ML13213A190
| ML13213A190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/2013 |
| From: | Figueroa C A Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13213A193 | List: |
| References | |
| L-2013-198 | |
| Download: ML13213A190 (134) | |
Text
SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT (REV. 2)IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC For TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 NRC Docket No. 50-250 Florida Power & Light Company Turkey Point Nuclear Plant 9760 SW 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Submittal Date: June 2013 Name & Title Affiliation Signature Date Preparer:
Carlos Andres Figueroa FPL Design Engineer _ __ _ _. F,40L- ovoi j3 Approver:
Eric Ballon FPL Engineering Supervisor Site Sponsor: Sergio Chaviano FPL Special Projects Manager, __O7/2 Site Fukushima Lead Contents L is t o f T a b le s .........................................................................................................
iii Executive Summary ...............................................................................................
iv 1 Introduction
.....................................................................................................................
I 1.1 Background
.......................................................................................................
1 1.2 P la nt O ve rv ie w .........................................................................................................
1 1 .3 A p p ro a c h ..................................................................................................................
1 2 Seism ic Licensing Basis ............................................................................................
2 2.1 Site Seismicity
...................................................................................................
2 2.2 Seismic Design Basis .........................................................................................
2 2.3 USI A-46 and Seismic IPEEE ..............................................................................
3 3 Personnel Qualifications
............................................................................................
5 3 .1 O v e rv ie w ..................................................................................................................
5 3.2 Project Personnel
................................................................................................
5 3.3 Equipment Selection Personnel
............................................................................
5 3.4 Seismic W alkdown Engineers
..............................................................................
6 3.5 Licensing Basis Reviewers
...................................................................................
6 3.6 IPEEE Reviewers
................................................................................................
6 3.7 Peer Review Team ..............................................................................................
6 3.8 Additional Personnel
...........................................................................................
6 4 Selection of SSCs ......................................................................................................
7 5 Seism ic W alkdowns and Area W alk-Bys .....................................................................
11 5 .1 O v e rv ie w ................................................................................................................
1 1 5.2 Seismic W alkdowns ...........................................................................................
11 5.3 Area W alk-Bys ..................................................................................................
31 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations
.....................................................................................
39 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report ...............................................................
40 8 Peer Review ...................................................................................................................
44 9 References
.....................................................................................................................
45 A Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates
................................................
46 A.1 Introduction
..............................................................................................................
46 A.2 Resum es ..................................................................................................................
46 A.3 Certificates
...............................................................................................................
48 B SW EL Selection Report ............................................................................................
51 C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) ...................................................................
57 D Area W alk-By Checklists (AW Cs) ............................................................................
90 E Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment
...............................
113 F Peer Review Report .....................................................................................................
116 1 .In tro d u ctio n ................................................................................................................
1 1 7 2. Background
..............................................................................................................
117 4. Peer Review -Selection of Com ponents for SW EL ...................................................
122 5. Peer Review -Seism ic W alkdown .............................................................................
123 6. Review Final Subm ittal Report & Sign-off ..................................................................
124 7. References
................................................................................................................
124 Attachm ent 1: Peer Review Checklist
............................................................................
126 List of Tables T able 3-1: P ersonnel R oles ......................................................................................
5 Table 4-1: Master Component List (SWEL 01) ....................................................
7 Table 4-2: Master Component List -Deferred Containment Items (SWEL 01) ..............
10 Table 4-3: Master Component List (SWEL 02) .....................................................
10 Table 5-1: Anchorage Configuration Confirmation
......................................................
13 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection
........................
16 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections
..............................
34 iii Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. (Ref. 12) In particular, this report provides information requested to address Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter. (Ref. 12)The 50.54(f) letter requires, in part, all U.S. nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration is within the current seismic licensing basis and identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions found.This report documents the seismic walkdowns performed at Turkey Point Unit 3 in response, in part, to the 50.54(f) letter issued by the NRC.The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), supported by industry personnel, cooperated with the NRC to prepare guidance for conducting seismic walkdowns as required in the 50.54(f)letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. (Ref.12).
The guidelines and procedures prepared by NEI and endorsed by the NRC were published through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012; henceforth, referred to as the "EPRI guidance document." (Ref. 1) Turkey Point has utilized this NRC endorsed guidance as the basis for the seismic walkdowns and this report. (Ref. 1)The EPRI guidance document was used to perform the engineering walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with the EPRI guidance document, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report." Seismic Licensing Basis* Personnel Qualifications
- Selection of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC)* Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations
- IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report* Peer Review Revision 2 of this report has been issued to document the results from the Follow-on activities addressing the requirements per Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter to include inspection of items deferred due to inaccessibility along with supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets.
Area Walk-Bys have been also complete, as required, during these follow-on activities.
In addition, the SWEL is provided based on feedback that was received in industry forums.Seismic Licensing Basis The safe shutdown earthquake for the Turkey Point site is 0.15g horizontal ground acceleration and 0.10 g vertical ground acceleration. (Ref. 2, Section 2)iv Personnel Qualifications The walkdown team consisted of experienced site personnel with Civil/Structural or Mechanical Engineering, Operations and PRA backgrounds.
The site personnel were supplemented by two vendors with significant experience in the area of seismic design and the performance of seismic walkdowns.
The personnel who performed the key activities required fulfilling the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are qualified and trained as required in the EPRI guidance document (Ref. 1).Selection of SSCs One hundred (100) components were selected for the walkdown effort, including spent fuel pool items. These components were selected using the process described in detail in the EPRI guidance document, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. (Ref. 1)Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Section 4, Appendix C, and Appendix D of this report documents the equipment Seismic Walkdowns and the Area Walk-Bys.
The online seismic walkdowns for Turkey Point Unit 3 were performed September 10-14, 2012. The supplemental seismic walkdowns for deferred/inaccessible Items identified in Revision 1 of this Report, were performed in February and May 2013. The walkdown team consisted of two 2-person Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) teams.During the initial seismic walkdowns, the team inspected 90 of the 100 components on the seismic walkdown equipment list (comprised of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2). Ten components were inaccessible and future walkdowns were planned for these items. Follow-on inspections on electrical panels that could not be opened at the time of the initial walkdown were also performed during the supplemental seismic walkdown phase. CCW Surge Tank (3T218) was originally included in the SWEL. The tank is inaccessible due to deficiencies in the room access doors that require an extended period of time to repair. This was considered acceptable since this item is only one (1) out of thirteen (13) components of the same class (Tanks and/or Heat Exchangers) included in SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. This class is the second most populated among all the classes of equipment considered during the development of both SWELs. It is also noted that records indicate the Unit 03 CCW Surge Tank was upgraded in 1992 to increase rigidity.
Also, an area Walk By inspection of the adjacent room (Unit 03 Spent Fuel Pit) was completed in 2012 with no issues identified.
Equipment Seismic Walkdowns included anchorage inspections and checks to verify as-found anchorages are consistent with design documents.
The walkdown found cases where the as-found anchorage was not consistent with the design document.
In other cases the document identifying anchorage design could not be identified.
Instances of anchor corrosion were cited, but the extent of corrosion is not a seismic capacity concern at this time. Except for the item E16B air handling unit (AHU), no concerns with overall anchorage strength were identified.
The E16B AHU was found to be lacking positive base anchorage.
The operability of the unit was addressed and the unit was found to be operable.Potential seismic interaction concerns were identified but none of the issues were considered to be hazards that rendered equipment inoperable.
Other equipment interaction issues are related to clearances between equipment and adjacent items and improper seismic housekeeping.
Loose or missing hardware, such as loose thumbscrews or latches, were found and cited under "Other" potentially adverse conditions.
v Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse conditions related to improper seismic housekeeping.
Potential seismic interaction concerns were also identified but none of the issues were considered to be significant immediate hazards. In some cases during the initial seismic walkdowns, potential relay chatter due to bumping of equipment is cited. Potential relay chatter issue is undesirable but the overall plant hazard related to relay chatter is typically low. For the Turkey Point USI A-46 evaluation (Reference 9), relay chatter was dismissed as a concern. One potential seismically-induced spray hazard was cited as requiring evaluation.
The evaluation determined that there was no significant hazard associated with the condition.
Seismic Licensinq Basis Evaluations Conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) and the Area Walkdown Checklists (AWCs), and entered into the CAP.For those conditions that operability or functionality could not be screened as acceptable, evaluations were initiated to demonstrate that the current licensing basis was met. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 in the report provide a summary of the conditions and the actions taken.IPEEE Vulnerabilities In lieu of a full IPEEE seismic analysis, FPL opted to submit a "scaled back" program to resolve USI A-46 and Generic Letter 87-02 as allowed by the NRC in a letter dated November 4, 1998 (Ref. 13) issued for the review of Turkey Point IPEEE evaluations.
The final results of this scaled back program for the A-46 program were submitted in a letter to the NRC, L-93-155, "Final Report of Plant Specific Seismic Adequacy Evaluation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to Resolved USI A-46 and GL 87-02" (Ref. 14). The components selected for this analysis were also included in the SWEL in order to verify no outlier issues persisted.
Peer Reviews The Peer Review of the walkdowns consisted of two teams made up of Operations and PRA representatives and engineers with knowledge and experience in seismic inspections and assessments.
The engineers made up the SWE teams, but also served to peer review each other's work. The Operations and PRA representatives also participated in some of the walkdowns for logistical support as well as peer review. Appendix F of this report contains a summary of the Peer Review. The Peer Review determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are met. Further, it was concluded by the peer reviews that the efforts completed and documented within this report are in accordance with the EPRI guidance document.Summary In summary, all seismic walkdowns and the associated follow-on activities (Except the Unit 03 CCW Surge Tank (3T218) due to inaccessibility reasons) have been completed at Turkey Point Unit 3 in accordance with the NRC endorsed walkdown methodology.
All potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective action program. None of the conditions found resulted in loss of operability or functionality of any structures, systems or components.
Follow-on activities required to complete the efforts to address Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter include the inspection of items previously deferred due to inaccessibility along with supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets.
Area Walk-Bys have also been completed, as required, during these follow-on activities.
vi 1 Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND
In response to Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 10CFR50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 requesting that all licensees perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address plant degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions, with respect to the current seismic licensing basis. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), prepared industry guidance to assist licensees in responding to this NRC request. The industry guidance document, EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. NextEraNext Era/Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) has committed to using this guidance as the basis for completing the walkdown effort.1.2 PLANT OVERVIEW The Turkey Point (PTN) site is located on the west shore of Biscayne Bay in Dade County, Florida. The site is 25 miles south of Miami and eight miles east of Florida City.The site contains two fossil units (Unit 1 and 2), two nuclear units (Units 3 and 4), and one combined cycle gas-powered unit (Unit 5). The plant's nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) was designed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
The Containment structure and balance of plant was designed by Bechtel Corporation.
The general description of the plant given above is based on the information in the UFSAR (Reference 2).1.3 APPROACH The EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference
- 1) was used for the seismic walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference 1, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:* Seismic Licensing Basis* Personnel Qualifications
- Selection of SSCs* Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Licensing Basis Evaluations
- IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report.Peer Review 1 2 Seismic Licensing Basis 2.1 SITE SEISMICITY Site seismicity is discussed in UFSAR (Reference
- 2) Section 2. On the basis of historical or statistical seismic activity, Turkey Point is located in a seismically inactive area, far from any recorded damaging shocks. Even though several of the larger historical earthquakes may have been felt in southern Florida, the amount of ground motion caused by them was not great enough to cause damage to any moderately well-built structure.
Predicated on history, building codes, geologic conditions, and earthquake probability, the design earthquake was conservatively established as 0.05 g horizontal ground acceleration.
The nuclear units have also been evaluated for a 0.15 g ground acceleration to assure no loss of function of the vital systems and structures.
Vertical acceleration is taken as 2/3 of the horizontal value and is considered to act concurrently.
2.2 SEISMIC
DESIGN BASIS The seismic design was based on the acceleration ground response spectrum curves shown in UFSAR Figures 5A-1 and 5A-2. The curves were derived from the "Housner Spectrum" normalized to 0.05g for the design earthquake and 0.15g for the maximum earthquake.
The UFSAR commitment for a maximum earthquake was determined at a time when probabilistic definition of seismic input had not been developed with any degree of consistency or confidence.
Therefore, the 0.15g PGA was conservatively estimated based on very limited data available at the time.The original design basis commits Turkey Point to the 1967 proposed version of General Design Criterion (GDC) Number 2 that relates to earthquake natural phenomena as identified below and is as follows: "Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention or to the mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that will enable such systems and components to withstand, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public the forces that might reasonably be imposed by the occurrence of an extraordinary natural phenomenon such as earthquake, tornado, flooding condition, high wind or heavy ice.The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been officially recorded for the site and the surrounding area and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design." 2 AEC Publication TID-7024 (Reference
- 4) was used as the basic design guide for earthquake analysis.
Floor response spectra were developed from the ground spectra for the Containment Buildings and Control Building to evaluate structures, systems, and components at the various elevations of those structures.
Earthquake forces were applied simultaneously in the vertical and any horizontal direction.
The vertical component of acceleration at any level was taken as two-thirds of the horizontal ground acceleration.
The damping factors for various types of construction are listed in Reference 2, Appendix 5A.For concrete structures and components, the basic code for determining the section strengths for original design was ACI 318-63 (Reference 5). For steel structures and components, the basic code for determining the section strengths was the AISC Steel Construction Manual, 6th Edition (Reference 6). Later codes were used for plant upgrades.
Design requirement for equipment varied by equipment type. The mechanical and electrical equipment were purchased under specifications that include a description of the seismic design criteria for the plant. Motor control centers and load centers were shake table tested to demonstrate no-loss-of-function capacity under the maximum hypothetical earthquake.
The Turkey Point units were within the scope of NRC unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46 (Reference 7), which required a re-evaluation of safety-related mechanical and electrical equipment.
At about the same time the NRC asked all operating power plants to undertake an investigation of design capability to extreme external events (Reference 8).Turkey Point resolved these issues as discussed in the next section. Resolution included implementation of seismic design improvements.
2.3 USI A-46 AND SEISMIC IPEEE Generic Letter 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46" (Reference 7)addressed seismic adequacy of equipment at older nuclear plants. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 were within the scope of USI A-46.The evaluation of Turkey Point for resolution of USI A-46 is reported in Reference 9.FPL developed and implemented a plant specific program to satisfy requirements of USI A-46 as agreed between FPL and the USNRC. The program consisted of developing a walkdown procedure that concentrated on anchorage concerns of USI A-46, the seismic spatial interaction concerns of USI A-17 and the design concerns for large tanks in USI A-40. The program was developed by FPL to be appropriate and cost effective for addressing GL87-02 concerns at its low seismic sites. The basic requirement for the walkdown was that the equipment be able to withstand the design basis SSE at the plant and still provide its safe shutdown function.
The procedure used relied on the judgment of an expert team to meet the basic requirement.
