IR 05000400/1986015
| ML18003B205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Ruff A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18003B204 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-15, IEB-82-04, IEB-82-4, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8604220522 | |
| Download: ML18003B205 (14) | |
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.i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
, ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/86-15 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted:
March 3 - 7, 1986 Inspector:
A.
.
Ru Approved by:
.
E.
Con on, Sects e
Plant Systems Section, Engin er n
Branch Division of Reactor Safe License No.:
CPPR-158 Date Signed Date Soigne SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 37 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement items, instrumentation installation and quality records, licensee identified items, and IE bulletins.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. Arnette, Superintendent of Craft - Instrumentation
- R. Bryant, Harris Plant Construction Section/Engineering Supervisor G. Campbell, Harris Plant Operation Section/Maintenance Manager N. Chiangia, Manager Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC), Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
- R. Flodman, Resident Engineer - Instrumentation Construction
- G. Forehand, Director QA/QC K. Hate', Principal QA Engineer T. Holt, Craft Foreman - Instrumentation
- B. Kramer, Specialist - Construction Quality Assurance Surveillance (CQAS)
B. Olliver, Design Supervisor R. Prunty Jr., Harris Plant Engineering-Section, Principal Engineer Instrumentation and Control
- D. Tibbitts, Project Specialist - Regulatory Compliance D. Walker, Technician, CQAS
- M. Wallace, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance D. Whitehead, COAS Supervisor NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Maxwell
- G. Humphrey
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 7, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92701B and 92702B)
a.
(Closed) Violation 400/85-39-01, Failure to Close Air Lines and Sensing Lines After Equipment Removal.
Carolina Power and Light's (CPSL's)
letter of response dated December 13, 1985, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with responsible CPLL representatives.
Training was held
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I to alert responsible personnel to comply with good work practices concerning test equipment and open ended tubing and piping.
Start up personnel were instructed to ensure that work covered by a Construction Work Request and Authorization (CWRSA)
forms be completed and that equipment be returned to and left as designed before closing the CWRSA.
Attendance records for this training were reviewed.
In addition, a
Harris surveillance inspection was performed in this area and corrective action was taken.
The inspector concluded that CPSL had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performed the necessary follow up actions to correct the present conditions, and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 400/85-32-01, Failure to Naintain Status of Equipment.
Carolina Power and Light's (CP&L's) letter of response dated October 11, 1985, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with CPSL representatives and examined the corrective actions as indicated in the letter.
The licensee held training sessions with start-up personnel to stress the importance of insuring that de-energization of electric motor heaters are minimized.
Attendance records for this training were reviewed.
The motor heater switches and/or circuit breakers for safety-related motors were added to the auxiliary operator log and are being checked daily.
A sampling of these logs was reviewed.
A field sighting on a sampling basis verified that motor heater switches were closed.
The inspector concluded that CP8L had determined the full extent of the violation, performed the necessary followup action to correct the present conditions, and developed the necessary corrective action to preclude recurrence similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Instrument Components and Systems
-
Work Observation (52053)
and Record Review (52055)
The inspection selected various safety-related components and mechanical/
electrical interconnecting equipment for inspection of activities relative to the performance of in-process and completed work to verify conformance with the applicable codes and standards required by the licensee's Safety Analysis Report (SAR) commitments, procedures and NRC requirements.
The following describes the areas that were examined for compliance with the aforementioned requirement II ) W t
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In Process Work Covered By:
Drawing IS/1-SP-518, Isometric for Hydrogen Analyzer/Radiation Monitor Solenoid Rack SA TIE-IN.
The tubing installation between valve 2SP-V386-SA-1 and ceiling support C-S-15 was examined.
The tubing was not welded to the valve at time of inspection and the drawing indicated that a coupling was to be installed in the tubing between the valve and the ceiling support.
Since this was in process work and licensee's gC inspection had not been performed, the licensee's representative stated that this discrepancy would have been identified as a result of work completion and inspection, and the drawing would be issued before the completion of the inspection to delete the coupling.
