IR 05000416/2020012
| ML20336A237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/2020 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Franssen R Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020012 | |
| Download: ML20336A237 (27) | |
Text
December 1, 2020
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2020012
Dear Mr. Franssen:
On November 13, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000416
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-012-0015
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location:
Port Gibson, MS
Inspection Dates:
September 21, 2020 to October 09, 2020
Inspectors:
C. Baron, Contractor
G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Nicely, Contractor
N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Include Required Testing in High Pressure Core Spray Transformer Preventive Maintenance Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000416/2020012-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, for the failure to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures for activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish, implement, and maintain procedures to perform transformer insulation resistance and turn ratio testing for high pressure core spray transformer 1E22S003.
Failure to Evaluate Safety Related Equipment at Technical Specification Minimum Voltages Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000416/2020012-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.21M The inspectors identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of technical specification minimum voltages to provide adequate voltage to operate safety-related equipment during a design basis accident.
Failure to Update Division 1 480/120V AC Class 1E Control Power Transformer (CPT) Circuit Voltage Drop Study Calculation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000416/2020012-03 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion VI, Document Control, for failure to update the 480/120V AC Class 1E control power transformer circuit voltage drop study calculations with the updated bus voltage inputs.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000416/2020012-04 Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure Differential Associated with a Tornado 71111.21M Open
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
From September 28, 2020, to October 8, 2020, the team inspected the following components and listed applicable attributes.
- (1) Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Bypass Motor Operated Valves 1E12F048A and 1E12F048B
- Voltage drop calculations to the MOV terminals, to ensure the proper voltage was utilized in the mechanical calculations for MOV torque/thrust calculations
- Calculations that establish control circuit voltage drop, and protection/coordination including thermal overload sizing and application
- Overall component health
- Inservice and GL 89-10 testing and acceptance criteria
- Weak link analysis
- Generic Letter 89-10 MOV thrust analysis
- Design basis flows and delta pressures
- Normal and emergency operating procedures associated with MOVs
- Overall component health
- Inservice and GL 89-10 testing and acceptance criteria
- Weak link analysis
- Generic Letter 89-10 MOV thrust analysis
- Design basis flows and delta pressures
- Normal and emergency operating procedures associated with MOVs
- (2) Standby Service Water Building Ventilation Fans and Dampers 1Y47C001B, 1Y47F001B, and 1Y47F002B
- Fan and duct design drawing, vendor specifications, air flow calculations and building temperature calculations
- Procedures for periodic HVAC system testing
- Normal and emergency operating procedures
- Piping and instrumentation diagram for HVAC system
- Protection of HVAC system against tornado missiles
- Diverse power supplies to HVAC systems
- Control logic for fans and dampers
- Design of HVAC system to withstand tornado depressurization event
- System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation
- Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within the minimum acceptable limits
- The protective device settings and feeder circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst case short-circuit conditions
- Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance; including the cable aging management program
- Results of completed preventative maintenance on switchgear and breakers, including breaker tracking
- (4) Division 2 480V Motor Control Center 16B31 and Load Center 16BB3
- System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation
- Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that electrical equipment capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits
- The protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst case short-circuit conditions
- Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance
- Results of completed preventative maintenance on load centers, motor control centers, and breakers
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
From September 28, 2020, to October 8, 2020, the team inspected the following components and listed applicable attributes.
- (1) Instrument Air Valve 1P53F001
- Valve testing procedures and performance history was reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations
- Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
- Design basis calculations including maximum expected differential pressure, minimum required stem thrust, and minimum required accumulator air pressure to verify that valve and actuator functional capability remained within acceptable limits
- Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications
- Setpoints and instrument uncertainty of the valve and associated testing equipment
- Air operator capability to actuate the valve under design basis conditions
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)
From September 28, 2020, to October 8, 2020, the team inspected the following permanent plant modifications.
- (1) Engineering Change 70377, Replace Pneumatic Logic Board 1P75K010B
- (2) Engineering Change 74325, General Electric QCR305C002 Contactor Seismic Qualification and Equivalency Evaluation
- (3) Engineering Change 75259, Setpoint Increase 1 Second to 10 Second on RCIC Turbine Trip Time Delay Relays 1E51K95 and 1E51K94
- (4) Engineering Change 77829, Replacement of Division 2 Diesel Generator Start Circuit Time Delay Relays TD2A and TD2B
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
From September 28, 2020, to October 8, 2020, the team inspected the following operating experience issues.
- (1) Review of NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample OpESS 2019/01
- (2) Corrective Actions from Previous NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspections at Grand Gulf Inspection Reports 05000416/2015007 (ML15317A126) and 05000416/2017007 (ML17339A154)
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Include Required Testing in High Pressure Core Spray Transformer Preventive Maintenance Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000416/2020012-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, for the failure to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures for activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish, implement, and maintain procedures to perform transformer insulation resistance and turn ratio testing for high pressure core spray transformer 1E22S003.
