ML022270346
| ML022270346 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/2002 |
| From: | Marschall C NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/EMB |
| To: | Rueger G Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-006 | |
| Download: ML022270346 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000275/2002006
Text
August 15, 2002
Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice
President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 3
Avila Beach, California 93424
SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-275/02-06; 50-323/02-06
Dear Mr. Rueger:
On July 11, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The
enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 11, 2002,
with Mr. D. Oatley, Vice President Operations and Plant Manager, and other members of your
staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and
representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one finding of very low safety
significance (green).
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
-2-
Dockets: 50-275; 50-323
cc w/enclosure:
David H. Oatley, Vice President
Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, California 93424
Lawrence F. Womack, Vice President, Power
Generation & Nuclear Services
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, California 93424
Dr. Richard Ferguson
Energy Chair
1100 llth Street, Suite 311
Sacramento, California 95814
Nancy Culver
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
P.O. Box 164
Pismo Beach, California 93448
Chairman
San Luis Obispo County Board of
Supervisors
Room 370
County Government Center
San Luis Obispo, California 93408
Truman Burns\Mr. Robert Kinosian
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102
San Francisco, California 94102
Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, California 93940
-3-
Ed Bailey, Radiation Control Program Director
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178)
Sacramento, California 94234-7320
Steve Hsu
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, California 94327-7320
Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 7442
San Francisco, California 94120
City Editor
The Tribune
3825 South Higuera Street
P.O. Box 112
San Luis Obispo, California 93406-0112
Robert A. Laurie, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 31)
Sacramento, California 95814
-4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EWM)
DRP Director (KEB)
DRS Director (EEC)
Senior Resident Inspector (DLP)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (JSD)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
Scott Morris (SAM1)
DC Site Secretary (AWC1)
SRI:EMB RI:EMB RI:EMB SRI:EMB RI:EMB SRI:EMB C:EMB C:DRPE C:EMB
MFRunyan/lmb JFMelfi JTaylor PAGoldberg WCSifre WMMcNeill CSMarschall WBJones CSMarschall
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
08/06/02 08/02/02 08/08/02 08/06/02 08/06/02 08/06/02 08/06/02 08/08/02 08/13/02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets: 50-275; 50-323
Report No: 50-275/02-06; 50-323/02-06
Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2
Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, California
Dates: June 17 through July 11, 2002
Team Leader: M. F. Runyan, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
Inspectors: P.A. Goldberg, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
W. M. McNeill, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
J . Taylor, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
J. F. Melfi, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
W.C. Sifre, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch
Accompanying G. Skinner, Beckman and Associates
Personnel:
J. Diecker, Engineering Associate
Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Engineering Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
-2-
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000275; -323/02-06; Pacific Gas and Electric. Co.; 06/24-07/11/2002; Diablo Canyon
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; safety system design and performance capability.
The inspections were conducted by six regional inspectors and one contractor. The inspectors
identified two green findings, one of which was characterized as a noncited violation. The other
finding did not involve a violation of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined by using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." Findings for which the significance
determination process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the
applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. The plant electrical distribution consisted of a design where the three redundant
4160 V safety buses and a non-safety bus were supplied from a common transformer
winding during both normal and emergency operation. The 4160 V buses were
interconnected by conductors so that a voltage disturbance on any part of the system
would affect the entire system. The system had a high resistance grounding design to
limit the magnitude of ground faults and to enable continued operation of a faulted load.
The grounding resistor admits sufficient fault current to prevent severe over-voltages
that could occur. However, if the grounding resistor developed an open circuit, the
entire system would be susceptible to over-voltage. The licensee was periodically
checking the continuity, but not the actual resistance of the grounding resistors and,
thus, assumptions in the design were not being verified. The licensee issued Action
Request A0561002 to evaluate the preventive maintenance program of the high
resistance grounding program.
This issue did not involve a violation of NRC requirements, but was considered to be a
finding because it revealed a vulnerability in the licensees design and maintenance that
could result in a safety problem. However, the finding was determined to be of very low
safety significance because there was no evidence that the grounding resistor had ever
been degraded and that the probability of a grounding resistor failure in combination
with a sparking ground fault was very small (50-275; -323/0206-01) (Section 1R215.b).
