ML083290215
| ML083290215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/24/2008 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Sena P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-008 | |
| Download: ML083290215 (35) | |
See also: IR 05000334/2008008
Text
November 24, 2008
Mr. Peter P. Sena, III
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Beaver Valley Power Station
Mail Stop A-BV-SEB1
P. O. Box 4, Route 168
Shippingport, PA 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION- NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES
INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2008008 AND 05000412/2008008
Dear Mr. Sena:
On October 10, 2008, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection
report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2008, with you
and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components and
operator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents.
The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and
records, and interviews with station personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding which was of very low safety significance
(Green). The finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However,
because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was entered into your
correction action program, the NRC is treating it as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with
Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should
provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
denial, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the
Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Beaver Valley Power Station.
P. Sena 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in
the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-334, 50-412
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000334/2008008 and 05000412/2008008
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
P. Sena 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in
the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-334, 50-412
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000334/2008008 and 05000412/2008008
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUNSI Review Complete: LTD (Reviewers Initials) ADAMS ACC#ML083290215
DOCUMENT NAME: T:\DRS\Engineering Branch 2\Mangan\BeaverValley2008CDBIreport.doc
After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure
"N" = No copy
OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS
NAME KMangan/DS/KM CCahill/CGC RBellamy/RB LDoerflein/LTD
DATE 11/10/08 11/10/08 11/21/08 11/24/08
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
P. Sena 3
cc w/encl:
J. Hagan, President and Chief Nuclear Officer
J. Lash, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer
D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering
K. Fili, Vice President, Fleet Oversight
P. Harden, Vice President, Nuclear Support
G. Halnon, Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs
Manager, Fleet Licensing Company
K. Ostrowski, Director, Site Operations
E. Hubley, Director, Maintenance
M. Manoleras, Director, Engineering
R. Brosi, Director, Site Performance Improvement
C. Keller, Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance
D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corporation
M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA
D. Allard, Director, PADEP
C. OClaire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio
Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio
Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio
D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia
J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia
W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency
J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club
J. Powers, Director, PA Office of Homeland Security
R. French, Director, PA Emergency Management Agency
P. Sena 4
Distribution w/encl: (via e-mail)
S. Collins, RA
M. Dapas, DRA
M. Gamberoni, DRS
D. Roberts, DRS
L. Doerflein, DRS
K. Mangan, DRS
D. Lew, DRP
J. Clifford, DRP
R. Bellamy, DRP
S. Barber, DRP
C. Newport, DRP
S. Williams, RI OEDO
R. Nelson, NRR
R. Guzman, NRR Backup
D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Spindler, RI
P. Garrett, Resident OA
ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 1
Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412
Report No.: 05000334/2008008, 05000412/2008008
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Location: Shippingport, PA
Dates: September 15 - October 10, 2008
Inspectors: K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team Leader
S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector
P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Tifft, Reactor Inspector
M. Balazik, Reactor Inspector
W. Sherbin, NRC Mechanical Contractor
J. Chiloyen, NRC Electrical Contractor
Approved by: Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2008008, 05000412/2008008; 09/15/2008 - 10/10/2008; Beaver Valley Power
Station; Component Design Bases Inspection.
The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of five NRC
inspectors and two NRC contractors. One finding of very low risk significance (Green) was
identified, which was considered to be a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance
Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be
assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing
the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, in that FENOC
did not take adequate corrective action following the identification of a condition adverse
to quality. Specifically, in 2004, 2005 and 2006, FENOC identified that if the Unit 1 river
water (RW) system or the Unit 2 service water (SW) system was aligned to the suction
of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps it could result in blockage of cooling water flow
for the pumps, but did not take actions to correct the deficiency. FENOC entered the
issue into their corrective action program to correct the non-conformance. In addition,
FENOC developed Operations Department standing orders to limit the use of TS action
statement 3.7.6.a which credited the use of the lineup, and formalized compensatory
actions to address an Appendix R compliance deficiency.
The finding was more than minor because there was reasonable doubt as to the
operability of the AFW system when supplied from RW or SW systems. In addition, the
finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Cornerstone and
affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Since
the finding represented a potential loss of safety function, the team conducted
Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 2 and Phase 3 analyses which
determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Finally, the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and
Resolution, Corrective Action Program Component, because FENOC did not adequately
evaluate this condition adverse to quality, including classifying, prioritizing, and
evaluating for operability when it was identified in February 2004, and again in March
2005 and June 2006. (IMC 0305, Aspect P.1(c)). (Section 1R21.2.1.1)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
ii
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (IP 71111.21) (samples 24)
.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using
information contained in the Beaver Valley Power Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) and the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Standardized Plant
Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. Additionally, the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 and 2
Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 2 Notebook, Revision 2.1a, was
referenced in the selection of potential components and operator actions for review. In
general, the selection process focused on components and operator actions that had a
Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) factor greater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth
(RRW) factor greater than 1.005. The components selected were located within both
safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components
such as pumps, breakers, heat exchangers, electrical busses, transformers, and valves.
The team reviewed a list of components and operator actions based on the risk factors
previously mentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design
bases inspection report (05000334/2006008 and 05000412/2006008) and excluded
those components previously inspected. The team then performed a margin
assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 24 samples including 18
components, 5 operator actions and 1 operating experience review. The teams
evaluation of possible low design margin included consideration of original design
issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a
result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. The assessment also included
items such as failed performance test results, correction action history, repeated
maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, operability reviews for degraded conditions,
NRC resident inspector insights, system health reports, and industry operating
experience. Finally, consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of
the design and the available defense-in-depth margins. The margin review of operator
actions included complexity of the action, time to complete the action, and extent-of-
training on the action.
The inspection performed by the team was conducted as outlined in NRC Inspection
Procedure (IP) 71111.21. This inspection effort included walkdowns of selected
components, interviews with operators, system engineers and design engineers, and
reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the
components to meet design basis, licensing basis, and risk-informed beyond design
basis requirements. A summary of the reviews performed for each component, operator
action, operating experience sample, and the specific inspection findings identified are
discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Documents reviewed for this
inspection are listed in the Attachment.
2
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews
.2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (18 samples)
.2.1.1 Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FE-P23A)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump to verify the
pump was capable of performing its design basis function. The team reviewed
drawings, calculations, hydraulic analyses, procedures, system health reports, and
design basis documents (DBDs) to evaluate whether the maintenance, testing, and
operation of the MDAFW pump was adequate to ensure the pump could deliver the
design basis flow at the required pressure to the steam generators under transient and
accident conditions. The team reviewed calculations for available net positive suction
head, pump minimum flow, run-out protection, and temperature qualification of
equipment to ensure the pump could operate under all design basis conditions.
Surveillance test results were reviewed to determine if the pump was operating within
established acceptable criteria, and the team also verified that the test acceptance
critieria ensured the pump could meet the design requirements.
The team reviewed electrical calculations, drawings and equipment specifications to
determine whether adequate voltage and current would be available at the pump motor
terminals for starting and running under worst case voltage conditions and to determine
if the motor capacity was adequate for the loading requirements. Protective relay
settings, motor feeder cable ampacity and cable short circuit current capability were also
reviewed to determine whether appropriate electrical protection coordination margins
had been applied and whether the feeder cable had been properly sized for the
maximum loading and short circuit current capability requirements.
The team reviewed the MDAFW lube oil cooling system to assess if the lube oil cooler
would work under design basis conditions. In addition, the team reviewed the adequacy
of water supply sources to the pump including an assessment of the potential for vortex
conditions in the primary plant demineralized water storage tank (PPDWST), and the
ability to transfer the pump suction to alternate water sources, including safety-grade
river water. The team performed a walkdown of the MDAFW pump and supporting
equipment to determine whether the alignment was in accordance with design basis and
procedural requirements, and to assess the material condition of the pump. Finally, the
team reviewed corrective action documents to ensure problems associated with the
pump were appropriately identified and corrected.
b. Findings
Introduction: The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)
involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective
Action, in that FENOC did not properly evaluate and take adequate corrective actions for
a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, FENOC identified that if the safety-related
Unit 1 river water (RW) system or the Unit 2 service water (SW) system was aligned to
the suction of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps it could result in blockage of cooling
water flow for the pumps, but did not take actions to correct the deficiency.
Enclosure
3
Discussion: The team reviewed FENOCs response to NRC Information Notice (IN) 2004-01 that described the potential for failure of AFW systems due to plugging of
orifices in the minimum flow recirculation line if the system is aligned to raw water.
FENOCs evaluation concluded that the potential for clogging of AFW components due
to supplying water from the Ohio River via the SW or RW systems did not present a
challenge to plant safe shutdown capability because the lineup was an alternate source
and only used if the safety related primary plant demineralized water storage tank
(PPDWST) was unavailable. In addition, other non-safety related water sources would
be preferentially used instead of the RW/SW system.
