IR 05000454/2021011
| ML21134A157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/2021 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Rhoades D Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR 2021011 | |
| Download: ML21134A157 (19) | |
Text
May 14, 2021
SUBJECT:
BYRON STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS)
INSPECTION REPORT 05000454/2021011 AND 05000455/2021011
Dear Mr. Rhoades:
On April 15, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Byron Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. John Kowalski, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000454 and 05000455 License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000454 and 05000455
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000454/2021011 and 05000455/2021011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-011-0025
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Byron Station
Location:
Byron, IL
Inspection Dates:
March 22, 2021 to April 15, 2021
Inspectors:
K. Barclay, Reactor Inspector
J. Benjamin, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Bozga, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Daley, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Sanchez Santiago, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Byron Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000454,05000455/
2021011-01 Main Steam Tunnel and Safety Valve Room Use of ACI 349-85 Appendix C Provisions 71111.21M Open URI 05000454,05000455/
2021011-02 Potential Protective Device Coordination Issues Associated with Battery Charger Short-Circuit Output 71111.21M Open URI 05000454,05000455/
2021011-03 Main Steam Safety Valve Room Structural Acceptance Criteria 71111.21M Open
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), regional inspectors were directed to begin telework. During this time regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. For the inspection documented below it was determined that the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be completed remotely.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
- (1) Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank
- ASME Section XI pressure test
- Walkdown
- Aging management inspection
- Overpressure protection
- Pipe stress and pipe support analysis for makeup source
- Anchorage design
- Internal and external corrosion inspection
- Design specification
- Operating experience
(2)480 VAC Switchgear 131x
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) licensing basis requirements
- Walkdown
- System health
- Environmental qualifications
- Breaker testing
- Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) surveillances
- Degraded voltage (direct current to bus)
- Protective devices and trip setpoints
- (3) Containment Isolation Valve 2CC685
- Walkdown
- Operating procedures
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Weak link analysis
- Closure and opening time
- Maximum allowed leakage (local leak rate testing)
- Thermal overload testing
- Voltage drop/Degraded voltage effects
- Control logic
- Thermal overload settings
- Motor design and protection
- (4) Unit 1 125 VDC Bus 112 Battery Charger
- UFSAR/TS/TRM licensing basis requirements
- Walkdown
- Operating procedures
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Modifications
- System health
- Translation of vendor specifications
- Environmental qualification
- Protection against external events: flooding, fire and high energy line break (HELB)
- Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria and recent results
- Electrical design calculations and considerations:
o Battery charger sizing / duty cycle o Current limit setting o Contribution to short-circuit fault current o Sizing of protective fuses/breakers o Cable ampacity o Ground protection o Configuration of electrical distribution
- UFSAR/TS/TRM licensing basis requirements
- Walkdown
- Operating procedures
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Modifications
- System health
- Translation of vendor specifications
- Environmental qualification
- Protection against external events: flooding, fire and HELB
- Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria, and recent results o load testing / replacement testing / periodic cycling
- Electrical design calculations and considerations:
o Loading calculations o Short-circuit calculations o Coordination calculations o Overcurrent protection, protective devices and trip setpoints o Transmission system protection o Cable ampacity
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 B Train Service Water (SX) Strainer
- UFSAR/TS/TRM licensing basis requirements
- Walkdown
- Maintenance work orders and effectiveness
- Aging management inspections and commitments
- Operator actions and contingency actions
- Operating experience
- Operational trends and system health
- Auto and manual operation procedures/instructions
- Design specification and modifications
- Control instrumentation
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 404484, Configuration Control Processing of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Room / Main Steam Tunnel (MST) HELB Calculations
- (2) EC 406220, Reroute Auxiliary Feedwater Diesel Combustion Air Intake
- (3) EC 627079, Revise Temperature Switch Setpoints for Unit 1 Miscellaneous Electric Equipment Room (MEER) Fan & Damper Control
Action Plan
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2019-08: Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Events
- (2) NRC Information Notice 2017-06: Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Main Steam Tunnel and Safety Valve Room Use of ACI 349-85 Appendix C Provisions URI 05000454,05000455/2021011-01 71111.21M
Description:
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 3.8.4.1 delineates the main steam tunnel as a seismic category I structure. Section 3.8.4.1.4 of the UFSAR describes the main steam safety valve room as a reinforced concrete structure which is a part of the main steam tunnel (also a reinforced concrete structure). UFSAR Section 3.8.4.5 provides the acceptance criteria for the main steam tunnel and main steam safety valve room reinforced concrete structures. UFSAR Section 3.8.4.5, states, in part, The stresses and strains of various structural components are based on the ultimate strength design provisions in American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete. The margin of safety is contained in the capacity reduction factor specified in the code.
