IR 05000400/1986026
| ML18004A271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Madden P, Taylor P, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004A270 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-26, NUDOCS 8607070224 | |
| Download: ML18004A271 (51) | |
Text
~pS AEqy P0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 YJ
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v. i,;v Report No.:
50-400/86-26 Licensee:
Docket No.:
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Pl
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Ii Carolina Power and Light Compan P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 50-400
/
'I fl,, Li R
U cense" No.": ~,. CPPR-158 l
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Facility Name:
Harris Inspection Conducted:
May 5-9, Inspectors:
'.
M.
M dden 1986 4-95-SA Date Signed P
A. Tayl o G.
R.
W eman Accompanying Personnel:
A. Herdt T. McElhinney Af)SC ~ a Date Signed 4-ax-s~
Date Signed Approved by Py f Pi g. Coo T.
. Conlon, Section Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
/-sr-sr Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
A special announced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of fire protection and the licensee's actions regarding the implementation of the plant safe shutdown guidance provided in Standard Review Plan 9.5. 1, positions C.5.b and CD 5.c.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"P. Carier, Project Engineering Licensing
- N. J. Cheiangi, Manager, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)
- J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations
"G. L. Forehand, Director of QA/QC
- S. Hardy, (HPES) Harris Project Engineering Support
- C. S. Hinnant, Manager, Startup
"L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support
- D. Mar kle, Fire Protection, Harris Project Operation Support
- C. L. McKenzie, Acting Director, Operations QA/QC
"G. A. Meyer, General Manager, Milestone Completion
- M. R. Oates, Nuclear Licensing
- J.
F. Pinto, Harris Project Engineering Support
- J.
H. Smith, Supervisor, Harris Project Operations Support
- M. Stokes, Harris Project Operations Support Fire Protection
- D. Tibbitts, Acting Director Regulatory Compliance
- M. F. Thompson, Jr, Manager, Harris Project Engineering Management
- E. J.
Wagner, General Manage~
- R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project
- E. E.
Willett, Harris Project Construction Support
- S.
R.
Zimmerman, Manager, Nuclear Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
"M. G. Gagliardi, Supervisor, Mechanical Engineering EBASCO
- J.
P. Kirk, Project Administrator, Daniels Construction NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Maxwell
- G. Humphrey
"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 9, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and di scussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee:
")
4 I
'E
a.
Inspector Fol 1 owup Item (400/86-26-01),
Verification of Design and Procedural Changes Required to Maintain RCP Seal Integrity in the Event of Fire paragraph 5.a. (1)(h).
b.
Unresolved Item (400/86-26-02),
Inadequate Direct Process RCS Monitoring Functions Provided in the Control Room for Fire Related Shutdown Operations paragraph 5.a(1)(h).
C.
Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-03),
Provide the Analysis and Methodology that Documents that Sufficient Time and Manpower is Available to Accomplish the Operations in AOP-004, to Achieve Hot Standby Conditions paragraph 5.b(2).
.d.
Inspector Fol 1owup Item (400/86-26-04),
Review of Licensee'
Analysi s for Unprotected Cable Tray/Conduit Supports - paragraph 6.b.
e.
Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-05),
Failure of Fire Brigade to Demonstrate Proper Manual Firefighting Techniques During a Fire Drill paragraph 7.
f.
Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-06),
Review of Emergency Lighting for a Fire Event paragraph 8.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.a(1)(h).
Compliance with NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5. 1, Positions C.5.b, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability and C.5.c, Alternative Shutdown Capability.
An inspection was conducted to determine if the proposed fire protection features for structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown at the Harris Facility will be in compliance with Standard Review Plan (SRP)
9.5. 1, Positions C.5.b and C.5.c.
The scope of this inspection determined if the proposed fire protection features which will be provided for reactor coolant system inventory control, steam generator inventory control, and reactor coolant system pressure control would be capable of limiting potential fire damage so that one train of these systems essential to achieving and maintaining hot standby from either the control room or emergency control stations are free from fire damag lg
Safe Shutdown Capability In order to 'ensure shutdown capability, where cables or equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions are located within the same fire area outside the primary containment, SRP 9.5.1, position C.S.b requires that one train of hot standby systems be maintained free from fire damage by fire protection features which meet the requirements of either C.5.b(2)(a), C,5.b(2)(b),
or C.5 '(2)(c).
On the basis of the above SRP 9.5. 1 criteria, the inspectors made an inspection of the cabling and components associated with the Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS); Auxiliary Feedwater System'(AFW),
Main Steam System (MS),
Component Cooling Water System (CCW),
Emergency Service Water System (ESWS),
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS),
AC Power Distribution System (PDSAC),
and Emergency Diesel Generator System (EDGS).
(1)
Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Systems/Components Shearon Harris Unit 1, upon completion of construction, will be divided into 32 separate fire areas.
An inspection was made of these fire areas to determine if redundant cabling, equipment and/or components required to achieve or maintain hot standby and cold shutdown conditions are going to be provided with adequate separation and/or protection in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.S.b.