In 2005 (CR 05-01577), FENOC questioned whether the potential for this lineup to clog
the AFW pump minimum flow recirculation line orifices and lube oil cooling line orifices
was a concern in relation to regulatory requirements. FENOCs investigation concluded
that there would be reasonable assurance that the AFW system would continue to
function in the RW/SW lineup until the AFW was no longer required, and this lineup
would only be used for beyond design basis event scenarios because it was only
credited as a defense-in-depth system. In 2006 (CR 06-03595), another evaluation
stated that the response to IN 2004-01 should be enhanced because it did not identify
follow-up corrective actions to assess the effect on all plant procedures and analyses
that may credit the RW/SW lineup. FENOC identified during this investigation that BVPS
Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) describes assumptions used in
the reliability analyses for AFW that specifically credited the SW source as a rationale for
not modeling a pipe rupture in the piping from the PPDWST; and concluded that the
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump lube oil cooler orifices in Units 1 and
2, and Unit 1 TDAFW and MDAFW pump minimum flow paths may be susceptible to
plugging if RW/SW lineup was used. Finally, in 2006, FENOC determined that RW
lineup was credited for Appendix R shutdown to cold standby for Unit 1; however,
because other sources of water were available no corrective or compensatory actions
were required.
The team reviewed the design of the AFW system and determined that the safety grade
PPDWST was the credited water source to meet Technical Specification (TS) operability
requirements for both AFW systems. The team reviewed operating procedures and
found they directed operators to use available water sources (non-safety related) to
supply the AFW pumps if the PPDWST became unavailable and the final choice for a
water supply to the pumps was the RW/SW lineup. The team then reviewed the TS, the
TS bases, the UFSAR and associated Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) to determine if
the licensing and/or design bases credited this lineup. The team found that TS Action
Statement 3.7.6.a credits the RW/SW lineup as the allowed water source if the PPDWST
is not available to allow continued operation of the unit. In addition, the team found that
the UFSAR describes the RW/SW lineup as a long term source of cooling water. The
NRC SER Section 10.4.9 written to discuss how the AFW system meets Appendix A
General Design Criteria credits the RW/SW lineup as the long term safety grade source
of water for AFW. Finally, the team reviewed the SER associated with the Beaver Valley
Unit 1 Appendix R and concluded that the RW lineup was part of the licensing basis for
compliance with the Appendix. Therefore, the team concluded that this lineup was part
of the design and licensing basis of the Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2.
The team then evaluated whether the water from the Ohio River could clog the AFW
components. The team determined there was no impact on AFW pump operability
Enclosure
4
regarding the minimum flow recirculation line orifices. However, the team determined
the orifices in the MDAFW and TDAFW lube oil cooler lines had cross-sectional opening
of approximately 0.26 inches and 0.29 inches, respectively, and the RW/SW rotating
screens openings had cross-sectional opening of approximately 0.5 inch. No other
screens or strainers are in the system. Therefore, the team concluded that it was likely
that debris large enough to block the orifice would pass through the screens and clog the
orifices. The team determined FENOC had incorrectly concluded the RW/SW lineups
were not a licensing and design bases requirement, and the AFW system would
potentially be made inoperable if the RW/SW lineup was placed in service. Therefore,
the team concluded FENOC had taken inadequate corrective measures to correct the
deficiency. FENOC entered the issue into their corrective action program (08-47469 and
08-47692) in order to develop correct actions for the non-conformance. Additionally,
FENOC developed Operations Department standing orders to limit the use of Technical
Specification action statement 3.7.6.a and formalized compensatory actions to address
the Appendix R compliance deficiency.
Analysis: The team determined that the failure to properly evaluate and take effective
corrective measures to address a condition adverse to quality was a performance
deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to Manual Chapter
(MC) 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that as a result of this issue there was reasonable
doubt as to the operability of the AFW system when supplied from RW or SW systems.
In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating
Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability,
and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have
any actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function,
and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. In accordance with
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
Characterization of Findings," a Phase 1 SDP screening was performed which
determined the finding was a design deficiency that could represent a loss of system
safety function; therefore, a Phase 2 evaluation was required.
The internal events Phase 2 analysis for core damage frequency (CDF) was conducted
using the Risk-informed Inspection Notebook for Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plant
Units 1 and 2, Revision 2.1a. Although the RW/SW lineup is mentioned in the
comments of the notebook, it is not explicitly modeled. As a result, a Region I senior
reactor analyst conducted a Phase 3 Risk Assessment, to evaluate the condition. The
analysis used an updated Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 SPAR model, Rev. 3 plus, dated
July 11, 2008, with modifications to the model to include the respective RW/SW line-up.
The baseline failure of the primary AFW water source was modeled with a failure
probability of low E-8. The total failure of the AFW water supply would require a failure
of both the primary and backup water supply. Assuming a complete failure of the
backup water source, the likelihood of this occurrence would be low E-8. As a result, the
finding represented very low safety significance (Green). Since the refined analysis
resulted in a delta CDF of less then 1E-7, no further review of large early release or
external events was needed to be considered.
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and
Resolution, Corrective Action Program Component, because FENOC did not adequately
evaluate this condition adverse to quality, including classifying, prioritizing, and
Enclosure
5
evaluating for operability when it was identified in February 2004, and again in March
2005 and June 2006. (IMC 0305, Aspect P.1(c))
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part,
that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as
failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and
non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above,
between February 11, 2004 and October 10, 2008, FENOC identified that if the safety-
related Unit 1 river water (RW) system or the Unit 2 service water (SW) system was
aligned to the suction of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps it could result in blockage
of cooling water flow for the pumps, but did not take actions to correct the deficiency.
FENOC identified the potential problem in Condition Reports (CR) 2004-01276, 2005-
01577, and 2006-03595; however, the associated evaluations were not adequate.
Because this violation is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the
licensees corrective action program (CR 08-47469 and 08-47692), this violation is being
treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy: (NCV 05000334/2008008,05000412/2008008-001, Inadequate Corrective
Action for Potential Blockage of AFW Pump Lube Oil Cooling System Orifices
when supplied by RW/SW)
.2.1.2 Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FE-P22)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump to assess its
ability to meet design basis head and flow requirements for injection into the steam
generators. The team reviewed drawings, calculations, hydraulic analyses, procedures,
DBDs, system health reports, preventive maintenance activities, and selected condition
reports to evaluate whether the maintenance, testing, and operation of the TDAFW
pump was adequate to ensure the pump performance would satisfy design basis
requirements under transient and accident conditions. The team verified whether design
inputs were properly translated into system procedures and tests, and reviewed
completed surveillance tests associated with the demonstration of pump operability. The
team also reviewed the design capacity of the PPDWST, and calculations that evaluated
the potential for vortexing at the suction source to ensure the availability of the preferred
water source. In addition, the team reviewed the adequacy of water supply sources to
the pump including an assessment of the potential for vortex conditions, and the ability
to transfer the pump suction to alternate water sources, including safety-grade river
water.
The team reviewed the ability of the TDAFW pump for operation during the blackout
(SBO) as described in the SBO analysis and procedures. This review included an
assessment of room temperature heat up calculations and equipment thermal design
requirements to assess whether the TDAFW pump would operate within design
temperature limits. The team also reviewed the TDAFW pump and turbine lube oil
cooling system to assure the oil cooler would operate under design basis conditions.
Lastly, the team performed field walkdowns to assess the material condition of the
TDAFW pump and supporting equipment.
Enclosure
6
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified in addition to the finding identified in
section .2.1.1.b.
2.1.3 Auxiliary River Water Pump (1WR-P-9A)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the auxiliary river water pump to verify the pump was capable of
performing its design basis function. The auxiliary river water system is relied upon to
supply cooling water to plant equipment necessary for safe shutdown following a loss of
the safety-related service water intake structure. The team reviewed design documents,
including drawings, calculations, procedures, and the auxiliary river water system DBD.
The team reviewed these documents to ensure the pump was capable of meeting its
design basis requirements, with consideration of allowable pump degradation and pump
submergence requirements to prevent vortexing at minimum river level. To assess the
current condition of the pump, the team interviewed engineers, reviewed system health
and related condition reports, and performed walkdowns of the auxiliary river water
pump house area. Pump surveillance test results were reviewed to determine whether
pump performance was acceptable to ensure design basis requirements could be
achieved.
The team also reviewed electrical calculations, drawings and equipment specifications to
determine whether adequate voltage and current would be available at the pump motor
terminals for starting and running under worst case voltage conditions and to determine
if the motor capacity was adequate for the loading requirements. The team reviewed
protective relay settings, motor feeder cable ampacity and cable short circuit current
capability to determine whether appropriate electrical protection coordination margins
had been applied and whether the feeder cable had been properly sized for the
maximum loading and short circuit current capability requirements. Finally, the auxiliary
river water system operating procedures were reviewed to ensure the system was
operated in accordance with its design basis assumptions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.4 Unit 1 Quench Spray Pump (QS-1B)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the quench spray (QS) pump to verify the pump was capable of
performing its design basis function. The team reviewed design basis documents,
hydraulic calculations, technical specifications, accident analyses and drawings to
ensure the QS pump was capable of meeting system functional and design bases
requirements. Surveillance test results were reviewed to assess whether the pump was
operated within established acceptable criteria, and the team verified that the test
acceptance criteria ensured the pump could meet the design requirements. The team
reviewed operating and emergency procedures to verify adequate reactor water storage
Enclosure
7
tank inventory was sprayed during a postulated accident. To assess the material
condition of the pump, the team performed walkdowns of the QS pump area, and
reviewed system health reports.