The inspectors reviewed Calculation No. 5.6.3-BYR96-233, "Evaluation of Main Steam and Aux-Feedwater Tunnels for Revised Accident Pressures and Temperatures associated with Replacement Steam Generators," Revision 1, Calculation No. 5.6.1-BYR96-234, "Evaluation of Safety Valve Rooms for Revised Accident Pressures and Temperatures associated with Replacement Steam Generators, Revision 1, and Calculation No. 5.6.1, "Main Steam and Auxiliary Feedwater Tunnel Analysis and Design," Revision 7. These calculations used ACI 349-85, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures, Appendix C, Special Provisions for Impulsive and Impactive Effects," to analyze the main steam tunnel and main steam safety valve rooms for the applied loading due to compartment pressurization from a main steam line break. The inspectors noted the licensee began incorporating the ACI 349-85, Appendix C provisions in the 1990s. The licensee did not appear to have a 10 CFR 50.59 regulatory evaluation to document this change to use ACI 349-85, Appendix C.
The inspectors noted in Appendix A of the UFSAR that the licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.142, "Safety-Related Concrete Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (Other than Reactor Vessels and Containments)", Revision 0. This Regulatory Guide provides the NRC staff regulatory position on the application of ACI 349 which includes the provisions for impactive and impulsive effects. Revision 0 of RG 1.142 provides the NRC regulatory position on ACI 349-76, Chapters 1 thru 19. Revision 1 provides the NRC regulatory position on the use of ACI 349-76, Appendix C. Revision 2 provides the NRC regulatory position on the use of ACI 349-97, Appendix C. Currently, none of the RG 1.142 revisions endorse the use of ACI 349-85, Appendix C. The inspectors will need to determine whether the use of ACI 349-85, Appendix C, which is not endorsed by RG 1.142, required a 50.59 regulatory evaluation.
This issue is unresolved because the inspectors cannot determine whether there is a violation and will need to consult with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors will discuss the information provided during the inspection with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to determine whether the licensee should have performed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation prior to incorporating ACI 349-85 Appendix C into their licensing bases.
Licensee Actions: The licensee plans to review the licensing requirements for the use of ACI 349-85 Appendix C and determine whether this change was appropriate.
Corrective Action References: AR 4417167: Byron NRC DBAI - Unresolved Issue (URI)
Unresolved Item (Open)
Potential Protective Device Coordination Issues Associated with Battery Charger Short-Circuit Output URI 05000454,05000455/2021011-02 71111.21M
Description:
NRC Information Notice (IN) 2017-06, "Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System," was issued to inform addressees of the results of a NRC-led battery testing program, which was documented in NUREG/CR-7229, Testing to Evaluate Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System.
The licensees battery chargers are silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR) type battery chargers and the testing described in NRC IN 2017-06 demonstrated SCR-type battery chargers produced significantly higher currents than expected. NRC IN 2017-06, stated, The testing validated that the initial fault current contribution to a downstream fault from a battery charger (specifically the SCR-type chargers vs. the CF-type) is much higherin the range of 7 to 10 times the battery charger full load ampere ratingduring the first 100 milliseconds than what is currently stated as 150 percent of battery charger full load rating in IEEE Standard 946-2004. The test results indicated that the initial short-circuit contribution from the charger is not limited when connected in parallel with the battery.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees operating experience evaluation for NRC IN 2017-06 and found that the licensee acknowledged the potentially higher short-circuit contribution from a battery charger but justified not performing any additional actions. The licensees justification was based, in part, on their use of conservative short-circuit current data as calculational inputs and the belief that existing calculations contained significant margin to station breaker interrupting ratings.