Within the following fire areas, the proposed fire protection features and the cable routings for redundant safe shutdown systems were inspected:
'a)
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 236'0",
Fire Area FAABA3 (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-BAL(A))
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAABA3 associated with the electric power distribution, emergency service water, auxiliary feedwater, component cooling water and chemical volume and control shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1 position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features in thi s fire area would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
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A - Train Cables 11765 A&D 11775 A, B,
& C
- 11755 A, B,
& C 12211A 12291 B & C 11976A, C, &K 11921A 10242 A&B 10440 A&B 10221A 10941A Function 480V power feed from 1A3-SA to MCC 1A22-SA 480V power feed from bus 1A3-SA to MCC 1A32-SA 480V power feed from bus 1B3-SB to MCC 1B35-SB
~
Note Cables 11755 A,
B,
& C will be protected by three hour fire barrier enclosures in the containment penetration area between column 8/12-E/FU and in common area cables 11755 A &
B will be protected by a
one hour fire bar rier between column 36/34 C/B.
Power to emergency service water pump PIA-SA.
Note -
Cable 12211A will be protected by a three-hour fire barrier enclosure in the containment penetration area between column 8/12 E/FU.
Control screen wash pump PIA-SA Power and control to AFW pump lx-SAB Power to AFW pump PIA-SA Power and control to RWST valve 2CS-L523SA-1 Power and control to safety inspection valve 2SI-V502SA-1 Power to charging pump PIA-SA Power to component cooling water (CCW}
pump PIA-SA
'I E
B" TRAIN Cables Function 11770 A&D 480V power feed from 1B3-SB to NCC 1B22-SB.
Note - Cables 11770 A&D will be protected by a partial three hour barrier in the Train
"A" residual heat removal heat exchanger room and a one-hour fire barrier in the common area between column 15/18 - D/E 12212A Power to emergency service water pump PIB-SB 12234A Power to service water booster pump PIB-SB 12299 B&C Control to screen wash pump PIB-SB Note Cable 12299 B&C will be protected by a one-hour fire barrier enclosure in containment penetration area between column 13/15 FZ/FV.
11922A Power to AFW pump PIB-SB Note - Greater than 20 feet of special separation from the redundant cable 11921A is provided in RAB common area.
10244 A&B 10268 A&B 10410 A&B Power and control to refueling water storage tank valve (RWST) 2CS-L522 SB-1.
Power and control to boric acid valve 2CS-V586SB-1.
Note Cable 10268A will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39 - B/C.
Cable 10268B is afforded a
minimum of
feet of special separation from the RWST valves and cabling within fire area FAABA3.
Power and control to boron injection tank valve 2SI-V504SB-l.
10408 A & B Power and control to boron injection tank valve 2SI-V5055B-1
10222A Power to charging pump PIB-SB 10942A Note The charging pumps are separated by one-hour fire rated walls and cable 10222A is routed in an embedded raceway away from the Train "A" pump cubical.
Power to CCW Pump PIB-SB Note Cable 10942A is separated in RAB common area from it's redundant counterpart by greater than 20 feet.
11755 A, B,
& C 480V power feed from bus 1B3-SB to MCC 1B35-SB.
Note Cables 11755 A, B,
&
C will be protected by three-hour fire barrier enclosures in the containment penetration area between column 8/12-E/FU and in common area cables 11755 A
&
B will be protected by a
one hour fire barrier between column 36/34 C/B.
12211A Power to emergency service water pump P IA-SA.
Note Cable 12211A wi 1 1 be protected by a three-hour fire barrier enclosure in the containment penetration area between column 8/12 E/FU.
12291 B & C 11976 A, C,
& K 11921A 10242 A&B Control screen wash pump PIA-SA Power and control to AFW pump 1X-SAB Power to AFW pump PIA-SA
Power and control to RWST valve 2CS-L523SA-1 Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAABA3 should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damage.
(b)
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 261'
0", Fire Area FAABB4 (FSAR Fire Ara 1-A-BAL(B))
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAABB4 associated with the electrical power distribution, emergency service water, auxiliary feedwater, chemical volume and
control and component cooling water functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, Position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
A-TRAIN Cables Function 11701 A, B, & C Train "A" diesel generator power feed to 6.9KV bus 1A-SA. Note Cables 11701 A,
B,
&
C will be protected by a one-hour fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39 - B/C, 11724A 11765 A&D Power feed to 480V.
BUS lA2-SA.
480Y power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A22-SA.
Note Cables 11765A
&
D are separated from redundant cables 11770 A&D by spacial separation which exceeds
feet.
11775 A, B, & C 480V power feed from BUS lA3-SA to MCC 1A32-SA.
Note Cables 11775 A, B, & C are separated from redundant cables 11779 A,
B,
&
C by: spacial separation which exceeds 20 feet.
11753 A&B 12211 A, D,-F, G, &W 12233 A, E',
F, H, K&N 480V power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A35-SA.
Power and control to ESW pump PIA-SA Power and control to service water booster pump PIA-SA.
Note Cables 12233 E,
K,
& N will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 25/39-B/C.
Cable 12233H will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 25/36 B/D.
10242 A, B,
& C Power and control to RWST valve 2CS-L523SA-1 10440C Control to safety injection valve 2SI-V502SA-1
10271C 10221 A&D 10229 A, C, E,
G & H 10941A 11922A 11975 A, 8, C,
D, E,
F,H,K,N Control to CVCS valve 2CS-V610SA-1 Power and control to charging pump PIA-SA Power and control to boric acid pump PIA-SA Power to CCW pump PIA-SA Power to AFW pump PIB-SB Power and control to main power and control to main steam supply valve 2MS-VBSA-1 to turbine driven AFW.