The team also reviewed electrical calculations, drawings and equipment specifications to
determine whether adequate voltage and current would be available at the pump motor
terminals for starting and running under worst case voltage conditions and to determine
if the motor capacity was adequate for the loading requirements. The team reviewed
protective relay settings, motor feeder cable ampacity and cable short circuit current
capability to determine whether appropriate electrical protection coordination margins
had been applied and whether the feeder cable had been properly sized for the
maximum loading and short circuit current capability requirements. Finally, the team
evaluated corrective action reports associated with the system to determine if problems
were being appropriately identified and corrected.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.5 Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PCV-1RC-455C)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) to verify the
valve was capable of performing its design basis function. The team reviewed
thermal/hydraulic analysis for feed and bleed to ensure sufficient relief capacity was
available to remove the required heat load. Design calculations were also reviewed to
determine the adequacy of lift settings of the PORV in order to protect the reactor
coolant system while in the low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) mode of
operation. Plant operating procedures were reviewed to ensure LTOP operational
controls were consistent with design basis assumptions. The team reviewed the
adequacy of the backup nitrogen supply for the PORV, including sizing of the nitrogen
accumulator, to verify the equipment was capable of cycling each PORV consistent with
design basis analyses. Also, minimum voltage calculations were reviewed to ensure
sufficient voltage would be available at the PORV for actuations when required. The
team reviewed recent surveillance testing of the PORV and pneumatic accumulator to
ensure test acceptance criteria were consistent with design basis assumptions on valve
stroke timing, and accumulator sizing requirements. Finally, the team reviewed
corrective action documents to ensure problems with the PORV were appropriately
identified and corrected.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
8
.2.1.6 Unit 2 Station Battery (BATT 2-1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 2 station battery to verify it was capable of performing its
design basis function. The team verified the battery was adequately sized to supply the
design duty cycle of the 125 VDC system. The team reviewed calculations to verify that
the sizing of the battery would satisfy the design requirements of the safety-related and
risk significant DC loads, and that all operating loads on the battery were included in the
calculation. In particular, the evaluation focused on voltage drop calculations to verify
adequate voltage would remain available for the individual loads required to operate
during design basis events. The team also reviewed the battery room hydrogen
generation calculation to verify that the hydrogen concentration level would stay below
acceptable levels during normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed battery
surveillance test procedures and results to determine whether test acceptance criteria
and frequency requirements satisfied technical specifications (TS) and the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards. Finally, the team performed a
walkdown of the battery and reviewed selected condition reports to verify that design
and testing issues related to the batteries were appropriately identified and corrected,
and to assess the overall material condition of the battery.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.7 Unit 2 Station Battery Charger (#2/1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 2 station battery charger to verify it was capable of
performing its design basis function. The team inspected the battery charger to verify its
sizing would satisfy the amperage and voltage requirements of the DC loads during
design basis events. The team reviewed the UFSAR, design basis documents, vendor
drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements for the charger. The
team verified the battery charger was adequately sized to supply the design duty cycle of
the 125 VDC system and that adequate voltage would be maintained for the individual
load devices required to operate during design basis events. In addition, the team
performed a walkdown to visually inspect the physical condition of the battery charger,
and to verify the charger was properly aligned and the panels indicated acceptable
voltage and current. The team interviewed design and system engineers to determine
the design aspects and operating history for the battery chargers. The team reviewed
battery charger surveillance test procedures and results to verify that applicable test
acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements specified for the battery charger
were in accordance with TS and design basis assumptions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
9
.2.1.8 Unit 1 DC Switchboard (#1/2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the DC switchboard to verify that it could meet its design function
requirements as the central distribution point of the DC subsystem. The team reviewed
the UFSAR, design basis documents, vendor drawings, and procedures to identify the
design basis and operational requirements for the switchboard. The team reviewed the
DC protective breaker coordination study to verify that adequate protection existed for
postulated faults in the DC system. A walkdown was performed to evaluate the material
condition of the equipment and to determine if the environment conditions in the
switchboard area were in accordance with design assumptions. The team reviewed
surveillance test procedures and results to determine whether test acceptance criteria
and frequency requirements were in accordance with TS and design basis assumptions.
System and design engineers were interviewed regarding the design aspects and
operating history of the switchboard, and condition reports were reviewed to verify that
design and testing issues related to the DC system were appropriately identified and
corrected.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.9 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Ventilation Fan (1VS-F-22A/B)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the EDG ventilation fan to verify it was capable of performing its
design basis function. The team reviewed the UFSAR, design basis documents, vendor
drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements for the fan. The
team verified the fan would be able to ensure the EDG room temperature remained
within component design assumption ranges for all design basis events. The team also
reviewed drawings and calculations to verify the fan was capable of providing adequate
air flow as required by the DBDs and that appropriate setpoints were established to
ensure system design requirements were maintained. Additionally, the team reviewed
the system interactions with the EDG carbon dioxide (CO2) system to ensure that
neither system would interfere with the design function of the other. Finally, the team
conducted a walkdown of the system, interviewed the system engineer, and reviewed
condition reports in order to assess the material condition of the system and verify that
issues were being appropriately addressed in the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
10
.2.1.10 Unit 1 4160 Vac Vital Bus (1AE)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 4160Vac vital bus to verify it was capable of performing its
design basis function. The team reviewed the UFSAR, DBDs and electrical distribution
calculations including load flow, voltage drop, short-circuit and electrical protection
coordination. This review was to verify the adequacy and appropriateness of design
assumptions; and to verify that bus capacity was not exceeded and bus voltages
remained above minimum acceptable values under design basis conditions. The team
reviewed the electrical overcurrent, undervoltage and ground protective relay settings for
selected circuits to verify that the trip setpoints would not interfere with the ability of the
supplied equipment to perform its safety function as assumed in the design basis, and
yet ensure the trip setpoints provided for adequate bus protection. The loss of voltage
and degraded voltage relay surveillances, calibration results, and setpoint calculations
were also reviewed to verify that they satisfied the requirements of the associated TSs.
The 4160 Vac emergency bus 1AE voltage calculation profiles were reviewed to verify
adequate voltage was available to the bus consistent with the design basis assumptions
during worst case offsite grid voltage assumptions. The control logic design drawings of
the 4kV supply breaker to Vital Bus 1AE were reviewed to verify adequate breaker
closing and opening circuit interlocks. In addition, the 125 Vdc voltage drop calculations
were reviewed to ensure that adequate voltage would be available to the breaker control
circuit as well as for the breaker opening and closing coils under all design basis
conditions. The team reviewed system maintenance test results, interviewed system
engineers and conducted field walkdowns to verify that equipment alignment, nameplate
data, and breaker positions were consistent with design drawings, and to assess the
material condition of the bus. Finally, the team reviewed test results of automatic and
manual transfers of AC power sources to verify that they satisfy the design basis timing
and voltage requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.11 Unit 1 4160 Vac to 480 Vac Transformer (1-8N)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 4160 Vac to 480 Vac transformer to verify it was capable of
performing its design basis function. The team reviewed the system one-line diagram,
nameplate data and design basis descriptions to verify that the loadings of Unit 1 480V
substation transformer 1-8N, and the associated 4160V and 480V circuit breakers were
within the corresponding transformer and switchgear design ratings. The team reviewed
the design assumptions and calculations related to short-circuit currents, voltage drops
and protective relay settings associated with transformer 1-8N and its feeder cables to
verify that the settings were appropriate and output voltage was adequate to meet
design assumptions. The team reviewed a sample of completed maintenance activities
and functional verification test results to verify that the high and low voltage cable
feeders associated with transformer 1-8N had sufficient capacity to supply the current
Enclosure
11
and voltage requirements of the 480 V substation during normal and postulated accident
conditions. The team reviewed a sample of independent short-circuit and voltage drop
calculations to verify that voltage values assumed in design basis documents were
available during design basis events. The team reviewed maintenance test results,
interviewed system engineers and conducted field walkdowns to verify that equipment
alignment and nameplate data were consistent with design drawings, and to assess the
material condition of the transformer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.12 Unit 2 138 kV to 4.16 kV Station Service Transformer (TR-2A)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 138 kV to 4.16 kV transformer to verify it was capable of
performing its design basis function. The team reviewed the design basis descriptions,
equipment specifications, drawings, equipment nameplate data, voltage drop
calculations, and short-circuit and load flow studies to evaluate the capability of the
system station service transformer to supply the minimum design voltage and maximum
current requirements of Unit 2 station safeguard loads. The review was also conducted
to verify that the 138kV and 4.16kV feeder cables associated with transformer TR-2A
were adequately sized. Protective relay trip setting calculations were reviewed to verify
adequate electrical protection coordination was provided. Transformer relay settings
were reviewed to verify they protected the transformer from sudden pressure increases,
differential voltage conditions, and phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground over current
conditions. The team also reviewed the rating of the transformer neutral grounding
resistor to verify that the ground relay trip settings were coordinated with the 4.16kV
feeder ground relays to ensure selective tripping. The team reviewed the results of
completed transformer preventive maintenance and relay calibrations to verify that the
test results were within design assumptions. Finally, the team performed a visual
inspection of the observable portions of transformer TR-2A including its neutral
grounding resistor bank to assess the installation configuration and material condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.13 Unit 1 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank (1WT-TK-10)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 1 primary plant demineralized water storage tank
(PPDWST) to verify it could meet its design function. The team reviewed the Unit 1
AFW system design basis documents which described PPDWST design requirements,
including capacity, level setpoint basis and minimum/maximum temperature limits. The
team also reviewed the UFSAR to obtain an overall understanding of the design function
of the Unit 1 PPDWST. The team evaluated the PPDWST ability to function as the
preferred safety related water supply for the auxiliary feedwater pumps and determine if
Enclosure
12
the tank had sufficient capacity for reactor decay heat removal and cool down of the unit
to hot standby condition for at least 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> without makeup during a design basis event.