A success path of equipment using safety and non-safety equipment was selected for achieving hot shutdown of the plant within a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.An assessment of the anchorage adequacy was performed on each equipment item included on the safe shutdown list. This included an assessment of the seismic demand on the equipment anchorage (forces and stresses on the anchorage), the seismic capacity of the anchorage components (attachment of the equipment to the anchorage, 3 the anchorage itself, and the development of the anchorage to the foundation), and whether the capacity of the weak link of the anchorage system exceeded the demand.A seismic spatial interaction assessment was performed on each equipment item included on the safe shutdown list. The following seismic spatial interaction issues were evaluated:
- 1) heavy objects falling (sometimes referred to as II over I interactions), 2)heavy objects sliding, swinging, vibrating or tipping (proximity interactions) and 3)inadequate flexibility of lines to accommodate seismic-induced relative movements between utility support points. An assessment was made as to whether possible interactions existed, and if it did, could the interaction preclude the equipment item from performing a safe shutdown function.
Those interactions identified as possibly precluding the equipment item's safe shutdown function were identified as outliers.The walkdown resulted in the identification of outlier equipment items with the majority of the outliers being lack of anchorage for electrical cabinets which were not previously required to be anchored.
FPL addressed all outlier issues listed and the actions taken are listed in Reference 9 Table 5.0. In many cases, FPL engineering generated Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) Packages which provided for physical modification to plant equipment resulting in additional seismic "hardening" of the equipment.
Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities" (Reference
- 8) addressed plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.
For implementation of the IPEEE, Turkey Point was classified as a "reduced scope" plant per NUREG-1407 (ReferencelO).
As such, the review level earthquake was equal to the site SSE and completion of the USI A-46 assessment largely satisfied the seismic IPEEE requirements.
FPL informed the NRC that the plant specific program developed for USI A-46 would be used to resolve GL 88-20 Supplement 4 at Turkey Point (see Reference 11).4 3 Personnel Qualifications
3.1 OVERVIEW
This section of the report identifies the personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown efforts. A description of the responsibilities of each Seismic Walkdown participant's role(s) is provided in Section 2 of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Resumes contained in Appendix A provide detailed personnel qualifications information.
3.2 PROJECT
PERSONNEL Table 3-1 below summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort.Table 3-1. Personnel Roles Equipment Seismic equion Plant Walkdown Licensing IPEEE Peer Engineer Ops. Engineer Basis Reviewer Reviewer (SWE) Reviewer C. Figueroa X X X X(note 2)T. Satyan-Sharma X X X X(note 2)G. Tullidge X X(note 1)A. Restrepo X X X T. Jones X X J. O'Sullivan-X X X(note 2)S. Baker X X X(note 2)Notes: 1. Peer Review Team Leader 2. Provided peer review of a sample of other SWE team's SWCs & AWCs.** Only participated in the initial seismic walkdowns.
3.3 EQUIPMENT
SELECTION PERSONNEL The SWEL development was performed by the Peer Review Team Lead member of the PRA Group. The SWEL was then independently reviewed by another member of the PRA Group, by Operations, and finally by Peer Reviewers from Engineering.
5
3.4 SEISMIC
WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The initial seismic walkdowns under Revision 1 of this Report were performed by four seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs) grouped into two seismic walkdown teams (SWTs).The lead SWEs for the initial seismic walkdowns were engineers from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized internationally as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as a regular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded research projects.
The professional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural dynamics, and structural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants, using either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) or Seismic Margin Assessment, to address US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) for over 35 US and European plants.Similarly, the supplemental seismic walkdowns of the deferred and inaccessible items under Revision 2 of this report were performed by three FPL SWEs grouped into two SWTs. One team in charge of the inaccessible items (Inside Containment) and the other team in charge of the deferred items (Electrical Cabinets).
3.5 LICENSING
BASIS REVIEWERS The Licensing Basis Reviewers for the initial seismic walkdowns consisted of the four seismic walkdown engineers.
The FPL engineers had the lead in licensing basis determinations, with support from the S&A engineers.
There were no licensing basis determinations required for the supplemental seismic walkdowns.
3.6 IPEEE
REVIEWERS IPEEE reviewers were engineers familiar with implementation of IPEEE at the Turkey Point site. The IPEEE Reviewers also participated in the SWEL preparation and seismic walkdowns.
3.7 PEER REVIEW TEAM The Peer Review Team is listed, along with their roles and qualifications, in the Peer Review Report included in Appendix F.3.8 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL Operations personnel provided support to the walkdown by reviewing the list of components for accessibility.
Similarly, Electrical Maintenance personnel assisted the SWTs to open cabinet doors for accessibility to anchorage.
6 4 Selection of SSCs The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List is documented in the SWEL Selection Report, provided in Appendix B describes how the SWEL was developed to meet the requirements of EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). The summary of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List for the supplemental items is included in Appendix C under Table C-1 Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Supplemental Walkdowns Only). The final SWEL (both SWEL 01 &SWEL 02) which details all of the component attributes used in the screening process, as well as the Master Component List, are in tables 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3.Table 4-1: Master Component List (SWEL 01)USI A-46 A-46 Scope item Equip. Equipment Name Eq Tag Location YES or NO# Class # Type Train & Eq.1 0 BORIC ACID BLENDER MS 3K200 201 -CHARGING PUMP ROOM NO BASKET STRAINER TO INTAKE 202 -COMPONENT COOLING 2 0 COOLING WTR SUPPLY FOR CCW HX A FI BS-3-1402 PUMP ROOM NO 3 ~347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER N 3 0 CREVS INTAKE BALANCING DAMPER AT BD-2 OMNO ROOM 4 347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER NO S 0 COMPENSATORY FILTER UNIT BL CFU-1 ROOM 5 1 A-MCC (CABINET)
EL 3B05 342 -3A MCC NO 6 1 B-MCC (CABINET)
EL 3B06 343 -3B MCC ROOM YES (#23)7 1 C-MCC (CABINET)
EL 3B07 220 -AUXILIARY BUILDING NO 8 1 D-MCC (CABINET)
EL 3B08 220 -AUXILIARY BUILDING YES (#25)9 2 L E (234 -NEW ELECTRICAL NO S 2 3H LOAD CENTER (CABINET)
EL 3B50 EQUIPMENT ROOM 10 2 31B02 480V HVPDS LOAD CENTER 3B EL 3B02 341 -480V LC ROOM YES (#28)(CABINET)11 2 3D LC (Part of B train) (CABINET)
EL 3B04 341 -480V LC ROOM YES (#29)12 3 3AA 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A (CABINET)
EL 3AA 368 -4160V SWITCHGEAR ROOM YES (#26)13 3 4.16KV SW1TCHGEAR 3AD FOR BUS 3D EL 3AD 429 -SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3D NO 14 4 4610/490V TRANSFORMER FOR 480V LC TR X05 341 -480V LC ROOM YES (#28)_____3B 15 5 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP B PU 3P2111B 202B- COMPONENT COOLING YES (# 4-5)PUMP ROOM 16 5 HI HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 3B PU 3P215B 206 -HI-HEAD SIS PUMP ROOM NO 17 5 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP B PU 3P214B 203 -CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP NO ROOM 18 5 EDG 3B OIL TRANSFER PUMP PU 3P10B 293 -GENERAL OUTDOORS YES (#-1)19 5 CHARGING PUMP B PU 3P201B 201 -CHARGING PUMP ROOM YES (#2-3)20 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP B PU P2B 306 -AUX FEED PUMP AREA NO 21 5 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP B PU 3P203B 200 -BORIC ACID TANK ROOM YES 7 USI A-46 A-46 Scope Item Equip. Equipment Name Eq Tag Location YES or NO# Class # Type Train & Eq.C~ass#22 6 INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP B PU 3P9B 370 -INTAKE AREA YES (#6-7)23 6 RHR PUMP B PU 3P210B 211 -RHR PUMP ROOM NO 24 7 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER FLOW CNTL VL FCV-3-113A 201 -CHARGING PUMP ROOM NO VLV 25 7 CHG TO RCS CONTROL VALVE VL HCV-3-121 209 -PIPE & VALVE ROOM NO 26 7 MN STM ISO VLV FROM S/G B VL POV-3-2605 300 -STEAM DECK NO 27 7 MAIN STEAM LINE A STM DUMP TO VL CV-3-1607 300 -STEAM DECK NO ATMOS CNTL VALVE 28 7 HAND CNTL VLV FOR RHR HX FLOW VL HCV-3-758 210 -RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO CNTL ROOM 29 7 TRAIN 1 SIG B FEED FLOW CONTROL VL CV-3-2816 302 -FEEDWATER DECK NO VALVE 30 7 TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS ISOLATION VL POV-3-4883 334 -TURBINE PLANT HEAT NO VALVE EXCHANGER AREA 31 7 NON REGEN HX OUTLET TO VCT OR VL TCV-3-143 201 -CHARGING PUMP ROOM NO DEMIN TEMP CNTL VLV 32 7 S/G B BYPASS FW Isolation VLV VL POV-3-487 302 -FEEDWATER DECK NO 33 203 -CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP N 33 8 HHSI TO COLD LEG MOV VL MOV-3-843B OMNO ROOM 34 8 RWST MTR OP ISO VALVE TO SI & RHR VL MOV-3-864B 217- RWST AREA NO PUMPS 35 8 RECIRC SUMP TO RHR PUMP SUCTION VL MOV-3-861B 211 -RHR PUMP ROOM NO MOTOR OPERATED VALVE MTR OPERATED VALVE FROM STEAM 36 8 GENERATOR A TO AUX FW PP VL MOV-3-1404 301 -BELOW STEAM DECK NO TURBINES 37 203 -CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP N 37 8 CTMT SPRAY PMP B DISCH ISO VLV VL MOV-3-880B OMNO ROOM 38 8 EDG 3B OIL DAY TANK INLET CONTROL VL SV-3-2046B 408 -B DIESEL GENERATOR NO SOLENOID VALVE BUILDING (UPPER LEVEL)39 8 EMERGENCY BORATION CONTROL VL MOV-3-350 201 -CHARGING PUMP ROOM NO VALVE 40 8 RECIRC SUMP TO RHR PUMP SUCTION VL MOV3-8808 210 -RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO MOTOR OPERATED VALVE ROOM 41 8 RWST TO RHR PUMP SUCTION VALVE VL MOV-3-862A 211 -RHR PUMP ROOM NO 42 8 RHR PUMP RECIRC TO RWST VL MOV-3-863B 210- RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO ROOM 43SI TO LOOP A&B HOT LEG MTR OP ISO VL MOV-3-869 209 -PIPE & VALVE ROOM NO VLV 44 9 AXIAL FLOW VENTILATION FAN BL 3V65B 429 -SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3D NO 45 9 EDG FAN ASSEMBLIES (RADIATOR FAN) BL N/A 309 -DIESEL GENERATOR YES (#21)BUILDING (LOWER LEVEL)46 9 3B EDG ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN BL 3V34B 409-B DIESEL GENERATOR NO BUILDING ( LOWER LEVEL)47 10 LOAD CENTER ROOM 3A/B -AIR BL 3E241 B 341 -480V LOAD CENTER ROOM NO 7 10 HANDLING UNIT 48 10 LOAD CENTER ROOM 3C/D -AIR BL 3E242B 341 -480V LOAD CENTER ROOM NO HANDLING UNIT (TRAIN-B)49 10 SWTCHGEAR ROOM 3A -AIR BL 3E243A 368 -4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM NO HANDLING UNIT 50 10 AIR HANDLER UNIT FOR ELEC EQUIP BL V78 234 -NEW ELECTRICAL NO RM A/C CONDENSER E232 EQUIPMENT ROOM 51 10 CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT BL E16B 310 -CABLE SPREADING ROOM NO 52 11 LC & SWGR ROOMS A/C SYSTEM- MS 3E239B 315- LP TURBINE NORTH AREA NO_2_ 11 CHILLER PACKAGE lB (TRAIN-B)
M 3 B 3 LT IE HAA 53 3C2B 409 -B DIESEL GENERATOR NO 12 EDG 3B AIR COMPRESSOR BL COMPRESSOR BUILDING ( LOWER LEVEL)347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER YE #2 54 14 3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) EL 3D23 ROOMNYES (#42)55 14 3D01 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) EL 3D01 310 -CABLE SPREADING ROOM YES (#41)8 m USI A- A-46 Scope Item UIA6Eq YES or NO Equip. Equipment Name Tag Location Tr NE# Class # Type Train & Eq.100 AMP 2-POLE AUTOMATIC 234- NEW ELECTRICAL 56 14 TRANSFER SWITCH (CHECK 1B 3S77 EQUIPMENT ROOM NO CABINET) EQUIPMENTROOM 57 15 3A BATTERY RACK BA 3D03 310 -CABLE SPREADING ROOM YES. (#37)Train A BA 3D24 347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER YES. (#- 38)58 15 3B BATTERY RACK ROOM rain4 ROOM Train B 59 16 3B1 BATTERY CHARGER BA 3D25 347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER ROOM YES (#34)60 16 3B2 BATTERY CHARGER BA 3D25A 234 -NEW ELECTRICAL NO EQUIPMENT ROOM 61 16 SPARE BATTERY CHARGER BA D51 234 -NEW ELECTRICAL NO EQUIPMENT ROOM STATIC INVERTER 3C 125 VDC/120 VAC 62 16 7.5 KVA IT 3Y05 ROOM YES (#45)(CABINET)STATIC INVERTER 3D 125 VDC/120 VAC 347-CONTROL ROOM INVERTER 63 16 7.5 KVA IT 3Y07 ROOM YES (#46)(CABINET)64 17 313 DIESEL GENERATOR GE 3K48 409 -DIESEL GENERATOR YES (#19)BUILDING (LOWER LEVEL)65 16 CONTROL ROOM PROTECTION RACK IN 3QR35 310- CABLE SPREADING ROOM NO (CHECK FOR SEISMIC INTERACTION) 66 19 SWGR RM 3D FAN 3V65B TEMP SWITCH IN TIS-3-6413B 429 -SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3D NO 67 20 3C264 -ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL IN 3C264 368 -4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM NO 68 20 VERTICAL PANEL A IN 3C04 360 -CONTROL ROOM, VERTICAL NO CHECK FOR SEISMIC INTERACTION PANEL 3C04 69 20 VERTICAL PANEL B IN 3C06/3C05 360 -CONTROL ROOM VERTICAL CHECK FOR SEISMIC INTERACTION PANEL (3C06) YES (#55)70 20 CONTROL ROOM CONTROL CONSOLE IN/ CONSOLE 362 -CONTROL ROOM CONTROL NO VL CONSOLE 71 20 SEQUENCER 3C23A -CABINET IN 3C23A 368 -4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM YES (#49)72 20 SEQUENCER 3C23B -CABINET IN 3C23B 368 -4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM YES (#50)73 2 3B CORLPEIN409