Cables 8-TRAIN Function 11749 A, 8,
& C 11770 A & D 11771 A, 8,
& C 11779 A, 8,
& C 11755 A&8 12212A Train "8" diesel generator power feed to 6.9 KV BUS 18-SB.
Note Cables 11749 A, 8,
& C will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39 8/C.
480V power feed from BUS 183-SB to MCC 1822-SB 480V power feed from BUS 183-SB to MCC 1823-SB.
Note - Cables 11771 A, 8,
&
C will be protected by a
one hour fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39 8/C and will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in the RAB recycle monitor tank and corridor area between column 42/43 8/C.
480V power feed from BUS 183-SB to MCC 1832-SB.
480V Power feed from BUS 183-SB to MCC 1835-SB.
Note -
Cable 11755A will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39-8/C.
Power to ESW pump PIB-SB
Ã
12234A Power to service
. water booster pump PIB-SB.
Note - Cable 12234A will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in RAB common area between column 36/39-8/C.
12299 BKC Control to screen wash pump PIB-SB.
Note Cable 12299C will be protected by a
three-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in the south RAB corridor area between column 13/15 - E/FZ 10244 A, B, 8(
C Power and control to RWST valve 2CS-L5225B-1 10268 A, B, & C Power and control to boric acid valve 2CS-V5865B-1 10222A Power to charging pump PIB-SB.
Note-Cable 10222A will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier in common area between column 31/36-B/C.
10230 AKC Power and control to boric acid pump PIB-SB 10942A Power to CCW pump PIB-SB Note Cable 10942A will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier in RAB common area between column 31/36-B/C.
11922A Power to AFW pump PIB-SB Note Cable 11922A will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier in RAB common area between column 31/36-8/C.
Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAABB4 should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damag l
(c)
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 261'
0", Electrical Penetration Room
"A", Fire Area FAAEPA (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-EPA).
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAAEPA associated with the electrical power distribution, reactor coolant, main steam and chemical volume and control systems functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
A-TRAIN Cables Function 11754 A&B 480V power feed from BUS lA3-SA to MCC 1A36"SA.
10136B Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V283-SA-1 10134B Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V281SA-1 10137B Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V284SA-1.
Note Cable 10137B will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in electrical penetration room
"A" between column 15/16/- FZ/FV.
10440C Control to safety injection val ve 2SI-V502SA-1 10271C Control to CVCS valve 2CS-V610SA-1 11975A, B,
C, 5 D
Power and control to main steam valve 2MS-VBSA-1 Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of thi.s report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAAEPA should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damag (d)
Reactor Auxiliary Building - Elevation 261'
0", Electrical Penetration Room
"B", Fire Area FAAEPB (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-EPB)
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAAEPB associated with the electrical power distribution, reactor coolant, and chemical volume and control shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.S.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capabi-lity from fire damage:
A-Train Cables 11754 A8iB Function 480V power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A36-SA B-Train Cables Function 1013 5B 10133B 10138B 10268C 10410B 11770 A 5 0 10408B 10230C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V282SB-1 Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC"V2805B-1 Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V285 SB-1.
Note - Cable 10138B will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure in the Electrical Penetration Room "B" between column 38/39 E/FZ Control to boric acid valve 2CS-V586 SB-1 Boron injection tank safety injection valve 2SI-V504 SB-1 480V power feed from BUS 1B3-SB to MCC 1B22-SB Boron injection tank safety injection valve 2SI-V505 SB-1 Control to bori c acid addition pump PIB-SB
Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAAEPB should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damage.
(e)
Reactor Auxiliary Building - Elevation 286'
0", Heating and Ventilation Rooms
and 4, Fire Area FAABB5 (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-BAL(B))
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAABB5 associated with the electrical power distribution, emergency service water, reactor coolant, chemical volume and control and main steam system shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
A-Train Cables Function 11764 A&B 11774 A&B 11777 A&D 11754 A&B 480V power feed from BUS lA3-SA to MCC 1A21-SA 480V power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A31-SA 480V power feed from BUS lA3-SA to MCC lA34-SA 480V power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A36-SA 10137B Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V284 SA-1 10440 A, B,
&. C Power and control to safety injection valve 2SI-V502 SA-1 10271C Control to RCS valve 2CS-V610 SA-1 11975 A, B, C,
D, &M Power and control to main steam supply valve 2MS-V8SA-1 to turbine driven AFT%I pump
~ 4
11254B Control to main steam power operated relief valve 2MS-P185SA-1 B-Train Cabl e Function 11779 A, B,
& C 480V power feed from BUS 1B3-SB to MCC 1B32-SB 12299 B Control to screen wash pump PIB-SB Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAABB5 should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damage.
(f)
Reactor Auxiliary Building - Elevation 286'
0", Heating and Ventilation Area, Fire Area FAABC5 (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-BAL (C))
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAABC5 associated with the electrical power distribution, emergency service water, reactor coolant and chemical volume and control system shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage.
A-Train Cabl es Functions 11754 A&B 480V power feed from BUS 1A3-SA to MCC 1A36-SA Note Cables 11754 A and B will be protected by three-hour raceway fire barrier enclosures between column 38/39-GY/ B-Train Cables 11770 A&0 11769 A&B 12287C 12299C 10135B 10133B 10138B 10268C 10410 B&C 10408 B&C Function 480V power feed from BUS 1B3-SB to MCC 1B22-SB 480V power feed from BUS 1B3-SB to MCC 1B21-SB Control to service water valve 3SW-
'16SB-1 Control to screen wash pump PIB-SB Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V282SB-1 Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V280SB-1 Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V285SB-1.