In addition, level instrumentation calibration records, operator surveillance verification
log records for channel checks for level indicators, the tank capacity curve, and vortex
calculations were reviewed to verify sufficient inventory existed for assumed AFW
system design requirements. The team also reviewed level instrumentation uncertainty
analysis calculations to verify appropriate corrections to indicated PPDWST level were
made to ensure Technical Specification requirements were met.
The team also inspected the capability of the tanks external enclosure to protect the
tank during design bases external events such as tornados. The team reviewed
auxiliary feedwater system surveillance tests and operating procedures, mechanical
system calculations, VT-2 visual examination reports, and pipe stress calculations to
verify the tank was capable of meeting design requirements. Finally, the team reviewed
a sample of condition reports, completed system engineer walkdown checklists, and the
Unit 1 AFW system health reports, performed a field walkdown, and interviewed the
system engineer to assess the material condition of the tank, associated attached piping
and level instrumentation, and to verify that deficiencies were being appropriately
identified and corrected.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.14 Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection Pump Suction Valve (2SIS-MOV-863A) and
Normal Charging Line Isolation Valve (2CHS MOV-310)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the high head safety injection pump suction motor operated valve
(MOV) and the normal charging line isolation MOV to verify both could meet their design
function. The team reviewed the UFSAR, design basis documents, vendor drawings,
and procedures to identify the design basis requirements for the valves. The team
performed a review of system operating procedures to assess whether component
operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing bases assumptions.
Valve testing procedures and valve specifications were also reviewed to verify the
design bases requirements, including worst case system and environmental conditions,
were incorporated into the test acceptance criteria and component design. The team
reviewed periodic verification diagnostic test results and stroke test documentation to
verify acceptance criteria were met, and that the valves safety function, torque switch
settings, performance capability, and design margins were adequately monitored and
maintained in accordance with GL 89-10 guidance and that test frequencies were
correctly determined based on the results as described in GL 96-05. The review
included verifying the valve analysis used the maximum differential pressure expected
across the valves during worst case operating conditions.
The team also evaluated if the valve motors could perform their design function under
worst case design conditions. The team reviewed motor data, electrical control and
schematic diagrams, degraded voltage calculations, thermal overload settings, and
voltage drop calculations to confirm that the motor operated valves would have sufficient
Enclosure
13
voltage and power available to perform its safety function at worst case degraded
voltage conditions. The team interviewed the MOV program and design engineer to gain
an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the valves and
conducted walkdowns to assess their material condition, and to verify the installed valve
configurations were consistent with the design bases and plant drawings. Previous
component corrective action reports, system health reports, and system engineer
walkdown checklists, were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were appropriately
identified and resolved, and that the valves were properly maintained. Finally, the team
reviewed design changes to assess potential component degradation, and impact on
design assumptions and valve performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.15 Unit 2 Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger (E21C)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 2 recirculation spray heat exchanger to ensure that it was
capable of removing the required containment heat loads during design basis events.
The team reviewed design basis documents, specification data, the tube plugging limit
evaluation along with current tube plugging status, thermal performance results, service
water full flow tests, heat exchanger cleaning and inspection reports, and the water
hammer analysis calculation to verify that the heat exchanger maintained adequate heat
removal capability and system integrity during all design basis events. Additionally, the
team conducted a walkdown of the heat exchanger, interviewed system and component
engineers, and reviewed system health and condition reports to assess the material
condition of the heat exchanger and overall system health, and to verify issues entered
into the corrective action program were being appropriately addressed. The team also
reviewed Fenocs response to Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, to verify that commitments made in the GL
response were being maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.16 Unit 1 Quench Spray Isolation Valve (MOV-1QS-101B) and Unit 2 Charging Pump
Suction Valve (2CHS-LCV-115B)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 1 quench spray discharge isolation valve and the Unit 2
charging pump suction valve to verify they were capable of meeting their design
functions. The team reviewed MOV calculations, including the weak link analysis,
maximum thrust/torque, maximum differential pressure, and degraded voltage
assumptions, to verify the valves would operate during design basis conditions. The
team interviewed the MOV program and design engineers, and conducted a walkdown
Enclosure
14
to assess the physical condition of the MOVs and to verify nameplate data. To assess
the capability of the valves to operate as required, the team reviewed system health
reports, design basis documents, drawings, condition reports, and work orders.
The team also evaluated if the valve motors could perform their design function under
worst case design conditions. The team reviewed motor data, electrical control and
schematic diagrams, degraded voltage calculations, thermal overload settings, and
voltage drop calculations to confirm that the motor operated valves would have sufficient
voltage and power available to perform their safety function at worst case degraded
voltage conditions. Inservice testing results were reviewed to verify that the stroke time
acceptance criteria were in accordance with the UFSAR and accident analysis
assumptions. To ensure valve performance during design basis events, the team
reviewed the most recent diagnostic testing results. Also, the team reviewed FENOCs
response to Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of
Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, to verify that commitments applicable to the
valves were being maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2 Detailed Operator Action Reviews (5 samples)
The team assessed manual operator actions and selected a sample of five operator
actions for detailed review based upon risk significance, time urgency, and factors
affecting the likelihood of human error. The operator actions were selected from a PRA
ranking of operator action importance based on RAW and RRW values. The non-PRA
considerations in the selection process included the following factors:
$ Margin between the time needed to complete the actions and the time available
prior to adverse reactor consequences;
$ Complexity of the actions;
$ Reliability and/or redundancy of components associated with the actions;
$ Extent of actions to be performed outside of the control room;
$ Procedural guidance to the operators; and
$ Amount of relevant operator training conducted.
.2.2.1 Unit 1 Operators Initiate Bleed and Feed After a Loss of Feedwater
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator actions associated with initiating reactor coolant
system (RCS) bleed and feed following a total loss of main and auxiliary feedwater. The
team reviewed FENOCs Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) to determine when and how
quickly this action should be accomplished. The team interviewed operators and training
staff, observed operator responses during a simulator run, reviewed emergency and
operating procedures, and walked down applicable panels in the main control room.
The team also reviewed maintenance history and a sample of condition reports
associated with components necessary to complete the operator action to assess the
overall health of the affected components.
Enclosure
15
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.2 Unit 1 Operators Initiate a Cooldown and Depressurization After a Small Break Loss-of-
Coolant Accident and High Head Safety Injection System Failure
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator action to initiate an RCS cooldown and
depressurization after a postulated small break loss-of-coolant accident. The team
reviewed FENOCs HRA to determine when and how quickly this action should be
accomplished. The team interviewed operators and training staff, observed operator
responses during a simulator run, reviewed emergency and operating procedures, and
walked down applicable panels and components in the main control room and in the
plant. In addition, the team reviewed maintenance history and a sample of condition
reports associated with components necessary to complete the operator action to
assess the overall health of the affected components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.3 Unit 1 Operators Start an Auxiliary River Water (ARW) Pump After a Failure of Both
River Water Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the operator action to start the Unit 1 ARW pumps, RW-P-1A or
RW-P-1B, when normal river water cooling pumps have failed. The team reviewed the
HRA and PRA studies to determine when and how quickly operators are credited with
establishing auxiliary river water flow to various components, specifically the emergency
diesel generators and reactor coolant pump seals. The team interviewed licensed
operators, reviewed various operating and surveillance procedures and associated
annunciators on the main control room panels, and performed a field walked down of the
ARW pumps and local alarm annunciator panels in the alternate intake structure to
evaluate the ability of the operators to perform the required procedural actions. The
team also observed a simulator scenario to verify that appropriate alarms and
procedures existed to allow the operators to take appropriate action in the required time
to prevent damage to the equipment that is cooled by auxiliary river water. Finally, the
team reviewed maintenance history and a sample of condition reports associated with
components necessary to complete the operator action to assess the overall health of
the affected components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
16
.2.2.4 Unit 2 Operators Align Makeup to the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Given a Steam
Generator Tube Rupture with Secondary Leakage
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator actions associated with aligning makeup to the
refueling water storage tank (RWST), given a steam generator tube rupture. In
particular, the team focused on providing RWST makeup from the spent fuel pool via the
spent fuel pool purification system. The team reviewed FENOCs HRA and design basis
documents to determine when and how quickly this action should be accomplished. The
team interviewed operators and engineering staff, reviewed emergency and operating
procedures, reviewed drawings, and walked down applicable components in the plant to
ensure this remote action could be performed as credited. The team also reviewed
maintenance history and a sample of condition reports associated with components
necessary to complete the operator action to assess the overall health of the affected
components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.5 Unit 2 Operators Align Spare Battery Charger, Given a Normal Battery Charger Failure
and a Station Battery is Supplying the DC Bus
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator actions associated with aligning a spare battery
charger, given that the normal battery charger has failed and the associated station
battery is supplying the DC bus. The team reviewed FENOCs HRA and design basis
documents to determine when and how quickly this action should be accomplished. The
team interviewed operators and engineering staff, reviewed emergency and operating
procedures, and walked down applicable components in the plant to ensure this action
could be performed as credited. The team also reviewed the maintenance history
associated with the normal and spare battery chargers to assess overall component
health.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.3 Review of Industry Operating Experience and Generic Issues (1 sample)
.2.3.1 NRC Information Notice (IN) 2002-29, Recent Design Problems in Safety Functions of
Pneumatic Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed FENOCs disposition of IN 2002-29 - Recent Design Problems in
Safety Functions of Pneumatic Systems. This IN discussed recent industry events
where it was discovered that the controls or designs of safety related systems
Enclosure
17
incorporating non-safety related air operated controls were less than adequate. The
team reviewed the disposition of the IN as documented by FENOC in CR 02-09460, for
both units. In this CR, FENOC had evaluated each plant system that has safety related
pneumatic components for adequacy of design. The corrective actions determined that
the design was adequate and additional design modifications were not required. The
team reviewed the corrective actions and determined that the pneumatic components
were identified and handled appropriately.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems that FENOC had identified and entered into
their corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate
threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. In
addition, CRs written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify
adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective
action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and
reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Peter Sena, Site Vice President,
and other members of FENOC staff at an exit meeting on October 10, 2008. The
inspectors verified that none of the information in this report is proprietary.