Report Details
1 REACTOR SAFETY
Introduction
A team inspection was performed to verify that facility safety system design and
performance capability were adequate and that the initial design and subsequent
modifications have preserved the current design basis of the systems selected for
review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related
structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safety
functions. The inspection effort also reviewed the licensees programs and methods for
monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basis
functions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems,
and barrier cornerstones.
The probabilistic risk assessment model for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant is based on
the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safety functions
successfully. The area and scope of the inspection were determined by reviewing the
licensees probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risk significant systems,
structures, and components according to their ranking and potential contribution to
dominant accident sequences and/or initiators. Deterministic effort was also applied in
the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area
history, and all modifications developed and implemented.
The team reviewed in detail the 4.16 kV electrical distribution system and the
component cooling water (CCW) system. The primary review prompted parallel review
and examination of support systems, such as, electrical power, instrumentation, room
cooling systems, and related structures and components.
The objective of this inspection was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses,
engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that were used to
support the performance of the safety systems selected for review and the necessary
support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria
utilized by the NRC inspection team included NRC regulations, the technical
specifications, applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable
industry codes and standards, as well as, industry initiatives implemented by the
licensees programs.
An inspection to assess the performance of the licensee's program to meet the
regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," was
conducted during the first week of the inspection.
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1R02 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (71111.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a selected sample of eight safety evaluations to verify that the
licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may
make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior
NRC approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspectors reviewed 14 safety evaluations pertaining to modifications and procedure
and calculation revisions, in which the licensee determined that evaluations were not
required, to ensure that the licensees exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees corrective action process to
identify and correct problems associated with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. In this effort,
the inspectors reviewed five condition reports. Further, the inspectors reviewed the
most recent 10 CFR 50.59 program audit. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the
10 CFR 50.59 training curriculum and the qualification records of a sample of
independent technical reviewers identified in the screening and evaluation forms.
b Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)
.1 System Requirements
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the following attributes of the CCW system and the 4.16 kV
electrical distribution system: (1) process medium (water, steam, and air), (2) energy
sources, (3) control systems, and (4) equipment protection. The team verified that
procedural instructions to operators were consistent with operator actions required to
meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The review also considered
requirements and commitments identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report, technical
specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-3-
.2 System Condition and Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the CCW and 4.16 kV electrical
distribution systems to verify that the design requirements were adequately
demonstrated. The team reviewed the environmental qualification of a sample of system
components to verify the capability to operate under design environmental conditions and
the assumed operating parameters including: voltage, speed, power, flow, temperature,
and pressure.
The team also reviewed the systems operations by conducting system walkdowns;
reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; and reviewing the
Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design calculations, drawings, and
procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems identified by the licensee in the corrective
action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design
issues. The sample included open and closed condition reports for the past 3 years that
identified issues affecting the selected systems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the CCW and 4.16 kV
electrical distribution systems, as well as, the required support systems. The walkdowns
focused on the installation and configuration of power supplies, piping, components, and
instruments. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:
- The placement of protective barriers and systems,
- The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions,
- The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns,
- Accessibility and lighting for any required local operator action,
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- The materiel condition and preservation of systems and equipment, and
- The conformance of the currently-installed system configurations to the design
and licensing bases.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Design Review
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical
design of the CCW and 4.16 kV electrical distribution systems. These reviews included a
review of design assumptions, calculations, required system thermal-hydraulic
performance, electrical power system performance, protective relaying, and instrument
setpoints and uncertainties. The team also performed a single-failure review of individual
components to determine the effects of such failures on the capability of the systems to
perform their design safety functions.
