IR 05000458/2008005
| ML090300208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2009 |
| From: | Geoffrey Miller NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Mike Perito Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-08-001, IR-08-005 | |
| Download: ML090300208 (44) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MM I SSI O N R E GI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 January 29, 2009 Michael Perito Vice President, Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775 Subject: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2008005; 07200049/2008001
Dear Mr. Perito:
On December 31, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 7, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA Wayne Walker for/
Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-458 72-049 License: NPF-47
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2008005; 07200049/2008001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000458, 07200049 License: NPF-47 Report: 05000458/2008005; 07200049/2008001 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, LA Dates: September 28 through December 31, 2008 Inspectors: G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C C. Norton, Resident Inspector, Project Branch C T. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch S. Garchow, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch R. Daley, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region III R. Kellar, PE, ISFSI Inspector, Repository and Spent Fuel Safety Branch C. Graves, Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch 2 P. Elkmann, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Plant Support Branch 1 P. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Approved By: Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2008005; 09/28/2008 - 12/31/2008; River Bend Station; Integrated Resident and
Regional Report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspections by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by regional based inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
River Bend Station began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. The plant remained at 100 percent power except for a brief period on October 31, 2008, when reactor power was reduced to 90 percent to perform an operability test for partially withdrawn control rods, and on December 5, 2008, when reactor power was reduced to 60 percent power to adjust the existing control rod pattern.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
1R04 Equipment Alignments
Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- Emergency Diesel Generator Division 1
- Standby Liquid Control Division 2
- Fire Protection Water Division 2 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
- October 6, 2008, Turbine Building, Mezzanine Level and Turbine Deck
- October 16, 2008, Control Building, 95-foot level
- October 22, 2008, Protected Area, fire main outside yard loop
- October 30, 2008, Diesel Generator Building, 98-foot level The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of
sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also walked down the one area listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
- December 26, 2008, Control Building, 70-foot elevation These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Biennial Inspection The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are conducted over a 2-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.
This inspection was held during the first week of the biennial licensed operator requalification examination testing cycle, which began the week of August 11, 2008.
The biennial requalification examination testing cycle ended the week of October 14, 2008, due to delays caused by Hurricane Ike.
a. Inspection Scope
To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification program, the inspectors conducted personnel interviews, reviewed both the operating tests and written examinations, and observed ongoing operating test activities.
The inspectors interviewed five licensee personnel, consisting of two operators, two instructors, and a training supervisor, to determine their understanding of the policies and practices for administering requalification examinations. The inspectors also reviewed operator performance on the written exams and operating tests. These reviews included observations of portions of the operating tests by the inspectors. The operating tests observed included six job performance measures and three scenarios that were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the inspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator mastery of the training program content.
The results of these examinations were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the licensees appraisal of operator performance and to determine if feedback of performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.
The inspectors interviewed members of the training department and reviewed minutes of training review group meetings to assess the responsiveness of the licensed operator requalification program to incorporate the lessons learned from both plant and industry events. The inspector also reviewed a sample of licensed operator annual medical forms and procedures governing the medical examination process for conformance to 10 CFR 55.53, requalification program feedback forms and process records, and the remediation process records.
In addition to the above, the inspectors reviewed examination security measures, simulator fidelity, and existing logs of simulator deficiencies.
At the conclusion of the testing cycle, the inspector reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the individual job performance measure operating tests, simulator operating tests, and written examinations administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycles and biennial examination. Final examination results were assessed to determine if they were consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"
Revision 9, Supplement 1, and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process."
