO/ATC * (7) Determines Condenser is NOT available.

o PK08 OFF.

o Goes to step 10.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip / Safety Injection (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture", continued)

SRO/ATC * (10) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 10% Steam Dumps.

o (10.a) Verifies Appendix FF is complete.

o (10.b) Manually opens PCV-19, 20, and 21 (10% Steam Dumps) to at least 90%

to dump steam at maximum possible rate. (S2CT-2) **

o (10.c) Continues on in procedure at step 11 while cooldown continues.

o (10.d) Stops the cooldown when ALL Core Exit Thermocouples are less the required target temperature. (S2CT-2) **

o (10.e) Stabilizes temperature slightly less than required temperature using steam dumps in AUTO.

    • (Critical Task) (S2CT-2) Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate to CETC target temperature specified in E-3, step 6, using 10% steam dumps such that RCS subcooled margin still exists following the cooldown.

SRO/BOP * (11.a,b) Maintains intact S/G levels while controlling S/G NR levels between 20%-65%.

  • (11.c) May throttle TDAFW flow to maintain level within band.

SRO/BOP * (12) CHECK PZR PORVs and Block Valves.

o (12.a,c) Notes power is available to block valve 8000C and valve is open.

Directs field operator to restore power to 8000A (if not done earlier).

o (12.b) PZR PORVs - all closed.

SRO/BOP * (13) Resets Safety Injection (VB1).

SRO/BOP * (14) Resets both Trains Phase A (Phase B was not in) (VB1).

SRO/BOP * (15) Restores Instrument Air to Containment and checks header pressure greater than 90 psig (VB4).

(Continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip / Safety Injection (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture") (continued)

SRO/BOP * (16) Shuts down RHR pump 1-2.

SRO/ATC * (17) Checks RCS cooldown stopped before continuing on to depressurization of RCS.

SRO/BOP * (18) Checks ruptured S/G pressure stable or rising.

SRO/BOP * (19) Checks Subcooling greater than 40oF.

SRO/BOP

  • Reads note regarding use of a PORV for depressurization if normal spray is determined to be ineffective.
  • (20) Notes RCP 1-2 not running and determines normal Pressurizer Spray will not be effective.
  • (21) Depressurizes the RCS using one PZR PORV:
  • Reduces RCS pressure until criteria of Appendix GG has been met: (S2CT-3) **

o RCS Pressure - LESS THAN Ruptured S/G Pressure AND o PZR Level - GREATER THAN 12% [40%]

OR o PZR Level - GREATER THAN 74% [66%]

OR o RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 20°F (Subcooled Margin Monitor, YI-31 or Appendix C)

    • (Critical Task) (S2CT-3) Depressurize the RCS until Appendix GG criteria has been met.

The scenario is terminated once critical task S2-CT3 is complete.

L181 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 18 of 24 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

SGTR (S/G 1-4) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E - ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

  • (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice).
  • (1b) Announces reactor trip/SI on PA system.
  • (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 is ON).
  • (3) Verifies Phase A (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, some white lights ON).

o Determines all failures are related to loss of 4kV Bus G.

  • (4) Verifies Containment Vent Isolation complete - red lights ON, white lights OFF (VB1).
  • (5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete - red lights ON, some white lights ON (VB1).

o Determines all failures are related to loss of 4kV Bus G.

  • (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white lights ON (VB1).

o Determines all failures are related to loss of 4kV Bus G.

  • (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation are NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF (VB1)).
  • (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light OFF (VB1)).
  • 9) Checks AFW status:

o AFW Pp 1-2 OOS; AFW Pp 1-3 running.

o TDAFW is running and IS required.

  • (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2), SI, RHR (VB1).

o Notes CCP 1-2 and 1-3 (VB2) off due to bus G loss.

(11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks).

  • (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip (VB2).
  • (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON) o Selects FCV-53/54 to recirc.

o Stops all but one CB Pp set.

o Takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

SGTR (S/G 1-4) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E - ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status)

BOP * (14) Checks proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (vent status light panel white lights)(VB4).

o Placed both Unit 1 VENT TRAIN 1 BUS F and H MODE SELECT Switches to Mode-3 (VB4).

  • (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))(VB4).
  • (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts)(VB5).
  • (17) Verifies MSRs reset (Triconex HMI)(CC3).
  • (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2).
  • (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm).
  • (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 20 of 24 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP E-3, Appendix FF, "Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator" (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, Appendix FF, Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator)

BOP Reads CAUTION regarding TDAFW as only source of feedflow prior to step 1.

  • (1) Reads step to ensure S/G 1-4 10% steam dump controller (PCV-22) set to 1040 psig and in AUTO (VB3).
  • (2) Checks S/G 1-4 10% steam dump valve closed (PCV-22) (VB3).
  • (3) Checks S/G 1-4 MSIV and bypass (FCV-44 and FCV-24) valves closed (VB3).

o Closes S/G 1-4 MSIV, FCV-44 (S2CT-1)(partial) **

  • (4) Notes no TDAFW steam valves associated w/ S/G 1-4 (VB3).
  • (5) Verifies S/G 1-4 SGBD valves outside cnmt (FCV-160 and FCV-244) closed (VB3).
  • (6) Verifies S/G 1-4 is isolated from intact S/G (S/G 1-4 MSIV and MSIV Bypass are both closed as are all intact S/G MSIV and MSIV Bypasses).
  • (7) Informs Shift Foreman S/G 1-4 isolation is complete.

BOP * (8) Removes WR Thot input to SCMM for loop 4 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3).

o Goes to PAM3 panel.

o Checks Loop 4 Thot Disabled.

  • (9) Contacts Chemistry to sample S/Gs per CAP AP-1.

o Ensures SI Reset (VB1).

o Ensures Phase A, Train A & B Reset (VB1).

o Open Instrument Air to Containment FCV-584 (VB4).

o When Chemistry is prepared to Sample, ensures Inside Containment S/G Blowdown Valves FCV-760-763 opened (VB3).

L181 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 21 of 24 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE IC-11 75%; MOL, CB - See Turnover X Setup Lesson drl_0120.lsn Clears AFW 1-2 The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements None Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; Foldout Pages; AR PK04-06, PK04-21, PK05-16, 06-21, PK011-06, OP AP-3, AP-5, AP-13, AP-25, EOP E-0, E-3 Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up X 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, min 960 iterations (30 sec).

Critical Task Specific Data Capture:

  • S2CT1: LCV-109 and LCV-113 valve position (or flow into S/G 1-4)
  • S2CT2: PCV-19, 20, 21 valve position; CETC (2 highest)
  • S2CT3: RCS Pressure, PZR Pressure, S/G 1-4 Pressure, Subcooling X 0 min Lesson L181 NRC-S2.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc.

by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X Evt-1: PCV-455A Setpoint ramps to zero over 20 seconds and can not be reset.

setpoint failure (approx. 3 min after taking watch per lead examiner)

X Evt-2: PT-474 Fails Check for OOS stickers on PI-474 and PR-455 and pink tags.

Low (once pressurizer When contacted as Turbine Watch, open breakers for 8000A and 8000B when pressure returned to requested (see field action branch of lesson file).

normal band, per lead examiner)

X Evt-3: PT-135 fails PT-135 fails high.

high (once Evt-2 TS addressed per lead examiner)

X Evt-4: 30 gpm tube Crew will contact chemistry for sampling and power reduction > 15%/hr.

leak on S/G 1-4 (once PT-135 being controlled in manual, per lead examiner)

Evt-5: 400 gpm tube Scenario Major - 400 gpm SGTR on S/G 1-4.

rupture (Major)

(triggers 30 sec after FCV-110A opening for boration)

Evt-6: 12 kV Bus D Results in loss of Condenser and RCPs 1-2 & 1-4.

Feeder Breaker Diff (post trip)

Evt-7: 4kV Bus G Diff Crew will contact field for closure of FCV-431 and control of TDAFW LCVs on xfer to S/U (post Note: Closing LCV-109 is part of the Critical Task to isolate the rupture S/G.

trip) Document the time isolation is requested and when crew notified complete:

Time LCV-109 isolation requested: ____________ Time notified:__________

X = manual entry required L181 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 22 of 24 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 860 MWe Power Level: 75% Net Generation: 810 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.7 SW 5.7 NE 5.7 SE 5.8 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW EMERGENT WORK:

  • MDAFW 1-2 OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:
  • TS 3.7.5.B MDAFW 1-2, OOS due in 68 hours7.87037e-4 days <br />0.0189 hours <br />1.124339e-4 weeks <br />2.5874e-5 months <br />.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

  • None TURNOVER ITEMS:
  • MDAFW 1-2 estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
  • Unit is operating at 75% due to a SCCW Hx Clearance PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

o MDAFW 1-2 repair

Shift Foreman Turnover 0B ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

  • There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

TURNOVER ITEMS:

  • U-1: maintain 75% - no one in containment.
  • U-2: maintain 100%.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

  • Time in core life: _MOL_.
  • Power History: Steady State at 75% for past 3 days.
  • Boron concentration is _966 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
  • Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.
  • The last dilution was completed _30 minutes ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

  • None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS
  • None

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 Op-Test No: L181 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOL with AFW 1-2 cleared Turnover:

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 PMP_CVC3_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL TS, C CCP 1-3 OC Trip (OP AP-17, ECG 8.1.A).

(ALL) 2 AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 1 TS, C ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 can not be started (OP AP-10, TS (BOP, 3.0.3).

SRO) 3 MAL_CWS3A 80 C (ALL) High DP on Intake Screens; ramp required (AR PK13-01, OP MAL_CWS3B 75 AP-7, OP AP-25).

MAL_CWS1A 0.15 ramp=120 MAL_CWS1B 0.15 ramp=150 4 PMP_CWS1_2 M Both Circ Water pumps trip off during ramp, requiring OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd='smss lt (ALL) Reactor Trip (OP AP-7).

1140' PMP_CWS2_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd='smss lt 1080' 5 MAL_EPS4C_2 DIFFERENTIAL C (ALL) Vital 4kV Bus F differential trip.

cd='fnispr lt 5' delay=30 6 VLV_PZR4_2 0.3 cd='jpplp4' del C (BOP) Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C fails slightly open on trip ay=60 requiring manual isolation by associated block valve 7 MAL_AFW1 1 cd='fnispr lt 5' C (ALL) Turbine driven AFW pump overspeed trip.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L181 NRC ES-D-1-03 r0.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 5,6,7) 3
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3) 3
4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 4) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1, FR-H.1) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-H.1) 1
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S3CT-1) Close the block MOV upstream of The open PORV and block valve constitute the
  • Westinghouse Owners the stuck open PORV prior rupture of the degradation of a fission product barrier. Closing the Group WCAP-17711-NP PRT. block valve is essential to safety since failure to do so results in the unnecessary continuation of the degraded condition.

