IR 05000400/1986034
| ML18003B300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1986 |
| From: | Burris S, Frederickson P, Humphrey P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18003B298 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-34, NUDOCS 8606100331 | |
| Download: ML18003B300 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris Unit 1 License No.:
CPPR-158 Inspection Conducted:
April 20 May 20, 1986 Inspectors:
.
F.
Maxwel
.
P.
Bur is Date Signed
</z/ZC Date Signed
.
G..
tImphr l
Approved y:
P.
.
F edrickson, Section Chief Divisi n of Reactor Projects'ate Signed Date Signed SUMMARY I
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection'nvolved 461 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters and Inspector Follow-up Items; Safety-related Pipe Supports and Restraints; Preoperational Test Program Implementation; Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description; Testing of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems; Fuel Receipt and Storage; Operational Staffing; Plant Nuclear Safety Committee; Technical Specification Review; and Preoperational Test Program Verification.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8bOb100331 8bOb02 PDR ADOCK 05000400 8,
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees N. J. Chiangi, Manager, QA/QC Harris Plant J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G.
L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations C.
S. Hinnant, Manager, Start-up L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support C.
L. McKenzie, Acting Director, Operations QA/QC G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion M. Thompson, Jr.,
Manager, Engineering Management D.
L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Maintenance E. J.
Wagner, Manager, Engineering C.
C. Wagoner, Project General Manager, Construction R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J.
L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations The inspectors were assisted by three Region II resident inspectors during this reporting period, H. Krug, R. Prevatte and J. York.
Other licensee employees contacted included six technicians, 7 operators,
mechanics, 8 security force members, 14 engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 23, 1986, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters and Inspector Follow-up Items (92701)
'a ~
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 82-24-01
"Installation Nonsafety-related Nonseismic Support Electrical Conduit in the Vicinity of Safety-related Equipment or Component".
This item was the result of an inspector's concern of the licensee's program to identify, track and resolve potential problems associated with nonseismic electrical installations whose failure could result in failure to safety-related electrical equipment.
When this concern was identified in 1982, the licensee had committed to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29 "Seismic Design Qualification" and a project commitment had been made to complete a
post-installation walkdown of spaces to identify and correct deficiencies in this are Seismic qualification testing was conducted in June 1983 by Corporate Consulting and Development Company and Wyle Laboratories under test report No. A-561-83 (Seismic gualification Report of Nonsafety-related Conduit Supports)
to provide acceptance criteria for the above installations.
This analysis subsequently was reviewed and evaluated by the NRC Integrated Design Inspection team as Items No.
D2.7-1 and D2.7-2 in Report No. 50-400/84-48.
A Regulatory Guide 1.29 verification walkdown program was implemented in August 1984 in accordance with the requirements of CPL drawing 2168-S-9146.
A preliminary walkdown of plant spaces was conducted in the spring of 1985.
Upon completion of this preliminary walkdown, the program was expanded and assistance was obtained from EBASCO to implement and complete this program.
Using the information obtained from the above walkdowns, Harris Plant Engineering Staff (HPES)
Procedure 7.6.B, Rev.
0 (Regulatory Guide Verification Walkdown)
was issued on February 22, 1985.
This procedure provided acceptance criteria, walkdown procedures, methods and forms for problem identification, documentation, tracking and resolution.
Using the above procedures and criteria, additional space walkdowns were conducted between March and June 1985 to document existing potential deficiencies in this area.
After completion of these walkdowns, existing deficiencies were evaluated by engineering.
Rework, where required, commenced in July 1985.
A review of HPES documentation by the inspectors indicates that identified deficiencies are being reworked, if required, and that a
tracking system with retrievable documentation exists to support rework and engineering evaluations of acceptability of the identified existing potential deficiencies.
Upon completion of this program the associated records will be transferred to the gA vault for retention.
The inspectors additionally reviewed the gA surveillance activities associated with this program.
gA survei llances are conducted in this area on a weekly basis.
A review of the surveillance by the inspectors shows that the preliminary walkdown program is greater than 97 percent effective in identifying existing problems.
The licensee anticipates that this preliminary walkdown program and associated rework will be completed by June 15, 1985.