The team reviewed calculations, drawings, specifications, vendor documents, Final
Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, emergency operating procedures, and
temporary and permanent modifications.
b. Findings
Grounding Resistor Vulnerability
A (green) finding was identified concerning the consequences of a loss of a ground
resistor that could make the entire 4160 V electrical system susceptible to damaging
over-voltage. The 4160 V electrical distribution system featured a design where the
three redundant 4160 V safety buses and a non-safety bus were supplied from a
common transformer winding during both normal and emergency operation. As a
consequence of this arrangement, the 4160 V buses were directly interconnected by
conductors so that a voltage disturbance on any part of the system would affect the
entire system. The team noted that the design employed a high resistance grounding
scheme that limited the magnitude of ground faults and, thus, enabled continued
operation of a faulted load as long as no other faults occurred on the system. The
grounding resistor was designed to admit sufficient fault current to prevent a severe over-
voltage that could occur as a result of an intermittent (or sparking) ground fault.
Therefore, if a ground resistor or its associated connection circuitry developed an open
circuit, the system would be susceptible to severe over-voltage. The team concluded
that, because of the interconnection of the 4160 V buses, the over-voltage would affect
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all redundant safety buses. The over-voltage that could occur from an intermittent
ground fault could reach several times normal system voltage, and cause failure of
redundant safety-related equipment. As a worst case (but unlikely) scenario, the over-
voltage could cause faults on all three safety-related 4160 V switchgear and prevent re-
energizing of the buses from the diesel generators.
The team noted that the grounding resistor was not electrically monitored so that an open
circuit would not be detectable while the 4160 V system was energized. The resistors
were subject to preventive maintenance during refueling outages including cleaning,
inspection, and meggering. The team noted that the actual resistance of the resistors
was not measured so the performance capability assumed in Calculation 99-DC,
"Calculation of Capacitive Charging Current and its Impact on 4.16 kV High Resistance
Grounding System," Revision 3, was not verified. However, the continuity of the resistor
to ground was checked informally as part of the procedure for removing ground buggies
after bus maintenance (Maintenance Procedure MP E-57.11B). In response to the
teams concerns, the licensee issued Action Request A0561002 to evaluate the
preventive maintenance program on the high resistance grounding system.
Although this finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements, the team
considered it to be significant because the loss of a grounding resistor could make the
entire 4160 V system susceptible to damaging over-voltages. This was considered to be
a very low probability/ high consequence event. However, because there were no known
occurrences of degradation of the grounding resistor during the history of plant
operations and that the probability of a grounding resistor failure in combination with a
sparking ground fault was very small, the finding had a very low safety significance
(green) (50-275;50-323/0206-01).
Effect of Harmonics on Second Level Under-Voltage Relay Accuracy
An unresolved item was identified as a consequence of the licensee having not evaluated
the susceptibility of the second level under-voltage relay to the effects of harmonics on
either the voltage parameter measured in the field or the voltage source used for
calibration. Harmonics may be imposed on the 4160 V safety buses from the offsite
power system or from the onsite 4160 V buses because of operation of equipment,
including large motors.
The team determined that the second level under-voltage relays installed at the site were
ABB (formerly Westinghouse) Model SSV-T relays, which use a rectifier-type sensing
circuit. The team noted that the relay did not appear to contain special circuitry required
to produce a True RMS reading in the presence of harmonics. The relay vendor
confirmed that the relay accuracy was affected by variations in input voltage frequency
but that the effect of harmonics had not been quantified. If the relay input voltage was
not a pure sine wave, or if the relay was not a True RMS reading relay, harmonics could
cause the relay to trip either high or low. If the relay tripped too low, safety-related loads
might not be protected, or technical specification limits could be exceeded. If the relay
reset too high, the offsite source could be subjected to spurious loss during design basis
events.
-6-
The team concluded that the licensee was not evaluating the susceptibility of the second
level under-voltage relay to the effects of harmonics on either the voltage parameter
measured in the field or the voltage source used for calibration. In response to the
teams concern, the licensee performed measurements for the presence of harmonics on
operating 4160V buses and found minor harmonic content. This team considered this
test to be incomplete because it did not include some motors that could be running
during an emergency. Consequently, the team was not able to conclude from the test
information provided that the second level under-voltage relay would perform as required.
