IR 05000454/2018004

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NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2018004 and 05000455/2018004
ML19039A068
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/06/2019
From: Hironori Peterson
Region 3 Branch 3
To: Bryan Hanson
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR 2018004
Download: ML19039A068 (21)


Text

UNITED STATES ruary 6, 2019

SUBJECT:

BYRON STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000454/2018004 AND 05000455/2018004

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On December 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Byron Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 16, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Chalmers and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66 Enclosure:

IR 05000454/2018004; 05000455/2018004 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

Letter to Bryan

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Byron Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations No findings or violations were identified.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000455/2018-001-00 Byron Unit 2 Automatic Safety 71153 Closed System Actuation due to System Auxiliary Transformer 242-2 Failure and Subsequent Unit 2 Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

URI 05000454/2012008-01; Inadequate Undervoltage 71153 Closed 05000455/2012008-01 Protection

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLANT STATUS

INSPECTION SCOPES

................................................................................................................

REACTOR SAFETY

.....................................................................................................................

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

..............................................................................................

INSPECTION RESULTS

..............................................................................................................

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

............................................................................................ 12

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

......................................................................................................... 12

PLANT STATUS

Both Units 1 and 2 operated at scheduled power levels for the entire quarter.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in

IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem

Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the

onset of seasonal cold temperatures. Risk significant systems reviewed for extreme cold

weather included the reactor water storage tank (RWST), the essential service water

system (SX), and the SX cooling tower.

Impending Severe Weather (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for

high wind conditions forecast on October 3, 2018. A second sample was performed on

November 23, 2018 for a winter weather warning for November 25, 2018 with 8-12 inches

of snow forecast for the site.

71111.04Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1) 2B diesel generator, controls, and auxiliary systems on October 23, 2018;

(2) 2B auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump during 2A AF pump work window on

November 11, 2018;

(3) 0A train of control room ventilation during a 0B train work window on

November 13, 2018; and

(4) Unit 1 stator cooling system on December 21, 2018, after compensatory actions were

taken for temperature control valve cycling.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected

areas:

(1) 2A diesel generator fuel oil storage tank room on October 5, 2018;

(2) 2B diesel generator fuel oil storage tank room on October 5, 2018;

(3) Auxiliary building 401 - 0 elevation general area on November 30, 2018; and

(4) 1A diesel generator fuel oil storage tank room on December 18, 2018.

Annual Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on October 23, 2018.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed

operator requalification training on November 6, 2018. The resident inspectors observed a

portion of an in-progress annual requalification operating test for an operating crew not

observed by the NRC examiners during the biennial portion of this IP.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance in the control room and

adjacent areas on December 18, 2018, during the performance of an operational high risk

surveillance.

Operator Exams (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated requalification examination results on

December 12, 2018.

Operator Requalification Program (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the operator requalification program from October 15, 2018 to

October 26, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated

with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Maintenance Rule (a)(3) assessment for the period of January 2017 through June 2018;

(2) Primary containment (Function PC); and

(3) Unit 0 SX Makeup (Function SX-06).

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent

work activities:

(1) Emergent risk due to degraded condition of 1B centrifugal charging pump (CV) auxiliary

oil pump and removal from service for repair on October 10, 2018;

(2) Walk down of risk management actions and protected equipment associated with the 2A

AF pump work window on November 8, 2018; and

(3) Walk down of risk management actions and protected equipment associated with the 0A

VC chiller work window on December 10, 2018.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality

assessments:

(1) Unit 1 leading edge flow meter after trouble alarms and automatic transfer to flow

venturies on October 11, 2018;

(2) 0A essential service water (SX) makeup pump after high vibration was measured at the

upper gearbox on November 1, 2018;

(3) 1C steam generator level instrument failed channel check on November 19, 2018; and

(4) 1RF027 valve stroke test failure while 1BOSR 6.3.5-14 was being performed on

November 19, 2018.

71111.18Plant Modifications (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 624333, Revision 1; Steam Generator Blowdown Overboard

and Reduction.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) WO 04838406, Unexpected Rod Motion on Unit 1, due to spiking temperature reference

signal on October 11, 2018;

(2) 0BOSR Z.7.a.6-2, Revision1; Unit Zero Essential Service Water Make-up Pump Prime

Mover Inspection, and 0BOSR 7.9.6-2, Revision 41; Essential Service Water Makeup

Pump 0B Monthly Operability Surveillance, after preventative maintenance on the pump

on October 18, 2018;

(3) 2BOSR 5.5.8.AF.5-1a; Unit Two Group A Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements for

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2AF01PA, Revision 12 on 2A AF pump after

preventative maintenance on pump, heat exchangers and coupling on

November 9, 2018; and

(4) WO 4596749-41, OPS VC/VS Cross-Tie Mod - A Train Testing, EC 0618035, not

performed as planned and engineering evaluation required.