A final walkdown to identify any remaining deficiencies in this area will be completed prior to final space turnovers from construction to operations.
The licensee has committed to resolve all deficiencies identified in this area prior to fuel loading, which is presently scheduled for July 25, 1986.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/83-30-01
"Significant Self-Initiated Evaluation Items".
The inspectors reviewed portions of a, final status report from Carolina Power and Light Co.
to INPO dated August 10, 1984 concerning the Self-Initiated Evaluation (SIE)
e I
performed at the plant.
The status report stated that all items in the SIE are closed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/84-07-02
"Seismic Supports for.
Battery Room Equipment".
For the purpose of closing this item the inspectors reviewed the following documents:
Nonconformance Report 84-106, Permanent Waiver PW-A5-7/22, and Drawings A-1-286-1-CW-H-807, A-1-286-1-CW-H-808, and A-1-286-1-CW-H-809.
The inspectors also performed a visual inspection of the affected areas in one of the battery rooms.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-01 TMI Action Item I.A.1
"Shift Supervisor Administrative Duties".
The inspectors reviewed CP&L's job description for a recently created position identified as
"senior clerk" for the operations shift foremen.
The operations manager informed the inspectors that CP&L is in the process of hiring enough senior clerks such that each shift will have one.
The clerks will be responsible for providing administrative assistance to the operations shift foremen.
These responsibilities, in brief, are as follows:
in the event of the activation of the site emergency plan, they will make the required telephone contacts to activate the emergency response team; they will track commitment dates on any assignment, for the assigned shift; and they will prepare a shift status report near the shift change; make call-outs to adequately staff the shift in the event of a vacancy; maintain shift records in a neat, legible fashion; maintain controlled manuals in the control room; prepare memorandums for the shift foreman; maintain an awareness of which plant managers are on call; serve as an access point to the shift foreman; serve as the communications focus between the power plant, the outside and the shift foreman; and control supplies, forms, mail and other administrative documents for the shift.
As a result, the inspectors determined that CP&L has provided sufficient controls to significantly reduce the administrative duties of the shift foreman.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-04 TMI Action Item I.C.6
"Verify Correct Performance of Operating Activities".
As outlined in Inspection Report 400/85-16, CP&L committed to provide evidence of independent verification.
CP&L has provided requirements through the Plant Program Procedure PLP-702
"Independent Verification".
The inspectors evaluated the latest revision of this procedure, dated October 17, 1985, which delineates the specific requirements of TMI Action Item I.C.6 and also Regulatory Guide 1.74 and ANSI N18.7.
The procedure clearly delineates the program's objectives, responsibi li-ties, definitions and implementation requirements.
This item is close f.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-08 TMI Action Item II.B.1
"Reactor Coolant System Yents".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee documentation implementing changes to the reactor coolant system, which included:
Initial design considerations to meet requirements of this TMI Action Item; Installation of the necessary piping connection to the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer; Electrical power supplies to the solenoid-operated valves; Control room indication for flow and valve~position; Procedure revision to incorporate identification of valves necessary to be operated during a venting evolution of the reactor coolant system.
CP5L has performed the necessary steps to meet the requirements of TMI Action Item II.B.1.
This item is closed.
g.
(Closed)
Inspector Fol low-up Item 400/85-16-22 TMI Action Item II.K.1.10
"Operability Status".
This item required the review and modification of the procedures which allowed removal of engineered safety features from service.
The procedure modification was made to assure that system operability status is continuously maintained.
CPKL has written two procedures to provide this assurance.
The first, Operations Management Manual Procedure OMN-03
"Equipment Inoperable Record", requires that equipment be logged out of service and any time limitations that apply would also be documented.
The second procedure, which is also an Operations Management Procedure, OMN-05, "Operations Work Procedures",
specifies the testing requirement of redundant equipment prior to or during testing.
It also specifies the testing required to declare operable equipment that was removed from service, This item is closed.
h.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-24-02
"Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Procedure". 'n May 14, 1986 Revision 2 of Administrative Procedure AP-13 was approved for use.
This latest revision includes additional guidance for initiating and conducting the review of subjects identified in Section 6 of the site Technical Specifications (T.S.).