Description:
While performing the review of condition reports from the 2017 NRC design bases assurance inspections at Grand Gulf, the inspection team reviewed the condition reports associated with the findings relevant to high pressure core spray transformer 1E22S003. In reviewing Work Order 52798013, implemented on January 7, 2020, for the maintenance of the transformer, the inspector determined that maintenance Procedure 01-S-12-9, General Cleaning and Inspection of Non-Rotating Electrical Equipment, was used as the guiding procedure for maintenance on HPCS transformer 1E22S003. To further understand the actual maintenance performed on this safety-related equipment, the team reviewed Procedure 01-S-12-9, which guided the maintenance process. The team determined that the procedure did not itemize specific preventive maintenance actions for the transformer. Additionally, the procedure did not include performance of transformer insulation resistance and turn ratio tests as recommended by the industry standards and Entergy preventive maintenance template for large transformers.
Entergy maintenance procedures are written to include requirements set forth in the Entergy preventive maintenance templates. The Entergy preventive maintenance templates for transformers are written to include vendor recommendations and industry best practices in industrial standards, such as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standard 57.94 (American National Standards Institute (ANSI) C57-94), IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation, Application, Operation, and Maintenance of Dry-Type Distribution and Power Transformers. In Entergy PM Basis Template EN - Transformer, Dry Type - Large (Rev. 1 06/11/2018) (Rev. 1 - 11/27/18), under the inspection Task Content section, it requires the maintenance personnel to, Remove high and low voltage sides connections of transformer and perform the following tests on the transformer: -
Transformer Turns Ratio test (TTR) at the present tap position only - Winding Resistance -
Transformer insulation Resistance, winding-to-winding and winding-to-ground. See ANSI/NETA MTS-2011, Table 100.5 and ANSI/IEEE Standard C57.94. ANSI C57-94 requires in Section 6 Testing, that Periodic tests should be made as a preventive maintenance procedure. In the Periodic Tests, Section 6.3.1, Recommended preventive maintenance tests, it states that It is recommended that the following tests be made at time-based and/or condition-based intervals as preventive maintenance tests: a) Insulation resistance test and b) Ratio test. Transformer 1E22S003 is a cast coil 750 KV, 3-phase ventilated dry type transformer per Vendor Document VM460000161. The transformer insulation resistance and ratio test are performed to assure the suitability insulation and windings of the transformer.
Following identification of the issue, licensee investigated the cause of the failure to include the insulation resistance and turn ratio test in the test procedure. The licensee identified the cause as missed opportunities to review and include the Entergy PM [Preventive Maintenance] Basis Template in the transformer maintenance work order and instructions. Specifically, the licensee identified that the preventive maintenance work order did not include an identifier that tied the high -pressure core spray transformer 1E22S003 to the repetitive work order. Additionally, the licensee failed to include review of the transformer PM Basis Template in the T-28 (28-week) review of the work order, prior to testing being performed in accordance with EN-DC-324, Preventive Maintenance Program.
Corrective Actions: In response to this issue, the licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program. Additionally, this issue does not represent an immediate safety concern.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-10384 and CR-GGN-2020-10432
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish, implement, and maintain maintenance activities for insulation resistance and turn ratio testing covered by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, for safety-related high pressure core spray transformer 1E22S003, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to incorporate the testing of the high pressure core spray transformer insulation resistance and turn ratio testing requirements into preventive maintenance procedures could cause unacceptable conditions to go undetected which would adversely affect the reliability of the transformer to perform its safety function.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design deficiency or qualification that did not impact operability or probabilistic risk assessment functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the preventive maintenance review process prior to performing the preventive maintenance task.
Enforcement:
Violation: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, requires that, Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstance.
Contrary to the above, prior October 8, 2020, the licensee failed to establish and maintain written procedures for performing maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.
Specifically, the licensee failed to perform maintenance and testing of the high pressure core spray transformer with written procedures and documented instructions incorporating appropriate insulation resistance and turn ratio testing requirements.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Evaluate Safety Related Equipment at Technical Specification Minimum Voltages Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000416/2020012-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.21M The inspectors identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of technical specification minimum voltages to provide adequate voltage to operate safety-related equipment during a design basis accident.
Description:
Example 1: Grand Gulf Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.2, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.20, and 3.8.1.21 demonstrate emergency diesel generator operability in accordance with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3. The surveillance requirement acceptance criteria require that Division 1 and 2 diesel generators obtain a steady-state voltage of +/- 10% of 4160 VAC (4576 VAC and 3744 VAC) for manual/emergency starts from standby conditions or actual/simulated loss of offsite power or emergency core cooling system initiation signals.
Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, Section 2.2, Test Descriptions, describe the applicable tests necessary to demonstrate operability of the emergency diesel generators. It describes throughout this section that tests reach required voltage and frequency within acceptable limits and time. This phrase is reflected in Start Tests, Fast Start Tests," "LOOP Test,"
"SIAS Test," and "SIAS LOOP Tests." This language is also reflected IEEE 387-1984, Section 6.3, "Site Test Categories," which states the tests must demonstrate the capabilities to accept design load and attain, stabilize, and maintain voltage and frequency within the acceptable limits. Design load is defined as: "That combination of electric loads, having the most severe power demand characteristic, which is provided with electric energy from a diesel-generator unit for the operation of engineered safety features and other systems required during and following shutdown of the reactor."
Based on inspection team review, the electrical distribution load flow and voltage drop calculation EC-Q1111-17002, GGNS Auxiliary Power System Voltage Study, assumed steady-state Class 1E bus voltages were based on the minimum grid voltage, which ensured that 3891 VAC was available at the 4160 VAC bus voltages and 431 VAC was available 480 VAC bus voltages. However, the licensee failed to analyze safety-related loads, using worst case steady-state emergency diesel generator technical specification minimum voltage loading of 3744 VAC, to demonstrate acceptable motive and applicable control voltages to start, run, and operate safety-related loads.
Previously, the lower analytical limit of 3744 VAC was analyzed in Calculation EC-Q1111-90028, AC Electrical Power Systems Calculation, Revision 6.
However, the licensee voided and superseded this calculation in November 2019, following issuance of calculation EC-Q1111-17002, GGNS Auxiliary Power System Voltage Study, Revision 0.
Example 2: The second level undervoltage relay settings at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station are set in accordance with Technical Specification Table 3.3.8.1-1. The table indicates the second level undervoltage relay allowable values from >3764.25 VAC and <3837.6 VAC with a dropout setpoint at 3790 VAC.
The selection of the dropout setpoint and its lower analytic limit was based on the capability to start required Class 1E loads under accident conditions with degraded voltage present while preserving the 90 percent nominal bus voltage for starting and running Class 1E loads. A 90 percent nominal voltage with a 9 second time delay was selected to ensure that adequate voltage was available so that Class 1E loads would not be damaged under sustained degraded voltage conditions. Previously, the lower analytical limit of 3744 VAC was analyzed in Calculation EC-Q1111-90028, AC Electrical Power Systems Calculation, Revision 6. However, the licensee voided and superseded this calculation in November 2019, following issuance of calculation EC-Q1111-17002, GGNS Auxiliary Power System Voltage Study, Revision 0.
NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP), Branch Technical Position PSB-1, titled Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages, Position B.1 a) states, The selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class 1E loads at all onsite system distribution levels.
This position is further clarified by NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2011-12, Revision 1. NRC RIS 2011-12 clarified that the need for two types of analyses:
- (1) degraded voltage relay design calculations and
- (2) offsite/station electric power system design calculations. For degraded voltage relay calculations, RIS 2011-12 clarifies that voltage calculations "should provide the basis for DVR settings, ensuring safety-related equipment is supplied adequate voltage, based on bounding conditions for the most limiting safety-related load in the plant." It further states, "As a minimum, the model should utilize loads on the plant distribution system consistent with the specific transient or accident being analyzed. These models would allow calculation of voltages at terminals of all safety-related equipment with the voltage at the DVR monitored bus at the DVR dropout setting, providing the necessary design basis for the DVR voltage settings. In this manner, the DVR circuit ensures adequate voltage (starting and running) to all safety-related equipment."