71111.22Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

In-Service (2 Samples)

(1) 2BOSR 5.5.8.DO-1, Unit Two Test of the Diesel Oil Transfer System, for the 2B diesel

oil transfer pumps on November 1, 2018; and

(2) 1BOSR 5.5.8.SI.5-1C, Unit One Comprehensive IST Requirements for Safety Injection

Pump 1SI01PA, Revision 7, on September 13, 2018.

71114.02Alert and Notification System Testing (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system on

October 15-18, 2018.

71114.03Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the readiness Emergency Response Organization on

October 15-18, 2018.

71114.04Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan

changes on November 29, 2018. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.05Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program on

October 15-18, 2018.

71114.06Drill Evaluation

Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated an emergency drill with the Technical Support Center

participating on November 14, 2018.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification (9 Samples)

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems-2 Samples (October 1, 2015 through

September 30, 2018);

(2) MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems-2 Samples (October 1, 2015 through

September 30, 2018);

(3) MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems-2 Samples (October 1, 2015 through

September 30, 2018);

(4) EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance-1 Sample (September 1, 2017 through

June 30, 2018);

(5) EP02: Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation-1 Sample

(September 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018); and

(6) EP03: Alert And Notification System Reliability-1 Sample (September 1, 2017 through

June 30, 2018).

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and various other

administrative processes for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety

issue.

Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 1 steam generator lower lateral support shim plate issues were identified and

repaired during the refueling outage. Inspectors reviewed the repairs prior to reactor

startup, but concerns regarding potential design or installation issues with these critical

seismic support elements warranted a more detailed inspection of the calculations and

design specifications used to support the functionality of the shim plates; and

(2) Action Request (AR) 04140600 Westinghouse Part 21 For CRDM [Control Rod Drive

Mechanism] Thermal Sleeves and AR 04140999 Westinghouse Part 21 For CRDM

Thermal Sleeves were associated with a 10 CFR Part 21 notification Westinghouse

made to the NRC (Westinghouse LTR-NRC-18-34, dated May 23, 2018). The specific

issue was associated with wear of thermal sleeves in the CRDM penetration tubes which

could have a safety consequence that was not previously considered (reference: NRC

Information Notice Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Leads to Stuck Control Rod at Foreign

Nuclear Plant).

The review for this sample was conducted in accordance with the NRC Operating

Experience Smart Sample 2018/01 Evaluation of Licensee Actions Taken in Response

to 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of the Potential Existence of Defects Related to Control

Rod Drive Mechanism Thermal Sleeves, to evaluate the licensees use of operating

experience and ensure that this issue was adequately evaluated for applicability, and

applicable lessons learned communicated to appropriate organizations and

implemented.

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report which can be accessed at

https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 455-2018-001-00, Byron Station Unit 2 Automatic Safety

System Actuation Following a Trip of a Safety Auxiliary Transformer and Subsequent

Loss of Offsite Power.

INSPECTION RESULTS

No findings or violations were identified.

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Observation 71152 - Semi Annual Trend Review

In addition to the licensees corrective action program (CAP), the inspectors reviewed the

licensees abnormal component position data sheet, equipment status tag log, and operator

burden and degraded equipment aggregate assessment, for the previous six months, to

identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The

inspectors selected a sample of items tracked by the licensee in these processes to verify that

issues were entered into the CAP and that the issue reports were given a priority

commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors concluded that the licensee

continues to identify issues and enter those issues into the CAP in a timely manner. The

inspectors did not identify any adverse trends that would be indicative of a more significant

safety issue.

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Observation-LER 455/2018-001-00, Byron Station Unit 2 Automatic Safety 71153

System Actuation following a trip of a Safety Auxiliary Transformer and

subsequent Loss of Offsite Power

On July 6, 2018, with both units at Byron Station operating at full power, Station Auxiliary

Transformer (SAT) 242-1 and SAT 242-2 tripped due to an internal fault on SAT 242-2

causing a loss of offsite power on Unit 2 and safety system actuation. The circuit breakers

supplying the common feed to SAT 242-1 and 242-2 tripped open on a differential current

relay and sudden pressure actuation. A significant amount of oil was found leaking from

the transformer and bushings. There were no switching operations or weather events in

progress at the time of the failure. The 2A and 2B diesel generators automatically started on

