IR 05000454/2022010
| ML23017A094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/2023 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML23017A094 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BYRON STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000454/2022010 AND 05000455/2022010
Dear David Rhoades:
On December 20, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Byron Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Adam Schuerman, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Byron Station.
January 17, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000454 and 05000455 License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000454 and 05000455
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000454/2022010 and 05000455/2022010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-010-0057
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Byron Station
Location:
Byron, IL
Inspection Dates:
November 28, 2022 to December 20, 2022
Inspectors:
K. Barclay, Senior Reactor Inspector
L. Rodriguez, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Siddiqui, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Byron Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish a Preventive Maintenance Schedule to Replace Solenoid Valve 1CV8116 Prior to the End of its Specific Lifetime Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2022010-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1 for the licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance schedule to replace solenoid valve 1CV8116 prior to the end of its specific lifetime of 38.5 years as documented in EQ-BB-HE-10A, Revision 6.
Although the licensee established preventive maintenance schedule PMID 00105874-01 for replacing internal components of the 1CV8116 valve, this preventive maintenance activity did not replace all components of the valve which had a specific lifetime such as the position indication reed switch assembly and the terminal block.
Failure to Use Correct Valve Factors to Ensure Motor Operated Valves Continued to be Capable of Performing Their Design Basis Functions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2022010-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured motor operated valves (MOVs)continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensee did not use the highest applicable Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Joint Owners Group (JOG), or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factors to properly size and set-up MOVs 2RY8000B,1CC685, and other MOVs at the site. The licensee incorrectly used lower non-conservative valve factors to size and set-up the MOVs, which did not ensure the MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a.
Determined whether the sampled power operated valves (POVs) were being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.
b.
Determined whether the sampled POVs were capable of performing their design-basis functions.
c.
Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs was adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.
d.
Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).
(1)1CV8116, 1B Charging Pump Minimum Flow Recirculation Solenoid Valve (2)1SX005, 1B Essential Service Water (ESW) Supply Valve to the Common Component Cooling (CC) Heat Exchanger (3)2SI8811B, 2B Containment Recirculation Sump Outlet Isolation Valve (4)1SX168, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler ESW Temperature Control Valve (5)1CC685, Reactor Coolant Pumps Thermal Barrier CC Return Isolation Valve (6)1RY456, 1B Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
(7)2RY8000B, 2B Pressurizer PORV Block Valve (8)1FW009C, 1C Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Establish a Preventive Maintenance Schedule to Replace Solenoid Valve 1CV8116 Prior to the End of its Specific Lifetime Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2022010-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.0
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1 for the licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance schedule to replace solenoid valve 1CV8116 prior to the end of its specific lifetime of 38.5 years as documented in EQ-BB-HE-10A, Revision 6.
Although the licensee established preventive maintenance schedule PMID 00105874-01 for replacing internal components of the 1CV8116 valve, this preventive maintenance activity did not replace all components of the valve which had a specific lifetime such as the position indication reed switch assembly and the terminal block.
Description:
Byron station had centrifugal charging pumps which would realign on receipt of a safety injection (SI) signal during an event to form the high head portion of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) for injection. A minimum flow bypass line with a normally open solenoid operated valve was provided on each pump discharge to recirculate flow to the pump suction after cooling the water via the seal water heat exchanger during normal plant operation. These valves had a safety function to close automatically upon receipt of an SI signal concurrent with a low-low reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure to isolate the minimum flow recirculation lines in order to ensure adequate SI flow to the RCS. These valves also had a safety function to open to protect the pumps should the RCS pressure increase above their open setpoint with an SI signal present. The minimum flow solenoid valves were designed to fail open on a loss of power.
The inspectors reviewed the 1B charging pump minimum flow recirculation solenoid valve (1CV8116) during the inspection. The inspectors noted environmental qualification (EQ)binder EQ-BB-HE-10A, "Environmental Qualification of Target Rock Solenoid Valve 79AB-010," Revision 6, applied to the valve. The inspectors also noted tab E, "Maintenance &
Surveillance Schedule," section 2, "Maintenance/Surveillance Requirements to Maintain Qualification," step 2.B stated, "The solenoid valve is qualified for 38.5 years. Replace the solenoid valve prior to expiration of qualified life." Therefore, the inspectors determined the valve had a specific lifetime of 38.5 years. The inspectors then reviewed the preventive maintenance (PM) scheduled for valve 1CV8116 and noted there was no replacement of the valve scheduled before the end of its specific lifetime (qualified life) of 38.5 years.