The objective of calculation EC-Q1111-17002, GGNS Auxiliary Power System Voltage Study, was to analyze the voltages and loading on the station electrical distribution system during both steady state and transient motor starting conditions. Additionally, the calculation was used to analyze acceptable minimum offsite grid voltage for design basis events to ensure adequate starting and running of the accident loads; and demonstrate the ability to reset the second level undervoltage relays. The calculation assumed that distribution system started at the minimum grid voltage, which ensured, following the loading transient, that the 4160 VAC bus voltages would return above the second level undervoltage voltage reset of 3859 VAC. However, the calculation EC-Q1111-17002 failed to evaluate the starting and running of loads up to the second level undervoltage dropout setpoint of 3790 VAC or the lower analytic limit dropout setpoint of 3764 VAC.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the conditions into the corrective action program. These examples do not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee has procedures in place to monitor degraded voltage conditions and maintain the emergency diesel generator automatic voltage regulator within a conservative band.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-10416
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to translate applicable design bases requirements for technical specification lower analytical limits for diesel generator voltage and second level undervoltage relay settings acceptance criteria into design calculations; and the failure to verify the adequacy of the design acceptance criteria by calculation methods, in accordance with the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 3, "Design Control," was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding adversely affected the capability of safety-related loads to have adequate motor running and starting voltage with the bus voltage at the technical specification allowable minimum settings.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The team determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires in part, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents, and that deviations from such standards are controlled. Additionally, the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, prior to October 8, 2020, the licensee failed to correctly translate the design basis into specifications and failed to verify the adequacy of design by calculation methods. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate applicable design bases requirements for lower analytical technical specification limits for diesel generator voltage and second level undervoltage relay settings into design calculations; and the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the technical specification surveillance requirement acceptance criteria by calculation methods.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Update Division 1 480/120V AC Class 1E Control Power Transformer (CPT) Circuit Voltage Drop Study Calculation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000416/2020012-03 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, Document Control, for failure to update the 480/120V AC Class 1E control power transformer circuit voltage drop study calculations with the updated bus voltage inputs.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed Grand Gulf calculation EC-Q1R20-91038, Division I 480/120V AC Class 1E Control Power Transformer (CPT) Circuit Voltage Drop Study. This calculation determined the available voltage at the terminal for devices in Division I Class 1E 120 VAC circuits powered from control power transformers in the motor control centers, with minimum power source operating voltage. Additionally, this calculation verified that all energized devices in the control power circuits will have minimum operating voltage at their terminals to enable them to perform their safety function. This calculation used the resultant 480 VAC bus voltages from Grand Gulf calculation EC-Q1111-90028, AC Electrical Power Systems Calculation, Rev 1, dated October 29, 1991, as the input voltage reference at the control power transformers.
During the review of the calculation EC-Q1R2-91038, the inspectors discovered that the input reference voltage for the control power transformers had not been revised since September 30, 1992; although, the reference calculation EC-Q1111-90028 had been updated five times since September 1992, most recently updated in January 2010.
In the most recent revision of EC-Q1111-90028, Revision 6, the voltage study evolved from a static steady state study to a dynamic transient study that provided the voltage results that change in fractions of a second. Therefore, to verify that the control power circuits will have the minimum operating voltages at their terminals to enable them to perform their safety function, the input reference voltages for the control power transformers should have been updated to reflect the transient nature of the voltage results. The transient nature of the voltage would result in lower voltages on the control power circuit, which would cause delays in control circuit contactor operation based on the inadequate pickup voltage. This would result in delays in actuation of safety-related motor operated valves, which potentially impacts the plant safety analysis timing.
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to meet the Document Control measures of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.64 and ANSI N45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants (as committed to by the Entergy Quality Assurance Manual). Furthermore, the licensee failed to coordinate and control the design interface documents to assure that required review and approvals were accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to review significant changes and revisions to calculation EC-Q1111-90028 to determine if resultant bus voltage references were adequate to support control power circuit voltages necessary to maintain safety function of energized devices, as calculated in calculation EC-Q1R20-91038.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this concern into the corrective action program. The licensee compared the voltage performance of the control power circuits and motor operated valve contactors to the electrical transient during a design basis event resulting from operation of safety-related motors and valves. The licensee determined that there were several cases where control circuit voltage would drop below the contactor minimum pickup voltage; however, the relative delay in energizing the motor-operated valve contactors and operating the valves was less than the inservice testing available margin for the subject motor operated valves. Therefore, the valves remained operable.
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2020-10287, CR-GGN-2020-10310, CR-GGN-2020-10311, CR-GGN-2020-10312
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that licensees failure to follow the Document Control measures of the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.64 and ANSI N45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, (as committed to in the Entergy Quality Assurance Manual) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to coordinate and control the design interface documents to assure that required review and approvals were accomplished challenged the assurance that safety-related motor-operated valves had adequate control voltage to operate within the established time designated by the safety analysis.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, Document Control requires, in part, that measures shall be established to control the issuance of documents, such as instructions, procedures, and drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribe all activities affecting quality. These measures shall assure that documents, including changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel and are distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is performed. To meet these requirements, the licensee is committed to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.64 and ANSI N45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants. ANSI N45.2.11-1974, Section 7.1(3) Coordination and control of interface documents," requires that "These interface documents should be mutually agreed to and prepared in sufficient detail to assure that the required reviews and approvals are accomplished.