4.16 kilovolt bus undervoltage signal and sequenced on to the Unit 2 emergency safeguards

feature buses as designed. All other buses normally powered from the SATs automatically

transferred to the Unit Auxiliary Transformers as designed. In addition, the 2A auxiliary

feedwater pump automatically started on the 2A diesel generator sequencing timer actuation

and injected into the Unit 2 steam generators. The inspectors review of the operator

performance in response to the event was previously documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000454/2018003 and 05000455/2018003 with no performance

deficiencies identified. The licensees causal investigation concluded that maintenance

activities to replace a low voltage bushing performed in May of 2018 exposed previously

damaged high voltage lead insulation to air and contaminants resulting in partial discharges

that ultimately resulted in the failure after the transformer was re-energized.

Review of the operating history of the transformer revealed that the dissolved gas analysis of

the SAT 242-2 oil changed significantly after a 2012 switchyard event that resulted in

operation of the transformer under load for approximately 40 minutes with an open phase

supply from the switchyard. That event was documented in LER 05000454/2012-001-00,

Unit 2 Loss of Normal Offsite Power and Reactor Trip and Unit 1 Loss of Normal Offsite

Power Due to Failure of System Auxiliary Transformer Inverted Insulators, and subsequent

evaluation of SAT 242-2 revealed some indication that a thermal fault had occurred in

SAT 242-2. After reviewing the dissolved gas trends, the licensee concluded that the fault

represented a long term concern for reliability rather than an imminent failure condition. This

conclusion was supported by the transformer original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the

licensee implemented a monitoring program, including installation of online dissolved gas

monitors, with contingency actions to remove the transformer should the trends indicate a

degrading condition. The transformer continued to operate in this condition until May 2018.

During a preventative maintenance outage in May of 2018, Commonwealth Edison

transformer technicians identified an oil leak on a low voltage bushing and the site prudently

decided to replace the bushing. Transformer oil level was drained to a level that allowed

access to the bushing connections but kept the transformer windings immersed in oil in

accordance with the transformer group maintenance plan. Contingency plans to limit

introduction of moisture and contaminants were put in place to purge the transformer cavity

with dry heated and filtered air while the transformer case was open and to minimize time that

the transformer case was open. The bushing was replaced and oil level was subsequently

restored with degassed oil using gravity fill. SAT 242-2 was re-energized on May 25, 2018.

An oil sample was drawn on June 4 with acceptable results. Another oil sample was drawn

on June 24 to evaluate the cellulosic material (furan test) and the lab concluded that very little

change had occurred since the last analysis and no accelerated degradation of the cellulosic

(commonly referred to as paper) insulation was occurring. Dissolved gas monitors continued

to sample gases every four hours and the output remained consistent with manual oil

samples. Hydrogen gas trended up at a rate of 2-3 parts per million (ppm) per day from

June 30 to July 6, but no additional hot metal gasses increased significantly and moisture

content remained low. Hydrogen levels were still a factor of 10 below the industry standard

required action level that required the transformer to be removed from service when the

transformer failed on July 6.

Internal inspection of the failed transformer identified damage to the A-phase high voltage exit

lead just above the top pressboard pressure ring. According to the evaluation, arcing

flashover was created between that lead and the top core clamp in several locations. One

strand of the high voltage lead was damaged, the porcelain broken and insulating paper burnt.

It was evident that the insulation structure of the high voltage lead was compromised and the

A-phase winding may have been compromised. The transformer was not able to be repaired

on site. As a corrective action, the damaged transformer was removed from service and the

unit was aligned to operate with SAT 242-1 supplying the loads as described in the previous

discussion. The causal evaluation employed outside experts (the OEM and a recognized

industry vendor) to perform a third party review and evaluate the transformer health evaluation

after the 2012 event and the maintenance activities performed in 2018. Both vendor reports

supported the licensees conclusion regarding the health of the machine after the 2012 event

and concluded that machine would not likely have failed in 2018 if not exposed to the air and

contaminants through the maintenance activity. However, the OEM also indicated that the

partial drain and gravity refill was a less than desirable method for oil replacement on

a 345 kilovolt transformer because it could introduce air bubbles that could become trapped in

critical areas of the transformer insulation structure. The OEM would have recommended a

vacuum fill and hold of the transformer after the maintenance to remove moisture and

contaminants and to limit the possibility of trapped air bubbles. The inspectors reviewed the

work documents, the vendor reports, industry maintenance recommendations and the OEM

maintenance instructions and concluded that the licensees evaluation of the transformer

condition after the 2012 event was supported by the data available. The inspectors also

concluded that while not optimum for large transformers, the partial drain methodology

employed by the licensee was an acceptable industry method of transformer oil replacement.