-DIESEL GENERATOR YES (#22)7 20 38 EDG CONTROL PANEL IN 3C12B BUILDING (LOWER LEVEL)74 21 BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK B AC T205B 200 -BORIC ACID TANK ROOM YES (#11)75 21 REFUELING WTR STORAGE TK AC 3T1 217 -RWST YES (#14)76 21 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B HT 3E206B 210- RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO ROOM 77 ~~~331 -CONDENSATE STORAGE YE(#2 77 21 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK AC 3T8 TANK YES (#12)78 21 COMPONENT COOLING HEAT HT 3E207B 202 -COMPONENT COOLING YES (#53)EXCHANGER B PUMP ROOM 79 21 COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK AC 3T218 212 -SPENT FUEL PIT ROOM YES (#17)80 21 EDG 3B FUEL OIL DAY TANK AC 3T23B 408 -B DIESEL GENERATOR YES (#16)BUILDING (UPPER LEVEL)81 21 EDG DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK AC 3T36 293 -GENERAL OUTDOORS YES (# 10)62 21 EDG 3B STARTING AIR ACCUMULATOR AC409 -B DIESEL GENERATOR YES (# 20)TANK BUILDING (LOWER LEVEL)83 21 SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER FOR HT 3P214B HEAT 203 -CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP NO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP B EXCHANGER ROOM 9 Table 4-2: Master Component List -Deferred Containment Items (SWEL 01)USI A-46 Eq A-46 Scope Item Equip. Equipment Name Tag Location YES or NO S ECiass N Type Train & Eq. #84 7 PRESSURIZER PORV SOLENOID VALVE VL SV-3-455C 103 -PRESSURIZER CUBICLE NO 85 7 PRZR PORV N2 BACKUP SUPPLY VL PCV-3-4885 123 -CONTAINMENT 58 FOOT NO PRESSURE REGULATOR ELEVATION 86 8 PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE VL MOV-3-535 103 -PRESSURIZER CUBICLE NO 87 8 SI ACCUM A DISCH MOTOR OPERATED V3865A 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT VLV VL MOV ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL NO RHR LO HEAD SI TO LOOP A MOTOR 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT 88 8 OPERATED VLV VL MOV-3-744A ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL NO NORMAL RHR INLET FROM RCS MOTOR 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT OPERATED VLV ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL 90 19 DELTA T-TAVG CH I COLD LEG 1 Ix TW-3-412C 104 -RCP A CUBICLE NO THERMOWELL 91 21 EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER B HT 3V30B 123 -CONTAINMENT 58 FOOT NO ELEVATION 92 21 SI ACCUM B AC 3T229B 114-ACCUMULATOR B AREA NO Table 4-3: Master Component List (SWEL 02)Item USI A-46# Equip. Eq Type Tag Equipment Name Location Seismic Cat Class #223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT SFP COOLING WATER PUMP LOW EXCHANGER ROOM (Cask Wash 1 0 VL 3-797 SUCTION VALVE Area) Rapid Drain SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING PUMP 223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT 2 0 CK 3NP212 TRANSFER SWITCH EXCHANGER ROOM 223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT 3 0 VL 3-910 SFP CLG PMP A SUCT ISO VLV EXCHANGER ROOM I SPENT FUEL PIT LEVEL 4 0 IN LT-3-651 TRANSMITTER 212 -SPENT FUEL PIT ROOM Rapid Drain 5 0 VL 3-12-031 TUBE GATE ISOLATION VALVE 212 -SPENT FUEL PIT ROOM Rapid Drain 223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT 6 5 PU 3P212A SFP CLG WTR PMP A EXCHANGER ROOM Rapid Drain EMERG SFP EMERGENCY SPENT FUEL PIT 223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT 7 5 PU CLG PMP COOLING PUMP EXCHANGER ROOM Rapid Drain SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT 223 -SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP/HEAT 8 21 HT 3E208A EXCHANGER EXCHANGER ROOM Rapid Drain 10 5 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys 5.1 OVERVIEW The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted by 2-person teams of trained Seismic Walkdown Engineers, in accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). The initial seismic walkdowns occurred on September 10-14, 2012. Components in the Containment building were inaccessible at the time of the initial seismic walkdowns and were later inspected in February 2013. Electrical cabinets with restricted access were also later inspected in May 2013. The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are discussed in more detail in the following sections.5.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the seismic adequacy of the items on the SWEL as provided in Appendix B of this report. The Seismic Walkdowns also evaluated the potential for nearby SSCs to cause adverse seismic interactions with the SWEL items.The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the following adverse seismic conditions associated with the subject item of equipment: " Adverse anchorage conditions
- Adverse seismic spatial interactions
- Other adverse seismic conditions The results of the Seismic Walkdowns have been documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) provided in the EPRI guidance document, Appendix C.The Initial Seismic Walkdowns were performed for 90 of the 100 items identified on the Turkey Point Unit 3 SWEL. The remaining items were later inspected during the next available refueling outage as previously noted. The associated SWCs for the remaining items are provided in Appendix C of Revision 2 of this report. Additionally, photos have been included with most SWCs to provide a visual record of the item along with any comments noted on the SWC. These photos are not included to limit the size of this report but are on file. Drawings and other plant records are cited in some of the SWCs, but are not included with the SWCs because they are readily retrievable documents through the station's document management system.Inspection for certain items could not be completed due to access restrictions during the initial Seismic Walkdowns.
Appendix E of this report identifies the equipment previously classified as inaccessible during the initial seismic walkdowns.
Currently, all the inaccessible and deferred items have been inspected, with the exception of the CCW Surge Tank (3T218) due to inaccessibility.
However, a sufficient number of items of this type were initially included in the SWEL. Therefore, it was determined to be acceptable to remove this item from the SWEL.11 The following subsections describe the approach followed by the SWEs to identify potentially adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic interactions, and other adverse seismic conditions during the Seismic Walkdowns.
5.2.1 Adverse
Anchorage Conditions Guidance for identifying anchorage that could be degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed relied on visual inspections of the anchorage and verification of anchorage configuration.
Details for these two types of evaluations are provided in the following two subsections.
The evaluation of potentially adverse anchorage conditions described in this subsection applies to the anchorage connections that attach the identified item of equipment to the civil structure on which it is mounted. For example, the welded connections that secure the base of a Motor Control Center (MCC) to the steel embedment in the concrete floor would be evaluated in this subsection.
Evaluation of the connections that secure components within the MCC is covered later in the subsection "Other Adverse Seismic Conditions." Visual Inspections The purpose of the visual inspections was to identify whether any of the following potentially adverse anchorage conditions were present: 0 Bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware* Corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation 0 Visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors 0 Other potentially adverse seismic conditions Based on the results of the visual inspection, the SWEs judged whether the anchorage was potentially degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed.
The results of the visual inspection were documented on the SWC, as appropriate.
If there was clearly no evidence of degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions, then it was indicated on the checklist and a licensing basis evaluation was not necessary.
However, if it was not possible to judge whether the anchorage is degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed, then the condition was entered into the Corrective Action Program as a potentially adverse seismic condition for further evaluation.
Additionally, any significant comments are noted on the SWCs. Drawings and other plant design documents are cited in some of the SWCs, but they are not included with the SWCs because they are readily available in the plant's electronic document management system.5.2.2 Anchorage Configuration Confirmation As required by the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1, page 4-3), at least 50% of the items were confirmed to be anchored consistent with design drawings.
Line-mounted equipment (e.g., valves mounted on pipelines without separate anchorage) was not evaluated for anchorage adequacy and was not counted in establishing the 50%sample size.12 Examples of documentation that was considered to verify that the anchorage installation configurations are consistent with the plant documentation include the following:
- Design drawings" Seismic qualification reports of analyses or shake table tests The SWC listed in Appendix C indicate the anchorage verification status for components as follows: N/A: component that is line-mounted and/or is not anchored to the civil structure and therefore does not count in the anchorage confirmation total.Y: component that is anchored to the civil structure and was chosen for anchorage configuration confirmation.
N: component which had anchorage but was not chosen for anchorage configuration confirmation.
See Table 5-1 below for the accounting of the 50% anchorage configuration confirmations, and the individual SWC forms in Appendix C for the specific documents used in each confirmation.
Total Items Chosen includes two deferred items.Table 5-1: Anchorage Configuration Confirmation Total SWEL SWEL Items Minimum Total Items Items without Anchorage (NIA) Required Chosen 100 29 36 37*CCW Surge Tank (3T218) has been deleted from SWEL 5.2.3 Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions An adverse seismic spatial interaction is the physical interaction between the SWEL item and a nearby SSC caused by relative motion between the two during an earthquake.
An inspection was performed in the area adjacent to and surrounding the SWEL item to identify any seismic interaction conditions that could adversely affect the capability of that SWEL item to perform its intended safety-related functions.
The three types of seismic spatial interaction effects that were considered are:* Proximity* Failure and falling of SSCs (Seismic II over I)* Flexibility of attached lines and cables Detailed guidance for evaluating each of these types of seismic spatial interactions is described in the EPRI guidance document, Appendix D: Seismic Spatial Interaction.
13 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify seismic interaction hazards. Section 5.2.5 provides a summary of issues identified during the Initial Seismic Walkdowns.
No new issues were identified during the Supplement Seismic Walkdowns.
5.2.4 Other
Adverse Seismic Conditions In addition to adverse anchorage conditions and adverse seismic interactions, described above, other potentially adverse seismic conditions that could challenge the seismic adequacy of a SWEL item were evaluated.
These inspections were mostly associated with in-cabinet inspections of selected electrical equipment.
Examples of the types of conditions that could pose potentially adverse seismic conditions include the following:
- Degraded conditions
- Loose or missing fasteners that secure internal or external components to equipment" Large, heavy components mounted on a cabinet that are not typically included by the original equipment manufacturer" Cabinet doors or panels that are not latched or fastened Any identified other adverse seismic conditions are documented on the items' SWC and Table 5-2, as applicable.
5.2.5 Issues
Identification during Seismic Walkdowns Table 5-2 provides a summary of issues identified during the Initial Equipment Seismic Walkdowns and recorded on SWCs. The tracking of issue resolution is identified in the table. Items are grouped based on the walkdown issue cited:* Anchorage issues* Seismic interaction issues* Other conditions
- Anchorage documentation not available" Anchorage inspection could not be fully completed The majority of potentially adverse anchorage conditions found were related to documentation of as-found anchorage.
In those cases either the as-found anchorage was not consistent with the available document, or the document identifying the anchorage design could not be identified.
Except for the item E16B air handling unit (AHU), no concerns with overall anchorage strength were identified during the Initial Seismic Walkdowns.
There was one instance where anchor corrosion was cited, but the extent of corrosion is minor at this time. The E16B AHU was found to be lacking positive base anchorage.
Low seismic ruggedness of attached piping was also cited as a concern. The operability of the unit was addressed and the unit was found to be operable.14 Potential seismic interaction concerns were identified but none of the issues were considered to be significant hazards but will be addressed to reduce risk. Most equipment interaction issues are related to clearances between equipment and adjacent items and improper seismic housekeeping.
Under good seismic housekeeping practice, transient and moveable items (e.g., ladders) should be restrained or stowed such that they will not slide into or fall against important plant equipment.
Items considered minor maintenance issues, such as loose or missing thumbscrews or latches, were found and cited under "Other" potentially adverse conditions.
In addition, these items were entered into the Corrective Action Program under separate Action Requests (ARs). None of these items affect component anchorage.
For items requiring anchorage verification, the SWC anchorage verification checklist item was set to "Unknown" if an anchorage design document could not be found.Notwithstanding, the configuration was assessed to ensure that there was no immediate operability concern. Also, anchorage checklist items were set to "Unknown" when the walkdown team could not see all anchors. For example, some anchors (relatively few)of control cabinets were covered by wiring. A comment is included on the corresponding SWC to explain that certain anchors out of the group could not be seen. Again, the configuration was assessed to establish that there was no immediate operability concern.For the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns, all the design documentation for those items requiring anchorage verification was found and there were no material deficiencies.
Accordingly, no additional items were entered into Table 5-2.Revision 2 of this Report also provides an update on the status for the items that were entered into the Corrective Action Program during the initial Seismic Walkdowns.
15 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Anchorage issues As-found anchorage determined to be 3B EDG FAN Anchorage does not match pattern adequate given the size and geometry ASSEMBLIES shown on drawing 5610-C-379 Sh. 1. of fan assemblies.
Also, item was Unknown if more recent anchorage reviewed for USI A-46 (Ref. 9). Documentation revision in documentation exists. Also, one anchor Anchorage found to be acceptable.
YES D eonresi at a support for the north fan appears to progress be missing. Revise drawings to match as-found condition.
As-found anchorage is approximately 3D03 Anchorage seen to be a mix of 5/8 and equivalent to that shown on drawing.1/2 diameter concrete expansion Also, Item was reviewed for USI A-46 3A BATTERY anchors (CEA's) for each rack. and anchorage was found to be Drawings revised.RACK acceptable.
YES Anchorage does not match drawing 5610-C-1369.
Revise drawings to match as-found condition.
As-found anchorage is similar to 3025 anchorage for other plant battery chargers and therefore judged to be 3B1 BATTERY Anchorage configuration differs from adequate.
Documentation revision in CHARGER drawing 5610-C-652 Sh. 1. YES progress Revise drawings to match as-found condition.
16 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Anchorage is by cast-in-place (CIP)3E207B Concrete is cracked and spalling, with anchors embedded in concrete exposed reinforcement, at north-east pedestals, and was judged to be COMPONENT anchor. The spalled area is not currently acceptable.
YES Repair activities have been COOLING HEAT tagged in the field. scheduled.
EXCHANGER B Repair concrete.3S77 Condition Evaluated.
Per walkdown and investigation it 100 AMP 2- Item is a medium size wall mounted was determined that the POLE Three anchors along right edge covered panel with substantial anchorage and whitish product was not AUTOMATIC by whitish corrosion product; lower was judged to be acceptable.
corrosion, but hardened grout TRANSFER anchor may have more than minor YES dropped on bolts during SWITCH corrosion of nut. Evaluate and take corrective action to concrete repairs in the area.repair corroded area. Recommended to leave As-Is to prevent damage to bolt during whitish product removal process.CONSOLE Accepted As-Is per Item is a low-height cabinet with Engineering Evaluation.
CONTROL substantial anchorage.
As-found Comparison with analysis ROOM anchorage is judged to be adequate under Calculation TPN-15JC-CONTROL Anchors along the cabinet front are given the overall capacity of the 91-001 show adequate CONSOLE typically 2' on center. One anchor along anchorage and the configuration of the YES overall capacity remaining.
the front appears to be missing. cabinets.
No drawing/document update required since the anchorage Plant drawings and documents need to configuration is below the be changed to reflect as-built level of detail of any drawing configuration.
available.
17 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 An analysis of the as-found condition E16B was performed and determined to be Further evaluation performed CONTROL Unit appears to be unanchored.
Feet of acceptable for its functionality for the by vendor concluded that ROOM AIR unit appear to sit on vibration isolation seismic loading. Operability of unit sliding and rocking of the ROOM AIR pads (4 places). confirmed by prompt operability YES subject component were HANDLING UNIT determination (POD). negligible.
