IR 05000400/1986016
| ML18003B199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1986 |
| From: | Burris S, Frederickson P, Humphrey P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18003B198 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.4, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.G.1, TASK-2.K.3.03, TASK-TM 50-400-86-16, NUDOCS 8604210083 | |
| Download: ML18003B199 (19) | |
Text
~p,g RE0II (4 Mp0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/86-16 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License Noe I CPPR-158 Inspectors:
6~G F. Maxwell Facility Name:
Harris Unit
Inspection Conducted:
F uary 20 - March 20, 1986 0/I~/8'~
Date Signed e/(v/ac Date Signed i/w/r~
ate Signed PQJ>
.
Hump ey Date Signed Approved by:
+SH P.
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reac'tor Projects u
'i, SUMMARY
)
'cope:
This routine, an'nounced'nspe'ction involved 240 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Egfor'cement Matters, Status of Three Mile Island Action Items, Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description, Preoperational Test Program Implementation and Testing of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees N. J. Chiangi, Manager, QA/QC Harris Plant J.
M. Collins, Manager, Operations G.
L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations C.
S. Hinnant, Manager, Start-up L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support C.
L. McKenzie, Acting Director, Operations QA/QC G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion M. Thompson, Jr.,
Manager, Engineering Management D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Maintenance E. J.
Wagner, Manager, Engineering C.
C. Wagoner, Project General Manager, Construction R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J.
L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
'echnicians, operators, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 21, 1986, with the Plant General Manager, Operations.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters and Inspector Follow-up Items (92701, 92702)
a.
(Cl osed)
Inspector Fol low-up Item 400/85-30-02
"Electrical Nonconformance Trend Analysi s".
The July 1985 rejecti on rate for electrical raceway inspections indicated that the rate of rejection for first inspections was increasing.
The rates of rejection were shown to be 14, 25 and 30 percent for cable trays, conduit and electrical boxes, respectively.
The unacceptable rejection rate was identified by CP&L management through their quality trend tracking system.
Since July, CP&L management has placed more emphasis on the electrical workers and craft supervision to produce higher quality work, prior to the work
'eceiving its first inspection.
The inspectors evaluated the Nonconformance Reports and Trend Reports from July 1985 through January 1986.
These reports show a significant reduction in the inspection rejection rate
~
For example, the rejection rate for electrical boxes was 30 percent during July 1985, and the
January 1986 rejection rate for electrical boxes was less than
percent.
During various plant tours the inspectors observed electrical
.
design personnel who were located strategically throughout the electrical work areas within the power block.
The designers were authorizing, as appropriate, the necessary changes to solve problems which were being encountered by electrical craft personnel.
'They also provided guidance to electrical-supervisors where further. engineering direction was needed.
The licensee has provided strong management support in resolving the problems which have been identified in the electrical area.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-52-01
"Construction Fire Brigade Drill".
A construction fire brigade drill was held on January 9,
1986.
The inspectors observed the drill, and noted that it took 15 minutes for the fire brigade to arrive at the drill site.
The responsible CP&L management informed the inspectors that the drill was a
subordinate training exercise to measure a recently appointed officer's ability to direct the brigade.
Although the drill was intended to show effective response, it had not been sequenced properly with the control room to allow a more expeditious di spatchment of the fire brigade to the drill site.
On February 27, 1986 the construction fire br igade conducted an unannounced fire drill.
The site alarm was sounded, and within two minutes the fire brigade arrived at the drill site and fully donned their firefighting equipment.
Within five minutes the would-be fire was extinguished.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-24-04
"Missing 0-Rings from Reactor Coolant Pumps".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's documen-tation of 0-ring installation in each of the three reactor coolant pumps and reviewed the correspondence with Westinghouse to assure that corrective measures have been taken.
Both the 0-ring installation and corrective measures are acceptable to insure that associated vendor manuals and documentation represent the as-built status.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 400/85-24-02
"Environmental Qualifications of Tremco 440 Tape".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's environmental qualification packages for Tremco 440 tape and found this material meets the minimum required acceptance criteria for the application in question.