The licensees actions to mitigate exposure to contaminants were reasonable and appropriate

to the circumstances as understood by the licensee. Based on the inspectors review, no

performance deficiency was identified.

Based on the above, this LER is closed.

Unresolved Item URI 05000454/2012008-01; 4OA5

(Closed) 05000455/2012008-01: Inadequate

Undervoltage Protection

Description:

On March 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documented an

unresolved item (URI) in Inspection Report 05000454/2012008; 05000455/2012008 (ADAMS

Accession No. ML12087A213) involving an undervoltage protection design vulnerability that

was revealed during the loss of a single phase event, which occurred on January 30, 2012.

The issue was opened as an unresolved item pending further review.

Recognizing the generic implications of this issue, the NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, Design

Vulnerability in Electric Power System," on July 27, 2012, to request, in part, that addressees

comprehensively verify their compliance with applicable requirements described therein.

Since that time, the industry developed an initiative to address the open phase condition of

electric power system. Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, notified the NRC of their intention to

complete necessary actions as scheduled in this initiative in letter from David Gullott titled

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Additional Information Regarding Response to

Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, dated February 3, 2014.

On March 9, 2017, the Commission issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum

in SECY-16-0068 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17068A297) providing direction to the NRC

staff regarding this issue. It stated, in part:

Going forward, the staff should verify that licensees have appropriately implemented

the voluntary industry initiative. If the staff determines that a licensee does not

adequately address potential OPCs [open phase conditions], including updating the

licensing basis to reflect the need to protect against OPCs, the staff should consider

the appropriate regulatory mechanism to impose the necessary requirements to

protect against OPCs using the current guidance on such matters from the Office of

the General Counsel.

Corrective Action Reference: AR 01322212, B2F26 Potential Design Vulnerability in

Switchyard Single Open Phase; 02/03/2012

Closure Basis: On April 5, 2018, the NRC completed an inspection of Temporary

Instruction 2515/194, Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative

Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems

(NRC Bulletin 2012-01), and did not identify any findings or violations of more-than-minor

significance. This inspection was documented in Inspection Report 05000454/2018011;

05000455/2018011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18138A136).

Based on the above, this URI is closed. This review did not represent an inspection sample.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public

disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

results to Mr.

T. Chalmers, Site Vice President (Acting), and other members of the licensee

staff.

  • On October 26, 2018, the inspectors presented the licensed operator requalification

program inspection results to Mr.

P. Boyle, Plant Manager (Acting), and other members of

the licensee staff.

program inspection results to Mr.

B. Lloyd, Site Emergency Preparedness Manager.
  • On December 12, 2018, the inspectors presented the completed 2018 LORT annual

operating test and biennial written examination inspection results to Mr.

K. Sanford,

Operations Training Manager, per teleconference.

  • On January 16, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to

Mr.

T. Chalmers, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

- WC-AA-107; Seasonal Readiness; Revision 20

- Temporary Configuration Change Package, TCCP 617316; TCCP - Proceduralized for

Temporary Auxiliary Boiler Unit 1; Revision 000

71111.04Equipment Alignment

- BOP AF-M2B, Auxiliary Feedwater System Train B Valve Lineup; Revision 8

- BOP VC-17, Swapping Control Room Chiller And HVAC Trains, Revision 14

- AR 04193204; 0A VC chiller oil recovery line; 11/8/2018

- EC 344171; Documentation of evaluation of the 0B VC chiller; Revision 0

- Drawing M-152, Sheet 1B; Manufacturers Supplemental Diagram Generator Stator Water

Cooling System; Revision EDSF

71111.05QFire Protection Quarterly

- Pre-Fire Plan #93; FZ 10.1-2 Auxiliary Building 383-0 Elevation 2B Diesel Fuel Oil Storage

Tank Room; Revision 2

- Pre-Fire Plan #95; FZ 10.2-1 Auxiliary Building 383-0 Elevation 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage

Tank Room; Revision 2

- Pre-Fire Plan #95; FZ 10.2-2 Auxiliary Building 383-0 Elevation 2A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage

Tank Room; Revision 2

- Pre-Fire Plan #148; FZ 11.5-0 Auxiliary Building 401-0 Elevation General Area-West;

Revision 3

- Pre-Fire Plan #146; FZ 11.5-0 Auxiliary Building 401-0 Elevation General Area-North;