Adequate safety Evaluate and take corrective action. margin was found.As-found anchorage was judged to be X05 adequate based on the amount of weld Anchorage is welded to embedded steel. provided in comparison to the 4160/480V Find that 4 of 6 welds are 4" long and 2 configuration and mass of the Documentation revision in TRANSFORMER of 6 welds are about 2" long. Anchorage transformer.
YES progress FOR 480V LC 3B does not match drawing 5610-E-9-35.
Plant drawings and documents need to be changed to reflect as-found anchorage configuration.
Seismic interaction issues 3C04 Ceiling tiles are plastic and light weight. Therefore, the hazard imposed VERTICAL Egg crate ceiling tiles above are not tied is judged to be low.PANEL A to framing and can fall on operators and Support documentation was soft targets. This issue was cited in USI Review indicates that after USI A-46 YES retrieved.
Item was closed.A-46 inspection.
inspection, metal ceiling tiles were replaced with plastic ones. AR was written to verify issue close-out.
18 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 3C06_3C05 Egg crate ceiling tiles above are not tied Ceiling tiles are plastic and light to framing and can fall on operators and weight. Therefore, the hazard imposed PANEAL B soft targets. This issue was cited in USI is judged to be low. Review indicates Support documentation was PANEL B A-46 inspection, that after USI A-46 inspection, metal Supprt docm was ceiling tiles were replaced with plastic YES retrieved.
Item was closed.ones. AR was written to verify issue close-out.
CONSOLE Ceiling tiles are plastic and light CONTROL Egg crate ceiling tiles above are not tied weight. Therefore, the hazard imposed ROOM to framing and can fall on operators and isSupport documentation was CONTROL soft targets. This issue was cited in USI Review indicates that after USI A-46 YES retrieved.
Item was closed.CONSOLE A-46 inspection, inspection, metal ceiling tiles were replaced with plastic ones. AR was written to verify issue close-out.
HCV-3-121 Per Engineering Evaluation accepted As-Is.CHG TO RCS Based on the difference in mass The induced force from the CONTROL HCV-3-121 is within 12" of the structural between the valve and the tubing, it is relative low horizontal VALVE support for asearby imit A judged that the hazard to valveswth accelerations will act over the Potential for seismic interaction.
A functionality is low.YE possible method of increasing clearance insactuator diaphragm housing woul be o ct th exende pat oftheinstead of the spring actuator would be to cut the extended part of the Evaluate and increase the clearance that brings the valve to a level transmitter bolt.as needed. safety position.
Therefore, no field work required.19 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 MOV-3-350 The gearbox of MOV-3-350 is Based on the difference in mass approximately 1/4" from a vertical conduit between the valve and the conduit, it is Per Engineering Evaluation, EMERGENCY (possibly abandoned).
judged that the hazard to valve accepted As-is. Enough BORATION functionality is low. flexibility was found in the CONTROL YES system. No field work VALVE Evaluate and increase the clearance required.as needed.Other conditions 3B50 Per field walkdown post-inspection it was determined that the subject lift 3H trolley and the associated metal hook LOADCENTER Lift trolley on roof of cabinet was found are always retracted into the rail (CABINET) uhousing.
As such, a banging against unrestrained side-to-side and may the stop is unlikely to occur. In against stop. This could be a relay addition, the stop is welded to the rail Per Engineering Evaluation, chatter issue, housing. Therefore, isolated from the accepted As-is. Enough Provide positive restraint to roof trolley to rigid upper frame of the cabinet with flexibility was found in the prevent impact against stops, OR electrical equipment inside. YES system. No field work As such, this condition was considered required.Verify there are no essential relays or to not represent a potential or other chatter-prone devices in the immediate operability concern cabinet Recommended to provide positive restraint to roof trolley to prevent impact against stops.20 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Potential impact with independent tube Per field walkdown post-inspection it Per Engineering Evaluation, 3C23B steel support crossing near the top of the was determined that the subject accepted As-Is. No field work cabinet in front. The gap to the T Is cabinet is top-supported and effectively YES required.SEQUENCER about 1/8" on one side, increasing to rigid as well as the TS support.3C23B about 1/2" on the opposite side.Best seismic practice for battery racks is to make batteries snug against rails or spacers in all lateral directions.
Typically there is a 3/8 to 1/2" (approx.)
Similar conditions were identified 3Dh3 gap between front of batteries and during the A-46 assessment and Repair activities have been horizontal rail. Condition is common for judged to be acceptable for operability.
YES scheduled.
3A BATTERY all inspected racks (batteries can slide Further evaluation of the as-qualified RACK forward to rail). condition is to be performed to determine if spacers should be installed to increase margin.Best seismic practice for battery racks is to make batteries snug against rails or spacers in all lateral directions.
3D24 Typically there is a 3/8 to 1/2" (approx.)gap between front of batteries and Similar conditions were identified Repair activitieshavebeen 3B BATTERY horizontal rail. Condition is common for during the A-46 assessment and YES scheduled.
all inspected racks (batteries can slide judged to be acceptable for operability.
forward to rail). Further evaluation of the as-qualified condition is to be performed to determine if spacers should be installed to increase margin.21 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resultina from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Potential relay chatter was addressed 3QR35 in the PTN USI A-46 evaluation.
It was concluded that the potential for relay CONTROL chatter was very low and that any ROOM chatter would be managed by PROTECTION Zero gap at left end to adjacent cabinet identifying the effect and taking Per Engineering Evaluation, RACK 3QR80A (next to line-up).
Suspect appropriate action to mitigate the accepted As-is. It was 3QR80A is not bolted to adjacent 3QR32 effect. Therefore there is no immediate verified that no essential cabinet (see gaps a mid-height).
Unable operability concern. YES relays or other chatter-prone to fully inspect interior due to access devices were attached to limitations.
This may be a relay chatter The resolution will be to verify that tops cabinet's door and/or walls.concern, of cabinets are bolted together such No field work required.that impact is prevented, OR Verify there are no essential relays or other chatter-prone devices in the cabinets.22 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 3T36 Based on field walk down, the tank EDG DIESEL integrity would not be adversely OIL STORAGE TANK Base plate at east and west anchors has affected by the condition above the corrosion of extension beyond wall/base amount of material left in the base Maintenance activities have weld at two locations.
Not a capacity plate is judged to be adequate for the YES been scheduled.
component to withstand its design concern at this time. las loads.This is a maintenance issue. Perform maintenance as needed per final resolution determined under CAP.E16B Operability of unit confirmed by prompt CONTROL operability determination (POD).ROOM AIR Per Engineering Evaluation, HANDLING UNIT There is non-rugged rod hung copper The impact of spray was evaluated and accepted As-Is. Copper tubing in the area and tubing is attached it would not adversely affect the tubing was found to be to E16B. The tubing may be a spray function of the air handler. YES properly supported and hazard. Also, leakage from tubing may An additional AR was written to seismically adequate.
No impair function of E 16B. address this specific condition and to field work required.review adverse effects, if any of the copper tubing on the functionality of the air handlers.
The operability screening of the AR determined that the AHU remain Operable.23 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Anchorage documentation not available Control panel has been confirmed to 3C12B be welded to an embedded metal frame at various locations.
As such, it 3B EDG would not be adversely affected by CONTROL seismic loads. The anchorage currently PANEL Im is designated for anchorage installed is judged to be adequate to verfItem a desig nt foa antifie withstand its design loads based on YES Documentation update in verification; a document that identifies the capacity of the anchorage in Yu onpes i anchorage design was not located, comparison to the mass and progress configuration of the panel.Design drawings will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
24 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Based on field walkdown, the 3D01 associated distribution panel has been Item is designated for anchorage confirmed to have anchor bolts (Sketch (DISTRIBUTION verification; a document that identifies provided in the Checklist) at various PANEL) anchorage design was not located, locations.
As such, it would not be adversely affected by seismic loads.The anchorage currently installed is judged to be adequate to withstand its YES Documentation update in design loads based on the capacity of progress the anchorage in comparison to the mass and configuration of the panel.Design drawings will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
25 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Heat exchanger has been confirmed to have anchors bolts to a concrete pedestal. (Sketch provided in the Checklist).
As such, it would not be adversely affected by seismic loads.The anchorage currently installed is 3E208A judged to be adequate to withstand its Item is designated for anchorage design loads based on the capacity of YES Documentation update in SPENT FUEL verification; a document that identifies the anchorage in comparison to the progress PIT HEAT anchorage design was not located, mass and configuration of the heat EXCHANGER exchanger.
Design drawings and calculations will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
26 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Chiller package has been confirmed to have anchor bolts to a welded steel frame (Sketch provided in the Checklist).
As such, it would not be 3E239B adversely affected by seismic loads.The anchorage currently installed is LC & SWGR Item is designated for anchorage judged to be adequate to withstand its LOM & SWverification; a document that identifies design loads based on the capacity of YES Documentation update in ROOMSYT anchorage design was not located, the anchorage in comparison to the progress CHILLER mass and configuration of the chiller PACKAGE1B unit.(TRAIN-B)
Design drawings and calculations will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
27 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Based on field walkdown, the associated pump frame has been confirmed to have anchor bolts to a concrete pedestal (Sketch provided in the Checklist).
As such, it would not be Item is designated for anchorage adversely affected by seismic loads.3P212A verification; a document that identifies The anchorage currently installed is anchorage design was not located, judged to be adequate to withstand its YES Documentation update in SFP CLG WTR design loads based on the capacity of progress PMP A the anchorage in comparison to the mass and configuration of the pump.Design drawings and calculations will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
28 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resultina from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Based on field walkdown, the associated protection rack has been confirmed to have anchor bolts (Sketch provided in the Checklist) at various locations.
As such, it would not be Item is designated for anchorage adversely affected by seismic loads.3QR35 verification; a document that identifies The anchorage currently installed is CONTROL anchorage design was not located, judged to be adequate to withstand its YES Documentation update in ROOM design loads based on the capacity of progress PROTECTION the anchorage in comparison with the RACK mass and configuration of the cabinet.Design drawings will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
29 Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection Entered Equipment ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Resolution into CAP Current Status as of Rev. 2 Based on field walkdown, the D51 associated battery charger has been confirmed to be anchor bolted to an SPARE embedded steel frame (Sketch BATTERY provided in the Checklist).
As such, it CHARGER would not be adversely affected by seismic loads. The anchorage currently Item is designated for anchorage installed is judged to be adequate to verification; a document that identifies withstand its design loads based on YES Documentation update in anchorage design was not located, the capacity of the anchorage in progress comparison with the mass and configuration of the cabinet.This is a configuration control issue.Design drawings will be updated to document the as-built configuration of the anchorage.
30 5.3 AREA WALK-BYS The purpose of the Area Walk-Bys is to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL items. Vicinity is generally defined as the room containing the SWEL item. If the room is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), then the vicinity is identified based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item. This vicinity is described on the Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC), shown in Appendix D of this report. A total of 45 AWCs were completed for Turkey Point Unit 3 during the initial seismic walkdowns.
Five (5)additional AWCs were completed during the supplemental seismic walkdowns.
The key examination factors that were considered during Area Walk-Bys include the following:
- Anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment)
- Significantly degraded equipment in the area* A visual assessment (from the floor) of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting (e.g., condition of supports or fill conditions of cable trays)* Potentially adverse seismic interactions including those that could cause flooding, spray, and fires in the area* Other housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interaction (including temporary installations and equipment storage)* Scaffold construction was inspected for adequate bracing and anchorage* Hazards from temporary equipment were evaluated and overall seismic housekeeping was evaluated The Area Walk-Bys are intended to identify adverse seismic conditions that are readily identified by visual inspection, without necessarily stopping to open cabinets or taking an extended look. If a potentially adverse seismic condition was identified during the Area Walk-By, then additional time was taken, as necessary, to evaluate adequately whether there was an adverse condition and to document any findings.The results of the Area Walk-Bys are documented on the AWCs included in Appendix D of this report. A separate AWC was filled out for each area inspected.
A single AWC was completed for areas where more than one SWEL item was located. New AWCs were completed for areas previously inspected that included deferred items.Additional details for evaluating the potential for adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding, spray, or fire in the area are provided in the following two subsections.
Seismically-Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions Seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions are the effect of possible ruptures of vessels or piping systems that could spray, flood or cascade water into the area where SWEL items are located. This type of seismic interaction was considered during the IPEEE program. Those prior evaluations were considered, as applicable, as information for the Area Walk-Bys.31 One area of particular concern to the industry is threaded fire protection piping with long unsupported spans. If adequate seismic supports are present or there are isolation valves near the tanks or charging sources, flooding may not be a concern. Numerous failures have been observed in past earthquakes resulting from sprinkler head impact.Less frequent but commonly observed failures have occurred due to flexible headers and stiff branch pipes, non-ductile mechanical couplings, seismic anchor motion and failed supports.Examples where seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions could occur include the following: " Fire protection piping with inadequate clearance around fusible-link sprinkler heads* Non-ductile mechanical and threaded piping couplings can fail and lead to flooding or spray of equipment* Long, unsupported spans of threaded fire protection piping" Flexible headers with stiffly supported branch lines* Non-Seismic Category I tanks The SWEs exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to flooding or spray. Fire protection piping at Turkey Point Unit 3 was found to be sufficiently restrained in areas where SC-I equipment items are located and no concerns were identified with fire protection piping.One potential seismic-induced spray interaction was identified at Turkey Point Unit 3 during the Initial Seismic Walkdowns, and included as an issue to be resolved.
This is related to the E16B AHU discussed in Section 5.2.Seismically-Induced Fire Interactions Seismically-induced fire interactions can occur when equipment or systems containing hazardous/flammable material fail or rupture. Examples where seismically-induced fire interactions could occur include the following:
- Hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets* Natural gas lines and their attachment to equipment or buildings* Bottles containing acetylene or similar flammable chemicals* Hydrogen lines and bottles Another example where seismically-induced fire interaction could occur is when there is relative motion between a high voltage item of equipment (e.g., 4160 volt transformer) and an adjacent support structure when they have different foundations.
This relative motion can cause high voltage busbars, which pass between the two, to short out against the grounded bus duct surrounding the busbars and cause a fire.The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to fires.32 One potential seismic-fire interaction was identified at Turkey Point Unit 3 and included as an issue to be resolved.
Valve POV-3-4883 is located in the vicinity of a main station transformer and the transformer is considered a potential fire source.Area Walk-By Results Table 5-3 provides a summary of issues identified during the Area Walkdowns and recorded on AWCs. The tracking of issue resolution is identified in the table. Items are grouped based on the walkdown issue cited:* Seismic housekeeping issues* Other seismic interaction issues* Other conditions The majority of potentially adverse conditions found are related to seismic housekeeping.
Potential seismic interaction concerns were identified but none of the issues were considered to be significant immediate hazards.Revision 2 of this Report provides an update on the status for the items that were entered into the Corrective Action Program during the initial Seismic Walkdowns (Revision 1).No additional items were entered into Table 5-3 after completion of the supplementary walkdowns under Revision 2 of this report, 33 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resultina from Area Walk-by Inspections Area ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Resolution Entered Current Status as of Rev.Condition into CAP 2)Seismic Housekeeping Issues No soft targets are vulnerable.