The inspectors evaluated the revised procedure and found it to be acceptable.
This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-37-01
"Differences Between the As-Built Plant and FSAR".
The inspectors evaluated the latest revisions to FSAR Figures 5.4.7-1, 6.3.2-1, 6.3.2-2 and 6.3.2-3.
Figures 5.4.7-1 and 6.3.2-2 have been revised to reflect the as-built condition of the residual heat removal system.
The inspectors evaluated the proposed changes to the FSAR and observed that CP&L has provided changes for Figures 6.3.2-1 and 6.3.2-3.
The changes will require updating these two figures to reflect the current revisions of the applicable EBASCO drawings CAR-2165-G-809 and CAR-2165-G-810.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-49-06
"As-Built Condition of the Reactor Coolant System".
The inspector s evaluated the proposed changes to FSAR Figure 5. 1.2-1 to insure that the identified discrepancies, Field Change Requests or installed equipment would be incorporated into the latest revi sion.
This revision should correct the discrepancies between CP&L drawing CPL 2165-S-1300 and EBASCO drawing CAR-2165-G-800, This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-52-02
"Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description".
The inspectors reviewed the measures CP&L has taken to resolve the discrepancies in the component cooling water system (CCW);
a list of these discrepancies and an accounting of each follows:
Incorporation of CP&L Drawing CAR-2165-G-819, Rev.
13, has been initiated into the FSAR to reflect the as-built condition.
A design change was initiated under Field Change Request FCR P-4487 12-1 to remove the "T" type strainer and install a
cone strainer at the suction of the the
"A" CCW pump.
This strainer was inserted for temporary service to be used during start-up flushing as referenced on Note 5 of Drawing CAR-2165-819 R-13.
The inspectors reviewed the as-built status and found that it complied with the revised drawing.
Work Request and Authorization (WR&A) 86-ABDM1 w'as initiated and the bonnet nut was installed on valve 1CC-32.
Identification tags have been installed on valves 1CC49, 1CC51, 1CC75, 1CC99, 1CC107 and 1CC113.
Misplaced tags for 1CC65, 1CC66 and 1CC108 have been corrected and installed.
Misplaced tags on 1CC43, 1CC127 and 1CC167 were properly refastened.
Pressure gauge 1-PI-CC-678B, referenced as a follow-up item was incorrectly identified on the report.
Pressure gauge 1-PI-CC-678A was the gauge that was broken and was repaired on WR&A 86-ABDL1.
The inspectors did an inspection on both gauges to verify that the deficiency was corrected.
Missing piping connections were identified and installed under Construction Work Request CWR-System 4080, Item 35 J'
Local temperature gauges on the RHR heat exchangers have a range of 200 to 700 degrees F.
These indicators were recalibrated on WRY 86-ABEBl and found to be indicating correctly.
The RHR heat exchanger 1B-SB temperature indicator TI-5551B had a broken glass face and a
WR&A was initiated to replace the face.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-52-03
"Leaking Steam Generator Relief Valves".
Several steam generator relief valves were detected leaking steam during hot functional testing.
Discussions with the licensee and several Region II operational specialists revealed that it is not unusual to have some leakage of steam near the setpoint for these valves.
This is due to the fact that the valve spring in compression applies just enough force to overcome the differential (delta)
pressure force at setpoint.
To have a leak-tight valve, an additional seating force equal to ten percent of delta pressure must be added.
These valves are not designed in this manner.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/86-07-01
"Independent Verification".
The licensee has refined the program for independent verification.
The program is delineated in Plant Program Procedure PLP-702 which is titled "Independent Verification".
In addition to this refined program, the licensee has provided additional training and counseling to start-up and test personnel concerning the requirements of independent verification during the start-up phase.
The new emphasis in this area, if continued, should alleviate any future misunderstandings as to the purpose of having start-up test personnel independently verifying temporary alterations which may be made to existing permanent plant systems.
This item is closed.
4.
Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Restraints (50090B)
During the inspection of hanger documentation, the inspectors reviewed parts of procedure QCI-18.2, Rev.
4,
"Seismic Pipe Hanger/Large Frame/Whip Restraint Inspection and Documentation".
Hanger documentation was examined for the following points:
The records confirm that the specifications and installation procedures were met.