Six separate crews participated in simulator operating tests, written examinations, and job performance measure operating tests, totaling 39 licensed operators, (17 Reactor Operators and 22 Senior Reactor Operators). All operators passed the biennial licensed operator requalification examination. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator requalification program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems:
- Automatic Depressurization
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
- Implementing appropriate work practices
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures
- Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
- Characterizing system reliability issues for performance
- Charging unavailability for performance
- Trending key parameters for condition monitoring
- Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2)
- Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of three quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
- Low Pressure Core Spray emergent relay replacement, October 24, 2008
- Control Building Chill Water Chiller C emergent work, October 29, 2008
- Fancy Point switchyard line maintenance, November 10-15, 2008
- Normal Service Water Pump 7A outage, November 17-21, 2008 The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the
risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- CR-RBS-2008-04676, standby service water pump house ventilation fan trouble, reviewed on October 3, 2008
- CR-RBS-2008-02983, Division II diesel cracked exhaust pipe near #8 cylinder head port, reviewed on October 29, 2008
- CR-RBS-2008-03094, RCIC pump oil bowls were found empty, reviewed on October 31, 2008
- CR-RBS-2008-06336, a low flow alarm occurred while alternating auxiliary building HVAC units HVR-UC11B to HVR-UC11A, reviewed on November 4, 2008
- CR-RBS-2008-06548, control building chiller condenser shell purge unit venting air unexpectedly, reviewed on November 17, 2008 The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated Safety Analysis Report to the licensees evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five operability evaluations inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following permanent modifications to verify that the safety functions of important safety systems were not degraded:
- Turbine Building Siding and Girt Modification (EC-9732)
- Revise EDC Norm. Press. Ranges for the Containment, Drywell, and Turbine Building, and Revise Norm. Min. Temp. for the RCIC Room (ER-RB-2002-0045-000)
The inspectors reviewed key affected parameters associated with materials/replacement components, equipment protection from hazards, pressure boundary, ventilation boundary, structural, licensing basis, and failure modes for the modifications listed above. The inspectors verified that modification preparation, staging, and implementation did not impair emergency/abnormal operating procedure actions, key safety functions, or operator response to loss of key safety functions; postmodification testing will maintain the plant in a safe configuration during testing by verifying that unintended system interactions will not occur, systems, structures and components performance characteristics still meet the design basis, the appropriateness of modification design assumptions, and the modification test acceptance criteria will be met; and licensee personnel identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with permanent plant modifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of two samples for permanent plant modifications as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
- WO 51052288 Task 01, SFC-MOV120 - Clean, Inspect, Insulation Test, Lubricate, Valve, EM-Maintain Valve Operability, reviewed November 18, 2008
- WO 00163834 Task 01 and 03, B33-D003B1 HPU Skid B Lost Power, reviewed December 10, 2008
- WO 51052810 Task 01, SWP-MOV4A - Clean, Inspect, Insulation Test, Lubricate, EM Maintain Valve Operability, reviewed November 20, 2008
- WO 174294, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor A, reviewed on December 5, 2008
- WO 51511154, Plant Stack Effluent Activity Monitor RMS RE 125, reviewed on December 5, 2008
- WO 14199-01, HGS-IGN 34B, reviewed on December 16, 2008
- WO 174987-01, HGS-IGN 38A Hydrogen Igniter Post Maintenance Test HCS-IGN34B, reviewed on December 16, 2008
- WO 172265, Replace Hale Fire Pump Batteries, reviewed on December 1, 2008 The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
- The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of eight postmaintenance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the nine surveillance activities listed below
demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:
- Preconditioning
- Evaluation of testing impact on the plant
- Acceptance criteria
- Test equipment
- Procedures
- Jumper/lifted lead controls
- Test data
- Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability
- Test equipment removal
- Restoration of plant systems
- Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements
- Updating of performance indicator data
- Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems, structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct
- Reference setting data
- Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
- STP-051-4283, Containment Unit Cooler System Instrumentation, Unit Cooler A - Containment to Annulus Differential Pressure High Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Test (HVR-ESX60E, HVR-ESY60E, HVR-PDT60E), Revision 301, performed on September 18, 2008
- STP-204-4203, LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow - Low, Channel Cal, Revision 8A, performed on September 18, 2008
- STP-256-6301, Division 1 Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Test, Revision 14, performed on October 23, 2008
- STP-403-0301, Containment Unit Cooler HVR-UC1A Flow Rate Verification, Revision 11, performed on October 30, 2008
- STP-000-6303, Miscellaneous Containment Isolation Valves, Revision 10, performed on November 9, 2008
- STP-000-0001, Daily Operating Logs, for reactor coolant system leakage detection calculation, Revision 56, performed from November 10-21, 2008
- STP-208-6302, DIV II MSIV Leakage Control Quarterly Valve Operability Test, Revision 6, performed on November 13, 2008
- STP-204-6304, DIV II RHR Quarterly Valve Operability Test, Revision 21, performed on November 19, 2008
- STP-000-0001, Daily Operating Logs for main steam radiation monitor Channel A, Revision 56, performed on December 3, 2008 Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of nine surveillance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 33 to the River Bend Station Emergency Plan, received November 13, 2008. This revision removed two engineering positions from the licensees emergency response organization, updated the locations of predesignated offsite radiological monitoring locations, removed references to a Transmission and Distribution division radio system, updated the location of county Sheriffs Dispatchers, and made minor editorial corrections.
The revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). This review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and did not constitute approval of the licensees changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection.
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on November 11, 2008, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Training Observations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on September 30, 2008 (Crew D), and October 21, 2008 (Crew B), which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program.
As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
a. Inspection Scope
This area was inspected to assess licensee personnels performance in implementing physical and administrative controls for airborne radioactivity areas, radiation areas, high radiation areas, and worker adherence to these controls. The inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical specifications, and the licensees procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance.
During the inspection, the inspector interviewed the radiation protection manager, radiation protection supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspector performed independent radiation dose rate measurements and reviewed the following items:
- Performance indicator events and associated documentation packages reported by the licensee in the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone
- Radiation work permits, procedures, engineering controls, and air sampler locations
- Adequacy of the licensees internal dose assessment for any actual internal exposure greater than 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent
- Physical and programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools
- Self-assessments, audits, licensee event reports, and special reports related to the access control program since the last inspection
- Corrective action documents related to access controls
- Posting and locking of entrances to all accessible high dose rate - high radiation areas and very high radiation areas Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of 10 of the required 21 samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector assessed licensee personnels performance with respect to maintaining individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. The inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures
required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following:
- Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure
- Site-specific trends in collective exposures, plant historical data, and source-term measurements
- Site-specific ALARA procedures
- ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements
- Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any inconsistencies
- Interfaces between operations, radiation protection, maintenance, maintenance planning, scheduling, and engineering groups
- First-line job supervisors contribution to ensuring work activities are conducted in a dose efficient manner
- Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry
- Source-term control strategy or justifications for not pursuing such exposure reduction initiatives
- Specific sources identified by the licensee for exposure reduction actions, priorities established for these actions, and results achieved since the last refueling cycle
- Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program since the last inspection
- Resolution through the corrective action process of problems identified through postjob reviews and postoutage ALARA report critiques
- Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up activities, such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking
- Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying and addressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of 8 of the required 15 samples and 6 of the optional samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.02-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Data Submission Issue
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the data submitted by the licensee for the third quarter 2008 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, Performance Indicator Program.
This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System performance indicator for the period from the fourth quarter 2007 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.
Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index heat removal system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Residual Heat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Residual Heat Removal System performance indicator for the period from the fourth quarter 2007 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.
Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index residual heat removal system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems performance indicator for the period from the fourth quarter 2007 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.
Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index cooling water system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Occupational Radiological Occurrences
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Radiological Occurrences performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, was used. The inspector reviewed the licensees assessment of the performance indicator for occupational radiation safety to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess the adequacy of the licensees performance indicator data collection and analyses, the inspector discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review, and the results of those reviews. The inspector independently reviewed electronic dosimetry dose rate and accumulated dose alarm and dose reports and the dose assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were potentially unrecognized occurrences.
These activities constitute completion of the occupational radiological occurrences sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, was used. The inspector reviewed the licensees issue report database and selected individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensees historical 10 CFR 50.75(g) file and selectively reviewed the licensees analysis for discharge pathways resulting from a spill, leak, or unexpected liquid discharge focusing on those incidents which occurred over the last few years.
These activities constitute completion of the radiological effluent technical specifications/
offsite dose calculation manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the stations daily corrective action documents.
