IR 05000354/1989017

Insp Rept 50-354/89-17 on 890926-1106.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance Testing,Emergency Preparedness,Security, Engineering/Technical Support & LERs

ML19354D555
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/21/1989
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19354D554	List: IR 05000354/1989017 ML19354D553
References
50-354-89-17, NUDOCS 8912280014
Download: ML19354D555 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-354/89-17 License NPF-57 Licensee:

Public Servico Electric.and Gas Company P. O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility:

Hope Creek Generating Station Dates:

September 26, 1989 - November 6, 1989 Inspectors:~

Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector Thomas P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector David K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector James R. Stair, Resident Inspector Approved:

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cN P._D. Swetland, Chief, Projects Section 2B

'Dat6 Inspection Summary:

Inspection 50-354/89-17 on September 26, 1989 - November 6, 1989 (-

Areas Inspected:

Resident safety inspection of the following areas:

operations, radiological controls, maintenance & surveillance testing, emergency preparedness, security, engineering / technical support, safety assessment / quality verification, and licensee event reports.

Results: The inspectors did not identify any violations. There were three PSE&G identified, non-cited violations two of which involved lack of attention to. detail by operations personnel. An Executive Summary follows.

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8912280014 891221 PDR ADOCK 05000354 Q

PDC

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hope Creek Inspection Report 50-354/89-17 September 26, 1989 to November 6, 1989 Operations: Two licensee identified violations involved missed Technical Specification requirements due to lack of attention to detail-by operators.

Radiological Control: There was effective effort by radiological control personnel throughout the outage.

Maintenance / Surveillance: Several minor equipment deficiencies were identified which were promptly corrected when brought to the attention of plant personnel.

Security:

Routine inspection did not identify any noteworthy findings.

Engineering / Technical Support: A core spray pump design change package violated a minor aspect of ASME Section XI.

Safety Assessment / Quality Verification:

Two incidents occurred due to attention

- to detail errors in the operations department.

This continuing trend may warrant further management attention.

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DETAILS 1.0' SUMMARY OC OPERATIONS The unit began the report period shutdown in operational condition five conducting the station's second refueling outage. The unit remained shutdown throughout this inspection period.

2.0 OPERATIONS (60710,71707,93702)

2.1 Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that the licensed activities were conducted safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements.

Public Service Electric

.and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct obser-vation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operation, and review of facility records.

These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71707.

The inspectors performed 191 hours0.00221 days <br />0.0531 hours <br />3.158069e-4 weeks <br />7.26755e-5 months <br /> of normal and back shift. inspection during this inspection period.

2.? Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events A.

On October 3, an equipment operator missed two Technical Specifi-cations (TSs) required log readings associated with the inoperable north plant vent (NPV) monitoring system.

When the NPV was taken out of-service for outage work, TS required compensatory measures were implemented involving radiological grab samplos and system flow readings.

The system flow compensatory action was understood by the control room personnel but was not communicated to the equipment operator who was required to take various fan flow readings.

These missed four hour fan flow readings had minimal safety significance because the information is utilized to estimate the volume released through the NPV in the event of an accident. This information could have been reconstructed if needed.

The root cause of this incident was a failure of control room personnel to communicate the additional log taking requirements to the equipment operator.

Corrective action included reviewing the event with all shift personnel and counseling the individuals involved.

The inspector concluded that the missed compensatory log reading represented a licensee identified violation and would not be cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement Policy were met.

(NCV 354/89-17-01) (LER 89-18)

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On October 16, the B channel reactor protection system (RPS)

electric protection assemblies (EPA's) opened causing a B channel half scram and containment isolation signal which isolated the B RHR system which had been operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

This event had minimal safety significance because the reactor had been shutdown for 30 days and the shutdown cooling isolation was not required in this operational condition. During the 5-10 minuted periods that shutdown cooling was isolated there was little or no rist in reactor coolant temperature.

Troubleshooting efforts even-tually determined that the EPA trips were due to an undervoltage condition on the output of the RPS motor generators (MG).

The low voltage output condition caused normal plant load variation to reduce voltage below the EPA trip setpoint.

The root cause was determined to be the resetting of the MG following bus outages utilizing the local panel volt meter instead of more accurate test equipment. A contributing cause was deficient procedures which specified a tolerance which, when combined with a MG set voltage output (calibrated using the local power meter), resulted in insufficient margin to the EPA undervoltage trip setpoint.

Corrective action included prompt restoration when shutdown cooling isolated and

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revising preventive and corrective maintenance procedures to require MG volt setting utilizing digital voltmeters. Additionally, the RPS

MG sets output voltage will be monitored and trended quarterly.