Enclosure
A-1
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
P. Sena Site Vice President
K. Ostrowski Director, Site Operations
R. Brosi Director, Performance Improvement
C. Mancuso Manager, Design Engineering
C. Keller Manager, Regulatory Compliance
R. Bologna Manager, Plant Engineering
R. Mueller Operations Support Shift Manager
B. Murtagh Supervisor, Design Engineering
J. Mauck Compliance Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
NCV 05000334-412/2008008-001 Inadequate Corrective Action for Potential Blockage of
AFW Pump Lube Oil Cooling System Orifices when
Supplied by RW/SW
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations:
10080-DMC-0056, SBO Steady State Temperature Calculations, Unit 2, Rev. 0
10080-DMC-0757, PPDWST Inventory Requirements for EPU, Rev. 0
10080-E-068, Station Service Voltage and Load Analysis, Rev. 4
10080-E-074, Station Service Fault Analysis, Rev. 4
10080-E-201-1, DC System Management Battery 2-1/Battery Charger 2-1, Rev. 1
10080-E-221, 4160 and 480 VAC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations Relating
to Bus 2AE, Rev. 0
10080-E-221, 4160 and 480 Volt AC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations
Relating to Bus 2AE, Rev. 0A9
10080-E-222, 4160 and 480 VAC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations Relating
to Bus 2DF, Rev. 0
10080-N-574, Determination of Maximum Differential Pressure Across the QA Category I Motor
Operated Valves in the BVPS-2 Charging System, Rev. 4
10080-N-642, Torque Calculations for 2CHS-LCV115B, 2CHS-LCV115D, Rev. 10A1
10080-N-645, Torque Calculations for 2CHS-MOV310, Rev. 8
10080-N-659, Torque Calculation for 2SIS-MOV863A, Rev. 8
10080-N-676, Addendum No. 8, Maximum Torque Output for Degraded Voltage in Selected SIS
Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 7
Attachment
A-2
10080-N-677, Addendum No. 7, Maximum Torque Output Accounting for Degraded Voltage for
Selected Charging System Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 3
10080-N-677, Maximum Torque Output Accounting for Degraded Voltage for Selected CHS
Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 3A8
10080-N-684, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Minimum Operating Curves, Rev. 1
10080-E-74.R3, Attachment AB, Design Analysis Transformer Data, 9/3/96
10080-N-779, Main Intake Bay Silt Buildup Limits, Rev. 0
10080-N-797, Documentation of Miscellaneous Unit 2 Containment Conversion Inputs, Rev. 4
10080-N-824, Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Inputs for MAAP, Rev. 0
10080-SP-2FWE-004, PPDWST Low and High Levels and Controls, Rev. 6
11700.26-N-122, RWST Volumes, Rev. 0
11700-ESK-130A, 125 VDC System Time-Current Characteristic Curves, dated 2/22/99
12241-B-7A, Service Building-Ventilation, Cooling Loads and Air Flow Rates, Rev. 4A2
12241-B-88, Alternate Intake Structure-Heat Gains and Required Airflow Rates, Rev. 1
12241-NP(B)-381-FA, Service Water System Water Hammer due to Flow into Initially Empty
Recirculation Spray System Coolers, Rev. 1
2706.450-001-003, Motor Operated Gate Valve Weak Link Analysis and Valve Data for
GL 89-10, Rev. D
8700-06.048-0185, Operating Load Condition Weak Link Analysis, Rev. E
8700-DEC-0230, Beaver Valley Unit 1 LTOPS Setpoint Calculation, Rev. 2
8700-DEC-181, Setpoint Inaccuracy Calculation for Emergency Bus Degraded Grid, Rev. 2
8700-DMC-1352, EDG Operating Time with Loss of RW, Rev. 0
8700-DMC-2275, Torque Calculation for MOV-QS-101B, Rev. 6
8700-DMC-2651, Aux Feedwater Pump Room Temperature Transient, Rev. 1
8700-DMC-2783, Determination of Maximum Differential Pressure Across the QA Category I
Motor Operated Valves in the BVPS-1 Containment Quench Spray System, Rev. 2
8700-DMC-2800, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Adequacy with One of Two Inlet Air
Dampers Closed, Rev. 0
8700-DMC-2806, Maximum Torque Outputs Accounting for Degraded Voltage for Selected
Quench Spray Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 6
8700-DMC-3173, Auxiliary River Water Pump Minimum Operating Point, Rev. 0
8700-DMC-3439, Impact of 3/4 inch Tubing on OPPS Operation, Rev. 0
8700-DMC-3429, PORV Nitrogen Accumulator Pressure in Modes 1-3, Rev. 0
8700-DMC-3523, Quench Spray System Performance, Rev. 2
8700-E-068, Transformer Data, Attachment D, Rev. 4
8700-E-068, Load Flow Report, Attachment J8E, Rev. 4
8700-E-20, 5KV and 480V Cable Size Evaluation for Short Circuit, Rev. 0
8700-E-201, D.C. System Management-Bat-1/Bat-Chg-1, Rev. 1
8700-E-207, Short Circuit Analysis, 125 VDC Class-1E DC System, Rev. 2
8700-E-221, 4160 and 480 Volt AC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations
Relating to Bus 1AE, Rev. 1
8700-E-222, 4160 and 480 Volt AC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations
Relating to Bus 1DF, Rev. 1A5
8700-E-223, 4160 and 480 Volt AC Load Management and Voltage Profile Calculations
Relating to Non-1E Bus 1A, Rev. 0
8700-E-261, Qualification of Cable Sizing Calculation Program, Rev. 0
8700-E-271, Station Service System Dynamic Stability Study, Rev. 3
8700-E-308, Protective Relay Setting Calculations for 480V Emergency Bus 1N1, Rev. 0
8700-E-309, 480V Emergency Bus 1N Ground Alarm Relay, Rev. 0A6
8700-E-310, Att.4 QS-P-1B 200HP Quench Spray Pump Motor Feeder Breaker 9P5, Rev. 0A5
Attachment
A-3
8700-E-342, Att. 11, Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculation, 4160V Emergency Bus
1AE, Feeder to Emergency Sub 1-8, 1000/1333KVA Transformer 1-8N, Rev. 0
8700-E-68, Station Service Voltage and Load Analysis, Rev. 4
8700-E-74, Station Service Fault Analysis, Rev. 2
8700-SP-1HV-04, Local Temperature Switch Setpoints for the Diesel Generator Building
Exhaust Fans, Rev. 0
8700-SP-1QS-10, Beaver Valley Unit 1 RWST Low-Low Level Uncertainty Calculation, Rev. 2
8700-SP-1WT-01, Unit 1 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank (WT-TK-10) Low
Level, Low-Low Level and Indication Uncertainty Calculation, Rev. 3
B-211, Hydrogen Evaluation in Battery Rooms, Rev. 1
Calculation 254, Surface and Buried Pipe Stress Calculation, Demineralized Water to
2FWE-TK210, Rev. 1
DMC-2219, Water Volume (PDDWST) Required for 9hrs at Hot Standby Following a LOOP,
Rev. 2
SCE-785-2, Issue 2, Stress Analysis For Small Bore Pipe And Supports, 8/15/86
Completed Surveillance and Modification Acceptance Testing:
1/2-PMP-E-75-202, 480 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8, performed 10/25/04
1/2-CMP-39BYS/DC-BATTERY-1E, Station Battery Corrective Maintenance, Rev. 8, performed
5/05/08
1/2-CMP-39DC-BAT-1-2-3-4-4E, Charging Individual Battery Cells, Rev. 2, performed 5/04/08
1/2-CMP-75-480V-MOTOR-TERM-1E, 480V Motor/Miscellaneous Equipment Termination,
Rev. 9, performed 3/09/06
1/2-CMP-75-MCB-1E, Testing of Westinghouse and Cutler-Hammer Molded Case Circuit
Breakers, Rev. 8, performed 3/09/06
1/2-CMP-75-MCC-OHR-1E, Inspection, Verification, and Calibration Testing of Westinghouse
480V MCC Overload Heater Relays, Rev. 1, performed 3/09/06
1/2-CMP-E-39-366, Station Battery Jumper Installation and Restoration, Rev. 4, performed
9/28/07
1/2-CMP-E-75-021, Testing of Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 6, performed 02/20/06 & 04/23/08
1/2-OST-30.19E, Alternate Intake Structure A Bay Silt Check and Bay Cleaning, performed
6/15/08, 01/15/08, 04/4/07 & 01/28/07
1/2-OST-30.19F, Alternate Intake Structure B Bay Silt Check and Bay Cleaning, performed
6/19/08, 04/23/07 & 01/30/07
1/2-PMP-75VS-VNT-3M, Ventilation System Damper Maintenance, Rev. 12, performed 3/16/06,
3/24/06, & 4/06/06
1/2-PMP-75VS-VNT-4M, Ventilation System Fire Damper Maintenance and Trip Check,
Rev. 10, performed 9/25/06
1BVT 1.47.5, Type C leak Test, Issue 1, Rev. 16, performed 11/07/04, 04/04/05, 02/21/06,