EBASCO documentation states that Tremco 440 tape is qualified under elevated temperatures, moisture and radiation conditions.
This
'tem is closed.
(Closed) Violation 400/85-24-01 "Failure to Conduct Preoperational Test
'in Accordance with Procedural Requirements".
CP&L's letter of response dated July 26, 1985 and the licensee's corrective actions in response.
to this violation were reviewed by the resident inspectors during this
reporting period.
The licensee has conducted a review to insure that its procedures do not cause equipment damage due to inadequate procedural problems.
Start-up personnel have received further instructions in the necessary precautions to be exercised during the conduct of preoperational testing.
Additionally, the licensee has provided a shift test engineer to coordinate the activities of the various different system test engineer s and operations personnel.
The inspectors reviewed CPKL's correspondence concerning this item and observed that CPS L has completed its proposed corrective action.
This item is closed.
~
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/84-27-02
"Review the Final Disposition and Closeout of NCR 83-111".
The inspectors reviewed NCR 83-111 which identified a discrepancy between the installation require-ments of drawing 2167-G-3071, Rev.
2 and the vendor drawing 1364-43092, Rev. 7.
The vendor drawing specified a hardened steel washer was to be installed between the nut and panel.
The licensee, installed the panel using a double nut arrangement and has since documented this condition, in NCR 83-111.
In concurrence with the vendor, the site engineering staff has evaluated this condition to be satisfactory and has changed the vendor drawing to reflect these changes.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the response to a concern where the top nut on this double nut arrangement did'ot have full thread nut engagement.
The licensee has replaced the top nut, with a half height nut to meet the requirements for complete thread nut engagement.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-49-03
"Operability of SI Valves".
The inspectors evaluated the installed condition of the safety injection valves which were listed in IE report 400/85-49 'he valve position indicator has been replaced for valve 2SI-V544SB-1
~
The handwheels for valves 4SI-V332-1 and 4SI-V210-1 have been cleared from the interference caused by adjacent pipe hangers.
The instrumentation air valve for valve 2SI-V530SB-1 has been relocated to allow its handwheel to be operated without interference with an adjacent structural support.
This item is closed.
h.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/83-25-19
"Provision for a More Comprehensive g-List".
CP&L has expanded the g-list given in the FSAR.
The expanded g-list was developed in accordance with CPS L Engineering Instruction 3. 16.
The list has been given a drawing control number, 2165-S-2241, and is available through the site document control system.
This additional control will assure that the g-list is maintained in conjunction with other design data and is continually upgraded to maintain its status current.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 400/85-30-01
"Inadequate Inspection of HVAC Duct".
The inspectors held discussions with the responsible quality control inspectors and examined the corrective actions as stated in the CPAL letter of response dated September 29, 1985.
The inspectors concluded that CPKL had determined the full extent of the violation, performed the necessary survey and follow-up action item to correct the referenced conditions, and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of this and similar circumstances.
This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-49-05
"Transformer Operability Problems".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of actions to correct a
problem identified during the conduct of test procedure 1-5145-P-Ol, "Start-up, Unit Auxiliary, and Main Transformer Preoperational Test (SAT and UAT)".
The problem, as identified in IE Report 400/85-49, was the licensee's attempt to charge and pick up the unit auxiliary and main transformers under a
reverse current flow condition thus causing larger than normal current surges and voltage drops.
The licensee committed to change its operational procedure and training program to implement steps to prevent recurrence of this problem.
The inspectors reviewed operations procedure OP-156.02, Rev.
1, Section 8,
"Back-feeding
.
Through Main Transformer" and operations lesson plan OSP-LP-3.0,
"Backfeeding Electrical Distribution System via Hain Transformers".
The licensee has changed both of these operations documents to include cautionary statements associated with performing this evolution.
This item is closed.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 400/82-24-01
"Installation of Nonsafety/
Nonseismic Support Electrical Conduit in Vicinity of Safety-Related Equipment".
On March 12, 1986 the inspectors identified an area in the fuel handling building where nonsafety-related/nonsei smically-installed conduit was located in the vicinity of class lE raceways.