Note Cable 10138B will be protected by a three-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 38/39-FZ/FV.
Control to boric acid valve 2CS-V586SB-1 Control to boron injection tank valve 2SI-V504SB-1 Control to boron injection tank valve 2SI-V505SB-1 10230C Control to boric acid addition pump PIB-SB Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, 'he level of fire protection in fire area FAABC5 should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damag e
(g)
Reactor Auxiliary Building - Elevation 286'
0", Train "A" Cable Spreading Room, Fire Area FAACSA (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-CRSA)
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAACSA associated with the electrical power distribution, emergency service water, reactor coolant, chemical volume and control, component cooling water and auxiliary feedwater system shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
.A-Train Cables Function 11724A 12211F, G, N&R 6.9KV power feed to 480V BUS 1A2-SA Control to emergency service water pump PIA-SA 12233 E,
H, K, & N. Control to service water booster pump PIA-SA 10136 B & C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V283SA-1.
Note Cable 10136 B wi 1 1 be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 18/23-C/D.
Cable 10136C will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barr ier enclosure between column 42/43 D/E 10134 B&C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V281SA-1.
Note Cable 10134B will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 18/23-C/D.
Cable 10134C will be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 42/43 D/E.
10142 C,
D, & E 10440 C,
D, & G Control to RWST valve 2CS-L523SA-1 Control to safety injection valve 2SI-V502SA-1 10439 D & G Control to safety injection valve 2SI-VSOOSA-1
I 'I
10271D, E, &H 10221 D & E 10223 D & E 10229 F & H Control to RCS charging valve 2CS-V610SA-1 Control to charging pump PIA-SA Control to charging pump PIC-SAB Control to boric acid addition pump PIA-SA 10941 D, E,
& K 11975F, G, H&K Control to CCM pump PIA-SA Control to main steam supply valve 2MS-V8SA-1 to turbine driven AFW pump 11921, M, N,
& Q Control to AFM pump PIA-SA B-Train Cable 10135C Function Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V282SB-1.
Note Cable 10135C will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 41/42 D/E.
10137 B & C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-V284SA-1 10138C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-Y2855B-1.
Note Cable 10138C will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 42/43-B/C.
Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that upon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAACSA should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damag (h)
Reactor Auxiliary Building - Elevation 286'
0", Train "B" Cable Spreading Room, Fire Area FAACSB, (FSAR Fire Area 1-A-CRSB)
An inspection was made to verify that the following safe shutdown related cabling routed through fire area FAACSB associated with the emergency service water, reactor coolant, chemical volumn and control, component cooling, auxiliary feedwater and main steam system shutdown functions would be protected in accordance with SRP 9.5. 1, position C.5.b and that the licensee's proposed plant fire protection features would maintain one train of safe shutdown capability free from fire damage:
B-Train Cables Function 12212 F,
G, N,
8(
R 12234 H, K, N, 8(
R 10135 B
8(
C Control to emergency service water pump'PIB-SB.
Control to emergency service water booster pump PIB-SB.
Control to reactor head vent valve 2RL V282SB-1.
Note - Cable 10135B will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 39/41 D/E.
Cable 10135C will be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 41/42 D/E.
10133 B 5 C
Control to reactor head vent valve 2RL-V280SB-1.
Note Cabl e 10133B wi 1 1 be protected by a one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 39/41 D/E.
Cable 10133C wi 1 1 be protected by a
one-hour raceway fire barrier enclosure between column 41/42 " D/E.
10138C Control to reactor head vent valve 2RC-Y285SB-1 10244 D,
E, 5 G
10268 E
10441 D
8(
H Control to RWST valve 2CS-L522SB-1 Control to boric acid valve 2CS-V586SB-1 Control to safety injection valve 2SI-V501SB-1
10408 C,
D, 5 E
Control to boron injection tank safety injection valve 2SI-V504SB-1 10272 E,
G,
H Control to RCS charging valve 2CS-V609SB-1 10222E 10230 F
8(
H Control to charging pump PIA-SA Control to boric acid addition pump PIB-SB 10942 D, E, K 5 R
Control to CCW pump PIB-SB 10944 K & L Control to CCW pump PIC-SAB 11922 E,
M, & N Control to AFW pump PIB-SB 11002C Control to main steam isolation valve 2MS-V2SAB-1
~
11253 E Control to main steam power operated relief valve 2MS-P19SB-1 11255 C,
E, F,
Control to main steam power operated G, 5 N
operated relief valve 2MS P19SB-1 Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis and the routings of the above sampled safe shutdown related cables, it appears, that 'pon completion of the fire protection features as discussed in paragraph 6 of this report, the level of fire protection in fire area FAACSB should maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby fr ee from fire damage.
In addition to the inspection of the licensee's methodology with respect to maintaining one train of safe shutdown systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby free from fire damage, the inspectors verified that the primary reactor coolant system boundary integrity would be maintained and that di rect Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
process monitoring capabilities would be assured with respect to fire conditions outside the control room.
e Therefore, based on the inspection of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis in case of fire, it was determined that the licensee's analysis did not maintain reactor coolant pump (RCP)
seal integrity in fire areas FAACSB, FAASGB, FAABC5 and FAABB4.