The significance of this issue depended on the magnitude of harmonics in the system,
but a definitive measure of this parameter was not available during the inspection.
Consequently, the team could not determine if this item was in noncompliance with 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which requires that design
control measures provide for verifying the accuracy of design, or, if so, whether the issue
constituted a finding of more than minor significance. A violation may exist if it is
established that the second level under-voltage relay setpoint was inadequate because
of failure to account for harmonic effects. The licensee agreed to perform additional
testing to determine the susceptibility of the system to harmonics. The finding was
identified as an unresolved item pending NRC review of the licensees tests (50-275; -
323/0206-02).
.6 Safety System Inspection and Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting selected
components in the CCW system and the 4.16 kV electrical distribution system. The
review included the results of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications.
The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting the CCW
pumps and heat exchangers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (ZA)
4OA6 Management Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Oatley, Vice President,
Operations and Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the onsite inspection on July 11, 2002.
At the conclusion of this meeting, the team leader asked the licensee's management
whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
Some proprietary information was identified, but it was returned to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT
Licensee Contacts :
A. Afzali, Acting Supervisor, PRA
K. Bush, Electrical Consulting Engineer
K. Bych, ICE Engineering Manager
P. Colbert, Electrical Design Supervisor
R. Hess, Assistant to Director of Engineering Services
J. Hodges, Supervisor, NQS
R. Jett, NRC Interface Engineer
K. Kaminski, System Engineer
S. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Regulatory Services
D. Malone, Regulatory Services Engineer
D. Miklush, Director, Engineering Services
P, Milne, System Engineer
D. Oatley, Vice President, Operations and Plant Manager
J. Portney, Senior Engineer, System Engineering
G. Reimers, Electrical Design Engineer
J. Shoulders, Manager, Design Engineering
D. Vosburg, Manager, NSSS
L. Womack, Vice President, Nuclear Services
NRC:
T. Jackson, Resident Inspector
D. Prouix, Senior Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened and Closed
50-275;50- FIN Grounding resistor vulnerability (Section 1R21.5.b)
323/0206-01
ITEMS OPENED
Opened
50-275; 50- URI Effect of harmonics on second level under-voltage relay accuracy
323/0206-02 (Section 1R21.5.b)
-2-
Documents Reviewed:
Safety Evaluations:
LBIE Log 2002-002, RHR Line 1-S6-509-8 Venting/SI-1-8818D Post-Stroke Leak Testing, Ref.
Doc. TP TO-0110/TP TB-0106, dated 2/1/2002
LBIE Log 2002-003, Delete references to Reg Guide 1.75 in DCP E-049605, dated 3/13/2002
LBIE Log 2002-005, ECG 7.8, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, dated 4/25/2002
LBIE Log 2002-006, DCPP Unit 1 Cycle 12 Reactor Core Fuel Load and COLR, dated 4/25/2002
LBIE Log 2002-007, TP TD-0203, Low Pressure Turbine Cover Handling, dated 5/7/2002
LBIE Log No. 2001-045, Unit2 EDUPS2 Battery Reconfiguration/Appendix R Compensatory
Measures, dated 12/28/2001LBIE Log No. 2001-042, Revision to Commitment NBR T31460,
dated 12/19/2001
LBIE Log No. 2001-037, Post Accident Sampling System, dated 9/28/2001DCP E-050322,
Interim Operation of Unit 2 Startup Transformer SU21as a fixed Ratio Transformer after ON-Line
Replacement, Revision 1
DCP E-049322, Replace SUT11 with new transformer equipped with LTC, Revision 0
Action Requests:
A0549345 A0517945 A0012461 A0301654 A0518733 A0554081
A0547979 A0393627 A0012469 A0315425 A0520616 A0561002
A0545470 A0231186 A0078312 A0351319 A0520617 A0559897
A0542755 A0237713 A0078315 A0368139 A0520618 A0560002
A0349338 A0542646 A0109944 A0453315 A0520580 A0541186
A0369822 A0419062 A0232589 A0464107 A0520582 A0419448
A0454631 A0559965 A0243993 A0467846 A0536318 A0301535
A0517415 A0559975 A0245077 A0517740 A0554076 A0300421
A0517595 A0559976 A0301653 A0517741
Procedures
STP M-77, Safety and Relief Valve Testing, Revision 25
MA1.ID19, Safety and Relief Valve Maintenance and Inspection Program, Revision 1A
STP M-51.5, Testing and Maintenance of Safety/Relief Valves, Revision 18
OP AP-11, Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System, Revision 19B
STP V-302, Exercising Valves DEG-214, 225, 236, 247, 258, and 269, Diesel Generator Starting
Air Compressor Discharge Check, Revision 10
-3-
STP M-130, Leak Rate Testing of the CCW Surge Tank Pressurization System, Revision 4
AR PK01-07, CCW System Surge Tank Level/Make-up, Revision 11A
