IR 05000400/1986020
| ML18019A801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1986 |
| From: | Burnett P, Jape F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18019A800 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-20, NUDOCS 8605060016 | |
| Download: ML18019A801 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/86-20 Licensee:
Carolina Power and P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Light 1l Company" jt II Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
License,No.:
CPPR-158 Inspection Conducted:
March 4-28,
6 Ins ector:
P.
T. Bur nett in/
Date Signed companying Personnel:
A.
R.
Long Approved by:
F. Jape, Sec ion Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 66 inspector-hours at the site in the review of proposed startup test procedures.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project
- J. L. Wills, Plant General Manager
"C.
S. Hinnant, Star tup Manager
- W. Wilson, Project Engineer, Technical Support
~W. Peavyhouse, Reactor Engineer, Technical Support
"R. Duncan, Startup Engineer, Technical Support
~D. Tibbitts, Regulatory Compliance
"M. G. Wallace, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, operators, and office personnel.
Other Organization
"'estinghouse Employees G. Traylor, Startup Supervisor NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector S. Burris, Resident Inspector
"G. Humphrey, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 28, 1986, with'hose persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Proprietary material was reviewed in the course of the inspection, but is not incorporated into this report.
The licensee confirmed the following commitments to be tracked as inspector followup items:
e IFI 400/86"20-01:
IFI 400/86-20-02:
IFI 400/86"20-03:
IFI 400/86-20-04:
Revise Initial Fuel Loading Procedure, paragraph 5.b.
Revise",RCS Leakrate procedure, paragraph S.c.( 1).
Revise the Procedure for Initial Criticality, paragraph 5.d.(1).
Revise Boron Endpoint Procedure, paragraph 5.d.(3).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items No unresolved item was identified during this inspection.
5.
Review of Proposed Startup Test Procedures (72300, 72400, 72500)
The startup test summaries as described in section 14.2. 12.2 of the FSAR were compared against the licensee's list of startup of test procedures.
A procedure was identified for each required test.
The details and acceptance criteria for the test procedures were then compared with the requirements of FSAR Chapter 14, the requi rements of appropriate Regulatory Guides, and current industry practice.
The detailed inspection of the procedures was not completed for all, but those that were addressed are listed below with pertinent observations and findings where appropriate.
a.
Startup Test Administrative Procedures (1)
9100-S-01 (Revision 0), Start-up Power Test Program.
(2)
9100-S-02 (Revision 0), Start-up Power Test Log.
b.
Cold Shutdown Testing Procedures (1)
9101-S-01 (draft), Initial Fuel Load Step 3. 1 does not specify that the SRO for refueling has no other concurrent duties which is a
requirement of standard Technical Specifications.
Step 3.2 implies that the residual heat removal system (RHR) can be turned off indefinitely.
This is contrary to standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors, but is consistent with the Technical Specifications proposed by the licensee.
However, that deviation from the standard may not be approved since it seems to ignore the concern for boron stratification that requires RHR operation even with unirradiated fuel.
Step 3. 13.5, Note 2, specifies actions to be taken if the inverse count rate ratio (ICRR) drops below 0. l.
Since criticality during fuel load has no defense, and is not anticipated, the licensee agreed that the action level should be changed to ICRR = 0.5.
'
Sections 6. 1. 1 and 6. 1.2 allude to required surveillance tests without specifying the test.
The licensee agreed the surveillance test procedures should be identified by procedure numbe The licensee commitment to revise the procedure as described above was confirmed at the exit interview.
The commitment will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 400/86-20-01:
Revise the Initial Fuel Loading Procedure.
(2)
(3)
9101-S-04 (Revision 0),
Core Loading Instrumentation Check.
9101-S-06 (Revision 0),
Rod Drive Mechanism Timing Test -
RCS Cold.
(4)
9101-S-07 (Revision 0),
Rod Drop Time Measurement, RCS Cold No Flow.
9101-S-08 (Revision 0),
Rod Drop Time Measurement, RCS Cold Full Flow.