C.

On November 4, a procedural &ficiency initiatect a reactor scram s;< nal when the dryve'l pre:,spe was ircreased in prepa?at!on fer an integrau.d har test (ILRT) of vie Fiury containment. There was no rod notion est.o ietec with the scram signal beta Jse all rods were l

already ff ly inserted.

1he IU;T procedt.re only jumpered one of two outputs associated witn the drywell pressure transmitter. All other I

aspects of the screen signal sere in accordance with design.

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ILRT procedure was immedi6toly revised and the test succast-Tully l

completed

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D.

On November 5, the licensce determined tiett t. jaint c.hemistry and operations department oversight resulted in a Technical Specification

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(TS) required conductivity sample not being taken.

The operations department failed to identify that a Limiting Condition for Operation might not be satisfied when the normal chemistry sample line was isolated for an integrated leak rate test (ILRT) lineup.

The chemistry department failed to notify operations personnel that they did not obtain a TS required sample although alternate sample paths were available. Chemistry supervision failed to identify the sample l

problem during routine oversight and log review. The compensatory measure required a ;rab sample to be taken every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the

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continuous conductivity monitoring system was not operating. The j

missed sample was identified and accomplished approximately 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br /> i

after the normal sample line was isolated.

That sample indicated the i

conductivity measured 0.68 micro seimen/cm which is significantly i

below the TS limit of 10.0 micro seimen/cm.

Corrective actions l

included operations department will now enter the chemistry action I

statement if any one of four continuous monitoring paths are isolated.

and chemistry will promptly notify supervisory personnel if TS

required samples cannot be obtained.

The inspector concluded that the missed sample represented a licensee identified violation and i

would not be cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of

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the Enforcement Policy were met.

(NCV 354/89-17-02)

3.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)

i 3.1 Inspection Activities PSE&G's implementation of the radiological protection program wcs verified j

on a periodic basis.

These inspection activities were conducted in

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l accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71707, i

3.2 jupectionFindingsandReviewofEvents Efforts by radiological protection perscnnel and ALARA consideration have betn evident throughout the outage, There appeared to be adequate control

of job related radiation dose an<' proper action taken in responte to

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changing rt.alcicgicA conditions or unexpMtedly high overall job doses.

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Personnel were observed to be properly wearing dosimetry snd correctly

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utilizing portal monitors and friskers.

4.0 MAINTENANLE/ SURVEILLANCE TESTING (62703,61726)

4.1 41ntenance lyJLection Activity

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The inspectves observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related

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equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in decurdsnca

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with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and apprcpriate

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industry codes and standards. These inspections were conducted in i

accordance with NRC' inspection procedure 62703,

Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed by the inspector:

Work Order P_rocedure Description 891004076 MD-GP.ZZ-31 Adjustment of D service water limitorque valve operator l-

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Work Order Procedure Description

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900208021 MD-CM.FC-001 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling i

i steam turbine overhaul 890721112 DCP 4HC - 0204 Install testing jacks

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external to control room panel

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F 10-C-611 i

F i-890729056 MD-CM.BF-002 Rebuild control rod drive r

7771 i

890908005 MD-PM.KJ-003 10 month main generator-i internal inspection 890608111 MD-CM.KJ-001 Diesel engine overhaul:

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replace head / exhaust valves

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gaskets 880328132 MD-GP.ZZ-003

. Repack HCU 26-35 drain

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valve 107

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DCP 4HC-0195 fwplace inboard and outboard containment isolation valves - crack monitoring system sample

line from B recirculation loor.

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s The maintenance ' activities insNeted were of fective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance program.

4.2 SurveillanceTestingInspectionfetivity The inspectors perfortred detailed tech ii.:a1 precedure reviews, witnessed in progress surveillance testing, and reviewod completed surveillar.ce

packages. The intpreters, verified thbt the surveillance tetts were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulations, These inspection activities wuee conducted in accordence with NRC inspection procedure 61726.

The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

- OP-ST.KJ-004 Monthly emergency diesel generator (DG004) operability test OP-ST.KJ-006 Integrated B emergency diesel generator

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18 month surveillance test

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OP-IS.BH-001 Inservice test on a standby liquid control pump

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MD-ST.KJ-001 B diesel generator 18 month surveillance and

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preventive maintenance OP-ST.KJ-005 Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator 1AG-400

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Test - 18 Months IC-FT.5M-009 Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-off System division I

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channel A reactor vessel level functional test SWRI-NDT-600-41 Manual ultrasonic examination of ferritic pressure

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piping welds SWRI-NOT-600-31 Manual ultrasonic examination of austenitic

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pressure piping welds M9-ITP-06C Hydraulic and mechanical snubber functional bench

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testing M9-I AP -04H Tension and compression drag test

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The surveillance testing activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance testing program.