Contrary to the above, prior to October 1, 2020, the licensee failed to control the issuance of documents which prescribe activities affecting quality. Additionally, the licensee failed to assure that documents were reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel and are distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is performed. Furthermore, the licensee failed to coordinate and control the design interface documents to assure that required review and approvals were accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to review significant changes and revisions to calculation EC-Q1111-90028 to determine if resultant bus voltage references were adequate to support control power circuit voltages necessary to maintain safety function of energized devices, as calculated in calculation EC-Q1R20-91038.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Open)
Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure Differential Associated with a Tornado URI 05000416/2020012-04 71111.21 M
Description:
On October 8, 2020, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to ensure that standby service water pump house dampers would withstand postulated pressure differential associated with a tornado. Calculation MC-Q1Y47-17001, "Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Ductwork for Tornadic Conditions," Revision 0, was performed in response to Condition Report CR-GGN-2017-9728 (issued during the 2017 CDBI); this calculation evaluated the effect of a 3 psid atmospheric pressure change on the ductwork in the standby service water pump house to ensure it would remain functional. The inspectors noted that the calculation did not address the inlet and exhaust dampers which could be in their closed position and subject to differential pressure during a tornado. The inspectors also noted that the damper purchase specification, 9645-M-617.1, Revision 11, did not require the dampers to remain functional after the pressure differential associated with a tornado event. The inspectors questioned whether the licensee had assurance that the dampers would be capable of opening to perform their safety function after a design basis tornado event.
In response to this concern, the licensee issued calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, "Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic Conditions,"
Revision 0, during the inspection. This calculation determined the maximum pressure differential across the closed dampers, evaluated the structural integrity of the dampers, and concluded that dampers were robust enough to withstand a tornado depressurization event. However, the inspectors reviewed calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision 0, and determined that it did not fully demonstrate that the dampers would remain functional. Specifically, the inspectors had additional questions on the volume of the pump rooms, the dimensional modeling of openings in the building, and the differences of the dampers as-built configuration compared to the design assumed in the calculation.
Based on inspectors questions, the licensee completed additional walkdowns, which identified additional differences from the design for building openings and as-built damper configuration. Because of the additional as-built configuration issues, the licensee determined additional analysis was necessary to determine if the standby service water ventilation system would remain operable to meet the specified safety functions.
Planned Closure Actions: To close this item, the inspectors will need to review the third party engineering analysis to determine if the standby service water system would remain functional following a tornado depressurization event. This will potentially include a walkdown of the building volume, building openings, and the as-built damper configuration to ensure the assumptions in the analysis are correct.
Licensee Actions: In order to complete additional analysis to assure operability, the licensee is contracting with a third-party engineering organization to analyze the additional concerns. While the analysis is being generated, the licensee instituted compensatory measures to assure operability of the standby service water ventilation system.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-10908
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) inspection results to Mr. M. Lingenfelter, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 13, 2020, the inspectors presented the Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) inspection results to Mr. R. Franssen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
A734.0-
Q1T10Y730-7.0-
1-3
Analysis Calculations (Pressure Relief Panel Units)
05/08/1981
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1111-17002
GGNS Auxiliary Power System Voltage Study
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1L21-90046
Division II 125V DC Class 1E Voltage Drop Study
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1L21-90047
Sizing of 125 VDC Division II Battery and Charger
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1L21-95003
Evaluation of Division I II & III Direct Current Bus Ground