The licensee agreed that for a fire in the above fire areas, they would initiate the following manual actions prior RCP seal degradatio '1 A
,I I]i O'
Fire In Manual Action FAACSB Open Valves 2CC-V170SB, 2CC-V190SB and 2CC-F2SN-1.
This will ensure CCW flow thermal barriers.
FAASGB or FAABC5 Open valves 2CC-V170SB and 2CC-V190SB.
This will ensure CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers.
FAABB4 Open valves 2CC-V169SA, 2CC-V191SA and
'CC-F2SN-1.
This will ensure CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers.
In addition, in order to open valve 2CC-V191SA, which is located inside the containment, for a fire condition which occurs either in fire area FAACRC (Control Room Complex)
or FAASGB (Switchgear Room B)
the licensee is going to implement a design change which will fail the valve in the open position upon transferring the valve circuit to the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP). This design change will be implemented by the licensee under Field Change Request (FCR) I-3343.
Therefore, this item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-01),
Verification of Design and Procedural Changes Required to Maintain RCP Seal Integrity in the Event of Fire.
The licensee's safe shutdown analysis did not address the availability of RCS T-Cold instrumentation for fire conditions outside the control room.
The licensee's analysis indicated that they did not need to
'rotect T-Cold since their R.G.
1.97 response dated April 15, 1983, identified that steam generator pressure was an acceptable alternative to T-Cold.
This position appears to be in conflict with the process monitoring criteria established by IE Notice 84-09, Attachment I,Section IX.
Therefore, this is identified as an Unresolved Item (400/86-26-02),
Inadequate Direct Process RCS Monitoring Functions Provided in the Control Room for Fire Related Shutdown Operations.
b.
Safe Shutdown and Alternative Shutdown Capability The in'spector s reviewed operating personnel training, shift staffing, and the use of plant procedures as these activities relate to safe shutdown and alternative shutdown capability.
These areas were reviewed to determine if the requirements of NUREG 0800, Section 9.5. 1.b and 9.5. l.c for, placing the plant in hot stand-by conditions and subsequently cooling the plant to cold shutdown conditions can be achieved.
(1)
Operating Personnel Training The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for conducting training on the procedure used for safe shutdown and alternative shutdown in case of fire.
AOP-004, Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire
or Control Room Inaccessibility, is the principle procedure used to achieve safe shutdown and alternative shutdown capability.
The inspectors examined training records and the lesson plan used for training and noted that the lesson plan covered NUREG 0800; the function of the remote auxiliary control panel (ACP) and AOP-004, Revision 1.
The inspectors noted that this training was provided to licensee operators during September, 1985.
Subsequent to this training Revision 2 dated April 7, 1986 was issued to AOP-004.
Revision 2 is a major change to Section 3.2, Alternative Shutdown Capability with regards to the operation of systems at the ACP and manual restoration of components to put selected systems back in to service following a major control room fire.
The licensee is preparing a requalification training schedule for licensed operators.
Training on the latest revisions to AOP-004 is planned during July 7 through August 8, 1986 for all shifts.
During this inspection the licensee had not developed a
lesson plan which addresses the latest revisions to AOP-004.
During discussions concerning the development of a
new lesson plan the inspectors brought to the attention of licensee management that the operating personnel who developed and walked through the procedure steps on the latest revisions to AOP-004 should make a
significant input into the lesson plan.
The inspectors stressed that operators should be given as much guidance as possible concerning the setting of priorities for restoring systems to service, preventing damage to equipment due to fire induced spurious operations, the appropriate use of fire plans, the setting of priorities for stopping spurious events and an understanding of the critical times to stop spurious operations for high/low pressure interface boundary valves which if not attended to could lead to a loss of volume either in the reactor coolant system or the steam generators.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed Training Instruction, 200 Revision 2, Licensed Operators Requalification Program which does provides for on going training which includes formal classroom lectures, simulator training on abnormal operating procedures and the significant revision to these procedures.
On-The-Job training for operators is scheduled during the fourth quarter of each year and administrative controls requi res conducting a
complete walk-through of AOP-004.
Shift Staffing The inspectors held discussions with fire protection engineers and operating personnel to review operator actions for conducting AOP-004, Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire or Control Room Inaccessi-bilityy.
Section 3. 1 is used to conduct a safe shutdown from the main control room when a
major fire in any plant fire area dictates such action.
Attachment 1, Affected Systems vs Fire
\\'.g
Areas, identifies the plant fire areas and the systems within the fire area which could be damaged by fire or could be affected by fire induced spurious operation of components.
Once the fire area is identified, as indicated by the fire panel alarms in the control room the operators can then refer to previously prepared fire plans for the specific fire area.
The fire plan identifies a
list of potentially affected equipment and systems and also a list of. the redundant equipment and systems.
Procedure steps require that affected equipment be shutdown in order to avoid damage, due to fire induced spurious valve operation.
Operator action is also taken to disconnect power to valves listed in the fire plan area to prohibit spurious operations.
Section 3. 1. 11 of AOP-004 provides safe shutdown guide-lines which gives operators guidance and manual operation to be accompli shed in the plant to restore affected safe shutdown system to service.
Once systems are restored to service they can be operated from the control room.