The inspectors discussed this discrepancy with the licensee. The licensee stated valve 1CV8116 was not replaced in its entirety and was not scheduled to be replaced. The licensee had established EQ PM schedule PMID 00105874-01, "Replace the Elastomers and Coil," to replace the elastomers and solenoid assembly of the valve on an 18-year frequency.
However, the scheduled PM did not require replacement of all susceptible components inside the valve which had an EQ qualified life. Specifically, the PM did not require replacement of the position indication reed switch assembly nor the terminal block inside the valve. The inspectors determined the failure of those internal components could render the valve incapable of performing its safety functions during an event.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and determined solenoid valve 1CV8116 had been in service less than its specific lifetime and remained qualified. The licensee planned to perform an extent of condition review on all PM activities scheduled for valves covered by EQ-BB-HE-10A to ensure EQ requirements had been correctly incorporated.
Corrective Action References: AR 04543031
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to establish a PM schedule to replace solenoid valve 1CV8116 prior to the end of its specific lifetime of 38.5 years as documented in EQ-BB-HE-10A was a performance deficiency and a violation of TS 5.4.1. Although the licensee established PM schedule PMID 00105874-01 for replacing internal components of the 1CV8116 valve, that PM activity did not replace all components of the valve which had a specific lifetime such as the position indication reed switch assembly and the terminal block.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, absent NRC's intervention, the licensee's failure to establish a PM schedule to replace solenoid valve 1CV8116 before the end of its specific lifetime could lead to failure of the valve's internal components, rendering the valve incapable of performing its safety functions, similar to example 13.a of IMC 0612 appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues."
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because although it was a deficiency affecting qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), the SSC maintained its operability. Specifically, solenoid valve 1CV8116 had been in service less than its specific lifetime and remained qualified at the conclusion of the inspection.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the PM strategy developed for valve 1CV8116 was created prior to the 3-year period used to assess present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical specification section 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, appendix A, February 1978.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, appendix A, section 9 addresses Procedures for Performing Maintenance" and section 9.b states, "Preventive maintenance schedules should be developed to specify lubrication schedules, inspections of equipment, replacement of such items as filters and strainers, and inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime such as wear rings."
EQ-BB-HE-10A, "Environmental Qualification of Target Rock Solenoid Valve 79AB-010,"
Revision 6, which applies to valve 1CV8116 states in tab E, "Maintenance & Surveillance Schedule," section 2, "Maintenance/Surveillance Requirements to Maintain Qualification,"
step 2.B, "The solenoid valve is qualified for 38.5 years. Replace the solenoid valve prior to expiration of qualified life."
Contrary to the above, as of December 15, 2022, the licensee failed to establish a procedure to address the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.33, appendix A, section 9.b. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a preventive maintenance schedule to replace solenoid valve 1CV8116 prior to the end of its specific lifetime of 38.5 years as documented in EQ-BB-HE-10A. Although the licensee established preventive maintenance schedule PMID 00105874-01, "Replace the Elastomers and Coil," for replacing internal components of the 1CV8116 valve, that preventive maintenance activity did not replace all components of the valve which had a specific lifetime such as the position indication reed switch assembly and the terminal block.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Use Correct Valve Factors to Ensure Motor Operated Valves Continued to be Capable of Performing Their Design Basis Functions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2022010-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.0 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)50.55a(b)(3)(ii) for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured motor operated valves (MOVs) continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Specifically, the licensee did not use the highest applicable Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Joint Owners Group (JOG), or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factors to properly size and set-up MOVs 2RY8000B. 1CC685, and other MOVs at the site. The licensee incorrectly used lower non-conservative valve factors to size and set-up the MOVs, which did not ensure the MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the 2B pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) block valve (2RY8000B) during the inspection. The valve was in a pipe between the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressurizer and the pressurizer relief tank (PRT), directly upstream of a pressurizer PORV. The valve had a safety function to open to provide a flow path from the pressurizer to the PRT. The valve also had a safety function to close to isolate the pressurizer PORV.