The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees corrective action program, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting hardened grease in 13.8KV and 4KV breakers. The inspectors reviewed the breaker replacement/refurbishment program including: the prioritization of breakers to be replaced, corrective action for emergent issues since initiation of breaker replacement/refurbishment program, probable risk assessment considerations for remaining breakers needing replacement/refurbishment, and the operability basis for continued operation with breakers installed beyond the industry recommended replacement interval. The inspectors concluded that the breaker replacement/refurbishment program progresses in accordance with licensee replacement criteria as modified in response to emergent conditions and events. The breaker replacement program prioritization does not take into account probable risk assessment. The result of this has been that breakers whose failure place the plant in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> technical specification shutdown limiting condition for operation but have low probable risk assessment contribution have been and are scheduled for replacement before breakers with very significant probable risk assessment contribution but are not associated with a technical specification shut down limiting condition for operation. During the past 12 months, the River Bend Station breaker replacement/refurbishment program has brought River Bend Station in closer alignment with established industry standards and has neither contributed to the initiation of nor hampered the mitigation of an event.
These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors performed observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with River Bend Station security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at Operating Plants
(60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
The licensee had seven loaded Holtec HI-STORM casks on the ISFSI pad at the time of the inspection. The licensee had recently elected to adopt the requirements contained in Holtec HI-STORM Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1014, License Amendment 5 for the current cask loading campaign. Loading operations for HI-STORM cask number eight were underway during the inspection.
Prior to the inspectors arrival, the licensee had noticed an unusual noise coming from the cask handling crane main hoist. The cask loading activities had been placed in a safe condition and the main hoist motor had been sent offsite for trouble shooting and repairs. After new bearings were installed and the bearing housing had been machined to achieve a correct fit, the motor was returned to the station. The station performed testing to confirm that the motor was ready for use. The initial portion of the lift of the loaded transfer cask from the floor of the cask loading pit during the final portion of the inspection occurred without incident.
A tour of the ISFSI was performed. The condition of the storage casks and the associated vents were determined to be adequate. The inspectors noticed erosion in four areas on the slope of the fill area which contained the ISFSI pad. The licensee had initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2007-00979 on March 12, 2007, which documented the deficiency. An operability review had been performed of the condition and an investigation for a recommended repair process had been undertaken.
Technical Specification 3.1.2 required the licensee to verify that the upper and lower cask vents were clear of obstructions on a daily basis. The licensees records for August 2006 and September 2007 were reviewed by the inspectors and determined to be adequate.
The spent fuel assemblies selected for loading into cask numbers eight and nine were reviewed for compliance with the requirements of CoC 1014. The fuel assemblies had been selected for loading in accordance with the requirements contained in licensee Procedure REP-0061, Fuel Selection for Dry Storage, Revision 302. The fuel assemblies selected for HI-STORM cask numbers eight and nine were found to meet the CoC requirements.
The radiological dose rates at the licensee controlled area boundary along with the Thermo-Luminescent Dosimeter (TLD) readings from the ISFSI perimeter fence for 2006 and 2007 were reviewed. The highest annual dose which was recorded at the controlled area boundary corrected for background and occupational exposure time was 13 mrem, which was well below the 10 CFR Part 72.104 limits on annual dose to a member of the public of 25 mrem. The TLD data from the ISFSI fence boundary indicated that the radiological dose rates were also below the 25 mrem requirements for an individual working in a building located near the ISFSI.
The inspectors selected two portions of the licensees Quality Assurance (QA) program for review. The audits and surveillances that had been performed since December 2005 were reviewed. Supplier QA had performed oversight of the cask vendor concrete placement activities and initiated Corrective Action Report CAR-2007-0009 in
January 2007, documenting deficiencies that had been identified during the concrete placement process. The corrective actions taken as part of the CAR were reviewed and determined to be thorough. Several oversight checklists had been completed by site QA personnel that documented observations of the ISFSI related activities. A representative sample of the condition reports from the licensee corrective action system documenting ISFSI deficiencies were also reviewed.