(S3CT-2) Establish a secondary heat sink as A loss of all feedwater transient is characterized by

  • FR-H.1 Background indicated by: a depletion of secondary inventory and eventual Document (HFRH1BG),
  • WR level rising degradation of secondary heat transfer capability. Rev. 3.
  • Core Exit Thermocouple As secondary heat transfer capability degrades, temperatures lowering core decay heat generation will increase RCS temperature and pressure causing loss of RCS Prior to reaching bleed and feed criteria inventory similar in nature to a small break loss of which is defined as wide range S/G level in coolant accident. Failure to restore a secondary any three S/Gs less than 18% [26%] AND heat sink when it is possible to do so constitutes a narrow range S/G level in all four S/Gs less significant reduction of safety margin beyond that than 15% [25%] narrow range.

irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-03 r0.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 0

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. Charging Pump CCP 1-3 trips on over current. The crew responds by entering OP AP-17, Loss of Charging to restore normal charging and letdown. Shift Foreman enters ECG 8.1.A - Charging Pump No. 3 Inoperable (establish continuous fire watch immediately; restore to operable status within 7 days).
2. ASW Pump 1-1 trips due to a seized shaft. Standby ASW Pump 1-2 fails to autostart and cannot be started manually. The Shift Foreman implements OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water and cross-ties to the Unit 2 ASW system via the ASW cross-tie valve FCV-601. Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable on Unit 1.
3. Screen differential pressure begins to rise quickly, bringing in AR PK13-01, Bar Racks/Screens. Following annunciator guidance, the crew enters OP AP-7, Degraded Condenser, Section C: Traveling Screen Problem and begins to reduce load to 50% or less per OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction.
4. Both Circ Water pumps trip off during ramp, requiring the crew to manually trip the Reactor oper OP AP-
7. The crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions.
5. On the trip, vital 4 kV bus F trips on differential. DRPI loses power, but crew is able to determine the reactor has tripped based on diverse indications (lowering reactor power and reactor trip breakers open). MDAFW Pump 1-3 is also lost due to the bus failure.
6. Board operators also identify PCV-455C in mid-position. The valve will not close and must be isolated using the associated block valve 8000B (S3CT-1) Close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV prior rupture of the PRT.
7. The TDAFW pump trips on overspeed. Steam Generator levels are initially high enough to provide an adequate secondary side heat sink and the crew transitions to EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Steam Generator levels slowly lower below the minimum required level of 15%

narrow range and the crew transitions to EOP FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. With the condenser unavailable, Condensate is used to restore a secondary side heat sink (S3CT-2) Establish a secondary heat sink.

The scenario is terminated once Critical Task S3CT-2 is complete L181 NRC ES-D-1-03 r0.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 14 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-3 OC Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of CCP 1-3 OC trip is made from one or more of the following:

  • CCP 13 blue OC light is lit, and the pump is no longer running (VB2, lower center).
  • PK0416 CCP 13 alarm (OC trip input).
  • PKs 0501 - 0504, due to RCP seal low flow alarms.
  • Observes low charging flow and/or RCP seal flows (CC2, PPC, VB2 meters).
  • Observes letdown has isolated (VB2, upper skirt).

SRO Implements OP AP17, "Loss of Charging, Section A, Loss of All Charging."

(OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging - Section A, Loss of All Charging")

SRO/BOP * (1.a) Ensures Letdown is isolated:

o Checks 8149A, 8149B, and 8149C closed (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (2.a) Ensures suction flow path:

o Checks VCT level and pressure - normal (VB2, PPC).

o Checks LCV112B and LCV112C open (CCP suction) (VB2, lower center).

SRO * (2.b) Determines that pump venting not required at this time.

SRO/BOP * (2.c) Verifies 8105 and 8106 are open (CCP recircs) (VB2, lower center).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 14 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-3 OC Trip (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging - Section A, Loss of All Charging", continued)

SRO/ATC * (2.d,e) Places FCV-128, CHARGING PUMP FLOW CONTROL, in MANUAL and closes (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (2.f) Starts an available charging pump (CCP 1-1 or 1-2)(VB2).

SRO/ATC * (2.g,h) Adjusts charging in manual to return level to program (FCV128) (CC2).

  • (3) Adjusts HCV142 to maintain RCP seal flows 813 gpm (CC2).
  • (4.a) Checks Pzr level > 17% (CC2 recorder, PPC, VB2 meter).

SRO/BOP * (4.b) Checks letdown in service; determines normal letdown can be restored (VB2, upper left skirt).

(OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging - Appendix R")

BOP/ATC

  • Reads CAUTION prior to step 1, App. R regarding high letdown temperature and the potential for lifting RV8117.

o (1.a) Checks FCV355 open (it is) (VB1, lower left skirt).

o (1.b) Opens TCV130 to 40% demand (VB2, lower middle).

o (1.c) Ensures 8149A,B, and C are closed (they are) (VB2, upper middle skirt).

o (1.d) Opens LCV459 and LCV460 (VB2, upper middle skirt).

o (1.e) Checks 8152 open (VB2, upper middle skirt).

o (1.f) Opens PCV135 to 60% demand (VB2, lower middle).

o (1.g) Adjusts charging to 87 gpm (ATC) (CC2).

o (1.h) Opens 8149B or C - 75 gpm orifice stop valve (VB2, upper middle skirt).

o (1.i) Adjusts PCV135 for 350 psig on PI135 and returns to AUTO (VB2, upper middle).

o (1.j) Adjusts TCV130 for 90oF110oF on TI130 and returns to AUTO (VB2, upper middle).

o (1.k) Checks RV8117 Letdown Relief Valve tailpipe temperature to verify relief valve is seated (TI129 VB2, middle).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 14 Event

Description:

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-3 OC Trip (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging - Appendix R", continued)

SRO/BOP * (4.c) Adjusts charging in manual to return level to program by throttling FCV128 for flow, and maintaining RCP seal flows 813 gpm using HCV142 (CC2).

  • (5.a - d.) Checks VCT Makeup Control:

o Checks VCT level 14% to 87% (LI-112 on VB2).

o Reads NOTE prior to step 5.b.

o Checks VCT pressure 15 to 60 psig (PI-135 on VB2).

o VCT makeup control (YIC-100) in AUTO mode and set for current RCS boron concentration which is displayed on lamicoid above ATC PPC displays (CC2).

(OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging", continued)

SRO/BOP * (5.e) Verifies instrument air is available (VB4 lower left area).

  • (6) Checks LCV112B and LCV112C open, providing suction from the VCT(VB2, middle skirt).

SRO * (7) Reviews Tech Specs and enters ECG 8.1.A - CCP 1-3 inoperable. Required actions:

o Establish a continuous fire watch in the ECCS Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) room Immediately.

OR o Inspect the ECCS CCP room with a fire watch once per hour.

AND o Verify the ECCS CCP associated smoke detection equipment is OPERABLE.

AND o Verify the ECCS CCP associated fire suppression system is OPERABLE.

AND o Restore Charging Pump No. 3 to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Proceed to the next event once ECGs are addressed, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 14 Event

Description:

ASW Pump 1-1 Seizure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK01-03 (ASW Pp OC trip) and PK01-01 (three low press / low dP inputs) alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP Observes that 1-1 ASW Pp has a blue OC light (VB1, far left), and reports condition to the Shift Foreman.

(AR PK01-03, "Aux Salt Water Pumps") if entered, else N/A SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, due to OC trip inputs.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Determines that the standby ASW pump is NOT running with normal current (did not start); takes 1-2 ASW pp to MAN, and attempts to start it.

SRO * (2.1.2) Determines ASW flow has NOT been restored; goes to OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Saltwater.

(OP AP-10, "Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water")

SRO/BOP * (1) Determines neither ASW pump is running.

  • (1.a,b,c RNO) Informs SM to contact Watch Commander. Determines Unit 2 ASW Pump 2-1 is available for cross-tie. Goes to Section 6.
  • (6.2.1) Directs Unit 2 to CLOSE 2-FCV-495 and OPEN 2-FCV-496.
  • (6.2.2) N/A
  • (6.2.3) Opens FCV-601 (VB1, lower far left skirt).
  • (6.2.4) Directs Unit 2 to start stand-by ASW Pump 2-1.

SRO * (1.e RNO) Implement Tech Spec 3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable. Required action:

Initiate shutdown within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Be in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

SRO/BOP * (1.f RNO) Contacts Aux Watch to stop any radwaste discharge in progress.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 14 Event

Description:

High Screen DP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Observes PK13-01 (Bar Racks/Screens) alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

(AR PK13-01, "Bar Racks/Screens")

SRO/ATC

  • Reads CAUTION regarding potential screen damage.
  • (2.2.1) Checks the PPC "Intake Screens" display.

SRO * (2.2.2-2.2.4) N/A.

SRO/BOP * (2.2.5) Calls the Intake Watch to check if all available screens are running.

SRO * (2.2.6) N/A.

SRO/ATC * (2.2.7) Checks if screen D/P of ANY of the bays exceeds 15 inches, and if so, checks the associated screens are operating as follows:

o CWP Bay 1 Screens 1-1 through 1-3 running at or trending toward 30 fpm.

o CWP Bay 1 Screens 1-4 through 1-6 running at or trending toward 30 fpm.

o U1 ASW Bay - Screen 1-7 running at or trending toward 10.8 feet per minute.

SRO * (2.2.8) Determines screen D/P cannot be reduced to less than 8 inches, IMPLEMENTs OP AP-7, "Degraded Condenser."

(OP AP-7, "Degraded Condenser - Section C, Traveling Screen Problem.")

SRO

  • Reads Cautions about screen stalling, backflow concerns, and need for tripping the reactor if both Circ Water pumps are lost.
  • Reads Note about PPC indication.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 14 Event

Description:

High Screen DP (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-7, "Degraded Condenser - Section C, Traveling Screen Problem.", continued)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks Traveling Screen Status:

o (1.a) Determines screen status is NOT normal.

o (1.b) Determines screen differential pressure is greater than 8 inches.

o (1.b RNO) Determines differential pressure is continuously above 8 inches and is NOT due to salp/jellyfish.

Implements OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown" to commence load reduction to 50% or less (see page 7).

SRO/ATC o (1.c) Checks screen differential pressure - 25 inches OR LESS.

Notes that it is. Actions are the same as for differential pressure is continuously above 8 inches and is NOT due to salp/jellyfish.

Proceeds with implementation of OP AP-25 (see page 7).

SRO/ATC o (1.d) Checks screens NOT overloaded.

Screen differential pressure LESS THAN 70 inches.

Each CWP in service has at least two operating screens.

Note: Evt-4, CWP Trip is expected to trigger before crew reaches remainder of procedure; subsequent steps have, been omitted.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3,4 Page 7 of 14 Event

Description:

Ramp / Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown")

SRO

  • Directs reduction of turbine load.

o (1.a) Determines runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew).

SRO/BOP

  • Directs board operator to input ramp parameters (CC3):

o (1.b) Places MW and IMP feedbacks in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI).

o (1.c,d) Sets load target and ramp rate.

o (1.e) Pushes GO.

o (1.f) Contacts Chemistry to advise 15%/hr shutdown rate will be exceeded.

SRO/ATC * (2) Ensures control rods are inserting in AUTO (CC1).

  • (3) Turns Pressurizer heaters on (CC1).
  • (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (5) Verifies DFWCS in AUTO and controlling S/G levels (CC3 MFW HMI, VB3, PPC):

o (5.a) Checks MFW control and bypass valves in AUTO.

o (5.b) Checks both MFPs and their controller in AUTO.

o (5.c) May check level trends, as well as steam flow/feed flow trends (CC3, PPC, and/or big VB3 DFWCS electronic recorders).

Note: CWP 1-1 will trip 30 seconds after boration is started causing a programmed ramp to commence. CWP 1-2 will trip when generator output reaches 1080 MW. Shift Foreman may direct Reactor Trip at this time.

SRO/ATC * (6) Initiates boration (CC2).

ALL

  • Identifies CWP 1-1 trip and notes programmed ramp in progress (VB4).
  • Identifies CWP 1-2 trip (VB4).