10/02/06, 04/29/07 & 04/14/08
1BVT-1.44.8, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Test, Rev. 4, performed 8/07/06
1MSP-36.41-E, 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays, 27-VE2100AB and
27-VE2100BC Test, Rev. 21, performed 7/22/08
1MSP-36.45-E, 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage, Rev. 22, performed 7/22/08
1MSP-36.47B-E, 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage, Time Delay Relay 62-VE2100,
Rev. 7, performed 10/17/07
1MSP-36.49A-E, 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays, 27-VE2100AB and
27-VE2100BC Calibration, Rev. 13, performed 10/17/07
Attachment
A-4
1MSP-36.81-E, Functional Test of 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Relay 27-VE-100
and Diesel Start Loss of Voltage Relay 27-VE-1100, Rev. 7, performed 7/22/08
1OST-13.2, Quench Spray Pump Test, performed 07/16/08
1OST-24.1, SG Aux Feed Pumps Discharge Valves Exercise, Rev. 14, performed 9/16/08
1OST-30.1A, Auxiliary River Water Pump Test, performed 08/01/08
1OST-30.1B, Auxiliary River Water Pump Test, performed 06/22/08
1OST-33.13C, Ten Ton CO2 Fire Protection System Test, Rev. 9, performed 3/01/08
1OST-36.5A, Emergency Switchgear Operation Test, Rev. 6, performed 9/23/07
1OST-39.3, 125 VDC Distribution Panels Check, Rev. 4, performed 9/28/08
1OST-6.12, Power Operated Relief Valve Test, performed 10/18/07, 03/21/06, & 10/18/04
1PMP-39DC-BKR-1E, Battery Air Circuit Breaker Inspection, Rev. 14, performed 4/20/07
2BVT-1.39.01, Station Battery Service Test, Rev.6, performed 5/06/08
2BVT-1.39.06, Station Battery Performance Discharge Test, Rev. 3, performed 4/06/05
2BVT-1.39.13, Spare Battery Charger Load Test, Rev. 6, performed 4/10/08
2BVT-1.39.14, Battery Charger Load Test, Rev. 4, performed 5/07/08
2CMP-13RSS-E-21A-B-C-D-1M, Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Rev. 4,
performed 05/05/08 & 10/14/06
2LCP-24-L104A1, PPDWST 2FWE-TK210, Level Loop Calibration, performed 07/23/07
2LCP-24-L104A2, PPDWST 2FWE-TK210, Level Loop Calibration, performed 08/15/08
2MSP-39.05-E, Battery No. 2-1 Inspection and Interconnection Resistance Check, Rev. 6,
performed 7/29/07
2MSP-E-39-001, Vital Bus Batteries, Test and Inspection, Rev. 18, performed 6/23/08
2-MSP-E-39-300, Vital Bus Weekly Battery Inspection, Rev. 19, performed 8/27/08
2OST-24.2, Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (2FWE*P23A) Test, performed 06/20/08
2OST-24.4, Steam Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (2FWE-P22) Quarterly Test, performed
10/17/08
2OST-24.4A, Steam Driven AFW Pump Full Flow Test, performed 04/05/08
2OST-24.6A, 23A AFW Pump Check Valves and Flow Test, performed 04/22/08
2OST-24.9, Overspeed Trip Test of TDAFW Pump, performed 05/11/08
2OST-30.13B, Train A Service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 24, performed 04/03/08
2OST-30.20A, Train A RSS Heat Exchangers and Supply Header Dry Layup Check, Rev. 3,
performed 08/27/08
2OST-39.1A, Weekly Station Battery Check, Rev. 18, performed 9/15/08
2OST-39.5, Station Battery Check, Rev. 4, performed 3/07/08
2PMP-39BYS-BAT-5-6-5E, Station Battery Inspection and Interconnection Resistance Check,
Rev. 4, performed 8/23/08
BV-L-1WT-104A1, Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Level Loop Calibration,
performed 3/18/08
BV-L-1WT-104A2, Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Level Loop Calibration,
performed 3/22/08
Corrective Action Documents:
02-09460 04-09194 05-07274 06-02800 07-13491
03-12509 05-00382 05-07971 06-03041 07-15302
04-01276 05-01577 05-08084 06-03527 07-17078
04-03210 05-02265 06-00231 06-03595 07-17292
04-06804 05-05496 06-00618 06-03595 07-23490
04-07609 05-05799 06-01112 06-03610 07-23540
04-08896 05-06712 06-02770 06-93990 07-23874
Attachment
A-5
07-24309 08-36809 08-44138 08-46518* 08-47469*
07-24330 08-36944 08-44446 08-46554* 08-47505*
07-26192 08-37313 08-44733 08-46560* 08-47514*
07-26632 08-37924 08-44734 08-47121* 08-47517*
08-33220 08-38792 08-45220 08-47159* 08-47519*
08-33408 08-39480 08-46379* 08-47175* 08-47544*
08-34360 08-40050 08-46381* 08-47247* 08-47552*
08-34677 08-43553 08-46426* 08-47257* 08-47622*
08-34854 08-43941 08-46456* 08-47302* 08-47692*
08-35713 08-43973 08-46508* 08-47337* 99-01531
Notifications
600461117
60049445*
- Identified during inspection
Drawings:
08700-06.048-0038, Limitorque Operator Outline and Dimensions, Rev. E
08700-06.048-0061, 10 150 lb. Stainless Steel Globe Valve Welded Ends with Limitorque
Operator, Rev. G
10080-E-5DE, Elementary Diagram Gen. Aux. Pump 2FWE*P23A, Rev. 27
10080-RB-84A, Flow Diagram Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Sht. 1, Rev. 6
10080-RB-84B, Flow Diagram Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Sht. 2, Rev. 11
10080-RB-84K, Flow Diagram Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Sht. 10, Rev. 7
10080-RE-1AR, 125V DC One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 20
10080-RE-1B, Main One Line Diagram, Sht. 2, Rev. 16
10080-RE-1C, Equipment One Line Diagram, Rev. 14
10080-RE-1D, 4160V One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 9
10080-RE-1F, 4160V One Line Diagram, Sht. 3, Rev. 20
10080-RE-21AP, Elementary Diagram SSSXfmr. 2A AC Schematic, Rev. 1
10080-RE-21AR, Elementary Diagram SSSXfmr. 2A LTC Schematic, Rev. 1
10080-RE-21B, Three Line Current Diagram Sys. Sta. Svce. Xfmr. 2A, Rev. 10
10080-RE-30C, Arrangement System Station Service Transformer 2A, Rev. 5
10080-RM-0045B, Auxiliary Feedwater Piping, Rev. 17
10080-RM-0079D, Flow Diagram Chemical & Volume Control Piping, Sht. 4, Rev. 39
10080-RM-0082A, Flow Diagram - Fuel Pool Cooling Purification Piping, Rev. 31
10080-RM-0087A, Flow Diagram - Safety Injection Piping, Sht. 1, Rev. 28
10080-RM-0407-001A, Chemical and Volume Control, Sht. 1, Rev. 18
10080-RM-0413-002, Quench Spray System, Rev. 16
10080-RM-0424-003, Auxiliary Feedwater, Rev. 11
10080-RM-420-1, Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification, Rev. 10
10080-RM-424-5, Aux Feed Pumps Lube Oil System, Rev. 2
10080-RM-85A, Flow Diagram Containment Depressurization Piping, Rev. 27
10080-RP-16A, Main Steam to AFW and AFW Piping - Safeguards Area, Sht. 1, Rev. 8
10080-RP-77B, Fuel and Decon Building Piping, Sht. 2, Rev. 5
10080-RP-77B, Fuel and Decon Building Piping, Sht. 4, Rev. 6
10080-RT-113C, Tubesheet Map for Heat Exchanger 2RSS-E21C, Rev. 5
10-108763, 100A Battery Charger, Sht. 1, Rev. C
Attachment
A-6
11700-ESK-115G1, Incoming Supply to 4160V Bus 1AE from 4160V Bus 1A, Rev. 1
11700-ESK-115L, 1000/1333KVA 1-8N and 1-8N1 Feeder to 480V Sub 1-8, Rev. 1
11700-ESK-129E, 1QS-P-1B Breaker 9P5 Time-Current Curves, 10/6/06
11700-LSK-22-5A, 4160V Power System Emergency Logic Diagram, Rev. 4
11700-LSK-22-5B, 4160V Power System Emergency Logic Diagram, Rev. 5
11700-LSK-5, Logic Diagram, Aux. Feedwater Pump, Rev. 13D
11700-RE-1W, 125 VDC One Line Diagram Sht. 2, Rev. 5
12241-ESK-112D, Incoming 4160V Supply to Bus 2B, SSST 2A, Time-Current Curves, Rev. 8
12241-ESK-115G, Incoming Supply From Bus 2A, 4160V, Time-Current Curves, Rev. 7
12241-ESK-115R, 4160V Bus 2AE, BKR 2E18, Time-Current Curves, 2FWE-P23A, 9/29/88
1WT-TK-10, Demineralized Water Storage Tank Capacity Curve, Rev. 1
2004.210-012-003, Recirc Spray Coolers 34 O.D. x 42-13/16 O.A.H. Details, Sht. 2, Rev. 10
2006.300-001-176, Motor Op Gate Valve Model 08000GM82FBB0J0, Rev. E
2D74749, Motor Op Gate Valve Model 08000GM82FBBOJO - 2SIS-MOV863A, Rev. E
8700-3.22-141A, Unit 1 WT-TK-10 Demineralized Water Storage Tank, 1/4/72
8700-RB-2E, Flow Diagram Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Sht. 3, Rev. 13
8700-RE-100A, 4KV Station Service System, Rev. 8