The inspectors also reviewed the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) thermal barrier component cooling (CC) return isolation valve (1CC685) during the inspection. This normally open MOV was required to close to isolate containment from the CC system upon receipt of a containment isolation signal during a design basis event. This valve was also required to close on receipt of a high flow signal (indicating an RCP thermal barrier rupture) to isolate the CC system from the RCS.
The inspectors then reviewed calculations BYR-2RY8000B, "Midacalc Results BYR-2RY8000B (BYR-2)," Revision 5, and BYR-1CC685, "Midacalc Results BYR-1CC685 (BYR-1)," Revision 4, for the 2RY8000B and 1CC685 MOVs, respectively. These calculations were used by the license to demonstrate the MOVs were capable of performing their design basis safety functions. The inspectors noted the valve factors used for both valves came from reference document MPR-2524-A, "Joint Owner's Group (JOG) Motor Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program Summary," Revision 1. Chapter 7 step 5 of the reference document stated, "each plant is responsible for the design bases for its gate valves. Although a plant can decide to conservatively increase its gate valve disk-to-seat coefficients of friction (COFs) to meet these thresholds, it is not acceptable to decrease a plant specific COF to the threshold value." Therefore, the inspectors requested the basis for the valve factors (the disk to seat COFs) in use for the 2RY8000B and 1CC685 MOVs since these had been obtained directly from the JOG document.
While reviewing the basis for the valve factors in use for the 2RY8000B and 1CC685 valves, the licensee determined they were incorrectly using valve factors from the JOG document in their calculations. Procedure ER-AA-302-1001, "MOV Rising Stem Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Sizing and Set-Up Window Determination Methodology," Revision 13, was a licensee procedure established to properly size and set-up MOVs to ensure their design basis functionality. Step 4.1.5.2.B stated, in part, "Where possible, it is expected MOV program valve calculations will use the highest applicable GL 89-10, JOG, or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factor. At no time is it acceptable to utilize a valve factor determined via grouping or industry data if valid, valve-specific test data demonstrates a higher valve factor exists." The licensee incorrectly used lower non-conservative valve factors to size and set-up the 2RY8000B and 1CC685 MOVs. Therefore, their calculations and MOV program did not ensure the MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and re-analyzed the design basis capability of valves 2RY8000B and 1CC685 using bounding valve factors. The licensee was able to demonstrate both valves were still capable of performing their design basis functions after removing available margins in the calculations.
The licensee also performed an extent of condition review during the inspection and determined an additional 33 valves also had non-conservative valve factors. The licensee re-analyzed those valves and determined they were all still capable of performing their design basis functions. The licensee planned to formally update their calculations to incorporate bounding valves factors for the affected valves, perform a fleetwide extent of condition, and perform additional diagnostic testing as required by their MOV program procedures for valves which had a loss of margin.
Corrective Action References: ARs 04540308, 04540309, 04541139, 04541231, and 04541543
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to ensure MOVs 2RY8000B, 1CC685 and 33 additional MOVs at the site continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions was contrary to 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) and was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, the licensee incorrectly used lower, non-conservative valves factors to size and set-up the MOVs instead of using the highest applicable GL 89-10, JOG, or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factors.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to ensure the 2RY8000B and 1CC685 MOVs were capable of closing during a design basis event adversely affected the objective of the RCS and containment barriers to protect the public from radionuclide releases. Similar to example 3.l of IMC 0612 appendix E, the licensee had to re-perform a number of valve design calculations to demonstrate they could meet their design basis functions and several valves required additional testing and maintenance per the site MOV program procedures because of a loss of margin.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because they answered "No" to all of the questions in exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions,"
section B, "Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Boundary," and section C, "Reactor Containment."