This is Area 200 a seismic housekeeping issue.BORIC ACID TANK Large cover plates for nearby recessed Condition was not considered to be Large cover plates ROOM area are stored adjacent to pump an immediate hazard. YES removed from area.4P203B.Take actions to ensure existing seismic housekeeping procedures are followed.Temporary light near one of the Pump casing is considered a rigid Area 201 noproperly sce component and interaction with temp 1 charging pumps is not properly secured. light risk is low. Temporary light removed CHARGING PUMP A ladder near RCS filters is not tied off. YES from area.ROOM Restrain OR Remove the temp light and ladder.Area 310C -CABLE No soft targets are vulnerable.
This is SPREADING ROOM, a seismic housekeeping issue.MECH.EQ ROOM Loose cover panels leaning against wall Condition was not considered to be in front of air handlers.
Potential to fall an immediate hazard. YES Loose cover panels on piping and conduit. removed from area.Take actions to ensure existing seismic housekeeping procedures are followed.34 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resultina from Area Walk-by Inspections Area ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Resolution Entered Current Status as of Rev.Condition into CAP 2)Area 343 -3B MCC This is a seismic housekeeping issue.ROOM Potential relay chatter issue is undesirable but the overall plant A cart (breaker lift cart) behind 3A MG hazard related to relay chatter is Set Controls cabinet is unrestrained and typically low as previously discussed.
YES Breaker lift car removed may hit that cabinet during earthquake.
from area.This may be a relay chatter concern. Take actions to ensure existing seismic housekeeping procedures are followed.Adjacent static inverters are not Area 347B considered soft targets relative to the resistive load bank. This is a seismic BATTERY CHARGER hu ROOM Temporary resistive load bank is stored housekeeping issue. Condition was Mwithin 1/4" of 3Y5. This is judged to be not considered to be an immediate YES Temporary resistive load a housekeepis issue. hazard. bank removed from area.a housekeeping issue.Take actions to ensure existing seismic housekeeping procedures are followed.35 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections Area ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Resolution Entered Current Status as of Rev.Condition into CAP 2)This is a seismic housekeeping issue.Area 360 Loose ladders behind 3QR50; ladders Potential relay chatter issue is CONTROL ROOM have minor impact potential against undesirable but the overall plant base of cabinet after falling then sliding hazard related to relay chatter is Area 362 tpclylwa rvosydsusd CONTROL ROOM A tool cart on locked wheels is directly typically low as previously discussed.
GENERAL next to cabinet "Rack No. 26 Prot. YES Loose ladders secured.GENERAL Chne e 1.Ptnilfripc nTake actions to ensure existing Channel Set I1". Potential for impact on seismic housekeeping procedures are cabinet. A loose printer on floor is next followed.to cabinet "Rack No. 26 Control".
Minor impact potential against base of cabinet.No soft targets are vulnerable in this Large scaffold assembly in area has area. This is a scaffold interaction bracing but does not appear to have issue. Condition was not considered Area 370 sufficient east/west anchorage near to be an immediate hazard. YES Large scaffold assembly pump 3P9B. Spacing between e/w removed from area.INTAKE AREA anchors is too far (about 40'). N/S Take actions to ensure existing anchorage of scaffold was OK. seismic housekeeping procedures are followed.36 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections Area ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Resolution Entered Current Status as of Rev.Condition into CAP 2)Other seismic interaction issues Operability of unit confirmed by Area 310C prompt operability determination (POD).CABLE SPREADING ROOM, MECH.EQ The impact of spray was evaluated ROOM Rod hung copper tubing ("Service and it would not adversely affect the Water" tag seen) appears to be non- function of the air handler. Per Engineering sateismic tAgseen)appears to be non- sEvaluation, accepted As-seismic. Appears to be a spray hazard. An additional AR was written to YES Is. No field work required.This issue is tracked under component address this specific condition and to review adverse effects, if any of the copper tubing on the functionality of the air handlers.
The operability screening of the AR determined that the AHU remain Operable.Condition was not considered to be Per Engineering Area 334 an immediate hazard. A condition of Evaluation, POVs will not seismic-then-fire event is low and fire be adversely affected by HEAT EXCHANGER Main transformer is about 20' to south of hazard would take time to develop. be condition.
POVs are AREA POV-3-4883 valve. Transformer is a not required to close under AREA ~fire risk and is relatively close to the The POV would only need to close YESne Sae hud w f a lvel under LOCA conditions to maximize new Safe Shutdown valve. flow to the CCW heat exchangers.
NFPA 805.Evaluate fire hazard with respect to Accepted As-Is nearby SC-I equipment.
37 Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections Area ID Potentially Adverse Seismic Resolution Entered Current Status as of Rev.Condition into CAP 2)Other conditions Condition was not considered to be Repair activity is being Area 220 Bent hanger rods on overhead lights in an immediate hazard. Evaluate YES Rpi ciiyi en front of D-MCC and LP 38. angedsotenh.
E scheduled.
AUXILIARYBUILDING hanger rods for strength.38 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations Potentially adverse conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the seismic walkdown and area walk-by checklists, as appropriate, and entered into the corrective action process. For those conditions that required a seismic licensing basis evaluation, an operability screening has been performed and an evaluation will be performed to provide the final resolution to be documented within the corresponding condition reports. Table 5-2 and 5-3 of this report provide the status of the subject evaluations as applicable.
Revision 2 of this report provides an update on the status for the items that were entered into the Corrective Action Program during the initial Seismic Walkdowns (Revision 1).There are no outstanding operability or functionality issues as of revision 2 of this report.39 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report As discussed in previously Section 2.3, for implementation of the IPEEE Turkey Point was classified as a "reduced scope" plant per NUREG-1407 (Ref. 10). As such, the review level earthquake was equal to the site SSE and completion of the USI A-46 assessment largely satisfied the seismic IPEEE requirements.
In lieu of a full IPEEE seismic analysis, FPL opted to submit a "scaled back" program to resolve USI A-46 and Generic Letter 87-02 as allowed by the NRC in a letter dated November 4, 1998 (Ref. 13) issued for the review of Turkey Point IPEEE evaluations.
The final results of this scaled back program for the A-46 program were submitted in a letter to the NRC, L-93-155, "Final Report of Plant Specific Seismic Adequacy Evaluation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to Resolved USI A-46 and GL 87-02" (Ref. 14). The components selected for this analysis were also included in the SWEL in order to verify no outlier issues persisted.
The actions taken for USI A-46 outlier resolution in Unit 03 are summarized in Table 7-1.40 Table 7-1: USI A-46 Outlier Resolution No. Equip Equip Name Outlier Issue SRT Recommended Resolution Status Class ID 1 6 3P9B 3B Intake Cooling Pump shaft length Evaluate Shaft for adequate Drawing 5613-C-1646 issued As-Water Pump longer than can be length and clearance.
Built per PC/M 08-071 on 04/20/09 screened by SSRAP Ref: (Drawing 5610-C-61 Sht 1)report.2 6 3P9B 3B Intake Cooling Cast iron fittings on Check stresses on fittings from Drawing 5613-C-1646 issued As-Water Pump pump. loads of attached piping. Built per PC/M 08-071 on 04/20/09 Ref: (Drawing 5610-C-61 Sht 1)3 6 3P9B 3B Intake Cooling Anchorage needs Verify anchorage with Anchorage adequate per PTN-Water Pump verification, calculation.
3FSC-87-020, anchorage replacement.
4 6 3P9B 3B Intake Cooling Interaction
-Fossil Unit Check adequacy of fossil stack. Fossil stack adequate per FPL Water Pump Stack may fall. Safety Evaluation.
9 21 3T36 U3 Diesel Oil Anchorage adequacy.
Replace chair plates with 1 1/4" Chair plates upgraded per PCM 91-Storage Tank thick plates and evaluate further. 169 on 01/05/93.10 21 3T36 U3 Diesel Oil Interaction
-Fossil Unit Check adequacy of fossil stack. Fossil stack adequate per FPL Storage Tank Stack may fall. Safety Evaluation.
11 21 T205B B Boric Acid Platform adequacy for Check platform adequacy for Platform upgraded per PCMs 90-Storage Tank torsional loads, torsion, and upgrade if required.
440 and 90-441on 09/07/91.12 21 3T8 U3 Condensate Anchorage adequacy.
Replace chair plates with 1 Y4" Chair plates upgraded per PCM 91-Storage Tank thick plates and evaluate further. 170 on 01/05/93.14 21 3T1 U3 Refueling Anchorage adequacy.
Replace chair plates with 1 Y4" Chair plates upgraded per PCM 91-Water Storage thick plates and evaluate further. 172 on 01/05/93.Tank 16 21 3T23B 3B EDG Day Tank Glass sight tube. Replace glass sight tube with Addressed by CR 95-1219.non-breakable material.
Ref (Attachment 1 of JPN-PTN 5477, dated 02/26/92)17 21 3T218 U3 Component Platform adequacy.
Check platform adequacy, and Platform upgraded per PCM 90-471 Cooling Water upgrade if required.
on 03/26/92.Surge Tank 19 17 3K4B 3B EDG Skid Glass sight tube. Replace glass sight tube with Addressed by CR 95-1219.non-breakable material.
Ref (Attachment 1 of JPN-PTN 5477, dated 02/26/92)41 Table 7-1: USI A-46 Outlier Resolution No. Equip Equip Name Outlier Issue SRT Recommended Resolution Status Class ID 20 21 3T269B 3B EDG Air Start Seismic interaction
-Complete plant work order Air supply and supports replaced Tanks threaded pipe for air (PWO) already written for the per PCMs86-155 and 86-190 on supply not rigidly support. 07/08/91.supported.
21 5 3B06 3B 480V Motor Seal welded anchorage, Upgrade anchorage.
Anchorage upgraded per PCM 91-Control Center inadequate in tension. 178 on 11/16/93.23 5 3B08 3D 480V Motor Inadequate anchorage Brace top of MCC to concrete Anchorage upgraded per PCM 91-Control Center for overturning, wall. 178 on 11/16/93.24 5 3AB 3B 4.16kV No anchorage.
Add anchorage.
Anchorage upgraded per PCM 91-Switchgear 174 on 04/23/94.26 5 3B02 3B 480V HVPDS Cannot determine Add anchorage.
New load center installed per PCM Load Center anchorage.89-532 and new anchorage (Includes installed per PCM 91-176 on Transformer) 10/12/93.27 5 3B04 3D 480V HVPDS Cannot determine Verify anchorage and upgrade if New load center installed per PCM Load Center anchorage.
required.89-532 and new anchorage (Includes installed per PCM 91-176 on Transformer) 10/12/93.30 15 3D03 Battery Rack 3A No spacers on east end Add spacers on east end of Spacers added (ref. FPL letters of battery rack. battery rack. JPN-PTN-92-5261 and 5707).31 15 3D03 Battery Rack 3A Shade on lights may fail Add tie wire to lights. Tie wires added per PCM 91-182 and fall on batteries, on 07/08/93.32 15 3D03 Battery Rack 3A Block walls not Verify block wall included in FPL FPL verified wall included in IE 80-evaluated by SRT. IE 80-11 program. 11 program as block walls C30-1, C30-2, C30-4.33 15 3D24 Battery Rack 3B No spacers on east end Add spacers on east end of Spacers added (ref. FPL letters of battery rack. battery rack. JPN-PTN-92-5261 and 5707).34 15 3D24 Battery Rack 3B Shade on lights may fail Add tie wire to lights. Tie wires added per PCM 91-182 and fall on batteries, on 07/08/93.35 15 3024 Battery Rack 3B Block walls not Verify block wall included in FPL FPL verified wall included in IE 80-evaluated by SRT. IE 80-11 program. 11 program as block walls A42-2, C42-16, C42-17, C42-18.42 Table 7-1: USI A-46 Outlier Resolution No. Equip Equip Name Outlier Issue SRT Recommended Resolution Status Class ID 42 14 3D01 3A Distribution One loose anchor bolt. Tighten loose bolt. Bolt disposition per PWO 93-Panels/Bus 010843.44 20 3C23B 3B Sequencer Additional top bracket as Add top bracket as found for Bracket added per PCM 91-180 on found for sequencer 3A sequencer 3A. 10/04/93.would provide added assurance and strength.This item had only one bracket.47 21 3E207B 3B CCW Heat SRT could not verify Verify adequacy of pedestal FPL verified pedestal adequacy by Exchanger reinforcement steel design. calculations C-SJ51 1-01 and 02.design of pedestal.49 20 3C06 3B Vertical Panel Interaction metal egg Clip in metal egg crate sections Currently light weight plastic egg crate ceiling may fall on of ceiling, crate is installed.
operators.
I I 43 8 Peer Review The Peer Review Report is included as Appendix F. This includes the peer review of the SWEL selection, peer review of the seismic walkdown, and peer review of this final report.44 9 References
- 1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.2. Turkey Point Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR): Section 1, Section 2, and Section 5.3. Not used.4. AEC Publication TID 7024, "Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes", August 1963.5. ACI 318-63, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete.6. AISC, "Specifications for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings", adopted April 17, 1963.7. USNRC, "Verification Of Seismic Adequacy Of Mechanical And Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46", Generic Letter 87-02.8. USNRC, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities", Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement
4.9. Stevenson
& Associates report, "Plant Specific Seismic Adequacy Evaluation of Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 to Resolve Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and Generic Letter (GL) 87-02," dated April 30, 1993.10. USNRC, "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities", NUREG-1407, June, 1991.11. FPL Letter L-92-222, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)," letter to USNRC, August 31, 1992.12. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Enclosure 2.3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," dated March 12, 2012 13. NRC Letter to FPL, "Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, -Individual Plant Examination For External Events For Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.Units 3 And 4", dated November 4, 1998.14. FPL Letter L-93-155, "Final Report of Plant Specific Seismic Adequacy Evaluation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to Resolved USI A-46 and GL 87-02".15. FPL Letter L-2012-416, "Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic.45 A Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates A.1 INTRODUCTION Resumes for the following personnel that contributed to the seismic walkdown and/or peer review are included in this Appendix: " FPL: C. Figueroa, T. Satyan-Sharma, A. Restrepo, George Tullidge, T. Jones" Stevenson
& Associates:
J. O'Sullivan, S. Baker In addition, certificates from the EPRI Walkdown Training Course are included for each of the designated SWEs: C. Figueroa, T. Satyan-Sharma, J. O'Sullivan and S. Baker.A.2 RESUMES Carlos Andres Figueroa Mr. Figueroa is a Mechanical and Civil Design Engineer I in the Turkey Point Nuclear Station at Florida Power & Light. He has one year of Mechanical Systems Engineering experience at Entergy's River Bend Station in St. Francisville, LA. Mr. Figueroa also has three years of Operations experience and four years of Civil Design Engineering experience at FPL's Turkey Point Station in South Florida. He holds a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Los Andes (Bogota, Colombia) and a MS in Mechanical Engineering, from the University of Florida. He completed Training on the Near Term task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns.