AR PK01-14, CCW Surge Tank Pressure, Revision 8A
AR PK01-06, CCW Vital Hdr A/B, Revision 18
EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Revision 19
OP F-2:VI, CCW System Alignment Verification for Plant Startup, Revision 26
OP K-10B1, Sealed Valve Checklist for Containment Manual Isolation Valves Inside
Containment, Revision 14
OP K-10B2, Sealed Valve Checklist for Containment Manual Isolation Valves Outside
Containment, Revision 26
OP K-10E1, Sealed Valve Checklist for Component Cooling Water Pump 1-1, Revision 8
OP K-10E2, Sealed Valve Checklist for Component Cooling Water Pump 1-2, Revision 8A
OP K-10E3, Sealed Valve Checklist for Component Cooling Water Pump 1-3, Revision 7
OP K-10E4, Sealed Valve Checklist for Component Cooling Water Vital Headers A and B,
Revision 20
STP M-16, Safeguards Active Component Operation by Slave Relay Operation, Revision 9
STP M-26, ASW System Flow Monitoring, Revision 25
STP P-MUW-01, Routine Surveillance Test of Makeup Water Transfer Pump 0-1, Revision 4
STP V-11, Containment Isolation Phase B Valves FCV-355, FCV-356, FCV-357, FCV-363,
FCV-749, and FCV-750, Revision 12
STP-13A, CCW Flow Balancing, Revision 13
MP E-63.6A, Maintenance of SF6 4 kV Circuit Breakers, Revision 10
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-06, CCW VITAL HDR A/B, Revision 18
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-07, CCW SYS SURG TK LVE/MK-UP, Revision 3A
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-08, CCW HEADER C, Revision 15B
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-09, CCW PUMPS, Revision 12
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-11, CCW PP. 1-1 RECIRC, Revision 7
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-12, CCW PP. 1-2 RECIRC, Revision 7
-4-
Annunciator Response Procedure AR PK01-14, CCW SURGE TANK PRESSURE, Revision 8A
OP AP SD-4, Loss of Component Cooling Water, Revision 13
OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby, Revision 13
OP AP-11, Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System, Revision 19A
STP I-1A, Routine Shift Checks Required by License, Revision 86
STP M-93A, Refueling Interval Surveillance - Containment Fan Cooler System, Revision 12
CF3.ID4, Design Calculations, Revision 10
CF3.ID9, Design Change Package Development, Revision 16
CF6.NE1, Instrument Channel Uncertainty and Setpoint Methodologies, Revision 2A
MP E-50.30C, Time Delay Relay Maintenance, Revision 0A
MP E-50.33A, Westinghouse Type SSV-T One Unit Voltage Relay Maintenance, Revision 6
MP E-57.11B, Protective Grounding, Revision 21
OP J-2:VIII, Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP, Revision 3
STP I-1C, Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses, Revision 73
STP M-75, 4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration, Revision 27
Surveillance Tests
R0202175, CCW Flow Balancing, dated May 24, 2001
R0214520, CCW Flow Balancing, dated May 25, 2002
R0221324, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-1, dated April 22,
2002
R0228901, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-3, dated April 13,
2002
R0228902, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 2-3, dated April 12,
2002
R0229319, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 2-1, dated April 27,
2002
R0230053, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2, dated May 18,
2002
-5-
R0231667, Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-2, dated June 11,
2002
Safety Evaluation Screenings:
LBIE S-2002-0372, Unit 1 MOD Cycling for Aux Switch Verification, dated 5/21/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0466, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank High Level Alarm Channel, dated 2/14/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0451, RVLIS RTD Qualified Life Determination, dated 5/10/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0429, Motor Protective Device Setting Calculation, dated 5/17/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0421, Motor Protective Device Setting, dated 5/15/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0366, EDG Design Class 1 Governor Model EGB10C/13C Refurbishment, dated
5/17/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0356, Reduced resin loading in CVCS Mixed Bed During Operations, dated
3/19/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0354, Flush Line 7010: Rapid Drain Down Fill Line From CST, dated 4/17/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0351, Steam Generator Nozzle Dam Assembly, dated 4/19/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0337, Motor Protective Device Setting, dated 5/1/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0313, Motor Protective Device Setting and Penetration Protection, dated 5/4/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0311, Unistrut CGI Fasteners, Fittings and Struts (Generic), dated 5/7/2002.