The inspectors review of calculations BYR97-225, Circuit Breaker Trip Settings for 125 VDC and 250 VDC and BYR97-227, 125 VDC Fuse Sizing and Coordination found that the licensee credited the 125 VDC battery charger current limit feature to maintain coordination between the battery charger output breaker and multiple downstream protective devices.
Downstream protective devices included individual load breakers and a pair of fuses on the safety-related 125 VDC bus. The two fuses, which were arranged in series, connected the safety-related bus to the non-safety related bus and were credited as isolation devices. The inspectors could not find a technical basis supporting the licensees conclusion that their battery chargers would limit current fast enough to maintain protective device coordination.
The inspectors reviewed the time-current characteristics curve for the battery charger output breaker and found that it could open at current levels as low as 3 times the battery charger full load ampere rating if the battery charger failed to limit current during the first 100 milliseconds of a fault. The inspectors were concerned that faults on 125 VDC cables or equipment could cause the loss of a battery charger that was not already considered in the licensees analyses for events such as fire, flood, HELB or other similar events.
The inspectors also reviewed Brookhaven National Laboratory Technical Report BNL-107800-2015-IR, Evaluation of Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System at a Nuclear Power Plant - Task 1 Report: Literature Review, which was performed to support the NRC-led battery testing. The report reviewed and summarized literature dealing with current contributions from the station battery and battery charger(s). The inspectors review of Section b., Journal Articles and Conference Proceedings - (Testing Related), found that it discussed multiple test results where the internal SCR fuses blew open during short-circuit testing on battery chargers.
Additionally, the inspectors noted that during the Palisades event, on September 25, 2011, which started from a fault on a DC distribution panel, one of the battery charger SCR fuses also blew open. The complete details of the Palisades event are provided in the SIT Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML113330802). The inspectors wanted to review the time-current characteristic curve for the battery charger internal SCR fuses to understand if the licensee was vulnerable to losing battery charger functionality during faults on downstream branch circuits. The licensee was unable locate the time-current characteristic curve for the charger SCRs to prior to the end of the inspection. The fuses may be the original fuses provide by the charger vendor and are no longer manufactured.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the components powered from the 125 VDC distribution system and assessed where their associated DC power cables where routed and located.
The inspectors did identify examples where a fire in one room, which disables the operation of a safety-related 125 VDC bus, also contained cables from the opposite train 125 VDC bus.
The inspectors found that if the fire caused a large fault on the cables associated with the opposite train, the battery charger output breaker or possibly the SCR fuses could open, resulting in the only remaining DC bus for the Unit being powered from its discharging battery. If the battery charger output breaker opened, the licensee would receive an alarm in the control room and operators may be able to reclose the output breaker if the original fault was cleared by the downstream protective device. However, if the internal SCR fuses blew open, maintenance would be required to replace the bolt-in fuses.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors plan to review the licensees updated evaluation of NRC IN 2017-06 and determine if any performance deficiencies exist, whether the performance deficiencies are more than minor, and if a violation of NRC requirements occurred.
Licensee Actions: The licensee intends to reevaluate their operating experience conclusions for NRC IN 2017-06 related to the coordination of the battery charger output breaker or internal SCR fuses and downstream safety and non-safety related protective devices. The licensee entered the issue related to coordination between the battery charger output breaker and the downstream isolation fuses into their corrective action program as AR 4415085.