SRO/ATC

Remaining Events Trigger Automatically

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 8 of 14 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

Note 1: On the trip, a loss of vital 4kV bus F and an overspeed trip of the TDAFW pump leaves the crew with no AFW flow. S/G levels are initially above the minimum required level of 15% NR, but lowering. Crew will enter E-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response", but will transition to EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", once all four S/G levels fall below 15% NR.

Note 2: PCV-455C partially opens on the trip, resulting in a critical task to close the associated block valve, 8000B.

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1)

  • (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, vital buses G/H white lights on mimic buses).

o Reports differential on bus F.

o (3 RNO) Refers to EOP ECA-0.3, "Restore 4kV Buses" while continuing in E-0.

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks for SI actuated (PK08-21 ON), checks safeguards bistable status light panel.

o Reports Safety Injection has not actuated and is NOT required.

SRO/BOP * (4.a RNO) continued o Notes no one in containment per shift turnover.

o Directs annoucement of Reactor Trip over Public Address System.

SRO/ATC * (4.a RNO) Checks feedflow greater than 435 gpm; notes 0 gpm flow, but S/G NR level IS greater than 15% in atleast one S/G.

o Directs Transition to EOP E-0.1 "Reactor Trip Response".

ANY

  • Identifies PORV 455C partially open and attempts to close. Valve will not close.
  • Closes PORV block valve MOV-8000B (VB2 lower right)**
    • (Critical Task) (S3CT-1) Close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV prior to rupture of the PRT.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,7 Page 9 of 14 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response")

Note 1: Crew will continue to monitor S/G levels and transition to EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", once all four S/G levels fall below 15% NR. There is no requirement for crew to complete steps of E-0.1 once extreme challenge to secondary heat sink condition exists.

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 547oF based on RCS Loop Tavg (RCPs running) (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC).

o If RCS temp < 547oF and decreasing: (Not: expected) checks steam dumps (VB3, indicator lights middle) and S/G blowdown isolation valves outside containment (VB3, lower left skirt) all closed.

Also checks MSRs reset on on Turbine Control HMI (CC3).

o RCS temp > 547oF and increasing:

If required, sets 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint)

(VB3, lower left).

verifies dumps modulate open to control temperature at 547oF.

o Monitoring of RCS temperature stable assigned as Continuous Action.

SRO/BOP * (2) Checks Feedwater Status:

o (a) RCS temperature < 554oF (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC) (NOTE:

expected).

o (b) Checks if Feedwater Isolation has occurred.

o (b.1) Feedwater Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box C (Red lights ON / White lights OFF) (VB1).

(c) Checks total AFW flow greater than 435 GPM (VB3, upper middle).

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks Rods fully inserted (VB2-DRPI).

o No DRPI due to loss of 4kV bus F (VB2) o Rx Trip breakers are open, power is lowering (VB2, CC1) o Determines reactor is tripped.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,7 Page 10 of 14 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response (continued) (CT - may already be complete)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response", continued)

Note 1: Crew will continue to monitor S/G levels and transition to EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", once all four S/G levels fall below 15% NR. There is no requirement for crew to complete steps of E-0.1 once extreme challenge to secondary heat sink condition exists.

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks Pressurizer level controls:

o (a) Level greater than 17% (VB2, middle right).

o (b) Charging in service with adequate flow (VB2)(CC2).

o (c) Letdown in service (VB2, upper middle skirt).

o (d) Pressurizer level trending to 22% (VB2, middle right).

o (may adjust charging to maintain level 22% to 60%).

o (e) May energize pressurizer heaters (CC1, lower left).

SRO/ATC

  • Reads CAUTION regarding Aux Spray and notes as N/A (Aux Spray not in service).
  • (5) Checks Pressurizer pressure control:

o (a) Pressure greater than 1850 psig (VB2, far right).

o (b) Pressure stable or trending to 2235 psig (VB2)(CC2).

o (b RNO) Directs closing of PCV-455C block valve, MOV-8000B, if not already completed (VB2 lower right)**

    • (Critical Task) (S3CT-1) Close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV prior rupture of the PRT.)

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks S/G NR levels greater than 15%:

o (a) Reports all S/G NR levels greater than 15%, but lowering (VB3, upper middle).

o (b) Reports with no AFW flow (VB3, upper middle).

o (c, d) Checks TD AFW Pump required for heat removal.

Reports TD AFW pump is tripped on overspeed (VB3, center skirt).

SRO

  • Directs transition to EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink".

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 11 of 14 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink")

SRO Enters EOP FR-H.1 (LOSHS) due to loss of AFW (complete) and low S/G levels.

SRO/BOP * (1) Determines total feedflow less than 435 gpm is NOT the result of operator actions.

SRO/ATC * (2) Determines Secondary Heat Sink is required.

o (2.a) RCS Pressure is GREATER than any intact S/G ; (RCS pressure (VB2); S/G pressure (VB3)).

o (2.b) RCS Hot Leg Temp is GREATER than 350oF; (VB2, lower (chart recorder)).

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks at least one ECCS CCP available.

o (3.a) CCP 1-2 is either available or in service.

SRO/BOP * (4) Tries to establish AFW flow to at least one S/G:

o (4.a) Verifies Blowdown and Sample isolation valves outside containment are closed (VB3, lower left skirt).

o (4.b.1) Verifies CST level is GREATER than 10% (VB3, middle).

o (4.b.2) Verifies none of the AFW pumps are running (VB3, middle).

o (4.b-c RNOs) Dispatches operators to locally check lineups and investigate pump trips; May check on status on getting AFW 1-2 returned to service.

SRO/ATC * (5) Stops all four RCPs (VB2, right).

SRO/BOP * (6) Notes Condenser is NOT available due to loss of both CWPs (no vacuum).

  • (6 RNO) Adjusts 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 12 of 14 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", continued)

SRO/BOP

  • Reads CAUTION regarding monitoring of Hotwell level.
  • (7.a) Checks at least one Condensate Booster Pump Set running in recirc (VB3, center skirt).

SRO/ATC * (7.b) Takes manual control of all Main Feedwater Reg Valves and Main Feedwater Reg Valves Bypasses and sets demand to zero (DFWCS HMI on CC3).

SRO/BOP * (7.c) Checks Feedwater Isolation Valves open (VB3, lower left).

  • (7.d) Determines Main Feedwater is NOT available (Condenser NOT available)

(PK08-14 NOT lit) and goes to step 9 (Establish Feed from Condensate System).

SRO/ATC Reads CAUTIONS before step 9.a regarding blocking/unblocking of automatic SI actuation.

Reads NOTE regarding parallel performance of S/G and RCS depressurization (steps 9.c in parallel with steps 9.a-b) and the need to stop S/G depressurization if PK06-06 comes in before SI signal are blocked (needed to prevent unwanted SI):

  • (9.a.1) Depressurizes RCS to less than 1915 PSIG (P-11) using PCV-456 (VB2, lower right vertical).
  • (9.a.2) After P-11 actuates (PK08-06), blocks RCS low pressure SI ((2) train switches) and low steamline pressure SI signals ((2) train switches)(CC2).
  • (9.a.3) Maintains RCS pressure below P-11 (1500 and 1865 PSIG) using PORV (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (9.b.1) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation Valves OPEN (VB3, lower left)**

  • (9.b.2) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation signal OFF (PK09-11); resets as needed (VB3, center).
    • (Critical Task) (Part of S3CT-2, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G prior to reaching bleed and feed criteria).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 13 of 14 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", continued)

SRO/BOP * (9.b.2) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation signal OFF (PK09-11); resets as needed (VB3, center).

SRO/ATC * (9.b.3) Throttles open Main Feedwater Reg Valves OR Main Feedwater Bypass Valves** (CC3 DFWCS HMI).

    • (Critical Task) (Part of S3CT-2, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G prior to reaching bleed and feed criteria).

SRO/BOP * (9.b.4) Bypasses feedwater heaters and condensate demineralizers (FCV-55 and FCV-230) (VB3, skirt, lower right).

Note 1: Once the crew has successfully opened one of the 10% dump valves to 90% or greater, a corresponding safety will temporarily lift, causing pressure to lower faster, and then reseat. This malfunction is added to reduce scenario run time where the crew has no verifiable actions to perform and is simply monitoring the depressurization.

SRO/BOP

  • Reads CAUTION before step 9.c regarding potential for low Tave Feedwater Isolation.
  • Reads NOTE about Low Tavg causing Feedwater Isolation and the need to reopen feedwater valves.
  • (9.c) Depressurizes ONE intact S/G to LESS THAN 490 PSIG at MAXIMUM RATE**

o (9.c.1) Verifies all MSIV and MSIV bypass valves closed (VB3, lower left).

o (9.c.2) Places one 10% dump valve in manual and opens to 90% or greater; Red indicator light ON, green indicator light OFF (VB3, middle)**

    • (Critical Task) (Part of S3CT-2, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G prior to reaching bleed and feed criteria).

SRO/ATC o (9.c.3) Checks charging in service; may maximize during depressurization to prevent losing Pressurizer level during the cooldown.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 13 of 18 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 14 of 14 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", continued)

SRO/BOP o (9.c.4) Establishes feedflow to at least one S/G (VB3)**

o (9.c.5) Stabilizes depressurized S/G pressure at 480 PSIG (VB3).

Sets depressurized S/G 10% dump valve setpoint to current S/G pressure, approx. 40% (or below) on controller.

Returns controller to AUTO.

    • (Critical Task) (Part of S3CT-2, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G prior to reaching bleed and feed criteria).

Terminate the scenario once feedwater flow from the Condensate System is established, per the Lead Examiner L181 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 14 of 18 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE IC-10 100%; MOL, CB - See Turnover Sheet X Setup N/A AFW 1-2 OOS Verify Liquid Rad Discharge and Chlorination lamicoids lined up to the 1-2 Train The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements Set CCP 1-2 boron concentration within 10 ppm of current boron concentration.

Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; Foldout Pages; AR PK01-01, PK01-03, PK04-16, PK05-01,02,03,04, PK13-01, OP O-4, O-28, AP-7, AP-10, AP-17, AP-25, EOP E-0, E-0.1, ECA-0.3, FR-H.1 Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up Provide Booth with copies of PK13-01 and AP-7 X 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, min 960 iterations (30 sec).

Critical Task Specific Data Capture:

  • S3CT1: 8000B position and PRT parameters
  • S3CT2: Feedwater iso, reg, and bypass valve positions; 10% steam dump valve positions; S/G feedflow; S/G pressures; CETCs.

X 0 min Lesson L181 NRC-S3.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc.

by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X Evt-1: CCP 1-3 OC Trip Aux Watch reports burnt electrical smell in CCP 1-3 pump room.

(approx. 3 min after Turbine Watch reports no issues noted.

taking watch per lead examiner)

X Evt-2: ASW Pp 1-1 ASW 1-1 shaft seizure and OC trip; ASW 1-2 autostart failure.

Shaft Seizure (once Evt-1 TS addressed per lead examiner)

X Evt-3: Intake Screen When contacted as Intake watch:

High DP (once Evt-2

  • Report Kelp attack; All screen running but heavily loaded.

TS addressed per lead examiner)

X Evt-4: CWPs Trip CWP 1-1 trips 30 seconds after FCV-110A starts to open (boration for ramp)

(Major) (triggers 30 triggering programmed ramp.

secs after start of CWP 1-2 trips @ 1080 MW.

boration)

X Evt-5: 4kV Bus F Diff 4kV Bus F Differential Trip - Loss of AFW 1-3 (part of Loss of Heat Sink).