Detection
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1R20-91038
Division I 480/120V AC [Alternating Current] Class 1E CPT
[Control Power Transformer] Circuit Voltage Drop Study
71111.21M Calculations
EC-Q1R20-91049
Division II 480/120 VAC [Volts Alternating Current] Class 1E
CPT [Control Power Transformer] Circuit Voltage Drop
Study
71111.21M Calculations
GGNS-NE-10-
00064
GGNS EPU - HELB Sub-compartment Evaluation
71111.21M Calculations
M-1061A
P&I Diagram - Standby Service Water System Unit 1
71111.21M Calculations
M-1085C
P&I Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1
71111.21M Calculations
M-1085D
P&I Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1
71111.21M Calculations
M195.0-01
Compartment Flooding Calculation
71111.21M Calculations
M195.0-41
Auxiliary Building Compartment Flood Level
71111.21M Calculations
M195.0-48
Internal Flooding in the Auxiliary Building
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1111-91132
Minimum Stem Thrust Required for Motor Operated Gate
and Globe Valves
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1111-96002
Calculation of Overall Actuator Ratio for Generic Letter 89-
Gate and Globe Motor Operated Valves
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1E12-94002 Calculation of The Maximum Expected Differential Pressure
for Valve in the Residual Heat Removal System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1Y47-07016 SSW Pump House Temperature for a Mispositioned Damper 0
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1Y47-15001 SSW Pump House Temperature for No Fans Louvers Open
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1Y47-17001 Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety
Related Ductwork for Tornadic Conditions
71111.21M Calculations
MC-Q1Y47-20001 Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety
Related Dampers for Tornadic Conditions
71111.21M Calculations
PC-Q1P53-02200
Calculation of the Maximum Expected Differential Pressure
for Air Operated Valve 1P53F001 for the GGNS AOV
Program
71111.21M Calculations
PC-Q1P53-02208
Calculation of the Required Operating Thrust/Torque,
Actuator Output Capability, and Available Actuator
Capability Margin for Air Operated Valve 1P53F001
71111.21M Calculations
XC-Q1111-
96004-1
Bounding EQ Temperature Environment for Increasing
RCIC and Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve Stroke Times
71111.21M Calibration
Records
11164521
DTL-0002, Indicator/RH&Temp/Logger
04/26/2019
71111.21M Calibration
Records
217901
DTL-0011, Indicator/RH&Temp/Logger
01/21/2020
71111.21M Calibration
Records
237826
DTL-0003, Indicator/RH&Temp/Logger
04/13/2020
71111.21M Calibration
Records
237827
DTL-0002, Indicator/RH&Temp/Logger
04/13/2020
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
CR-GGN-2006-00680, CR-GGN-2005-01377, CR-GGN-
2009-00984, CR-GGN-2009-00985, CR-GGN-2009-01024,
CR-GGN-2012-09030, CR-GGN-2012-09103, CR-GGN-
2012-09111, CR-GGN-2012-09175, CR-GGN-2012-09305,
CR-GGN-2012-CR-GGN-2014-01951, CR-GGN-2015-
04113, CR-GGN-2015-04611, CR-GGN-2015-04627, CR-
GGN-2015-04672, CR-GGN-2017-09557,CR-GGN-2017-
09749, CR-GGN-2017-09763, CR-GGN-2017-12283, CR-
GGN-2017-10192, CR-GGN-2017-12282, CR-GGN-2017-
285, CR-GGN-2017-12288, CR-GGN-2018-09705, CR-
GGN-2019-06773, CR-GGN-2019-07871, CR-GGN-2019-
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
07901, CR-GGN-2020-00315
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
CR-GGN-2020-09863, CR-GGN-2020-09956, CR-GGN-
20-10022, CR-GGN-2020-10156, CR-GGN-2020-10199,
CR-GGN-2020-10212, CR-GGN-2020-10215, CR-GGN-
20-10238, CR-GGN-2020-10240, CR-GGN-2020-10284,
CR-GGN-2020-10285, CR-GGN-2020-10287, CR-GGN-
20-10310, CR-GGN-2020-10311, CR-GGN-2020-10312,
CR-GGN-2020-10315, CR-GGN-2020-10317, CR-GGN-
20-10384, CR-GGN-2020-10409, CR-GGN-2020-10416,
CR-GGN-2020-10432, CR-GGN-2020-10454, CR-GGN-
20-10457
71111.21M Drawings
2E2988A-002
One Line Diagram, High Pressure Core Spray System
006
71111.21M Drawings
A-0734
Pressure Relief Panels Miscellaneous Details
71111.21M Drawings
E 1009
One Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4.16 KV Bus 17AC Unit
71111.21M Drawings
E-0001
Main One-line Diagram
057
71111.21M Drawings
E-0116-01
Schematic Diagram R20 480V SWGR [Switchgear] Typical
Circuit BRKR [Breaker] Internal Details Units 1 & 2
71111.21M Drawings
E-1008
One-line Meter and Relay 4.16 KV E.S.F System Buses
15AB & 16AB, Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
E-1018
One Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 480 V Bus 16BB1,
16BB2, 16BB3, 16BB4
71111.21M Drawings
E-1087-001
MCC [Motor Control Center] Tabulation 480V. ESF
[Engineered Safety Feature] MCC 16B31 Auxiliary Building
71111.21M Drawings
E-1087-002
MCC [Motor Control Center] Tabulation 480V. ESF
[Engineered Safety Feature] MCC 16B31 Auxiliary Building
71111.21M Drawings
E-1090
MCC [Motor Control Center] Tabulation 480 V. ESF
[Engineered Safety Feature] MCC 16B51 Standby Service
Water Pump House
71111.21M Drawings
E-1111-012
Schematic Diagram P75 Standby Diesel Generator Sys. Div.
II Train A Start & Stop Circuit
71111.21M Drawings
E-1111-013
Schematic Diagram P75 Standby Diesel Generator Sys. Div.
