IR 05000400/1986010

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Insp Rept 50-400/86-10 on 860210-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Procedure Review & Preoperational & Integrated Hot Functional Test Witnessing
ML18019A674
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/12/1986
From: Jape F, Macdonald J, Taylor P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18019A672 List:
References
50-400-86-10, NUDOCS 8603240192
Download: ML18019A674 (10)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:

50-400/86-10 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:

50-400 Facility Name:

Harris

Inspection Conducted:

February 10-14, 1986 License No.:

CPPR-158 Inspectors:

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ac ona Approved by:

F. Jape, Section ie Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

$ r A Date Signe SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 66 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of preoperational test procedure review preoperational and Integrat-ed hot functional test witnessing.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project
  • J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager
  • J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager
  • N. J. Chiangi, Manager Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)
  • C. L. McKenzie, Acting Director QA/QC Operations
  • D. L. Tibbitts, Acting Director Regulatory Compliance
  • H. W. Bowles, Director Operations Nuclear Support
  • J. L. Dority, Startup Supervisor Electrical Systems
  • G. W. Traylor, Startup Supervisor Nuclear Steam Supply System
  • L. J.

Woods, Startup Supervisor Radwaste/HVAC Systems

  • M. G. Wallace, Specialist Regulatory Compliance R. Duncan, Startup Engineer R. Stir ling, Startup Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • G. F. Maxwell
  • S.

P. Burris

  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 14, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dis-senting comments were received from the licensee.

The following new item was identified.

3.

Inspector Followup Item 400/86-10-01, Clarify Procedure, Provide Additional Training to Operators Concerning the Meaning and Use of AOP-004, Alternate Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire or Control Room Inaccessibility - Paragraph 6.b.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio II t

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4.

Unresol ved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5.

. Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70300, 70341, 70352)

The inspectors reviewed the following preoperational test procedures:

1-5095-P-01, Revision 0, 1A-SA Diesel Generator Performance Preop 1-5095-P-03, Revision 0, Diesel Generator lA-SA, Emergency Response, Load Sequencer Loading and Endurance Run 1-5095-P-05, Revision 0, lA-SA D/G Mechanical Preop 1-6013-P-03, Revision 0, Cold Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Panel Test These procedures were reviewed to verify that the technical content was consistent with FSAR Chapter 14.2, Preoperational Test Program, applicable FSAR Section, and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68, Revision 2.

In addition, the diesel generator test procedures were reviewed to verify that the commit-ments of RG 1. 108, Rev.

1, Periodic Testing of D/G Units and RG 1.9, Rev.

Selection, Design and gualification of D/G Units were addressed in the test procedures.

The test procedures were also reviewed to verify that the requirements of Harris Plant Startup Manual have been incorporated into the test procedures regarding the preparation, review, management approval, procedure format and the required prerequisites, precautions, initial conditions, and acceptance criteria.

The inspectors met with licensee management to review concerns regarding the test objective and the acceptance criteria of procedure 1-6013-P-03.

The inspectors compared this test procedure with RG 1.68.2, Revision 1, Demon-strate Remote Shutdown Capability since this RG was listed as a reference.

In addition, FSAR Test Summary 14.2.12.2.20, Remote Shutdown Test provided additional details regarding test objectives, prerequisites, test method and acceptance criteria for satisfying RG 1.68.2.

The review of these documents indicated that the cold shutdown demonstration as provided in the test procedure differed from the RG and FSAR test summary.

The test procedure specified that the RCS temperature be lowered 50'F from no-load temperature at the remote auxiliary control panel (ACP) then transfer plant control back to the main control room.

RCS temperature and pressure is then lowered from the main control room to 350+ 5'F and 363+

15 psig which are the conditions for placing the residual heat removal ( RHR) system in service.

RG 1.68.2, Section 4a requires that both RCS temperature and pressure be lowered from outside the main control room (i.e.

ACP) sufficiently to permit the opera-tion of the RHR.