(post trip)

(cont on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 15 of 18 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION Evt-6:PCV-455C PORV fails 30% open.

partial opening (post trip)

Evt-7 (TDAFW trip): When contacted, report FCV-152 trip handle shattered.

(post trip)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 16 of 18 Rev 1

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1187 MWe Power Level: 100% Net Generation: 1137 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.7 SW 5.7 NE 5.7 SE 5.8 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW EMERGENT WORK:

  • MDAFW 1-2 OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test.

SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

  • TS 3.7.5.B MDAFW 1-2, OOS due in 68 hours7.87037e-4 days <br />0.0189 hours <br />1.124339e-4 weeks <br />2.5874e-5 months <br />.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

  • None TURNOVER ITEMS:
  • MDAFW 1-2, estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

Shift Foreman Turnover 0B ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

  • There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

TURNOVER ITEMS:

  • U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.
  • U-2: maintain 100%.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

  • Time in core life: _MOL_.
  • Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 3 days.
  • Boron concentration is _906 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
  • Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.
  • The last dilution was completed _30 minutes ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

  • None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS
  • None

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 Op-Test No: L181 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 75% Power, MOL with D/G 1-2 OOS Turnover: At 75% power for SCCW HX Clearance Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 XMT_RMS3_3 1E+06 TS, I RE-3 spurious spike followed by high failure (AR delIA XMT_RMS3_3 2 delay=15 (BOP, PK11-21, ECG 39.3.D).

SRO)

XMT_RMS3_3 1e+06 cd='H_RM_C08B_1' delay=15 2 XMT_CVC19_3 0.0 ramp=120 I (ATC, LT-112 Fails Low (auto make-up) (OP AP-19, AP-5).

SRO) 3 MAL_RCS3B .07 TS, C 70 gpm RCS leak on Loop 2; increased to 90 gpm MAL_RCS3B .09 cd='h_v2_265r_1 or (ALL) on start of 2nd CCP (OP AP-1, TS 3.4.13.A).

h_v2_264r_1' delay=60 ramp=10 4 MAL_SEI1 0.21 ramp=10 C Seismic event causing Full Load Rejection (OP AP-MAL_GEN4_3 TRIP delay=10 cd='jmlsei1' (ALL) 2, AP-25).

LOA_SYD6 OPEN delay=15 cd='jmlsei1' LOA_SYD7 OPEN delay=15 cd='jmlsei1' LOA_SYD8 OPEN delay=15 cd='jmlsei1' 5 MAL_ROD13 TRUE cd='fnispr lt 55' M Auto rod control insertion failure requiring reactor (ALL) trip (OP AP-2).

6 MAL_SYD2 0 cd='fnispr lt 5' delay=2 M Loss of all A/C power.

(ALL)

MAL_EPS4E_2 DIFFERENTIAL cd='h_v4_217r_1' MAL_DEG1C_2 NO_RESET cd='H_V4_224R_1' 7 VLV_AFW7_1 1 C TDAFW Pump fails to autostart - manual start (BOP) required.

DelIA VLV_AFW7_1 2 cd='V3_219S_3'

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L181 NRC ES-D-1-04 r0.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Event 7) 1
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4
4. Major transients (1-2) (Events 5,6) 2
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (ECA-0.0, ECA-0.2) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA-0.0, ECA-0.2) 2
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (S4CT-1) Establish a minimum of 435 gpm After the initial RCS cooldown, decay heat
  • WCAP-17711-NP, CT-23 AFW flow before S/G reach dryout increases the RCS temperature. Without an
  • ECA-0.0 Background condition of 10% WR by starting the adequate secondary heat sink to support natural Document (HECA00BG),

turbine drive AFW pump (AFW Pp 1-1). circulation, the S/Gs could not support any Rev. 3.

significant plant cooldown. Thus the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncovery.

(S4CT-2) Energize at least one vital AC bus Failure to restore vital AC power from an available

  • WCAP-17711-NP, CT-24 from prior to implementation of FLEX source when available represents an unnecessary
  • ECA-0.0 Background strategies (ECA-0.0, step 10 RNO) continuation of a degraded electrical condition and Document (HECA00BG),

associated with entry into Extended Loss of unnecessarily complicates the mitigation strategy Rev. 3.

AC Power Event (ELAP) conditions (S4CT-3) Establish flow from at least one Failure to manually start at least one

  • WCAP-17711-NP, CT-7 high head injection pump prior to transition high/intermediate head injection pump under the out of ECA-0.2. postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded core cooling capacity.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-04 r0.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 0

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. RE-3 (Oily Water Separator Effluent Line Radiation Monitor) spikes high momentarily, bringing in annunciator AR PK11-21, High Radiation. The crew identifies the signal as spurious and performs a reset of RM-3 per PK11-21, section 2.1.4. RE-3A fails high shortly after the reset and cannot be cleared. Shift Foreman enters ECG 39.3.D, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (30 days).
2. Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT-112 fails low, causing a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured, and makeup is accomplished (if needed) using manual mode (or enabling the auto mode for short periods).

Crew may elect to use OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel to take manual control of Makeup Control System.

3. A 70 gpm RCS leak develops, requiring entry in OP AP-1, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage.

Pressure. The leak increases to 90 gpm when a second charging pump is started and letdown must be isolated. VCT level can be maintained at the current leak rate, however, and the crew determines a plant shutdown is required. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.4.13.A, RCS Operational Leakage (4 hrs).

4. A significant seismic event results in a full load rejection on Unit 1. The crew recognizes the condition based on numerous power level alarms and the ensuing secondary side transient. The crew monitors primary and secondary system responses, most notably rod control, steam dumps, and digital feedwater, to ensure all systems respond appropriately in automatic. Shift Foreman implements OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection to stabilize the plant.
5. During the ramp down, automatic rod motion stops and the Shift Foreman directs a Reactor trip.
6. Startup power is lost on the trip followed by a bus differential fault on vital 4kV bus H. Diesel Generator 1-3 trips and cannot be reset. The crew transitions to EOP ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power.
7. The turbine driven AFW pump fails to autostart requiring the crew to perform the critical task of manually starting the pump (S4CT-1) Establish a minimum of 435 gpm AFW flow before S/Gs reach dryout conditions.
8. Energy Trading informs the crew that 230kV start up power is not available, but 500 kV is expected back shortly. The crew performs actions to isolate RCP seal cooling.
9. Power is restored to vital 4kV buses F and G following the guidance of ECA-0.0, Appendix DD (Backfeed from 500kV Power) (S4CT-2) Energize at least one vital AC bus from prior to implementation of FLEX strategies.
10. The crew transitions to ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power with SI Required where they manually start safeguards equipment. The crew performs the final scenario critical task (S4CT-3) Establish flow from at least one high head injection pump.

The scenario is terminated once injection flow is established.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-04 r0.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 16 Event

Description:

Perform Weekly Aux Building Supply and Exhaust Fan Swap Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP H-1:II, "Auxiliary Building Safeguards Ventilation (ABVS) - Normal Operation")

BOP

  • Reads Caution regarding starting of fan shortly after shutdown.
  • Reads Note regarding Buildings and Safeguards mode.
  • (6.1.1) Notes fans have been off for at least five minutes prior to start.
  • (6.1.2) Places Exhaust Fan Select Switch to E-2 and allows it to spring return to neutral.

Notes indicator light change (VB4).

  • (6.1.3) Places Supply Fan Select Switch to S-32 and allows it to spring return to neutral.

Notes indicator light change (VB4).

  • (6.1.4) Notes correct fan operation indicated on AFHBVS Monitor (VB4).

Note: E-2 trips 15 seconds after S-32 is started.

(AR PK15-17, "AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE") if used, else N/A SRO/ATC

  • Enters AR PK15-17, "Aux & FHB Vent Pwr Failure" for input 276, Aux Bldg Exh Fan E-2 UV or Lo Flo POV2.

SRO/BOP * (2.2) Fan Low Flow or Fan UV.

  • Reads NOTE regarding AC control power supplies.

o (2.2.1) Checks that redundant exhaust fan train started automatically.

(2.2.1.a) Notes E-1 restarts after slight delay.

(2.2.1.b) Checks for correct damper alignment.

(2.2.1.c) Dispatches an Operator to investigate and determine the cause of the fan failure.

(2.2.1.d) Notes not running in Safeguards Only mode.

o (2.2.2-2.2.4) N/A.

o (2.2.5) Refers to TS 3.7.12.B for one ABVS train inoperable. Required action:

Restore ABVS train to Operable status (7 days).

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 1 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 16 Event

Description:

Perform Weekly Aux Building Supply and Exhaust Fan Swap (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK15-16, "Aux and FHB Vent Sys") if used, else N/A SRO/ATC

  • Enters AR PK15-16, "Aux & FHB Vent Sys" for input 311, AFHBVS Trouble POV2.

SRO/BOP

  • Reads note regarding operation of Tricon HMI screens on VB4.
  • (2.1) AFHBVS POV Trouble Alarms.

o (2.2.1) Checks that redundant exhaust fan train started automatically.

o (2.1.2) Contacts I&C to investigate trouble alarms.

o (2.1.3) N/A o (2.1.4) May check for individual alarm input as follows:

(2.1.4.a) Selects Active Alarms screen on Tricon HMI (VB4).

(2.1.4.b) Refers to Attachment 2 for individual alarm description.

o (2.1.5-2.1.6) N/A o (2.1.7) Refers to TS 3.7.12.B for one ABVS train inoperable. Required action:

Restore ABVS train to Operable status (7 days).

(AR PK16-22, "480V BUS 1H") if used, else N/A SRO/ATC

  • Enters AR PK16-22, "480V Bus 1H" for input 301, 480V Bus-1H Mtrs TOL Trip.

SRO/BOP * (2.3) Motor Thermal Overload:

o (2.3.1) Determines E-2 is the load that tripped.

o (2.3.2) Verifies E-1 started automatically.

o (2.3.3) May refer to OPS Policy B-2, "Electrical Alarm Relay Responses," to address the overload.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs are addressed, per Lead Examiner

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 2 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 16 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of makeup control failure is made by one or more of the following:

  • Automatic makeup is running, but VCT level shows normal (LT-114) (PPC as L0112A, HSDP).
  • LT-112 shows low level (0%), but VCT pressure shows normal, and CCP operation (suction) is normal (all on VB2).
  • Yokogawa recorder (L0112A) (VB2 upper left).

ATC Takes Makeup Control to STOP (on the makeup control HMI, CC2) (may be done before or during entry into AP).

SRO Implements OP AP-19, "Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System" or OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel".

(For OP AP-19, "Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System"), if entered, else N/A SRO/ATC * (1.a) Ensures M/U set to correct mode (AUTO and stopped based on unwarranted makeup) (CC2).

  • (1.b) Determines auto makeup should NOT be selected to start due to undesired makeup operation.

SRO/BOP * (2) Checks makeup system pumps and valves lineup up, and in AUTO (VB2, lower center).

ATC/BOP * (3) Verifies VCT level channels OPERABLE:

o Observes discrepancy between LT-112 (0%), and LT-114 (normal level).

o May use VCT pressure and/or normal CCP operation to diagnose that LT-112 has failed.

ALL * (3 RNO) May refer to Appendix A, "Guide to Failed VCT Level Channel", step 1.b.1 to determine what effect the failed LT-112 will have on makeup system operation.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 3 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 16 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup) (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-19, "Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System", continued)

ATC/BOP * (4) Verifies CCP suction parameters are normal (CCP flow/amps/ pressure, VCT level/pressure; VB2 and CC2 meters) (as time permits).