8700-RE-1A, Main One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 25
8700-RE-1AR, 125 VDC One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 20
8700-RE-1B, Main One Line Diagram, Sht. 2, Rev. 25
8700-RE-1C, Equipment One Line Diagram, Rev. 25
8700-RE-1D, 4160V One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 18
8700-RE-1F, 4160V One Line Diagram, Sht. 2, Rev. 19
8700-RE-1K, 480V One Line Diagram, Sht. 4, Rev. 28
8700-RE-1V, 125 VDC One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 27
8700-RE-1Z, Vital Bus and DC One Line Diagram, Sht. 1, Rev. 27
8700-RE-21CF, Elementary Diagram 4KV Elec. System, Sht. 1, Rev. 8
8700-RE-21GX, Elementary Diagram Fire Protection, Sht. 6, Rev. 11
8700-RE-21HD, Elementary Diagram Feed Water, Sht. 507, Rev. 18
8700-RE-21JK, Elementary Diagram Quench Spray, Rev. 15
8700-RE-21KY, Elementary Diagram River Water, Sht. 3, Rev. 3
8700-RE-21MP, Elementary Diagram Ventilation System, Sht. 4, Rev. 4
8700-RE-21PY, Elementary Diagram Annunciator, Sht. 1, Rev. 13
8700-RE-21QA, Elementary Diagram Annunciator A6, Sht. 3, Rev. 13
8700-RE-22AW, Instrument Power Supplies in the Vertical and Benchboards, Sht. 1, Rev. 9
8700-RE-9AY, Wiring Diagram, 480V Substation 1-8, Bus N, Sht. 47, Rev. 11
8700-RE-9AZ, Wiring Diagram, 480V Substation 1-8, Bus N, Sht. 48, Rev. 17
8700-RM-0018A, Feed Water, Rev. 47
8700-RM-0413-001, Containment Depressurization System, Rev. 22
8700-RM-0430-001, River Water System, Rev. 29
8700-RM-37B, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 38
8700-RM-406-2, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 20
8700-RM-424-2, Feed Water System, Rev. 12
8700-RM-533-3, Flow Diagram Fire Protection CO2, Sht. 1, Rev. 7
8700-RP-0061D, Containment Recirculation Spray and Low Head Safety Injection External
Stems, Sht. 4, Rev. 9
D-79-7546, Demineralized Water Storage Tank, Rev. 6
Attachment
A-7
Licensing and Design Basis Documents:
1DBD-06, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 7
1DBD-13, Unit 1 Design Basis Document for Containment Depressurization System, Rev. 15
1DBD-24B, Design Basis Document for Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 10
1DBD-30, River Water, Auxiliary River Water, and Raw Water Systems, Rev. 15
1DBD-33B, Unit 1 4.16KV Power Distribution System, Rev. 7
1DBD-37, Unit 1 480V Distribution System, Rev. 7
1DBD-39, 125 VDC Power System, Rev. 6
2DBD-07, Unit 2 Design Basis document for Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 12
2DBD-13, Unit 2 Design Basis Document for Containment Depressurization System, Rev. 11
2DBD-24B, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 12
2DBD-39, 125 VDC Power System, Rev. 7
2DBD-M-003, Piping Design & Piping, Tubing, and Duct Stress Analysis, Rev. 1
BVPS Technical Specifications
BVPS-1 License Requirement Manual, Rev. 59
BVPS-2 License Requirement Manual, Rev. 54
Duquesne Light Company letter dated 03/17/97, 180-Day Response to Generic Letter 96-05
L-05-090, Commitment Changes and Report of Facility Changes, Test and Experiments,
05/13/05
L-05-148, Commitment Changes and Report of Facility Changes, Test and Experiments,
08/29/05
L-98-072, Updated Response to Safety Evaluation-Joint Owners Group Program on Periodic
Verification of Motor-Operated Valves, 04/13/98
L-99-046, Response to Request for Additional Information on Generic Letter 96-05, 03/19/99
Letter from J. D. Sieber, DLC to USNRC, Reference: Beaver Valley NRC Bulletin Number
88-04, Potential Safety Related Pump Loss, 08/08/88
Letter from NRC (A. W. De Agazio0 to DLC (Mr. Sieber), DLC Confirmation Related to Actions
Required by NRC Generic Letter 88-14, dated 08/19/91
Response to Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related
Equipment, 01/29/90
Safety Evaluation Report Related to Operations at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, Docket
Number 50-412, October 1985
Second Response to Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-
Related Equipment, 06/27/91
Miscellaneous:
138KV Voltage Profile, BV1 SSST & ERFS-3B Phase A Voltage, 10/8/08
2DLS-13027, Stone & Webster correspondence, 12/22/81
8700-3.22-193A, Lasalle Hydraulic Laboratory Ltd., Hydraulic Model Study of Quench Spray
Inlets, January 1980
Beaver Valley Unit 2, Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary (August 18, 2008), Rev. 1
BE-VBE-8, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-51E, 1/15/01
BV1-RPB-6, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 11/30/06
BV1-VBE-2, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 11/28/88
BV2-TA-1, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-47H, 5/16/83
BV2-TA-11, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 1/27/97
BV2-TA-14, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 12/6/91
Attachment
A-8
BV2-TA-2, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, HU-1, 11/2/84
BV2-TA-3, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-47H, 5/16/83
BV2-TA-4, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-51D, 9/9/83
BV2-VBE-20, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-51L, 11/28/88
BVPS-1 Stone & Webster Specification BVS-374, Rev. 3
BVS-162, QS-P-1A, QS-P-1B Induction Motor Data, 5/29/69
ES-E-003, Protective Relaying Philosophy for Unit 2, Rev. 4
ES-E-004, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit 1, Rev. 7
Human Reliability Assessment (Unit 1), 6/2/06
Human Reliability Assessment (Unit 2), 4/2/07
IR Surveys of Unit 2 SSS Transformer TR-2A conducted on 4/29/05 and 9/3/08
IST Program for Pumps and Valves, Unit 1, Rev. 1
IST Program for Pumps and Valves, Unit 2, Rev. 2
NRC Information Notice (IN) 2002-29, Recent Design Problems in Safety Functions of
Pneumatic Systems
NRC Information Notice (IN) 2004-01, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Recirculation Line Orifice
Fouling - Potential Common Cause Failure
Specification for Free Standing Power Distribution Panel Unit 1, Rev. 2
System Health Report, Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution System, 2nd quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 1 Area Ventilation Systems - Miscellaneous, 2nd quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 1 Containment Depressurization System, 2nd Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System, 2nd Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 1 River Water System, 2nd Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 2 125 VDC Distribution System, 2nd quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 2 AFW System, 2nd Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System, 2nd quarter 2008
System Health Report, Unit 2 Containment Depressurization System, 2nd quarter 2008
TER 13630, Evaluate the Addition of Individual Cell Equalizers to the Station Batteries, Rev. 0
Unit 1 & Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps and Valves, Issue 4, Rev. 1
Unit 1 Feedwater/Aux Feedwater System Walkdown Checklist, performed 9/25/08
VB1-VBE-17, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 51-VE1112, 12/5/95
VB1-VBE-26, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-47H, 1/23/03
VB1-VBE-5, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, 51-VE105, 3/7/00
VT-2, Visual Examination Report VT-01-234, WT-TK-10, performed 10/12/01
VT-2, Visual Examination Report VT-97-235, WT-TK-10, performed 11/4/97
WCAP-16902-P, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Upgrade Analysis for Emergency Response
Guideline FR-H.1
VB1-VBF-25, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, ITE-47H, 7/12/01
Procedures:
1/2, ES-G-014, Engineering Standards Manual Units, Guidelines for MOVs, Rev. 7
1/2-ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 17
1/2OM-35.4A.A, Voltage Schedule Guidance, Rev. 4