T. Satyan-Sharma, P.E.Mr. Satyan Sharma is a Consultant to Florida Power and Light for Turkey Point Station.He has managed and was the technical lead for the SQUG Project at a Nuclear Utility.He was a Peer Reviewer on the SQUG project at other Nuclear Plants and provided third party reviews. Mr. Satyan Sharma has 40 years of experience in Nuclear Industry in both Consulting (6 years) and Utility (34 years ) supporting plant operations.
Mr.Satyan Sharma has a Master of Science in Structural/Engineering Mechanics from New York University.
He was a member of the SQUG Team in the development of the Generic Implementation Procedures (GIP). He has received industry training as Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI 5-Day Training), SQUG New and Replacement Equipment and Parts (NARE) Training, and SQUG Equipment Selection
& Relay Evaluation Training.46 Alexander Restrepo Mr. Restrepo is an Engineer I in the PRA Group at NextEra Energy, working primarily on Turkey Point Nuclear Station. He has three years of Operations experience at Turkey Point and two years of PRA experience.
He has completed the necessary requirements and qualifications for a PRA engineer.
Recently he completed Training on the Near Term task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns.
He holds a BS and MS in Nuclear Engineering, both from the University of Florida.George Tullidge Mr. Tullidge is a Staff Engineer in the PRA Group at NextEra Energy Juno Beach office.He has over 30 years of commercial nuclear power experience.
Mr. Tullidge has a degree in Physics from Pennsylvania State University.
His years of experience include Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering.
He also held an active Senior Reactor Operator license at St. Lucie and was a qualified Operations Shift Manager.Tim Jones Mr. Jones is an Operations Department Shift Manager at Turkey Point Nuclear. He has over 26 years of experience in the Operations Department and was licensed in 1994 as Reactor Operator.
He received his SRO license in 1998. His years of experience include Operations, Maintenance, and Security.John J. O'Sullivan, P.E.Mr. O'Sullivan is a Senior Consultant in the S&A Boston office. He has managed and led seismic walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments.
Mr. O'Sullivan has 24 years of seismic experience serving the nuclear industry.
Mr. O'Sullivan has participated in more than 10 USI A-46 and IPEEE projects in response to the requirements of Generic Letters 87-02 and 88-20.Mr. O'Sullivan has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He has received industry training as Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI 5-day SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, and Seismic Fragility training.Seth Baker Mr. Baker is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Boston office. He has performed structural engineering analysis & design, finite element analysis, structural mechanics evaluations, seismic qualification managed and seismic walkdowns.
Mr. Baker has a Master of Science in Civil/Structural Engineering from Stanford University.
He completed the EPRI training for NTTF 2.3 plant seismic walkdowns.
47 A.3 CERTIFICATES r=FI--I I Certificate of Completion Carlos Figueroa Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3-Plant Seismic Walkdowns idy 27, 2012~~~mmNLX.lm 48 U tresents this Certificate of Achievement To Certify qfhat Jiu aiStan-Sarma has Compfetedthe SQUG Walkdoum Screening andSeismic Evaluation Training Course HfeldJune 17-22, 1992_____SQUGCh.
mQ UwmM~MSQUG Presents this Certificate ofAchievement To Certify 'rflt I John O'Sullivan has Completed the SQVG Wakdmown Screening andSeismic Evafuation Training Course JldfiAugust 10-15, 1992 kTh. I K... IIml Ul 49 50 B SWEL Selection Report Florida Power & Light Selection of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for the Requirement
2.3 Walkdown
Turkey Point Nuclear Station Prepared by Reviewed by Reviewed by Reviewed by Alxade..efrpo(P~i'Group)
G4Lt idge (PRA Group)Date Date Date Timi Jonic *perafions)(L~k Wa CjzKI Carlos Figueroa (IAgineering) 51 I Introduction This document contains the information used to develop the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) at Turkey Point (PTN) in accordance with EPRI Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance," dated June 2012 [1].The selection process was completed by applying separate screening criteria to develop SWELs 1 and 2. The documentation is laid out by first providing the screening criteria requirements, and then providing the implementation of how PTN applied that screening criteria.2 Process The general process focused first on building a Master Component List, with attributes to support the sample selection process (Sections 3 and 4). This list was obtained by generating a NAMS query of the entire PTN Equipment Database for all components along with data such as system code, component type, location, etc. Then the screening criteria below were applied to arrive at a final SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 comprised of about 92 items and 8 items, respectively.
The process also included identifying a set of plant locations around which the walkdown was organized (Section 5). The plant locations were also used to support the "walk-by" process to assess cable trays and ventilation ducts and the potential for seismic spatial interactions (Section 6).Finally, Section 6 identifies several evaluations that supported the identification of targets for the walkdown and the specific attributes that needed to be examined.Because the SWEL needs to address a number of attributes, the selection was performed and reviewed by a team that includes representatives from PRA, Operations, and Engineering.
This was done systematically by performing table-top virtual walkdowns and pre-walkdowns of each location to identify candidates for the SWEL as well as other issues (e.g., seismic-flood) that needed to be inspected by the walk-by.3 SWEL 1 Screening Criteria The final SWEL 1 is contained in the Microsoft Excel workbook, "U3 (U4) PTN Fukushima SWEL" [2], in the "SWEL 1" spreadsheet on file. Each iteration of the screening process described below is contained in the Microsoft Access database, "SWEL 1"[3]. These final SWEL (both SWEL 01 & SWEL 02), as well as the Master Component List, are available in Excel format on file at Turkey Point.3.1 Screening Criteria 1 -Seismic Category 1 Requirement The scope of SSCs (Systems, Structures, and Components) in the plant are limited to those that are designed to Seismic Category (SC) I requirements.
This is done because only such items have a defined seismic licensing basis against which to evaluate the as-installed configuration.
Selecting these items is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(f) Letter, under the "Requested Actions" section, to "verify current plant configuration with the current license basis." 52 Application Seismic Class 1 SSCs include over 20,000 items in the PTN equipment database.
A complete equipment list from the PTN equipment database was obtained via a NAMS query ran in June 2012. The Seismic Class 1 SSCs were queried from the report by choosing only those SSCs where the Seismic Class was designated with an I.3.2 Screening Criteria 2 -Equipment or Systems Requirement The scope of SSCs included selecting only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the plant licensing basis.Cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ductwork were not included as "equipment" in the SWEL 1, and were instead left to be reviewed during area walk-bys of the spaces containing items on the SWEL 1. Also omitted were SC 1 structures, containment penetrations, and SC1 piping systems.Application The list of all SC1 SSCs was further reduced by including only "active" components, removing all items classified as "design" or "non-equip".
3.3 Screening
Criteria 3 -Supports 5 Safety Functions Requirement The scope of SSCs to be included in SWEL 1, are those SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions.
These five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the Ultimate Heat Sink), plus the containment functions.
Application Since the PRA risk model represents the five safety functions listed above, a list of all PRA component tags was compared to the remaining SSCs. Items not included in the PRA model were removed.3.4 Screening Criteria 4- Sample Considerations Requirement It was expected that SWEL 1, taken as a whole, would include representative items from some of the variations within each of the following five attributes: " A variety of types of systems" Major new and replacement equipment* A variety of types of equipment 53 A variety of environments 0 Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program Application The seismic aspects of the PTN IPEEE were resolved by the use of the FPL site-specific Seismic Program associated with Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 [4]. The equipment analyzed in this program was used as a base and compared to the screening criteria above.The remaining components in the Master Component List were reordered according to system code, component type, and then location in order to obtain a broad sample. Operations personnel were consulted with to identify new or replaced equipment that were on the truncated Master Component List.4 SWEL 2 Screening Criteria SWEL 2 began with the same Master Component List as SWEL 1. An initial screening was done retaining only SSCs related to the Spent Fuel Pool system. Screening criteria 1, 2, and 3 for SWEL 2 were performed identically to that of screening criteria 1,2, and 4 for SWEL 1, respectively.
The final SWEL 2 is contained in the Microsoft Excel workbook, "U3 (U4) PTN Fukushima SWEL" [2], in the "SWEL 2" spreadsheet on file. Each iteration of the screening process is contained in the Access database, "SWEL 2" [5]. These Microsoft Excel Workbooks, as well as the Master Component List are available in Excel format on file at Turkey Point.4.1 Screening Criteria 4 -Cause Rapid Drain-Down Requirement The EPRI guidance requires assessment of the potential for Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) rapid draindown, specifically the identification of SFP penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
Application There are only two penetrations in the SFP below this level. One is a lower suction valve (*-797), the other is the fuel transfer tube, used to move fuel from containment to the SFP. During normal operation, this tube is isolated by a blind flange on the containment side and a manual valve on the Fuel Storage Building side. Other components were included in this screening based on their importance in maintaining spent fuel pool inventory and cooling.54 5 Walk-By Table Each location will also be subject to a walk-by, an examination (in less detail) of the other PRA components, as well as an inspection for other seismic issues: " Several other passive component types: cable trays & ventilation ducts." Seismic-induced fire. This includes all flammable materials in each location such as hydrogen lines, gas bottles (acetylene, hydrogen), natural gas lines, and hazardous/flammable material stored in the location.* Seismic-induced flood. This includes all flood/spray sources (tanks, piping) originating in each location, based on the Internal Flood PRA. Note, the flood sources of interest are only those originating in the location, not those coming from another location.
The potential for flood propagation will be addressed in the seismic/flood analysis.0 Spatial interactions (2 / 1). This includes adverse physical interaction due to proximity, failing of other components or structures (e.g., cranes), and flexibility of attached lines and cables.The final Walk-By Table is contained in the Microsoft Excel workbook; "U3 PTN Fukushima SWEL" [2], in the "Walkby Table" spreadsheet as well as the Master Component List are available in Excel format at Turkey Point on file.6 Evaluations The following evaluations were performed prior to and during the walkdown to assess specific issues that may add to the walkdown scope or the inspection criteria.6.1 IPEEE or US! A-46 Vulnerabilities The seismic assessment performed for PTN USI A-46 was reviewed for any seismic vulnerability identified.
These issues were included in the SWEL table.6.2 Configuration Verification The EPRI guidance identifies two types of inspection for the walkdown: (a) visual inspection and (b) configuration verification.
Visual inspection is typically what is performed in a walkdown, looking for obvious degraded conditions in equipment anchorage.
However, configuration verification is a more involved inspection consistent with the existing plant documentation of the design basis. This is required in at least 50% of the SWEL items with anchorage.
Since 28 SWEL components are MOVs (Class 8) or AOVs (or similar Class 7 components) which do not have anchorage, this leaves 50% of 72, or at least 36 components to be included in the configuration verification.
For those components, the design basis was reviewed and the key attributes included in the walkdown forms to assist the inspection.
55 6.3 New Equipment The EPRI Guidance directs that the SWEL should include a "robust sampling of the major new or replacement equipment installed within the past 15 years (i.e., since the approximate completion of the seismic IPEEE evaluation)".
Based on discussion with Operations and Engineering, major new or replacement equipment was identified and noted as such in the SWEL spreadsheet.
6.4 Modifications
The walkdown team allowed for changes to be made to the SWEL mid-walkdown.
Many components were changed from 'B' train to 'A' train as the former was the protected train, precluding the thorough inspection of some components.
Various items were also replaced or removed because they were common components already on the other unit's SWEL or the component was no longer installed in the plant.7 References
- 1. "Final Report of Plant Specific Adequacy Evaluation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to Resolve Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46 and Generic Letter (GL) 87-02," Stevenson& Associates, April 1993.2. "PTN Fukushima SWEL," FPL, August 2012.3. "SWEL 1," FPL, August 2012.4. EPRI TR-1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance," June 2012.5. "SWEL 2," FPL, August 2012.56 C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Supplemental Walkdowns Only)(See revision 1 for Initial Walkdown Checklists)
- - Anchorage Configuration Confirmation Performed Tag ID Component Description Area Equip. page Class 3B02 3B02 480V HVPDS LOAD CENTER 3B 341 -480V LC ROOM 2 58 (CABINET)3804 3D LC (Part of B train) (CABINET) 341 -480V LC ROOM 2 60 3AA 3AA 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A (CABINET) 368 -4160V SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3 62 3AD 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 3AD FOR BUS 3D 429 -SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3D 3 64 PCV-3-4885 PRZR PORV N2 BACKUP SUPPLY 123 -CONTAINMENT 58 FOOT 7 83 PRESSURE REGULATOR ELEVATION SV-3-455C PRESSURIZER PORV SOLENOID VALVE 103 -PRESSURIZER CUBICLE 7 85 MOV-3-535 PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE 103 -PRESSURIZER CUBICLE 8 75 MOV-3-744A RHR LO HEAD SI TO LOOP A MOTOR 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT 8 77 OPERATED VLV ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL MOV-3-751 NORMAL RHR INLET FROM RCS MOTOR 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT 8 79 OPERATED VLV ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL MOV-3-865A SI ACCUM A DISCH MOTOR OPERATED 121 -CONTAINMENT 14 FOOT 8 81 VLV ELEVATION OUTSIDE BIO-WALL 3D01 3D01 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) 310 -CABLE SPREADING ROOM 14 66 3D23 3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) 347 -CONTROL ROOM INVERTER 14 68 ROOM TW-3-412C DELTA T-TAVG CH I COLD LEG 1 104 -RCP A CUBICLE 19 87 THERMOWELL 3C23B SEQUENCER 3C23B -CABINET 368 -4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM 20 70 3T229B SI ACCUM B 114- ACCUMULATOR B AREA 21 71 3V30B EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER B 123 -CONTAINMENT 58 FOOT ELEV. 21 73 Note: Detailed signed records of the checklists are available at the site.##Per the EPRI guidance document, the top row of each checklist summarizes the status as follows: Status Meaning Y All relevant checks were answered Yes and no further action is required.N At least one check is answered No and follow-up is required.U At least one check could not be answered due to lack of information and follow-up is required.Section 5.2.5 of this report identifies planned actions for items requiring follow-up.
57 Class (02) Low Voltage Switchgear 3B02 SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY-IN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 31302 (2) Low Voltage Switchgear Equipment
==
Description:==
3802 480V HVPDS LOAD CENTER 3B (CABINET)Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 30.00 ft, 341 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findinQs.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documentinci other comments.Anchoragqe
- 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?Small crack in floor at rear but stops short of cabinet pad.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
See 1-1/2" fillet welds at base at 12" o/c or less front and rear. No shims installed.
Matches 5613-C-1789.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 58 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)W-IN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3B02 (2) Low Voltage Switchgear Equipment
==
Description:==
3B02 480V HVPDS LOAD CENTER 3B (CABINET)6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There are masonry walls in the area. See A WC for comments.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Inspected exterior of cabinets.
No loose or missing hardware.
Also opened 3 of 3 lower doors and found no loose or missing hardware.Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns when only 2 of 3 lower doors were opened.59 3B04 SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)WY- N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
3B04 (2) Low Voltaqe Switchqear 3D LC (Part of B train) (CABINET)Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 30.00 ft, 341 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Welds along base, front and rear, 1-1/2" long and 12" o/c or less.Matches 5613-C- 1789.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of pootentiallv adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 60 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY-IN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
3B04 (2) Low Voltage Switchgear 3D LC (Part of B train) (CABINET)Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There are masonry walls in the area. See A WC for comments.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Inspected exterior of cabinets.