Revision 2

- Pre-Fire Plan #147; FZ 11.5-0 Auxiliary Building 401-0 Elevation General Area-South;

Revision 2

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

- OP-AA-101-111-1001; Operations Standards and Expectation; Revision 20

- OP-AA-102-106; Operator Response Time Program; Revision 04

- OP-AA-103-102; Watch-Standing Practices; Revision 16

- OP-AA-103-102-1001; Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation; Revision 2

- OP-AA-105-101; Administrative Process for NRC License and Medical Requirements;

Revision 21

- OP-AA-105-102; NRC Active License Maintenance; Revision 14

- OP-DR-102-106; Operator Response Time Program at Byron; Revision 09

- OP-DR-103-102-1002; Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation; Revision 23

- OP-DR-108-101-1002; Operations Department Standards and Expectations; Revision 27

- TQ-AA-150; Operator Training Programs; Revision 16

- TQ-AA-201; Examination Security and Administration; Revision 17

- TQ-AA-155; Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation; Revision 08

- TQ-AA-306; Simulator Management; Revision 08

- TQ-AA-155-F04; Simulator Evaluation FormIndividual; Week 3 Crew D; October 25, 2018

- TQ-AA-155-F05; Simulator Evaluation FormCrew; Week 3 Crew D; October 25, 2018

- TQ-AA-155-J010; Job Performance Measure (JPM) Development Job Aid; Revision 00

- TQ-AA-155-J020; Job Performance Measure Template Job Aid; Revision 00

- TQ-AA-155-J030; Simulator Evaluation Job Aid; Revision 02

- TQ-AA-150-J202; LORT Annual Exam Development Job Aid; Revision 03

- Byron Station LOR Simulator Scenario Guide (SEG) BY-66; Revision 6

- Byron Station LOR SEG BY-71; Revision 1

- Byron Station LOR SEG BY-72; Revision 6

- Byron Station LOR SEG BY-75; Revision 0

- Job Performance Measure (JPM) N004; Revision 10

- JPM N012; Revision 8

- JPM N023a; Revision 4

- JPM N056a; Revision 5

- JPM N056c; Revision 0

- JPM N085a; Revision 10

- JPM N102; Revision 3

- JPM N127; Revision 3

- JPM N130a; Revision 2

- JPM N32t; Revision 0

- Remedial Training Records; Various

- Byron Simulator Cycle 22 Steady State Test Records; dated May 25, 2017

- Byron Simulator Cycle 22 Reactor Physics Test Results; October 2017

- Byron Simulator Cycle 22 Core Performance Testing Records; dated May 23, 2017

- Byron Station PPC Replacement Site Acceptance Test (SAT) for Simulator Interface; dated

February 12, 2018

- Byron Station Simulator Transient Test TT2; Loss Of All Feedwater (Normal and Emergency);

March 2018

- Byron Station Simulator Transient Test TT5; Single Recirc Pump Trip; March 2018

- Byron Station Simulator Transient Test TT6; Turbine Trip from A Power Level Such That A

Scram Does Not Occur; March 2018

- Byron Station Simulator Transient Test TT8; LOCA With A Loss Of Off-Site Power;

March 2018

- Byron Station Simulator Post Event Transient Analysis; 2B Reactor Recirc Pump Trip 6/26/17;

October 6, 2017

- Scenario Exercise Guide OPEX - I; Scenario Based Testing Report; March 20, 2018

- Scenario Exercise Guide OPEX - P; Scenario Based Testing Report; March 21, 2018

- Simulator Review Board (SRB) Minutes; 1st Quarter 2016; March 30, 2016

- SRB Minutes; 3rd Quarter 2016; September 23, 2016

- SRB Minutes; 1st Quarter 2017; June 26, 2017

- SRB Minutes; 3rd Quarter 2017; September 19, 2017

- SRB Minutes; 4th Quarter 2017; December 8, 2017

- AR 03966217; 4.0 Critique: Reactivity Control; 01/24/2017

- AR 04014697; Unit 2 TCV Failure 4.0 Critique; 05/25/2017

- AR 04064859; Incorrect SX MU Pump Start; 10/19/2017

- AR 04065037; 1B DG Unexpected Alarm - Level 4 CC Event; 10/20/2017

- AR 04077538; 4.0 Critique: 1A EH Pump Trip; 11/23/2017

- AR 04080034; 4.0 Critique of Response to U2 TCV Bypass Valve Failure; 12/01/2017

- AR 04098253; End of the Year Reactivity Management Roll Up; 01/29/2018

- AR 04152764; 4.0 Critique of Ops Response to DC Bus 111 Charger Loss; 07/03/2018