The two conduits measured three inches in diameter and spanned a distance of about 150 feet along the east wall of the fuel handling building, at about elevation 305'.
The inspectors were informed that CP5L engineer-ing will 'ensure that the above specific conduits are evaluated when the fuel handling building is walked down.
Thus, these conduit installations are identified as additional examples of Unresolved Item 400/82-24-01; This item remains open.
(Closed)
Violation 400/85-49-01
"Failure to Incorporate Changes to System Drawings".
The inspectors reviewed CPLL's letter of response of January 4,
1986 citing their corrective action to resolve the issues identified in this violation.
This review included a review of changes to the affected documents and interviews of select plant personnel.
The licensee took immediate corrective steps, as follows, to revise the identified drawing and to prevent a recurrence of thi s problem.
Field Change Request P-4854 was issued to correct the missing drawing details.
A flow diagram cross reference check was performed to verify that no other drawings existed with the same problem.
Of the 105 drawings reviewed, one drawing was found to have a
flow flag (identification between two separate drawings)
which should have been deleted.
The licensee issued Design Change Authorization M-523 to correct this deficiency.
The licensee has reviewed its procedures for the periodic review of changes to its drawings.
The licensee is evaluating to see if these cycles of review need to be updated to expedite the implemen-tation of essential drawing These measures will be reviewed during future inspections.
This item i s cl osed.
(Closed)
Inspector Fol low-up Item 400/85-49-04 "As-Built Condition and Operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System".
The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to the concerns identified during the auxiliary feedwater system walkdown.
Resolution to the open items are as follows:
Identification tags for'alves lAF-146 and lAF-113 were replaced and are clearly identifiable.
Pipe strap sensors for the auxiliary feedwater system have been identified correctly on the drawings.
Electrical motors leads for the valve 1AF-19 have been removed and there is not an interference problem.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-52-04
"Pressurizer Pressure Indicators".
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's and EBASCO's evaluation of this problem.
Interviews with CP&L and EBASCO personnel show that the problem occurred when Westinghouse changed pressure transmitter manufacturers from Varitrack brand to a Barton type.
The reason for the licensee-identified discrepancy involves the internal operational differences between a Varitrack instrument and the Barton instrument.
The Barton instrument requires that the,low pressure and high pressure lines be connected in reverse of the Varitrack arrangement.
Although this should have been identified by the design review group, it was not and therefore during testing the charging level of the pressurizer affected the pressure sensing device.
Thi s i tem was identified by the start-up group under contr ol of a
Nonconformance Report 86-0043.
The licensee and EBASCO staffs identi-fied that the incor ect connection had been used when the instruments had been changed out.
Additionally, CP5L and EBASCO performed a
100%
review of sensing lines inside containment to verify that this was an isolated case.
EBASCO performed an analytical analysis to provide information as to the severity of safety significance had this item gone undetected and uncorrected.
The analysis shows that under no circumstances would this uncorrected item have exceeded the allowed pressure indication tolerances (.3% actual error, 1% allowed).
EBASCO design management has also reviewed other selected design reviews of the specific individuals involved and cannot find any similar irregularities.
The licensee has issued Field Change Request I-2994 to correct the affected drawings and to rework pressure sensing lines to give the correct sensing point for the installed level and pressure transmitters.
This item is close T,
4.
Status of Three Mile Island Action Items (25401B)
'a
~
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-23 "II.K.3.3, Reporting of S/V and R/V Failures and Challenges".
CP8 L committed to document all challenges to safety or relief valves in the plant annual report, as identified in Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2.C.
The failure of these valves is to be reported in accordance with the plant LER Procedure AP-615, Attachment 4 "Technical Specification Special Reports".
The.inspectors evaluated the addition of this requirement to the LER Procedure and find it acceptable.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-03
"I.C.4, Control Room Access".
The CPEL procedure which controls access to the control room, Procedure OMM-001, Section 5. 1. 11, was reviewed and found to be acceptable.
The inspectors have evaluated the implementation of the procedure, during various tours of the control room, and noted no significant problems.
C.
In each instance the inspectors have found these controls to be acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-20 "II.G.1, Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment".