Acceptance Criteria d.2. of FSAR Test Summary 14.2.12.2.20 specified that the RCS be cooled from outside the main control room begin-

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The licensee stated that the cold shutdown demonstration conducted in Test Procedure 1-6013-P-03 was not intended to meet the RG and FSAR test summary nor would they take credit for the cold shutdown demonstration during Hot Functional testing.

The licensee described the test as a

CPL operational/

functional test to permit operating personnel to train on the ACP.

The licensee stated that they intend to meet RG 1.68.2 and FSAR test summary 14.2.12.2.20, cold shutdown demonstration during power accession testing which is the FSAR committed time period for accomplishing the test.

Based on this understanding, the inspectors had no further questions.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Preoperational and Integrated Hot Functional Test Witnessing (70312, 70314, 70452)

a.

Integrated Hot Functional Test Witnessing - 1-2005-P-01 Revision 1, Hot Functional Testing (HFT)

During this inspection, the licensee had initiated the cooldown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) for the purpose of testing and observing the integrated operation of plant systems during the cooldown phase.

The inspectors observed control room activities during the cooldown to verify that the controlling procedure prerequisites and initial condi-tions were being met at the various cooldown plateaus.

The inspectors noted that operating personnel were using approved general plant procedures and operating procedures for operating and aligning plant systems.

b.

Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test to verify that the test was being conducted in accordance with an approved procedure, test data were being recorded properly, revisions and procedure changes were current and equipment or component problems, when applicable, were being handled in accordance with licensee's administrative controls.

1-6013-P-03, Revision 0, Cold Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Panel Test.

The purpose of this test was to demonstrate the ability to achieve cold shutdown from hot standby using the controls and instrumen-tation located outside the control room at the auxiliary control panel, which is located in the reactor auxiliary building.

The inspectors witnessed Section 6. 1 through 6.9 of the test procedure which required the transfer of control from the main control room to the ACP and then lower RCS temperature approximately 50'F.

Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) 004, Revision 1, Alternate Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire or Control Room Inaccessibility, Section 3.2, Step 1 was used to make the transfer to the ACP.

The operators then used the main steam power operated relief valve to lower RCS temperature.

Plant control was then returned to the main control room in accordance with AOP-004, Section 3.2, Step 76.

RCS temperature and pressure were

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subsequent1y decreased to approximately 350'F and 475 psig from the main control room.

Prior to resuming Test Procedure 1-6013-P-,03 to demonstrate placing the RHR system into service from the ACP, a proce-dure change was issued to incorporate steps to demonstrate that RCS pressure can be lowered from the ACP.

RCS pressure was then decreased from approximate1y 475 psig to approximately 363 psig using pressurizer spray controls from the ACP.

The operators then experienced a problem in using the designated steps of AOP-004, Section 3.2 for placing the RHR system into service from the ACP.

The test procedure specified that only steps designated

"Safe Shutdown" in Section 3.2 of AOP-004 be used.

This section left out other steps, for example, the warm up of the RHR system on miniflow recirculation prior to use in order to avoid potential thermal shock of the RHR system with relatively hot reactor coolant.

A procedure change was issued to incorporate the necessary steps from AOP-004, Section 3.2 to place RHR system in a cooldown alignment because the inspectors had brought to managements attention a concern that plant operators may not clearly understand how to perform AOP-004, Section 3.2 and may not understand the intent of "Safe Shutdown" steps in the operating procedure.

The licensee indicated that this area would be reviewed and appropriate clarification made to the procedure.

Additional training would be provided to plant operators on the use of AOP-004.

This matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 400/86-10-01; Clarify Procedure, Provide Additional Training to Operators Concerning the Meaning and Use of AOP-004, Alternate Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire a Control Room Inaccessible.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Plant Tour The inspectors toured the control room, 'reactor auxiliary building, contain-ment, containment annulus and outside plant areas to observe work activities in progress, housekeeping and tag controls on equipment.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie I I

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