IR 05000338/2016003

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000338/2016003 and 05000339/2016003

ML16312A095
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	11/07/2016
From:	Masters A NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2016003
Download: ML16312A095 (25)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 7, 2016

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2016003 AND 05000339/2016003

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 19, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Bischof and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

IR 05000338/2016003 and 05000339/2016003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2016003 and 05000339/2016003 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: July 1, 2016 through September 30, 2016 Inspectors: G. Croon, Senior Resident Inspector G. Eatmon, Resident Inspector B. Collins, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

Approved by: Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000338/2016003, 05000339/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; North Anna Power

Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and one inspector from the regional office. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP).

On September 10, 2016, the unit was taken offline for a planned refueling outage. The unit remained offline for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On July 29, 2016, the unit was taken offline to repair a leak in an RCP seal return pipe. Unit 2 restarted on August 2, returned to RTP on August 3, and operated at RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed one site specific weather related inspection due to anticipated adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed licensee adverse weather response procedures, including 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Conditions, Revision 64, and site preparations including work activities that could impact the overall maintenance risk assessments.

• Outside site preparation, including inspection of drainage on August 31, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted two equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify the operability of a redundant or backup system/train or a remaining operable system/train with a high risk significance for the current plant configuration (considering out-of-service, inoperable, or degraded condition); or a risk-significant system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage, maintenance, modification or testing; or a risk-significant single-train system. The inspector conducted the reviews to ensure that critical components were properly aligned, and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room chillers when A SW loop inoperable

• Unit 2 Fuel oil transfer train B for 2J EDG when train A inoperable

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted focused tours of the four areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Revision 10, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 8, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Revision 5.

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to:

(1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;

(2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and,

(3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Auxiliary building, 274 elevation with active welding and grinding were underway

• Emergency switchgear, Unit 1 & Unit 2

• Normal switchgear, Unit 1 & Unit 2

• Service water valve house, Unit 1 & Unit 2

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities From September 19 - 23, 2016, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk-significant piping and component boundaries, and containment boundaries in Unit 1.

The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed the following non-destructive examinations (NDEs) mandated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code of Record: 2004 Edition with no Addenda) to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements and, if any indications or defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement. The inspectors also reviewed the qualifications of the NDE technicians performing the examinations to determine whether they were current and in compliance with the ASME Code requirements.

• Ultrasonic Examination (UT), residual heat removal system, 10 pipe-to-elbow weld 10-RH-12-35, ASME Code Class 1 (observed)

• Visual Examination (VE), reactor pressure vessel upper head, ASME Code Class 1 (observed)

• Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT), safety injection system, 12 pipe-to-pipe weld 12-SI-68-28H, ASME Code Class 1 (reviewed)

The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed the following welding activities, qualification records, and associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code,Section XI and Section IX requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.

• Replacement of charging valve 01-CH-MOV-1267A, 6 pipe-to-valve and valve-to-pipe welds, ASME Code Class 2 (reviewed)

During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service; therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

PWR Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspectors observed portions of the bare metal visual examination of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations and reviewed NDE reports for penetration numbers 53, 60, and 65 to determine if the examinations were performed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the vendor inspection report to determine if the required examination coverage was achieved and if limitations were recorded in accordance with the licensee procedures.

The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 1 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these inspection procedure attributes.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The inspectors reviewed the licensees boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to determine if the activities were implemented in accordance with the commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants, and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite records review of procedures and the results of the licensees containment walkdown inspections performed during the current refueling outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner; conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensees BACC program requirements; and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensees BACC and corrective action programs.

The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations, completed for evidence of boric acid leakage, to determine if the licensee properly applied applicable corrosion rates to the affected components; and properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure boundary integrity in accordance with the licensee procedures.

CR573530, Boric Acid Evaluation for 1-RH-HSS-1701 CR577527, Boric Acid Evaluation for 1-FC-P-1B CR1020547, Boric Acid Evaluation for 01-SI-MOV-1836 The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

• CR562764, Boric Acid Leak from 1-SI-61

• CR1036581, Boric Acid Leak from 1-FC-P-1B

• CR1039171, Boric Acid Leak from 1-BR-P-10B

• CR1021933, Boric Acid Leak from 1-CH-78 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that for the Unit 1 steam generator tubes, no inspection activities were required this refueling outage, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code, the licensees Technical Specifications, and Nuclear Energy Institute 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related issues entered into the corrective action program to determine if the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant.

The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a licensed operator performance on September 23, 2016, during a simulator scenario. The scenario required classifications and notifications that were counted for NRC performance indicator input.

The inspectors observed the following elements of crew performance in terms of communications:

(1) ability to take timely and proper actions;

(2) prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms;

(3) correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures;

(4) timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and

(5) oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Control Room Operator Performance Observations

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted three observations of licensed reactor operators actions and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. As part of this assessment, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance:

(1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications;

(2) control board/in-plant component manipulations;

(3) use and interpretation of plant instruments, indicators and alarms;

(4) documentation of activities;

(5) management and supervision of activities; and,

(6) communication between crew members.

The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance during the following events:

• July 30, 2016 during increased Unit 2 unidentified leakage and shutdown decision

• August 2, 2016 during Unit 2 start up from forced outage

• September 10, 2016 during Unit 1 shutdown for planned refuel outage.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

For the three equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 6. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• WO59103005449, Replace 115/230V 250VDC power supply for N35.