The required scope of QA/QC inspections was met.
Weld identifica-tion/locations corresponds to respective weld card, drawing, work order or other welding documentation.
Welding material used corresponds to the material specified in the licensee's procedures.
Welders were qualified for the welding procedures use The examination records are complete and meet the NDE procedure requirements, including personnel qualifications.
The following hangers were checked for these attributes, with welders and weld dates also noted:
Auxiliary Feedwater System:
~Han er No.
AF-H-301 AF-H-443 AF-H-4 AF-H-9 AF-H-14 AF-H-21 AF-H-1 Welder Stencil E41 E33 J35 SM57 D85 G56 D31 SL6 A
roximate Weld Date 9/85 5/84 9/84 9/84 9/84 12/84 10/84 4/85 Safety Injection System:
t e
~Han er No.
Welder Stencil A
roximate Weld Date SI-H-2 SI-H-103 SI-H-14 SI-H-20 SI-H-27 SI-H-191 SI-H-1 SI-H-8 SI-H-80 SK77 G41 E49 SJ22 J55 C84 K58 E33 I49 J 11 6/84 7/84 7/84 9/84 1/85 5/84 1/85 8/85 8/84 3/85 Of the listing of 16 hangers, approximately half are dynamic type (with snubbers and spring cans)
and half are rigid type.
The weld procedure used for welding all of the hangers was No.
1A4.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation (70302)
The inspectors interviewed the CP5L start-up manager and found him to be cognizant of the start-up test program requirements.
The manager was questioned and found to be aware of his responsibilities in assuring that the test program is conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements.
He was also found to understand the responsibilities of his key personnel and the requirements in selecting the most qualified individuals.
The inspectors evaluated the most current site operations organizational chart and the lines of authority described in Section 2 of the Start-up Manua I
The evaluation revealed that sufficient organizational structure exists to allow the necessary interface among start-up, operations, maintenance and engineering.
The inspectors questioned the managers of operations, maintenance, and start-up concerning site administrative controls.
During the last six reporting periods, the inspector s have interviewed seven CP8 L maintenance personnel and questioned them about the administrative controls.
The inspectors determined that CP&L personnel were familiar with the administrative controls established for corrective and preventive maintenance during the preoperational testing.
The inspectors reviewed the schedules for eight systems to be preopera-tionally tested.
Tests were assigned starting dates and schedules updated to keep the status current.
Testing was tracked by a master schedule which was further broken down into subgroups categorized by the milestone that each was to support,.
System completion status was tracked on Start-up Form SU-203, which listed the required completion dates for each system preoperational test, system turned over to operations and deemed operational, and the date that the system documentation was filed as a permanent record.
The inspectors obtained
recently approved test procedures from the document vault.
They evaluated the review and approval cycle for test procedures.
This effort revealed that the performance in this area has been done in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Periodic reviews have been performed by the inspectors to assure that vendor manuals and system drawings are kept current for the applicable preopera-tional tests in progress.
The testing program has provided a satisfactory method for assuring that current revisions of drawings and other documents were utilized.
The inspectors reviewed Field Change Request FCR SP-308, which changed the arrangement of the containment spray eductor test line on the containment spray system.
This change was approved by the start-up engineer as required by Section 13 of the Start-up Manual.
The change was routed through the approval process in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Three design changes were evaluated.
The evaluation was conducted and a determination was made that design changes were reviewed, processed and implemented in accordance with Secti'on 13 of the Start-up Manual.
The inspectors have verified that an acceptable program, as defined in Section 6 of the Start-up Manual, assured that modifications and design changes have been reviewed and approved by the cognizant engineer prior to their implementation.
The program required that the engineer evaluate the change to determine effects, if any, on the preoperational test and that any
necessary revisions to the test were made to assure that the change was incorporated.
In the event that the change was associated with equipment that had been tested, the engineer was required to specify a retest to assure that the change met the design requirements.
Completion of this retest was required prior to closeout of the design change package.
Required reading logs and personnel files were obtained from the start-up library by the inspectors for the purpose of evaluating test supervisors qualifications and training.