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the valve factors selected to demonstrate that MOVs were capable of performing their design basis safety functions were chosen prior to the 3-year period used to assess present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) states, in part, the licensee must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Procedure ER-AA-302-1001, "MOV Rising Stem Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Sizing and Set-Up Window Determination Methodology," Revision 13, is a licensee procedure established to properly size and set-up MOVs to ensure the valves are capable of performing their design basis safety function. Step 4.1.5.2.B states, in part, "Where possible, it is expected MOV program valve calculations will use the highest applicable GL 89-10, JOG, or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factor." The procedure also states, "At no time is it acceptable to utilize a valve factor determined via grouping or industry data if valid, valve-specific test data demonstrates a higher valve factor exists."
Contrary to the above, as of December 1, 2022, the licensee failed to establish a program that ensured MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Specifically, the licensee did not use the highest applicable GL 89-10, JOG, or valve specific, empirically determined, stable valve factors to properly size and set-up MOVs 2RY8000B, 1CC685, and 33 other MOVs at the site. The licensee incorrectly used lower non-conservative valve factors to size and set-up the MOVs, which did not ensure the MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On December 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Adam Schuerman, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
06-0615-C-002
Byron and Braidwood Reactor Pressurizer System MOV
Design Basis Document and dP Calculation
AOV-MARG-
BYR-1SX168
ACE Calculation for 1(2)SX168 Byron Unit 0
BYR-1CC685
Midacalc Results BYR-1CC685 (BYR-1)
BYR-1SX005
Midacalc Results BYR-1SX005 (BYR-1)
BYR-2RY8000B
Midacalc Results BYR-2RY8000B (BYR-2)
and 6
BYR-2SI8811B
Midacalc Results BYR-2SI8811B (BYR-2)
BYR01-084
Generic Thermal Overload Heater Sizing Calculation for
Motor Operated Valves
BYR01-087
MOV Actuator Motor Terminal Voltage and Thermal
Overload Sizing Calculation Component Cooling System
1B and 2
BYR01-094
Motor Operated Valves (MOV) Actuator Motor Terminal
Voltage and Thermal Overload Sizing Calculation - Safety
Injection (SI) System
BYR08-001
Owner Review of Seismic/Weak Link Report for 30 Inch
SX Butterfly Valves
3B
BYR08-011
Owner Review: Determination of Butterfly Valve Operating
1A and 1E
BYR97-386
Safety Injection (SI) MOV Differential Pressure Calculation
1A
Calculations
BYR97-386
MOV Differential Pressure Calculation Sheets
01072841
Work Request Needed for Grease in 2SI8811B
05/25/2010
2563274
B1R20 M3 AOV 1SX168 Failed to Meet Stroke Length AC
09/15/2015
04107333
Partial Stem Lube During the RH Work Window
2/23/2018
04169589
Inactive Packing Leak
09/03/2018
04174658
1CV8116 Shows Dual During STT and PIT
09/19/2018
241119
2RY456 Will Not Open
04/18/2019
04328947
1FW009D Low Pressure
03/24/2020
04403064
MOV 2SI8811B Actuator Grease at Grade 3
2/17/2021
04446314
1SX168 Fail Open Test Failed
09/14/2021
71111.21N.02
Corrective Action
Documents
04447170
B1R24 Expanded Scope on 1SX168
09/17/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04448697
B1R24 - Recommendations from Internal 1SX168
Inspect / Repair
09/26/2021
04503607
Evaluation Request for SST Frequency of 1/2SX005
06/03/2022
04539975
NRC ID - 2SX005 Valve Operator Bolt Issues
11/30/2022
04539976
NRC ID - 1SX005 Valve Operator Bolt Issue
11/30/2022
04540295
NRC ID - 1CC685 Limit Control Scheme
2/01/2022
04540308
NRC ID - 2RY8000B Valve Factor Discrepancy
2/01/2022
04540309
NRC ID - 1CC685 Valve Factor Discrepancy
2/01/2022
04540550
