IR 05000400/1986003
| ML18019A577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18019A576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-03, 50-400-86-3, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8602180129 | |
| Download: ML18019A577 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/86-03 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
CPPR-158 Facility Name:
Harris
t Inspection Conducted:
January'10, 1986 Inspector:
J. J.
Le Approved by:
F. Jape, Section Chief
ngineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety w~liw
~/~i'74 Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 36 inspector-hours on site in the areas of review of thermal expansion and vibration test procedures, observation of thermal expansion test, pre-service inspection of snubbers, followup of IE Bulletin 80-11, and followup of licensee identified (50.55(e))
items.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"N. J. Chiangi, Manager Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC),
Harris Project
- G. L. Forehand, Site Director, QA/QC Construction
- P.
M. Inman, Design Specialist, Start Up
~P.
S.
Lamb, Senior Engineer, Start Up J. Nevill, Supervisory Engineer, HPES
"R. A. Watson, Vice-President, Harris Nuclear Project L. Williams, Supervisory Engineer, HPES
- J. L. Wills, Plant General Manager Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers and technicians.
'
Other Organization
"K. Fitzgerald, Civil Design Engineer, EBASCO NRC Resident Inspectors
- S.
P. Burri s, Resident Inspector
~G.
F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 10, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio.
Thermal Expansion Test (70370)
The inspector reviewed the thermal expansion test procedures, observed portions of the thermal expansion test, and reviewed test data.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appear in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 3.9.2. 1.
and 14.2. 12. 1.44.
Review of Thermal Expansion Test Procedures The inspector reviewed test procedure number 1-2005-P-07, Piping System Thermal Expansion Test Hot Functional.
This procedure covers testing of safety-related piping systems whose normal operating temperatures exceed 250 F.
The inspector verified test prerequisites were specified, test instructions and objectives were clearly stated, and acceptance criteria were specified.
The test acceptance criteria requires that snubber movement be within design limits, that spring supports remain within the scale travel range, that measured thermal displacements of pipe be within tolerances, and that piping and components not contact any interferences which may restrict piping thermal expansion.
The inspector also examined procedure number 1-2005-P-08, RCS Thermal Expansion and Shim Gap Measurement.
This procedure provides instructions for obtaining measurements of the reactor coolant loop support gaps during plant heat up and after cool down.
The purpose of this procedure is to provide data to size the support shims and to verify the expected thermal displacement behavior of the reactor cool loop piping and major NSSS components.
Observation of Thermal Expansion Test The inspector walked down portions of the reactor coolant, safety injection and main steam systems.
During the walkdown the reactor coolant system was operating at the 450 F temperature plateau.
The inspector verified that temporary hangers had been removed, and that temporary scaffolding and ladders and permanent plant equipment (HVAC ducts, cable tray supports, structural steel supports, etc)
was not restricting piping thermal movements.
Review of Test Results The inspector made a cursory review of piping thermal expansion data for various systems obtained at RCS temperature plateaus of ambient, 250
,
350',
and 450 'F.
The inspector also reviewed the thermal expansion problem description form (Data Sheet 10.2)
and memos from design engineering documenting status of installation of piping systems (test prerequisite).
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identifie Piping Vibrations (70370)
The inspector reviewed test procedure 1-2005-P-05, Piping System Steady State Vibr'ation Test.
This procedure provides instructions to verify the acceptability of the steady state vibration response of safety related piping systems.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appear in FSAR Sections 3.9.2. 1 and 14.2. 12. 1. 12.
During review of the above procedure, the inspector verified that test prerequisites and acceptance criteria were specified, and that test instructions and objectives were clearly stated.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Pre-Service Examination of Snubbers (70370)
The inspector examined the preservice inspection program for snubbers.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appear in FSAR Section 3'.2. 1.3.d.
The licensee's snubber pre-service inspection program requires all snubbers to be examined after installation, but not more than six months prior to the hot functional test.
The preservice inspection program verified that snubber location, orientation, position setting, and configuration were in accordance with design requirements, that snubbers were not damaged, seized, frozen, or jammed.
Prior to snubber installation, all mechanical snubbers were functionally tested by the licensee.
The hydraulic snubbers were installed and serviced by the manufacturer.
The inspector reviewed Maintenance Surveillance Test procedure MST-M0033, Mechanical Snubber Operational Functional Test.
The inspector made a cursory review of the functional test results.
This review disclosed that approximately 200 of the 2000 snubbers tested did not comply with the licensee's functional test criteria.
However, the licensee used a
very conservative acceptance criteria which specified a limit of 1% for drag (fractional resistance)
force for initial snubber installation.
The majority of the test failures only slightly exceeded the drag test acceptance criteria.
The inspector also reviewed snubber installation data and verified that the pre-service inspections had been performed within six months prior to the hot functional test, or in cases where the six months had been exceeded, that the snubbers had been re-examined prior to the start of the hot functional test.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
(Open)
IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design IE Bulletin ( IEB) 80-11 was issued to Harris and to other construction sites for information only.
This Bulletin was received and evaluated by the licensee in order to respond to a
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation information request which was transmitted to all licensees with plants under construction in a letter dated April Zl, 1980.
This information request asked for data on the design and construction of Category I masonry walls in
~
l
plants under construction.
The licensee included this information in Section 3.8.4.8 of the FSAR.
In order to preclude problems of the type addressed by IEB 80-11, the licensee designed all walls in the proximity of safety-related equipment to meet seismic design criteria.
The walls were inspected by QA/QC inspectors in accordance with procedure number TP-44, Inspection of Concrete Masonry Walls.
In addition, attachment of equipment to masonry block walls was approved on a case by case basis only.
-The inspector reviewed architectural drawings showing locations of block-walls and walked down portions of the auxiliary building on elevations 190, 216, 236, 261, 286 and 305 and the containment building on elevations 221, 236, 261, and 286 and verified that all masonry walls were identified on the drawings and that no safety-related equipment was attached to them.
IE Bulletin 80-11 will remain open pending further review by NRC of QA/QC construction records.
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
Licensee Identified Item (10 CFR 50.55(e))
Prior to this inspection the licensee identified the following item under
CFR 50.55(e):
(Closed)
Item (CDR 83152)
Pacific Scientific Mechanical Snubber, Capstan Spring Tang Failure.
This item was reported to NRC Region II on November 8, 1983.
The licensee submitted interim reports for this item in letters dated December 1,
1983, March 30, 1984, September 26, 1984,'nd January 22, 1985, and a final report to NRC in a letter dated March 29, 1985.
In September 1983, Pacific Scientific Company advised the licensee of failure of capstan spring tangs in four PSA-1 snubber s at the Callaway site.
Subsequent review of this problem and testing by Pacific Scientific disclosed that the problem involved PSA-1 and PSA-3 snubber models with certain serial numbers.
The results of the testing and a
summary of the problem is discussed in Pacific Scientific Service Report Number SR 83-01.
In order to resolve this problem, the licensee wrote Deficiency Report DDR 2254.
The disposition of DDR 2254 required the licensee to inspect the snubbers in storage at the Harris site to identify those affected by the problem.
The licensee identified 101 snubbers, six of which were sold to VEPCO.
The licensee returned the 95 affected snubbers to Pacific Scientific for inspection and replacement if necessary of the capstan springs.
The licensee advised VEPCO of the potential problem with the six snubbers in a letter to VEPCO dated March 1, 1985.
This item is closed.