LBIE S-2002-0289, 120VAC Class 1E Panels, dated 3/21/02.
LBIE S-2002-0276, Scaling Calculation Update, dated 2/9/2002
Work Orders
C0169414 C0143532 R0064420 C0169520 R0200883
R0136671 C0143779 R0223043 R0213299 C0178220
R0223043 R0064420 A0561048 R0212995 C0178244
Modifications
DCP 049284, Pressurization of the Unit 1 CCW Surge Tank, Revision 0
Calculations
N-190, ASME III Overpressure Protection Devices, dated October 11, 1995
M-1005, Pressure Retention Capability of the CCW Surge Tank, Revision 2
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D.2.7, Component Cooling Water System-PRA System Analysis, Revision 6
M-0911, Fire Evaluation of Postfire Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability During Loss of HVAC,
Revision 2
M-0912, HVAC Interactions for Postfire Safe Shutdown/room heat-up Due to Loss of HVAC as a
Result, Revision 2
M-1017, To Determine Flows in the CCW System, Revision 3
WCAP-13907, Analysis of Containment Response Following Loss-of-Coolant Accidents for
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, Revision 0
WCAP-13908, Analysis of Containment Response Following Main Steamline Break Accidents
for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, Revision 0
WCAP-14282, Evaluation of Peak CCW Temperature Scenarios for Diablo Canyon Units and 2,
Revision 1
M-998, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank, dated April 5, 1996
WCAP-14282, Evaluation of Peak CCW Temperature Scenarios for Diablo Canyon Units 1
and 2, Revision 1
CAP-12526, Auxiliary Salt Water and Component Cooling Water Flow and Temperature Study
for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, Revision 1
WCAP-13907, Analysis of Containment Response Following Loss-of-Coolant Accidents for
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, dated December 1993
WCAP-13908, Analysis of Containment Response Following Main Steamline Break Accidents
for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, dated December 1993
M-938, CCW Data Input for 1993 Containment Analysis Program, Revision 3
M-966, Establish Maximum CCW Flow Rate to the RHR Heat Exchangers, dated April 8, 1994
M-962, CCW Heat Exchanger DP Limit Calculations, Revision 3
M-1027, To Determine the Maximum Allowable ASW Temperature when Two CCW Hxs are
aligned, Revision 2
420DC, Final Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger Test Results, dated November 22, 1994
420DC-98.49, DCPP Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger 2-1 Test, dated February 1998
420DC, DCPP Unit 1 CCW Heat Exchanger Test, dated April 1995
420DC, Final Unit 1 CCW Heat Exchanger 1-1 Test Results, dated April 22, 1996
420DC, Final Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger Test Results, dated November 22, 1994
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420DC, DCPP Unit 1 RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Test, dated April 16, 1996
93-DC, Unit 1 Load Summation for 120VAC Panels (Class 1E Instrument Power
Systems, Revision 10
99-DC, Calculation of Capacitive Charging Current and its Impact on 4.16 kV High
Resistance Grounding System, Revision 3
156-DC, Determine Starting Time for 4 kV Motors as a Function of Voltage, Revision 5
101-DC, Unit 2- Load Tabulation and Load Flow Analysis of 120VAC Class 1E
Instrument Power Panels, Revision 12
160-DC, O/C Relay Settings for Non-1E 12kV and 4kV Motors, Revision 3
170-DC, Provide Setting for new Basler Electric Overcurrent Relays Used in Overcurrent
Protection of 4 kV Class 1E Motors, Revision 15
192A-DC, Determine the maximum allowable length of 120 VAC control wire for control