Corrective Action References: AR 4415085: NRC DBAI - NRC Information Notice 2017-06 Evaluation
Unresolved Item (Open)
Main Steam Safety Valve Room Structural Acceptance Criteria URI 05000454,05000455/2021011-03 71111.21M
Description:
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 3.8.4.1 delineates the main steam safety valve room as a seismic category I structure. Section 3.8.4.1.4 of the UFSAR describes the main steam safety valve room as a reinforced concrete structure which is a part of the main steam tunnel (also a seismic category I reinforced concrete structure). UFSAR Section 3.8.4.5 provides the acceptance criteria for the main steam tunnel and main steam safety valve room reinforced concrete structures. UFSAR Section 3.8.4.5, states, in part, The stresses and strains of various structural components are based on the ultimate strength design provisions in American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete. The margin of safety is contained in the capacity reduction factor specified in the code.
The inspectors reviewed Calculation No. 5.6.3, "Safety Valve Room Analysis and Design",
Revision 5. The licensee used an acceptance limit in which the applied stresses in the reinforcing steel were limited to the yield strength for the applied loading due to compartment pressurization from a main steam line break. The acceptance limit did not include any capacity reduction factor as discussed in UFSAR Section 3.8.4.5.
This issue is unresolved because the inspectors cannot determine whether there is a violation and will need to consult with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors will discuss the information provided during the inspection with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to determine whether the use of an acceptance limit based on the yield strength of the reinforcing steel with no capacity reduction factor is in accordance with the design and licensing basis.
Licensee Actions: The licensee plans to review whether the use of an acceptance limit based on the yield strength of the reinforcing steel with no capacity reduction factor is in accordance with the design and licensing basis.
Corrective Action References: AR 4417167: Byron NRC DBAI - Unresolved Issue (URI)
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 15, 2021, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. John Kowalski, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
5.6.3-BYR96-234
Evaluation of Safety Valve Rooms for Revised Accident
Pressures and Temperatures Associated with Replacement
00549400
EM Test All MCC Breakers at MCC 131x1
031220
Piping Stress Report for Subsystem 1CC45
13.1.5-BYR09-
057
Evaluate Structural Adequacy of Modified Pipe Support
1CC06039R for New Piping Loads
13.1.5-BYR09-
2
Evaluate Pipe Support 1CC06040R Due to Increase in
Support Load
13.1.5-BYR11-
073
Qualification of Existing Support 1CC06041 R for SX
Makeup to the CC System
13.1.5-BYR11-
209
Evaluation of Supports for Increased Pipe
Load-1CC06033X, 1CC06036R, 1CC06039R and
1CC06040R
13.1.6-BYR11-
100
Qualification of New and Existing Supports for Piping
Subsystems 1CC15, 1CC17 and
1CC45 for SX Makeup to the CC System
19-AQ-65
Overvoltage Evaluation Due to 4160-480 V Unit Substation
Transformer Tap Changes
19-AU-4
480V Unit Substation Breaker and Relay Settings
5.3.2-BYR19-012
Evaluation of Containment Wall for Revised Main Steam
Line Break Pressures
5.6.1
Main Steam and Auxiliary Feedwater Tunnel Analysis and
Design
5.6.1-BYR19-010
Evaluation of Main Steam Tunnels for Revised Main Steam
Line Break Pressures
5.6.1-BYR96-233
Evaluation of Main Steam and Aux-Feedwater Tunnels for
Revised Accident Pressures and Temperatures Associated
with Replacement Steam Generators
5.6.3
Safety Valve Room Analysis and Design
5.6.3-BYR19-011
Evaluation of Safety Valve Rooms for Revised Main Steam
Line Break Pressures
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
89-0189
Component Cooling System Overpressurization Analysis
BYR12-042
Essential Service Water Discharge Header Temperature