The fire protection engineers confirmed that the operation of system pumps (eg CVCS, AFW, ESW)
can be accomplished from the control room and that control power to main control board switches is available so that operators have the capability to isolate primary and secondary system high/low interface boundaries, such as power operated relief valves so that RCS and steam generator water volumes can be controlled.
Section 3.2, Control Room Inaccessibility portion of the procedure requires transferring to the remote auxiliary control panel in the reactor auxiliary building to achieve and maintain hot stand-by conditions.
The licensee has assigned five operators to manually isolate and restore to oper ation components in selected systems which will then be operated from the ACP.
The inspectors noted as a result of walking throu'gh this portion of the procedure that the manual restoration of systems (eg charging, auxiliary feedwater, emergency service water, component cooling water)
and the stopping of spurious high/low pressure valve operation is critical before the loss of pressurizer level or steam generator level which could adversely affect RCS pressure control, and the decay heat removal capability.
In addition, the transfer from the control room to the ACP to stop fire induced spurious events is one of the most critical operator actions Based on the times provided in Chapter 15 of the FSAR for a stuck open pressurizer PORV or a
steam generator PORV very little time exist where the loss of RCS and steam generator water inventory must be stopped in order not to lose pressurizer level or uncover the reactor core and reduce decay heat removal capability.
After reviewing the overall operation of AOP-004 and noting that Section III B of the licensee's, safe shutdown analysis which states; For Components required to achieve and maintain hot standby, manual operation of equipment such as valves, switches, circuit breaker s, etc.,
is considered an acceptable means of operating equipment and isolating systems only if it can be demonstrated that sufficient
}
~
time and manpower i s available.
Based on the above, the inspectors have identified Inspector, Followup Item (400/86-26-03),
Provide the Analysis and Methodology that Documents that Sufficient Time and Manpower is Available to Accompl.i sh the Operations in AOP-004 to Achieve Hot Standby Conditions.
(3)
Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) General Procedures (GP)
and Emergency Operating Procedures-End Path Procedures (EOP-EPP)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's AOP,GP and EOP-EPP procedures to determine that systems necessary to accomplish the performance goals of NUREG 0800, Section 9.5. l.b and 9.5. l.c as given below have been incorporated into applicable procedures:
Achieve and maintain hot standby conditions Achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor Provide decay heat removal capabilities Maintain reactor coolant inventory and steam generator inventory Achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions Provide direct readings of process variables necessary to control the above conditions Provide supporting systems necessary to permit the operation of equipment used for safe shutdown The following procedures were reviewed:
AOP-004, Revision 3 Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire or Control Room Inaccessibi 1 ity GP-006, Revision 1, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 1 to 3)
GP-007, Revision 1,
Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to 5)
EOP-EPP-005, Revision 0, Natural Circulation Cooldown The principle procedure used to accomplish hot standby and the subsequent cooldown to cold. shutdown condition is AOP-004.
Systems necessary to accomplish the above performance goals have been incorporated into this procedure.
The inspectors examined the process variables used to monitor system performance while achieving and maintaining hot standby conditions The direct reading instrumentation that is available meets the minimum monitoring capability identified in
P
IE Notice 84-09 or approval has been received from NRR to use other means, except for that identified in paragraph 5.a.
by Unresolved Item (400/86-26-02).
In addition to reviewing the above procedures the inspectors conducted a walk-through of AOP-004, Section 3.2 Control Room Inaccessibility.
The procedure assumes that all safe shutdown equipment is affected and that a.loss of offsite power may occur.
The procedure has steps to use the emergency diesel generator and utilizes Train B
systems and equipment.
The purpose of the walk-through was to verify that:
Communications between various stations are adequate and operable.
Identification plates installed on valves and instrumentation agree with that called for in the procedure steps.
Equipment and valves to be operated can be reached and are not obstructed.
Sound power phone headsets and procedures to be used are available.
Steps of procedures are clear and can be accomplished.
As a result of the walk-through of AOP-004 the inspectors noted that equipment identification plates did not agree with that called for by the procedure steps in several cases.
It was noted that the licensee is in the process of upgrading component identification plates, however, some were already completed that were in error.
This item was provided to the licensee for correction.
It was pointed out to the licensee that obtaining the
"ACP transfer key" from a
locked locker at the ACP can delay the transfer to the ACP from the control room.
The time to complete the transfer is critical in order to stop the spuriously operation of primary and secondary system boundary valves which is necessary to stop the loss of
, water inventory and enhance the capability to control pressurizer level, pressure, and decay heat removal.
The walk through also revealed that the backup means of phone communications (Bell system) is still being installed in various areas of the plant.
The inspectors review of AOP-004 resulted in several comments which required that certain procedure steps be clarified, the rearranging of steps for control of operating equipment and the addition of primary and secondary system boundary valves.
Inspector's comments were addressed by Change No. I to the procedure dated May 8, 1986.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie.
Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features for Safe Shutdown Systems/
Components An inspection was made to determine if the fire protection provided for safe shutdown systems is adequate with regard to maintaining one train of hot stand-by systems free from fire damage as required by the Standard Review Plan (SRP) 9.5.1
~
a.
Plant Tour A walkthrough inspection was made of the following fire areas/zones to evaluate the licensee's progress and action on implementation of the fire protection features and commitments to meet the requirements of SRP 9.5. 1
~
The NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
dated November 1983, its Supplement 2,
and the licensee's Fire Protection Hazards Analysis (Appendix 9.5.A of the FSAR) were used in this evaluation.