• WO59102886942, 2-CH-FL-216, U2 charging pump recirc flow indicator

• WO59103000200, 1-SW-101A, repair of SW reservoir level indication

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;

(2) management of risk;

(3) appropriate and necessary steps taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities upon identification of an unforeseen situation; and,

(4) adequate identification and resolution of maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems. The inspectors reviewed these maintenance activities to verify that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify that deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.

• 1-PT-33.13, Reactor Trip System Channel Operational Test for reactor Coolant Pump Buses 1A, 1B, and 1C Undervoltage, Revision 1

• 1-PT-70.1, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Verification using Trevitest, Revision

• 1-PT-71.1Q, 1-FW-P-2, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Test, Revision 67

• 1-PT-71.4, AFW Pump Time Response and Logic test Including SW Pump and SBO Diesel Autostart Tests on U1 Loss of Reserve Power, Revision 40

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability and Functionality Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations (OD) and functionality assessments, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate:

(1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;

(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;

(3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensatory measures;

(4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and

(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the SDP. The inspectors review included a verification that ODs were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 13. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• CR1041935, 1-QS-P-1A Motor station lube manual incorrect

• CR1042846, Unit 2 H2 gas analyzer found low and out of tolerance

• CA3036198, EDG fuel oil line excavation

• CA3038151, 1H EDG coolant biological activity

• CR1042100, Primary metrological tower out of service

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

.1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the one completed temporary plant modification design change packages (DCO) listed below. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the installation, discussed the desired improvement with system engineers, and reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59, Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Removal and Reinstallation of Service Water Manway Missile Protection

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two completed permanent plant modification design change packages (DCO) listed below. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the installation, discussed the desired improvement with system engineers, and reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59, Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Engineering technical evaluation for IAV53 relay tolerance acceptance criteria revision

• Gear ratio change from 2-QS-MOV-202A/B, NA-16-00021

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, listed below, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;

(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;

(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;

(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and,

(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Revision 14.

• 1-FW-P-1B 3 year PM

• 2-EG-LS-2JA, fuel oil level switch for 2J EDG day tank

• 1/2 SW-PPA-1A2/2A2, SW spray array cleaning

• 2-BC-TIC-202, EHC TCV repair

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Outage Activities

.1 Unit 2 Forced Outage for RCP Seal Return Line Leak

a. Inspection Scope

Unit 2 was shutdown on July 29, 2016, due to a leak in an RCP seal return line. The forced outage lasted until August 3, 2016. During the forced outage period, the inspectors used NRC inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, to observe portions of the maintenance and startup activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with outage risk assessments and applicable TS. The inspectors reviewed licensee actions for the outage activities listed below.

• Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage safety plan and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.

• Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met.

• Decay heat removal processes to verify proper operation and that steam generators, when relied upon, were a viable means of backup cooling.

• Containment closure activities, including a focused containment walkdown prior to startup, to verify that there was no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left which could affect the performance of the containment sump.

• Heat up and startup activities to verify TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment penetrations and containment isolation valves.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unit 1 Refueling Outage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Review (OSR) and contingency plans for the Unit 2 refueling outage, which began September 10, 2016, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors also confirmed that the licensee had mitigation/response strategies in place for any losses of key safety functions. Using NRC inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, the inspectors observed portions of the refueling, and maintenance activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable TS. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

• Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the OSR for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.

• Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing.

• Installation and configuration of Reactor Coolant System instrumentation for system pressure, level, and temperature to provide accurate indication, and an accounting for instrument error.

• Implementation of licensee procedures for foreign material exclusion.

• Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities.

• Controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.

• Reactor inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.

• Controls over activities and SSCs which could affect reactivity.

• Fatigue management in accordance with meeting the rule requirements for each process.

• Refueling activities, including fuel handling operations (inspection, sipping, reconstitution and insertion), and fuel assemblies tracking, including new fuel, from core offload through core reload.

• Refueling activities, including fuel handling operations (inspection, sipping, reconstitution and insertion), and fuel assemblies tracking, including new fuel, from core offload through core reload.

• Controls over containment penetrations, per TS, such that containment closure could be achieved at all times.

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities.

• Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisities, walkdown of the containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system strainers, and the review of reactor physics testing.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the six surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Test:

• 1-PT-15.1, Boric Acid Transfer Pump (1-CH-P-2A) Test, Revision 36 RCS Leakage Detection

• 2-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage, Revision 28 Containment Isolation Valve:

• 1-PT-57.5A, Leak Rate Test of 1-SI-P-1A and Associated Piping and Inservice Inspection for 1-SI-6, Revision 25 Other Surveillance Tests:

• 1-PT-58.3, Refueling Water Storage Tank - Boron Concentration, Revision 19

• 2-PT-36.17A, Channel Calibration for Station Blackout - Unit 2, Train A Bus 1E and Bus 1F, Revision 6

• 2-PT-77.11A, Control Room Chiller (2-HV-E-4A) Pump and Valve test, Revision 35

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the three Unit 1 and 2 PIs listed below to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the NRC for the period July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• MSPI Heat Removal (2 units)

• Safety System Functional Failures (2 units)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

• Reactor Coolant System Activity (2 units)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by NRC inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.

.2 Annual Sample: Review of CR 1045457, Boric acid discovered on 2-CH-MOV-2289B

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for CR1045457 to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in licensee procedure, PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program, Revision 25 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 19, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Bischof and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning

G. Bischof, Site Vice President

B. Gaspar, Manager, Nuclear Site Services

R. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services

E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering

L. Hilbert, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor, Licensing

F. Mladen, Plant Manager

J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures

J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness

J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations

W. Standley, Manager, Nuclear Training

D. Taylor, Manager, Station Licensing

M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None