Instrument Indication Uncertainty
0A
BYR-2CC685
MIDACALC AC Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve Calc
2CC685
BYR01-084
Generic Thermal Overload Heater Sizing Calculation for
Motor Operated Valves
BYR01-087
Motor Operated Valves MOV Actuator Motor Terminal
Voltage and Thermal Overload Sizing Calc Component
Colling System
BYR97-183
C&D Battery Installation and Operating Manual, Battery
Rack Installation Instructions and Short Circuit Calculation
04/04/1997
BYR97-204
25 VDC Battery Sizing Calculation
BYR97-205
25 VDC Battery Charger Sizing Calculation
BYR97-224
25V DC Voltage Drop Calculation
BYR97-225
Circuit Breaker Trip Settings for 125 VDC and 250 VDC
Distribution Center
& 4A
BYR97-226
25 VDC System Short Circuit Calculation
BYR97-227
25 VDC Fuse Sizing and Coordination
2A, 3, & 4
NED-M-MSD-136
Appropriate Current and Power Factor to Calculate Terminal
NES-EIC-10.02
Standard for Thermal Overload Relay Element Selection for
Motor Operated Valves
TID-E/I&C-02
Thermal Overload Relay Element Selection for Motor
Operated Valves
Corrective Action
Documents
00548837
SX Strainer Contingency Actions and Procedure
Enhancements
10/25/2006
Temp Swings Causing Low Temp Alarm
2/18/2016
Problems Found with Safety Related Switchgear During PM
04/08/2016
Received Unexpected Alarm Batt Charger 112 Trouble
09/27/2016
Set Point Change Needed
04/12/2017
AR 040003670
Close Out Contingency Task for the 125 VDC Batt Charger
2
04/27/2017
25 VDC Battery Charger Operability Test Failed
04/27/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ESF Battery 112 Terminal Voltage is Above Admin Max
Limit
06/08/2017
25 VDC Battery Charger Trouble Alarm
07/26/2017
Edge Card Connector One Time Replacement for Battery
Charger
08/23/2017
MCC FD Breaker 1AP10EQ (131X-5B) did Not Open FR
External Button
04/15/2018
06/28/2018
NRC IN 2019-08 OPEX REGARDING FAC CAUSING RX
10/16/2019
Key Calculation Review - BYR97-225
10/01/2015
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2018 NRC DBAI: Nickel Cadmium Battery Float Voltage
Range
2/01/2018
AR 04099722-02
Identify and Revise Procedure as Recommended. Create
Additional Actions as Necessary for Clarification
05/31/2018
2018 NRC DBAI: AFW Nickel Cadmium Battery Sizing
2/06/2018
AR 04101248-02
Revise BYR97-193 to Reflect the Postulated Loss of the DD
AFWP Battery Charger by Fully Enveloping the Associated
DDAFWP Mission Time Requirements as Part of the Battery
Sizing Analysis
08/16/2018
DBAI NRC ID - Wording Clarification on Vendor Drawing
Needed
03/31/2021
NRC Identified Drawing Typo
04/01/2021
NRD ID - Clarification Needed in Calculation MAD 89-0189
04/05/2021
NRC DBAI - Calculation Methodology for CC Surge Tank
04/06/2021
NRC DBAI - Superseded Design Basis Calculations
04/06/2021
NRC DBAI - 10% Overstress Acceptance Criteria
(Calc 5.6.3)
04/08/2021
NRC 2021 DBAI - Calc 5.6.1-BYR19-010 Issue
04/08/2021
NRC DBAI - Drawing Error on M-2139 Sheet 1
04/16/2021
Byron NRC DBAI - Unresolved Issue (URI)
04/16/2021
DBAI NRC ID - Missing Department Review for EC 627079
04/06/2021
NRC DBAI - NRC Information Notice 2017-06 Evaluation
04/08/2021
NRC DBAI - Procedure MA-AA-723-325 Wording
04/08/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Clarification
Drawings
1188E02
Tank - Component Cooling Surge Vol 2,000 Gal
Electrical Installation Auxiliary Building Plan EL. 451'-0"
CA
Station Key Diagram
U
Single Line Diagram 120V AC ESF Instrument Inverter Bus
111 & 113 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center 111
L
Single Line Diagram 120V AC ESF Instrument Inverter Bus
2 & 114 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center 112
L
Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 131x (1AP10E)
M
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 111
(1DC05E) Part 1
M
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 111
(1DC05E) Part 2
H
Key Diagram 125 VDC Non-Safety Related Distribution
Panel 113 1DC05EB
L
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 112
(1DC06E) Part 1
N