NRC ID - PZR PORV IST Test Requirements
2/02/2022
04541139
NRC ID - POV Inspection Valve Factor Application
2/06/2022
04541231
NRC ID - Byron MOV Program Valve Factor
Discrepancies
2/06/2022
04541543
NRC ID - 2CV8105 Follow up to IR 4541231
2/08/2022
04541949
NRC ID - 2SI8811B Test Documentation Discrepancy
2/10/2022
04542182
NRC ID - 2SI8811B - WO Documentation Discrepancy
2/12/2022
04542414
NRC ID - Housekeeping of 1C MSIV Room
2/13/2022
04542707
NRC ID - Inadequate Past Operability Review for 1SX168
Failure
2/14/2022
04542770
EOC for IR 04539975 - SX Valve Operator (HBC)
Mounting Bolts
2/14/2022
04542773
EOC for IR 04539975 - SX Valve Operator (HBC)
Mounting Bolts
2/14/2022
04542780
EOC for IR 04539975 - SX Valve Operator (HBC)
Mounting Bolts
2/14/2022
04542912
NRC ID - 2SI8811 Installed Packing Doesn't Match
Drawing
2/15/2022
04543031
NRC POV Insp. - EQ PM Missing Required Components
Replacement
2/15/2022
04543204
NRC ID - Follow-up on RY PORV Testing per IST
2/16/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04543255
NRC ID - Maintenance Rule Evaluation Dispositioning
2/16/2022
6434E05
Motor Operated Gate Valve Model 03000GMBBFNH000
3-1525 ASME Class I
Drawings
6E-1-4030CC04
Schematic Diagram CCW from Reactor Coolant Pumps
O
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Thermal Barrier Isolation Valves - 1CC9438 & 1CC685
6E-1-4030SX06
Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Heat Exchangers
& 0 Inlet Valves 1SX004 & 1SX005
K
77920
Valve Assembly, Gate - 24 Inch, 300 lb., Cres., Motor
Operated
2" Solenoid Opr. Valve High Temp. and High Press.
Energize to Close
F
CD04101
General Assembly Plain Wafer Per MSS-SP-68 & MSS-
D
M-135
Diagram of Reactor Coolant
M-136
Diagram of Safety Injection
AZ
M-36
Diagram of Feedwater (Main) Loop 3
M-42 Sheet 3
Diagram of Essential Service Water
BG
M-60
Diagram of Reactor Coolant
M-64
Diagram of Chemical & Volume Control & Boron Thermal
Regeneration
AZ
MS-18
Large Bore Isometric Main Steam (MS) System
P4-6775-N-1
Sheet 1
3" & 6" 150# Bolted Bonnet Manual Globe Valve (Cast)
Q
P4-6775-N-1
Sheet 2
3" & 6" 150# Bolted Bonnet Manual Globe Valve (Cast)
C
96-064
Technical Evaluation Checklist Pressurizer Relief Isolation
Valve
BYR-2RY8000B
BYR-2SI8811B
EQ-BB-047
Environmental Qualification of Borg Warner Valves
7A
Engineering
Evaluations
EQ-BB-HE-10A
Environmental Qualification of Target Rock Solenoid Valve
Joint Owner's Group (JOG) Motor Operated Valve
Periodic Verification Program Summary
2RY8000B
Gate and Globe Valve Data Sheet Byron Unit 2
2/25/1991
BB-PRA-005.04
Byron and Braidwood Probabilistic Risk Analysis Auxiliary
Feedwater System Notebook (AF)
Miscellaneous
BVP 200-2T5
IST Valve Reference Value/Acceptance Criteria
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CECO-0267
Vendor Manual: Invar Industries: Operating and
Maintenance Manual for Pneumatic Valve Actuators
03/01/2002
DM-0162
Velan Valve and Pneumatic Actuator Design
Information - 1SX168
INL/CON-11-
21863
OM Code Requirements for MOVs - OMN-1 and Appendix
III - Eleventh NRC/ASME Symposium on Valves, Pumps,
& Inservice Testing for Operating & New Reactors
08/01/2011
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-CC
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1CC685
10/08/2022
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-CV
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1CV8116
10/09/2022
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-FW
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1FW009C
10/09/2022
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-RC
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1RY456
10/10/2022
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-RC
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 2RY8000B
03/01/2019
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-SI
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 2SI8811B