This correction was made before the close of the inspection and is reflected in Revision 1 of the drawing.
(2)
(3)
Work Package and Drawing IS/1-SP-511, Isometric for Radiation Monitor and Hydrogen Analyzer.
The wall support W-S-15 and ceiling support C-S-29 installations inside the containment near azimuth, 215 degrees were examined.
These supports were being installed by craft personnel.
The fit-up, and part of the field welds were in process.
Several of the welds on the support were performed in a fabrication area before the supports were placed in their final location.
Work Package LT-01-RC-0459-IW, Rack C1-46.
The tubing, for transmitter PT-1RC-455-IW, Pressurizer Pressure, was initially connected to the low pressure line of level transmitter LT-lRC-0459IW, Pressurizer level.
The rack tubing was installed by the manufacturer.
This configuration caused inaccurate pressure readings and was identified on Field Change Request (FCR)
I-2994.
The work package was issued to modify the configuration so that the pressure transmitter obtained its signal from the high pressure line.
The inspector observed that the tubing modifi-cation for Rack Cl-46 was in place and that welding for this field change was being performed.
b.
Completed Work Covered by:
Work package and Drawing:
IS/1-RC-482 Isometric for LE-1RC-1310 SAW.
The tubing run, instrument LE-lRC-1310SAW, and ceiling and wall supports C-S-2, W-S-3, W-S-4, W-S-18, W-S-19, W-S-20 were inspected.
This equipment is located inside the containment and bounded by secondary shield wall.
Records for these items were examined.
(2)
Work Package and Drawing:
IS/1-RC-482, Isometric for LE-1RC-1310 SAW.
The tubing run, and wall support W-S-74 and W-S-75 were inspected.
This equipment is located near azimuth 174'egrees between the biological shield wall and secondary shield wall.
Records for these areas were examine *
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Work Package and Drawing:
IS/1-RC-490501, Isometric for LIS-1RC-1310 SAW.
The tubing run for this instrument outside the biological shield wall from penetration M107 to the instrument rack and associated wall and floor supports W-S-3, W-S-4, and F-S-6 were inspected.
Records for these areas were examined.
t Work Package and Drawing; IS/1-CC-79, Isometric for LT-1CC-670-IW.
The component cooling water surge tank level transmitter, LT-lCC-670-IW, instrument loop and records were examined.
Work Package and Or'awing:
IS/1-CS-166, Isometric for LT-ICS-0106-I-W.
The boric acid tank level transmitter, LT-ICS-0106-I-W, instrument loop and records were examined.
The inspection of the above equipment included, where applicable, the verification of the following features:
Instrument location, identification and mounting; (2)
(3)
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Use of correct materials; Torquing of fasteners (selected records);
Physical integrity; Adherence to drawing, specification and procedures
[Work packages for the above were developed in accordance to the licensee procedures; WP-300,
"Instrument Work Package Preparation and Control",
WP-302,
"Installation of Supports for Safety/Seismic Related Instrumention",
WP-304, "Installation of Safety-Related Seismic Process Tubing and Instrumentation";
and WP-305,
"Installation of Tube Track/Impulse Line/Instrument Identification Marker/Tags".];
Inspection were performed, recorded, reviewed and evaluated; Inspection records were complete and satisfied documentations; Installed equipment is adequately protected
[Instrument sensing lines for the most part are run in tube track channels];
Specified instruments, components, and associated items have been used; Nonconforming conditions had been identified and controlled in accordance with approved procedure H *I H
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During the course of the inspection, it was noted that tubing to instrument LT-01CS-0106-I-W was damaged.
This was written up by the licensee on their nonconformance report 86-0167.
Also, many of the nameplates for safety-related components (solenoid valves, level transmitters, pressure transmitters and instrument racks)
were not color coded as specified in the SAR.
The licensee representative stated that a program was underway to make nameplate colors agree with safety train and/or instrument protection channel color codes.