II Train B Start & Stop Circuit
71111.21M Drawings
E-1116-004
Schematic Diagram R20 480V Load Center ESF
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
[Engineered Safety Feature] DIV [Division] II 480V IC FDR
[Feeder] BRKR [Breaker] 52-16301 To LC [Load Center]
16883
71111.21M Drawings
E-1116-006
Schematic Diagram R20 480V Load Center FSF DIV
[Division] II - 480V IC FDR [Feeder] BRKR [Breaker] 52-
16501 TO LC [Load Center] 16BB5
71111.21M Drawings
E-1181-026
Schematic Diagram E12 Residual Heat Removal System
Heat Exchange-Shell Side Bypass VLV [Valve] F048A Unit
007
71111.21M Drawings
E-1181-027
Schematic Diagram E12 Residual Heat Removal System
Heat Exchange-Shell Side Bypass VLV [Valve] F048B Unit
005
71111.21M Drawings
E-1220
Schematic Diagram, R21 Load Shedding and Sequencing
System, LSS Table 1 1H22-P331 (Div. 1) Part 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-018.0-
Q1P75E001A.15
Control Panel Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
M-1061B
P&I Diagram - Standby Service Water System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-1061C
P&I Diagram - Standby Service Water System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-1061D
P&I Diagram - Standby Service Water System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-1085A
P&I Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-1085B
P&I Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-1106A
P&I Diagram - Ventilation System Unit 1
71111.21M Drawings
M-2027
Equipment Location - Standby Service Water Pump House
Basin B
71111.21M Drawings
M-242.0-Q1-1.1-3
Ralph A. Hiller Company Valve Actuator Information 10SA-
A012 Valve No. Q1P53-F001
71111.21M Drawings
M242.0-Q1-1.2-
194, Sheet 1
18-Inch 300 Pound Globe Valve
71111.21M Drawings
M617.1-QS-1.1-
2
Automatic Control Dampers
71111.21M Drawings
SFD-1067-001
System Flow Diagram Instrument Air System Unit 1
71111.21M Engineering
Replacement of Div. 2 Diesel Generator Start Circuit Time
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes
Delay Relays TD2A and TD2B
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Replacement of Division 2 Diesel Generator Start Circuit
Time Delay Relays TD2A and TD2B
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Replace SDG [Stand-by Diesel Generator] Logic Boards
1P75K010A and 1P75K010B
000
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Replace Pneumatic Logic Board
2/10/19
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
General Electric QCR305C002 Contactor Seismic
Qualification and Equivalency Evaluation
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
General Electric QCR305C002 Contactor Seismic
Qualification and Equivalency Evaluation
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Setpoint Increase from 1 sec. to 10 sec. on the RCIC
Turbine Trip Time Delay Relays 1E51K95 (Div I) and
1E51K94
(Div II).
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Cable Equivalency for RK2
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Markup to Calculation MC-Q1P41-11001 to Include
Moderate Energy Line Break of a Division of SSW
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
GGNS-92-0028
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Engineering Report - Evaluation
of the Existing Selection and Sizing of Thermal Overload
Relays for Safety Related Motor Operated Valves
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
Procurement
Evaluations
PE-GGN-00198819, PE-GGN-00176488, PE-GGN-
00182737, PE-GGN-00197569, PE-GGN-00198819, PE-
71111.21M Miscellaneous
1-734.0-
Q1T10Y730-26.0-
1-1
Air Seal Test Pressure Relief Panel Units
11/02/1981
71111.21M Miscellaneous
10517243
Purchase Order - Contactor, Electrical, Magnetic, 1 NEMA,
600VAC, 120VAC, 60HZ Coil, 30A
71111.21M Miscellaneous
21A3598
Specification for Transformer High Pressure Core Spray
System
C
71111.21M Miscellaneous
460000469
Vendor Manual - Metal Enclosed Low Voltage Power
06/16/2005
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Switchgear
71111.21M Miscellaneous
9645-M-617.1
Specification - Automatic Dampers
71111.21M Miscellaneous
A734.0-
Q1T10Y730-26.0-
2-0
Shear Pin Test Pressure Relief Panel Units
11/06/1981
71111.21M Miscellaneous
AOV ID:
1P53F001
Instrument Air
Supply Header to
Containment
AOV Data Record Form 1P53F001
71111.21M Miscellaneous
BRK-REBL
Switchgear Breaker Replacement Instructions.
N/A
71111.21M Miscellaneous
2015
IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation, Application,
Operation, and Maintenance of Dry-Type Distribution and
Power Transformers
2/5/2015
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M5.8.023
Equipment Environmental Qualification
04/27/2004
71111.21M Miscellaneous
MWO 50302941
MWO for PANEL 1R21S601-B
N/A
71111.21M Miscellaneous
PM Basis Template EN - Breaker - Molded Case Circuit
(Rev. 1 - 02/17/07)
2/17/07
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Quality Assurance Program Manual
71111.21M Miscellaneous
S1818.1
Curtis Wright Nuclear Seismic Test report for ASCO
Solenoid Valves, ASCO Solenoid Valves, West Scheler
Instruments Meters, Agastat Time delay relays, US Gauge
Amatek Pressure Gauge, Asco Solenoid Valve
71111.21M Miscellaneous
SDC-Y47
System Design Criteria - Standby Service Water Pump
House Ventilation System
71111.21M Miscellaneous
SEP-THERM-
GGN-001
Grand Gulf Infrared Thermography Program
2
71111.21M Miscellaneous
TR-112579
EPRI Report Critical Characteristics for Acceptance of
9/2000
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Seismically Sensitive Items (CCASSI)
71111.21M Miscellaneous
VM-460000161
ELMA Cast Coil Power Transformers Installation,
Maintenance, Operation and Storage Instructions.