SRO * (5) Notifies Tech Maintenance to troubleshoot and repair (as time permits).

(For OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel") if entered, else N/A SRO/ATC * (1) Confirms that Makeup Controller was NOT controlling properly in Auto and has been taken to manual (CC2).

o Refers to Attachment 5.2, "Process Control System Racks", for indications and controls affected.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF).

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2).

  • (4) Determines Steam Dump valves are controlling properly.

SRO * (5) Contacts I&C to investigate.

  • Reads caution regarding Eagle 21 design feature and notes it does not apply.
  • (6) Ensures affected channel is removed from service prior to performing maintenance.
  • (7) Uses Attachments 5.1 and 5.2 to determine affected indicators and evaluate TS/ECGs. Determines no TS impact.

Proceed to the next event once Make-up control system in STOP, per the lead examiner.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 4 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 16 Event

Description:

70 gpm RCS Leak on Loop 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses RCS leak from one or more of the following:

  • Drain and/or Sump high level alarms (PK15-01)
  • Pzr level lowering (PPC, CC2 recorder, VB2 meters)
  • Charging flow demand and/or low level deviation alarms (PK05-21)
  • Containment parameters slowly rising (temp, press) (PPC, VB1 recorder, PAMS panels)

Note: Leak starts instantaneously at 70 gpm. The crew may raise charging by opening FCV-128 and adjusting HCV-142 (CC2) in order to maintain pressurizer level prior to entering OP AP-1, "Excess Reactor Coolant System Leakage".

SRO Enters OP AP-1, "Excess Reactor Coolant System Leakage".

(OP AP-1, Excess Reactor Coolant System Leakage)

SRO/ATC * (1.a) Determines pressurizer level and charging flow are NOT normal.

o Charging flow is elevated and pressurizer level is slowly lowering (CC2).

  • (1.a) Adjusts charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level.

o May adjust seal flows using HCV-142 (CC2) to maintain 8-13 gpm.

o May raise charging in manual using master level controller (HC-459D)(CC2) or flow controller (FCV-128)(CC2).

Note: Monitoring Pressurizer level and charging flow - NORMAL is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e. unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO/ATC * (1.a) Determines pressurizer level is still lowering (Continuous Action to Monitor).

SRO/BOP * (1.a.1 RNO) Starts second charging pump (VB2, Lower middle skirt).

SRO/ATC * (1.a.2 RNO) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level:

o Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC1).

o Determines pressurizer level has stabilized (PPC, VB2, CC2).

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 5 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 16 Event

Description:

70 gpm RCS Leak on Loop 2 (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-1, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage, continued)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks RCS pressure greater than 2210 psig and stable (VB2) ( 2220-2250 psig).

  • (3) Determines RCS Makeup can keep up with leak.

o Makeup Control is in AUTO (CC2).

o VCT Level is stable (PPC, VB2 RCDR-4 just below DRPI).

Note: Remainder of procedure focuses on identifying the actual leak location and is not part of the scenario design. The procedure does not direct review of Tech Specs until after the leak location has been identified and may need to be addressed as a follow up question.

SRO If not already completed, reviews T.S. 3.4.13.A, RCS Operational Leakage - RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE. Required actions: Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits within 4 hrs.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs are addressed, per Lead Examiner

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 6 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 16 Event

Description:

Seismically Induced Full Load Rejection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Seismic event initiates load rejection; it is not intended that the crew respond in detail to the earthquake.

ALL Crew Diagnoses Earthquake from the following:

  • Physical shaking of room
  • PK15-24, "Seismic Instr System" Crew Diagnoses load rejection based on the following:
  • Generator load dropping
  • Generator output breakers open.
  • Steam Dumps activated
  • Rods stepping in SRO Implements OP AP-2, "Full Load Rejection".

(OP AP-2, "Full Load Rejection")

SRO Reads CAUTION regarding need for manual trip if deliberate operator action to stabilize the plant ON LINE is unlikely.

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1).

  • (2) Verifies proper operation of steam dumps, Tave trending to Tref (VB3, red/green indicator lights; Tave/Tref from CC1 recorder/PPC).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks MFP suction adequate:

o (3.a) Notes standby Condensate/booster pump set did not autostart and manually starts pump set (VB3, lower, center).

o (3.b) Determines MFP suction is NOT adequate (PPC, VB3 meter).

MFP suction should recover after standby Condensate/booster pump is started

  • (4) Checks DFWCS in AUTO and controlling S/G levels (CC3 MFW HMI, VB3, PPC):

o (4.a) Determines MFW control and bypass valves in have failed to manual.

o (4.a RNO) Directs Reactor Trip.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 7 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5,7 Page 8 of 16 Event

Description:

Manual Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" )

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1).

  • (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kV bus status (VB4, white lights on mimic buses).

o Reports all vital 4kV buses de-energized.

SRO

  • Directs Transition to ECA-0.0, "Loss of All Vital AC Power".

(ECA-0.0, "Loss of All Vital AC Power")

SRO/ATC * (1) Re-verifies reactor trip; trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

  • (2) Re-verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO Reads notes regarding CSF Status Trees being monitored for INFO only and need for radios.

SRO/ATC * (3) Performs RCS isolation steps:

o (3a) Ensures letdown isolated (VB2):

Verifies 8149C closed.

May close LCV-459/460.

o (3b) Checks Pzr PORVs closed (VB2).

o (3c) Checks Excess Letdown isolated (8166/8167, VB2 lower far right).

o (3d) Ensures NSSS sample valves closed (VB1 lower left):

Closes NSSS Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valves (9355A/B).

Closes NSSS RCS Sample Isolation Valves (9356A/B).

(continued on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 8 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 9 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of All A/C Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.0, "Loss of All Vital AC Power", continued)

Note: Once started, TDAFW will require stationing of local operators to control the TDAFP LCVs.

SRO/BOP * (4) Verifies AFW status.

o Checks AFW flow is not > 435 gpm (VB3 upper center meters, SPDS).

o Starts TDAFW pump by opening FCV-95 (VB4).

Note: Shift Foreman may authorize an attempted reset of the shutdown relay and DG start for D/G 1-3 or will dispatch field operators to walk down the diesel prior to attempting restoration. D/G 1-3 will not reset.

SRO/BOP * (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus.

o (5.a) Attempts to start D/Gs.

Depresses D/G Shutdown Relay & Alarm Reset for D/G 1-3 (yellow lamicoid, just below associated diesel tachometer, VB4).

Notes PK18-15 does not clear (D/G 1-3).

o (5.a) Dispatches field operators to attempt local start of D/G 1-3.

Note: If the crew enquires about grid status, GCC reports 230kV has experienced significant damage. 500kV is available. Crew may also determine 500kV is available by checking Sync voltage on CC3.

SRO/BOP o (5.b RNO) Implements Appendix DD, "Backfeed from 500KV System" (see page 15).

Note: The Shift Foreman will continue on through ECA-0.0, emphasizing step 6 (continuous action to check for any 4kV vital bus energized), while Appendix DD is implemented to restore power. Once 4kV power is restored, crew will exit ECA-0.0 and enter ECA-0.2, "Loss of All AC Power With SI Required" (see page 12).

SRO/ATC * (7) Isolates RCP Seal Cooling:

o Reads note regarding RCP seal isolation prior to starting a CCP or CCW pump.

o (7.a) Directs field operators to close seal injection valves:

CVCS-8382A, Filter 1-2 Outlet.

CVCS-8382B, Filter 1-1 Outlet.

CVCS-8387A, Filter Bypass.

o (7.b) Directs field operators to close CVCS-8396A, Seal Return Filter Inlet Isol.

o (7.c) Directs field operators to close FCV-357, RCP Therm Bar CCW Return Isol.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 9 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of All A/C Power (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.0, "Loss of All Vital AC Power", continued)

SRO/ATC * (8) Controls Turbine driven AFW flow to limit the cooldown:

o (8.a) Checks S/G Level GREATER THAN 15% in at least one intact S/G.

o (8.b) Dispatches field operator to throttle LCVs locally.

o (8.c) Maintains S/G N/R level between 20%-65%.

SRO

  • Reads caution about resetting SI before loading 4kV loads if necessary.
  • Reads caution about safety hazard if bus is energized during load stripping.

SRO/ATC * (9) Isolates safeguards loads from deenergized vital buses:

o Installs control switch interlocks on the following:

4KV Vital Bus F 4KV Vital Bus G 4KV Vital Bus H

  • ASW Pump 1-1
  • ASW Pump 1-2
  • CS Pump 1-2
  • SI Pump 1-1
  • CS Pump 1-1
  • SI Pump 1-2
  • AFW Pump 1-2 o Ensures Standby Select switches are in MANUAL:

ASW Pump 1-1 and 1-2 CCW Pump 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 o Places all CFCU Speed Select switches in LOW AND dispatches operators to open all CFCU breakers.

CFCU No. 1-1 52-1F-02 CFCU No. 1-2 52-1F-01 CFCU No. 1-3 52-1G-01 CFCU No. 1-4 52-1H-01 CFCU No. 1-5 52-1G-02 Note: On completion of Appendix DD, Shift Foreman will implement continuous action step 6 and go to step 28.

SRO/BOP * (28) Determines at least one 4kV vital bus is energized.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 10 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of All A/C Power (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.0, "Loss of All Vital AC Power", continued)

SRO/ATC * (29) Checks S/G pressure:

o Maintains pressure using 10% steam dumps.

SRO/BOP

  • Reads CAUTION regarding overloading capacity of power sources.
  • (30) Ensures following realigned/loaded on energized vital buses:

o 480 volt bus - energized.

o 125 V DC batteries and associated battery chargers.

SRO

  • Reads NOTE regarding RCP seal cooling.
  • (31) Identifies ECA-0.2, "Loss of All AC Power With SI Required" as the appropriate recovery procedure.

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 11 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 16 Event

Description:

Start Engineered Safeguards Systems Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.2, "Loss of All Vital AC With SI Required")

SRO

  • Reads CAUTION regarding CSF Status Trees being monitored for INFO only prior to the completion of step 11.
  • Reads NOTE regarding waiting for restoration of multiple buses before continuing on in the procedure.

Note: May use monitor light box test switch to view valve status.

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures SI RESET (status lights, VB1 and PK08-21 out).

  • (2) Checks RWST level greater than 33%. (VB1)
  • (3) Manually aligns SI valves to establish injection alignment:

o (3.a) Checks Monitor Light Box A - White lights out (VB1).

o (3.b) Checks Monitor Light Box C - White lights out (VB1).

o (3.c) Ensures CCP recirc valves, 8105 and 8106 are OPEN.

  • (4) Checks RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Isolation status:

o (4.a) Checks all CCW pumps not running (VB1).

o (4.b) Notes/verifies FCV-357 closed per earlier direction (VB1).

SRO/BOP * (5) Manually loads Safeguards Equipment on vital 4kV buses F and G:

o (5.a) Checks vital 4Kv auto transfer relays reset - blue lights out (VB4).

SRO/ATC o (5.b) Ensures ASW pump standby select switches in MANUAL (VB1):

ASW Pump 1-1 ASW Pump 1-2 o (5.c) Ensures CCW pump standby select switches in MANUAL (VB1):

CCW Pump 1-1 CCW Pump 1-2 CCW Pump 1-3 o (5.d) Removes interlocks from ASW pump control switches and manually starts pumps (VB4):

ASW Pump 1-1 ASW Pump 1-2 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 16 Event

Description:

Start Engineered Safeguards Systems, (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.2, "Loss of All Vital AC Power", continued)

SRO/ATC * (5) Manually loads Safeguards Equipment on vital 4kV buses F and G (cont):

o (5.e) Removes interlocks from CCW pump control switches (VB1):

CCW Pump 1-1 CCW Pump 1-2 CCW Pump 1-3 (may leave interlock due to 4kV bus H differential)

SRO/BOP (5.e.4) Ensures following valve alignments:

  • (5.e.4.a) Letdown orfice stop valve, 8149A, B, C: CLOSED.
  • (5.e.4.b) Excess letdown isolation valves, 8166 or 8167:

CLOSED.