- AR 4039858; NOSA-BYR-17-08 Operations Functional Area Audit Report; 10/04/2017

- AR 4134069; NOSA-BYR-18-07 Training and Staffing Audit Report; 07/11/2018

- List of Open and Closed Simulator Work Requests; dated October 16, 2018

- Simulator Work Request (SWR) 16945; EC 401418, PPC

- SWR 17019; EC 403794, EHC System Upgrades

- SWR 132476; DEOP Screen Revision

- SWR 132942; EC 401316, Cyber Security

- SWR 133261; EC 406696, TR-81 MOD Modification

- SWR 133418; EC 388779, TR22/TR86 Open Phase Protective Relaying

- 2BOSR 3.1.5-2; Train B Solid State Protection System Surveillance; Revision 44

- AR 04204201; 2BOSR 3.1.5-2 Train 2B SSPS Reset Timer Out of Tolerance; 12/18/2018

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

- Maintenance Rule System Basis Document for Function PC

- Function PC Summary Evaluation for Previous 2-Year Period; 09/2018

- Byron Station Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment #15, Revision 0; January 2917 -

June 2018; dated 9/28/2018

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

- AR 04174760; B CV Pump Aux Oil Pump Is Cycling; 9/19/2018

- WO 04832473; B CV Pump Aux Oil Pump Is Cycling; 10/10/2018

- OP-BY-108-117-1000; Byron Protected Equipment Program; Revision 11

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

- AR 04182314; Unit 1 LEFM Trouble; 10/11/2018

- WO 04816930; 0SX02PA Comprehensive IST Requirements for SX Makeup Pump; 11/1/2018

- 0BOSR 5.5.8.SX.5-1c; Unit Zero Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements for

Essential Service Water Makeup Pump 0A; Revision 14

- AR 04190344; 0SX02PA Upper Gear Box High Vibes; 11/1/2018

- AR 04201702; Remove 0SX02PA From Double Test Frequency; 12/10/2018

- AR 04196402; 1C S/G [Steam Generator] Level Channel1LI-0537 Failed Channel Check Per

Rounds; 11/19/2018

- AR 04190942; 1RF027 Valve Stroke Test Failure 1BOSR 6.3.5-14; 11/2/2018

71111.18Plant Modifications

- AR 04184575 Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown Overboard Issues 2SD054B; 10/17/2018

- AR 04185114; Steam Generator Blowdown Overboard Issues Local Inlet Gauges; 10/18/2018

- WO 04786778; Install EC 624333, SG Overboard Modification; 10/9/2018

- Report SL-013213, Revision 0; Study to Investigate Various Aspects of Steam Generator

Blowdown Flow; March 22, 2016

- 1BOSR 0.1-1,2,3; Unit One Mode 1, 2, & 3 Shiftly And Daily Operating Surveillance;

Revision 69

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

- AR 04180628; Unexpected Rod Motion on Unit 1; 10/05/2018

- AR 04184873; 0B SX Makeup Pump Tripped During PMT Run; 10/18/2018

- AR 04201813; VC/VS Xtie EC 618035 PMT for 0A VC Train; 12/10/2018

- EC 626548; Evaluation 0A VC/VS Crosstie Flow Capability with Respect to EC 618035

Modification Test Criteria; 12/11/2018

- BOP VC-20, VC Chilled Water System to VS Chilled Water System Crosstie Operation with

One Train Inoperable for Maintenance; Revision 0

71111.22Surveillance Testing

- 2BOSR 5.5.8.DO-1, Unit Two Test of the Diesel Oil Transfer System; Revisions 6, 7, and 8

- AR 04173100, Test Transmitters Found Out of Cal After Testing; 9/14/2018

- EC 625558, Evaluate Impact of Test Transmitters Found Out of Tolerance as Described in IR

04173100, Revision 0

71114.02Alert and Notification System Testing

- Offsite Emergency Plan Alert and Notification System Addendum for Byron Nuclear Power

Station; Dated May 2013

-

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Letter; Backup Alert and Notification System;

Dated December 10, 2012

- Exelon Nuclear Manager, Midwest Emergency Preparedness Letter to Program Enhancement

Manager, Illinois Emergency Management Agency; Submission of Byron Generating Station

Public Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report, Revision 3; Dated October 1, 2018

- KLD-TR-986; Byron Generating Station Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report;

Dated September 19, 2018

- EP-AA-1000; Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan Section E;