An evaluation was then performed and it was determined that the applicable procedural requirements as set forth in Section 3 of the Start-up Manual were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description (37301)
a
The inspectors were accompanied by the technical staff engineer on a
walkdown of the containment spray system.
The system'
as-built status was compared to the following CP&L drawings:
CAR-2165-S-0550 and CAR-2165-G-050.
At the time of the walkdown, the system was being pr epared for flushing.
Temporary hoses and piping had been installed as required by the flushing procedure.
The inspectors identified one discrepancy during the walkdown which had been previously identified and was being tracked by CP&L's program.
b.
The inspectors performed a
walkdown of the electrical distribution system from the 1-A 6.9KV transformer to the breakers for various equipment fed from the system.
The system'
as-built status was compared with the following CP&L drawings:
CAR-2166-G-029, CAR-2166-G-030, and CAR-2166-B-041, SH.185S02.
C.
The inspectors performed selected walkdowns of the diesel generator (D/G)
and associated systems, which included the D/G starting air system, D/G jacket water system, D/G fuel oil system, D/G air intake and exhaust system and D/G lube oil system.
These walkdowns were conducted using the simplified flow diagrams (SFDs)
CPL 2165-S-0633 and CPL 2165-S-0633-S01, to verify that the physical arrangements agreed with those identified on the SFD.
The inspectors identified several discrepancies which had been previously identified and were currently being tacked by CP&L's program.
d.
The inspectors, accompanied by the start-up engineer, completed a
walkdown on the main steam system on May 15, 1986.
The as-built system status was compared to CP&L drawing CPL-2165-S-0542.
The system was additionally evaluated to its completion status and the outstanding work items were reviewe r
The results from the walkdown were concluded as follows:
The inspectors found that the as-built status of the system agreed with the applicable drawings.
Twenty-five valves were found to have the operator identification ID tags missing.
A program has been reviewed by the inspectors to complete valve ID tagging and area cleanup in an area turnover and acceptance routine.
The system was not completely insulated.
Efforts were in progress to complete this work.
Limit switch rework was in progress on the following valves as per Field Change Request FCR-SI-1017:
An inspection of the pressure operated relief valves was made to evaluate the status of the valve operator solenoids.
Prior investiga-tions of these solenoids had found that they did not meet the required environmental qualifications.
This inspection revealed that these solenoids were properly identified as to their deficiency, and temporary modification tags were attached.
Additional temporary tags were placed in reference to changeouts of the level switches LS-308A, B
and C on the hydraulic reservoirs of these valves.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Testing of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (70370C)
The inspectors toured areas of the reactor auxiliary and containment buildings.
Seven struts, eight spring can supports and eight mechanical snubbers were observed.
Visual examinations were conducted to check for deterioration and physical damage of the mechanical snubbers.
Visual examinations were also conducted to check proper installation of base support plates, fasteners, locknuts, brackets and clamps for fixed pipe supports.
8.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Fuel Receipt and Storage (60501B)
a.
During this reporting period the fuel handling building was turned over by construction to operations for new fuel receipt and storage.
The inspectors evaluated CP8L's procedures for receipt, inspection, storage and control of nuclear fuel.
The procedures were found to contain sufficient controls for the anticipated new fuel deliveries.
The inspectors evaluated CP5L's provision for control of the environment of the fuel storage and handling area.
A class
"B" cleanness was
specified and maintained in the handling and storage areas.
Fuel was stored i nside the fuel handling building in a safe array in seismically designed storage racks provided for the application.
Protection from physical damage was provided by the design of equipment and applicable procedures that restrict handling and limit access to and above the storage area of the fuel.
The licensee procedures for receiving and inspection of nuclear fuel include a review of shipping documents, applicable regulations, quality assurance records, and procurement documents to assure that the delivered materials meet acceptable requirements and regulations.
Shipping containers were inspected by the licensee as required by procedure for external damage, security seal integrity, shock indicator integrity and for loose parts or materials.
The inspectors conducted interviews with the licensee personnel to determine their knowledge of the requirements set forth in
CFR 70.52.
Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the require-ments for reporting any accidental criticality or loss or theft or attempted theft of special nuclear material.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fuel handling procedure FHP-003
"Unpacking and Handling of New Fuel Assemblies, Fuel Inserts and New Fuel Shipping Containers" to verify that the following controls were established:
Fuel handling activities were performed in accordance with an approved procedure.