This item includes power supplies for pressurizer relief valves, block valves and pressurizer level indicators.
The inspectors observed the installed condition of these valves and level indicators and found them to 'be powered as described in the FSAR, Section 8.3. 1.2.
The testing of these.valves and indicators has been satisfactorily completed.
Portions of these tests were witnessed by the inspectors during hot functional testing.
This item is closed.
(Open)
Inspector Follow-up Item.400/85-16-17 "II.F.1 Subparts (4) and (5) Containment Pressure and Water Level Monitors".
As discussed in the SER Section 7.5.2.2, NRR has reviewed and accepted the design of the Harris containment pressure and water level monitors.
The inspectors evaluated the condition of the hardware associated with this TMI Action Item.
The following were noted during the evaluation:
the level transmitters and hardware were installed; the pressure transmitters were mounted and the displays and indicator lamps have been installed.
However, the electrical cables were not installed for the level or pressure transmitters.
This item will remain open pending satisfactory completion and testing of the containment water level and pressure monitoring system.
5.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description (37301)
a
During the week of March 3, 1986 the inspectors, accompanied by the system start-up engineer, completed a walkdown of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR).
The following items were observed and assessed during the tour to assure compliance with requirements:
The inspectors observed 19 valves in the system that were not properly identified with tags.
In addition, the "A" RHR pump and temperature element TE-604B were not tagge *.9
Temporary vibration testing devices, which were installed for Hot Functional Testing, remained clamped on piping'he inspectors observed instrument tubing loose or crimped on five of the RHR air operated valves.
Seven of the Limitorque valve covers within the system had fastener screws which were either broken, the wrong type, or missing'he inspectors observed flex conduit which was damaged, or had the seal broken, at three motor operated valves.
One pipe hanger was found missing at elevation 190'n tIle reactor auxiliary building.
The inspectors observed interference with valve handles on two of the system valves.
The inspectors observed vent plugs missing on two instruments.
The inspectors found that, in general, electrical conduit fittings and junction box covers were not installed.
Teflon tape was used on the two vent plugs on flow transmitter FT-605A.
Upon completion of the walkdown the inspectors were shown a
CP&L system punch list for the RHR system.
The list identified all of the above and other concerns which will require correction prior to allowing the RHR system to be declared operational.
However, the concern involving the teflon tape had not been previously identified by CP5L as a punch list item.
Pending resolution of the installed teflon tape, this will be identieid as an inspector follow-up item "teflon tape in the RHR system",
400/86-16-01.
The inspectors accompanied by the cognizant start-up engineer, completed a walkdown inspection of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS)
to review items not inspected during the walkdown referenced in IE Report 50-400/85-43.
The system was evaluated as to its completion status and the physical installation.
Drawings CAR-2165-G-805 and CAR-2165-G-806 were referenced for requirements.
The following were observed as a result of the inspection:
Skid mounted equipment (each of the three charging safety injection pump stations with associated mounted oi 1 pumps, instruments and valves)
was not properly identified with operator identification tags.
Grounding wire was missing on the flex conduit on the "C" injection pump motor and on valve 2CS-V609SA-1.
Operation identification tags were missing on 12 of the system valve '\\
S
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Pressure indicators on several air-operated valves were found to be damaged.
A temporary hanger 'was installed to support valve 2CS-VI56SA-1 during hot functional testing.
Upon completion of the walkdown the inspectors were shown a
CP&L system punch list for the CVCS system.
The list identified all of the above and other concerns which will require correction prior to allowing the CVCS system to be declared operational.
C.
The inspectors, accompanied by the system start-up engineers, completed a walkdown of the containment valve isolation system (CVIS) during the week of March 10, 1986.
The following items were observed and assessed by the inspectors during the tour to..assure compliance with requirements:
Prope~ identification tags were missing on 47 containment isolation valves; There were 14 discrepancies found between the FSAR sketches-and the as-built conditions; Seven isolation valves with conduit damaged or connections at the valves loose; Four'ontainment isolation valves with conduit plugs missing on the operators; Ten test connection caps were loose or missing; Valve rising stem indicator housings were missing on six valves; Insulation was not completed on the main steam system; Cover bolts were mi ssing or loose on
containment isolation valves.