Revision 29

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station,

Section 4; Revision 35

- Byron Station 2017 Warning System Maintenance & Operational Reports

- Byron Station 2018 Warning System Maintenance & Operational Reports

- Byron Station Monthly Siren Availability Reports; September 2016 - September 2018

- Byron Station Siren Corrective Maintenance Reports; September 2016 - September 2018

- 2018/2019 Emergency Planning for the Byron Area (Community Information Booklet)

- AR 02738001; EP-Siren Failure (BY51)

- AR 03946775; EP-Planned Siren Upgrade (BY58)

- AR 04037291; EP-Siren Failure (BY48)

- AR 04072003; EP-Siren Failure (BY29)

- AR 04148373; EP-Siren Failure (BY05)

71114.03Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

- EP-AA-1000; Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan, Sections B and N;

Revision 29

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station,

Section 2; Revision 35

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station,

Addendum 1, On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis; Revision 1

- EP-AA-112-100-F-06; ERO Notification or Augmentation; Revision W

- EP-AA-112-200; TSC Activation and Operation; Revision 11

- EP-AA-112-300; OSC Activation and Operation; Revision 10

- EP-AA-112-400; EOF Activation and Operation; Revision 14

- EP-AA-112-600; PIC Organization Activation and Operation; Revision 14

- EP-AA-112-700; Alternative Facility Activation and Operation; Revision 0

- TQ-AA-113; ERO Training and Qualification; Revision 34

- September 6, 2017 Emergency Response Organization Drive-In Drill Report; Dated

September 25, 2017

- Quarterly Unannounced Off-Hours Call-In Augmentation Drill Results; November 2016 -

August 2018

- Emergency Response Organization Duty Team Roster; Dated September 28, 2018

- ERO Staff Training Records Review (Sample - 10)

- AR 02714828; Operations Focus - EP Performance

- AR 03970778; Failure During Simulator Scenario

- AR 04157032; Emergency Preparedness Qualification Lapsed\

71114.04Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

- EP-AA-120; Emergency Plan Administration; Revision 21

- EP-AA-120-1001; 10 CFR 50.54(q) Change Evaluation; Revision 9

- EP-AA-1000; Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan: Revision 29

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station;

Revisions 34 and 35

- EP-AA-1002 Addendum 1; Byron Station On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis; Revision 1

- EP-AA-1002, Addendum 3; Emergency Action Levels for Byron Station; Revisions 1 and 2

- 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluator Qualification Spreadsheet; Dated May 30, 2018

- 50.54(q) Evaluation No. 17-70; EP-AA-1002, Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan

Annex for Byron Station (Revision 35) Evaluation and Effectiveness Review; Dated August 23,

2017

- 50.54(q) Evaluation No. 17-93; EP-AA-1002, Addendum 3, Emergency Action Levels for Byron

Station (Revision 2) Evaluation and Effectiveness Review; Dated July 28, 2017

71114.05Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

- EP-AA-1000; Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan Section J, Protective

Response; Revision 29

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station,

Section 3, Classification of Emergencies; Revision 35

- EP-AA-1002; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Byron Station,

Section 5.1, Emergency Response Facilities; Revision 35

- EP-AA-1002, Addendum 3; Emergency Action Levels for Byron Station; Revision 2

- KLD-TR-637; Evacuation Time Estimates for Byron Station Plume Exposure Pathway

Emergency Planning Zone; Revision 0

- Byron Generating Station Annual Population Update - 2017; Dated June 6, 2017

- Byron Generating Station 2018 Population Update Analysis; Dated September 8, 2018

- EP-AA-122; Drills and Exercise Program; Revision 19

- EP-AA-124-F-03; Site & Site-Specific EOF Communications 9.3 & EMNET Satellite

Communication Systems Semi-Annual Testing & Inventory; Dated July 30, 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-01; Control Room/Simulator Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd

Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-02; CR/Simulator/TSC/OSC Equipment Test - TSC Software and

Reference Document Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-03; Technical Support Center Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd

Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-04; Operations Support Center Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 -

3rd Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-05; Field Team Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-06; Assembly Area Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd Quarter

2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-08; Medical Response Kit Inventory Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd

Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-14; Monthly NARS Communications Test Records; January 2018 -

October 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-15; Monthly ENS Communications Test Records; January 2018 -

October 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-17; Quarterly Directors Hotline Test Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd

Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-18; Quarterly Operations Status Line Test Records; 1st Quarter 2018 -

3rd Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-19; Quarterly Damage Control Line Test Records; 1st Quarter 2018 - 3rd

Quarter 2018

- EP-MW-124-1001-F-20; Quarterly Technical Support Line Test Records; 1st Quarter 2018 -