The licensee reported that there had been no 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed since the last inspection. Several of the 10 CFR 72.48 regulatory screenings performed for the changes to the implementing procedures were reviewed along with the screening for the changes to the 10 CFR 72.212 report and were found to meet regulatory requirements. Selected portions of the revisions to the licensees 10 CFR 72.212 report incorporating License Amendment 5 requirements were reviewed. The 72.212 report was found to adequately incorporate changes to the Multi-Purpose Canister helium backfill limits and new pressure monitoring requirements during cask unloading activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176, Emergency Diesel Generator
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of TI 2515/176 was to gather information to assess the adequacy of nuclear power plant emergency diesel generator endurance and margin testing as prescribed in plant-specific technical specifications. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's technical specifications, procedures, and calculations and interviewed licensee personnel to complete the TI. The information gathered while completing this TI was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/174, Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power
Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an inspection of the hydrogen igniter portable generator and associated equipment, procedures, and training as a backup power supply. The inspectors assessed the location of the temporary connection to verify the ability to reliably provide power to the igniters consistent with commitments. The inspectors determined that the equipment necessary to provide backup power to the hydrogen
igniters was available, and the portable power supply and temporary connections that were selected performed the following:
- The power supply can be transported from its storage location to the access location for providing power to the igniters using readily available equipment.
- Fittings, cables, and power conditioning equipment necessary to provide power to the igniters are readily available and compatible with identified connection points on the power supply and in the internal power distribution system.
- Unnecessary portions of the internal power distribution system can be separated from portions necessary to provide power to the igniters from the portable power supply.
- The movement of the power supply and connection of necessary fittings and cables to provide backup power to the igniters can be completed within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
- The rating of the portable power supply is adequate to continuously power at least one train of igniters and the operating time is consistent with commitments.
The inspectors determined that appropriate procedures have been established to govern the provisions of backup power to the igniters. They insured that procedures addressed the decision to provide backup power to the igniters and the steps required to provide the backup power. They determined that the procedures included cautions against actuation of the igniters after indications of severe core damage are present.
The inspectors determined that a suitable training program has been established to train selected staff in the actions necessary to provide backup power to the igniters and that the training provides appropriate guidelines for initiation of the backup power to the igniters. The inspectors also determined that maintenance and testing schedules that are consistent with vendor recommendations have been established for portable and permanently installed equipment. The inspectors walked down the associated power supply and connection points and determined that the capability of the power supply to provide the required power with the necessary properties, the capability to physically connect the power supply to the internal power distribution system, and the capability of the internal power distribution system to power the igniters.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 2515/174-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On August 15, 2008, the inspectors briefed Mr. E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee's staff, on the results of the licensed operator requalification program inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. After review of the complete biennial requalification cycle examination results, the inspector conducted a telephonic
exit with Mr. R. Persons, Training Superintendant, on November 4, 2008. The licensee acknowledged the results as presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On October 23, 2008, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. M. Perito, Vice President, Operations, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On December 12, 2008, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting to present the results of the in-office inspection of changes to the licensees emergency plan to Mr. J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, who acknowledged the findings. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On January 7, 2008, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results to Mr. M. Perito, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- G. Bush, Manager, Plant Maintenance
- J. Campbell, Senior Project Manager
- M. Chase, Manager, Training and Development
- J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Training
- F. Corley, Electrical Design Supervisor
- B. Cox, Manager, Operations
- C. Forpahl, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components
- B. Heath, Superintendent, Chemistry
- K. Higgenbotham, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift
- B. Houston, Manager, Radiation Protection
- K. Huffstatler, Technical Specialist, Licensing
- J. Hurley, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- A. James, Manager, Security
- C. Keller, Reactor Engineer
- K. Klamert, System Engineer - EDG
- R. Kowaleski, Manager, Corrective Action
- J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
- W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering
- B. Matherne, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
- R. McAdams, Manager, System Engineering
- J. McElwain, Manager, Human Resources
- L. Meyer, Health Physics Specialist, Radiation Protection
- E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations
- S. Patterson, Health Physics - Dosimetry
- R. Persons, Superintendent, Training
- C. Roberts, Lead Reactor Engineer
- J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
- J. Schlesinger, Supervisor, Engineering
- J. Schroeder, Assistant Operations Manager - Support
- B. Smith, Modification Supervisor
- T. Tankersley, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. Vukovics, Reactor Engineer
- D. Wiles, Director Engineering
- D. Williamson, Sr. Licensing Specialist
- R. Womack, Manager, Outage
Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000458/2515/176 TI Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing (Section 4OA5)
- 05000458/2515/174 TI Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification (Section 4OA5)