Pretesting and inspection of fuel handling equipment were performed as required by the approved procedures.
Good housekeeping was maintained in the fuel handling areas.
Radiological controls were maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
Control of personnel and material entering the fuel handling area were in accordance with administrative procedures.
In addition to this review the inspectors witnessed operations personnel perform several movement evolutions which included the unpacking of the new fuel to its predesignated storage location in the new fuel pool storage racks.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Operational Staffing (36301)
The inspectors evaluated Section 6 of the "Proof and Review" revision of the Harris Operations Technical Specifications (TS).
The evaluation included comparing TS organizational structures, personnel qualification requirements and staffing plans with the current site operations staff.
The TS was found to be consistent with the FSAR and the CP&L Corporate QA Program concerning quality assurance and quality control personnel.
The qualification requirements for QA/QC management and supervisory personnel were evaluated and found to be consistent with the regulatory requirements of ANSI N18.1.
Over the past three months the inspectors have reviewed the qualification and training program for the operations personnel.
Currently there are approximately 420 personnel in the operations section at the Harris Plant.
All key positions have been filled.
As of April 1986, 30 individuals have passed their 'NRC operators licensing examination.
There are 24 individuals in training to take the next senior reactor operator (SRO)
examination.
Sixteen of these will be required positions and eight will be support personnel.
CP5L plans to have as a
minimum shift complement during operations:
one shift foreman," who will be a
SRO; two senior control operators, who will be SROs; and two reactor operators, who will be licensed reactor operator s; and four auxiliary operators.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (40301)
Ouring the months of June and July 1985, the inspectors documented in IE Report 400/85-27 the satisfactory review of the plant operations procedure AP-13,
"Plant Nuclear Safety Committee".
The procedure was evaluated against FSAR and Technical Specification commitments'he points which were considered for the evaluation included the following:
Responsibility and authorization for conducting reviews; Review group membership; Method and responsibility for designating alternate members; Requirements for a committee quorum; Frequency of meetings; Requirements for maintaining and distributing minutes of review; Lines of communication and interface with off-site review group; Provisions for follow-up action to resolve identified discrepancie ~
~
The inspectors verified that the procedure does address the requi rements relative to the Technical Specifications, Section 6,
as they relate to the safety committee activities.
The inspectors have attended several safety committee activity meetings since July 1985 and have found that these meetings were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Operations Procedure AP-13.
The inspectors have reviewed the minutes of the meetings conducted by the on-site safety committee during the past six months and-have found the results are being documented and action items have been tracked until satisfactory resolution was attained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (71302)
CP5L management notified the inspector s that problems had existed on May 12, 1986 with the feedwater system when attempting to perform a preliminary run of the preoperational test 1-3050-P-02.
All three of the bypass valves and regulator bypass valves that bypass the main block valves and feedwater regulator valves were open and the total flow through the system was measured at approximately 6620 gallons per minute.
At this point, the feedwater regulator valves were stroked and left in the closed position to assure that each operated properly from the main control room while the regulator block valves remained closed to prevent changes in the flow conditions.
After the regulator valves were each cycled and reclosed, the
"A" regulator block valve was then opened and no flow variations were seen.
Then the "B" and "C" block valves were in the process of being opened, and a
sever water hammer was felt in the turbine building.
Fluctuations in the flow were indicated on the flow instrumentation and the feedwater pumps tripped within 15 to 30 seconds after the event occurred.
The inspectors and CP5L start-up personnel performed a
walkdown of the system and the damage was found as follows:
The handwheel on "B" regulation block valve was broken off.
The floor drain was found to be loose at the connection to the feedwater (5B).
The "B" regulator bypass valve was found to have a broken yoke.
Inspection of hangers revealed that some had been moved during the event.
CPE L management has studies in progress to determine the cause and effect and to make the necessary corrections.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Technical Specification Review (71301)
During this reporting period the Region II staff completed an in-office review of the first proof and review copy of the Shearon Harris Technical Specifications.
Comments were forwarded to NRR and will be incorporated in the NRR response to CPKL.