No loose or missing hardware.
Also opened 3 of 3 lower doors and found no loose or missing hardware.Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns when only 2 of 3 lower doors were opened.61 Class (03) Medium Voltage Switchgear 3AA SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)W-1 N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3AA (3) Medium Voltage Switchgear Equipment
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Description:==
3AA 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A (CABINET)Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 18.00 ft, 368 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Anchorage is consistent with drawing 5613-C-I1791 Sh. 1 Rev. 0.Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 62 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FWN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3AA (3) Medium Voltage Switchgear Equipment
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Description:==
3AA 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A (CABINET)6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Inspected exterior and interior of cabinet; no loose or missing hardware found.Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns 63 3AD SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)I-WN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3AD (3) Medium Voltage Switchgear Equipment
==
Description:==
4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 3AD FOR BUS 3D Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 42.00 ft, 429 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?No Yes Yes Yes 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Yes 64 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)-W-I N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: EauiDment DescriDtion:
3AD (3) Medium Voltage Switchgear 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 3AD FOR BUS 3D Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
Light are well supported; cable tray is lightly loaded.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Thumb screws on back panels that were not snug at time of previous inspections have been fixed.Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
65 Class (14) Distribution Panels 3D01 SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)F-]N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
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Description:==
3D01 (14) Distribution Panels 3D01 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL)Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 30.00 ft, 310 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Opened all kick panels, saw bolt heads and verified anchorage consistency with plant documentation.
Calculation PTN-BFSC-13-1001, Rev. 0 (EC 279239).Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 66 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)ff]N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3D01 (14) Distribution Panels Equipment
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Description:==
3D01 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL)6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There are a masonry walls in the area. See A WC for comments.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?About 1-1/8" gap to wall behind; judged OK for shake space.Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Inspected exterior.
No loose thumb screws in line-up observed.
Front grill of distribution panel may rattle, but very minor issue, OK. Inspected interior from open kick panels. No anomalies.
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
67 3D23 SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY1N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3D23 (14) Distribution Panels Equipment
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Description:==
3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL)Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 42.00 ft, 347B Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?No Yes Yes Yes 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Yes 68 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY1N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: EauiDment DescriDtion:
3D23 (14) Distribution Panels 3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL)Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Some rigid lines going into the cable tray overhead, but the tray is flexible.10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
69 Class (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets 3C23B SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)W- N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3C23B (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Equipment
==
Description:==
SEQUENCER 3C23B -CABINET Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 18.00 ft, 368 Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?Visual cracks are present but judged to be of minor significance.
Appear to be surface cracks only.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
No Yes Yes Yes Not Applicable 70 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 3C23 FY1N U B Equipment Class: (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Equipment
==
Description:==
SEQUENCER 3C23B -CABINET 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There is a masonry wall behind the cabinet. The wall is safety related and acceptable for design basis (see A WC).9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Inspected exterior and interior of cabinet. No loose or missing hardware.Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
71 Class (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers 3T229B SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)W- N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3T229B (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers Equipment
==
Description:==
SI ACCUM B Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 58.00 ft, 114 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Anchorage was verified against Sheet 1for Dwgs. 5610-C-575, Rev. 2 and E-5610-M-4709, Rev. 4.Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 72 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)VIN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: 3T229B (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers Equipment
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Description:==
SI ACCUM B 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
73 3V30B SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY1N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
3V30B (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER B (Inside Containment)
Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 58.00 ft, 123 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Plant drawing 5610-C-572 was verified as consistent with observed conditions.
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Dotentiallv adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, Yes 74 3V30B SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)WNU Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
3V30B (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLER B (Inside Containment)
Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
75 Class (8) Motor-Operated Solenoid-Operated Valves MOV-3-535 SWC Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: MOV-3-535 (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 58.00 ft, 103 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 76 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)-Y-WN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: MOV-3-535 (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Yes Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
77 MOV-3-744A SWC Status: Y-] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: MOV-3-744A (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
RHR LO HEAD SI TO LOOP A MOTOR OPERATED VLV Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 14.00 ft, 121 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Yes 78 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY1N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
M OV-3-744A (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves RHR LO HEAD SI TO LOOP A MOTOR OPERATED VLV Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
79 MOV-3-751 SWC Status: Y] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: MOV-3-751 (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
NORMAL RHR INLET FROM RCS MOTOR OPERATED VLV Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 14.00 ft, 121 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Yes 80 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)-Y-- N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Eauipment
==
Description:==
MOV-3-751 (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves NORMAL RHR INLET FROM RCS MOTOR OPERATED VLV Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
81 MOV-3-865A SWC Status: W] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: MOV-3-865A (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
SI ACCUM A DISCH MOTOR OPERATED VLV Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 14.00 ft, 121 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Yes 82 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FY1N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Eauipment
==
Description:==
MOV-3-865A (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves SI ACCUM A DISCH MOTOR OPERATED VLV Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
83 Class (7) Fluid-Operated Valves PCV-3-4885 Status: W] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: PCV-3-4885 (7) Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
PRZR PORV N2 BACKUP SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 58.00 ft, 123 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documentinq other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 84 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)FYIN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: PCV-3-4885 (7) Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
PRZR PORV N2 BACKUP SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
85 SV-3-455C SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)I--IN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: SV-3-455C (7) Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment
==
Description:==
PRESSURIZER PORV SOLENOID VALVE Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 58.00 ft, 103 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Yes 86 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)--I N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Eauipment DescriDtion:
SV-3-455C (7) Fluid-Operated Valves PRESSURIZER PORV SOLENOID VALVE Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes-8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes-and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
87 Class (19) Temperature Sensors TW-3-412C SWC Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)[IN U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: TW-3-412C (19) Temperature Sensors Equipment
==
Description:==
DELTA T-TAVG CH I COLD LEG 1 THERMOWELL Project: Turkey Point 3 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Unit 3, 14.00 ft, 104 (Inside Containment)
Manufacturer/Model:
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the No 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Yes 88 Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)-Y-1 N U Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment
==
Description:==
TW-3-412C (19) Temperature Sensors DELTA T-TAVG CH I COLD LEG 1 THERMOWELL Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yes and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that Yes could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns 89 D Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs)Table D-1. Summary of Area Walkdown Checklists (Supplemental Walkdowns Only)(See revision I for Initial Walkdown Checklists)
Area Walk-by Description ID Page Area 103 Area 103 -PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MOV-3-535 90 SV-3-455C Area 104 Area 104 -RCP A CUBLICLE TW-3-412C 92 Area 114 Area 114 -ACCUMULATOR B AREA 3T229B 94 Area 121 Area 121 -CONTAINMENT 14' EL MOV-3-744A 96 OUTSIDE THE BIO-WALL MOV-3-751 MOV-3-865A Area 123 Area 123 -CONTAINMENT 58' EL 3V30B 98 PCV-3-4885 Area 310B Area 310B -AREA NEAR MG SET 3001 100 Area 341 Area 341 -480V LC ROOM 3B04 102 3B02 Area 347B Area 347B -BATTERY CHARGER 3D23 105 ROOM Area 368A Area 368A -4160V SWITCHGEAR 3AA 107 ROOM A Area 368B Area 368A -4160V SWITCHGEAR 3C23B 109 ROOM B Area 429 Area 429 -SWITCHGEAR ROOM 3D 3AD 111 Note: Detailed signed records of the checklists are available at the site.Per the EPRI guidance document, the top row of each checklist summarizes the status as follows: Status Meaning Y All relevant checks were answered Yes and no further action is required.N At least one check was answered No and follow-up is required.U At least one check could not be answered due to lack of information and follow-up is required.Section 5.3 of this report identifies planned actions for items requiring follow-up.
90 Area 103 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)N U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 103 -Pressurizer Cubicle Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 91 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
FY1N U Area 103 -Pressurizer Cubicle 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?There are a masonry walls in the area.Yes Yes Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
92 Area 104 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)I-WN U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 104 -RCP A Cubicle Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 93 Status: ] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 104 -RCP A Cubicle 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
94 Area 114 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)FY1N U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 114 -Accumulator B Area Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 95 Status: Y-] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 114 -Accumulator B Area 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
96 Area 121 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)W- N U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 121 -Containment 14' EL Outside the Bio-Wall Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 97 Status: F-I N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 121 -Containment 14' EL Outside the Bio-Wall 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
98 Area 123 Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)W- N U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 123 -Containment 58' EL Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 99 Status: Y] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 123 -Containment 58' EL 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Comments This item was deferred for inspection due to unavailability for access during previous walkdowns.
100 Area 310B Status: [-Y N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 310B Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit Yes raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?No fire piping is the area. See possible sanitary drain line along wall by 3A Battery room, not a concern.6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause a fire in the area?101 Status: Y] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 310B 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
- 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?There are a masonry walls in the area. Per drawing 5160-C-I1727, the walls are safety related and acceptable for design basis (walls C-30-1, -2, -3, -4)Comments Initial walkdown by Team B.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 102 Area 341 Status: LY N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 341 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit Yes raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?No fire piping is the area.6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause a fire in the area?103 Status: LYJN U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 341 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
Breaker lift cart in corner behind cabinet 3X06 is tied off -OK. Also restrains a small ladder.8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?There are a masonry walls in the area. Per drawing 5160-C-1727, the walls are safety related and acceptable for design basis (walls T-31-IB,-2B, -3B).Comments AWC covers both LC rooms.Initial walkdown by Team B.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 104 Area 347B Status: Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)W-- N U Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 347B Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 105 Status: FY] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 347B 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
Temporary resistive load bank stored within 1/4" of 3Y05 during initial Seismic Walkdowns (Revision
- 1) has been removed. Thiswas judged to be a housekeeping issue.Other.Scaffold in area found to be adequately braced and anchored.8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?There are a masonry walls in the area. Per drawing 5160-C-1728 Rev. 0, the walls are safety related and acceptable for design basis.Comments Walkdown by Team A Initial walkdown by Team A.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 106 Area 368A Status: ] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 368A Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
Assumed that MCC 3L behind 3AA (along wall) is anchored).
Opened 3C23A-1 and saw it was well anchored.Small dry transformer 3X034 confirmed as anchored., Also, it is >42" from 3AA. Not a credible hazard.2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit Yes raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
Some chain hung lights. One light behind 3AA can swing and hit conduit entry box atop 3AA (6-3/4" gap). Not a credible hazard because gap is large and any impact is remote from devices.5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?No fire piping in area.6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause a fire in the area?Small dry transformer 3X034 confirmed as anchored., Also, it is >42" from 3AA. Not a credible hazard. (won't topple).107 Status: LYJ N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 368A 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
Loose spear breakers in front of 3AA ablong wall >35" from 3AA. Not a credible hazard.8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?There are a masonry walls in the area. Per drawing 5160-C-1730, the walls are safety related and acceptable for design basis (walls T-18-5A,-6A, -7A).Comments Add sub-areas for AWC: 368A, 368B Initial walkdown by Team B.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 108 Area 368B Status: j N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 368B Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
Assumed that MCC 3M adjacent to 3AB is anchored.2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit Yes raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
There are chain hung lights; no concerns to note.5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?No fire piping in area. Also saw threaded drain lines from room cooler. Drain lines are dry and not a hazard.6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause a fire in the area?109 Status: Y] N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 368B 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
Loose breakers, similar to 368A area. Not a credible hazard.8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Masonry walls between 368A and 368B areas are safety related. See 368A AWC.Comments Initial walkdown by Team B.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 110 Area 429 Status: N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 429 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
- 2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of Yes significant degraded conditions?
- 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit Yes raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
Lights on Unistrut frames, well supported.
- 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?No fire piping in area.6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions that could cause a fire in the area?111 Status: FV N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):
Area 429 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Yes interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?
Loose breaker in corner of room, >42" from 3AD and >28" from conduit to 3S75 wall panel, OK.8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?Comments Initial walkdown by Team B.This Area was inspected again during the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns 112 E Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment This appendix identifies equipment that was partly or completely inaccessible for inspection during the walkdown.
The tables below address three categories of equipment:
Table E-1 Item was completely inaccessible due to radiological, safety or other issues. Area corresponding to the item was also inaccessible.
Table E-2 Anchorage of item was internal and team was denied permission to open due to personnel hazard or hazard to plant operation.
Table E-3 Status of inspections of electrical cabinet for "Other Adverse Conditions" under SWC Check 11. For some cabinets, inspection did not include all compartments/sections because of safety concerns or hazard to plant operation.
The inspections for Turkey Point Unit 3 deferred components and inaccessible components will be performed during the Refueling Outage currently scheduled for early 2014. An action request (AR) has been issued to plan for and implement additional cabinet internal inspections.
As of revision 2 of this report, the inaccessible components, with the exception of the Component Cooling Water surge tank (3T218), have been inspected.
The surge tank has been removed from the SWEL and this is acceptable because a sufficient number of items of this type were initially included in the SWEL.113 Table E-1. Completely Inaccessible Equipment Component ID Description Reason for Inaccessibility 3T229B SI ACCUM B Item is within Containment and plant was operating at the time of inspection.
3V30B EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT Same as above COOLER B MOV-3-535 PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK Same as above VALVE MOV-3-744A RHR LO HEAD SI TO LOOP A Same as above MOTOR OPERATED VLV MOV-3-751 NORMAL RHR INLET FROM RCS Same as above MOTOR OPERATED VLV MOV-3-865A SI ACCUM A DISCH MOTOR Same as above OPERATED VLV PCV-3-4885 PRZR PORV N2 BACKUP Same as above SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR SV-3-455C PRESSURIZER PORV SOLENOID Same as above VALVE TW-3-412C DELTA T-TAVG CH I COLD LEG 1 Same as above THERMOWELL 3T218 COMPONENT COOLING SURGE Surge tank area not accessible during_TANK walkdown, plant security issues.Table E-2.lnternal anchorage of equipment not accessible for inspection Component ID Description Reason for Inaccessibility 3AA 3AB 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A Electrical hazard (CABINET)3AD 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 3AD Electrical hazard FOR BUS 3D 3D23 3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) Electrical hazard 3C23B SEQUENCER 3C23B- Hazard to plant operation CABINET 114 Table E-3.Status of internal inspection of electrical cabinets Component ID Description Class Status 3B05 A-MCC (CABINET) 01 MCC is within an environment enclosure.
Opened enclosure doors and inspected front of MCC.3B06 B-MCC (CABINET) 01 MCC kick plates (lower plates) were opened and the interior was inspected.
3B07 C-MCC (CABINET) 01 Same as above.3B08 D-MCC (CABINET) 01 Same as above.3B04 3D LC (Part of B train) 02 Permission to open spare compartments.
Opened 2 of 3 lower doors.3B02 3B02 480V HVPDS LOAD CENTER 3B 02 Permission to open spare compartments.
Opened 1 of 3 (CABINET) lower doors.3850 3H LOAD CENTER (CABINET) 02 Permission to open spare compartments.