03/01/2019
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-SX
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1SX168
03/01/2019
IST-BYR-BDOC-
V-SX
Inservice Testing Basis Document - 1SX005
03/01/2019
IST-BYR-PLAN
Byron Nuclear Power Station Units 1 & 2 - Inservice
Testing Program Fourth Ten Year Interval
03/25/2021
MR System
Basis Document
- AF
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - Auxiliary
11/08/2022
MR System
Basis Document
- CC
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - Component
Cooling
11/03/2022
MR System
Basis Document
- SX
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - Essential
11/09/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MR System
Basis Document
- VA
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - Auxiliary
Building HVAC
11/09/2022
NES-MS-06.6
MOV Valve Factors
OSR 86-242
Valve Stroke Time of Pressurizer Power Operated Relief
Valve
2/19/1986
TR-113561
EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program - Friction
Coefficients for Non-Metallic Butterfly Valve Bearing
Materials
2/01/1999
White Paper 176
Borg-Warner Valve Factors
04/06/1995
1BOSR
0.5-2.FW.4
Main Feedwater System Valves 1FW009A/B/C/D
Indication Test 18 Month Surveillance
1BOSR 4.11.3-1
Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Accumulator Pressure Decay
Test
Calibration of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Diesel Room
Temperature Control Loop
MOV Rising Stem Motor Operated Valve Thrust and
Torque Sizing and Set-Up Window Determination
Methodology
MOV Margin Analysis and Periodic Verification Test
Intervals
Motor-Operated Valve Maintenance and Testing
Guidelines
Inservice Testing (IST) Program Corporate Technical
Positions
Air Operated Valve Testing Requirements
Procedures
Torquing and Tightening of Bolted Connections
00688020
Perform Inspection of Solenoid Operated CV Recirc.
Valves
04/02/2008
01178660
MOV PM, Actuator Inspection, Diagnostic Testing
05/25/2010
01646720
MOV PM, Actuator Inspection, Diagnostic
Testing - 2SI8811B
11/25/2014
Work Orders
01674690
PM - MOV Actuator Inspection, Diagnostic Testing
1SX005
07/28/2015
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
01789861
(Check) 2B Cnmt. Recirc. Sump Isol. Vlv.
05/26/2016
01860589
Perform Inspection of Solenoid Operated CV Recirc.
Valves
09/17/2018
01882186
"B" Train CVCS Isolation Valve Indication Test
05/22/2017
01910301
1CV8116 SOV Stroke Closed IST Test (Adverse Trend)
11/29/2017
01932426
(Check) 2B Cnmt. Recirc. Sump Isol. Vlv.
2/23/2018
01932872
STT/PIT for 2SI8802B, 2SI8809B, 2SI8811B, 2SI8923B
10/07/2017
04618029
EWP EVR Perform Thermal O.L. Surveillance (MCC
2X4) - 1AP28E-D4
09/18/2018
04646661
"B" Train CVCS Isolation Valve Indication Test
09/19/2018
04718799
PM Inspection, In-Service Diag. Test, PIT
2/16/2021
04752319
PM - MOV Stem Clean/Lube & Act. Grease Inspect.
2/16/2021
04788240
STT for 1CV8116 (Week L)
09/19/2018
04831101
Inservice Diagnostic Testing - 1CC685
03/16/2020
04834737
"B" Train CVCS Isolation Valve Indication Test
03/17/2020
04910760
MOV Stem Clean/Lube & Act. Grease Inspection
05/07/2020
04927935
MOV Thermal Overload Surveillance (MCC 232X4-H1
2SI8811B CNM)
2/17/2021
04950919
EXTST for 2SI8802B, 2SI8809B, 2SI8811B, 2SI8923B
10/09/2020
05020408
Internal Valve Inspection - 1SX-168
09/21/2021
05022355
EWP EM Perform Actuator Wiring
09/21/2021
05024052
"B" Train CVCS Isolation Valve Indication Test
09/21/2021
05025484
STT/PIT for 1RY455A and 1RY456
08/30/2021
05026595
1FW009A-D Full Stroke Test
09/28/2021
05047204
EWP IM Flowscan Valve 1RY456
08/31/2021
05088698
STT for 2RY800A and 2RY8000B
04/05/2021
05172217
1BOSR 7.5.4-2, 1B AF PP RUN
08/18/2021
209224
STT for 1CV8116 (Week L)
03/11/2022
242413
STT for 1CV8116 (Week L)
05/17/2022
269739
STT for 1CV8116 (Week L)
09/06/2022
86008721
Repack Valves with Graphite Packing
2/18/1986