circuits of 480V MCCs, Revision 2
196A-DC, Voltage Drop Calculation for 460V Continuous Duty Motors, Revision 0
235A-DC, Battery 11 Sizing, Voltage Drop, Short Circuit and Charger Sizing Calculation,
Revision 5
235B-DC, Battery 12 Sizing, Voltage Drop, Short Circuit and Charger Sizing Calculation,
Revision 5
357I-DC, 230/12 kV Startup Transformer LTC (System 69). Revision 2
195F, Verification of MOV Motor Voltages During Starting and Running Conditions,
Revision 3
357A-DC, DCPP Unit 1 & 2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Motor Starting Calculations,
Revision 6
357K-DC, 4160 Volt Second Level Undervoltage Relay and Timer Setpoint Calculation,
Revision 3
357P-DC, 4160 Volt Second Level Undervoltage Relay and Timer Setpoint Calculation,
Revision 0
359-DC, Determination of 230 kV Grid Voltage Limits for DCPP Oper Instr O-23,
Revision 4
EQP205.1, Safeguard Relay Boards in Turbine Bldg @ El. 119 - Anchorage, Revision 1
-8-
ES-13, Qualification of Safeguards Relay Boards, Revision 16
Design Criteria
SCM S-14, Component Cooling Water System, Revision 15C
DCM S-62, 12kV System, Revision 10D
DCM S-63, 4160 Systems
DCM T-18, Electrical Protection, Revision 9
DCM T-19, Electrical Separation and Isolation, Revision 7
DCM T-21, Grounding, Revision 4
Drawings
102014, Sheet 5, Revision 56
102014, Sheet 5A, Revision 45
102014, Sheet 6, Revision 53
102014, Sheet 10, Revision 59
108014, Sheet 5, Revision 45
108014, Sheet 5A, Revision 35
108014, Sheet 6, Revision 40
108014, Sheet 10, Revision 41
498124, Electrical Schematic Diagram Stand-by Start-up Transformer No. 11 Load Tap
Changer, Revision 7
437518, Electrical Single Line Diagram for Station Auxiliaries, Revision 35
437519, Single Line Diagram 12/4.16KV System, Revision 19
437529, Electrical Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Generation Excitation Main and
Auxiliary Transformers, Revision 35
437532, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4160 V System, Revision 26
437533, Electrical Single Line Diagram Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System,
Revision 33
441220, Single Line Diagram for Station Auxiliaries, Revision 23
441219, Electrical Single Line Diagram 12/4.16KV System, Revision 12
441226, Electrical Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Generation Excitation Main and
Auxiliary Transformers, Revision 27
-9-
441228, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 V System Bus Section D & E, Revision 15
441229, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 V System Bus Section F, Revision 14
441230, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 V System Bus Section G & H, Revision 20
437566, Electrical Schematic Diagram Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps,
Revision 32
437583, Electrical Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Revision 23
437589, Schematic Diagram Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 14
437590, Electrical Schematic Diagram Containment Spray Pumps, Revision 17
437591, Electrical Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal Pumps, Revision 21
437593, Electrical Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Water Pumps, Revision 28
437594, Electrical Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Salt Water Pump, Revision 25
437595, Electrical Schematic Diagram Charging Pumps, Revision 25
437613, Schematic Diagram Bus Potential and Synchronizing 4160 Volt System, Revision 15
437614, Electrical Schematic Diagram Bus Potential and Synchronizing 4160 Volt System,
Revision 31