1/2OM-53C.4A.35.1, Degraded Grid, Rev. 5
1/2PMP-36TR, Transformer-IE System Transformer Inspection, Rev. 3
1/2PMP-75VS-VNT-3M, Ventilation System Damper Maintenance, Rev. 13
1/2PMP-E-36-001, 4KV Bus Switchgear Inspection, Rev. 6
1/2PMP-E-36-015, ITE Med. Voltage Ckt. Breaker Inspection and Test, 5HK-250/350, Rev. 16
1/2PMP-E-75-202, 480 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 9
Attachment
A-9
1/2RCP-11-PC, Calibration of Ground Fault Relays, Types ITE/ABB GR-5 and GR-200, Rev. 5
1/2RCP-13-PC, Calibration of ABB/Westinghouse Transf. Diff. Relays type HU and HU1, Rev. 5
1/2RCP-1A-PC, Calibration of Auxiliary Relays, Rev. 8
1/2RCP-25-PC, Calibration of Westinghouse/ABB Sudden Pressure Relays type SPR, Rev. 2
1/2RCP-29A-PC, Calibration of ABB TD-5 Time Delay Relay, Rev. 1
1/2RCP-30A-PC, Calibration of Timing Relays, Rev. 3
1/2RCP-31-PC, Calibration of Auxiliary Relays, Rev. 10
1/2RCP-38A-PC, Calibration of ITE/ABB Single Phase Overcurrent Relays Type 50/51, Rev. 4
1/2RCP-38B-PC, Calibration of ITE/ABB Three Phase Overcurrent Relays Type 51, Rev. 6
1MSP-36.47A-E, 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage, Rev. 10
1MSP-36.81-E, Functional Test of 1AE 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Relay, Rev. 7
1OM-24.2.B, Setpoints, Rev. 9
1OM-24.4.AAD, Aux. Feedwater Pump Recirc Loops A/B Low Flow, Rev. 4
1OM-24.4.AAF, Primary Plant Demin Water Storage Tank Level-Low WT 104 A1, Rev. 2
1OM-30.4.V, Auxiliary River Water System Startup, Rev. 6
1OM-30.4.W, Issue 4, Unit 1 Auxiliary River Water System Running, Rev. 0
1OM-33.4.L, Cross Connecting to River Water, Rev. 2
1OM-36.4.A, 4KV Station Service System Startup, Rev. 12
1OM-37.4.ABA, 480V Emergency Bus 1N Ground, Rev. 0
1OM-44F.1.C, Major Components, Rev. 3
1OM-52.4.R.1.F, Station Shutdown From 100% Power to Mode 6, Rev. 15
1OM-53A.1.E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 11
1OM-53A.1.E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 12
1OM-53A.1.E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 12
1OM-53A.1.ECA-0.0(ISS1C), Issue 1C, Loss of All Emergency 4KV AC Power, Rev. 8
1OM-53A.1.ECA-3.1, SGTR with Loss of Rx Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, Rev. 13
1OM-53A.1.ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 6
1OM-53A.1.ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 12
1OM-53A.1.ES-1.3(ISS1C), Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 6
1OM-53A.1.FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 11
1OM-53B.1.FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Background, Rev. 11
1OM-53B.5.GI-6, RCP Trip/Restart, Issue 1C, Rev. 1
1OM-53C.4.1.30.2, Unit 1 River Water/Normal Intake Structure Loss, Rev. 6
1OM-53C.4.1.36.1, Unit 1 Loss of All AC Power When Shutdown, Rev. 4
1OM-53C.4.1.36.2, Unit 1 Loss of 4KV Emergency Bus, Rev. 6
1OM-56B.4.A, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Primary Auxiliary Building, Rev. 6
1OM-56C.4.F-2, Transferring AFW Pump Suction to River Water, Rev. 12
1OST-6.8, Placing Overpressure Protection System (OPPS) in Service, Rev. 17
1RCP-8A-PC, Calibration of Westinghouse/ABB Overcurrent Relay Type CO, Rev. 3
2LOT-M5D18, Licensed Operator Initial Training - AOP/EOP Practice Scenarios, Rev. 8
2OM-13.1.C, Containment Depressurization System Description-Major Components, Rev. 2
2OM-13.4.AAD, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Off Normal, Rev. 12
2OM-20.4.A, Fuel Pool Cooling/Purification System Startup and Operation, Rev. 10
2OM-24.4.AAI, Primary Plant DWST Level Low, Rev. 11
2OM-24.4.K, Operation and Shutdown of AFW System to Control SG Levels, Rev. 7
2OM-39.4.A, Startup of Batteries *2-1, *2-2, *2-3, *2-4, *2-5, *2-6 and Chargers, Rev. 7
2OM-39.4.D, Startup and Shutdown of Spare Battery Charger (Train A), Rev. 10
2OM-39.4.M, Startup and Shutdown of Spare Battery Charger (Train B), Rev. 0
2OM-53A.1.A-1.8, Makeup to PPDWST [2FWE*TK210], Rev. 2
2OM-53A.1.E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 8
Attachment
A-10
2OM-53A.1.E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 10
2OM-53A.1.E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 13
2OM-53A.1.ECA-3.1, SGTR with Loss of Rx Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, Rev. 10
2OM-53A.1.ECA-3.2, SGTR with Loss of Rx Coolant - Saturated Recovery Desired, Rev. 8
2OM-53A.1.ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 5
2OM-53C.4.2.39.1A, Loss of 125Vdc Bus 2-1, Rev. 2
2OM-54.3.L5, Surveillance Verification Log, Rev. 69
2OM-7.4.O, Makeup to the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Rev. 12
2OST-39.7, Weekly DC Bus Distribution Surveillance, Rev. 0
2PMP-2FWE-P-T-22-1M, Turbine Driven Aux. Feed Pump Lubrication, Rev. 6
3LOT-M4D7/8/9, Licensed Operator Training - Shutdown From 100% to Mode 5, Rev. 4
3SQS-39.1, Licensed Operator Training - 125 Vdc Distribution System, Rev. 5
3SQS-53.5, Licensed Operator Training - Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev. 3
NOP-OP-1003, Grid Reliability Protocol, Rev. 00
Vendor Manuals:
08100-01.026-0066, Battery Breaker Switchgear, Rev. E
195B7798AL, General Electric Neutral GND Resistor Enclosure, 4/1/78
2501.240-841-006, Exide Instructions for Installing and Operating Flooded Stationary Batteries,
Rev. G
3SD-130-100CE, Unit 2 Battery Charger 2-1, Rev. 1
Bulletin 3412, Heinemann General Purpose Circuit Breakers, 7/71
BVS-215, ITE Specification for 4160V Metal Clad Switchgear, Rev. 2
H-5121-D, Auxiliary River Water Pumps (Johnston Pumps), Rev. 4A
IL 41-133.3J, ABB Type IRV Directional Overcurrent Relay for Phase Protection, 9/00
IL 41-222E, ABB Types CV, CV-8 Voltage Relay, 9/00
Spec No. 2BV-208, Steam Generator Aux. Feedwater Pumps, 04/27/78
VTM 2502.180-208-001, Turbine Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump Instruction Manual, Revision AF
VTM 2502.400-208-005, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance Manual-Motor Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, Revision W
Work Orders:
200071985 200165183 200210880 200249658
200074178 200165219 200215990 200263740
200075905 200165220 200221730 200267943
200077832 200165221 200221865 200275504
200099221 200191083 200240006 200276191
200099262 200191084 200240168 200276192
200115000 200196133 200248055 200276194
200135367 200196167 200248165 200281370
200135369 200206668 200249086 600242815
200135459 200206669 200249087 ECP 04-0440-02
200143974 200206673 200249088 ECP-04-0134
200151460 200209796 200249089 ECP-05-0059
200158455 200209800 200249657 ECP-06-0091
Attachment
A-11
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AC Alternating Current
ARW Auxiliary River Water
BVPS Beaver Valley Power Station
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
DC Direct Current
DBD Design Basis Document
DBE Design Basis Event
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
GL Generic Letter
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IN Information Notice
IST Inservice Testing
kV Kilo-volts
LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection
MOV Motor Operated Valve
MDAFW Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
NCV Non-cited Violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PPDWST Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
QS Quench Spray
RAW Risk Achievement Worth
RRW Risk Reduction Worth
RW River Water
RWST Refuel Water Storage Tank
SBO Station Blackout
SDP Significance Determination Process
SER Safety Evaluation Report
SPAR Standardized Plant Analysis Risk
TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TS Technical Specifications
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Vac Volts, Alternating Current
Vdc Volts, Direct Current
Attachment