(1)
Containment (Fire Area 1-C/FARCB)
f Automatic multicycle sprinkler systems will be provided over safe shutdown related electrical cable trays and conduits, the charcoal filter housings, electrical penetration areas, and over the Pressure Operated Relief Valves (PORV's).
The sprinkler systems will be activated by thermal detectors located in the area.
At the time of the inspection the detection system was incomplete within the fire area.
The sprinkler system was being hydrostati-cally tested and was not complete at elevation 236'zimuth 240, for protection of some safe shutdown cables.
(2)
Reactor Auxiliary Building, Elevation 190', (Fire Area 1-A-BAL/
FAABA1)
Fire zones 1-A-1-PA and l-A-1-PB are provided with an automatic sprinkler system activated by thermal detection.
The thermal detection system, however, was not complete nor had the licensee performed a sprinkler system obstruction walkdown for the fire area.
The inspectors noted that the fire door installation for the north stairwell enclosure was also not complete.
(3)
Reactor Auxiliary Building, Elevation 216',
(Fire Area 1-A-BAL/
FAABA2)
This fire area is provided with a multicycle automatic sprinkler system.
The inspectors pointed out to the licensee several potential sprinkler, head obstructions along column lines FZ and FV, between columns 15 and 25.
In addition, the detection system in this area was not complete, fire doors in fire barrier walls column 15, were not complete; and, the stairwell fire doors on this elevation were not functional.
Penetration seals for the stairwells and fire area boundary walls were also incomplet Reactor Auxi 1 iary Bui 1 ding El evati on 236'Fire Area 1-A-BAL/
FAABA3)
The inspector's review of the fire area boundary indicated that open pipe and electrical cable tray penetrations existed in the fire walls along column line 14, column line 13, column line 43, B/L; and around the stairwell enclosures.
Within these fire wall boundaries the installation of TSI fire proofing for the fire door transams and mullions was also incomplete.
The fire detection system, zone 1-19, has not yet been installed.
The fire suppression, provided for this fire zone consists of an automatic multicycle sprinkler system installed at the ceiling level.
Between column lines H
and F/columns 15/41, within this sprinklered area is installed a grating platform at elevation 248'.
The inspectors expressed a concern that the grated platform could possibly obstruct the water discharge from the ceiling level sprinkler s to the floor below such that the reliability of the sprinkler system to control and suppress on exposure fire on the floor may not be assured.
This condition is not addressed in the licensee's FSAR or Fire Hazards Analysis.
The licensee stated that this configuration would be evaluated as part of the sprinkler system obstruction walkdown.
An in specti on was made of RAB (Fire Area FAABA3) sprinkl er systems, which protect redundant trains of cabling for hot stand-by systems, to determine if their design is adequate with respect to controlling and/or suppressing an exposure fire and maintain one train of hot stand-by systems free from fire damage.
The sprinkler system applications provided for that portion of elevation 236'column lines B to L, columns 23/42)
appear to be inadequate with respect to protecting redundant hot stand-by cabling.
The sprinkler systems associated with these plant areas provide sprinkler coverage at the ceiling level.
Due to the cable tray, conduit, piping, and HVAC duct obstructions in the overhead of these areas, adequate sprinkler water discharge from the ceiling level sprinklers to the floor, to control and suppress an exposure fire on the floor, cannot be assured.
Reactor Auxiliary Building, Elevation 261',
( Fire Areas 1-A-BAL/
FAABB4, 1-A-EPA/FAAEPA, 1-A-EPB/FAAEPB, 1-A-BAL4/FAABA4)
Review of fire area boundary walls column line 43, B/L, and 13/15, column line H indicated numerous unsealed pipe and electrical cable tray penetration openings.
Several fire door installations in these fire walls were incomplete and missing door hardware.
The proposed one-hour partial height fire wall along column line GZ/42 to 43 between redundant MCCs (lA35-SA and 1A35-SB)
was not installe ) s
By letter dated February 13, 1986, the licensee submitted to NRC/NRR additional deviations to the Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9:5-1 to NUREG-0800.
Two deviations,
"C" and
"D", were requested from having to provide one-hour fire rated barriers between redundant equipment and cables on Elevation 261',
Fire Area 1-A-BAL/FAABL4.
Justification for these deviations included installation of suppression systems in the areas in question.
The fire suppression systems associated with these plant areas provide sprinkler coverage at the ceiling level over floor mounted instrument racks Al-R23'nd 1A-R24 and their related cables, (Deviation C) and over floor mounted pull box B1551-SA (Deviation D).
However, due to numerous cable tray, conduit, piping, and HYAC duct obstructions in the overhead of the sprinkled areas, it appears that adequate sprinkler water discharge from the ceiling level sprinklers to the floor does not exist to assure control or suppression of an exposure fire on the floor in the vicinity of the redundant instrument racks or pull boxes.
In addition to the above plant areas, other sprinkler obstructions were identified on Elevation 261'n the areas as noted below:
Plant Area Location Electrical area Corridor area Corridor area Column line 42, column B
Columns 42/43, column lines C to H
Columns 31/33, column lines B to D
Reactor Auxiliary Building, Elevation 286'Fire Areas 1-A-SWGRA/
FAASGA, 1-A-SWGRB/FAASGB, 1-A-CSRA/FAACSA, 1-A-ACP/FAACP, 1-A-CSR-A/FAACSA, 1-A-CSR-B/FAACSB, 1-A-BATA/FAABTA)
Review of the fire area boundary walls on this elevation indicated incomplete and unsealed penetration openings along the fire wall (column line B) in the Switchgear Room and along the wall (column 36) of the Cable Yault.