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 112
(1DC06E) Part - 2
G
Key Diagram 125 VDC Non-Safety Related Distribution
Panel 114 (1DC06EB)
P
Internal/External Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Dist. Center
Bus 111 PT. 3 1DC05E Sect. E (Front) Dist. Pnl. 113
(1DC05EB)
T
Internal/External Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Dist. Center
Bus 111 PT. 6 1DC05E Sect. E (Rear) Dist. Pnl. 113
(1DC05EB)
M
Internal/External Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Dist. Center
Bus 112 Part 3 1DC06E Sect. E (Front) Dist. Pnl. 114
(1DC06EB)
U
Int-Ext Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center
Bus 112 P
- T. 4, 1DC06E Sect. A & B (Rear)
M
Internal/External Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Dist. Center
Bus 112 PT-6 1DC06E Sect. E (Rear) Dist. Pnl. 114
Q
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1DC06EB
Single Line Diagram 120V AC ESF Instrument Inverter Bus
211 & 213 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center 211
G
Single Line Diagram 120V AC ESF Instrument Inverter Bus
2 & 214 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center 212
G
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211
(2DC05E) Part - 1
L
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211
(2DC05E) Part - 2
G
Key Diagram 125 VDC Non-Safety Related Distribution
Panel 213 2DC05EB
M
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center Bus 212
(2DC06E) Part - 1
L
Key Diagram 125 VDC ESF Distribution Center 212
(2DC06E) Part - 2
F
Key Diagram 125 VDC Non-Safety Related Distribution
Panel 114 2DC06EB
N
6E-2-403OCCO4
Schematic Diagram CCW from Reactor Coolant Pumps
Thermal Barrier Isolation Valves 2CC9438 & 2CC685
L
M-10
General Arrangement Basement Floor At EL. 364'-0"
O
M-11
General Arrangement Floor Plan At EL. 346'-0"
N
M-2139
P&ID/C&I Diagram Component Cooling System CC
P
M-42-1A/B
Diagram of Essential Service Water
01/28/1998
M-521 Sheet
M-10
Pipe Sleeve & Opening Closure Details
05/03/2000
M-6
General Arrangement Main Floor At EL. 451'-0"
V
M-7
General Arrangement Mezzanine Floor At EL. 426'-0"
V
M-8
General Arrangement Grade Floor At EL. 401'-0"
X
M-9
General Arrangement Floor Plan At EL. 383'-0"
Q
S-899
Steam Tunnel/Safety Valve Room Floor Plan EL. 399'-0" &
401'-0" Area 1
Z
Engineering
Changes
404484
Configuration Control Processing of MSIV Room / MST Helb
Calculations
406220
REROUTE AF DIESEL COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE TO
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
364' GENERAL AREA UNIT 1
Perform Circuit Modifications for U2 Outage IEN 92-18
Valves for MSO MItigation 2CC 9413A/B, 2CC9414,
2CC9416, 2CC9438
01/06/2012
Revise Temperature Switch Setpoints For Unit 1
Miscellaneous Electric Equipment Room (MEER) Fan &
Damper Control
03/25/2019
Fire Plans
FPR Chapter 2.3 Fire Area Analysis Figure 2.3-0; Legend &
Description
December
2008
FPR Chapter 2.3 Fire Area Analysis Figure 2.3-8; Main Floor
At EL. 451'-0"
December
2012
Miscellaneous
ATI 4061107-02
Level 3 OPEX Evaluation: NRC Information Notice 2017-06:
Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current
Contribution to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution
System
11/08/2017
DRP 7-155
Change Applicable Revision of Regulatory Guide 1.63 from
to 0
11/25/1997
EDS-AT-045
Equipment Data Sheet for Component Cooling Surge Tank
M-1998-0393-001 (Commercial Grade Dedication) Differential Pressure
Indicating Switch, ITT Barton 289A
04/23/1998
Receipt Inspection of New or Refurbished Westinghouse
Type DS 480V Circuit Breakers
NA
Byron FSAR Question 040.13
2/1981
NA
Byron FSAR Question 040.76
2/1981
NA
Technical Manual Models 289A and 291A Differential
Pressure Indicating Switch
NA
Gate and Globe Valve Data Sheet 2CC685
03/09/1993
P319-0018
Power Conversion Products Inc., Instruction Manual: Battery
Charger Model: 3S-130-400
01/29/1979
PR-17-004
Revise Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Technical
Surveillance Requirement TSR 3.8.b.1
08/15/2017
Specification No.