  • (5.e.4.c) RCS and PZR sample isolation valves:

o 9354A/B CLOSED o 9355A/B CLOSED o 9356A/B CLOSED Note: May elect to leave RHR Pump shutdown since RCS is above pump shutoff head.

SRO/ATC * (5) Manually loads Safeguards Equipment on vital 4kV buses F and G:

  • (5.e.5) Manually starts ONE CCW pump.

o (5.f) Removes interlocks from RHR pump control switches and manually starts available pump (VB1):

RHR Pump 1-1 RHR Pump 1-2 (may leave interlock due to 4kV bus H differential) o (5.g) Removes interlocks from SI pump control switches and manually starts available pump (VB1):

SI Pump 1-1 SI Pump 1-2 (may leave interlock due to 4kV bus H differential)

(continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 13 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 16 Event

Description:

ECA-0.2, "Loss of All AC Power With SI Required", (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.2, "Loss of All Vital AC Power", continued)

SRO/ATC o (5.h.1-5) Ensures all CFCUs selected to LOW speed and breakers closed.

o (5.h.6) Manually starts CFCUs:

CFCU 1-1 CFCU 1-2 CFCU 1-3 CFCU 1-4 (may leave interlock due to 4kV bus H differential)

CFCU 1-5

  • (6) Checks if ECCS CCPs should be started:

o (6.a) Checks all ECCS CCPs STOPPED (VB2).

o (6.b) Notes seal injection valves CVCS-8382A, 8382B, and 8387A reported CLOSED by field operators.

o (6.c.1-2) Removes interlocks from ECCS charging pump control switches.

o (6.c.3) Manually starts one available pump: (S4CT-2)**

CCP 1-1 Or CCP 1-2

    • (Critical Task) (S4CT-2) Establish flow from at least one high head injection pump prior to transition out of ECA-0.2.

The scenario may be terminated once Safety Injection flow is verified.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 14 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of All A/C Power (continued) - Appendix DD, "Backfeed from 500KV System" Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP * (1) Determines 500kV power is available:

o Checks Sycn bus volts approximately 120V (uses sync key on CB 532 or 632; CC3).

BOP * (2) Ensures Main Generator Exciter Field Breaker - OPEN (CC3).

  • (3) Opens Motor Operated Disconnect (CC3).
  • (4) Cuts out Generator Protective Relay Toggle Switches (VB4):

o 62AMG1/62AMG11, Anti o 21G1, Main Gen Backup Motoring o 3XG1/3XG11, Sequential o 46G1, Negative Sequence o 87YG1, Differential o 81G1/T3, UF-55HZ o 51RU, Unit Runback Fail Trip o 38G1, Turbine Thrust Bearing Wear o 94LSL1, Loss of System Load o 81G1/T2, UF-57HZ o 40G1, Loss of Field o 81G1/T1, UF-58HZ o 59G1, Overvoltage o OXP2\K3, Over Excitation o 59NG1, Neutral Running o 51E1, Exciter Overcurrent Overvoltage o 51STU1, Unit S/U Overcurrent o 78G1, Main Gen Out of Step BOP * (5) Directs field operator to cutout the following Generator Protective Relay Switches in the back of Generator Relay Board RG Section 1 (128ft Cable Spreading Room):

o 62GSC3-TCO, Low Flow and Run Back Failure Trip Cutout o 62GSC4-TCO, Mn Gen Stator Amps Cutout o ANS2CX-TCO, Stator Cooling Water Low Flow Condct Hi Trip Cutout o 62GSC5-TCO, Stator Cooling Water Flow Greater than 60 min Trip Cutout (continued on next page)

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 15 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of All A/C Power - Appendix DD, "Backfeed from 500KV System" (continued)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP * (6) Ensures the Gen Output Bkrs Reset Pushbutton (VB4) - Blue Light OFF.

  • (7) Resets Unit Trip Lockout Relays (VB4):

o 86G1 o 86G11

  • (8) Closes the 500kV output breakers (CC3):

o CB 532 o CB 632

  • (9) Cuts out 4kV vital bus autotransfer to startup switches (VB4):

o Bus G o Bus F

  • (10) Ensures the 4kV vital bus autotransfer relays are reset (VB4):

o Bus G - Blue light off.

o Bus F - Blue light off.

  • (11) Contacts field operators to ensure safe conditions in the switchgear rooms for energizing 4kV vital buses:

o Breaker cubicles - doors closed.

o Personnel clear of 4kV vital buses.

  • (12) Ensures 4kV Bus F and G Startup Feeder breakers and D/G Feeder breakers are OPEN.

Note: Board Operator will update the crew prior to energizing the vital buses.

BOP * (13) Closes 4kV Aux Feeder Breakers on available buses (VB4): (S4CT-1)**

o Bus G, 52-HG-13 o Bus F, 52-HF-13

  • (14) Reviews OP J-2:V, "Backfeeding the Unit from the 500kV System" for additional actions as time permits.
    • (Critical Task) (S4CT-1) Energize at least one vital AC bus from prior to implementation of FLEX strategies (ECA-0.0, step 10 RNO) associated with entry into Extended Loss of AC Power Event (ELAP) conditions.

The scenario may be terminated once Safety Injection flow is verified.

    • Critical Task L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 16 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE IC-11 75%; MOL, CB - See Turnover Sheet (Alt - Use IC-11 and swap ASW trains (1-2 in service w/1-1 shut down; may use Swap2ASWP2.lsn or perform manually)

X Setup N/A D/G 1-2 OOS; Verify ABVS supply fan S-31 and exhaust fan E-1 in service.

Check for OOS stickers from LT-112 failure in prior run of scenario.

The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements STP I-1C - Completed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago, due in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; Foldout Pages; OP J-2:V, PK03-17, PK11-21, AP-1, AP-2, AP-5, AP-19, EOP E-0, ECA-0.0, ECA-0.2 Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up X 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, min 960 iterations (30 sec).

Critical Task Specific Data Capture:

  • S4CT1: Vital 4kV Bus Voltage
  • S4CT2: ECCS Injection Flow X 0 min Lesson L181 NRC-S4.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc.

by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X Evt-1: E-2 OC Trip E-2 trips 15 seconds after S-32 is started.

during fan swap If dispatched to check fan, report smell of burnt insulation in fan room.

(approx. 3 min after taking watch per lead examiner)

X Evt-2: LT-112 Fails Causes auto make-up.

Low (once Evt-1 ECG addressed, per Lead Examiner)

X Evt-3: RCS Leak Bottom of loop 2 cold leg.

(once Evt -2 auto makeup secured, per Lead Examiner)

X Evt-4: Seismically Full Load Rejection following large seismic event.

induced Full Load Rejection (once Evt-3 boration complete and TS addressed, per lead examiner)

X Evt-5: Low MFP Low MFP Suction caused by Htr 2 drip pump shaft shear, OC trip of suction pressure and CBP 1-2, and standby CBP autostart failure (manual start works)

DFWC fails to manual.(Major) (DFW DFWCS fails to manual from PT 508A & B loss of pwr (2 of 3 PCS input control failure triggers off transmitters).

manual start of CBP Expected response is Manual Rx Trip; Turbine/Rx will auto trip if no action set) taken by crew.

(cont on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 17 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION Evt-6: Loss of All AC Bus H Differential and loss of Startup both triggered on Rx trip.

(Major) ) D/G 1-3 shutdown relay trigger on D/G 1-3 feeder breaker close.

When directed to walkdown D/G 1-3, report back no obvious issues identified.

Once crew enters ECA-0.0, clear generator fault.

When GCC contacted, report 230 kV appears to have sustained significant damage but 500 kV is available.

Evt-7 TDAFW Pump FCV-95 fails to open in auto but can be opened manually in the C/R.

autostart failure (post trip)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 18 of 20 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 860 MWe Power Level: 75% Net Generation: 810 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.7 SW 5.7 NE 5.7 SE 5.8 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW EMERGENT WORK:

  • None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:
  • D/G 1-2 Lube oil heater replacement. TS 3.8.1 Action B - due in 6 days ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:
  • None TURNOVER ITEMS:
  • Unit is operating at 75% due to a SCCW Hx Clearance PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:
  • Complete D/G 1-2 return to service and testing following repairs.
  • Perform swap of ABVS Supply and Exhaust Fans per OP H-1:II, step 6.1.

ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

  • There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

Shift Foreman Turnover 0B TURNOVER ITEMS:

  • U-1: maintain 75% - no one in containment.
  • U-2: maintain 100%.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

  • Time in core life: _MOL_.
  • Power History: Steady State at 75% for past 3 days.
  • Boron concentration is _966 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
  • Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.
  • The last dilution was completed _30 minutes ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

  • Perform STP I-1C for D/G 1-2 OOS every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

  • None

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 5 Op-Test No: L181 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOL with CCP 1-3 cleared Turnover: At 100% power. CCP 1-3 cleared for routine maintenance. CCP 1-1 I/S.

Event Malf Event Type* Event Description No No. (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 CC01CCW_CCP11_MTFSHEAR 1 TS, C (BOP, CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (AR PK01-11; TS 3.7.7.A).

SRO) 2 MAL_CVC8A 100 ramp=60 C (ATC, SRO) Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs causing reduction in charging flow to RCP seals (AR PK04-22).

3 MAL_PPL7J 1 TS, I (BOP, Eagle 21 DFP-1 Halt in Rack 10 (OP AP-5; TS SRO) 3.3.1.E,M; 3.3.2.D, L; 3.4.11 ).

4 PK1421_0829 1 C (ALL) Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (AR PK14-21, AP-25) 5 MAL_SEI1 0.31 delay=0 ramp=15 M (ALL) Large seismic with no automatic or manual reactor MAL_PPL5A; PPL5B BOTH trip (ATWS).

6 MAL_RCS3C 10.0 cd='jmlsei1' M (ALL) SBLOCA following seismic; ramps in over 60 seconds.

delay=10 ramp=60 7 MAL_PPL1A FAILURE_TO_INIT C (BOP) Phase A - Train A and B fail to actuate requiring MAL_PPL1B FAILURE_TO_INIT manual alignment.

8 MAL_SYD2 0 cd='jpplsia' delay=15 C (ALL) Loss of Start-up power 15 seconds after Safety Injection 9 PMP_SIS2_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL C (ALL) Combination of electrical and mechanical failures cd='h_v4_218r_1' delay=3 result in no high or intermediate injection along with PMP_CVC2_1 AS_IS degraded secondary side heat removal capabilities.

BKR_EPS15 AS_IS BKR_EPS9_1 OVERCURRENT cd='H_V4_225R_1' MAL_AFW1 TRIP cd='h_v3_109m_1 gt 3000'

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L181 NRC ES-D-1-05 r0.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 9
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7,8,9) 3
3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4
4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1, FR-C.1) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-C.1) 1
7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (S5CT-1) Trip the Reactor by manually de- The safeguards systems that protect the plant
  • Westinghouse Owners energizing 480V Buses 13D and 13E within during accidents are designed assuming that only Group WCAP-17711-NP 90 seconds of AR PK04-11, Reactor Trip decay heat and pump heat are being added to the
  • Calc G.2 Rev 5 (08151-Initiate coming into alarm. RCS. Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a 2169) challenge to the subcriticality critical safety
  • OP1.ID2, Time Critical function beyond that irreparably introduced by the Operator Actions Rev 12, postulated conditions. #34.