4,3 in3pection Fincinos

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The inspletor observed an adjustment of +.he limiteroue i,porator for the D service water strainer P+ckwash valve following valve repieco-

.went. The technicians were knowledgeable and well trained concerning limitorque valve operatinns. A disconnected ground strap was promptly corrected when the inspector brought it to the technicimC s attentior..

B.

The inspector observed brush insatetton ord rotor / stator air gap measurements oc the B diesel cenerator. While observing this surveillance test the inspecter noted a badly crimped cooitng water connection to the outboerd generetet b?aring, The crimped connection was pt onptly replaced when orought to the system engineer's attention.

This connection had been previously replaced and verified during the diesel outage and apparently, subsequently damaged.

C.

While observing the D diesel generator overhaul the inspector noted that the generator work was complete but that the generator space heaters had been left deenergized. The heaters were promptly energized when this discrepancy was brought to the attention of the system engineer.

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5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707)

There were no noteworthy findings in this area during this inspection period.

j 6.0 SECURITY (71707,62703)

6.1 Inspection Activity i

PSE&G's compliance with the security program was verified on a periodic

basis, including adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundaries.

The inspector reviewed design change package (DCP)

15C-2156, " Modification of Security Fence Routing" and observed portions of DCP implementation.

6.2 Inspection Findings q

The activities observed related to the security fence modification were i

effective with respect to meeting the objectives of the security plan and procedures and the design change implementation process.

7.0 ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT (92700)

On November 4, the licensee identified a nonconformance with the ASME Code in that the f ull scale range of the core spray pump flow instruments

were more than three times the single pump flow rate.

This criterion

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ensures sufficient accuracy for measuring a paramet.er with E given

ictM t ument pgs.

The core spray pump flow instruments utilized for p m

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perfomance monitoring have a scale of 0 to 10,000 gpm. The baselire iated i

flow of each core spray pump is 3200 gpm.

Thus, to comply with ASMii Cuoe IWP-4120 the maximum rarge allowed by ASME cmc IWP-4120 woulc be 9600 gpm.

Since Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5 mandates adherence with A5ME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, thfs conoition constitutes

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a TS violation. All core sprey pumps wree declared 'noperable and the quarterly intervice tests (IST) were completed with por table teu eavir> ment which mot Section XI requirements.

This subsequent testing determined that all core spray pumps met IST requirements.

The core spray pumps were not required to be operable when the problem vias identified.

The *oot cause of this occurrence was an inadequate design change package (DCP)

which was implemented to shift from dual pump testing to single pump testing.

For corrective action all IST related DCPs will be reviewed by the IST engineer prior to issuance and an ongoing effort to review all systems for compliance with Section XI will be implemented.

The inspector concluded that the failure to meet ASME Section XI requirements had minimal safety significance and represented a licensee identified violation which would not be cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the

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Enforcement Policy were met.

(NCV 354-89-17-03) (LER 89-19)

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8.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION During this assessment period two events involving lack of operator attention to detail were noted.

Similar attention to detail errors were noted in the preceding inspection reports 50-354/09-16 and 89-14. The current events included an operations department communication breakdown which resulted in missed Technical Specification required leg readings, and a failure to identify that a Limiting Condition for Operation was not met when.the normal conductivity sample line was isolated. These violations were not cited because of their minimal safety significance and the dif-i fering circumstances of the events. Collectively (with events from previous inspection reports) these everds may indicate the need for renewed manage-ment involvement in the attentioil to detail area.

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recent corrective action and other efforts in this area will be judged based on the future reduction of attention to detail errors.

9.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (92700)

PSE&G submitted the following event reports and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and adequacy of the evaluation.

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asterisked (*) items identify reports which involve licensee identified Technical Specification violations which are not being cited based upon meeting the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C.

Montnly Operating Report for September 1989

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1ER 89-0 9 Reactor Sc am Caused by Failure of Soldered Scram Valve Pi'ct Air Line; Discusstd in Sectier, 2.2. A of Inspection Report 59"354/89-16.

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LER 89-018 Technical Specification Required Readings Not

Taken due to Miscommunication of Requirements; Disensed in Sectien 2 2. A of this f astertioa report.

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LER 89-019 Technical Specificatior Violation - Use of

Inadequate Instrumentation on Cote Spray Pumps for ASME

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Station XI Testing Discussed in Sectior, 7 of this inspection report.

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10.0 EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)

The inspectors met with Mr. Joe Hagan and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activities.

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Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined l

that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 l

restrictions.

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