437616, Schematic Diagram 4160 V Bus Differential, Revision 5
437617, Schematic Diagram 4160 Volt Bus Differential, Revision 9
437620, Schematic Diagram Stand-by Start-up Transformer No. 12 and Associated Circuit
Breakers, Revision 13
437621, Schematic Diagram Stand-by Start-up Transformer No. 12 and Associated Circuit
Breakers, Revision 21
437624, Schematic Diagram 4160 V Bus Section D & E Automatic Transfer, Revision 6
437625, Electrical Schematic Diagram 4160 V Bus Section F Automatic Transfer, Revision 28
437626, Electrical Schematic Diagram 4160 V Bus Section G Automatic Transfer, Revision 29
437627, Electrical Schematic Diagram 4160 V Bus Section H Automatic Transfer, Revision 31
437628, Schematic Diagram Motor Control Center Transformer, Revision 12
437628, Electrical Schematic Diagram Motor Control Center Transformer, Revision 15
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437663, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Transformer No. 12 and Associated Circuit Breakers,
Revision 16
437664, Electrical Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Transformer No. 12 and Associated Circuit
Breakers, Revision 15
Licensee Event Reports97-001
Miscellaneous Documents
PG&E Letter No. DCL-90-004
Design Calculation STA-133, Maximum allowable leakage from the HHSI header into RCS
without imposing thermal stress to the injection piping.
R003P1A, EOP Local Actions Walkdown, dated August 8, 2000
R996P1, AOP/EOP Local Action Walkdown Package L, dated November 24, 1999
LPA-11, Malfunction of CCW System, dated September 8, 2001
NRC Inspection Report 50-275/91-07 and 50-323/91-07, dated July 18, 1991
NRC Inspection Report 50-275/91-07 and 50-323/91-07, dated February 19, 1993
PG&E Letter No. DCL-91-207, Reply to notice of violation, dated August 19, 1991
OMa-1988, Inservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants
Technical Specifications, Revision 15
Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 14
Operating Experience Assessment Log 97-079
Maintenance Rule Database
Pump and Valve Trending Database
DC663312-10-4, D & DB Series Safety Relief Valve Maintenance Manual
P-8136, Safety/Relief Valve Data Sheet
50.59 Review associated with Design Change Package M45691, Revision 0
Listing of rubber lined butterfly valves
Vendor Instruction Manual 663173-120, Fisher Controls Co. - Type 7600 Butterfly Control Valve
Body, Revision 7
-11-
Vendor Instruction Manual 663314-38, Instruction Manual for Continental Butterfly Valves -
Series 9100 RR/L Design, Revision 7
Vendor Instruction Manual 663314-116, Limitorque Type HBC Instruction and Maintenance
Manual, Revision 3
PG&E Letter DCL-94-037, Auxiliary Saltwater System, dated February 15, 1994
PG&E Letter DCL 94-120, Auxiliary Saltwater System Outside Design Basis Due to Fouling
File SS5, Supplementary Specification for Squirrel Cage Induction Motors
63ST11: Test New Sudden Pressure Relay Pre-OTG
THU11: Startup XFMR 1-1 Perform Inspection
THU21: Startup XFMR 2-1 Perform Inspection
Westinghouse I.L.41-766.5B, Installation, Operation, Maintenance Instructions Types
SSV-T and SSC-T Relays for Class 1E Application
Maschinenfabrik Reieinhausen Motor Drive Unit MA 7 Operating Instructions No. 40/02
Beckwith LTC Backup Control M-0329A
ABB Instruction Leaflet 48-500-24A, Instructions for Automatic Control of Load Tap Changers
Cut Sheet for Struthers Dunn 112XAX and 112XBX relays
NRC Letter dated April 29, 1999, Issuance of Amendments for Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit 1 (TAC No. MA0743) and Unit No. 2 (TAC No. MA07744)
System Training Guide J-6a, 4 kV System, Revision 11