This program is being handled by the Harris Plant Operation Support (HPOS)
Maintenance Section in accordance with Plant Program Procedure (PLP)
610,
"Equipment Identification and Numbering System".
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin (IEB) (92703B)
(Closed)
IEB No. 82-04, Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays in use in Class 1E Safety Systems.
The inspector reviewed CPSL's letters of July 13, November 30, 1984 and April 1, 1985 and has determined that the requested actions of the bulletin have been acceptably addressed.
In the letter of July 13, 1984, CPSL indicated that four HFA relays were located in the diesel generator control panels and that their investigation was still in process.
The four relays in the D.G. control panel would be replaced before fuel load.
In the letter of July CPSL stated that the
relays in the D.
G. control panels were GE HFA-151 Century Series which did not fall under IEB 84-02 and that their investigation was still in process.
The letter of July 13 stated that CPKL's investigation was complete and that they had no relays in safety systems that fall under the area of IEB 84-02.
This item was discussed with responsible CPSL representatives and a field sighting confirmed that relays in the DG control panels are GE-type KFA-151 Century series.
As indicated in CPSL's letter of July 1984, these relays are not in the scope of IEB 84-02.
This bulletin for Shearon Harris is considered closed.
7.
Licensee Identified Items (LLI) 10 CFR 50.55(e)
a ~
(Closed)
LLI No.
139, Westinghouse 7300 Process Equipment NTC Card Problem.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on June 30, 1983 and submitted a final report on Aprl 24, 1985.
In addition Westing-
.house reported this as a
CFR 21 item to the NRC in Washington, D.
C.
CP8L's final report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
This item involved the Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection System NTC Card Relay.
During seismic testing of the Temperature Channel Test (NTC) Card, contact bounce was experenced in the mercury relay utilized by this card.
A discussion with on site Westinghouse personnel and CPSL representatives revealed that
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Westinghouse issued field change notice CHELM-10648.
This FCN modified the card so that it added two additional reed relays in parallel to the mercury relays.
During normal operation, the majority of the Resistant Temperature Detection (RTD) signal will continue to pass through the mercury wetted relay contacts since they have a lower resistance than the reed relay contacts.
However, if bounce is experienced on the mercury relay contacts during a seismic event, the RTD signal will pass through the reed relay contacts and allow for acceptable operation.
This FCN was accomplished on Shearon Harris equipment under their FCR I-2394Rl.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LLI No.
218, Main Transfer Panels
- Series (LSR) Latching Switch Relays.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on September 10, 1985 and submitted a final report on December 20, 1985.
The final report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
This deficiency involved the latching switch relays (31 LSR Series)
that could affect electrical transfer from Main Control Room (MCR) to Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP) and from ACP to MCR.
Binding in the mechanism located in the front portion of the switch was determined to be the failure mechanism.
This deficiency was tracked by the licensee on their NCR 85-1888.
CP8L completely flushed and relubricated the mechanical internals of the front portion of the relay.
A licensee representative stated that after this action the relay was cycled approximately 1000 times without failure or binding.
This test cycling is considered to exceed the number of cycles which the switch could see during the life of the plant by a factor greater than five.
No failures have been observed in the field installed equipment after this action.
The inspector concluded that CP8L has determined the failure mechanism and has performed the necessary follow up actions to correct this deficiency.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LLI No. 217, Instrument Racks - Incorrect Bolting Material The licensee reported this item to Region II on September 9,
1985 as a
potential
CFR 50.55(e)
item.
This item was tracked by the licensee on their NCR 85-1841 and involved bolting material that didn't conform to material recommended for seismic duty by the instrument supplier.
CPSL performed tensile and hardness test on a sample of the material.
A discussion with responsible CPSL representatives and an explanation of their evaluation based on the test data indicated that the bolting material supplied in the Mercury Company Instrument Racks furnished for Shearon Harris are seismically adequate and that this item is not reportable per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector agrees with CPSL's positio ~
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