6/20/2001
71111.21M Miscellaneous
VM-460000450
Instruction Manual Transamerica Delaval Inc. Engine and
Compressor Division MODEL DSRV-16-4 DIESEL Engine
/Generator Serial Nos. 74033-2624, 74034-2625, 74035-
26, 74036-2627
7/17/1980
71111.21M Miscellaneous
VM-460000468
ITE Imperial Indoor Metal Clad Switchgear
1/31/2001
71111.21M Procedures
01-S-02-9
General Cleaning and Inspection of Non-Rotating Electrical
Equipment
016
71111.21M Procedures
04-1-01-R21-1
Load Shedding and Sequencing System
107
71111.21M Procedures
04-1-02-1H13-
P601-16A-D3
Alarm Response Instruction - HPCS DSL ENG Trouble
161
71111.21M Procedures
04-1-02-1H13-
P870-1A-G2
SSW PMPHS A Area Temp HI
131
71111.21M Procedures
04-1-02-1H22-
P118-1A-E2
Low/High Jacket Water Temp
71111.21M Procedures
05-1-02-III-12
Off-Normal Event Procedure Standby Service Water Basin
Level Control
71111.21M Procedures
05-1-02-VI-2
Off-Normal Event Procedure Hurricanes, Tornados, and
Severe Weather
140
71111.21M Procedures
06-EL-1R20-R-
0001
Breaker Overcurrent Trip Functional Test
110
71111.21M Procedures
06-OP-1E12-Q-
0006
Surveillance Procedure LPCI/RHR Subsystem B MOV
Functional Test
116
71111.21M Procedures
06-OP-1P75-M-
0001
Surveillance Procedure Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11
Functional Test
147
71111.21M Procedures
06-OP-1P75-M-
0002
Surveillance Procedure Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 12
Functional Test
144
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Procedures
06-OP-1P75-M-
0004
Surveillance Procedure Standby Diesel Generator 12
Functional Test
2
71111.21M Procedures
07-8-12-71
General Maintenance Instruction Calibration Checks of Time
Delay Relays
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-10
Calibration Checks of GE AC Under voltage Relays
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-145
ITE HK350 4.16kv Breaker Overhaul Instructions
004
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-2
Calibration Checks and Functional Checks of AC and DC
Voltmeters
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-39
General Cleaning and Inspection of Non-Rotating Electrical
Equipment
016
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-42
Inspection and Testing of ITE 5 KV Power Circuit Breaker
010
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-12-71
Calibration Checks of Time Delay Relays
71111.21M Procedures
07-S-23-P75-3
Preventive Maintenance Instruction Div. 1 and Div. 2 I Diesel
Generator Simulated Run
71111.21M Procedures
Engineering Change Process
71111.21M Procedures
Engineering Change Process
71111.21M Procedures
Engineering Calculation Process
71111.21M Procedures
Control of Engineering Documents
71111.21M Procedures
Air Operated Valve Program
71111.21M Procedures
AOV Setpoint Control, Signature Analysis, and Trending
Evaluation
71111.21M Procedures
Engineering Methodologies for Design Basis Review (DBR)
or Air Operated Valves (AOV)
71111.21M Procedures
Acceptance of Commercial-Grade Items/Services in Safety-
Related Applications
71111.21M Procedures
Predictive Maintenance Program
009
71111.21M Procedures
Procurement Engineering Process
71111.21M Procedures
Preventive Maintenance Program
24
71111.21M Procedures
PM Basis Template
009
71111.21M Procedures
PM Basis Template
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Procedures
PM Basis Template
71111.21M Procedures
Process Applicability Determination
71111.21M Procedures
Corrective Action Program
71111.21M Procedures
Licensing Basis Document Change Process
71111.21M Procedures
Use of VIPER or VOTES Infinity Air Operated Valve
Diagnostics
71111.21M Procedures
Critical Procurements
71111.21M Procedures
Inventory Control
71111.21M Procedures
Shelf Life Program
71111.21M Procedures
Material Receipt
71111.21M Procedures
Control of Material
71111.21M Procedures
In-Storage Maintenance Process
71111.21M Procedures
Operability Determination Process
71111.21M Procedures
ENS-DC-199
Off-Site Power Supply Design Requirements Nuclear Plant
Interface Requirements
71111.21M Procedures
GGNS-GES-013
General Engineering Standard for the Evaluation of Air
Operated Valves
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-P75
System Design Criteria, Standby Diesel Generator System
A
71111.21M Procedures
SEP-AV-001
71111.21M Work Orders
Work Orders
2887 01, 517580 01, 52853433 01, 82560 01, 425254 01,
2798013 01, 52918754 01, 136453 01, 361101 01,
2918754 02, 52763899 01, 52773256 01, 528088224 01,
491330, 491331, 529224, 357425, 359496, 374685,
4788448, 528827, 530819, 52830932, 52831788,
2853433, 00475992