(S5CT-2) Manually close containment Failure to perform the critical task leads to an

  • WCAP-17711-NP, CT-11 isolation valves such that at least one valve unnecessary release of fission products to the is closed on each Phase A containment auxiliary building, increasing the potential for penetration before transition out of EOP E- release to the environment and reducing
0. accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building (S5CT-3) Depressurize Steam Generators to RCS depressurization allows accumulator injection

and clear the Extreme (red path) challenge Continued secondary depressurization allows for to the Core Cooling critical status function. low head injection and a stable source of long term Core Cooling. Failure to depressurize the Steam Generators results in the crew having to rely on the lower priority action of sequentially starting RCPs which constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced as part of the scenario's design.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-05 r0.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 0

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #5

1. AR PK01-11, CCW Pp 1-1 Recirc comes into alarm for FCV-606, CCW Pump 1-1 Recirc Valve, open. Crew identifies low pump amps on VB-1 and dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate. Field reports no audible flow sound in spite of indications motor is running. CCW Pump 1-3 is started manually and CCW Pump 1-1 shutdown. TS 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, is entered for one loop of CCW inoperable (72 hrs).
2. In-service Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs, reducing flow to RCP seals and bringing in AR PK04-22, RCP Seal Inj Fltr Delta-P Hi. Reactor Operators verify CCP seal cooling is still being maintained by CCW and ATC operator throttles RCP seal injection hand control valve, HCV-142, as needed to maintain pressurizer level. Shift Foreman establishes bands for pressurizer level and confirms field operators have been dispatched to swap seal injection filters.
3. Eagle 21 experiences a Digital Filter Processor (DFP) halt on rack 10. Associated indicators PI-456, LI-460A, FI-415, FI-425, FI-435, FI-445 (VB2), and PR-445, LR-459 (CC2) fail as-is as well as control channels for PORV 456 (PT-456) and Pressurizer Level Control (LT-460). Crew responds per OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel. Shift Foreman reviews Tech Specs, entering:
  • TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC-456E, to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs).
4. Crew responds to AR PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF. A nuclear operator is dispatched to investigate local alarms and reports back that NO cooling fans or oil pumps are running on the Main Bank C Transformer.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown and directs a 50 MW/min power reduction while Maintenance and field Operators attempt to restore transformer cooling.

5. A large earthquake (0.31 g) occurs during the ramp, but the reactor fails to trip automatically. The crew performs the immediate actions of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and successfully trips the reactor by opening the breakers for 480 V buses 13D and 13E to de-energize the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) allowing control rods to fully drop into the core (S5CT-1) Trip the Reactor by manually de-energizing 480V Buses 13D and 13E.
6. A SBLOCA occurs as a result of the earthquake, but both trains of Phase A fail to actuate. The crew performs manual alignment of Phase A containment isolation valves per Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (S5CT-2) Manually close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each Phase A containment penetration.
7. Startup power is lost shortly after Safety Injection initiates and a combination of electrical and mechanical failures result in the loss of both ECCS charging pumps and safety injection pumps.

Secondary heat removal is affected as well. The turbine driven AFW pump trips on overspeed and AFW pump 1-3 has no power due to a loss of 4kV bus F.

(continued)

L181 NRC ES-D-1-05 r0.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 0

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #5

8. The crew proceeds through E-0, transitioning to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. A loss of subcooling and lowering RVLIS level eventually results in a magenta path followed quickly by a red path on the core cooling critical safety function. The crew transitions to FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling briefly, and then on to FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling.

Following the guidance of FR-C.1, the crew performs the final critical task (S5CT-3) Depressurize Steam Generators to inject SI Accumulators to re-flood the core and clear the Extreme (red path) .

The scenario is terminated once critical task S5CT-3 is complete.

L181 NRC ES-D-1-05 r0.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 16 Event

Description:

Swap to CCP-1-1 From CCP 1-3 per OP B-1A:V, Section 6.1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP

  • Reads NOTE regarding LTOP.
  • (6.1.1) Notes per Turnover Sheet, RP surveys and postings are complete.

ATC * (6.1.2) Places HC-459D in MANUAL (CC2).

BOP * (6.1.3) Starts CCP 1-1 (VB2).

  • (6.1.4) Checks CCP 1-1 amps stable (VB2).
  • (6.1.5) Shuts down CCP 1-3 (VB2.)

ATC * (6.1.6) Checks FI-128 to verify acceptable charging flow with CCP 1-1 in service (CC2).

  • (6.1.7) Adjusts Pressurizer level to program band using HCV-142 and HC-459D (CC2).
  • (6.1.8) Adjusts RCP seal flow to 8-13 gpm using HCV-142 and HC-459D (CC2).
  • (6.1.9) Returns charging to AUTO once Pressurizer level is approximately at reference (CC2).
  • (6.1.10) N/A BOP * (6.1.11) Records the date and current boron concentration for CCP 1-1 on the Abnormal Status Board.

Proceed to Next Event once seal flow adjusted, per Lead Examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 16 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: OP AP-11, "Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System" may also be referenced for guidance on starting the standby CCW Pump, however, adequate guidance is provided in the AR PK.

ATC

  • Observes PK01-11, "CCW PP 1-1 RECIRC" alarming and informs the Shift Foreman (AR PK01-11, "CCW PP 1-1, RECIRC")

SRO * (2.1) Reads note describing alarm behavior - alarm is enabled 10-30 seconds after pump is started and disabled when the pump is shut down.

o Notes alarm is active when CCW Pp 1-1 amps fall below 44 amps.

BOP * (2.1.1) Reports pump is running; motor current reading is approx 16 amps (VB1).

o May report CCW Header flow lower on all three headers (~ 4000-6000 gpm on each) (VB1).

SRO/BOP

  • Reads note describing local reset of recirc valve.
  • (2.1.2) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate.

Note: Nuclear Operator in the field will report the following: Recirc valve FCV-606 is open, but there is no sound of flow in the adjacent piping. The pump is running, but sounds unusually high pitched.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.3.a,b) Starts stand-by CCW Pp 1-3 and shuts down CCW Pp 1-1 (if not already done)(VB1).

  • (2.1.3.c) N/A
  • May use OP F-2:II, "Component Cooling Water System - Changing Over Pumps and Common Components" for guidance on swapping CCW pumps.

SRO * (2.1.3.d) Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System for one loop of CCW inoperable. Required action: restore vital loop to operable status (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 16 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-11, "Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System, Section A - Loss of a CCW Pump/High CCW System Temp") if entered, else N/A.

Note: Guidance to start the standby CCW Pump is applicable once CCW Pump 1-1 has been shutdown.

SRO * (1) Notes only (1) CCW pump is running, goes to RNO.

SRO/BOP * (1 RNO) Starts CCW Pump 1-3:

o Places STANDBY SELECT switch in MAN (VB1).

o Takes CCW Pump 1-3 START/STOP switch to START.

o Goes to Step 4.

  • (4) Ensures ASW is supplying the in-service CCW Hx:

o Checks ASW Pp 1-1 in-service with normal amps (VB1).

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 16 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 DFP-1 Halt in Rack 10 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Observes PK06-01 (PPS CHANNEL SET FAILURE) and PK06-04 (PPS TROUBLE) alarming and informs the SFM.

SRO

  • Enters OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel")

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures Primary and Secondary Control Systems Controlling Properly in AUTO.

SRO

  • Reads notes prior to Step 2.
  • (2) Determines extent of Eagle 21 Instrument Failure.

o Identifies Protection Set 2 affected by PK06-01 & PK06-04 inputs.

o Dispatches operator to locally identify affected rack per Attachment 5.3.

o Identifies instruments affected by Rack 10 malfunction Attachment 5.1.

PT-456, Pressurizer Pressure (PI-456 - VB2)(PR-455 - CC2)

LT-460, Pressurizer Level (LI-460A - VB2)(LR-459 - CC2)

FT-415, RCS Loop 1 Flow (FI-415 - VB2)

FT-425, RCS Loop 2 Flow (FI-425- VB2)

FT-435, RCS Loop 3 Flow (FI-435 - VB2)

FT-445, RCS Loop 4 Flow (FI-445 - VB2)

SRO/ATC * (3) Rotates TR-411 to channel other than Loop 2 (CC1).

SRO/BOP * (4) Checks steam dumps NOT actuated:

o Steam dumps are closed, UI-500 demand is zero, Dump Arming and Trip Signal lights are all out (VB3).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 16 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 DFP-1 Halt in Rack 10 (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO

  • Reads NOTE regarding consequences of a rack failure.
  • (5) Notifies I&C to investigate.
  • (6) Notes the need to ensure affected channels are removed from service prior to maintenance.

BOP * (7) Places Out-of-Service stickers on affected indicators.

SRO * (8) Shift Foreman review Tech Specs and enters the following:

o TS 3.3.2.D, PC 456D Low Press SI (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.E, PC 456A High Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 456C Low Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, LC 460A High Level Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, FC-415(425,435,445) RCS Loop 1 (2,3,4) Flow (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.2.L, PC-456B, P-11 (1 hr) o TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC-456 E, to close & remove power from associated PORV block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs)

SRO/BOP * (8) Directs board operator to implement OP A-4A:III, "Pressurizer - Shutdown and Clearing" to place PCV-456 in close and close block valve 8000C, and dispatches Nuclear Operator to remove power.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

  • Observes PK14-21, "MAIN TRANSF", and informs the Shift Foreman.

(PK14-21, "MAIN TRANSF")

SRO/ATC * (1) Identifies input 829 - "Mn Bk Xfmr Annun and UV" for >90°C AND only 1 fan group running.

SRO/ATC * (2.1.1, 2.1.2) Updates crew that AR PK contains the Rx Trip and Turbine Trip criteria.

  • (2.1.3) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate and report any local alarms:

o Checks blue breaker trip lights OFF in each TQMx-Cx panel (6 panels total).

o Nuclear Operator will report back there are no local alarms in, but Main Bank C has no fans running and winding temperature is currently 95oC.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.4.a,b,c) When Nuclear Operator is directed to manually start the fans, reports fans did not start, and there are no oil pumps running.

  • (2.1.4.d) Contacts Maintenance to investigate.

SRO * (2.1.6) Directs Shift Manager to contact GCC to report alarm is in due to cooling problem on Main Bank C (GCC receives local annunciator alarm when PK14-21 goes into alarm).

  • (2.1.7) Determines alarm condition will not clear.

o (2.1.7.a) Notes alarm IS due to Main transformer bank high winding temperature and forced cooling cannot be restored.

Notes Reactor must be tripped, and E-0 entered if winding temperature reaches 115oC and forced cooling has not been restored.

Updates crew that Unit will be ramped at 50 MW/min per OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown," until the Unit is off line or forced cooling is restored.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction")

SRO Enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction.

  • (1.a) Notes runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew).

SRO/BOP

  • Commences ramp (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3 or Shift Foreman will hand off Step 1 sheet to BOP):

o (1.b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3).

o (1.c) 60 MWe load target is entered into Triconex HMI.

o (1.d) Sets ramp rate to 50 mw/min.

o (1.e) Pushes GO.

o (1.f) Determines downpower is greater than 15%. May contact chemistry in advance or wait until 15% power change is complete.

ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1).

  • (3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1).
  • (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2) (VB3).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction", continued)

Note: Major event of scenario is triggered by the boration flow control valve FCV-110A going open following at 45 second delay.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook):

o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2).

o Presses BORATE on HMI.

o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset.

o Sets boric acid flowrate.

o Presses START, and monitors boration.

o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2).

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3).

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1).

  • (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2).

Next event triggered automatically 45 seconds after boration commenced L181 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 8 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 16 Event

Description:

Large seismic with no automatic or manual reactor trip (ATWS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL ATWS is diagnosed from the following:

(EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

Note: Attempt to manually trip the reactor may be done prior to entry into EOP E-0 or as part of E-0, step 1 RNO.

ALL Performs immediate actions:

  • (1) Ensure reactor trip:

o Identifies reactor is NOT tripped based on the following:

Rx Trip breakers did NOT open (VB2)

NIs are NOT lowering (CC1)

Rod bottom lights are NOT lit(VB2); moves to step 1 RNO ATC/BOP * (1 RNO) Attempts Manual Reactor Trip o Tries manual reactor trip handles but is unsuccessful (CC1 or VB2).

o Opens 480V breakers 13D and 13E (VB5)(CT)**

(Critical Task)(S5CT-1) Trip the Reactor by manually de-energizing 480V Buses 13D and 13E within 90 seconds of PK04-11, Reactor Trip Initiate coming into alarm.

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left)).

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses G/H have white lights on mimic busses; bus F has no power).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 16 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection") (continued)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) (VB1 upper right, or CC2 right).

o May note loss of pumps due to bus F failure.

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 14) o Board manipulations are as follows:

Manually closes Phase A Containment Isolation Valves: (CT S5CT-2)**

9356A/B (RCS Sample),

9355A/B (PZR Liquid Space Sample) (VB1, far left, lower skirt) 8045 and 8029 (PRT Primary Water and N2 Supply valves) (VB2, far right, upper) 8110 and 8112 8152 FCV-253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 260 FCV-500, 501 FCV-584 FCV-633 8880 Starts CCP 1-2 and SIP 1-2 (S5CT-3)**

Switches LCV-12 to CONT ONLY (VB3).

Opens Main Feedwater Recirc Valves FCV-53 & 54 (VB3).

Stops all but one CB Pp set.

Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2).

    • (Critical Task)(S5CT-2) Manually close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each Phase A containment penetration before transition out of EOP E-0.
    • (Critical Task)(S5CT-3) Start CCP 1-2 and SIP 1-2 pump so as to avoid a severe (Magenta) challenge to the Core Cooling critical status function.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6,8 Page 11 of 16 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection") (continued)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF.

  • (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves.

o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right).

o PORVs closed and block valves 8000A and 8000B are open. (VB2 - upper panel, far right).

8000C is closed and without power.

8000A is without power due to loss of bus F.

o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2).

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o Notes RCPs already off due to loss of startup power (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted.

o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

SRO/ATC * (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured:

o Checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15R/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC); (all normal) o PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF).

o No levels rising in an unexpected manner.

o May request samples.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6,8 Page 12 of 16 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection") (continued)

SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0):

o (11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC).

o (11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS).

o (11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM-11, 02, 07 in alarm).

o (11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service (opens FCV-603 and FCV-431, VB1)

SRO

  • Checks Critical Safety Function Status Trees and transitions to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant")

SRO/ATC * (1) Re-checks RCP trip criteria, noting again pumps not running due to bus loss (VB2).

SRO/ALL * (2 & 3) Re-checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs:

o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized).

o Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15R/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes), and PK11-06/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

o Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1) o Opens FCV-584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left) o Opens blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV-760, 761, 762, 763) o Ensures Chemistry is sampling per CAP AP-1.

SRO/ALL * (4) Checks S/G levels:

o Intact S/Gs NR Level - GREATER THAN 15% [25%] (VB3).

o Controls feedflow to maintain NR S/G Level between 20% and 65%.

o Notes only able to feed S/Gs 1-1 and 1-2 due to equipment failures.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 16 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant") (continued)

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks PORVs closed; block valves 8000A and 8000B are open (VB2 - upper panel, far right). May restore power to 8000C (5.a RNO) o 8000A is without power due to bus loss.

o 8000C is closed and without power.

SRO/ATC * (6) Determines Containment Spray did not actuate and is not required.

  • (7) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced.

o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI-31, lower center VB2).

SRO/ATC

  • Reads CAUTION regarding running RHR pump with cooling to associated heat exchanger.
  • (8) Determines RHR pump may be stopped:

o (a) Pressure is greater than 300 psig and slowly lowering. Goes to step (9) per RNO.

  • (9) Notes RCS Pressure is lowering and continues to step (10).

SRO/ATC * (10) Checks if Diesel Generators should be stopped o Notes D/G powering buses G/H.

SRO/ALL * (11) Evaluates Plant Status:

o (a) Verifies cold leg recirculation capability - notes power available to both RHR pumps.

o (b) Checks Aux building radiation monitor - all are Normal.

o (c) Checks if RHR pumps are on recirculation - they are not.

o (d) Directs RO to Implement Appendix P, Monitor Light Box Verification (checks ECCS valve lineup).

o (e) Contacts Chemistry to sample the RCS and place H2 analyzers in service.

o (f) Checks Turbine status (oil pumps, coast down, etc).

o (g) Checks for alarms on Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature.

Once CTs S5CT-2 and S5CT-3 are complete, scenario may be terminated at any point past E-1, step 7.

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8 Page 14 of 16 Event

Description:

(EOP E-0, Appendix E) (continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

  • (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)
  • (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system
  • (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs open, and exciter field bkr open, CC3 right side)
  • (3 & 4) Checks Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, Monitor Light Box B: red lights ON, white lights ON) o Identifies white lights associated with failed open Phase A Containment Isolation Valves.

o Manually closes Phase A Containment Isolation Valves: (CT)**

1. 9356A/B (RCS Sample),
2. 9355A/B (PZR Liquid Space Sample) (VB1, far left, lower skirt)
3. 8045 and 8029 (PRT Primary Water and N2 Supply valves) (VB2, far right, upper)
4. 8110 and 8112
5. 8152
6. FCV-253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 260
7. FCV-500, 501
8. FCV-584
9. FCV-633
10. 8880
    • (Critical Task)(S5CT-2) Manually close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each Phase A containment penetration before transition out of EOP E-0.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8 Page 15 of 16 Event

Description:

(EOP E-0, Appendix E)(continued) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Appendix E", continued)

BOP * (5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete (SI Portion of Monitor Light Box C: red light ON, white lights - some ON);

o Identifies white lights associated with ECCS pump failed autostarts and Bus F) o Starts CCP 1-2 and SIP 1-2 (CT)**

    • (S5CT-3) Start CCP 1-2 and SIP 1-2 so as to avoid a severe (Magenta) challenge to the Core Cooling critical status function.

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white lights ON (VB1).

o Determines all failures are related to loss of 4kV Bus F.

  • (7) Checks containment spray, Phase B - NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF); may also note containment pressure, while elevated, is well below actuation setpoint)
  • (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolate complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light, some ON)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status (AFW Pp 1-2 running, AFW Pp 1-3 lost from bus F) o Verifies either min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15% (VB3 center) o Notes only able to feed S/Gs 1-1 and 1-2 due to equipment failures.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L181-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

(EOP E-0, Appendix E) (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, "Appendix E", continued)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel);

o Identifies injection flow from both CCP 1-2 and SIP 1-2.

o Determines RHR pumps are running in recirc; RCS pressure currently above pump shutoff head. (VB1, middle center skirt)

  • (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue with Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown - not in service (8166/8167 closed);

  • (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON) o Selects FCV-53/54 to recirc.

o Stops all but one CB Pp set.

o Takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY.

BOP * (14) Checks proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (vent status light panel white lights)(VB4).

o Places both Unit 1 VENT TRAIN 1 BUS F and H MODE SELECT Switches to Mode-3 (VB4).

  • (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))(VB4).
  • (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts)(VB5).
  • (17) Verifies MSRs reset (Triconex HMI)(CC3).
  • (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2).
  • (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm).
  • (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(continued on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 16 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE IC-10 100%; MOL, CB - See Turnover Sheet X Setup N/A PT-403 OOS The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements Ensure Abnormal Status board reflects initial setup prior to pump swap.

Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; Foldout Pages; OP B-IA:V, AR PK01-11, PK14-21, OP AP-5, AP-11, AP-25, EOP E-0, E-1 Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up X 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, min 960 iterations (30 sec).

Critical Task Specific Data Capture:

  • S5CT1: 13D & E position
  • S5CT2: Phase A valve positions (see pg 13 for listing).
  • S5CT3: ECCS pump discharge pressure and amps; Charging Injection Flow FI-917, and SI Flow FI-918 and FI-922 X 0 min Lesson L181 NRC-S5.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc.

by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X Evt-1: Normal - Swap Normal plant evolution to swap from CCP 1-3 to CCP 1-1.

Charging Pumps (approx. 3 min after taking watch per lead examiner)

X Evt-2: CCW 1-1 Shaft When dispatched to investigate, report back pump is running, but sounds Shear (once seal flow unusual - high pitched squealing noise. Recirc valve FCV-606 is open, but there is adjusted after is no sound of water flowing in the adjacent pipe.

pump swap)

X Evt-3: Eagle 21 DFP When dispatched to rack, provide crew with copy of completed AP-5, Halt in Rack 10 (once Attachment 5.3 (using time compression)

Evt-2 TS addressed per lead examiner)

X Evt-4: Loss of Main When dispatched to Main Transformer, report back "no local alarms in, but C Transformer Cooling has no fans running and winding temperature is currently 95oC. If asked about (once Evt-3 TS TQMx-Cx panels, report back "the blue breaker trip lights are OFF".

addressed)

When directed to manually start the fans, report "Fans did not start and there are no oil pumps running".

X Evt-5: (Major) Seismic Seismic event is automatically triggered 45 seconds after boration flow control event - ATWS valve FCV-110A opens.

(triggers 45 seconds ATWS: 13D/E will work.

after FCV-110A opens)

(continued on next page)

L181 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 17 of 20 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 11) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION Evt-6: (Major) SB Loca SM Loca in loop 3 cold leg.

(10 seconds after seismic)

Evt-7: (Phase A, Train Phase A, Train A/B actuation failure.

A/B failure to init (post trip)

Evt-8: Combination of Failures result in no high or intermediate head ECCS flow and only 1 mechanical/electrical MDAFW pump running.

failures resulting in potential ICC condition (post trip) If contacted regarding D/G 1-3, report (after delay) breaker mechanically jammed.

L181 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 18 of 20 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1187 MWe Power Level: 100% Net Generation: 1137 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.7 SW 5.7 NE 5.7 SE 5.8 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW EMERGENT WORK:

  • None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:
  • None ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:
  • None TURNOVER ITEMS:
  • PT-403 OOS for Calibration (TS 3.3.3.A); RTS next shift PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:
  • Perform swap from CCP 1-3 to CCP 1-1 per OP B-1A:V, Section 6.1. RP surveys and postings have been completed.

Shift Foreman Turnover 0B ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

  • There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

TURNOVER ITEMS:

  • U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.
  • U-2: maintain 100%.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

  • Time in core life: _MOL_.
  • Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 3 days.
  • Boron concentration is _906 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
  • Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.
  • The last dilution was completed _30 minutes ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

  • None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS
  • None