679066
Auxiliary Pressure Vessel General Specification ASME
Section III Class 3
VTIP MANL
Limitorque Motors Bulletin LM-77
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
L200-0055 &
0014
VTIP MANL
W120_0390
Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Types DS and DL
07/1981
Byron/Braidwood Plants Component Cooling Water System
Design Basis Document
Procedures
1BCA-0.0
Loss of All AC Power Unit 1
304
1BOSR DC-R3
Instructions to Cycle 125 VDC Bus 112 Distribution Center
Distribution Panel Molded Circuit Breakers
2BOA PRI-6
Component Cooling Malfunction Unit 2
114
2BOSR 6.1.1-12
Primary Containment Type C Local Leak Rate Tests and IST
Tests of Component Cooling System
INT-EXT Wiring Diagram 125 VDC ESF Dist Center Bus 112
P
- T. 4, 1DC06E Sect. A & B (Rear)
M
BAR 1-22-E8
25 VDC Batt Chgr 112 Trouble
BAR 1-7-E4
RCP THERM BARR CC WTR FLOW HIGH FLOW
BOP AP-74T1
Bus 142 Outage Preparation Checklist
BOP DC-E1
DC Battery & Distribution Center Electrical Lineup
BOP DC-E1B
DC Battery & Distribution System Train "B" Electrical Lineup
BOP SX-4
Essential Service Water Strainer Manual Operation
Preventive Maintenance Program
Preventive Maintenance Program
Equipment Classification
Maintenance Strategy Analysis
Primary Containment Leakrate Testing Program
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process
Preventive Maintenance on Westinghouse Type DS 480V
Circuit Breakers
Work Orders
00549400
EM Test All MCC Breakers at MCC 131x1
00847714
Contingency WO for Manual Backwash of 2B SX Strainer
01728804
EM Oden Test All MCC Breakers - MCC 131x5
01915246
EWP IM Perform Calibration of 2FIS-0685A
04707659
Modify Drain Piping off Bottom of SX Strainer
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04887250
PMSR Essential Service Water 2B
04900229 01
EWP IM Perform 1TS-VE003 Setpoint Changes Per EC 27079
04/09/2020
04903047
Grease Shaft Bearings
04903047
Grease Shaft Bearings
1316288
Replace Breaker for DC Bus 112 Circuit BR1-3
03/29/2011
1573624
Internal/External CC Surge Tank PCM Inspection
03/18/2014
1647781
As Found LLRT for P-24 - 2CC9518, 2CC9438, 2CC685
09/15/2014
1780872
As Found LLRT for P-24 - 2CC9518, 2CC9438, and 2CC685 02/23/2016
24539
As Found LLRT for P-24 - 2CC9518, 2CC9438, and 2CC685 04/03/2019
27517
EPP Perform 2BVSR 6.1.1-24: LLRT Summation
10/09/2017
4702889
EPP Perform 2BVSR 6.1.1-24: LLRT Summation
04/21/2019
4900229
EC 627079, Unit 1 MEER Temperature Switch Setpoint
Change
04/09/2020
4914411
EPP Perform 2BVSR 6.1.1-24: LLRT Summation
09/29/2020
4943097
Unit 1 ASME Section XI Pressure Test CC-3-5
2/22/2020