3rd Quarter 2018

- October 03, 11, 18 and 25, 2016 TSC Tabletop PI Drills Report; Dated November 30 2016

- Byron 2017 NRC Graded Exercise Evaluation Report; Dated July 26, 2017

- Byron 2017 Medical and Health Physics Drill Findings and Observation Report; Dated

September 9, 2017

- December 12, 2017, and January 31, 2018 TSC-OSC Tabletop Drills Report; Dated

February 21, 2018

- EP Drill Report - March 21, March 28 and April 4, 2018 Drills; Dated April 30, 2018

- Byron 2018 Radiological and Plume Phase Radiological Monitoring (Environs) Drill Findings

and Observation Report; Dated July 17, 2018

- Byron 2018 Medical and Health Physics Drill Evaluation Report; Dated August 15, 2018

- Byron 2018 Off-Year Exercise Evaluation Report; Dated May 22, 2018

- PI-AA-126-1001-F-01 (AR 4090606); Self-Assessment, Pre-NRC Baseline Inspection

Assessment; Dated July 19, 2018

- NOSA-NCS-17-03; Emergency Preparedness Audit Report - Nuclear Corporate Support;

Dated April 5, 2017

- NOSA-NCS-18-03; Emergency Preparedness Audit Report - Nuclear Corporate Support;

Dated April 4, 2018

- NOSA-BYR-17-03; Emergency Preparedness Audit Report - Byron Station; Dated

April 12, 2017

- NOSA-BYR-18-03; Emergency Preparedness Audit Report - Byron Station; Dated

April 10, 2018

- AR 03952052; EP Inventory Discrepancies

- AR 03993542; MMD Mask Fits Drop Below 50% in 90 Days if No Actions Taken

- AR 04024687; Byron EP Exercise Failed Facility Objective - TSC

- AR 04050193; Byron 2017 Medical / HP Drill Enhancement

- AR 04013553; EAL HU3 Bases Discrepancy

- AR 04074151; NSRB ID: EP Facility Walkthrough Issues/Enhancements

- AR 04106380; Byron TSC/OSC Focused Area Drills Results

- AR 04132427; Byron 2018 SIM/TSC/OSC Drill Series - Improvement Areas

- AR 04147581; RP Instrument in EP Vans Set to Expire in August 2018

71151Performance Indicator Verification

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 1 MSPI - Emergency AC (EAC)

Power System for September 2018

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 2 MSPI - Emergency AC (EAC)

Power System for September 2018

- Margin Calculation for EAC Power, HPI, and RHR Systems

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 1 MSPI - High Pressure Injection

(HPI) System for September 2018

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 2 MSPI - High Pressure Injection

(HPI) System for September 2018

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 1 MSPI - Residual Heat

Removal (RHR) System for September 2018

- Consolidated Data Entry 4.0 MSPI Derivation Report for Unit 2 MSPI - Residual Heat

Removal (RHR) System for September 2018

- NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness - Drill/Exercise Performance;

3rd Quarter 2017 - 2nd Quarter 2018

- NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness - ERO Readiness

3rd Quarter 2017 - 2nd Quarter 2018

- NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness - Alert and Notification System

Reliability; 3rd Quarter 2017 - 2nd Quarter 2018

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

- AR 04173407; Loose Shim Plate Assembly on Support 1RC-01-BA-LLR; 9/15/2018

- AR 04174489; Cracked Shim Plate Tack Weld on Support 1RC-01-BD-LLR; 9/18/2018

- AR 04140600; Westinghouse Part 21 For CRDM Thermal Sleeves; 05/23/2018

- AR 04140999; Westinghouse Part 21 For CRDM Thermal Sleeves; 05/24/2018

- AR 04156217; NSAL-18-1, TS Flange Wear Leads to Stuck Control Rod; 07/10/2018

- AR 04172030; MRP 2018-027 NEI 03-08 Needed Guidance Issued; 08/30/2018

- AR 04172031; NRC IN 2018-10 Issued for CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear; 08/28/2018

- EC 0000624381; Thermal Sleeve Evaluation; Revision 0

- OP-AA-108-101; Control of Equipment and System Status; Revision 14

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

- AR 04153681; Loss of Bus 13 -SAT 242-2 Failure; 9/6/2018

- ABB Report 4469811; Auxiliary Transformer Inspection SAT 242-2; 7/13/2018

- ABB Report 4473225; System Auxiliary Transformer SAT 242-2 Failure Analysis; 8/10/2018

- Doble Report; Summary of the Doble Review of the ABB Analysis of the SAT 242-2 Failure

Analysis; 8/13/2018

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