The fire door installations at column E
and column 18 were incomplete.
The inspectors witnessed a fire hose pull test in the Cable Spreading Rooms in order to determine if a fire hose from a hose station was accessible to all safe shutdown cable tray and equipment areas within the fire area.
The inspectors determine'd that hose coverage was adequate for these safety-related area A 't
+ ! (7)
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 305',
( Fire Areas 12-A-CR/
FCACRM, 12-A-CRC1 FCACRC, 12-A-HVIR/FCAHVI)
This plant elevation consists of the control room complex.
The inspector's review of these areas indicated several incomplete penetration openings in fire barrier boundary walls.
Installation of the fire detection system for the control room areas above the suspended ceiling and in the terminal cabinet room have not been completed.
Summary of Plant Fire Protection Features Malkthrough It appears that the fire barrier enclosure assemblies being installed to protect the safe shutdown cables identified in paragraph S.a of this report have the appropriate fire resistance ratings of either one or three hours.
Upon their completion, the installations will conform to the design limitation and installat,ion criteria as documented by the manufacture's instructions and fire test documentation; except that, the structural supports for the raceways enclosed within the fire barriers have not been provided with protection to provide a fire resistance equivalent to the fire rating of the barriers.
The licensee is preparing an analysis which is to provide justification for the lack of steel protection.
This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-04, Review of Licensee's Analysis for Unprotected Cable Tray/Conduit Supports.
Following completion of the licensee's analysis, this item will be addressed during a
subsequent NRC inspection.
As identified in the above paragraphs there are several areas within the reactor auxiliary building that the sprinkler system coverage will be inadequate with respect to protecting redundant hot standby cabling from an exposure fire which originated on the floor level.
The sprinkler heads associated with these systems are installed at the ceiling level in the reactor auxiliary building.
Due to the cable tray, conduit, piping and HVAC duct obstructions in the overhead of these auxiliary building areas, adequate sprinkler water discharge from a ceiling level sprinkler to the floor and the reliability of these sprinkler systems to control and suppress an exposure fire on the floor cannot be assured.
The licensee has developed Procedure WI-141, As-Constructed Pi e, and Drawing No.
SD/C-A1023, Interference Guide-lines for S rinkler Installation, for use in evaluation of the obstructions to the systems.
Review of the procedure indicated that multiple and overlapping obstructions were not considered within the criteria for sprinkler coverage.
The licensee stated that this concern would be addressed in the system walkdowns.
This will be reviewed during future NRC inspections and has been identified by a previous NRC Inspector Followup Item (400/85-40-11).
The Shearon Harris plant SER dated November 1983, Section 9.5. 1 (page 9-46) states that the NRC staff will require the plant fire protection program and fire protection features including fire-rated cable wraps, fire barrier walls and enclosure boundaries, fire detection and suppression systems and structure steel fireproofing to be operational before initial fuel load.
As identified above, during this inspection many of the fire protection features for safety-related areas were incompl,ete in their installation or were not functional.
As the licensee's proposed fuel load date approaches, completion of these features will be verified by the Region II NRC staff.
This item has been previously identified by Region II as Inspector Followup Item (400/85-40-01).
Within the areas inspected no violati'ons or deviations were identified.
7.
Fire Brigade During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced fire brigade drill.
The drill fire scenario was a fire in the mechanical equipment area of the fuel handling building on elevation 261'
0" adjacent to the railroad/truck bay, In addition, a
truck, identified as the Nuclear Transport vehicle, was placed inside the railroad/truck bay to simulate an exposure from the fire.
Based on the observations of the inspectors, the following inadequate manual firefighting techniques were identified:
Improper hose deployment techniques and hose configurations utilized by th'e fire brigade, Improper search and rescue techniques utilized by the fire brigade, Inadequate communications between fire brigade and team leader with respect to fire ground operations, Improper smoke control and exposure protection measures taken by the fire brigade Support firefighting equipment (i.e.,
spare hose, forcible entry tools, spare air cylinders, life line, etc.)
was not deployed and/or staged at the onset of the fire emergency.
As a result of this drill, the licensee committed to improving the manual fire fighting proficiency of each shift fire brigade by increasing the fire brigade drill frequency.
However, this is identified as Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-05).
Failure of Fire Brigade to Demonstrate Proper Manual Firefighting Techniques During a Fire Drill, and will. be reviewed during a
subsequent NRC inspectio C
8.
Emergency Lighting Emergency lighting was not reviewed during this inspection because the licensee has installed very few of the.required lighting units.
Fixed self-contained eight-hour battery powered lighting units will not be provided for the control'room, auxiliary control and computer rooms where the 125 V Battery D.
C., Emergency Lighting is to be separated so that a
single plant fire will not cause loss of all lighting capability in these areas.
The inspectors verified that those cables for the D.
C.
Emergency Lighting System (CRLT) were included in the safe-shutdown/cable separation analysis; however, these cable routings were not reviewed during this inspection.
Also, the licensee proposes to use security perimeter lighting in outdoor yard areas.
These items are identified as Inspector Followup Item (400/86-26-06),
Review of Emergency Lighting for a Fire Event, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.