Opened 3 of 3 lower doors.3AD 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 3AD FOR BUS 03 See Table E.2 3D 3AA 3AB 4.16V SWITCHGEAR 3A (CABINET) 03 See Table E.2 3D23 3D23 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) 14 See Table E.2 3D01 3D01 (DISTRIBUTION PANEL) 14 Not accessible due to plant operation/safety hazard.D51 SPARE BATTERY CHARGER 16 Permission to open lower compartments.
Opened 2 of 2 lower doors.STATIC INVERTER 3C 125 VDC/120 16 Same as above.VAC 7.5 KVA (CABINET)STATIC INVERTER 3D 125 VDC/120 16 Same as above.VAC 7.5 KVA (CABINET)3125A 3B2 BATTERY CHARGER 16 Same as above.3D25 3B1 BATTERY CHARGER 16 Same as above.3C23B SEQUENCER 3C23B -CABINET 20 See Table E.2 115 F Peer Review Report Peer Review Report for the Seismic Walkdown Inspection of Turkey Point Nuclear Station (NRC Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3)Turkey Point Nuclear Station October 2012 Prepared by Reviewed by Reviewed by Reviewed by Lead) Datp-D~ate Date 116
- 1. INTRODUCTION This report documents the peer review of the seismic walkdowns performed for Turkey Point Nuclear Station in September 2012, in support of the NRC Near Term Task Force (NTTF)Recommendation 2.3. This document describes the peer review team and process (Section 3), the peer review of the SWEL selection (Section 4), and the peer review of the seismic walkdown (Section 5).The peer review was performed consistent with Section 6 of the EPRI-TR-1 025286 (REF 1)guidance document and addresses the following specific activities: " Review of the selection of components for the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (Section 4)" Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns
& Walk-Bys (Section 5.1)" Review of any licensing basis evaluations (Section 5.2)" Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Program (Section 5.2)" Review of the final submittal report (Section 6).2. BACKGROUND This peer review covers three portions of the seismic walkdown: (a) the preparation of the SWEL, (b) the actual walkdown, and (c) the final submittal report.The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) was prepared in July and August and finalized in September 2012, based on revisions that occurred during the walkdowns.
Section 3 describes the process of peer reviewing the SWEL.The vast majority of the initial seismic walkdowns occurred September 11 through September 20. The peer review of the walkdowns occurred in the afternoons of those same dates. This portion of the peer review is documented in Section 4.During the initial seismic walkdowns, two entire areas -the containments
-were deferred for each unit for completion during each following respective outage as supplemental seismic walkdowns.
This allowed the initial walkdowns to occur with less radiation exposure to the walkdown team.Also, during these initial seismic walkdowns, four components could not be examined entirely with the bus powered: Essential 4KV switchgear Buses 3AB and 4AB, and the protected sequencers during walkdowns which were 3C23B and 4C23B. Consequently, the walkdowns for these components were performed in February and May 2013 as supplemental seismic walkdowns and documented in Revision 2 of this report.117
- 3. Peer Review Team & Process The Turkey Point (PTN) Peer Review Team for the initial seismic walkdowns consisted of individuals from PTN operations, civil engineering, licensing, and PRA as well as structural/seismic engineers from Stevenson
& Associates.
These individuals participated in phases of preparation, performance, and peer review of the seismic walkdowns.
Similarly, the Turkey Point (PTN) Peer Review Team for the supplemental seismic walkdowns under Revision 2 of this report consisted of individuals from PTN operations, civil engineering, licensing, and PRA. These individuals participated in phases of preparation, performance, and peer review of the seismic walkdowns.
This section documents the peer review process and how the Peer Review Team interacted with the Seismic Walkdown Engineering Teams.3.1 Peer Review Team The affiliation, role, and qualifications for each Peer Review Team member are summarized in the following table.Initial Seismic Walkdowns (Revision 1 of this report)Name Group Role
- Qualifications
&Assoc. SWE Team #1 (a), (b), (c)(consultant eng.) PR -SWE Team A Seth Baker Stevenson
&Assoc. SWE Team #2 (a), (b), (c)(consultant eng.) PR -SWE Team B Alexander Restrepo PTN PRA Group PR Team Lead (a), (e)PTN -SWEL George Tullidge PSL PRA Group SWEL Review (e)Notes:* Role: PR (peer review), SWEL (seismic walkdown equipment list), SWE (seismic walkdown engineer)** Qualifications: (a) Completed EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training (b) Seismic engineering experience (c) Degree in mechanical engineering or civil/structural engineering (d) Seismic PRA / IPEEE experience (e) Knowledge of plant operations, documentation (f) Plant Operations member 118 Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns (Revision 2 of this report)Name Group Role
- Qualifications
- Tim Jones PTN Operations PR -SWEL (e), (f)Tirumani Satyan PTN Licensing SWE Team #3 (a), (b), (c), (d)Sharma PR -SWE Team D Carlos Figueroa PTN Civil Engineering SWE Team #3 & #4 (a), (b), (c), (e)Alexander Restrepo PTN PRA Group SWE Team #4 (a), (e) ,(d)PR -SWE Team C PTN -SWEL George Tullidge PSL PRA Group SWEL Review (e)PR -Team Lead Notes:* Role: PR (peer review), SWEL (seismic walkdown equipment list), SWE (seismic walkdown engineer)** Qualifications: (a) Completed EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training (b) Seismic engineering experience (c) Degree in mechanical engineering or civil/structural engineering (d) Seismic PRA / IPEEE experience (e) Knowledge of plant operations, documentation (f) Plant Operations member 3.2 Peer Review Process PR Team Lead A. Restrepo served as the Peer Review Team Lead. In that role, he was responsible for coordinating the peer review and assembling this report. As described below, he also performed some additional roles as part of the walkdown team PR. He also had the lead in the SWEL preparation, so he was not part of that PR process. As such, the SWEL was independently reviewed by a PRA Engineer from PSL, a Senior License Operator from PTN and one of the Peer Reviewers from PTN. Finally, he did not participate as an active team member during the seismic walkdown process and did not perform any other work besides the one described above. Therefore, his roll as the lead peer reviewer is considered acceptable SWEL Preparation The SWEL was prepared by A. Restrepo, who is a PTN PRA engineer, with PTN Operations experience and familiarity with the PTN IPEEE Report and the PTN PRA model.The SWEL was reviewed by a team that included a PRA engineer (G. Tullidge), a licensing engineer (T. Satyan Sharma), a civil engineer (A. Figueroa), and an Operations representative (T. Jones). All of these individuals are familiar with the design and layout of the plant and plant documentation.
Seismic Walkdown (Initial)The primary seismic walkdown was conducted with two teams, each with two qualified structural/seismic engineers.
The Peer Review of the walkdowns consisted of a Peer Review Team Lead with Operations and PRA knowledge, and structural/seismic engineers.
The structural/seismic engineers made up the SWE teams, but also served to 119 peer review each other's work. The Peer Review Team Lead also participated in many of the walkdowns for logistical support as well as peer review. The ultimate judgments regarding licensing basis were made by qualified PTN structural engineers." Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE):-SWE Team #1 -J. O'Sullivan (team lead), T. Satyan Sharma-SWE Team #2 -S. Baker (team lead), C. Figueroa" PR Team Lead -A. Restrepo" PR SWE Team A -S. Baker (team lead), C. Figueroa" PR SWE Team B -J. O'Sullivan (team lead), T. Satyan Sharma" Licensing Basis Reviewers
-T. Satyan Sharma, C. Figueroa* IPEEE Reviewers
-A. Restrepo Seismic Walkdown (Supplemental)
The supplemental seismic walkdowns (Revision 2 of this Report), containing deferred items and previously inaccessible electrical cabinets ware also conducted with two teams, each with two qualified structural/seismic engineers.
One of them, the team lead, participated in both teams as a team member. The structural/seismic engineers served to peer review each other's work.* Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE):-SWE Team #3 (Inside Unit 03 Containment
-Deferred)
-C. Figueroa (team lead), T. Satyan Sharma-SWE Team #4 (Unopened Cabinets)
-C. Figueroa (team lead), A. Restrepo." PR Team Lead -George Tullidge" PR SWE Team C -A. Restrepo (SWE),* PR SWE Team D -T. Satyan Sharma* Licensing Basis Reviewers
-T. Satyan Sharma, C. Figueroa* IPEEE Reviewers
-A. Restrepo Review of Sample Checklists
& Area Walk-bys (Supplemental)
The peer review of the supplemental seismic walkdown items included in Revision 2 of this report (i.e. deferred equipment inside containment, previously inaccessible electrical cabinets) consisted of each SWE Team (#3 and #4) presenting ALL the Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) that they had completed earlier to the SWE of the other team. The team lead (C. Figueroa) did not participate in these Peer Review sessions in order to guarantee in independence due to his participation in both teams (#3 & #4)120 Final Report (Initial Seismic Walkdowns)
The report for the Initial Seismic Walkdowns was prepared by the Stevenson
& Assoc.consultants, with review by Turkey Point representatives from Operations, design structural engineering, and PRA.Final Report (Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns)
The report for the Supplemental Seismic Walkdowns was prepared by FPL Engineering with review by Turkey Point representatives from Operations, design structural engineering, JB PRA and PSL engineering.
Prepared by (see cover Aet of rev. 2 for signature)
Peer Review by Peer Review by Peer Review by Ca 7 l Flgu ria 7'Tim Jones Tirumant Satyn Shrma Date Dae Date Dat~e Alexander Restro po Peer Review by 121
- 4. PEER REVIEW -SELECTION OF COMPONENTS FOR SWEL The purpose of this section is to describe the process to perform the peer review of the selected components that were included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). This peer review was based on review of the SWEL Selection Report (REF 2)The guidance in Section 3: Selection of SSCs of the EPRI Technical Report (REF 1) was used as the basis for this review. Specifically, this peer review utilized the checklist in Appendix F: Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection of the EPRI Technical Report in Reference 1.Attachment 1 of this peer review report documents the completed checklist.
This peer review determined that the SSCs selected for the SWEL 1 seismic walkdowns represent a diverse sample of equipment required to perform the five safety functions and to meet the sample selection attributes, including: " Various types of systems" Major new and replacement equipment" Various types of equipment" Various environments
- Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE" Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the peer review determined that spent fuel related items were adequately considered and were appropriately included or excluded.This peer review resulted in no additional findings.
All peer review comments requiring resolution were incorporated prior to completion of the SWEL Selection Report.This peer review concludes that the process for selecting SSCs to be included on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List appropriately followed the process outlined in Reference
- 1. It is further concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a broad population of plant Seismic Category 1 equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) Letter.122
- 5. PEER REVIEW -SEISMIC WALKDOWN The peer review of the seismic walkdown was performed by the PR Teams on September 11-20, following the walkdowns for those days. Additional peer reviews occurred following the walkdowns as documented in this report.5.1 Review of Sample Checklists
& Area Walk-bys The peer review meetings consisted of each SWE Team (#1 and #2) presenting samples from their Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) that they had completed earlier that day. This peer review meeting following the day's walkdown activities allowed for immediate feedback between each walkdown team as well as common agreement on how some issues would be addressed.
Table 5-1 lists the sample of 14 components from each unit from the Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) that were discussed in the peer review meetings.
These samples represent about 14% of each unit's SWEL population of 100 components.
The sample includes a variety of types of components (heat exchanger, valve, pump, tank, instrument rack, unit sub, transformer, fan, MCC, compressor, power panel, and control panel) and component locations (RHR pits, intake, RCA, DG BIdg, and Essential Switchgear room).Table 5-1 also lists the sample of 6 areas per unit from the Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) that were discussed in the peer review. These samples represent about 20% of the total AWC population of 30 areas.When reviewing the components and areas during the afternoon peer review sessions, the following topics were addressed: " Concrete cracks -For each team, concrete cracks were observed in the concrete floors where components were anchored.
Since the guidance does not give discretion for the significance of the crack, the peer review team agreed that the concrete cracks near anchorage should be recorded as "U" (unresolved).
Then, following further review, these findings could be changed to "YES" for minor surface cracks or "NO" for concrete crack near anchorage that may need further review." Physical interaction
-Several of the samples were examples of close spacing between the SWEL component and a hard object (such as a hand rail), with the potential for interaction.
In each case, the spacing was judged adequate, but this did reinforce the importance of careful field examination of each component." Seismic housekeeping
-Seismic housekeeping was assessed in each area and found to be acceptable.
Storage boxes were tied off or separated from equipment in designated areas.The presence of stanchions to rope off the protected train equipment was noted. It was agreed that these do not represent significant seismic risk due to the weight distribution (heavy base) and the light-weight nature of these stanchions.
123
" Seismic scaffolding
-A number of areas had scaffolding.
In each case, the scaffolding was carefully braced to provide seismic strength and documented on the scaffolding.
This was observed by both walkdown teams." Non-safety piping in SR buildings
-NS piping in all walk-by areas was observed to be well supported.
5.2 Review
of Licensing Basis Evaluations&
Corrective Action Process The final report provides a list of the anomalies encountered during the Turkey Point seismic walkdown inspections and how they were addressed.
The review of those anomalies demonstrates a thorough and reasonable process for the review of open issues. There were no added comments offered by the peer review team.6. REVIEW FINAL SUBMITTAL REPORT & SIGN-OFF The final submittal report has been reviewed by Turkey Point representatives from structural engineering, Operations, and the PRA Group, and found to meet the requirements of the EPRI 1025286 -Seismic Walkdown Guidance (REF. 1)7. REFERENCES
- 1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012.2. Turkey Point Report, Selection of the Turkey Point Nuclear Station Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for the Requirement 2.3 Walkdown, Rev 01, September 2012.124 Table 5-1: Table of Sample Components from Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Walkdown Team (PR Team) Equipment Identification Walkby Area Identification Unit 3 -SWE Team #1 LT-3-651 (PR Team A) HCV-3-121 209 3B08 220 3P212A EMERG SPF CLG PMP 3-797 3E207B 202 Unit 3 -SWE Team #2 3P9B 370 (PR Team B) 3T36 3C23A 3B05 3K4B 409 3DO3 3S77 234 Unit 4 -SWE Team #1 4B07 (PR Team A) T205C 4E208A 4P212A 223 4E206B 210 4T1 217 4P214B Unit 4 -SWE Team #2 4C23A 368 (PR Team B) 4k4A 4T8 4T259A 432 4X05 4C12A 4QR35 310 125 ATTACHMENT 1: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST Peer Review Checklist for SWEL Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?
YO NEI Requirement met.Remarks: 2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems?YO NEI Requirement met.Remarks: b. Major new and replacement equipment?
YO NEI Requirement met.Remarks: c. Various types of equipment?
YO NEI Requirement met.Remarks: d. Various environments?
Requirement met.Remarks: e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?Requirement met.Remarks: YO NEI YO NEI 126 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YI NEI Requirement metýRemnarks 3. For SWEL 2: a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in SWEL 2? YS NEI Requirotet met.Remark~s: b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items Y0 NO not included in SWEL 2?Requirement ma, Remrnoks: 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.S. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YE NOI Peer Reviewer#1: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Date: iISi Peer Reviewer#2: Carlos Figueroa Date: I 127