One cover was found to be off.
Upon completion of the walkdown the inspectors were shown a
CPKL system punch list for the CVIS system.
The list identified all of the above and other concerns which will require correction prior to allowing the CVIS system to be declared operational, No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (71302)
a
~
The inspectors conducted routine tours of the facility to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The tours included a
general observation of plant areas to determine if fire hazards existed; observation of activities in progress (e.g.,
maintenance, preoperational testing, etc.) to determine if they were being conducted in accordance, with approved procedures; and observation of activities
which could damage installed equipment or instrumentation.
The tours also included evaluation of system cleanness controls and a review of logs maintained by test groups to identify problems that may be appro-priate for additional follow-up.
The inspectors evaluated and witnessed portions of.the rotopeening process.
This
"special process" was conducted to form a thin compressive stress layer on the inside surface of the steam generator tubes.
This stress is formed to inhibit the initiation of inter-granular stress corrosion cracking.
Aotopeening is performed using a
short bonded fabric attached to a rotating shaft.
The fabric impacts the steam generator tube surface causing a thin work-hardened compressive layer.
The inspectors observed Westinghouse personnel performing the insertion and operation of the rotopeening equipment.
Westinghouse personnel on station were questioned as to the number of tubes which have been completed and the average length of time to perform each tube pass.
The inspectors noted that Westinghouse provided an on station quality control person to aid.in the rotopeening process.
The inspectors reviewed the Westinghouse procedure which was being used to insure that the process was being performed in accordance with approved guidelines and criteria.
In addition, the inspectors interviewed Westinghouse supervision and quality control personnel to insure that the individuals were aware of the quality control requirements associated with this process.
The rotopeening process is scheduled for completion during the month of March 1986.
During the week of March 10, 1986, Westinghouse representatives from the Pensacola, Florida guality Assurance office started the post hot functional inspections of the reactor vessel internals.
The inspectors observed that the Westinghouse gA inspection included a variety of checkpoints, such as:
Visual examination of welds; Verification that clamps were not damaged; Verification that locking devices were not damaged; Visual inspection of vessel nozzles for any evidence of surface damage; Taking measurements for possible wear; Verification that thermocouple tips did not move freely.
The Westinghouse representatives identified a small number of concerns which Westinghouse deemed as having no safety significance.
These concerns have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Westinghouse gA representativ '
d.
During the inspection period the licensee performed containment building Structural Integrity Test (SIT)
and the Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT).
On February 21, 1986, the primary containment was pressurized to 51.75 psig, this pressure was held for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The containment was sub-sequently depressurized to a secondary plateau of 34 psig, thi s pressure was held for 24-hours.
On February 23, 1986, the primary containment was repressurized to 41 (+2-0) psig, and the-licensee commenced the stabilization period for the ILRT.
After the stabilization criterion for a, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test were met, the ILRT proceeded.
After satisfying all test criteria the ILRT was terminated.
The ILRT was followed by a
superimposed leak rate verification test.
Upon successful completion of the verification test the containment building was depressurized.
A post ILRT containment inspection revealed only the minor equipment damage expected during the test.
During the conduct of the test there were not significant test exceptions written and all available data indicated that the SIT and ILRT had been completed successfully.
The inspectors assisted regional inspection personnel in witnessing and reviewing selected portions to verify that test personnel were trained adequately; an approved test procedure was available for use; test equipment was calibrated and installed correctly, and test data was collected by the appropriate personnel.
Preliminary review of the test results indicates that all cr iteria have been met satisfactorily, No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
7.
Testing of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (70370C)
The inspectors toured areas of the reactor auxiliary and containment buildings.
Five struts, 12 spring can supports and 15 mechanical snubbers were observed.
Visual examination were conducted to check for deterioration and physical damage of the mechanical snubbers.
Visual examinations were also conducted to check proper installation of base support plates, fasteners, locknuts, brackets and clamps for fixed pipe supports.
No violations or deviations were identifie I E