(6)
9101-S-09 (Revision 0), Incore Moveable Detector System Checkout.
c.
Hot Shutdown Testing 9102-S-02 (Revision 0), Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Test, was reviewed in concert with the corresponding surveillance test procedure, OST-1026 (Revision 1),
RCS Leakage ~valuation.
The startup test does not specify a test duration, but the licensee did agree a
period of two to four hours would be appropriate.
It also lacks requirements to control T-average and account for any change, to prohibit taking water samples or adding water during the test, and to start with the VCT level high to preclude the need for adding water during the test.
Since the test addresses a limiting condition for operation, the acceptance criterion should be classed as level 1, not level 3.
The surveillance test does require that T-average be maintained constant, but provides no limits on constancy.
Attachment III contains a correction factor to account for a change in T-average, but one correction factor is not sufficient to cover the range of temperatures over which the test is required to be performed.
The procedure does not limit sample taking.
Further, on page 8, the gross leakage should be corrected for identified leakage before being compared with the acceptance criterion, which is the limit on unidentified leakage.
Finally, the identified leakage should be compared with the limit of 10 gpm for such leakage.
(2)
Following discussions of the procedure, the licensee agreed to the changes outlined above, and the commitment was confirmed at the exit interview.
It will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 400/86-20-02:
Revise RCS leakrate procedures.
9102-S-03 (Revision 0), Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement by d/ ~ i
(3)
(4)
9102-S-04 (Revision 0), Reactor Coolant System Flow Coastdown
~
9102-S-05 (Revision 0),
RTD Bypass Loop Flow Verification.
9102-S-09 (Revision 0),
Rod Drop Time Measurement, RCS Hot -
No Flow.
(6)
d.
Zero 9102-S-10 (Revision 0),
Rod Drop Time Measurement, RCS Hot - Full Flow.
Power Testing 9103-S-01 (Revision 0), Initial Criticality, was reviewed in concert with WCAP -
10781 (Proprietary),
The Nuclear Desiin and Core Physics Characteristics of the Shearon Harris Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant Cycle 1.
In step 3.16, the reference should be to 4.12 not 4
~ 13.
The procedure does not control the VCT spray valve in the alternate dilute mode.
Spraying the VCT with unborated water during the approach to criticality can result in an over-diluted VCT.
Then, when dilution stops, deboration will continue during mixing.
That in turn can lead to a reactivity overshoot requiring considerable insertion of the control rods to compensate.
The dynamic check of the reactivity computer does not include compari sons with negative periods.
Since the computer will be used to measure negative reactivities during the tests that follow, it should be checked ( calibrated)
over the entire span of intended users WCAP-10781 does not include a specific prediction of the critical boron concentration with D
bank at 160 steps withdrawn, the configuration established by the procedure.
Hence, the procedure should include a calculation of the predicted concentration using the information and analyses provided in WCAP-10781.
(2)
(3)
During discussions of the procedure with licensee personnel, they agreed to correct the procedure to address the comments above.
That commitment was confirmed at the exit interview, and will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 400/86-20-03:
Revise the procedure for initial criticality.
9103-S-04 (Revision 0), Technical Specification Surveillance and Data Acquisition During Low Power Physics Testing, implements and documents the survei llances require by Technical Specifications 4. 10.x when operating under the special tests exceptions allowed by limiting conditions for operation 3. 10.x.
9103-S-05 (Revision 0), Boron Endpoint Measurement All Rods Ou a o
Step 6. 10 requires a stable boron concentration, but the term is not defined in the 'procedure ( for example successive measurements within 5 ppmB).
Step 6. 11.2 requires averaging over all measurements of boron concentration, but the averaging should be limited to the period of stability.
In discussions of the procedure the licensee staff agreed to the procedure changes described above for all measurements of boron endpoint concentration.
The commitment was confirmed at the exit interview, and will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 400/86-20-04:
Revise Boron Endpoint procedures.
The completion date for all of the procedure revisions discussed above is May 31, 1986, and is part of each commitment.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of the proposed startup test procedure ~
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